

THE VICTORS IN WORLD
WAR I AND FINLAND

The Victors in World War I and Finland

Finland's Relations with the British,
French and United States Governments
in 1918—1919

By

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The Victors in World War I
and Finland

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ENSIMMÄISEN MAAILMANSODAN VOITTAJAT JA SUOMI
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To the memory of my father



TURUN SANOMALEHTI JA KIRJAPAINO OSAKEYHTIÖ
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Preface

This work examines Finland's relations with the British, United States and French Governments during the closing stage of World War I and the period immediately after the war.

Chief attention is directed to the shaping of diplomatic relations, the procurement of relief supplies for Finland, the resolution of the problem of obtaining recognition for Finnish independence and the issues of the Aland Islands (Ahvenanmaa) and East Karelia. The matter of intervention in Russia is also dealt with insofar as it relates to military operations planned by the so-called White Russians in the Finnish sector and the possible participation of Finland in such action as well as to the relations between the Western Powers and Finland in this connection.

The questions involved had by and large emerged in the field of international politics before hostilities had ended, but the radical change in the world situation in the months of October and November 1918 gave them a different position and significance in many respects within the framework of relations between the Western Allies and Finland. The scope of the present work does not reach beyond the concluding stage of the Paris Peace Conference, which produced the Treaty of Versailles. The issues of the Åland Islands and East Karelia remained, it is true, to be definitively settled. But it has been deemed advisable to separate the early phase of the League of Nations from the subject matter here treated. By that time the position of Finland as an independent State had become substantially stabilized and, following the great global crisis, the international situation was showing signs of clearing up and international relations of returning to normal.

From the standpoint of progress in carrying out this work, particularly fruitful was the research the author had the opportunity of doing in England in the spring of 1959 and in the United States in the fall of the same year. From the standpoint of source material, it was of utmost importance that I was able to go through the archives of the State Department in Washington for the years 1918 and 1919. These records shed revealing light on the politics of not only the United States but the Western Powers in general and on the conduct of the Paris Peace Conference. In this connection I wish to express my appreciation of the helpfulness of Dr. E. Taylor Parks, head of the State Department's Historical Division.

Valuable source material relating to special questions was provided, moreover, by the records concerning the operations of General N. Yudenitch in 1918 and 1919, which are preserved in the Archives of Russian and East European History and Culture, Columbia University, New York. I am indebted to Professor Philip E. Mosely for his service in obtaining a researcher's permit for me and to the keeper of the archives, Mr. Lev. F. Magerovsky, for his generous assistance while I was at work there.

My trips abroad further gave me a chance to do research at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., the British Museum in London and other libraries, the collections of which naturally contain an abundance of literature relating to my field of study that is unobtainable in my own country. In addition, their collections of old newspapers enabled me to attempt a systematic survey of the treatment of the Finnish question during the critical period under examination here by a politically significant part of the press in the Allied countries.

I also wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the many research historians with whom I was in contact during my sojourns abroad. Two of them — Professor Samuel Morison, of Harvard University, and Professor Edward Hallett Carr, of Cambridge University — stand in special relation to my research project, for they participated in both the preparations for and the actual work of the Paris Peace Conference, the former as an expert on the U.S. Peace Commission and the latter as an assistant with the British Delegation; and, among other things, both had been entrusted with the task of studying the Finnish question.

In addition to those already mentioned, I have been in contact with the following persons in seeking and clarifying material likely to shed light upon background questions pertaining to my study: Professor Hugh Seton-Watson of the University of London, Professor W. N. Medlicott and Dr. R. Hatton, London School of Economics; Professor Fritz T. Epstein and Dr. John Davidson, Library of Congress; Professor Hans Kohn, City College of New York; and Professor Oscar Halecki, Columbia University. To all of them I acknowledge my appreciation.

Following what has now become a valuable tradition, I was able to draw on the wise counsel of Professor Arvi Korhonen during my research work in my efforts to solve the problems involved and uncover source material. I wish to thank him for this and for having read my whole manuscript.

I am indebted to Professor Sven Lindman for his comments. Professor Carl Erik Knoellinger was kind enough to check certain portions of my manuscript that lay in his special field of study, and so was Väinö Luoma, Ph. Lic.

Mauno Koski, Ph. Lic., has earned my gratitude by editing the manuscript as a Finnish expert and Matti Nieminen, archives keeper, by lending assistance in many ways in preparing this work for publication.

Finally, I am pleased to acknowledge the receipt of a research grant from the Emil Aaltonen Foundation, an ASLA grant for study in the United States and a modest docent's stipend, which was still made available to me while I was engaged in producing this book.

Turku, Finland

November 11, 1960

J. P.

P.S. The original manuscript in Finnish was completed by the end of August, 1960. During the printing stage a couple of major insertions of new material were made in addition to certain minor changes and revisions.

It was possible to take notice of some works that appeared after the dating of the manuscript.

In preparing the English version, the author added a couple of paragraphs to the first chapter in order to acquaint the non-Finnish reader with the historical background to the period under examination, and he also deleted parts of the text here and there that could be of little or no interest to readers not living in Finland.

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Chapter I

The Development of Finnish Independence Before the Armistice

Finland's declaration of independence on December 6, 1917, confronted her with a set of political problems that could be divided along geographical lines into four principal parts: there were the problems involved in working out diplomatic relations with Russia, Germany and the Western Allies, in addition to which there were issues to be settled between this country and Sweden. From the standpoint of historical experience, the least familiar of the problems were those bound up with the establishment of relations with the Allied Powers of the West. In the past Finland's contact with these Powers had been mostly in the form of trade and, to some extent, of cultural exchange.

Before the outbreak of World War I, it had been England among the countries of the West that had had the liveliest commercial dealings with Finland. Interest of a political nature in Finland had been evinced, too, in Great Britain as well as France ever since the beginning of the century, but it had been confined to small academic and liberal circles. Finland had become known in these circles as an autonomous country with a constitution of her own though ruled since 1809 by the Czar of Russia. She was known to have her own Parliament, which was empowered to pass laws and to levy taxes, her own administrative system, her own army and police, and her own monetary and postal systems. Finland, it was understood, moreover, belonged in the cultural sphere of the West!

When in 1899 Russia began systematically to destroy the special status of Finland, the Finnish people won widespread sympathy abroad in their struggle to defend their constitutional rights. The Finnish question began to attract the attention of the press in various countries, and this led to some extent to a gradual increase in public awareness of the existence of a remote, hyperborean country called Finland. This was true with respect to England and to France. But in the United States, which had pursued a foreign policy of splendid isolation in line with the Monroe Doctrine, Finland remained a hazy geographical entity, the country of origin of a minor group of immigrants and little or nothing else, even to leading political circles.

During the final stages of World War I, the attention of the major belligerent powers had begun to be drawn to the far northern sphere of

Petsamo—Murmansk—East Karelia—Archangel, where the interests of the Western Powers, Germany, the Bolsheviks and the White Russians collided and which later was destined to become a key theater of interventionist operations. The emergence of this new focal point of power politics was bound to enhance the importance of adjacent Finland and to arouse interest in the »lines» of the independent politics being formulated by this country — particularly in view of the fact that, in addition to everything else, she was aspiring to take a hand herself in the goings-on in the area to gain her own objectives. Consequently, Finland attracted notice for reasons beyond her having joined the family of independent states. Finland's emergence in the international political arena from the limbo of geographical oddities was thus quite abrupt and rapid. She had become an active force with a mind and a will of her own. She had begun to take a stand toward issues of international consequence and foreign governments were obliged to sit up and take notice.

And, among other things, Finland's relations with Great Britain, the United States and France were beginning to take shape.

The ratification of the declaration of independence by the Finnish Parliament on December 6, 1917, gave rise to the problem of obtaining for the country the diplomatic recognition of foreign governments. And, for the first time, Finland was officially committed to defining her foreign policy.¹ However much the Government headed by Prime Minister P. E. Svinhufvud might have been swayed by sentiment favoring reliance upon German support, it was decided to pursue an impartial line in this matter by stressing Finland's neutrality toward the belligerent powers. This line was revealed in the way certain details were handled in requests to foreign governments for diplomatic recognition. The notes concerning the matter addressed to Germany, on the one hand, and to France, Great Britain and the United States, on the other, were essentially the same in content — in fact, almost to the letter identical with the ones addressed to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. A similarity of procedure also characterized the diplomatic approaches to the various governments, all of which were contacted through either their consular representatives in Helsinki or their missions in Petrograd. Indirect emphasis on neutrality was also given when in contacting Germany, which had no corresponding representation, the Finnish Government bypassed Edv. Hjelt, a prominent leader of the Activists, an illegal patriotic organization that favored a pro-German line of policy, as an envoy and instead requested Sweden to act as intermediary.

As strong as the pro-German leanings of certain members of the Finnish Government were, it was realized that Great Britain, France and the United States represented a force in international affairs that could not easily be ignored. It was, to be sure, only in very limited Finnish circles that any sympathy was felt toward the Western Powers, allied as they had been with Russia in the war, but no intelligent Finn was inclined to underestimate the power and influence of Germany's enemies. It was seen that their fighting capacity and operational capabilities were upheld by a supporting area of vast geographic extent, which included the incalculable resources of the British Empire and the United States. With the cessation of Eastern trade, the opening up of Western markets was important to Finland's welfare from the standpoint of both the procurement of industrial raw materials and food supplies and of finding new buyers for Finnish products.

Even so, Finnish ruling circles gradually began to steer a political course leading to closer relations with Germany. It was their belief that Germany would actively work toward realizing Finnish independence, obtaining recognition from Russia and bringing about a decision to remove the Russian troops from Finland. Germany's Eastern policy, however, took the line of military-political realities, which thrust the Finnish question to one side. The German objective, bypassing ideological considerations, was to conclude peace with the Soviet Government and thereby make it possible to shift troops to the Western front, where hostilities were expected to build up to the climactic stage.

In connection with the drafting of the program of diplomatic recognition, the Finnish Government had at first dismissed the idea of approaching the Soviet Government, whose recognition it considered to be of secondary importance. The Finnish way of thinking was that the according of recognition by other countries would create a pressure of international opinion likely to bend the Russians over to a conciliatory frame of mind — or, then, if Russia insisted upon maintaining a negative position, the general political climate abroad would deprive it of strength. This »general line» of Finnish policy had to be revised, however, in the middle of December, and the prod came in the form of comments and suggestions primarily from the direction of Germany, that is, the power on whose support the policy-makers of Finland mostly wanted to depend. It was emphasized in Berlin that contacting the Soviet Government was in the interest of Finland and Germany and that recognition of Finnish independence by the Soviet Government would have to be a pre-condition of a corresponding move by the German Government.

It was on December 31, 1917, that the Soviet of People's Commissars voted in favor of recognizing Finnish independence, and on January 4, 1918, that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified this resolution. Thus was created the situation that not only Germany but also Sweden had required as the condition of their own decision to accord Finland diplomatic recognition. Sweden acted on January 4, after having been appealed to in the matter on numerous occasions, the last time by Finnish Government envoys who turned straight to the Swedish King. Not having allowed the ratification of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Russia to delay her decision any longer, Sweden thus became the first foreign power — though actually only after Russia — to recognize Finland. Berlin waited until word had come that the Soviet recognition had been ratified. This shows how delicately Germany sought to handle its relations with Russia. As a result of Germany's attitude of waiting, France, a country on the opposite side in the war, came across with its diplomatic recognition of Finland sooner, or on the same day as Sweden. This seems to have taken the Germans by surprise: upon announcing their recognition of Finnish independence on January 6, they explained that they had actually made their decision two days earlier.

France's action was exceptional in that Russian recognition had not been imposed as a condition for its own. The French Government also tried to influence the other Western Powers to follow its example. The favorable stand toward Finland taken by France was apparently due not only to idealistic French sympathy for the cause of liberty but also to the hope that if the Allies in general gave their recognition of Finnish independence it might foster pro-Entente sentiment in this country.

The British Government, which drew the Americans to concur, regarded the French point of view as based upon dubious wishful thinking. Finland was considered in the light of the war within the framework of the Russian question and against the background of the problems of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. »Independent Finland» was a fresh problem for the British and their American allies, one that was overshadowed by the larger issues just mentioned. It was in the main merely a geomilitary »concept» situated in the middle of a war between the big powers, where the achievement of victory was the central objective of all activity. Therein lies the explanation to the response given by British Foreign Secretary A. Balfour on January 18, 1918, to the Finnish delegation that had arrived in London to ask for diplomatic recognition. Persistently striving to patch up the alliance between Russia and the Western Powers that had remained in effect till the fall of Kerenski's provisional government, Lord Balfour ex-

plained that the British Government was »tied» to whatever decision the coming Russian National Assembly might reach with respect to the Finnish question. The British stand toward recognition of Finnish independence remained noncommittal even though the Bolsheviks broke up the National Assembly right after the Foreign Secretary had made the foregoing explanation. The British — and the Americans, too — decided to wait for the Council of People's Commissars to be replaced by some new organ of government that would be interested in restoring the old alliance and waging war on the common enemy again. The situation prevailing in Russia was observed to be chaotic, and the policy adopted — notably by the United States — was marked by a desire to avoid premature decisions, which might subsequently have to be modified.

The political orientation adopted by Finland was one indication of the way the northeastern sector of the European theater of hostilities appeared to the Western Allies from the standpoint of their struggle against Germany. And it served as the point of departure for Allied policy toward Finnish political aspirations. The circumstance that among the states that accorded Finland diplomatic recognition at the beginning of January 1918 both sides in the war were represented, as well as neutral Sweden and no less an interested party than Russia itself, could be offered as evidence of a neutral line.

During the month of January, however, the Finnish Government showed signs of straying off the course of strict neutrality. As internal tensions mounted in Finland, the Government tended to lean toward Germany as the only great power likely to support the national existence of this country with its military resources. The change of course could also be attributed to an increase in the influence of the Activist movement. Neutralist sentiment grew weaker in proportion to the increase in the threat of civil war. Furthermore, the fact that the British and American Governments had refrained from acknowledging Finnish independence carried the indirect effect of causing the widening pro-German attitude of the Finnish people to develop into a political orientation.

The outbreak of the Civil War on January 28, 1918, also meant changes in the international position of Finland. During the spring months the Russian troops that had been stationed in this country — the total number of which had decreased between the previous September and the end of January from some 100,000 to roughly 40,000 — were destined to be evacuated to the last man, thus eliminating a factor that had tended to limit Finnish sovereignty. The German intervention in the Finnish strife at about the same time led in the course of developments to advancing Ger-

many's military lines to closer striking distance of inflammable Murmansk, where a British expeditionary force had landed in November of the previous year for the purpose of opening up a »new Eastern front».

The true aims of the German expeditionary force commanded by General Rüdiger von der Goltz, which had been sent to Finland ostensibly to support the army of White Guards, were, on the one hand, to maintain threatening pressure against Petrograd as a means of keeping alive the Soviet Government's »love of peace», and, on the other hand, to foil the Allied strategy in northern Russia and, ultimately, to utilize the Arctic coast for the launching of naval operations and the establishment of submarine bases. In the total German military program, Finland was thus intended to serve as a geographically separate sector of operations, in connection with which it was aimed to establish a preparatory position for future action in the Northeast.

The Western Powers took the view that Finland had forfeited her claims to neutrality on account of the foregoing developments and were therefore unwilling to improve her status by recognizing her political independence. The so-called treaty of peace concluded by the legal Finnish Government with Germany on March 7 included a clause worthy of note from the standpoint of Finland's future orientation in foreign affairs: in it Germany undertook to see to it that Finland's independence would become universally recognized, and this, it was believed, would be done at the latest when the peace conference was convened. This reflected the belief rooted in the minds of the pro-German leaders of the winning side in the Finnish Civil War that the world conflict would end in victory for the Central Powers. And it was such thinking that nourished the hope that the area of independent Finland could be enlarged, with the support of Germany, by the annexation of East Karelia.

German policy, for its part, called for strengthening relations with Russia, where the Bolsheviks represented the only political party which had acknowledged the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, with its great territorial cessions, comprising the Ukraine and the Baltic countries. It appeared to be in the German interest, furthermore, to try to bring Finland and Russia closer together toward achieving joint action against the British in the region of Murmansk.

In its striving to establish peaceful relations with Russia, Germany wanted to curb the Finns' expansionist demands, and it even sought to exert its influence toward having the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus shifted in favor of the Russians. The conflict between the objectives of Finnish and German policy became evident in the negotiations held be-

tween Finnish and Russian delegates toward the end of the summer in Berlin. There the Finns found themselves lacking the political support for their territorial demands that had been anticipated.

Finland's pro-German orientation in the spring and summer of 1918 was indirectly reflected in the attitude of the Western Allies, specifically Great Britain. The attention of the British was increasingly being drawn toward the northern European sphere of action. It was the task of the British force sent to Murmansk to prevent any advance by the Germans or by Finnish troops collaborating with them into Petsamo or into any other area along the Arctic coast. The fact that the general situation in the war was such as to preclude the sending of Allied troops in very great strength to this area caused the British to resort to other means: to collaborate with the Regional Council of Murmansk and even to form a special fighting unit, the so-called Murmansk Legion, which was made up of fugitives from Finland who had fought in the Red ranks during the Civil War.

Around the period of April and May, the Western Allies had addressed notes to Finland cautioning her against serving as a tool of the Germans in the arena of power politics. On the one hand, the British Government »solemnly warned» Finland not to interfere in the settlement of the East Karelian question; and, on the other hand, it presented conditions the fulfillment of which would make possible provisional recognition of the country's independence. In matters concerning the British, the Finnish Government maintained close contact with the highest German authorities; and since the German stand toward the conditions laid down by the British was negative, the Finnish Government reached its decision accordingly. Its reserve in dealings with the Western Allies during this time was also shown in its avoidance of direct contact in the matter with British diplomatic envoys: the Finnish Government's rejection of the terms of recognition was announced through the official Finnish news agency.

The strong German influence was reflected in this refusal of the Finnish Government to enter into negotiations with the Allies at the same time as it was enhanced by the Finns' confidence that the support of Germany would be sufficient in the future. The British reserve was further strengthened by reports from Allied representatives in Russia² and, also, Stockholm that the Finns and Germans were preparing to start offensive operations in the Murmansk sector. The stationing of German military contingents up North as far as Rovaniemi and Kemijärvi was the main basis for this idea, although the real reason for this maneuver seems to have been to forestall any offensive move by the adversary.

The situation took a critical turn when, at around the same time, the

Finnish Government delivered a note to the British Government demanding that the British troops in Petsamo withdraw and let the Finns take over the region. At this juncture the Western Allies, which had consular representatives in Helsinki, were poorly informed on developments in Finland. The transmission of messages in secret code was banned, and it was only through reports received by the respective diplomatic missions in Stockholm from go-betweens that the Allied Governments had access to information. Illustrative of the Allied outlook, at the end of June their consuls in Helsinki, after conferring together, seem to have resigned themselves to having their residence permits cancelled by the Finnish Government on the first opportune occasion.³

In the aforementioned note drawn up by the Finnish Government and signed June 26, which was handed over by the Finnish Chargé d'affaires in Stockholm, A. Gripenberg, to the British Minister, Esme Howard, the region of Petsamo was claimed to be part of Finland. The justification for this claim was a promise made by Czar Alexander II in the 1860's to surrender Petsamo to Finland at a future date. The chief attention of the recipient was attracted by the sharply worded contents of the note^{3a}, which was given alarming interpretations by Allied diplomatic representatives in Stockholm: the British envoy suspected Finland of intending to present an ultimatum, while the French Minister described the note as a categorical request.⁴ The presentation of such a demand by a small state that had just declared its independence to a major power — and one actively engaged in the hostilities of the World War — was certainly quite exceptional. And the conclusion reached by the British Government was that Germany was backing the move and, perhaps, even inciting the Finns to pick a quarrel with the Allies.⁵

What happened was that the suspicion nursed by the British around the period of April and May that the Finns were political dupes of Germany revived. There was talk of the deterioration of relations to the point of the danger of war. Great Britain had no hankering for the spread of hostilities in northeastern Europe, but it believed precautions would have to be taken against possible offensive action there. From London there issued an order not to withdraw from Petsamo, as General C. Maynard, commander of the British expeditionary force, had been prepared to do so as to be able to concentrate his small army on the defense of Murmansk.⁶ British action stemmed from a desire to safeguard the lines of communication between the Western Powers and Russia and, in particular, to prevent the possibility of Germany's gaining access to the Arctic coast for the purpose of building a submarine base there.

The worsening of the crisis⁷ impelled Foreign Minister Otto Stenroth, who had been primarily responsible for the note, to bend every effort toward pacifying the situation. For in Finland there prevailed a profound desire to avoid getting involved in the fighting, and not even the pro-German elements wanted to see relations with the Western Powers completely broken. Accordingly, the Finnish Government accepted the Swedish Government's offer to act as mediator. Sweden's aim was to bring her influence to bear toward dispelling the crisis and settling the East Karelian question in Finland's favor and, in the bargain, to promote the realization of Swedish interests. In line with the offer of mediation, Sweden was to persuade both Germany and Great Britain to give a pledge not to institute military operations in the northeastern sector and to give their blessing to Finland's expansionist program. In the event of a successful annexation of territory in the East by Finland, the Swedish Government expected the Finns to show their gratitude by handing the Åland Islands over to Sweden as »compensation».

The Swedish efforts at mediation failed, however, in spite of numerous moves made in different directions at different times: neither of the opposing big powers was willing to make any commitment liable to restrict its freedom of military action any more than it was ready to support Finland's territorial demands. The British stand toward Finland was one of waiting: to find out the true objectives of Finnish policy in the northeastern sector and to determine whether the Finnish Government had any desire to take a conciliatory step toward the Allies. For its own part, as long as the war lasted, the British Government was disinclined to concede anything in Finland's favor.

This the British Foreign Office made plain in the answering note handed Gripenberg on August 9.

The avoidance of any spread of hostilities to a remote area of secondary importance, as it was viewed from the West, nevertheless served British interests at a juncture when the fortunes of war were taking a fateful turn as the great offensive operation launched by the Germans at the end of March had begun to lose momentum and the initiative to switch over to the Allied side. During her entire campaign of mediation, Sweden's overriding objective was to get Finland to shift from her pro-German orientation to the line of neutrality. In this effort, too, the Swedes failed, for the Finnish Government was not ready for any change of orientation but preferred to stick to the fundamental line of foreign policy it had thitherto pursued.

The pro-German leanings of Finnish Government circles were inspired, as pointed out in the foregoing, by a belief that Germany would emerge

victorious from the World War and that at the latest in connection with the peace conference it would make sure Finland's independence would gain universal recognition. By the fall of 1918 this line of thinking was put to the test and gradually, along with the inexorable march of events — though very slowly on the policy-making level —, its political basis was understood to have collapsed.

As the military situation began to take an unfavorable turn for the Central Powers — dramatized by Germany's »black day» of August 8, when the Allied forces made their breakthrough in the Battle of the Somme —, the Finns felt increasingly insecure. The feeling of apprehension was aggravated by the disappointments experienced by the administration over the way the Germans had chosen to »collaborate» with Finland. The intelligence that Germany had refrained from supporting Finland's territorial claims at the Finnish-Soviet negotiations that summer in Berlin had come as a disagreeable surprise. The explanation for this conflict of interest was, of course, that Russia, at whose expense the Finns sought to expand their domain, had become a positive factor in Germany's overall plans with respect to the war.

This discrepancy did not become altogether clear to the Finnish circles championing collaboration with Germany until that country had, on August 27, signed an agreement with Russia supplementing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. With its secret exchange of notes, it called for joint military action — which would suck in Finnish troops, too — designed to drive the British army, which had started to advance southward during the summer months, out of Murmansk. Germany, for its part, had further contracted, however, to see to it that the German-Finnish reinforcements would withdraw after the conclusion of this campaign and leave the Russian territory inviolate.

Germany was compelled, however, to abandon the planned march of General von der Goltz's force via Petrograd against Murmansk, for at the very same time the situation on the Western front was beginning to be untenable for the Germans, who found themselves facing swift, certain defeat. Germany disguised the truth by announcing that its troops would not invade East Karelia if the British would withdraw from Murmansk within a prescribed period.⁸

At the end of August newspapers in the Finnish capital began to give expression to growing doubts about the prospect of collaboration with Germany yielding results as far as the annexation of East Karelia by Finland was concerned. Simultaneously, critics of Government policy openly began to advocate that Finland shift to the pursuit of a neutral line and seek to

improve relations with the Western Powers. The first member of the Government to broach the subject of a change in policy was probably Foreign Minister Otto Stenroth. Toward the end of September he had intimated to the British Consul in Helsinki that Finland ought to try to break loose from her close ties with Germany.

By this Minister Stenroth was not referring to the settlement of the question of Finland's Form of Government, which on October 9 led to the election of Friedrich Karl, Prince of Hesse, as King of Finland. Rather, what Stenroth was driving at was a subsequent overhauling of Finnish relations with Germany. In the discussion cited, the Foreign Minister explained to Consul Henry McGrady Bell that the election of the king would give Germany a guarantee that Finland would not join any anti-German alliance, and this would justify raising the question of the German troops' leaving the country. Stenroth further outlined measures that in connection with the king's arrival in Finland would lead to a »declaration of strict neutrality»⁹, which he asserted expressed the desire of the majority of the Finnish people.

The idea stressed by Stenroth that good relations with the Western Allies were essential to Finland came to the fore again when, after Bulgaria had capitulated and Austria-Hungary had sued for peace, he proposed at a session of the Government held on October 1 a re-examination of foreign policy. He argued that the position of Germany in international affairs had changed, with the result that the basis upon which Finnish foreign policy had rested — the expectation of Germany's looking after the matter of Finland's being accorded universal diplomatic recognition — no longer existed.

Under the changed circumstances, it was important that Finland gain the diplomatic recognition of the American and British Governments before the peace conference was called and thereby prevent this matter of such vital significance to the country's independent political existence from becoming enmeshed in the tangle of problems to be dealt with by the conference itself. If the Finns succeeded in this, they would be in a position to defend their claims in the questions of the Åland Islands and East Karelia, which would apparently be taken up for consideration at the conference, as a sovereign nation. The key to success in this bid for recognition, however, was a policy of neutrality.¹⁰ With a view to getting the business of establishing diplomatic relations with the Western Powers off to a rapid and auspicious start, Foreign Minister Stenroth proposed that General Mannerheim, then resident in Stockholm, be prevailed upon to make a trip to England and France for the purpose of sounding out the prospects.

The Government headed by J. K. Paasikivi was not in its entirety convinced, however, that Finland needed to revise her foreign policy. This was also evidenced by the fact that the proposal to appeal to Mannerheim failed to gain general support at this juncture.¹¹ Even after a new government composed of centrists and right-wing socialists had been formed in Germany with Prince Max of Baden at its head and an exchange of notes between it and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States had started concerning an armistice, the dyed-in-the-wool champions of collaboration with Germany in the Finnish Government spoke of »temporary German reverses» and continued to cling to their belief that Germany would remain a powerful political force in Europe.¹² Protagonists of this line would — up to the middle of October — acknowledge no change in international affairs that might affect Finland's position.

Discussions held by Finnish political leaders between October 15 and 18 under Government auspices indicated that the idea of the necessity for a revision of foreign policy had begun to make increasing headway among pro-German elements, though contrary opinions were still being expressed. By this time the Government had been informed of official French and British reactions to the royal election in Finland. The French Government minced no words: by holding the royal election, which had been managed as a »veritable coup d'état», Finland had thrown her lot in with the Central Powers, resigning herself to a condition of »complete dependence on Germany». At the same time, it was announced that France would not recognize a sovereign who was a native of an enemy country.¹³ The French Government took speedy action, as one might expect from the foregoing, by breaking off diplomatic relations with Finland.

The point of departure for the British Government was different in that it had not recognized Finnish independence. The course naturally open to it was to remain passive and to avoid making any concessions in Finland's favor. The British authorities took the view that the election of Kaiser Wilhelm's brother-in-law to the Finnish throne was among German war aims and that the British Government was free to decide whether or not to deal with a German prince. But, unlike their French ally, the British authorities did not regard the election as sufficient ground for taking action but postponed their decision until such time as the prince might actually seat himself on the throne of Finland.¹⁴ Since the British Government thus did not choose to break off the semi-official relations that had till then been maintained by the two countries, a line of contact between Finland and the Western Powers continued to exist via London. And this kept open the door for further negotiations.

These reactions among the Allies sufficed to cause certain members of the Finnish Government to take stock of their opinions, while other members succumbed to the prospect of a clearcut defeat for Germany. Reports on the development of the situation on the Western front began to expose the inevitability of the outcome, and Wilson's notes in response to the German request for armistice negotiations added to the weight of evidence. In his first note, dated October 8, the President of the United States had demanded that the Central Powers withdraw from all foreign territory they had occupied. Considering the relations between the Western Powers and Germany as a whole, this demand for withdrawal did not necessarily signify a dislocation of the balance of power in Europe.

Wilson's second note, presented on October 14, took the line, however, that no treaty could come into question with Germany unless it secured military domination for the Western Allies. This showed a distinct tilting of the scales: in the event of an armistice, Germany would categorically be the loser. The second note also admonished the Germans to get rid of the Hohenzollerns, which displayed the Allied intention of bringing about an internal political reform in Germany. The first note could be considered to be applicable also to the Baltic Division of the Germany Army stationed in Finland, and the second note likewise had obvious repercussions affecting the future of this country.

On the one hand, Finland stood to lose the support in the arena of power politics that she had sought to gain in the pursuit of her territorial objectives. On the other hand, a change in the German political system would indirectly undermine the dynastic basis upon which the election of Friedrich Karl as King of Finland had been built. The threatening collapse of the German military position brought to the fore certain other points of view as well. The new German Government headed by Prince Max depended for its support on those parties that in previous months had strenuously protested against letting a German prince ascend the Finnish throne — on the ground that it would prove a political embarrassment to Germany.

In the new situation the Finns could scarcely look forward to receiving aid and comfort from ruling German circles — rather the opposite.¹⁵ Those who in the Finnish Government still opposed a change of course in foreign policy put up the argument that the outcome of the World War had not been decided even yet.¹⁶ Their political outlook was bound up with an admiration of the social and political order represented by Germany and to a sense of gratitude for the military assistance which the White Guards had been given against the Reds in the Civil War. The sympathy they had thus cultivated for the German cause inspired them to resist every measure

of foreign policy liable to »break the ties» with Germany or that might signify leaving the Germans »in the lurch» in their hour of need.¹⁷

The Government debate was bound up with the question as to what to do about two proposals. One involved the scheme of approaching the Western Powers by using General Mannerheim, who had already visited Helsinki to discuss the matter, as emissary. And the other one called for persuading Prince Friedrich Karl to defer his acceptance of the Finnish throne. No resolution was passed by the Finnish Government on the latter issue. The majority viewed the arrival in Finland of Friedrich Karl as a natural sequel to his election as king; neither political events nor a revision of foreign policy should have any obstructive effect; nor, for its own part, had the Government any business either hindering or preventing the prince's enthronement. Thereby, it was surmised, the future of the monarchical system would be safeguarded in this country.

The Government minority, however, feared that Friedrich Karl's arrival in Finland would bring the crisis in foreign relations to a head, resulting in his being pressured to renounce the Finnish crown. This would spell the doom of the whole monarchical movement. The proposal to send Mannerheim to France and England, on the other hand, was voted upon favorably. It proved that the view was gaining that the center of gravity in deciding the fate of Finland was shifting from Berlin to the Allied capitals.

The exchange of opinions described in the foregoing took place wholly in the monarchists' camp. Concurrently, starting around the turn of September and October, the republicans could be heard making ever louder demands to have the country's foreign policy changed. These demands were being pressed by, on the one hand, the Agrarians and the republican faction of the party known as Young Finns and, on the other hand, the Social Democrats, who were then reorganizing their ranks.¹⁸ The monarchists' attempt to extricate themselves from the prevailing crisis by a slight shift in the line of foreign policy was also due to a fear that any fundamental change in foreign policy might easily lead to a loss of their dominant position in domestic politics.

The republicans, for their part, hoped that along with the end of the Government orientation toward Germany their own voice in political affairs would gain strength. When, toward the end of October, hopes began to be expressed that General Mannerheim might be invited to take over the political leadership of the country, the enthusiasm of the bourgeois republicans was offset by the misgivings, at first, of certain monarchists, who were afraid that such a move might not only bring about a drastic change of foreign policy but also cause the monarchists' majority in the rump Parliament to be thrust into the background.¹⁹

The reformation of the country's administration took place through a truce concluded among the bourgeois parties, which called for a postponement of action on the issue of the Form of Government, the holding of new elections in the near future, the setting up of a coalition government of monarchists and republicans, and inviting General Mannerheim to accept the office of Regent. The new Government, headed by Lauri Ingman, took office on November 27; and it was on December 12 that Mannerheim was chosen to succeed P. E. Svinhufvud, who had resigned, as Regent.

The opinion expressed by the Government minority in mid-October that Friedrich Karl should put off his decision on the matter of accepting the throne of Finland in order not to prevent improved relations with the Western Powers and delay the general recognition of Finnish independence gradually began to make headway. The prince's own stand contributed significantly to the situation. He was at first concerned over domestic Finnish politics: the support he could count on seemed too weak (*»Minderheitskönig»*) and he was afraid that later on he would be forced to abdicate. Consequently, upon meeting Svinhufvud in Tallinn on September 25, Friedrich Karl had decided that he had best wait.

Little by little the prince's doubts were strengthened by considerations of foreign policy. As we have seen, the parties in control of the new German Government had previously criticized the scheme to place a German prince on the throne of Finland and even condemned such a move as a German political *»adventure»*.²⁰ By the time of the armistice negotiations, Prince Friedrich Karl thought that his acceptance of the Finnish crown might lead to difficulties for Germany in suing for peace. On October 18 he received word²¹ concerning the French and British notes to Finland. It was Foreign Minister Stenroth who relayed the information with the devious intention of encouraging the prince to say no. In a subsequent briefing of a Finnish delegation preparing to call on the prince, Stenroth said that the majority of the members of the Government had by that time come around to the view that Friedrich Karl should not accept the Finnish throne, though there was disagreement over the matter of communicating this intelligence. He expressed as his personal opinion that Friedrich Karl's arrival in Finland would make it impossible to gain the diplomatic recognition of the Western Allies.²²

The prince's decision was evidently hastened by the new German Government's taking a hand in the matter. It did not specifically want to set up obstructions, but only after the exchange of notes with President Wilson was the question seen in a clear light. The election of Friedrich Karl had been thrust into the danger zone by the demanded overthrow of the

Hohenzollerns, but his disqualification had not been categorically determined. Having conferred with the new German political leaders in response to a call to Berlin from Prince Max, who was serving as Chancellor of the Reich,²³ Friedrich Karl on November 4 announced that he would postpone his »final decision» regarding acceptance of the royal crown of Finland. This decision was made on December 14, when the king-elect announced, following confirmation of the unconditional character of the Allied demands, that he was definitively declining the proffered crown.

Besides the issue of the king's election, an important question in the clarification of relations between Finland and Germany in the fall of 1918 concerned the withdrawal of the German expeditionary force from Finland. Wilson's first note to the German Government relating to the armistice question had, it will be remembered, included the demand that German troops withdraw behind their own borders. The Armistice Treaty concluded on November 11, however, contained different instructions regarding the evacuation of German troops from the Western front, which would have to be carried out within short time limits (Articles II and V), and their withdrawal from regions that had belonged to Russia before the war (Article XII). In the latter case, the withdrawal of the German troops should take place as soon as the Western Powers deemed the time appropriate from the standpoint of the internal situation prevailing in the regions concerned. This provision of the Armistice Treaty accordingly presupposed different decisions by the Western Allies as to when the evacuation of various parts of Eastern Europe should be carried out.

The presence of German troops in Finland since the spring of 1918 was a circumstance to which the Allies had pointed in expressing their refusal on various occasions to recognize the independence of Finland. The demand for the withdrawal of the German troops had been reiterated at the turn of October-November when the Finns contacted the British Government. One of the prime conditions requiring fulfillment toward effecting the desired revision of Finnish foreign policy was thus the evacuation of the German expeditionary force.

Certain members of the Paasikivi Government had opposed such a measure, but the new Government under Ingman appeared to adjust quickly to this requirement. The fact that the statements emanating from official quarters were inconsistent with respect to the matter can probably be explained, on the one hand, by the pressure of political necessity as far as establishing relations with the Western Allies was concerned and, on the other hand, by the strong pro-German sentiment prevailing in bourgeois circles combined with the general uncertainty inspired by the critical situ-

ation. In content and tone, therefore, these statements were wide open to interpretation.²⁴

How did General von der Goltz, for his part, react to this question from the time the armistice negotiations started? He represented the type of soldier who also had a hankering for political activity and whose trend of thought deviated in certain respects from the line laid down by German military tradition. Whereas Germany's general policy had, as previously noted, been constructed the summer before on the basis of peaceful relations between the German and Soviet Governments, von der Goltz maintained contact with certain White Russian leaders in Finland.²⁵ Concerning the matter of preparing in August for what was purported to be a military expedition via Petrograd against the British force operating in the Murmansk area, von der Goltz later, in his memoirs, generally spoke about making preparations to fight the Bolsheviks.²⁶

On various occasions during the months of October and November, von der Goltz showed that he was not particularly willing to see the German troops evacuate Finland — at least not speedily, even after, as soon as the Armistice had taken effect, he had given notice of his intention to withdraw.²⁷ What, then, was von der Goltz's objective at this juncture? Apparently, he was not immune to the hope that, in accordance with Article XII of the Armistice Treaty, the Allied High Command might offer his force an extra lease on life in view of the need to stabilize the internal conditions of the country. This procedure had been followed in some cases in the region of the Baltic countries, where the Allies approved of German military measures to forestall aggressive Bolshevik action. Moreover, certain military minds in Germany, like General Max Hoffman,²⁸ were entertaining schemes around this period to make a last-minute attempt to conquer Petrograd from the Bolsheviks.

At the beginning of December, von der Goltz announced that the German troops would have departed from Finland by the 15th of the same month. This announcement of evacuation did not, however, satisfy the Allied Powers in itself; they further demanded the resignation of Col. K. von Redern, who had served as Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, and other German officers serving as military instructors in Finland — which demand was also soon carried out. Finland's political and military dependence upon Germany was thus essentially undone. The new situation served as a point of departure for the establishment of relations with the victorious Allies.

When von der Goltz announced the deadline for the evacuation of the German troops from Finland, he knew about the imminent appearance of

Allied military power in the vicinity of this country: a British naval force was heading for the Baltic Sea. As the German troops were pulling out of the Baltic region, it was simultaneously becoming exposed to the offensive operations of the Bolsheviks. Of the Western Allies it was the British who at this juncture wanted to take a hand in the progress of events in the Baltic sector. The interest of the United States, on the other hand, was mainly limited to administering its relief program, while France steered clear of this general area, preferring to look after its interests in Central Europe.

The task of the British naval force was to keep an eye on the naval units flying the Red flag and based at Kronstadt, guarding the approaches to Petrograd, as well as to offer aid in the form of military supplies needed for the organization of the defense of Estonia and in general to give moral support to the Baltic peoples in their efforts to steer an independent political course.²⁹ This did not, in the light of events, signify putting up a defense against Soviet attacks alone but also against those German troops that under von der Goltz's command at the beginning of February, 1919, intervened and later captured objectives like the Latvian capital of Riga.

NOTES

¹ For the following see Paasivirta, *Suomi vuonna 1918* (Finland in 1918), pp. 22—37, 123, 157—166, 337—344.

² Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations 1917—1920* II, *The Decision to Intervene*, pp. 268—271.

³ Cablegram from Th. Haynes, U.S. Consul in Helsinki, sent 26 VI (through Morris) to State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 00/197).

^{3a} The note first makes reference to the fate of the Finnish force of volunteers that in May tried to occupy Petsamo, having been compelled to withdraw upon encountering an army composed of Russians, Finnish Red fugitives and British marines. Then it goes on: »Inasmuch as British troops have no right to operate in such a fashion, still less to attack subjects of the legal Finnish Government in territory that incontrovertibly belongs to Finland, or even to be present there . . . the Government of Finland is obliged as a consequence to protest categorically (de protester catégoriquement) . . . against the lawless actions of the said troops and the violations of Finland's rights committed . . . (and) to demand that the British Government withdraw its force without delay from Finnish territory and also prevent the rebels from receiving assistance in any form from subjects of the British Crown» (Copy: Auswärtiges Amt L 263/L 082543—44).

⁴ Stenroth, *Puoli vuotta Suomen ensimmäisenä ulkoministerinä* (Half a Year as Finland's First Foreign Minister), pp. 43, 44.

⁵ Ruutu, Senaattori Stenrothin ulkopolitiikka (Senator Stenroth's Foreign Policy). — Valtiotieteellisen Yhdistyksen vuosikirja (Yearbook of the Society of Political Science) 1944, p. 85.

⁶ Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*, p. 68.

⁷ Ossian Donner, then residing in Stockholm, warned against getting Finland involved in war with the Western Allies (letter dated July 3 to R. A. Wrede. Wrede's collection). A similar appeal was also made later by Mannerheim (Alkio, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja [Political Notes] 16 VII). The Petsamo crisis was taken up by the delegation of the bourgeois parties on July 4 and 15, when Sweden's efforts to act as mediator were disclosed (Estlander, Anteckningar 4 VII and 15 VII). The press received no information on the notes.

⁸ The cablegram of Sept. 4 from the German High Command to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt L263/Lo82856); the Swedish Government was also informed (telegram sent Sept. 10 by Sweden's envoy to Helsinki, C. G. Westman, to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 10 26), after which the news reached the Finnish press (Helsingin Sanomat 12 IX); among the journals published in the Swedish capital, Svenska Tidningen (12 IX Den tyska förklaringen), however, interpreted it as meaning that Germany would undertake military measures immediately if the British troops did not withdraw from East Karelia before the deadline.

⁹ Bell's report of Sept. 30 to the British Foreign Office (Copy: Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 10 26).

¹⁰ Memorandum drawn up by Stenroth after the surrender of Bulgaria (undated) (Törngren's collection).

¹¹ Stenroth, Puoli vuotta Suomen ensimmäisenä ulkoministerinä, p. 148.

¹² Thesleff, Dagboksanteckningar 2 X and 10 X; also newspaper Karjala 8 X Rauha lähellä (Peace Near); Wasabladet 13 X Vår utrikespolitik; Uusi Suometar 13 X Ulkopolitiikkamme tulevat suuntaviivat (Future Lines of Our Foreign Policy); Svenska Tidningen 16 X Kring telegrammen; Dagens Press 26 X Är kriget avgjort?

¹³ Kihlman's telegram of 10 X to the Finnish Legation in Stockholm and the communication of 15 X from L. Raynaud, French Consul in Helsinki, to Stenroth. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen (Recognition of Finland's Independence), pp. 145, 146, 149.

¹⁴ Holsti's telegram of 11 X to the Finnish Legation in Stockholm and the telegram of 31 X from the British Foreign Office to Esme Howard. — *Ibid.*, pp. 145, 146, 149.

¹⁵ Statements by Fr. Ebert on 22 X and G. Noske on 24 X in the Reichstag concerning the Finnish Government and the question of the king. — *Verhandlungen des Reichstags. Band 312. Stenografische Berichte*, pp. 6164, 6215.

¹⁶ In addition to Stenroth, a revision of foreign policy was favored by, among others, J. K. Paasikivi and Heikki Renvall, while the old line was steadfastly championed by, e.g., Onni Talas, Wilhelm Thesleff and Samuli Sario (Setälä, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja [Political Notes] 15—18 X; Thesleff, Dagboksanteckningar 18 X and Hultin, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja [Political Notes] 18 X).

¹⁷ Uusi Päivä 9 X Kuninkaan vaaliin käytässä (Holding the Election of the King); Karjala 9 X Saksa (Germany); Svenska Tidningen 11 X Finlands heder; 1 XI Ståndaktighet; Uusi Suometar 18 X Saksa, Suomi ja ympärysvallat (Germa-

ny, Finland and the Central Powers); Dagens Press 12 X Vår utrikespolitik; Abo Underrättelser 11 X Behöves en utrikespolitisk nyorientering?

¹⁸ Ilkka 19 X Ulkopoliittikkaamme suuntaviivoja (Trends of Our Foreign Policy); 4 XI Oikeistomme — kello käy kahdettatoista (Take Heed, Our Political Right — The Clock is About to Strike Twelve); Helsingin Sanomat 9 X Suomi ja uusi suunta Saksassa (Finland and the New Trend in Germany); 31 X Kuningasmielisten politiikan tuloksia (Results of the Monarchists' Policy); Karjalan Aamulehti 17 X Monarkistit ja ulkopoliittikkamme (The Monarchists and Our Foreign Policy); Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 9 X Ulkopoliittikkamme uusi suunta (The New Trend of Our Foreign Policy); Suomi ja ehdottoman neutraalisuuden lait (Finland and the Laws of Unconditional Neutrality).

¹⁹ Estlander's letter of 19 X to Wrede (Wrede's collection); also, Haataja, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja (Political Notes) 12 XI.

²⁰ Paasivirta, Suomi vuonna 1918, pp. 289, 290.

²¹ Ingman, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja (Political Notes) 18 X.

²² Stenroth's letter of 19 X to Antti Tulenheimo, then at Frankfurt am Main (Copy: Ingman, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja 24 X).

²³ Friedrich Karl conferred with, among others, Foreign Minister W. Solf on Nov. 4, after which he handed his communication addressed to the Finnish Parliament to the delegation headed by Ingman (Ingman, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja 31 X and 4 XI).

²⁴ E.g., Stenroth, Puoli vuotta Suomen ensimmäisenä ulkoministerinä, pp. 151, 152 and 157; Enckell, Politiska minnen I, p. 397 (in response to von der Goltz 30 XI): »Now the question could not be . . . one of (the Finnish Government's) 'wishes', for the Government was compelled to urge the German troops to hasten back to their homeland.» The Foreign Ministry's Tilannekatsaus (Survey of the Situation) dated Nov. 30 (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 1), again, stated: »No Finnish Government can ask, still less demand, that the Germans evacuate this country; but, as is well known, Goltz, well understanding the nature of the situation, has announced the departure of his troops.» According to Castrén's notation (Poliittisia muistiinpanoja 30 XI), »the Foreign Ministry states that Goltz has given notice that the Germans have an order to withdraw from here.» Also Ilvessalo, Suomi ja Weimarin Saksa (Finland and Weimar Germany), pp. 34, 35.

²⁵ von der Goltz, Meine Sendung in Finnland und Baltikum, pp. 92, 93.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 91—93.

²⁷ E.g., v. Lersner's communication of Nov. 4 to the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt L 263/083093).

²⁸ Hilger-Meyer, The Incompatible Allies. A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918—1941, p. 19.

²⁹ Agar, Naval Operations in the Baltic. — Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. Vol. LXXIII (1928), p. 661.

Chapter II

The Organization of the Peace Conference and the Question of the Small States

Germany's request for an armistice, which was then signed on November 11, 1918, came as a considerable surprise to the Western Allies. They had overestimated the German capacity to wage war to the extent of not expecting hostilities to end before 1919, and even then they never counted on the total collapse of their enemy. When the guns ceased to fire, new problems came to the fore. The formulation of Allied peace plans during the last stages of fighting had been based on different assumptions. What the Allied planners had had in mind for the most part was a compromise peace settlement, and they had been prepared to make certain concessions to bring it about. The same kind of conciliatory attitude had been in evidence when the composition of the league of nations to be established after the war had been under deliberation. For it had been assumed that Germany would also be admitted to membership in such an organization.

When Germany requested armistice negotiations at the beginning of October, 1918, the Western Powers reacted in diverse ways, marked by conflicting opinions. Idealists hoped that President Wilson's fourteen points would be adopted as the basis of the peace — but the British, French and Italian national leaders had not been consulted before their publication in January of the same year. In asking for an armistice, Germany specifically referred to the principles enunciated by Wilson, which seemed to assure it of »moderate» terms and a favorable future. An exchange of views ensued between the Western Allies, and the result was an exposition of Wilson's fourteen points by the President's intimate adviser Col. Edward M. House, in response to which the government of each of the Allied nations presented its stand, determined by its own national interests and considerations of security.¹

The military terms of the armistice agreement were laid down by the top Allied commanders, largely along the lines of Marshal Foch's proposals, while the naval stipulations were drafted by the British naval staff.² The severity of these conditions created a situation that made resistance by Germany afterward hopeless; the Western Powers were in absolute control. This circumstance was to influence the course of events in many ways

later, when the program of the final peace settlement began to be worked out in detail.

The organization of the Peace Conference proceeded slowly and it took time to put its machinery into motion. The delay was due mainly to the difficulties involved in the practical application of the armistice terms and in the arrangement of the *modus operandi* of the conference. The very nature of the circumstances forced the organizers to make haste slowly. On the other hand, it was not considered expedient to rush matters while passions were still inflamed in an atmosphere of nervous tension generated by four years of warfare. The political map was still, after all, largely unconstructed; alongside the old states there had appeared new ones, like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and the Baltic countries, where conditions had not yet been stabilized.

The hardest nut to crack, however, was Germany, the position of which, as the chief vanquished power, appeared to be extremely uncertain. There was no way of telling what sort of political system would replace the overthrown Hohenzollern monarchy. Would it be one approximating communism under the revolutionary Spartacists, or would it be a parliamentary democracy as urged by the so-called Majority, or right-wing, Socialists and the bourgeois liberals? The peace terms dictated by the victorious Allies put Germany's fortitude to the test, threatening to paralyze the internal resistance of the people and laying the groundwork for Bolshevism. The German question weighed upon both sides. The chaotic condition of Russia also demanded the attention of the Peace Conference — if only as a political background factor.

The cessation of hostilities was followed by a breach of the solidarity of the front that had prevailed on the Allied side during the war. In switching over from the enforced concentration of strength in the face of common peril to the freer situation following the Armistice, a struggle began among the victors for the attainment of political and other special national advantages. This thrust to the fore various problems that split up the common front. The historian Nicolson has observed that nearly half the time consumed by the Peace Conference was spent upon ironing out the wrinkles caused by disputes between the victors.

The Peace Conference turned into a sort of general executive organ for a sizable part of Europe.³ In addition to its difficulties settling the problems generated by the war, it was obliged to wrestle with ever new ones arising from revolutions, food shortages and bad hygienic conditions. Areas of special annoyance were central and southeastern Europe, where newly formed states often resorted to measures of military occupation to clinch

their territorial claims rather than await the decisions of the Peace Conference. Owing to the »continuity» of military activity, the program of the conference could not be planned precisely in advance, and its agenda had to be expanded as fresh problems sprang up from time to time.⁴ As an organization the Peace Conference was thus subjected to constant changes. It was obliged to cope with a dual task: laying a foundation for peace in Europe and simultaneously »pacifying» the continent. Everywhere the peacemakers were harassed by a restless world on the move.

The leading Allied Powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, were not destined to make their weight felt at the Peace Conference on a basis of parity. Japan, as a Far Eastern state, was situated at too great a distance from the focal point of power politics to be able to influence the decisions. Italy was by no means remote geographically but nevertheless kept to the sidelines during the most important negotiations, except when questions involving territory in which it was particularly interested were being examined. Accordingly, it was the »Big Three» — the United States, Great Britain and France — that ultimately dictated the terms of peace.

Also participating in the Peace Conference were the small European allies of the great Western Powers, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Serbia and Rumania, as well as, from among the new states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, plus certain of the South American states, which were generally referred to by Western representatives as »theoretical» belligerents. In November of 1918 the idea of inviting representatives of the Central Powers to attend the Peace Conference had been considered,⁵ but it was subsequently abandoned. Neutrals, like the Scandinavian countries, and new arrivals in the family of independent states, like Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the sovereign aspirations of which had not drawn on the support of the Western Powers, were not invited to sit at the conference table, either.

The leaders of the »Big Three» emerged as the dominant personalities of the Peace Conference. It was President Woodrow Wilson who played the central rôle during its early stage with his program of a »just peace», on the basis of the principles of which he believed a better world could be created. In line with the historical traditions of the United States, he endeavored to raise high the banner of political law and morality and on the strength of proclamations and manifestos to lay a foundation of opinion for a new order of international justice.⁶ It was from the soil of his political faith in liberalism and democracy that his two great idealistic conceptions sprang: the self-determination of peoples and the League of Nations, in which he envisaged liberalism and democracy realized on an international scale.

Wilson believed that the principle of self-determination should be adopted as the guiding light of the Peace Conference: no territories should be arbitrarily transferred from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another; instead, the will of the inhabitants of such territories should be sounded out. During the war Wilson had spoken of a »peace of conciliation» and of a »peace without victory». At the same time, it had been his aim to prevent »Prussian militarism» from taking root again in the new Europe. These objectives were not altogether in harmony as far as their serving as bases for the Peace Conference was concerned. The former, stressing as it did the demands of justice, rejected the set-up of »victor» versus »vanquished», whereas the latter called for securing the victory of the Western Powers and the construction of the peace treaties on the basis of the strength of the victorious states.⁷

The right of nations to self-determination, which Wilson developed into a political principle, was primarily an ideological watchword of a general character rather than a program ready for practical application. The President himself realized the difficulties and conflicts involved in applying it, although he did not think they could thwart his creative efforts. It was to be expected that in many cases the aspirations of nationalities to self-determination would not be in harmony with historical points of view, especially as far as power-political, social and economic factors were concerned. The heavy contribution of the United States to the joint Allied victory in the World War had imbued Wilson with a sense of superiority, buoyed up by which he, with his poor knowledge of Europe, aspired to carry out a reformation of conditions on the eastern side of the Atlantic in line with American traditions. He fancied that the establishment of democracy as the predominant system would cause expansionist policies to be rejected by the nations and the desire for peace to grow stronger. And he did not doubt that nationalities were capable of creating states. He even believed that by common effort and following the example of the United States it would be possible to mold Europe into a great political unit, in the framework of which big and small could co-exist peacefully.⁸

Wilson did not, however, entertain the illusion that American ideals were in themselves more exalted than European ones. The nucleus of his outlook was the view that more fortunate circumstances had given the United States a chance to foster ideals that should begin to exert their influence in Europe, too, as conditions improved. The principles enunciated by Wilson and couched in slogan-like terms — »the right of peoples to self-determination» and »nations ripe for democracy» — were rooted in the American heritage, and could be traced back to colonial times and

the Declaration of Independence of 1776. By contrast, the »league of nations» represented an ideological structure deviating from the traditions of American foreign policy.

The old Monroe Doctrine, which stressed that each nation was entitled to govern itself as it saw fit without outside interference, was wholly alien to this new planning. Many supporters of the Monroe Doctrine were against American meddling in European affairs, and they were even less enchanted by the prospect of some sort of »world government» being set up under United States leadership. Yet, the vision of a league of nations was a fundamental part of Wilson's creative activity. He believed that it could benefit mankind by the strength of its sheer moral influence.

The change from war to peace signified at the same time a change from the idealistic thinking kindled during the closing stage of hostilities to a practical confrontation of reality. It soon became obvious that the »Wilsonian» approach was at a remote distance from the tough attitude taken by the men seated around the conference table. The President's worst opponent proved to be Georges Clemenceau, a nationalist and a statesman with his feet firmly planted on solid ground, who viewed the plans to create a new Europe according to the principle of self-determination with a cynical eye. The »Tiger» of France had no faith in the feasibility of »noble principles»; as he saw it, ideals of justice and morality were untenable in making international arrangements. He shook his head warningly when the subject of the league of nations was brought up.

It was Clemenceau's conviction that only by inflicting harsh peace terms on the vanquished and by taking precautionary military measures could Europe be pacified and lasting security be achieved.⁹ The accentuation of the authority of the victorious powers was to be noted also in Clemenceau's attitude toward the general *modus operandi* of the Peace Conference, too: in deciding matters, he demanded compliance with the views of the »Council of Ten», which was composed of representatives of the major victorious powers. Clemenceau's political experience enabled him to find the procedures required in carrying on the work of the conference and the political support required in settling each particular issue.

Clemenceau's main objective was to secure the future of France, which, in his opinion, presupposed the complete prostration of Germany. Of the Western Powers it was France that had suffered most in the war: its manpower losses, counting the wounded, too, amounted to millions, in addition to which extensive industrial and agricultural areas, especially in the northern parts of the country, had been devastated. During the severest phase of the war, marked by the massive German offensive from May to July on

the Western front, Clemenceau had shown unyielding tenacity and energy. He had become the symbol of France's resistance, and he imbued his nation with faith in the future. After victory had been achieved, he had his own demands to make — branded as his »program of vengeance» — in order to lay the enemy low. Germany must be politically encircled: the newly independent states of Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as Yugoslavia and Rumania must be made to enter into defensive alliances with France, besides which Great Britain and the United States must guarantee the preservation of France's boundaries.

The future allies of France referred to must be made strong in order to fulfill their function. Accordingly, Clemenceau vigorously pursued this line. The coal and iron mines of Silesia, he demanded, should be handed over to Poland, which must also be given a »corridor» to the Baltic Sea. For France he demanded the cession of Alsace-Lorraine as well as administrative control of the Saar region to satisfy his country's coal requirements. In insisting, on top of everything else, upon the demilitarization of Germany and its paying heavy war reparations, Clemenceau was reminded that a country subjected to such encirclement and exhaustion measures might be driven into the lap of Bolshevism. As fierce an opponent of Bolshevism as Clemenceau was, this threat could not induce him to moderate his »program of vengeance».

The head of the British delegation at the Peace Conference was David Lloyd George. Up to the World War his sphere of activity had been limited to internal politics, but after he became Prime Minister in 1916, he began to play a prominent rôle in the arena of international politics. His ideals, like Wilson's, were liberalism and democracy, which he believed to have supplied much of the spiritual force necessary to achieve victory. In line with its political traditions, Britain had steered clear of continental European affairs, but now it was obliged to learn to »listen with continental ears» and to speak in matters concerning continental nations». With respect to Lloyd George this change meant that his political outlook had to widen to the extent of embracing all Europe. As a statesman he was not, like Wilson, any architect of grand designs, nor did he apparently possess any general program drawn up in advance, only certain sketchy outlines of one. During the course of the negotiations, he frequently changed his position.¹⁰

Lloyd George was the silver-tongued rhetorician and acknowledged master tactician of the Peace Conference, and his debating and maneuvering skill brought results.¹¹ Whenever the essential interests of Great Britain were involved, as, for instance, in the question of its being given control

of the German colonies, in that of extending the British sphere of influence at the expense of Egypt and Persia, or in that of the destruction of the German navy, his skill as a politician was displayed with dazzling brilliance.

The British Prime Minister pursued the line of compromise. When conflicts of opinion between Wilson and Clemenceau had to be adjusted, each of them having insisted upon some one-sided decision, the stand of the British leader was that of expediency. In Clemenceau's view, particularly, Lloyd George was fickle, downright »opinionless» (on account of his disposition to make compromises) and unfit to represent a major power. This judgment was influenced also by the fact that Lloyd George in participating in the decisions being made in Paris felt his responsibility to Parliament, with which — unlike Wilson and Clemenceau — he remained in active contact and because of which he experienced difficulties, too.¹²

During the war the British and French governments had made certain »promises», which they were supposed to redeem when peace came. It became hard, however, to live up to these commitments made under the pressure of critical situations, so those responsible for them would have wanted to forget them. One such promise concerned the cession of Dalmatia and the Tyrol to Italy in compensation for its joining the Allies in 1915. Lloyd George thought, like Wilson, that when the multifarious problems created by the World War came up for solution in connection with the peace settlement, it would be difficult to reconcile »secret treaties» with »guiding principles».

Lloyd George advocated more moderate peace terms for the Central Powers than Clemenceau did. Accordingly, he resisted the proposal, for instance, of strengthening Poland by awarding it extra territory. If Germany were deprived of the iron and coal mines situated in the eastern part of the country, Lloyd George contended, and Hungary were chopped up into insignificance, such a constriction of the means of these nations to support their existence could lead to anarchy and even warfare. The British Prime Minister pressed his arguments successfully in clarifying the situation. The Peace Conference decreed, on the one hand, that the territorial issue of Upper Silesia would be decided by a plebiscite, while, on the other hand, it would not consent to the cession of Dalmatia to Italy. The decision was partly influenced by the backing given Lloyd George by Wilson. In spite of these arrangements, many an inflammable area was left on the political map of Europe, causing statesman at a later date trouble and headaches.

Vittorio Orlando, leader of the Italian peace delegation, was overshadow-

owed by the »Big Three». The Italian contribution to the Allied war effort had been of slight significance; hence, Italy could not back up its demands with military achievements. As a result, Orlando's rôle was much like that of a spectator on the sidelines while the major issues were being settled. He came to life only when the problem at hand touched upon Italy's special territorial interests. He was not out to reduce the vital conditions of Germany's existence. In siding with the Western Powers in the war, Italy had betrayed its ally, so Orlando had no taste for wreaking vengeance on the vanquished.

Orlando had a temperamental character, but in his activities as politician and statesman it was exhibited only under special circumstances. When Wilson, who championed the principle of self-determination of nationalities, took a stand in opposition to Italy's claims upon Dalmatia, Orlando lost his temper and announced that he would leave the Peace Conference in protest. Since, however, this action did not seem to have any effect on Wilson and the others, his absence was cut short.

When the apportionment of power at the Peace Conference was being worked out, Clemenceau, backed up by Foreign Minister S. Pichon, took the position that the major powers should be ensured the leading role in deciding matters and that the rest of the participating nations should be entitled to a voice only in matters directly concerning them. Wilson, on the other hand, favored granting the other participants the right to a voice in the conference on a basis of »equality» with the big powers. Clemenceau believed that the procedure he proposed would expedite the handling of matters and advance the interests of the victors without trouble. Wilson, however, was looking ahead to the situation after the peace settlement, when the small powers would be participating in the work of the League of Nations and taking responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the decisions made by the Peace Conference.

The mode of procedure advocated by Clemenceau was applied in practice and the work of the Conference thus became concentrated in the hands of the big powers. It was possible for the small powers to express their views in the special cases referred to in the foregoing, though the big ones even then reserved for themselves the right to make the decisions. It was judged by the men in control of the Conference that thereby they could make sure that, in concentrating upon the matters of particular interest to them, the plenipotentiaries of the small powers could not usurp the floor during debate, as had happened a short time before at an Allied economic congress in Paris¹³, and thus slow down the machinery of the Peace Conference.

It was deemed expedient to restrict the participation of the small nations in three ways: their representatives could be invited for a hearing before the Council of Ten; they could attend the plenary sessions of the Conference, which, to be sure, were planned to be convened only very seldom; and an opportunity would be reserved for them on the basis of their membership to bring their influence to bear upon the content of statements and reports submitted to so-called special committees for expert treatment. Even in the third case, the major powers commanded a substantial majority of those participating in the rendering of decisions. Whereas the representation of each of the chief powers in the plenary assembly had been set at five delegates, the basis on which that of the small allies was determined was not their geographical size but the extent of their contribution to military operations and the magnitude of their war losses. Accordingly, states like Belgium and Serbia, which had fought in the war from the very beginning and had suffered exceptionally heavy losses, were conceded augmented representation at the plenary sessions on these express grounds.

Estimates regarding the participation of any given small power in the war provoked endless controversy. Among South American states associated with the war effort of the Western Allies, there were certain ones that were deemed, as pointed out earlier, to have waged war only in a theoretical sense. The question of the size of any given body of delegates represented in the plenary assembly involved, in view of its secondary importance, the granting in the main only of symbolic recognition to nations that had performed the Western Powers some service rather than guaranteeing them a realistic chance to advance special interests of theirs.

At the session of the plenary assembly held on January 25, 1919, the dissatisfaction of the small powers over the rigid control maintained by the chief powers was given expression. At issue was the election of representatives to the special committees of the Peace Conference. According to the plan drawn up by the leaders, the small states would be entitled to one-third of the membership of each committee. The right to participate in the conference had been granted to all the nations that had fought on the Allied side, including those that had »theoretically» waged war, as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia, which by virtue of the pro-Western orientation of their independence policy had been recognized before the Armistice in Paris, London and Washington as belligerents opposed to the Central Powers.¹⁴

The discussion featuring criticism of the predominant position taken by the Big Five was opened by Belgium's Foreign Minister Paul Hymans. In his turn on the floor, he demanded that Belgium be given two places

on each of two committees, the one dealing with the establishment of the League of Nations and the one drafting an international labor code.¹⁵ This demand was in conflict with the program formulated by the leaders of the chief powers, according to which, as mentioned, the small powers would be limited to a third, that is, five of the fifteen seats on each committee. Hymans' speech, in which his demand was grounded on Belgium's dangerous geopolitical situation, led to the release of pent-up feelings, sweeping aside the issue under examination and bringing on general censure of the control over the Conference exercised by the chief powers. Similarly, the representatives of, for example, Poland and Serbia emphasized the exposed position of their countries and pointed up the reasonableness of their being granted a voice when the question of the League of Nations came up for discussion. The speeches delivered by the Brazilian and Canadian plenipotentiaries likewise criticized outspokenly the fact that the Big Five had reserved for themselves the authority to decide matters at the Conference and that the lesser powers were informed only after the decisions had been made.¹⁶

Clemenceau responded to these critical attacks in characteristic impetuously sarcastic terms.¹⁷ His tone of finality, moreover, made it clear that the controlling powers had no intention of relinquishing their authority. The idea embodied in Hyman's demand that the question of the representation of the small powers on the committees should be dealt with all over again and that substantial concessions be made in their favor was thus in reality buried. The slight concessions made, with respect to the election of additional members to certain committees in some cases,¹⁸ did not alter the power relations in the Conference or the arrangements for the exercise of authority there.

Thus did the organization arrived at during the war carry over in the Allied camp, having the effect of establishing a tradition, which was maintained also in the work of constructing the peace. The counterparts of the Western Allies' Supreme War Council in the Peace Conference were its leading organs, composed of the top representatives of the chief powers, such as the Council of Ten and the »Big Three«, who represented the former in more compact strength. Among the smaller powers bitterness was felt over the attitude of great powers in curtailing their voice in matters. A particular target of grumbling was Clemenceau, whose personal influence and activity were known to have effectively contributed to this state of affairs.

The states that had gained their independence during the final stages of the World War were destined to receive quite varying treatment from

the Conference when it assembled. On the one hand, there were Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the other, Finland and the Baltic states; with the claim of having leaned for support on the Western Allies in their striving for sovereignty, the former belonged in a different class in regard to diplomatic rights from the latter, which had lacked any high-level contact with the West in the pursuit of their independence policy. Thanks to their Westward orientation, the Poles and Czechs found themselves in a favored position at the end of the war: with the right of representation at the Peace Conference. Although these new states generally found themselves relegated to the background during negotiations, it did not mean that their interests were given no attention.

A significant factor in drawing the Poles and Czechs together with the Western Allies was a community of interests. The aspiration of Poland and Czechoslovakia to acquire sufficient living space for themselves was in harmony with the aim of the latter to weaken the Central Powers by reducing their boundaries. The concentration of control at the Peace Conference in the hands of the chief Western Powers thus was tantamount to a guarantee that the territorial interests of certain new states would be attended to.

Compared with the aforementioned new states, Finland was in an exceptional position in that she had sought political support from Germany, which then went on to lose the war. In Finland's case, in contrast to that of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the outcome of the war meant the defeat of a cause she had looked upon as politically favorable. Whereas Poland and Czechoslovakia saw many auspicious opportunities opening up for themselves when the Peace Conference was called to assemble, Finland was forced into an acute crisis of adjustment in her endeavor to restore relations with the Western Powers, which had been impaired by her German-oriented politics.

Remotely situated as she was, Finland did not draw the attention of the victorious powers the way Poland and Czechoslovakia did on the new map of Europe, although she was not without political interest, either. The cool reception given Finland by Britain, France and the United States — notwithstanding the fact that the principle of self-determination could obviously be applied without trouble in establishing Finnish independence — was due mainly to the pro-German orientation of the country in 1918. Since Finland had not yet fully shaken off the after-effects of this line of policy, she was placed in quarantine until she could get rid of the last traces of it; and the duration of this period partly depended on whether the Russian question, that »unknown factor», would prevent the pacification of conditions in the northwestern corner of East Europe.

The interest of the Western Powers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had earlier been slight; geographically, they were fairly unknown lands to, for example, the United States. At the stage of the signing of the Armistice, when the general situation along the western borders of Russia was uncertain, owing to the Bolshevik offensive and subsequent German military operations, interest was distinctly on the rise. The three Baltic countries constituted a region in which, to be sure, Finland was occasionally included by Western observers, although she differed from them not only with respect to her unique political heritage, featured by home rule for more than a century, but also because geopolitically she was not a »border state» but a buffer state between Russia and Scandinavia.

Historically, the Baltic countries had been important to Russia as a military zone of defense and as key links in its chain of trade routes. This, in turn, had the effect that the Western Powers treated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with more reserve than they did Finland when the question of acknowledging their complete independence came up. The final adjustment of the situation in Russia reflected in this connection its influence in the background.

NOTES

- ¹ Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, pp. XVII, XVIII.
- ² Rudin, *Armistice 1918*, p. 285.
- ³ Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris I*, p. 256; Binkley, *New Light on the Paris Peace Conference*. — *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XLVI (1931), p. 542.
- ⁴ Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference*, p. 27.
- ⁵ Marston, *The Peace Conference of 1919. Organization and Procedure*, p. 28.
- ⁶ Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900—1950*, p. 49.
- ⁷ Hofstadter, *American Political Tradition*, pp. 261, 270—272.
- ⁸ Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement II*, pp. 63—65; v. Muralt, *Der Friede von Versailles und die Gegenwart*, p. 25.
- ⁹ Michon, *Clemenceau*, pp. 217, 238, 239; also Clemenceau's later estimate of Wilson in his memoirs, *Grandeurs et misères d'une victoire*, pp. 139—146, and Keynes' characterization of Clemenceau in his work, *Essays in Biography*, pp. 6, 7.
- ¹⁰ Hardinge, *Old Diplomacy*, pp. 241, 242.
- ¹¹ Lansing, *The Big Four and Others of the Peace Conference*, pp. 79, 80.
- ¹² Thomson, *David Lloyd George*, p. 307.
- ¹³ *Daily Telegraph* 9 XII 1918 *Peace Conference. Preliminary Meeting*.
- ¹⁴ Paasivirta, *Puolalaisten ja tšekkien itsenäisyysliikkeen (1914—18) kansainvälispoliittinen tausta (The International Political Background of the Poles' and*

Czechs' Independence Movement (1914—18). — Turun Historiallinen Arkisto (Historical Archives of Turku) XV (1961), pp. 253—259.

¹⁵ Hyman's speech of 25 I at the plenary session of the Peace Conference. — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 III, pp. 188, 189.

¹⁶ Discussion held on 25 I at the plenary session of the Peace Conference. — *Ibid.*, pp. 190—196.

¹⁷ According to Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, a member of the U.S. delegation, the discussion was a «hot» one. Clemenceau spoke vehemently and at length, Bliss observes, and finally had his statement approved. But the representatives of the small powers evidently did not take to it kindly. This incident showed, Bliss adds, that it would have been necessary to prepare the resolutions to be passed more carefully in advance. Everything Clemenceau said in his fiercely passionate speech could have been put across more effectively in a calm manner, especially if matters had been worked out beforehand. (Bliss, *Diary* 25 I).

¹⁸ Marston, *The Peace Conference of 1919. Organization and Procedure*, pp. 77—79.

Chapter III

Finland's efforts to achieve diplomatic contact with the Western Powers

Following the Finnish Declaration of Independence, the Government decided to send delegations to the capitals of the major Western Powers as one measure toward gaining diplomatic recognition. It is obvious that the members of these delegations were poorly prepared to meet the difficulties involved in carrying out their missions. As notable figures in Finland's fight for her constitutional rights, they had traveled abroad and had suffered personally, too, in coping with tasks demanding courage. The unyielding faith they continued to show in the victory of justice was a legacy of the period of Czarist tyranny, when the Finnish people successfully resisted their alien ruler's attempts to Russify their country. And it was in the goddess of justice that the delegates continued to see the dominating force of the political forum. Idealists that they were, they paid less heed to the realistic factors affecting international relations. They gave little notice, for example, to Finland's delicate position in the near vicinity of a new meeting place of the opposed sides in the World War. And they largely failed to reckon with the reactions of opinion stirred up in the nations of the West by the increasing pro-German leanings of official Finnish circles.

In line with the traditions of the period of the struggle to safeguard Finland's constitutional rights, the diplomatic activity of the members of the delegations was very much in the open: they often freely expressed their views, disregarding the caution required by their mission. Inspired by their ideas of patriotism, they were apt to say things in an Allied country that betrayed their open sympathy for Germany. They represented a breed of diplomats whose time was passing away into history. It was their innocent belief that the cause of Finnish independence would win out on its own merits.

Among these pioneer diplomats of independent Finland, who had won fame as defenders of the nation's threatened constitutional rights, were L. Kihlman and E. Wolff, whose sphere of operations became the countries of Western Europe, as well as Professor J. N. Reuter, who was assigned to tackle the United States. Of these representatives of the old generation, Reuter came nearest to possessing diplomatic skill; and he was teamed up with Dr. Kaarlo Ignatius, who had been stationed on the other side of the

Atlantic since the fall of 1917 to deal with matters connected with food deliveries.

Differing in some respects from the old type of diplomat was Rudolf Holsti, a liberal in political outlook and a great admirer of the Western democracies. His chief base of operations became London.

Having been in contact with the British Government, Kihlman, Wolff and Holsti learned on January 18, 1918, from the Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, that the question of according Finland diplomatic recognition would not be dealt with until a later date. The delegation's journey took it after that to the Continent. The situation became rather mixed up at this stage, since the members of the delegation were practically cut off from contact with their own country and were therefore obliged to act according to the instructions given them on December 15, 1917. Thus, they turned to the French Government on February 15 in the matter of diplomatic recognition, although as early as January 4 France had announced that it had decided to recognize Finnish independence. The call on Foreign Minister S. Pichon accordingly was reduced to a polite round of introductions and an expression of thanks by the delegation for the favorable action taken by the French.¹

The work of the delegation was continued by its submitting requests for diplomatic recognition to the Governments of Belgium, Italy and Spain. A favorable response was obtained without difficulty from Spain, which simultaneously expressed its readiness to establish relations with Finland at once. Belgium and Italy postponed their decision, the former considering that the matter required negotiations with other Allied Powers and the latter being of the opinion that the matter was one to be decided by the Peace Conference. The delegation even turned to the Holy See, on the strength of later authorization, requesting its recognition. By this course of procedure, the delegation calculated that a successful outcome could have a favorable effect on the attitude of Roman Catholic countries. The gamble paid off: on March 2 the Vatican announced its recognition of the independence of Finland.

Finland had thus established contact with the states of Western Europe, after which the country's diplomatic representation began to shape up on a provisional basis. Holsti, assisted by Tancred Borenius, pitched camp in London, and Kihlman, with Erik Ehrström as his right-hand man, in Paris. The aides of both »chargés d'affaires» were Finns who had resided for a fairly long time in the respective countries.

Contact was made with representatives of the United States Government after the outbreak of the Civil War in Finland. A political race occurred

between delegates representing the legally installed Finnish Government (Senate) and the »People's Commissariat», or governing body set up by the Red Guards, to gain the ear of Uncle Sam. Santeri Nuorteva, the agent appointed by the revolutionary government, visited the State Department on February 26 — two days before Reuter and Ignatius were received by Secretary of State Lansing for an audience. Nuorteva used tactics based upon the line-up of belligerents in the World War: he branded the Finland under the White or legal Government as an ally of Germany's and as an enemy of democracy, his aim being to arouse unfriendly feeling in the United States toward the »Whites».² The exceptional nature of the Finnish situation — what with the Civil War and the uncertainty over whether the country had accepted German intervention voluntarily or under external compulsion —, on the one hand, and the particularly critical phase of the World War then in progress, on the other, were factors that took away American interest in the Finnish question as far as the matter of diplomatic recognition was concerned. The envoys of the legal Finnish Government were laconically informed that the »internal disorders» in Finland barred the road to further negotiations. The audience with President Wilson that they had hoped for accordingly failed to materialize.³ After that they left Washington and contented themselves with awaiting developments.

There was no lack of difficulties connected with the diplomatic mission of Reuter and Ignatius. The approach taken by the latter, in particular, resulted in further obstructions to any favorable outcome. A brother of General Hannes Ignatius, an officer on the staff of the White Guard Headquarters, he took it upon himself to defend the pro-German stand of the legal Finnish Government as well as the measures adopted toward establishing a monarchy. This propagandistic activity of his defeated its own purpose of promoting good will toward Finland.⁴ In the summer of 1918 Ignatius and Reuter returned home convinced that under prevailing conditions nothing could be done by diplomatic means to strengthen the cause of Finnish independence in the United States.⁵

During their sojourn in the United States, the two Finnish envoys had also run into troublesome cross-currents of opinion in Finnish-American circles, which were mainly divided into two factions in their attitude toward the situation in their native land. A substantial portion of the Finnish-American population emphasized their loyalty to official American policy, and while supporting the country's war effort also strove to influence the administration to adopt a tolerant attitude toward Finland. They did not wish to see Finland abandoned to her fate on account of her pro-

German orientation but advocated the application of pressure on Svinhufvud by, for instance, having the United States Government promise on certain conditions to send food supplies to Finland and to recognize her independence. This, it was felt, would encourage resistance to the pro-German policies of the legal Finnish Government.⁶ Activity along these lines was viewed by Reuter and Ignatius with misgivings.⁷ Whereas the Finnish-Americans behind such activity condemned the abortive coup d'état of the Red Guards, the faction led by Nuorteva openly displayed its sympathy with the revolution; and even after the end of the Civil War it endeavored, through its leader, to dissuade certain of the states bordering on the United States, notably Mexico, from hastening to recognize the independence of the Finland under the Government headed by Svinhufvud and Paasikivi.⁸

Ignatius and Reuter could report no favorable results under prevailing conditions upon returning from their mission.⁹ After their departure from the United States, the only person in that country with credentials from the legal Finnish Government was P. J. Valkeapää, who had been sent there to purchase grain. As of the summer of 1918, Finland was without any political representative in the United States.

The landing on Finnish soil of German troops under General von der Goltz in April and the climactic event of the pro-German phase, the election on October 9 of Friedrich Karl, Prince of Hesse, as King of Finland, were developments that laid the basis for a suspension of Finnish diplomatic activity in Western capitals on both sides of the Atlantic.

German intervention in the Finnish Civil War also had a chilling effect on relations with France, which had been among the first countries to accord diplomatic recognition to independent Finland. The souring of the French attitude in the new circumstances was given expression when Kihlman appeared in Paris to present his credentials as Chargé d'affaires for Finland — the French Government did not want to acknowledge his status.¹⁰ After serving as an unofficial envoy¹¹ until the middle of July, Kihlman returned to Finland for consultations with the Government. He appears to have worked out a scheme for Finland's improving her relations with the Western Powers on condition that the German troops were made to withdraw from the country.

Upon his return to Paris, Kihlman nevertheless openly championed the policy of his Government as far as the issue of the election of the king, in particular, was concerned.¹² His attitude exasperated the French authorities. Accordingly, the French Foreign Ministry, »infinitely offended», made it known that it did not want to have anything to do with Kihlman.¹³ Seeing

how he had forfeited his chances of operating in France, Kihlman moved to Madrid, capital of neutral Spain, which had kept out of the World War. Finland was thus left without diplomatic representation in Paris as well as in Washington. Kihlman's aid, Ehrström, who had been stationed in Paris to handle commercial matters, remained at his post there so that, despite the breach in Franco-Finnish relations, he might seek to establish contact with the French Foreign Ministry.¹⁴

Holsti's position as the Finnish envoy in London was rendered difficult by the development of the situation at home in 1918. His predicament was complicated further by his personal views. As a whole-hearted champion of the republican form of government, he was distasteful to the conservative members of the Finnish Government, who idealized the monarchical system. And as an Entente sympathizer, he was known to oppose pro-German policies. As a diplomat, he became cut off at this stage from many of the vital issues of Finnish politics, which he found himself observing from the sidelines as if he were nothing better than a supernumerary. The crisis over Petsamo was dealt with, for example, by the Finnish *Chargé d'affaires* in Stockholm, A. Gripenberg, and Holsti was informed on the matter by the British Foreign Office. It was Holsti's complaint, moreover, that his queries to the Government were seldom answered,¹⁵ and he was not entrusted with certain technical facilities necessary to carry out the duties of a diplomat, such as the right to use a code.¹⁶

Despite his limited resources, Holsti endeavored to keep active. It was his belief that the majority of the Finnish people opposed the pro-German orientation of their Government and the establishment of a monarchy; and, having been exposed to the ill will of the conservatives, he decided that he could count upon the support of what he assumed to be this majority of Finns. Holsti's activity in London in the summer and fall of 1918 disseminating information in line with his own thinking apparently had a special significance¹⁷ when Finland was obliged to proceed through the tumultuously emotional period experienced after the War by the Western Allies to a change of political orientation.

This stage of »retreat» in Finnish foreign policy, which the Government was forced to submit to, brought satisfaction not only of a general nature but also of a highly personal kind to Holsti, victim that he had been of hostile treatment. The repeated warnings he had given the foreign policy makers of his country concerning the untenability of the pro-German orientation¹⁸ had been proven valid. His self-esteem was bolstered by the fact that he was the only one of the members of the several delegations appointed at the turn of the years 1917—1918 to make overtures to the

Allied Governments who succeeded in keeping his post and starting a new tour of duty as a diplomat.

Owing to his individualistic personality and views, which clashed with the general trend of opinion prevailing in Finnish bourgeois circles, Holsti had plenty of adversaries, who showered him with bitter criticism. They did acknowledge his energy, but, as they saw him, there was a good deal that was superficial about his character. They accused him of being untrustworthy and looked upon him as a person whose self-confidence caused him to overestimate his own abilities and to become a »pusher».

A problem by itself in this connection revolves around the question as to whether Holsti's diplomatic activity before the Armistice reflected loyalty to the governing authorities then in power in Finland or whether he let his personal outlook — as a republican and an Anglomaniac — represent the character of these authorities in a one-sided and unfavorable light.

The victory of the Western Allies in the World War brought the prevailing trend of Finnish politics to a halt. The belief, which had sustained the Government's line of policy, that Germany would look after the matter of international recognition of Finland's independence, in accordance with the pact signed by the two countries on March 7, had been shattered by the inexorable force of events. In the changed situation, a re-evaluation of foreign policy became a sheer necessity, and yet the adjustment could not be made by the Finnish policy makers without trouble. The members of the Senate, or old Government, had compromised themselves during the period of collaboration with Germany and forfeited their chances of devoting themselves to the future administration of their country.

The phase then finished had been tantamount to a period of training rich in experience for Finnish diplomacy. It had been necessary to break loose from the deeply rooted idea that the issue of gaining recognition of national independence would be resolved by the »victory of justice», which Finland could count upon as a matter of course as the fruit of the nation's long struggle for political existence. The outlook cleared up only slowly; at the same time, it proved an arduous task to choose the lines of procedure that might yield results. It was suspected that entrusting the settlement of the Finnish question in its entirety to the Peace Conference would not be to the advantage of the country, since the Conference would be burdened with the task of threshing out the postwar problems of the entire continent of Europe. On the other hand, there was no lack of those, either, who in their idealism entertained the belief that the Finnish question, including the territorial claims that had been generated during

the Civil War to encompass even East Karelia, could be carried to a favorable conclusion.¹⁹

Around November the Finnish Government began to formulate plans for diplomatic operations with the Peace Conference in view.²⁰ It remained for the future to reveal whether Finland would be allowed to be represented at the Conference by any agent authorized to look after her interests. Opinions differed regarding the political conditions that might be expected to be laid down before Finland's participation could be approved. There was talk of the necessity for restoring diplomatic relations between France and Finland, of »gaining the confidence of the Entente powers» in general,²¹ and even of having the question of diplomatic recognition resolved as a pre-condition of participation.²² This exchange of views took place at a time when even the general lines along which the composition of the Peace Conference would be decided were unknown. Nobody knew, for instance, whether small states in the class of neutrals would be admitted at all. In the event of a negative decision, Finnish national interests would have to be safeguarded by other means. Among such »interests» — in addition to the matter of diplomatic recognition — were the questions of Petsamo, East Karelia and the Åland Islands.²³ The line to be pursued in particular seemed to be establishing contacts with each of the leading Western Powers separately, so that they might be used to look after these interests at the Peace Conference.

It was realized that the choice of office holders would be a difficult and delicate matter in connection with the change in the trend of foreign policy. Both Mannerheim, after visiting London and Paris, and Holsti had pointed out that accredited representatives of Finland would have to be persons enjoying the confidence of the Western Powers.

Since the principal question remained open, it was generally decided that steps would have to be taken without delay to disseminate information effectively. Toward this end, plans were made to dispatch diplomatic observers to Paris; it was thought that thereby the situation might be cleared up in general, too. It was further considered a handicap that Finland had no political representative in the United States, which was believed bound to exercise a strong influence at the Peace Conference.²⁴ The Paasikivi Government even appointed two representatives to go to Washington. One of them, Kaarlo Ignatius, who had previously been on a mission to the United States, was obliged to turn back upon his arrival in London, however, apparently because of being stigmatized as a pro-German sympathizer.²⁵ The other, Akseli Rauanheimo, continued his journey across the Atlantic, but he was prevented from engaging in diplomatic activity by the

refusal of the American authorities to accept the credentials that had been given him by the Finnish Government in power during the period of collaboration with Germany.

Following the signing of the Armistice, the Finnish Government had instructed Holsti to do what he could to enable Finland to participate in the Peace Conference. As, for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing, the country had no envoy in Paris or Washington, Holsti requested that the British Government, which he approached in the matter on November 18, transmit corresponding petitions to the American and French authorities.²⁶ The matter was shelved among questions »to be jointly dealt with by the Western Powers» at some future date.²⁷ It was then assumed in Finland that the Peace Conference would provide a general forum not only for the belligerent powers on both sides in the World War but also for neutrals and for the new states seeking recognition of their sovereignty on the principle of self-determination.

Weighed down heavily by uncertainty, the Finnish Government, which had been headed since the end of November by Lauri Ingman an, »old line» man famous for his flexibility, undertook to select a delegation to be sent to Paris. The Government was by no means ignorant of the fact that the delegates would have to be men who had not actively supported pro-German policy.²⁸ The choice further involved taking into consideration the candidates' knowledge of foreign languages and their diplomatic skill, which, owing to the force of circumstance, was limited by lack of training and experience.

Senator Leo Ehrnrooth had been considered for the post of leader of the delegation. But when difficulties arose in securing a visa for him,²⁹ he was replaced by Dr. Adolf Törngren, who had been on hand in December 1917 to present Finland's request for diplomatic recognition to the Swedish Government and who enjoyed a reputation as an authority on, for example, the Russian question. The other members of the delegation were Stefan Söderhjelm, chief of the political section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Professor Yrjö Hirn, the well-known esthetician, who in connection with his travels abroad to do research had gained an insight into the political situation prevailing in Western Europe and whose knowledge of foreign languages might prove a valuable asset. The visa for Törngren could not be arranged without delay, for the French authorities contended that at an early stage of the World War he had endeavored to mediate a separate peace between Germany and Russia.³⁰ This allegation, which was aimed to compromise him, did not prevent him from reaching Paris in the end, but this was not until the beginning of February.

The troubles attending the initial stage of Finnish diplomacy — marked by sharp differences of opinion, surging personal ambitions and, finally, the uncertainty stemming from inexperience — are illustrated by the fact that, at a juncture when outwardly directed activity should have been prosecuted with all available means, disagreement among those engaged in the diplomatic operations in Paris hampered the work of the delegation. The course of events in this case reflects the internal difficulties involved in the organization of the administrative apparatus in charge of Finland's foreign affairs.

The Peace Conference consisted mainly of the political leaders of the of the Western Allies. In addition, representatives of such nations as Czechoslovakia and Poland, which had gained their independence as a result of the war, were allowed to participate, as already mentioned, in the discussion of certain questions, thanks to their having sought the support of the Allies in their struggle for freedom. The neutral states, among them those of Scandinavia, were not admitted to membership in the Conference.

Finland, whose neutrality was open to question as a result of her collaboration in the Civil War with Germany, was not accorded the right to attend the Conference, as were certain of the new states. Accordingly, she was obliged to seek unofficial connections with the victorious Allies or resort to the use of intermediaries.

To prevent the Finnish question from being buried, the Government endeavored to increase the effectiveness of its diplomatic representation in the French capital. Thus, Holsti was instructed, after the practical arrangements relating to grain deliveries had begun to be ready, to shift his base of operations from London to Paris, where Foreign Minister Enckell also arrived at the end of March. This strengthened Finland's representation in Paris considerably. In addition to the names already mentioned, the Finnish delegation included a few experts on special matters, such as J. Uggla, who was on hand to deal with the question of the Åland Islands, and Lauri Hannikainen, whose specialty was East Karelia. In spite of the added personal prestige of its membership, the work of the delegation was nevertheless weakened by constant bickering.

Foreign Minister Enckell assumed the prerogatives of rank in the Finnish Paris delegation. Törnngren, who had acted as head of the delegation on the strength of his appointment in December, 1918, took it as a loss of face. Piqued, he refused to collaborate with Enckell and instead undertook to look after the interests of his country as a separate enterprise, establishing a »bureau» of his own for the purpose. Enckell was joined in his »bureau»,³¹ in turn, by Hirn and Holsti — the latter presumably on account of their

official relationship in the main, for he failed to see eye to eye with the Foreign Minister on many a matter.

Enckell, who in his capacity as Minister Secretary of State in St. Petersburg in 1917 had acquired a good deal of diplomatic experience, enjoyed the confidence of Mannerheim. It was also to carry out certain special tasks assigned by Mannerheim that he had traveled to Paris. In particular, his mission was to hasten recognition of Finnish independence by the Western Powers and to ascertain whether support would be forthcoming in case Finland participated in intervention operations against St. Petersburg.³² Holsti, for his part, felt that he had been accorded no respect whatsoever, and he viewed with mistrust Ossian Donner, for example, who, as an economic expert with an excellent knowledge of the British way of life,³³ had been chosen to take his place in London. During the dispute over «vacancies» in the Finnish foreign service, Holsti evidently was anxious to clinch his claim to the London post with the future in view.³⁴

Gaining the ear of conference leaders in Paris proved difficult for the Finnish representatives. The very working procedure of the Peace Conference made it hard to contact top-level men personally, but the Finns were further handicapped by the »pro-German» stigma attached to their politics and their country's continued existence without the diplomatic recognition of the Western Allies.

Enckell had to wait until late in April before, for instance, he was received by French Foreign Minister Pichon. And in his efforts to gain an audience with the United States Peace Commission, he managed to make contact only with Henry White and Samuel Morison, who were outside the »inner circle». Törnngren seems to have been just about totally cut off from any contact with the diplomatic leaders of the West.

The difficulties encountered failed to cool down tempers as the qualifications and abilities of others were challenged. The general feeling of uncertainty grew among the members of the delegation, since the information received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki on developments back home was extremely scanty. Thus, the Finnish delegates learned for the first time in April about the progress made in settling the issue of the Finnish Government through a member of the United States Peace Commission.³⁵

Taking advantage of the freedom of movement afforded by the division in their ranks, the members of the Finnish delegation busied themselves in a fumbling way, without any definite line of strategy. The best known of them, Enckell, Holsti and Törnngren, went their separate ways around Paris: Holsti rubbed elbows with Americans and Englishmen, Törnngren with the

French and Enckell with White Russians as well as the French.⁹⁶ The Russian émigrés represented a sphere of influence that aroused the interest of the Finns to a certain extent. Of the Finnish delegates it was evidently Enckell who, having been in contact with the Russians most and having the closest knowledge of the Russian question, drew support from the émigrés for his notion that the Bolshevik regime was a transitory phenomenon and that it would not be to Finland's advantage to refrain from participating in action organized to hasten its end. Holsti, for his part, paid heed, in formulating his conception of the situation in Russia, to the views of the American and British political leaders, whose attitude toward intervention was marked by restraint.

The Finnish delegation was split over the Russian question in a different way from its division over personalities and leadership. Hirn, for example, could not warm up to the idea of intervention, whereas Törngren lined up on Enckell's side in this matter. The disagreement over it and other political problems closely affecting the status of Finland as an independent country resulted in divergent reports, furthermore, to the Regent and the Foreign Ministry, leaving the Government in a state of perplexity.

Finland had taken her first steps on the road to a new foreign policy around the time the World War ended and the machinery of the Peace Conference began to be installed in Paris. The majority of the Finns who became involved in the business of diplomacy considered themselves eminently qualified from the standpoint of experience to tackle the problems at hand. Since, in addition to everything else, communications with the Government back home were poor, these diplomatic representatives were guided in their operations by their own highly subjective ideas on how to deal with the problems confronting them. The disorganized conditions and the lack of diplomatic traditions produced in the atmosphere charged with conflicting opinions a slow working rhythm, which yielded meager results.

NOTES

¹ Kihlman's statement of Feb. 15 to Pichon. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, pp. 87—89.

² Paasivirta, *Suomi vuonna 1918* (Finland in 1918), p. 93.

³ Telegram sent Feb. 28 by Reuter and Ignatius to the Finnish Legation in Stockholm. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 106. — After being received by Lansing, Reuter was pessimistic. "The audience . . . lasted a few minutes and took place standing up," he wrote concerning the incident. With

reference to the draft of a statement intended to be delivered to Wilson, which Reuter had submitted previously (the draft of a statement signed on Feb. 27 by Reuter and Ignatius. State Dep't 860 d 00/162), Lansing commented that he had not read it (Reuter's letter of March 5 to Svinhufvud. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, pp. 107—109).

⁴ Valkeapää, Report on his work procuring food supplies from the United States for Finland in 1918—1919, pp. 26, 31 (written in Finnish).

⁵ Ignatius' telegram of June 18 to the Senate (Government). — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 110.

⁶ Our Policy in the (sic) North Europe. — Finland Sentinel, Vol. 1 (1918), pp. 49, 50; New Yorkin Uutiset (New York News) March 5 The Finnish People Face in (sic) Face with Starvation; Appeal to Wilson drawn up by a meeting of Finnish-Americans held in Warren, Ohio (State Dep't 860d. 00/208) and speech made by Valkeapää on the same occasion. — Finland Sentinel, Vol. 1 (1918), pp. 54—57; letter of June 26 to Lansing written by H. Montagu Donner, president of The Finland Constitutional League of America (State Dep't 860d. 48/15).

⁷ Reuter's letter of May 28 to Ignatius (Copy: Reuter's collection).

⁸ Nuorteva's letter of July 9 to Wilson (State Dep't 860d. 00/230) and of Aug. 2 to Ignacio Bonillas, Mexican Ambassador to Washington (State Dep't 860d. 00/245).

⁹ Ignatius' letter of May 20 to Reuter (Reuter's collection); interview given the newspaper Uusi Päivä on Sept. 17 under the heading »Viljaa Amerikasta Suomeen hankkimassa» (Procuring Grain from America for Finland).

¹⁰ Letter dated April 14 to Alexis Gripenberg from E. Thiébaud, French envoy to Stockholm. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 130.

¹¹ Idman, Maamme itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen (The Recognition of Our Country's Independence), p. 319.

¹² Before his departure from Paris in July, Kihlman had endeavored to obtain some statements from the British and French Governments that would disclose what they would offer Finland in return for effecting the withdrawal of the German troops from the country. In London on July 19, Lord Hardinge had responded to him that if Russia threatened Finland with an armed attack, the Allies would prevent it. Diplomatic recognition could come into question only after the British Government had received clear proof of the strict neutrality of the Finnish Government and the German troops had left the country. (Holsti's report of July 19 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, pp. 135—136). After returning to Paris, Kihlman defended the holding of a royal election and the candidacy of a German prince (Holsti's reports of Sept. 26 and Oct. 9 to the Foreign Affairs Commission. Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

¹³ The French Foreign Ministry announced through the press that it had broken off diplomatic relations with Finland. Holsti's report of Nov. 1 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

¹⁴ Holsti's report of Dec. 21 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

¹⁵ Holsti's letter of May 23 to W. A. Lavonius (Copy: Holsti's collection CXXVII).

¹⁶ Idman's letter of July 5 to Holsti (Ulkoministeriö 1 Q m).

¹⁷ Information given on May 4, 1959 by Edward Hallet Carr, then a Foreign Office man; also Gregory, *On the Edge of Diplomacy*, p. 189.

¹⁸ Holsti's reports of May 6 to the Government and of Aug. 12 and Aug. 20 to the Foreign Affairs Commission (Ulkoministeriö 1 G q and 5 C 7).

¹⁹ Senator Stenroth's memorandum on the international situation in October 1918 (Törngren's collection).

²⁰ The Paasikivi Government had appointed a five-man committee to make preparations. One of the members, Professor Rafael Erich, drew up a memorandum analyzing the status of Finland from the standpoint of international law (P.M. ang. Finlands ställning vid den förestående mellanfolkliga uppgörelsen. Copy: Törngren's collection).

²¹ Ulkoministeriön tilannekatsaus (Review of the Situation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) dated Nov. 30 (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 1).

²² *Hufvudstadsbladet*, Nov. 19, Finlands representerande vid fredsunderhandlingarna.

²³ *Helsingin Sanomat*, Nov. 21, Suomi tulevissa rauhanneuvotteluissa (Finland in the Coming Peace Negotiations).

²⁴ *Helsingin Sanomat*, Nov. 6, Suomen etujen valvominen ulkomailla (Looking After Finland's Interests Abroad).

²⁵ Statement of Oct. 9 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by S. Whitehouse, Chargé d'affaires pro tem for the United States in Stockholm (State Dep't 860 d. 00/323).

²⁶ Holsti's letter of Nov. 18 to Lord Balfour (Copy: Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

²⁷ Message of Nov. 27 to the United States State Dep't from C. Barclay, British Chargé d'affaires pro tem in Washington. — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 I, 246.

²⁸ Enckell, *Politiska minnen II*, p. 366.

²⁹ Ehrnrooth, *Från ett skiftesrikt liv*, p. 293.

³⁰ Hirn, *Anteckningar* Feb. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, April 26, April 29 and May 3.

³² For a description of Enckell's personal reaction to the news of Holsti's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, see Hirn *Anteckningar*, May 1.

³³ Howard's comment on Donner (*Theatre of Life II*, p. 266).

³⁴ Törngren's letter of March 25 to Reuter (Reuter's collection).

³⁵ Hirn, *Anteckningar*, April 8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, for comments on these matters in general, April 4 — June 19.

Chapter IV

Finland's Food Shortage and the Western Allies

The exceptional conditions created by World War I had reduced Finnish foreign trade to a fraction of what it had been before. The situation made Finland materially dependent on her eastern neighbor. The Russian Revolution, which reduced Russia to chaos internally, broke Finnish economic ties with the East, too. Russia's military deterioration, which proceeded parallel with the revolutionary activities in 1917, hastened the paralysis of trade between the two countries: Russia no longer purchased military supplies or industrial products from Finland, and Russian grain no longer reached the Finnish market. The slowdown in industrial and commercial activity resulted in an economic crisis, which was manifested in unemployment and in a scarcity of food and other necessities.

During the early stage of the crisis fumbling efforts were made to establish contacts in the West, particularly the United States, the seemingly inexhaustible economic resources of which, it was hoped, could be tapped to combat hunger in Finland. Negotiations undertaken in the spring of 1917 led to an agreement whereby the Finnish Government entered an order through the American firm of Grace Company for 50,000 tons of wheat from the United States. Because of the exceptional situation the Americans insisted upon payment in advance despite the fact that the price of wheat could not be determined at the time the contract was signed. Accordingly, with the Bank of Finland acting as guarantor, the Finnish Government had sent a promissory note for an agreed sum to the National City Bank in New York to be handed over to the agent as soon as the wheat had been delivered to the export harbors. The matter of obtaining a transportation permit had, however, been left open on the part of both Russia and the warring Western Powers.

Obstacles to a practical solution of the grain problem began to appear. The Inter-Allied Supply Committee stationed in St. Petersburg put on a cold front. It instructed the Finnish Government to procure a corresponding amount of rye from Russia because difficulties seemed to have arisen in obtaining a license for the grain purchased in the United States. Accordingly, the Finnish Government ordered even a larger consignment of grain from the Russians, making the payment in full in advance since assurances were given that this would expedite the deal.¹ Having turned

both East and West in the matter, the Finns consoled themselves with the thought that grain would be delivered from at least one or the other side.

At the end of July 1917 new obstacles to the fulfillment of the deals cropped up.² It began to appear as if the provisional Russian Government wanted to put an economic squeeze on the Finns to dissuade what it considered a pig-headed Finnish Parliament from going ahead with its scheme to establish complete home rule by enacting a special law. Toward the end of August the tension between Finland and Russia showed signs of relaxing when the Finnish Government decided to submit to an order from the provisional Russian Government to dissolve Parliament. But even then the chances of getting grain from Russia did not seem to improve.

This brought the earlier plan to import wheat from the United States to the fore again. The Inter-Allied Supply Committee in St. Petersburg had finally come across with the required licence. By the end of October, thanks to the efforts of the American agent, a third of the 45,000-ton wheat purchase had been delivered to the ports for loading and the remaining two-thirds were on their way.³ Meanwhile, Swedish cargo ships had been chartered to carry the grain. In addition, the Finnish authorities had agreed to go along with any measures the Allies might take to control the transportation and distribution of the grain.

The United States authorities continued to practice caution in handling the matter of the grain transportation license. They set in October as the primary condition for the granting of such a license that the provisional Russian Government approve the measures taken by Finland to procure grain from the United States.⁴ A recommendation to this effect was sent on November 6 from St. Petersburg to Washington⁵, or at a time when the provisional Government was on the point of collapse. When the cablegram was delivered three days later, Kerenski had already been overthrown. After that it was no longer deemed necessary to sound out the »Russian attitude» toward delivering American grain to the hungry Finns.

In the summer and fall of 1917 the grain deal between the United States and Finland touched upon problems involving the course of hostilities in the World War and the interests of the major belligerent powers. One of these problems was how to avoid the danger of the grain's falling into German hands. Another was the growing problem of supplying the Allied forces fighting on the Western front, as the number of American troops in action steadily increased, this matter commanded more and more attention, overshadowing Finland's need. After many difficulties had been surmounted, it nevertheless came as a surprise when on November 12 the United

States food administrator, Herbert Hoover, announced that he had called a halt to preparations for shipping grain to Finland and ordered it to be sent to France instead. To justify this decision Hoover explained that the Allied supply situation had deteriorated to the extent that the available wheat stores could hold out only about twenty days.⁶ He reported shortly afterward to Secretary of State Lansing that America was simply incapable of arranging the delivery of wheat or wheat products to anybody else except the Allies.⁷

State Department officials and the directors of the Food Administration considered the Finnish appeal for grain from various angles. The State Department took into account the political factors bearing upon the matter: geographically Finland was situated at a crossroads of international political interests where pro-German, pro-Entente and neutralist forces were apt to clash in a struggle for domination. The prime consideration of the food administrators was to settle supply problems in a way best calculated to serve the country's own war effort. The Finnish authorities had very little insight into Allied thinking; and even if they did perhaps have some grasp of the difficulties with which the Western Powers were coping, they could not understand the prolonged delay in reaching a favorable decision.

When toward the end of October 1917 information began to reach Finland concerning the appearance of obstacles to the fulfillment of the grain deal — there was talk of the confiscation of the wheat purchased by the Finns without its being known that the consignment was being diverted to feed Allied soldiers in the field — there was no lack of bitter indignation in the Finnish press. Finland was observed to have suffered a hard blow, Wilson's idealistic slogans were found to be empty in practice, and »American cynicism» became a catchword.⁸ After the hopes of obtaining help from across the Atlantic slumped, a further worsening of the situation caused Finns to seek a solution elsewhere. It was at this juncture that the Finnish Government decided to appeal to Sweden and later on also to Germany.⁹

In his first report to the State Department, the United States Consul, Thomas Haynes, who had started his tour of duty in Helsinki around this time, explained that pro-German propaganda was gaining the upper hand in Finland. He took the line that expressly from the standpoint of the development of public sentiment it would be expedient to do something about the grain deal.¹⁰ With an eye to a chance to weaken the German influence, Lansing ordered Hoover at the beginning of December to investigate the possibility of letting Finland have food supplies in some form.¹¹

The offers made by Hoover shortly afterward to the Finnish Govern-

ment's representative Kaarlo Ignatius were aimed to alleviate the frustration felt in Finland over the cancellation of the wheat deliveries. Hoover offered to have 40,000 tons of oat products shipped to Finland either immediately or by the end of January 1918. The other alternative, which appeared to be a more complicated and slower arrangement, involved procuring wheat from Australia — in which case Finland would have to fend for herself in chartering the tonnage to carry the grain. Explaining these alternatives to the Secretary of State, Hoover confessed to feeling the utmost reluctance in proceeding with the plan in spite of its political expediency. He said he failed to see any humanitarian excuse for it, since somebody else was being deprived of food to the same extent as another was being provided with it.¹²

The exchange of views between Lansing and Hoover showed that they failed to see eye to eye in the matter of allocating grain to Finland. Common to both, in any case, was a desire to advance the Allied cause in the war. The focus of their attention, however, was on different sectors of the vast theater of military operations: on the one hand was the Western front and on the other the incipient Northern front. The State Department presumably was informed on Germany's aspirations to extend its influence to the Arctic sphere, and that is why Lansing sought to cool down the pro-German sympathies of Finnish political leaders by arranging for food deliveries to Finland. Since, furthermore, Finland had entered the phase of establishing her independence, the State Department was bent on settling the issue with the «least possible delay».¹³ The Food Administration for its part was anxious to concentrate its operations on the area of hostilities where the decisive battles could be expected to be fought. That was the main reason for Hoover's dissatisfaction.

When the question came up of implementing the «substitute plan» for delivering grain to Finland, the Allied Powers demanded the institution of strict control to prevent the shipments from falling into the wrong hands. It was feared that the supplies shipped to Finland might be diverted by intermediaries to Germany or that they might be used to provision the Russian troops still based in Finland. Conferring on the matter, the American and British authorities considered the relative merits of routing the shipments via Gothenburg, Sweden, or Narvik, Norway, to Finland. The Narvik route seemed the more expedient one, for it was less exposed to the danger of the supplies' being sidetracked to Germany.¹⁴

Secretary of State Lansing, who had influenced the decision to help the Finns, was anxious to study the reliability of the «guarantees» offered in detail.¹⁵ According to his directives, plans were laid to deliver the grain

included in the substitute program in small consignments — consisting at first of 8,000 tons —, to designate the United States Consul in Helsinki as the consignee, to have explicit instructions given regarding the continued control of the shipments en route from Narvik via Haaparanta (Haparanda), Sweden, to Finland, and finally to control the distribution measures taken at the destination. Such instructions were dispatched from Washington to Mr. Haynes in Helsinki on January 16, 1918.¹⁶ The Finnish envoy Kaarlo Ignatius was on hand when the arrangements were worked out,¹⁷ but the Finnish Government was also required to agree specifically to the conditions laid down.

Political suspicion of German designs was manifested in many ways in both the United States and Great Britain while the problem of delivering grain to the Finns was being worked out. The British even expressed apprehension that the grain might be smuggled out of Finland to Germany. The Americans for their part, citing Lansing's directives, stressed that if despite the control measures taken during transportation and distribution anything uncalled for happened, the American Consul in Helsinki would have the acknowledged right to suspend the deliveries. It was desired to insure the feasibility of the precautionary measures in advance so that something could be done without further delay to relieve the food shortage in Finland.¹⁸

The Western Powers' insistence on exercising rigid controls could be explained in part in the light of certain prior warning experiences. At an earlier stage in the war they had participated in supplying Bulgaria and Greece, only to discover that certain shipments had been diverted over to the side of the Central Powers. That is why the Allies wanted to make sure of Finland's stand toward two previously mentioned circumstances: one was their right, in line with the blockade of Germany, to supervise the distribution of the food supplies; the other concerned Finland's obligation to refrain from re-exporting any of these supplies to Germany.¹⁹

The Civil War that broke out in Finland toward the end of January 1918 signified a political event that the Western Allies did not overlook even in connection with the food deal. The question of distribution and its supervision was bound, it was realized, to grow increasingly difficult. The United States Embassy in Stockholm urged Washington to wait until «order» was restored in the country,²⁰ but the State Department did not wish to cancel the plans already set into motion. On orders from Secretary Lansing the American food administrators continued at the beginning of February with preparations for the initial shipment of eight to ten thousand tons of grain to Finland. The consignment was supposed to be ready for transportation within two to three weeks.

The transportation of the food consignment to Finland depended ultimately upon what the United States Ambassador in Stockholm had to say. It was in the light of his statement that the final decision would be made as to whether conditions in Finland would permit a controlled distribution of supplies.²¹ Additional directions concerning the supervision of deliveries to Finland came from London, which was the operational center for the blockade of Germany. The British Government wanted to extend the export ban to apply not only to the grain consignments but also in part to products of the Finnish woodworking industry, like pulp, being sold to Germany. In general it sought to arrange supervision in the same way as had been done in the case of neutral powers; that is, it was out to secure the entry of British observers into Finland and to establish a Finnish trade agency in London.

The British authorities were likewise anxious to expedite the delivery of the first grain consignments to Finland, and they were prepared to grant immediate permission for their transportation as far as Sweden. The transfer of the grain to the Finnish side would be permitted, however, only after fulfilment of the conditions laid down had been made certain.²²

During negotiations concerning the conditions of control in February between both parties to the deal, signs of restraint began to appear in the attitude of the White, or legal, Finnish Government. The idea of admitting British observers into the country aroused negative reactions among many who had become accustomed to contemplating the development of future Finnish policy along lines of close collaboration with Germany.²³ The demand that the export to Germany not only of food but also of certain products of the woodworking industry be banned appeared to violate the commercial freedom of action of the Finnish Government.²⁴ Submission to the export ban was apparently inhibited by the prospect of the White forces' obtaining munitions from Germany, which might then insist upon certain deliveries in exchange. Such a likelihood required preserving a free hand in trade.

The discussions in Stockholm and London during February nevertheless appear to have resulted in the Finnish representatives' showing an inclination to accept a kind of control agreement.²⁵ The draft agreement mentions the institution of Allied control measures as well as a ban on food exports to Germany; on the other hand, no mention is made of any ban on the export of products of the woodworking industry.²⁶ The hope of getting the first grain consignment from the United States speedily and of gaining certain other commercial advantages in the West²⁷ evidently had the effect of creating a compliant frame of mind even in pro-German Finnish

circles. The legal Finnish Government at Vaasa, whose representatives abroad were obliged to go about their business without clearly defined instructions on account of the poor communications, was prepared for its part to resort to certain expedients to bolster its position in an uncertain situation.

The march of military events, however, caused the representatives of the Western Allies and of the Finnish Government to move away from each other. The war effort was intensified in Washington, London and Paris, and the Allies aimed to close every possible gap in the blockade of Germany. The waxing strength of the Germans in Eastern Europe was observed with increasing concern by the Western Powers. When the offensive on the Eastern front began toward the end of February, Finland too could be expected to be affected by the course of events.

Advance intelligence regarding German intervention in the Finnish Civil War caused the sympathy — cool that it had been, to be sure — felt in Allied quarters over the supply situation in Finland to vanish. Hoover had repeatedly made known his opposition to Lansing's measures²⁸ and the Department of War Commerce joined him in opposing the shipment of grain to Finland.²⁹ As a consequence the preparatory steps taken in February were halted.³⁰ The negative attitude of the Entente Allies was strengthened by the reports received by them concerning the agreements concluded by the Finnish and German Governments. On March 8 the British Government notified the United States that no grain shipments to Finland would be sanctioned.³¹

The Finnish bid for food had now been stopped dead. Contact both ways was maintained to some extent, it is true, mostly as before by representatives of the different parties stationed in Stockholm. The »negotiations», if the talks might be dignified by such a term, had shifted to a lower diplomatic level. The geopolitical environment, however, was a favorable one, for the Swedish capital provided a good observation post from which to follow the development of the emergency situation that had arisen in Finland.

Evidently the Western Powers had for the time being abandoned their practical preparations to provide Finland with grain; they were now bent upon keeping a close check on the progress of events. The subject of food supplies could serve as a trial balloon. By sounding out the attitude toward it of Finnish representatives now and then, British and American diplomats could draw plausible inferences with respect to the status of relations between Finland and Germany and to the degree of hardening of political sentiment among the Finns toward the Western Allies.³² When events led

to German military intervention in the Finnish Civil War, Finland was no longer a neutral country in the eyes of Germany's enemies. Illustrative is the view expressed by the United States Minister to Stockholm, Ira Morris:

»Allied Ministers are of the opinion that in view of control of Finnish commerce now obtained by Germany any arrangement in *prima facie* undesirable as it would presumably be made only with German consent and is therefore presumably in German interest.»

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the notion gained force in Great Britain and the United States that Germany had obtained a supervisory hold on the political and economic situation in White Finland.³⁴ It was surmised that, impelled by its pro-German leanings, the Finnish Government based in Vaasa would defy the Western Powers and, forfeiting its sovereign rights, make the territory under its rule available to German troops to operate in.³⁵ The World War had reached its decisive stage, and neither side had any scruples about resorting to any action likely to help defeat the enemy. The outbreak of the Civil War had enabled the Germans to obtain a hard grip on Finland and they apparently intended to exploit this advantage to create an opportunity of gaining access to the Arctic coast.

The Western Powers for their part were forced to confine their activity to the use of economic weapons. The United States believed from experience that it could utilize its material resources to guide the policies of such nations as had kept out of the war. Thus it had scored successes in developing trade relations with certain neutral countries, like Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and, most recently, Sweden, at the same time arousing popular sentiment favorable to the Allied cause. The American and British authorities were not inclined, on the other hand, to draw closer to Finland, a country in upheaval, which to an important extent was »under German occupation». In the prevailing circumstances they did not think any good purpose could be served by supplying the hungry Finns with grain.³⁶

Accordingly, the attitude of the Western Powers toward Finland could conceivably change only in two cases: 1) if Finnish politics took a favorable turn from their standpoint during the course of the World War, or 2) if Germany lost the war. As long as no convincing evidence turned up that either thing was happening, the chances appeared to be that the Americans and British would not change their stand toward Finland's bid for food supplies. The end of the Civil War in May 1918 did not alter the complexion of the situation: the German troops stayed in Finland and, looked at from the Allied camp, the country appeared to be politically and economically under German control.³⁷

In Lansing's view it would be unwise for the Western Allies to lure Finland with promises of grain to break relations with Germany. Such a move, as he saw it, might tend to create the impression outwardly that Finland was valuable and important as a pawn in the hostilities against Germany. Instead, the idea should be fostered that Finland was working in collaboration with Germany. If, then, as it appeared, Finland intended to acquire territory for herself with the support of Germany from Russia, the Allies should take a negative position toward any such move and at the same time continue to refuse to let any grain consignments pass.³⁸

The Governments of the Scandinavian countries made attempts in the summer of 1918 to adjust the difficulties in the way of Finland's obtaining relief from the West. Seeing the Finnish scarcity of necessities grow worse than ever, Sweden took the initiative. And when the matter was taken up for discussion at the meeting of Scandinavian foreign ministers held in Copenhagen in the early summer, Denmark and Norway expressed willingness to go along with Sweden. The upshot of the conference was that on August 8 the three Scandinavian Governments simultaneously delivered requests, each couched in approximately the same terms, to the British and United States Governments that grain be shipped to Finland. The amount asked for was not large, only 8,000 tons, but it was considered sufficient to relieve the situation until the next crop could be distributed for public consumption. Efforts were made to find a line of compromise in the question of control, which had previously aroused disagreement: it was proposed that a body chosen by the Scandinavian countries be formed to supervise the distribution of the grain; being neutral it might stand a better chance of acceptance.³⁹

Besides desiring to help the Finns in their distress, Sweden was politically motivated in taking action. The issue of Petsamo had placed a new strain on British-Finnish relations in late June and early July. So Sweden, which had made earlier efforts to ease the tension, was using this joint Scandinavian move as a means to persuade the Finnish authorities to practice greater restraint in collaborating with the Germans.⁴⁰

The responses received by the Scandinavian Governments from London and Washington revealed that the attitude of the United States and Great Britain remained negative. During the course of the summer it had been made known in various connections⁴¹: the »occupation» of Finland was a decisive obstacle to the delivery of grain.⁴² This stand demonstrated that the leading Western Powers actually were convinced that Germany was preparing an offensive operation in the direction of Murmansk and the Arctic coast with Finland serving as the base and that the Finns were in league with the Germans.

At the stage of the Armistice negotiations in October 1918, the general lines of development of events began to take shape rapidly. Insofar as Finland intended to take into account the political prospects of the changed circumstances, she would have to start revising her program of operations, which had been drawn up on a basis of a pro-German orientation. Cutting loose the German ties was all the more important as it was known that after the Armistice had taken effect the blockade of the Central Powers would continue to be maintained and possibly even intensified. At the end of hostilities the victorious powers felt their responsibility for the progress of events extend throughout nearly the whole of Europe, and it forced upon them problems requiring solution beyond their own territories. The food shortage in particular demanded urgent action. The political turnabout on the international scene spurred Finland to consider the expediency of shifting her orientation: the sheer scarcity of the necessities of life offered her no alternatives.

Victory in war thus did not free the Western Powers from further exertions. The overriding problem for them was how to make the shift to the conditions of peace without losing control of the situation and forfeiting victory. According to the logic of »victory», the organization of peace involved a general guardianship by the victors over the vanquished. Only Russia was to be left outside the pale, although certain Western political circles itched to intervene in that country's internal affairs. The need of establishing a system of guardianship was justified not only by the chaotic conditions then prevailing but also by the threatening outbreak of ideological war between the »old states» and Russia. In their efforts to create a new social order on the basis of Lenin's doctrines, the Bolsheviks adopted offensive ideological tactics and aimed their propaganda beyond the borders of their own country.

To meet this aggressive challenge the Western Allies were compelled to set up their own ideological barricades: in addition to upholding their politico-social system, they were confronted with the task of organizing an effective international relief operation. It was at this juncture that the states that had kept out of the war and those that had been created during the final stage of hostilities drew the attention of the political centers of action in London, Paris and Washington. There were not only political but also humanitarian reasons for engaging in relief work. The victorious powers nevertheless treated the defeated Central Powers, especially Germany, severely. As long as the terms of the Peace Treaty and its acceptance remained open on Germany's part, the behavior of the Allies was marked by a toughness aimed at »securing victory». The fear that the revolutionary

movement which had gained momentum among the Central Powers might swing over to the far left seemed to be overshadowed by this aspiration.

The relief program was brought into the framework of a kind of division of labor worked out after the signing of the Armistice by the Western Powers. The United States was awarded total responsibility for the management of this program, while France took over the military supervision of continental Europe and Great Britain the enforcement of the blockade. The part played thereafter by Britain and France in the relief operations was confined to decisions affecting the blockade and the transportation of supplies, while the actual administration of relief became the province of the United States, with its proprietary control of the food stores.

The organization of the relief program was entrusted to Herbert Hoover, whose name had become famous during the war as the administrator of the economic aid given Belgium and to whom President Wilson had now granted broad powers of action. Hoover constructed a large-scale operational network for the distribution of supplies. The local administrative agents in the different countries became known as »Hoover men», and they had at their disposal stores of foodstuffs situated in neutral territory at key points like Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Copenhagen.

Hoover for his part did not relax his hold on the powers granted him to organize the relief operations but, exploiting the prestige and might of the United States, saw to it that his jurisdiction was not narrowed down by the other Allied Powers. He was, it is true, agreeable to maintaining relations with the other Allies on a negotiating level. But he disregarded every proposal and demand for, e.g., the formation of a joint collegial agency with discretionary authority in the matter of distributing supplies.⁴³ Problems confronting Hoover included the organization of shipping facilities and obtaining the co-operation of the authorities in charge of the blockade in arranging grain shipments to various countries.

To Finland overcoming the supply shortage was a matter that, in addition to its practical urgency, under prevailing circumstances could contribute significantly to strengthening the foundations of her sovereign existence. It presupposed, however, the surmounting of certain difficulties, for on account of her political orientation during the spring and summer of 1918 Finland had become branded as an associate of the Central Powers. Thus, when Hoover for the first time after the Armistice took up the question of feeding the hungry in Europe, the political status of Finland was described as »unclear». Politically Finland was lumped together with certain parts of the Russian realm, like the Baltic countries and the Ukraine, as distinguished from the neutral Scandinavian states and the »little Allies», such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Serbia.⁴⁴

Before the Armistice negotiations opened Secretary of State Lansing had repeated his earlier view that Finland should be considered an occupied country, which the Germans were liable to use unopposed in military operations against the Western Allies.⁴⁵ During the negotiations Allied representatives gave vent in numerous connections to their displeasure over Finland's political course up to that time. The British made it known that the Finnish Government had not been recognized, and the adverse attitude of the Americans was reflected in their continued unwillingness to let the Finns have grain. Sweden's renewed efforts to obtain a grain allocation for Finland by acting as intermediary in arrangements were given the cold shoulder by Washington.⁴⁶

Signs of a change in the Allied policy toward Finland began to appear after the signing of the Armistice, when growing burdens of responsibility for the progress of events in Europe weighed down the shoulders of the political leaders of the victorious powers.

The active interest shown by Sweden in combating the supply scarcity in Finland had not waned in the meantime. At this stage Sweden had proposed in conjunction with Denmark, in response to suggestions made from Finnish quarters, that each of the two countries deliver 5,000 tons of grain from its own stores to give Finland temporary relief from scarcity on condition that the Allies later make good this total allocation of 10,000 tons.⁴⁷ The United States announced its acceptance of this plan in principle, and the British authorities also expressed a willingness to go along with it. At the same time both the Americans and the British stressed their opposition to treating the case of Finland separately but rather as part of the total program to be organized for the relief of Europe in general. It was specifically pointed out on this occasion, moreover, that the administration of the program had been entrusted to Mr. Herbert Hoover.⁴⁸

After arriving in Europe on November 26, Hoover proceeded to deal with the situation with characteristic vigor. London and Paris served as his two main centers of operation. The concentration of the relief program by the Western Powers caused Finland to resort to a corresponding centralization of authority in the matter. It was the Finnish envoy in London, Mr. Rudolf Holsti, who was charged with the task of procuring foodstuffs for his country. Shortly afterward it was deemed judicious to cancel the authority given Mr. Valkeapää, who had been sent to the United States on a grain-procurement mission.⁴⁹

In the general relief program drawn up by Hoover before his arrival in Europe, Finland had been marked down as needing »some assistance».⁵⁰ It thus appeared that Finland was not regarded as a primary target of relief

operations. In proceeding to act in his new capacity Holsti first contacted Hoover's secretary Lewis, to whom he painted a lurid picture of the distress prevailing in his country. The only bread eaten in many parts of the country, he pointed out, was made of pine bark, and the mortality rate among infants and expectant mothers was the highest in its history.⁵¹ This sort of appeal met with a strong response when Holsti gained the opportunity to repeat it directly to Hoover.⁵²

The discussions between Hoover and Holsti begun on December 7 quickly led to important decisions affecting Finland. First Hoover agreed to have the United States later make up out of its own stores grain to the amount of 11,000 tons if Sweden and Denmark would, as they had proposed earlier, proceed to make it available to the Finns immediately. In addition to the grain shipments from Scandinavia, which presumably sufficed to cover the most urgent first month's need, Hoover said the United States was prepared to place at the disposal of the Finnish Government the following monthly quotas of foodstuffs: 10,000 tons of grain products, 2,000 tons of pork, 1,000 tons of fats and 1,000 tons of sugar.⁵³

Considering that in Allied eyes Finland still belonged to the blockaded area, the measures taken by Hoover called for another decision of no small consequence in principle: the authority in charge of the blockade announced that the deliveries to Finland approved by the Allied supply authorities had been liberated.⁵⁴ The contact achieved by Holsti with the highest American supply authorities, thanks to his energetic efforts, was important to Finland not only from the standpoint of alleviating the supply shortage but also politically. Finland had thus approached the Western Allies on her own, and this proved to be an opportune point of departure for the acquisition of fully acknowledged international status.

The principles involved in making foodstuffs available to Finland had accordingly been decided, but there were still many practical problems to be solved. The bureaucratic machinery set up during the war to regulate the actions of the authorities in charge of the blockade and other measures functioned slowly as far as special problems such as the removal of the multiple obstacles to Finland's commercial aspirations were concerned. Making decisions concerning the distribution of food supplies was Hoover's prerogative. But the implementation of these decisions was hampered by many of the negative factors spawned by the war, including the red tape involved in financing supplies, the shortage of merchant tonnage and coal and the danger to shipping of mines.

The solution to the problem of transportation was retarded specifically by the reluctance of the United States to permit its merchantmen to sail

into Baltic waters owing to the mine threat.⁵⁵ A further complication was the loss of Finnish tonnage through confiscation abroad — some of the Finnish ships had been seized in German ports around the time the Armistice was signed. The Finnish authorities had hoped to be able to depend on tonnage belonging to Allied Powers. But when this recourse appeared to be closed (being opened up only later), the possibilities were explored for the purchase of trading vessels from either England or the United States. Moreover, efforts were made to release native shipping engaged in other tasks for the transportation of foodstuffs.

The situation seemed to ease up slightly in early January 1919, when Hoover announced⁵⁶ that the supplies promised Finland would be delivered to Rotterdam, whence the purchasing country would have to take care of their transportation the rest of the way. Compared to the other alternatives in sight this solution afforded the advantage of reducing the transport distance to a fraction of what it would have been had the Finns been obliged to fetch the supplies from American ports in their own bottoms.

In practice, however, another retarding factor entered the picture: the ships the Finns managed to muster for service were kept lying idle in Rotterdam harbor, waiting for their grain cargoes to be loaded. This was because certain consignments of foodstuffs had been shipped from the United States as far as Copenhagen for reshipment to Finland, while other consignments were carried the whole way.⁵⁷ By a decision of the blockade authority on February 24,⁵⁸ Finland was recognized as belonging in the same category as the neutrals like the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. The Inter-Allied Trade Committee that had set up headquarters in Helsinki thereafter kept tabs on Finland's foreign trade relations.⁵⁹

The foregoing cluster of multifarious problems of organization had the inevitable effect of delaying the achievement of practical results on the basis of previously endorsed principles. »The practical difficulties,» Holsti stated in a report to the Finnish Foreign Ministry dated February 17, 1919, »have been too great, indeed impossible, to overcome sooner. In Finland it can scarcely be appreciated that even in the conduct of all their own affairs the same sort of dilatoriness prevails among the Entente states as a universal phenomenon. The official machinery is completely worn out, and the more extensive and the more complex it has grown during the course of the war, the more numerous are the points at which a halt in operations threatens.»⁶⁰

The aforementioned circumstances contributed to the result that whereas the grain shipments promised by Sweden and Denmark (i.e., the ones Hoover had agreed to make up later out of stores in the United States)

arrived in Finland before the year 1918 was quite over, the first consignments of food intended to be delivered each month on a regular quota basis started to arrive in Finnish ports on February 20, 1919, and by the end of the same month five ships carrying cargoes of American supplies had reached this country. All told, the food supplies delivered to the Finnish authorities by Hoover's organization in, for instance, the month of March amounted to 26,344 tons and in April to 27,256 tons.⁶¹ In the late winter of 1919 Hoover consented to increase the monthly quota of foodstuffs previously fixed,⁶² in addition to which, according to the terms of a separate agreement with the United States, Denmark delivered to Finland an extra 10,000-ton consignment of grain (the Danes having been promised a corresponding amount from America at a later date)⁶³. Britain and Norway likewise pitched in with small shipments of grain.⁶⁴

Special difficulties were confronted in working out the matter of payment for the supply deliveries. When it first cropped up at the beginning of December 1918, on the occasion of Hoover's central agency's agreeing in principle to accede to the Finnish appeal for food, great was the surprise of the Americans, according to Lewis L. Strauss, to learn from Holsti that Finland was prepared to pay immediately. The Finnish envoy made reference in this connection to the money deposited in the United States in the summer of 1917 as advance payment for grain purchased at the time but never delivered.

The Finnish proposal had a novel twist in Hoover's experience. It caused astonishment because it came at a time when the general tendency in Europe was to appeal to American open-handedness as a means of surmounting financial problems.⁶⁵ It gave the impression that the Finns did not expect to need credit before the advance deposit had been spent. For his own part Hoover considered it a matter of course that Finland would be able to pay for her purchases with the currency deposited to her credit at the National City Bank in New York.

At this juncture, however, the State Department intervened. At the turn of the year it proclaimed that inasmuch as the United States Government had not accorded recognition to the Finnish Government then in office, no orders could be issued for the utilization of the money deposited by Finland. To prevent the situation from developing into an impasse, Hoover thereupon agreed to accept payment in British currency, which Finland had deposited in London. But this did not solve things either, for the British Government would not permit the pounds to be taken out of the country. The solution was worked out at the beginning of February 1919 by an agreement that the money belonging to Finland in London would serve as

security given to the United States. As soon as the dollars frozen in the National City Bank were released for making payments, the checks in pound sterling would be returned to the Finnish authorities. Subsequently, Hoover persuaded the National City Bank to agree to transfer the Finnish funds, amounting to approximately 8.5 million dollars, to the American food supplier as soon as the Bank of Finland issued the order.⁶⁶

There was a delay, however, in the issuance of this order, as a consequence of which the danger arose toward the end of March that the grain deliveries to Finland might be discontinued.⁶⁷ Moreover, the pounds available to Finland in London gave out. Indeed, at one stage, the Finnish envoy, Ossian Donner, had to furnish a personal guarantee, in a way, when the Finnish account was considerably overdrawn as a result of continuous payments.⁶⁸ The Bank of Finland probably hesitated to authorize a transfer of the funds deposited in New York for fear the American supply authorities would be paid twice for deliveries — full payment in dollars and the corresponding amount in pounds sterling, represented by the security furnished in London. The question of compensation for the previously confiscated grain might, it was suspected, remain unsettled.⁶⁹

The efforts made to clear up the matter of payment had the effect of increasing Hoover's activity, in the political sector, as is recounted in another chapter, toward gaining recognition for the independence of Finland. While the supply problem was being hashed out, economic contacts between the United States and Finland spread with both sides seeking to develop trade relations under peaceful conditions. Russia's having become isolated on account of the chaotic situation prevailing in that country and Germany's having lost its capacity to make advances in the commercial sphere by the collapse of its military power, the victorious Western Allies were in an exceptionally favorable position to capture new markets for themselves. The United States, whose productive machinery had not been directly damaged by the war, as had by contrast, for example, that of France, was the first of the belligerents to regain its feet commercially. The steadily growing American industry began to seek new outlets for its products in Europe.

The press had watchfully followed the progress of Finland's efforts to overcome the shortage of supplies. From the middle of December 1918, reports started to appear in the Finnish newspapers regarding grain shipments likely to arrive shortly. Mostly in the form of news dispatches, these reports at first referred to the assistance promised by the Scandinavian countries and later to the food consignments planned for delivery on a monthly basis from the United States.⁷⁰ The news correspondents seem to

have been ignorant of Mr. Herbert Hoover's position as administrative director of the international relief operations. Thus, one report explained that the decision to furnish Finland with foodstuffs had been made in the United States and that the responsible party actually was an outsider.⁷¹

Upon his return home from his mission abroad, just before Christmas, General Mannerheim made known in a communiqué addressed to the Finnish nation that there had been a favorable turn in the supply crisis. He stated that the benevolent promise of the Western Allies to make grain available to Finland would be fulfilled in the near future.⁷² The previously disseminated information concerning food imports was thereby authoritatively confirmed. Before that there had been no official announcement from the Government on the matter. The supply situation was now expected to grow brighter. Extra comfort was drawn from the knowledge that Finland was getting an »advance share».⁷³ When around the time of the Regent's return the initial shipment of grain out of the 5,000-ton Swedish allocation was delivered, it was interpreted as »Mannerheim's Christmas present» to the Finnish people.⁷⁴

Herbert Hoover, who had made the decisions regarding assistance to Finland, really wielded powers tantamount to dictatorial control of the Allied relief program. This side of the matter seems to have escaped the comprehension of the Finnish public at first, but gradually, as the name Hoover became known, it began to take on legendary features. His organization — »Hoover's men» — became famous for its efficiency and speedy action. The name of the relief director even spawned a new functional concept: *hooveroida*, a Finnish verb meaning in general to work for the elimination of hunger.⁷⁵

Evidently, Holsti with his dramatic descriptions of the distress in Finland had influenced the decisions taken to send relief. In his preliminary plans, as noted, Hoover had marked Finland down only as needing »some assistance». But, as it turned out, the shipments to Finland were on a considerable scale, in addition to which special measures were adopted to expedite the deliveries.

On his mission to Western Europe, Mannerheim did not directly influence the decisions in Finland's favor in the sphere of relief. It was with the British and the French authorities that he conferred — and not with any of the American public leaders active on the European scene. Around the same time as the decisions were being made in principle with regard to the Finnish appeal for assistance at Hoover's headquarters in London, Mannerheim was on his return journey to the British capital from Paris. His diplomatic activity therefore had no direct bearing on the resolution

of the supply problem, but he did make a contribution indirectly by breaking down political barriers. This is true specifically as far as England and France were concerned. The fruits reaped by Mannerheim included the readiness of the Allies to exempt the supply deliveries to Finland from the blockade. The warmth displayed by British Foreign Secretary Balfour toward Mannerheim had its influence here, too.

The political conditions laid down in connection with the relief operations were not apparently adhered to rigidly — with the exception of the demand that the German troops get out of Finland. In a memorandum written by Hoover in the middle of November 1918, the Finnish line of foreign policy was described as confused. Following that date, not only had the forces under von der Goltz withdrawn from Finnish territory, but the Finnish Government had changed, Mannerheim had carried out his special diplomatic mission to London and Paris, and, under the pressure of the Allied Governments, Germany itself had renounced the secret articles incorporated in the trade pact concluded with Finland March 7.

Insofar as political factors affected the Allied position in connection with the settlement of the relief question, they were primarily of a general nature following the signing of the Armistice and as such simultaneously applicable to relations with several other countries as well: by overcoming famine, or at least speedily alleviating it, the Allies sought to avert chaos. The humanitarian program was designed in the last analysis to prevent the spread of Bolshevism over the Russian borders into the rest of Europe. Looked at from this vantage point, Finland might be considered to be either a buffer state or a bridge between East and West. As conditions became stabilized in the area of the new independent states, the assistance given might serve as a point of departure for the opening of commercial relations with the United States.

After the American supply shipments began to arrive in Finland at a rapid rate at the end of February 1919, the solution of the emergency on such a large scale was bound to have its political repercussions. The benevolence shown Finland in the supply crisis was tantamount to material recognition of her newly won independence by the West.

NOTES

¹ Tanner, *Kuinka se oikein tapahtui. Vuosi 1918 esivaiheineen ja jälkiselvittelyineen* (How It Really Happened. The Year 1918 with Its Preliminary Stages and Ensuing Adjustments.), p. 82.

² Communication from Ab Skandinaviska Handelskompaniet of Aug. 10 to Grace & Company's agent in London (Copy: State Dep't 860 d. 48/42).

³ Communication from Grace & Company dated Oct. 22 to Mr. F. L. Polk, chief of section in the State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 48/42), and Kaarlo Ignatius' communication of Dec. 4 to the State Dep't. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, pp. 573, 574.

⁴ Lansing's communication of Oct. 27 to the U.S. Embassy in Petrograd (State Dep't 860 d. 48/43).

⁵ Communication of Nov. 6 from the Russian Foreign Ministry to the Russian Embassy in Washington (State Dep't 860 d. 48/43).

⁶ Hoover's communication of Nov. 12 to Polk (State Dep't 860 d. 48/48).

⁷ Hoover's communication to Lansing of Nov. 16 (State Dep't 860 d. 48/49).

⁸ Helsingin Sanomat 26 X Tuontitoiveet raukeavat (Import Hopes Dashed); Hufvudstadsbladet 27 X Ett hårt slag för vår livsmedelsförsörjning.

⁹ Georg v. Wendt was sent to Stockholm and Väinö Vuolijoki to Berlin to pursue the matter.

¹⁰ Haynes' report of Nov. 5 to the State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 48/64).

¹¹ Lansing's instructions to Hoover (State Dep't 860 d. 48/13 a). — In his aforementioned communication of Dec. 4 to the State Dep't, Ignatius asserted that hunger and death threatened a large part of the population.

¹² Hoover's communication of Dec. 12 addressed to Lansing (State Dep't 860 d. 48/57); Polk's communication of Jan. 12, 1918, addressed to the Dep't of War Commerce (State Dep't 860 d. 48/55).

¹³ Polk's communication of Jan. 12 to British Commercial Attaché R. Crawford (State Dep't 860 d. 48/3 a).

¹⁴ Memorandum of the State Dep't dated Jan. 4, Food Supplies for Finland, (State Dep't 869 d. 48/66) and Crawford's communication of Jan. 4 to Polk. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, p. 575.

¹⁵ Lansing's communication of Jan. 9 to the U.S. Legation in Stockholm (State Dep't 860 d. 48/53a).

¹⁶ Lansing's telegraphic message of Jan. 16 to Haynes. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, p. 586; also Polk's cablegram of Jan. 22 to the U.S. Embassy in London (State Dep't 860 d. 48/70).

¹⁷ Ignatius' communication of Jan. 11 to Polk (State Dep't 860 d. 48/69).

¹⁸ Polk's telegram of Jan. 12 to the Dep't of War Commerce (State Dep't 860 d. 48/55).

¹⁹ Holsti's report of Jan. 27 to the Senate (Ulkoministeriö (Finnish Foreign Ministry) 5 C 7) and the communication of Jan. 31 from the British Embassy in Washington to the State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 48/5).

²⁰ Telegram of Jan. 29 from I. Morris, U.S. Minister to Stockholm, addressed to the State Dep't. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, p. 577.

²¹ Lansing's telegram of Feb. 7 to the U.S. Embassy in London (State Dep't 860 d. 48/75).

²² Telegram jointly sent on Feb. 2 by Wolff, Kihlman and Holsti to A. Gripenberg, Finnish Chargé d'affaires in Stockholm (Copy: Ulkoministeriö 1 P c).

²³ A. Gripenberg's telegram (date of receipt Feb. 7) to Senator Heikki Renvall (Copy: Ulkoministeriö 1 P c).

²⁴ Helsingin Sanomat 3 XI, 1918 Englannin suhtautuminen elintarvikekysy-

mykseemme (England's Attitude toward Our Food Question) (article written by Senator Renvall in polemical response to an article of the same name published on Oct. 31 in the same newspaper on the basis of information supplied by A. M. Tollet).

²⁵ Supplement entitled »Förslag till öfverenskommelse mellan de allierade och Finland angående import af livsmedelnödenheter samt råmaterial till Finland» belonging to Holsti's report of March 2 to the Finnish Government while it operated out of the city of Vaasa (Copy: Holsti's collection CXXXIII).

²⁶ Morris, telegram of Feb. 27 to the U.S. State Dep't — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, p. 578.

²⁷ Aforementioned telegram from Alexis Gripenberg to Renvall (received Feb. 7) and his telegram (undated) to the Finnish Government in Vaasa (Kai Donner's papers) as well as the communication of March 4 from the Commercial Attaché of the British Embassy in Washington to Polk (State Dep't 860 d. 48/3).

²⁸ Hoover's communication of Feb. 11 to Lansing (State Dep't 860 d. 48/179).

²⁹ The memorandum of the Dep't of War Commerce dated March 1 (State Dep't 860 d. 48/85).

³⁰ Holsti's report of March 14 to the Finnish Gov't in Vaasa (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

³¹ Telegram of March 8 from W. H. Page, U.S. Ambassador in London, to the State Dep't. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918: Russia II, p. 777.

³² Morris, From an American Legation, p. 180.

³³ Morris' telegram of March 16 to the State Dep't. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, pp. 578, 579.

³⁴ Morris' telegram of March 11 to the State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 00/46).

³⁵ Statement of June 11 to Holsti by L. P. Sheldon, U.S. Commercial Attaché in London (Holsti's report of June 13 to Finnish Gov't. Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

³⁶ Valkeapää, Selostus toiminnastaan elintarpeiden hankkimiseksi Amerikasta Suomeen vuosina 1918—1919 (Report on His Activities Seeking Food Supplies for Finland from America in the Years 1918—1919), p. 15.

³⁷ Wilson's communication of May 20 to Lansing (State Dep't 860 d. 00/163); Polk's telegram of June 8 to the U.S. Legation in Stockholm (State Dep't 860 d. 48/26); communication of June 10 to Polk from the chief French commissariat situated in Washington (State Dep't 860 d. 48/28).

³⁸ Lansing's telegram of July 6 to the U.S. Embassy in London. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1918. Supplement 2, p. 582.

³⁹ Memorandum addressed by the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish Governments on Aug. 8 to the State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 48/19—21).

⁴⁰ Höjer's memorandum of July 19 (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 26) and Hellner's communication of July 27 to Westman (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 26).

⁴¹ Communication dated July 30 to Polk from the chief French commissariat situated in Washington, D.C. (State Dep't 860 d. 48/8) as well as Holsti's reports of July 19 and 31 to the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

⁴² Lansing's telegram of Aug. 20 to the U.S. Embassy in Oslo (State Dep't 860 d. 48/35); Lansing's memorandum of Aug. 17 (State Dep't 860 d. 48/19) and the British Foreign Ministry's memorandum of Aug. 23 to the Swedish Legation in London (Copy: State Dep't 860 d. 48/37).

⁴³ Hoover's letter (undated) to Alexander Loveday. — Organization of American Relief in Europe 1918—1919. Documents, pp. 3, 4; Wolfe, Herbert Hoover, pp. 57—59; Hinskow, Herbert Hoover, pp. 108, 109.

⁴⁴ Hoover's memorandum of Nov. 22 concerning the lines along which the European food problem should be solved. — Organization of American Relief in Europe 1918—1919, pp. 50, 51.

⁴⁵ Lansing's memorandum of Sept. 20 (State Dep't 860 d. 48/24).

⁴⁶ Lansing's telegram of Oct. 15 to the U.S. Legation in Stockholm (State Dep't 860 d. 48/92).

⁴⁷ Communication of Nov. 18 from the Swedish Legation in Washington, D.C., to the State Dep't State Dep't 860 d. 48/111).

⁴⁸ Communication of Nov. 28 from the Dep't of War Commerce to Polk (State Dep't 860 d. 48/118); communication of Nov. 30 from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., to the State Dep't (State Dept 860 d. 48/115).

⁴⁹ Enckell's telegram of Jan. 3 to Valkeapää (Ulkoministeriö 58 b 1); telegram of Jan. 29 from the Finnish Foreign Ministry to Valkeapää (Ulkoministeriö 58 b 1); also Haynes' telegram of Jan. 6 to the U.S. Peace Commission (State Dep't 860 d. 00/346).

⁵⁰ Aforementioned memorandum of Hoover's, Nov. 22.

⁵¹ Lewis L. Strauss' letter of Aug. 22, 1945, to Urho Toivola.

⁵² The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover I, pp. 363, 364.

⁵³ Hoover's telegram of Dec. 7 to Sheldon («A Preliminary Program for Finland») — Hoover-Holsti Documents 1918—1920, pp. 10, 11; Holsti's reports of Dec. 14 and Dec. 21 to the Finnish Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

⁵⁴ Laughlin's telegram of Dec. 10 to the State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d. 48/119); communication of British Foreign Office dated Dec. 14 to Holsti (Copy: in Holsti's report of Dec. 21 to the Finnish Foreign Ministry).

⁵⁵ Holsti's communication of Jan. 8 to the Finnish Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 58 B 1).

⁵⁶ Holsti's report of Jan. 8 to the Finnish Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 58 B 1).

⁵⁷ Tables 111 and 307 in the work Surface and Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period.

⁵⁸ Minutes of Feb. 24 of the High Blockade Council (State Dep't 180.05101/6).

⁵⁹ Harmaja, Maailmansodan vaikutus Suomen taloudelliseen kehitykseen (The Effect of the World War on the Economic Development of Finland), p. 330.

⁶⁰ Holsti's report of Feb. 17 to the Finnish Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

⁶¹ Table No. 111 mentioned in Note 57; Hoover's memoranda of April 14 and May 17 (Bliss' collection) as well as Ruhl, New Masters of the Baltic, pp. 48—51.

⁶² Holsti mentions Hoover as having subsequently given promises (Strauss' communication of Jan. 24 to Holsti. — Hoover-Holsti Documents 1918—1920, p. 58; Holsti's communication of March 6 to Hoover (Ulkoministeriö 58 B 1) that the monthly supply quota would be raised to 25,000 tons (the commitment in effect having called for 14,000 tons). On April 26 Hoover informed Holsti that Finland would be permitted to buy from the United States as much food as she was capable of paying for and transporting (Holsti's report of April 28 to the Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 58 B 1)).

⁶³ Saastamoinen's telegram of Feb. 18 to the Finnish Foreign Ministry (Ulko-ministeriö 58 B 1).

⁶⁴ Surface and Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period*, p. 183.

⁶⁵ Lewis L. Strauss' letter of Aug. 22, 1945, to Urho Toivola.

⁶⁶ Holsti's communication of April 11 to Enckell (Ulko-ministeriö 58 B 1).

⁶⁷ Robert A. Taft's communication of March 28 to Enckell (Ulko-ministeriö 58 B 1).

⁶⁸ Ossian Donner, *Min tid*, p. 156.

⁶⁹ Communication from Otto Stenroth and others, dated April 28, to the Bank of Finland (Copy: Ulko-ministeriö 58 B 1).

⁷⁰ News dispatches published in the *Helsingin Sanomat* of Dec. 14, 16 and 17.

⁷¹ Valkeapää, in a telegram to Enckell dated Dec. 10 (State Dep't 860 d. 48/15), had explained that, in response to a proposal of his, Hoover had endorsed a large quantity of food supplies for export to Finland; at first relief shipments granted by Sweden and Denmark would be sent to Finland, after which monthly shipments could be regularly delivered from the U.S. A report to this effect soon reached the press (News dispatches in *Helsingin Sanomat* of Dec. 16). Later, the report was described, according to a »reliable source», as erroneous and it was pointed out that Finland's representatives in London had made the agreement with Hoover on the grain deliveries (News reports published on Dec. 28 in *Uusi Suometar*).

⁷² Mannerheim's announcement of Dec. 22 to the Finnish nation (*Helsingin Sanomat*, Dec. 23).

⁷³ *Uusi Suometar*, Dec. 24, *Leipäviljan saanti* (Procurement of Bread Grain).

⁷⁴ *Hufvudstadsbladet* 23 XII *Riksföreståndarens första budskap*; *Helsingin Sanomat* 28 XII *Kirje Helsingistä* (Letter from Helsinki).

⁷⁵ Another popular saying with reference to the arrival of relief supplies was: »hooveria tulee» (some Hoover is coming). In northern Finland (at least) pork was popularly called »Wilsonin pintaa» (Wilson's flesh).

Chapter V

The Recognition of Finnish Independence and the Policy of the Western Powers

When the matter of approaching the Western Powers was brought up in the Finnish Government during the Armistice negotiations, the attention of those who supported the move was drawn, as previously indicated, to General Mannerheim. There was much to recommend him for the mission: Mannerheim was a very distinguished looking gentleman with an authoritative mien, and his political views had been colored by Russia's membership in the Entente during his career as a military officer in the service of the Czar. It was in an army allied with the West that he had fought in the World War. But opinion was divided, to be sure, as to whether Mannerheim had lent his support to the White appeal for German aid in the spring of 1918 or whether he had simply been confronted with a *fait accompli* when word reached him that German troops had landed on Finnish soil.

In any case, Mannerheim regarded the »comradeship-in-arms» with the Germans as a temporary arrangement, one that should not last longer than the Civil War; and he suspected the Germans of planning to exploit their intervention to gain political objectives in the Arctic area. The resignation in May of Mannerheim as commander-in-chief as a result of disagreement with the pro-German Government apparently bolstered Allied confidence in him. His withdrawal from the political scene exposed his Entente sympathies in a clearer light than had been the case in previous months.

When the Government turned to Mannerheim, who had moved to Sweden, for help in its efforts to improve Finland's relations with the Western Powers in order to facilitate gaining recognition of the country's independence, he did not at first lend it an entirely sympathetic ear. After all, as he felt justified in declaring, he was living in »exile». But, after overcoming his misgivings, which obviously had an emotional basis, he agreed to accept the proffered assignment provided he could act as a private citizen rather than as an official envoy. This reservation may be interpreted as having been inspired partly by unwillingness to commit himself to collaboration with a Government that less than half a year earlier had approved his resignation from the post of commander-in-chief, and partly by the fact that he could not possibly be sure in advance of the results of the

proposed mission to London and Paris. Besides, in a private capacity, Mannerheim would have the opportunity, in the event negotiations got under way, to act with greater freedom than as an authorized agent of the Government, in which case he would have been obliged to follow instructions. He would have the freedom to act as he saw fit; and this was clearly demonstrated when Mannerheim drafted his plan of action and formulated the methods he intended to use in the negotiations.

Mannerheim wanted no part of the responsibility for the line of foreign policy pursued by Finland during and after the Civil War. In his view it would have been possible to bring about a more cordial understanding with the Western Powers, or even to create a propitious mood for negotiations, if, disregarding their position, the negotiator proceeded to support pro-German policy. The march of events had been swift, producing a situation less auspicious than ever for Finland. President Wilson's notes in response to Germany's bid for a truce began, as already mentioned, to extend their influence to the Finnish question, too. And they placed in a dubious light the political decisions of previous months and the continued presence of German troops in Finland.

The series of notes delivered to Finland included one that further complicated the task of dealing with the situation, which had taken on the aspect of a crisis. It was the French Government's notification (likewise referred to in the foregoing) that it would break off diplomatic relations with Finland on account of the election of a King. The situation was truly, as Prime Minister Paasikivi described it, one to »inspire anxiety».¹ The Government, which evidently considered a change in the composition of the Government necessary, nevertheless was inclined to temporize. Most of the Ministers, who were at their wits' end concerning the course of foreign policy, wished to see a monarchic majority in the re-formed Government to insure the preservation of the dominant position held by the Conservatives. In transmitting the Senate's request to Mannerheim, Enckell had indicated that the proposed mission was designed to gain the recognition of the British Government and to restore relations between Finland and France.² In connection with these problems, Mannerheim should try to ascertain the attitude of the Western Powers toward the election of the King. Mannerheim promised to keep these objectives in mind also to uphold the choice of Friedrich Karl as the Finnish sovereign.³ At this point, Mannerheim's traditional monarchic leanings appear to have taken precedence over his pro-Entente sentiments.

Obviously, Mannerheim had begun to have faith in his chances of success. It is hardly conceivable that a person of his character, who was

extremely resistant to persuasive pressure,⁴ would have been likely to accept any assignment that struck him as unpromising. With respect to British recognition, for example, Mannerheim was hopeful, whereas he was somewhat doubtful whether France, the politics of which he described as having been »very temperamental«, would be particularly eager to have normal relations with Finland restored.⁵ In addition, Mannerheim formulated the settlement of the question not only of the Åland Islands but also of East Karelia along the lines of Finland's desire.

Mannerheim's optimism stemmed from his belief that Finland could offer the Western Powers something in return for the resolution in her favor of all the issues mentioned. He had in mind a scheme of intervention designed to capture St. Petersburg (Petrograd) from the Bolsheviks. The scheme was Mannerheim's own; under the prevailing critical conditions, the members of the Government, who were conscious of the insecurity of their position, could scarcely have entertained such notions of military activity.

Mannerheim thus reverted to a previous military plan⁶ of his, presented the summer before on certain occasions — now deviating from its earlier lines in that the intervention would be carried out, not by the great powers, but by Finland in league with the neutral Scandinavian countries.⁷ He believed that the implementation of this plan would afford the Western Powers such an opportunity to look after their interests in Russia as to effect a speedy change for the better in their political attitude toward Finland — with the desired results.

Mannerheim's departure was delayed, and he did not arrive in London until November 12 — that is, the day after the signing of the Armistice.⁸ In view of the prevailing excitement, the political atmosphere was not propitious to his mission. Victory had lifted the Allied peoples to transports of joy, but the end of armed hostilities did not end the bitter hatred of the enemy, Germany, which had demonstrated its dangerous power; and while such a feeling swayed the public temper, Finland could easily be branded, it is reasonable to suppose, as an ally of the enemy.⁹ It had been hoped in Finland — and Mannerheim's mission reflected this hope — that the Finnish question could be resolved before the general peace settlement because it was liable, as a »minor issue«, to be buried under bigger issues at the conference table.

In London, Mannerheim was briefed on the prevailing British mood and trends of thought by Holsti, who, as the Finnish envoy there, had gained an insight into the situation. Holsti pointed out that the election of a German king had stirred up sentiment against Finland and created the

impression that the political leadership of the country was obstinately sticking to its old line. The attention received by Mannerheim in London proved to be cool, and the matters he had to submit for consideration met with a half-unwilling response. It became clear in the discussions that the British Government was not prepared to take a separate stand toward the question of recognizing Finnish independence: the Western Allies intended to make a joint, negotiated decision.

On the other hand, the British made much of the fact that Finland had accepted German assistance, made friendly overtures to the Central Powers and opened up her territory as a field of operations for their Arctic policy.¹⁰ This was the way London looked at things, and Mannerheim's task was to break through the British mental barrier in order to make headway toward gaining recognition of Finland's independence.

Mannerheim managed to contact certain of the British foreign policy makers, such as Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour and his assistant R. Cecil, but discussion with them was stiff and centered mostly on the position of Finland in 1918. From the standpoint of clearing up the situation, Cecil considered it completely improper that Friedrich Karl become King of Finland.¹¹ He let it be understood that Finland had sought recognition prematurely; she would first have to give proof that her course of foreign policy had changed. The view represented by Holsti¹² had — upon the landing of the German troops on Finnish soil — led the British Foreign Office to suspect that the Government's pro-German leanings and monarchic sentiments were in conflict with the will of the majority of the Finnish public. Accordingly, the British authorities deemed it fitting to set forth as the prerequisites of a resolution of the Finnish question the withdrawal of von der Goltz's troops from Finland and the settlement of the issue of the Form of Government by a Parliament voted into office at new elections.

Mannerheim was unable to dissipate the oppressive atmosphere generated by the Finnish question. He tried to bring about a more conciliatory attitude by explaining that the traditional form of government established in Finland was a monarchical one,¹³ but as applied to the prevailing situation this explanation struck the British Government representatives as far-fetched. The general had previously failed to grasp sufficiently the fact that Entente observers¹⁴ saw in the German intervention in the Finnish Civil War, the resolution of the constitutional dispute in favor of a monarchical system and the choice of a German prince as candidate for the Finnish throne a consistent sequence of events systematically directed by their enemy — one that validated the view held by the British regarding Finland as a kind of German protectorate.

One of the first political conclusions drawn by Mannerheim in London was that the project to crown the prince king, which he had at first supported, would have to be abandoned. This conclusion he transmitted to the Government in a cablegram sent on November 17. It was in his opinion an obligation that would absolutely have to be fulfilled before any results could be expected in subsequent negotiations. The final reckoning of Mannerheim's mission in London was, in spite of everything, on the plus side, although, regarded in short perspective, it did not promise much. The British Government appeared to be irrevocably committed to its thesis that the question of recognizing Finnish independence, which was still an open one in British and American eyes, would have to be decided jointly by the Western Powers. In any case, it had been ascertained where the main trouble lay, from the Entente standpoint, in clearing up the Finnish situation. Mannerheim also took up for discussion the issue of the status of the Åland Islands, but the British dismissed it as premature — and otherwise, too, British opinion seemed to run counter to Finnish interests in that sector. Nor did the annexation of part of East Karelia by Finland meet with any favorable response in London.

By the time of Mannerheim's arrival in Paris at the end of November, the progress of events set in motion by the World War had wrought a change in Finnish political conditions in the direction indicated by the Western Allies, though, to be sure, this change took place in a spirit of great caution. Half the members of Ingman's Government, which replaced the German-oriented Government headed by Paasikivi, were republicans friendly to the Entente. Yet, the Prime Minister (the terms Council of State, Minister, etc., came into use on November 27) was a well known »royalist», a circumstance hardly likely to inspire confidence in Allied circles. In Paris, Mannerheim's mission was hampered by the news reports published in the local press about the change in the Finnish Government. These dispatches placed special stress on the fact that the new Prime and Interior Ministers had but a short time before, in October, been members of the delegation that had called upon the Prince of Hesse to inform him of his election as King of Finland¹⁵ — not only that, but readers were reminded that the former had actually headed the delegation. Mannerheim's embarrassment was reflected by his statement, issued at this time, that Ingman's Government did not represent his personal choice of ministers.¹⁶

Mannerheim's objective was the restoration of diplomatic relations between Finland and France, the breaking off of which some observers thought might lead to a retraction of the recognition of Finnish independence

granted at the beginning of January, 1918. The general claimed to have received a promise that relations would be restored from Foreign Minister Pichon. Clemenceau, however, had laid down stiff terms after conferring with Cabinet Secretary Berthelot of the Foreign Ministry: the restoration of relations was contingent upon the holding of parliamentary elections to determine the popular will, after which a new government should be formed on the basis of the results and issue a declaration pledging its pursuit of a line of foreign policy friendly to the Entente. The terms further called for the nomination of a head of State who enjoyed the confidence of the Allies.¹⁷

Mannerheim relates that in Paris he was received with greater warmth than in London. There he felt more at home, thanks to earlier sojourns, and his familiarity with French culture and, ultimately, his fluent command of the French language were to his advantage. In the more relaxed environment, he tended on occasion to be fairly outspoken. With regard to the question of the Åland Islands, for example, he took an uncompromising stand and minced no words. If, he observed, the Peace Conference decided to hand the islands over to Sweden, blood would flow, and if, he added, an attempt was made to subdue the Finns with a food blockade, the citizenry of Helsinki would sooner perish of hunger in the streets than acquiesce in the seizure of the archipelago by any foreign power.¹⁸ Such grandiloquence might smack of theatrical pathos and be out of keeping with the role of a diplomat. Nevertheless, Mannerheim considered it¹⁹ to be probably the only way, under the circumstances prevailing after the Armistice, to impress upon the victors the Finnish point of view.

Mannerheim left Paris around the time Thomas Masaryk, provisional President of newly independent Czechoslovakia, arrived in that city. The enthusiastic and festive welcome given Masaryk was a demonstration of the strong sympathy felt in the West for the political leaders of the nations that had leaned for support on the Allies in their struggle for independence. "The French and the Czechs have two strong bonds in common, the same ideals and the same interests," declared a leading Parisian journal on this occasion.²⁰

When President Woodrow Wilson arrived in the French capital some time after Masaryk, he was hailed as a great popular hero: not only was he head of a leading allied State but also personified high idealism, and his name represented the promise of a happier future for the nations of Europe. Caught in the froth and foam of this wild wave of emotion, the envoy from Finland, regardless of his identity, was bound to be obliged to shoulder the burden of "sins" of his compromised nation. It was a burden not

even Mannerheim, for all his traditional Entente leanings, could escape when he sought to advance the interests of his fatherland in the changed world political situation.

Upon returning to London from Paris, Mannerheim was notified on December 13 that Svinhufvud, stigmatized for having pursued the »old line», had resigned as Regent of Finland and that he had been elected the day before to fill the vacant office. The news pleased Mannerheim, and since his election had been sponsored, in addition to everything else, by the very political quarters that had forced him into »exile», he appears to have savored the turnabout in something of a spirit of revenge.²¹ Mannerheim had now become his country's official envoy.

As Regent of Finland, he had greater authority than before, outwardly seen, although this increase in authority tended to restrict his freedom of movement and expression to narrower confines than when he had been acting as a private individual in his contacts with Western Government representatives. But he was continually running up against a »wall». Foreign Secretary Balfour, Under-Secretary Hardinge and Secretary for War Milner refused to consider any modification of the conditions for recognition of Finnish independence mutually agreed upon by France and England but demanded their strict fulfillment as evidence of a change in Finland's political orientation. These conditions (referred to in the foregoing) impressed Mannerheim as humiliating since they set limits to self-determination in matters that, he felt, should be left to the Finns to decide for themselves.

Mannerheim's distinguished personality had succeeded in breaking the ice in British and French ruling circles to the extent of his obtaining authoritative pronouncements on the Finnish question. Those responsible for the formulation of Finnish foreign policy now knew, as the result of his mission, what was expected of Finland among the great powers that had won the World War. This was a matter that had inspired great uncertainty and differences of opinion during the autumn of 1918.

No immediate fruit was borne by Mannerheim's efforts to gain recognition of Finland's independence, however, although this was the point of departure and the purpose of the plans relating to his journey to the Western capitals. By producing the »conditions» laid down as the price of recognition, it did in any case stake out the road Finland would have to travel in the near future to obtain a solution to her most important political problem.

The view held by the Western Powers regarding the events and conflicts in Finland in the year 1918 gradually began to clear up. Holsti's contention

that the majority of the people in Finland did not support the pro-German line had been buoyed up by the position taken by Mannerheim in negotiations with Western leaders. In Western eyes, the Finnish Whites had been lumped together, in accordance with notions formed during the Civil War, into a solid pro-German faction. Now this idea was evidently undergoing modification.

The fruitlessness of his efforts to gain recognition of Finnish independence in the Western camp was a disappointment to Mannerheim, who had cherished expectations of a better outcome of his mission. The statement given out by Mannerheim before his return home that new elections would be held in Finland as soon as possible and that the government question would be resolved on the basis of the will of the electorate showed that he realized the fulfillment of the internal political conditions required by the change in foreign policy to be imperative.²²

In the Western capitals, Mannerheim had, as he relates in his memoirs and as certain of his public statements indicate, repeatedly harped on his favorite theme — military action against Bolshevism, which he had maintained as the watchword of the White cause in Finland during the fighting in the spring of 1918. When he spoke around that time about the Finnish »War of Liberation» under his leadership, he stressed that he had not been fighting »against Russia but against Bolshevism».²³ At the same time, he emphasized, for his own part, the desirability of establishing good relations with »la vraie Russie», or the old regime of Russia, which had fought as an ally of the Western Powers.²⁴

These explanations did not cut much ice with the British: the reserved attitude of Lloyd George's Government toward the Russian question was widely known. Insofar as alongside the resolution of the main issue of Finnish politics Mannerheim had hoped for some support for the personal schemes involving intervention that he had concocted upon setting forth on his journey, he must have perceived in broaching them a lack of response.²⁵

From the standpoint of re-orienting Finland's foreign policy, Mannerheim's mission to London and Paris, considered as a whole, proved of far-reaching significance. Now, as pointed out in the foregoing, the Finnish Government could begin to lay down its lines of action systematically on the basis created by the progress of events in the world at large. Hitherto certain measures whereby Finland had striven to clarify her political status had been made known. In addition to the ones previously mentioned, it had been announced that the annex to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk calling for joint Finnish and German operations against the Western Allies in the

Murmansk sector was not binding on Finland since she had not even taken part in making the treaty. It could further be announced that the German forces had withdrawn from the country and that Friedrich Karl — the central figure of the episode of pro-German politics — had on December 14th renounced the Finnish throne. Upon returning home a week later, Mannerheim made reference in a proclamation he issued to the fact that the personal problems involved in the change of orientation in Finnish foreign policy remained unresolved and that it would be necessary to come to grips with them vigorously. »We can still — even if at the last moment —,» he declared, »reach our goal.»

Mannerheim's trip abroad excited, as has already to some extent been indicated in the foregoing, political speculation. The historical tradition linked with his name symbolized the alliance between the Western Powers and Russia. In this respect it awakened confidence — in decisive measure, it may be said — in British and French governing circles. The circumstance, furthermore, that Mannerheim's name was linked with the »old regime» in Russia was a factor that led to its being coupled with the rising interventionist activity of the »White generals».

It was this that gave impetus to the news sensation that while passing through Stockholm he had sought to confer with Russian »Whites» on the restoration of the monarchy in Russia and that in London he had endeavored to gain approval for the idea of having the Finnish Army attack Petrograd.²⁶ As already intimated, the latter assertion was not altogether contrary to the facts. Conjecture along these lines was soon forgotten for some time, but later on the matter cropped up again in connection with certain events.

As far as the Åland Islands question was concerned, Mannerheim was regarded from the Swedish standpoint as a »dangerous man». Suspense mixed with fear was felt over the possibility that he might seek the support of the Western Allies for Finland's efforts to maintain possession of the archipelago.²⁷ There was unreserved sympathy for Mannerheim in Sweden, on the other hand, when it came to his endeavor to gain for Finnish independence the recognition of Western Governments, and it was hoped that he would succeed in this task.²⁸

In a separate class was the sharp criticism levelled at Mannerheim's role as Commander-in-Chief of the White forces in the Finnish Civil War from the direction of the labor movement in England and in France. Ideologically colored, this view branded him a »counter-revolutionary», and he was further opposed in labor quarters as a champion of intervention in Russia.²⁹ A similar attitude was also taken by certain liberals with radical

leanings. These segments of public opinion had no effective influence, however, upon the government policies in the two countries.

The general's feelers in London and Paris sufficed to show that the problem of obtaining recognition in the West for Finnish independence was more complicated than had been anticipated in many quarters. A complete political metamorphosis was the price demanded of the Finnish Government. The resolution of the Finnish question was thus postponed by force of circumstance to a future date. It was then expected to ripen for decision in connection with the general settlement of European affairs at the Peace Conference.

Insofar as the Finnish question came up for consideration after the convocation of the Peace Conference, it was dealt with only in passing in connection with some other matter, usually one concerning Russia. This is what happened at the negotiations held on January 22, 1919, where the Western Powers tried to find common ground to stand on in coping with Bolshevism. One thing that became evident was that France alone, whose Prime Minister, Clemenceau was known to be an uncompromising foe of the Soviet Government, was rigidly opposed to Bolshevism. The French delegation would have been ready to draw a clear-cut conclusion from its point of view and invite representatives of the Russian Whites to participate in the negotiations on the Russian question at the Peace Conference. President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George tended to favor a compromise solution and accordingly were not inclined to bypass the Bolsheviks in the task of arranging affairs in Russia. Accepting the line advocated by the American and British leaders, the Peace Conference's Council of Ten drew up an appeal urging the governments and political coalitions operating in European Russia (meaning the territory extending to the 1914 boundaries of the empire) and in Siberia to cease hostilities and send representatives to the island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora for a meeting under the auspices of the Allies toward restoring peace to Russia.

Nothing came of the scheme to decide the future of Russia at Prinkipo, but the scheme itself incorporated a view of Finland that in principle proved of no little significance. Among the countries previously under Russian rule that had been invited to take part in the negotiations, two were set apart from the rest: Poland and Finland. This was generally interpreted to mean that the Western Powers did not regard either country as any longer belonging to the Russian sphere of political control.

The projected line-up of participants for the Prinkipo conference was thus some kind of token — though, to be sure, a vague one — of the fact that Finland was considered to have broken loose from Russian rule, even

if no decision confirming this view had been made at the Peace Conference. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that in connection with the Prinkipo project Finland was equated with a country like Poland, which the Western Powers had recognized as an independent state. An event like this was a step forward from the standpoint of the Finnish question although no mention had been made of recognizing the country's independence.

As arrangements continued at Paris for the Peace Conference and working procedures had to be drawn up in detail, the Council of Ten decided on January 27 that the Finnish question would be dealt with in connection with the settlement of affairs in Russia.³⁰ It appeared as if, according to the plans that had been outlined, which set up the problems of the Poles and the Czechs alongside those concerning Germany and Austria-Hungary for solution, Finland would find herself in a similar position in the general program of the conference. Nevertheless, Finland would rank after the states mentioned in the political scale. Poland and Czechoslovakia were acknowledged sovereign entities. Moreover, the general order of the items on the agenda of the Peace Conference, which gave precedence to matters pertaining to Germany and its allies, meant a considerable time advantage for them, provided no changes — based largely on Wilson's recommendations — were made later in the schedule.

Of all the Western Powers, France was the one that had, perhaps, taken the most severely critical stand toward the election of the king held in Finland in the autumn of 1918, having, as mentioned earlier, broken its diplomatic relations with the Finnish Government on that account. The French attitude began to soften after the turn of the year, apparently in anticipation that Finland would, in the interest of gaining recognition of her independence, live up to the conditions imposed on her by the Western Allies. The removal from positions of influence of pro-German individuals was still demanded, however, in certain connections, and these demands were transmitted from Paris to the Finnish authorities. The formation of the Ingman Government was looked upon only as a half-way measure. Prime Minister Ingman and Interior Minister Tulenheimo were among those who, as »king makers», were considered unfit to serve as members of a government entrusted with the task of steering a new political course. Even Foreign Minister Enckell was branded an undesirable in certain quarters, where he was thought to have had close contacts in Germany.³¹

The suspicion smoldering in France that the leading politicians of Finland continued to be under German influence caused some diplomatic incidents. For instance, Adolf Törngren, who had been sent to Paris as

political observer for the Finnish Government, was obliged to wait in London for several weeks at the beginning of 1919, as mentioned previously, before he could obtain the visa required for entry into France.

On the whole, the interest of French political circles in Finland was rising. An important reason for this was that Paris had been swept by the interventionist tide of feeling and hopes had been raised that intervention would lead to a solution of the Russian question favorable to the Whites. Finland was looked upon as a suitable base of operations for such a war of intervention, particularly as far as the conquest of Petrograd was concerned. When France in this connection supported the stabilization of Finland's independent status, the matter did not strike her as being any political objective worth striving after for its own sake but only as an incidental goal likely to further the interventionists' ends — or, then, Finland was viewed as a barrier to the spread of Bolshevism.

In the leading political quarters of Paris, Finland was thus generally placed against the background of the Russian question for scrutiny. Attention was then drawn to Mannerheim, who, as a former Czarist officer and friend of the Entente, was seen to be destined for a special mission in the »pacification of Russia«. This interest in Finland, aroused by interventionist sentiment, involved the danger — as far as the task of gaining general recognition for Finnish independence was concerned — that France would begin to back down to a passive position at some stage in the game. From the point of view of the Clemenceau Government, the White Russians represented elements who had remained loyal to the old Entente cause,³² and the hope was nourished that, after gaining power in their own country, they would constitute a balancing factor in Europe against any future resurgence of Germany.³³

An indirect consequence of this was that the victorious Allies had no desire to overlook White Russian interests in international politics, although, on the other hand, they did not deem it feasible to endorse in full the appeal issued at the beginning of March by the White Russians that the status and territorial claims of the minority nationalities belonging to »the Russia of the year 1914« — with the exception of Poland — be left off the agenda of the Peace Conference.³⁴ It was specifically the endeavors of French Government circles to form close ties with the Russian Whites that threatened to lead to conflict with the Finnish bid to reinforce the independent position of this country.

While in Paris, Mannerheim had made it clear, as pointed out in the foregoing, that Ingman and his ministers were not a Government of his choice. On the other hand, he did not favor abrupt changes; rather was

he inclined to act slowly in yielding to the demands for the removal of office-holders branded as pro-German by the Western Allies, for such measures would cause the Government to lose face. If, he argued, all the politicians that had previously held positions of influence were forced to step down, the Government would lose the support of the Conservatives and then stand on a very narrow bourgeois base. And this, he warned, could encourage revolutionary elements to take action.³⁵ Mannerheim relied upon the ability of the Conservatives to maintain public security and order in Finland.

In a communication sent to the French Government in the middle of January, Mannerheim further explained that changes in the composition of the Finnish Government would be taken advantage of by highly influential forces hostile to him.³⁶ Which he was referring to in this connection, »revolutionary» or republican bourgeois circles, is hard to say. Both of these groups, particularly the Social Democrats, were considered by him unprepared to pull the nation through the difficulties of the »transitional period». In asking the French Government to hasten the measures required to give recognition to Finnish independence, he evidently was also thinking of his own position, which was likely to be strengthened by the resolution of the question.

During the month of January the French took action to the extent of turning to the British Government with the idea of doing something about Finland's plea for recognition.³⁷ From the standpoint of the country as a whole, a favorable decision at this early stage would have been a significant event: it would have given Finland an acknowledged status at the very beginning of the Peace Conference, and this would have given her a voice in matters relating to her territorial claims. If it had come to pass — i.e., if Finland would not have had to await the holding of parliamentary elections as a prerequisite of recognition —, Mannerheim could have taken personal credit: it would have shown that his personality had been deemed a sufficient guarantee that the demands of the Western Powers would be met.

The action taken by the French authorities to deal with the question of Finnish independence was apparently prompted by the very thought³⁸ that the hand in Finnish politics of Mannerheim, who was known to be interested in intervention, might be strengthened if the American and British Governments could be persuaded to moderate the conditions imposed on Finland. The efforts made by the French proved, however, to be ineffective. The other Western Powers would not budge.

The political mood of the transitional period is illustrated by the fact

that during the change from a German orientation to one favoring the Western Allies neither press opinion nor official diplomacy in Finland had yet reached a state of equilibrium. There was nervous excitement over the delay in gaining recognition after expectations had been raised to a pitch of confidence, and rightist circles, in particular, severely criticized the Allies for their stiff attitude toward Finland. Prevailing bourgeois sentiment was kept in constant agitation by the Russian peril and the revolutionary threat. Rumors were spread about joint preparations undertaken by the Bolsheviks and fugitive Finnish Reds to start a revolution in this country.

In circles favoring intervention in Russia, on the other hand, Mannerheim was represented as believing he could defeat the Bolsheviks. He was further alleged to have asserted that he considered the capture of Petrograd essential to the security of Finland.³⁹ In addition to these rumors, word spread around the country that the White Russians had become more active after ex-Foreign Minister Sazonov had arrived in Paris at the end of January to direct their operations. In Finland special note was taken both in Parliament and in the press that⁴⁰ in various connections Russian Whites were expressing their opposition to Finnish independence.

The atmosphere of vague apprehensions and impatient waiting prevailing in Finland evidently hampered the fulfillment of the conditions that the Western Powers had set as the price of recognition.

The state of high tension generated by the uncertainty over the issue was revealed by the publication of a sensational, if misleading, report — and the chain reaction it set off is not without its comical side.

On January 26 there appeared in the newspapers of the Finnish capital a news report⁴¹ that the Government had learned from »quite reliable sources» that France had taken the initiative in effecting recognition of Finnish independence and that — it was added — »an affirmative response probably had already been received from the British Government». The latter, rather vague expression inspired headlines in certain newspapers that made it appear as if a *fait accompli* were in question.⁴² The information had been communicated to the Regent and to the Foreign Minister by the acting French Consul in Helsinki, M. J. Poirot, who in his enthusiasm at the same time drew up for the Government a complete proposal for an announcement on the matter to be made to the Finnish public. He further explained the matter himself to the press in an interview⁴³ in which he laid special stress on the part played by the French Government in arranging things.

The intelligence that the British Government had agreed to recognize

Finnish independence naturally inspired rejoicing in the national capital. The newspapers published solemn editorials⁴⁴ which, drawing upon the glad tidings, proclaimed that after months of uncertainty the sovereignty of the country had been established on a sound basis. Heartfelt expressions of gratitude were heaped upon the French nation and Consul Poirot. The leading Swedish-language daily also published an article eulogizing Sir Esmé Howard, onetime British Minister to Stockholm, who had joined his Government's delegation to the Peace Conference and who was supposed to have influenced the decision in favor of Finland.⁴⁵

Public spirits were kept buoyed up by a report, emanating from a Swiss source, which was made known some days later. Deviating from Poirot's communication, it stated that a proposal to have Finnish independence recognized had been made at the Peace Conference itself and been accepted.⁴⁶ Press comment did not consider the news tapped from the Swiss source to have altered the fundamental significance of the event. Illustrative of the steadfast position taken by the highest Finnish authorities, the Regent awarded the Foreign Minister the Liberty Cross, a decoration that had passed him by during the pro-German period, to celebrate the occasion.⁴⁷

When no official notification was forthcoming from the British Government, which had been credited with the decision to recognize independent Finland, one of the newspapers published in Helsinki began to demand a verification of the authenticity of the news report.⁴⁸ It was established as a consequence, to be sure, that French diplomacy was bent upon furthering the cause of Finnish independence, but it was also discovered that the French proposal in Finland's favor made to the British Government had metamorphosed upon being reported to Helsinki into a resolution of the question. At this point, the French Consul felt constrained to offer an explanation. In communicating his intelligence, Poirot let it be understood, he had been motivated »solely by a desire to remove the anxiety concerning the intentions of the Entente powers». As much as a week after his communication had been made public, Poirot was giving assurances that the British had responded affirmatively to the French proposal and that a similar response could be expected from the rest of the Allies.⁴⁹

When the anticipated official communiqués of the American and British Governments failed to materialize, the high spirits of the Finns began to sag and doubts about the true state of affairs to gnaw at people's minds. One of the Helsinki dailies then dashed cold water upon die-hard enthusiasts by reporting that no decision had been yet made concerning recognition of Finnish independence.⁵⁰

Disappointment followed in the wake of the exposure of the canard. It perhaps tended to clear up the political atmosphere in Finland and to develop caution in the drawing of conclusions among those in positions of responsibility. The episode nevertheless did not pass without some real benefit to the Finns: the French Government announced that it had decided to restore diplomatic relations with Finland as they had been before the breach came on October 15, 1918.⁵¹

In following the course of French policy toward the Finnish question, one is struck by its abrupt twists and turns; in other words, to borrow again Mannerheim's previously quoted expression, the French behavior in reaching decisions was »temperamental». The behavior of the British, on the other hand, was stiffly restrained — they insisted upon Finland's strictly meeting the conditions imposed upon her and were unwilling to modify the attitude they had taken earlier. The British view was that Finland would have to change her politics and that this would take time,⁵² and for this reason the British obviously disapproved of the French readiness to modify the conditions jointly imposed on the Finns. The cool detachment of British diplomacy had been previously displayed when, in October 1918, contrary to the precipitate action of the French, London refrained from resorting to drastic measures; and Great Britain remained alone among the Western Allies to maintain contact — through the Finnish Chargé d'affaires, Holsti — with the Finns. As a result, in the changed world political situation later on, at least one channel remained open for possible exchanges of views between the British and Finnish Governments.

In dealing with the Finnish question, London did not, accordingly, seem to have any special reason to make haste. Following the Armistice the British position had become easier. British naval units were cruising around Baltic waters and Allied troops tarried in the Murmansk area, which meant that the strategic interests of Great Britain were being well looked after. Germany, the enemy, had withdrawn on account of the fatal turn in its fortunes of war from the northeastern theater of operations, which had included the Åland Islands and the Gulf of Finland. Simultaneously, the Arctic coast had been neutralized, now that the possibility of its developing into a danger zone through joint Finnish and German action no longer existed.

Rôles had changed on the stage of power politics, and Finland was obliged to face the consequences of having leaned for support on the losing side. The Finns needed time to adjust to the changed circumstances, and the view of the British authorities was that too short a time had elapsed up to the beginning of the 1919 for relations between the two

Governments to be established on a basis of mutual confidence. That is why they chose simply to follow the progress of events in Finland and let the political leaders of the country wait.

Of the Western »Big Three», France had proved to be the weak link in the chain of collaboration. At the end of 1918 it had, it is true, approved the decision in principle according to which Finland would be required to fulfill certain conditions in order to gain recognition of her independence. But in practice it was ready to make »adjustments», which caused the Americans and the British embarrassment. To the French, as noted in the foregoing, Mannerheim's appointment to the Regency sufficed as guarantee of the desired change in the Finnish political line, and, contrary to the Americans and the British, the French began to feel that Ingman's Government could qualify for acceptance of the act of recognition.

The United States looked upon Finnish independence as a *de facto* reality. The Prinkipo Plan initiated by President Wilson treated Finland as a state that had seceded from Russia. Characteristic of the American attitude toward Finland was the fact that it involved a desire to separate the different parts of a broad set of problems. Thus, the problems of political recognition and relief deliveries were handled separately.⁵³ The decision made at the beginning of December 1918 to deliver food supplies to Finland did not signify any point of departure for acting upon the Finnish request for recognition. The Finnish authorities considered the treatment of the latter problem slow, and this annoyed American diplomats. Illustrative of the American frame of mind was the response given by Mr. Henry White, a member of the United States delegation to the Peace Conference, to Holsti upon his inquiring what Finland could do to speed up action on the issue of diplomatic recognition. »... Nothing,» White said, »just wait.»⁵⁴

From the beginning of February the distinctive feature of the Allied stand toward the Finnish question was one of waiting — waiting for the outcome of the parliamentary elections in March, the holding of which would signify the fulfillment of the most important of the conditions imposed on Finland. By this time, French enthusiasm in the matter of armed intervention in Russia was also showing signs of waning. Foreign Minister Pichon, who had endeavored to secure Mannerheim's position, deemed it necessary to retreat and fall in line with the views of the American and British representatives. By the beginning of March he, too, was interested in the Finnish elections and the new government to be formed on the basis of the results.

Considered in the light of diplomatic activity, the Finnish situation was

nearly dead as the parliamentary elections approached. Whenever any of the Western representatives were approached, queries were met with coldly laconic responses to the effect that »the matter is under advisement». ⁵⁵ Getting anything done to facilitate action on the question of diplomatic recognition at the Peace Conference had proved difficult: alongside the major problems of the peace settlement, the Finnish question looked »small» and of »secondary importance». ⁵⁶ Practical diplomatic activity had -- bypassing all wishful thinking -- made this fact plain, as unpleasant as it was from the Finnish point of view but easy enough for any observer of a different nationality to see. ⁵⁷

The Finnish parliamentary elections of March 1 and 3, 1919, were held in an atmosphere of high political tension. At stake, after all, was the resolution of vitally important political issues. The results of the elections would, it was felt, lead to a settlement of the prolonged controversy over the constitutional form of the government, among other things, as well as determining the general line of social reform and laying a foundation on which to build foreign policy.

What happened was that the bourgeois parties together won a substantial majority of the seats in Parliament, but with their 80 seats the Social Democrats emerged as the strongest single party. The republican factions -- the Agrarian Union with 42 and the Progressive (Liberal) Party with 26 seats -- established themselves as the largest of the bourgeois groups. Of the monarchist factions, the National Coalition (Conservatives) ended up with 28 and the Swedish People's Party with 22 seats -- though three members of the latter party favored the establishment of a republic. In addition, two seats went to the Christian Workers' Party.

The political right had suffered defeat, for the republican factions, counting the Social Democrats, had captured a three-quarters majority in Parliament. Political responsibility had shifted to different hands. ⁵⁸ The results of the election had cleared the air. They disproved the notion that the Finnish people were monarchists at heart. And this fact the republicans did not fail to stress. ⁵⁹

The Agrarians and Liberals hoped to have the biggest voice in the enactment of laws, after lending a due ear to the views of the Social Democrats. Taken as a whole, the results of the election reinforced the line of neutrality. It was felt that the country had wrested itself free of pro-German influence once and for all and that a decisive step had been taken toward the fulfillment of the »conditions» laid down by the Western Powers. ⁶⁰

As Regent, Mannerheim took a hand in the re-organization after the

elections of the administration of the country on the highest level. As a monarchist by conviction, he could hardly have found the task a congenial one. Because the Conservatives and the Swedish People's Party had adopted him as their guiding political star, his prestige had been cast into the electoral scales and even been damaged by the defeat suffered by the parties lined up behind him.

Also contributing to the weakening of Mannerheim's position was the circumstance that the Social Democrats, who had been barred from the rump Parliament, had gained the biggest representation of any single party in the new Parliament. The Regent's attitude toward them was one of stern repudiation — that supporters of the Social Democratic Party had been allowed to vote in the first place he had condemned as a »grave risk».⁶¹ Considering the importance attached by the Western Powers to the holding of free elections in Finland, however, it is hardly conceivable that the Government would have dared to impose any restrictions on their participation in the elections.

On the occasion of the parade held on May 16, 1918, to celebrate the end of the Civil War, Mannerheim had emphasized, as a precept for future observance, the principle of »firm government», which would not be sensitive to the pressure of partisan interests or liable to the acceptance of compromises. He was now confronted with the problem of applying this principle in practice under completely changed conditions. Mannerheim's objective, the formation of a bourgeois coalition government⁶² was no longer possible of realization — the election results could not be ignored. His first personal contact with Finnish democratic parliamentary politics obviously proved disappointing.

In constructing the post-election government, Mannerheim strove to keep the rightist parties from being cast out into the cold. They consisted of »Mannerheim's men», whom he could count upon to bring stability to the exercise of governmental authority. On occasion Mannerheim championed the formation of a bourgeois coalition government so zealously that he threatened to quit as Regent unless his demands were accepted.⁶³ When, to bolster his arguments, he referred to the »opinion of the Western Powers», he was probably not thinking solely of gaining recognition of Finnish independence but evidently also — and France figured particularly in this matter — of the attitude toward intervention.⁶⁴ In the light of this question a centrist government looked troublesome to Mannerheim, one hard to manipulate; inclusion of the rightist groups had its advantages in his view.

The radical elements among the centrists were out to gain objectives of

their own. What they wanted was a government composed wholly of ministers who stood for the republic, and they believed that the three-quarters majority in the new Parliament entitled them to make such a demand. So far had they advanced along this line that the Agrarian and Liberal groups in Parliament had nominated a candidate to head such a government, Mikael Soininen. But implementation of this scheme, which would have facilitated obtaining the support of the Social Democrats, was evidently regarded in circles close to the Regent as marking too abrupt a change under prevailing conditions.

Negotiations led to the formation of a government in which the majority of the portfolios were held by republicans but a few were reserved for men who enjoyed the confidence of Mannerheim. Notable among the latter were Prime Minister Kaarlo Castrén and Defense Minister Rudolf Walden. At the uncompromising insistence of the republicans, the Regent's candidate Carl Enckell had to step aside to let Rudolf Holsti take over the office of Foreign Minister. In the main, the Castrén Government, which also included certain members of the Swedish People's Party or men in close sympathy with it, had a centrist complexion. Left outside the pale were the National Coalition⁶⁵ and the Social Democrats.

During the negotiations preceding the distribution of portfolios, the observation was made that protraction of the government crisis could have an unfavorable effect upon the position of the country in international affairs.⁶⁶

The parliamentary elections in March and the appointment of the Castrén Government on April 17 were forward steps in the development of internal Finnish politics that facilitated the shift in orientation westward and simultaneously brought diplomatic recognition closer. The last of the »conditions» laid down at the end of 1918 by the victorious Allies — establishing a democratic foundation for the government⁶⁷ — had thus been fulfilled.

The attitude of the American and British Governments toward these »conditions» had been consistent the whole time, and toward the end France, too, was standing firm beside them.⁶⁸ At the end of March, after the election results had become known but before the new government had been formed, Enckell and Donner made brave efforts in London to bring about an immediate settlement of the issue of diplomatic recognition toward bolstering the Regent's position.⁶⁹ The British policy makers refused to take action, ignoring the favorable recommendations of certain of their subordinates in the diplomatic service.

While relations between Finland and the Western Allies remained un-

settled because the question of diplomatic recognition was still an open one, the British Consul in Helsinki, like his French colleague, kept in touch unofficially around the turn of the months of March and April with the Finnish authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The United States Consul, by contrast, kept his distance, to Mannerheim's chagrin.⁷⁰ Consul Haynes had decided to hold back as long as a new Finnish government failed to materialize,⁷¹ and his line of conduct was supported by Secretary of State Lansing.⁷² The attitude of the State Department provoked criticism outside Finnish circles, too. There were those Americans who felt the United States, by its own actions, was forfeiting commercial markets to the British.⁷³

The necessity of looking after economic interests placed the two great English-speaking powers in a competitive relationship. Of all the countries in the West, the British had maintained the liveliest trade before the war with Finland, which had been a valuable source of agriculture goods and products of the woodworking industries. And England made haste to revive its old trade with the Finns. The United States, for its part, had tremendous economic resources at its command; and the Finns had felt their pull at the time the deliveries of food supplies had been made by the American Relief administration. On the top level at the Peace Conference, where the future status of Finland was being weighed, however, political considerations continued to hold sway.

After the parliamentary elections had been held and the Liberal-colored government formed, satisfying Allied demands, the only factor remaining to delay recognition of Finnish independence was the decision made on January 27 concerning the order of business at the Peace Conference, which bound the Finnish question up in the same package with Russia.

From the standpoint of Finnish diplomatic activity, it was important to try to extricate by some means the question of the country's diplomatic recognition from the planned agenda, according to which the peace treaties with Germany and the other Central Powers would have had to be dealt with completely before other matters, such as those relating to Russia, could be considered.⁷⁴

During the latter part of April, around the time the Castrén Government took office in Finland, the main attention of the Allied leaders at the Peace Conference was centered upon putting the finishing touches to the German peace treaty as well as upon solving certain territorial problems, including Italian claims in the Balkan sphere. The border revisions demanded by the Italians had provoked such sharp differences of opinion that powerful exertions were required to iron them out sufficiently to

keep the conference going. The clash of views amounted to a crisis that threatened to make it more difficult than ever to get to the conference table matters not marked on the schedule.

At this stage of the conference, the Russian question was at a dead end as far as the Western Powers were concerned. The scheme for holding a meeting on the island of Prinkipo had petered out because the proposed participants — the groups and governments exercising authority in Russia — could not be brought together for talks. President Wilson's next attempt to »pacify» conditions in Russia, which involved sending the American diplomat C. Bullitt to Moscow late in February to sound out the possibilities of settling the Russian question through negotiations with the Bolshevik rulers, had likewise yielded no results. Wilson's originally tolerant attitude toward the Bolsheviks, whom he looked upon as representing in their own peculiar way the strivings of the Russian people to achieve internal reform, had begun to change to one of restraint and even opposition. Lloyd George, another advocate of the Prinkipo Conference, had experienced the resistance put up by the majority — consisting of Conservatives — in his own Government, a situation that gave Winston Churchill, a zealous champion of the idea of intervention, courage to move into more vigorous action.

The proponents of intervention stressed the argument that the Soviet Government was engaging in propaganda that preached world revolution, and it was pointed out that the failure of the Western Powers' Russian policy only served to fan the flames of this propaganda the more.⁷⁵ The founding of the Communist International, or Comintern, in Moscow and the establishment of Béla Kun's »Red dictatorship» in Hungary forged new links in the chain of revolutionary events.

Contact between the Western Powers and the Bolsheviks had been nearly completely broken after the third notoriety attempt to do something for or about Russia in the West, represented by Herbert Hoover's plan, fell through. Hoover had proposed that relief shipments of food be delivered to Russia under the direction of a neutral commission, just as had been sent to Belgium during the early years of the World War; but the Bolsheviks reacted to the proposal with suspicion, and the political leaders of the Western countries raised strenuous objections, regarding the delivery of relief supplies to Russia as a form of indirect support to the Soviet regime.⁷⁶

The functional break in the relations of the Western Powers with Russia appeared, on the one hand, in the loss of contact with Moscow and, on the other hand, in their failure to develop — France excepted — firm contact with the Russian Whites, who also claimed a voice in deciding the

fate of Russia. It became possible to make observations on a change in the situation only after the middle of May, when reports began to reach the West about offensive operations started by White troops against the Red forces, first under Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and later under General Denikin in southern Russia.

The decision of January 27 made by the Western Allies to put off action on Finland's request for diplomatic recognition until the question of Russia was dealt with was losing its binding force. It was hardly reasonable to expect that a governing body in control of all Russia would appear before long, one with the authority to take a »definitive stand» on the status of Finland. That the Finnish question, contrary to the agenda of the Peace Conference, might be extricated from the broad scope of the Russian problem, the primary objective would have to be to persuade Wilson to modify his attitude in principle toward the order of business of the Conference. The task facing Finnish diplomacy was to find out how to reach the ear of the American President, who had withdrawn in Paris into splendid isolation and kept in touch only with the top representatives of the major powers in the central organs of the Conference.

Having been advised in London⁷⁷ how to open the knot formed by the political strings attached to the Finnish question, Holsti decided to appeal to Herbert Hoover for help in influencing Wilson. In connection with administering the Finnish relief program, Hoover had become acquainted with the development of the situation in Finland, one of his informants having been none other than Holsti himself during the previous five months. It gave him an opportunity to follow the progress of events on the Finnish political scene, such as the holding of the parliamentary elections and the setting up of the new government in fulfillment of the »conditions» laid down by the Allies.

Nor was the issue of Finland's diplomatic recognition *terra incognita* to Hoover: he knew the various phases it had undergone, and he had even made a move a short time before to settle it.⁷⁸ Lack of recognition was hampering Finland's economic dealings abroad, and this, too, Hoover had witnessed first hand. For example, American banks were continually refusing to honor bills of exchange from Finland covering the growing food deliveries and other commercial transactions between the two countries. After Holsti had explained the nature of the obstacle to recognition of Finnish independence, Hoover actively demonstrated his capacity to seize upon the solution of problems not within his special field of operations.

The sequence of events leading to the resolution of the issue of Finland's diplomatic recognition was as follows: On April 26 Hoover drew

up a memorandum to be dispatched to Wilson toward ending further procrastination in the matter. Detailed grounds were given for action, so at this juncture Hoover emerged as the prime mover in a matter of paramount importance to Finland. In appealing⁷⁰ to Wilson, he emphasized that Finland had met the demands of the Western Powers and that therefore her request for diplomatic recognition deserved a favorable response. Moreover, as a general matter of principle, he observed that in their political development the Finns had lived through every phase the world could ask to achieve their status as an independent nation. And, referring to the political inheritance of the West, he stated further that the Finnish people had bravely striven to establish in their own country a »liberal democracy».⁸⁰ Finally, Hoover expressed the opinion that, considering everything, Finland would undoubtedly have gained recognition of her independence had not a tremendous number of other questions simultaneously confronted the Peace Conference.

Wilson took up the Finnish question at a meeting of the »Big Four» on April 28. The »Fourth», Orlando, did not attend on account of the cold reception given the territorial demands of Italy, so he did not participate in dealing with the matter. Hoover's message provided the basis for discussion, and the direction it took was staked out by President Wilson's proposal that the independence of Finland be recognized. The brief comments made by Lloyd George and Clemenceau boiled down to the observation that the matter had been brought up at precisely a time when neither was prepared to tackle it. Lloyd George presented reasons why the Finnish question could not be settled at an earlier stage. He remarked that Finnish politics had opposed Western interests and had in general vacillated since the outbreak of the Russian revolution. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau wanted to consult their men in charge of foreign affairs, and thus the matter was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers for treatment.⁸¹

When the recognition of Finland's independence had been under consideration as a theoretical problem ever since the latter part of March on the top foreign policy-making levels in the British and United States Governments, the following alternatives had received attention: should *de facto* recognition be given first and *de jure* recognition only later? or, if the *de jure* step were to be taken directly, should it be granted conditionally or unconditionally?

The British authorities had no intention of dictating any actual conditions but only expressed the hope that certain wrinkles in the situation which interfered with the resolution of the main issue might be ironed out. Among matters that might be rectified, as mentioned by Lord Curzon in the

middle of March to the Finnish envoy in London, Ossian Donner, were the expulsion from Finland of a couple of German agents and the granting of an amnesty to the Finnish legionaries who had served in the British forces in the Murmansk sector.⁸²

Curzon brought up both matters somewhat later again in discussions with Foreign Minister Enckell, who was visiting London at the time. The first measure stirred up no resistance on the part of the Finnish authorities, whereas the second did. With regard to pardoning the legionaries, Mannerheim had refused to go along with the proposal, as a diplomatic communication sent to London at the beginning of April disclosed.⁸³ The British Foreign Office then proposed an alternative solution: it called for the appointment of a mixed committee of British officers and representatives of the Finnish Legion, which would proceed to negotiate with the Finnish authorities toward settling their differences.⁸⁴ This proposal, which did not involve any decision regarding the fate of the legionaries, was accepted by the Regent. The recognition of Finland's independence was, in accordance with the stand taken by the British Foreign Office, to be *de jure* in form.

When the mode of recognition of Finnish independence had been weighed at the State Department in Washington during the month of March, the granting of *de facto* recognition had at first been considered.⁸⁵ The reason for this was that the United States policy-makers wanted to reserve for the Peace Conference a voice in the Finnish question in its entirety for the time being, that is, until the eventual granting of *de jure* recognition. The aim of this strategy was to keep open for the Peace Conference the possibility of influencing the solution of the problem of Finland's territorial boundaries.

The Western Powers apparently drew a parallel between the Finns' boundary policy and the measures undertaken by the Poles and the Italians to acquire additional territory at their neighbors' expense. The latter two nations had taken matters into their own hands — without awaiting the decisions of the Peace Conference — to satisfy their demands for border revisions by force of arms and thereby confront the great powers with a *fait accompli*. On the part of Finland, the reservation regarding the granting of recognition was probably made with an eye on both the Åland Islands and East Karelia, particularly the latter.

In the United States delegation to the Peace Conference, special attention had been focussed on East Karelia,⁸⁶ the annexation to Finland by force of arms of which appeared to be the aim of new attempts later in April. In

contrast to the other states that had gained their independence as a result of the World War, the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland had possessed national boundaries of her own. Acknowledgment of the Peace Conference's power of decision in the matter of these boundaries posed a problem because it was liable to throw the controversy over the Åland Islands into the lap of the Western Powers and thereby cause Finland to lose part of her national territory.

Among Finnish diplomats it was Holsti, enjoying as he did the closest contacts with representatives of the English-speaking powers, that expected his Government to submit to the desire of the United States to have the question of Finland's boundaries decided by the Peace Conference.⁸⁷ This »wishful thought» of Holsti's stemmed from his endeavor to remove the obstructions in the way of a rapid solution of the issue of diplomatic recognition.

Holsti appears to have nourished the idea that unless the Finns showed compliance in the matter of their national boundaries, the recognition of their independence would only be a *de facto* one.⁸⁸ It would mean that the main issue, recognition without any reservations, would be left at the half-way point and might nevertheless leave the boundary problems open for rehashing at a later date. Even if submission to the judgment of the Peace Conference involved the risk of Finland's losing territory — the Åland Islands, perhaps, in particular — Holsti felt sure compensation would be offered from some other direction, most likely that of East Karelia. The possible acquisition of territory in the east appears to have interested him more than the retention of the Åland Islands.⁸⁹

Like Holsti, Adolf Törngren also thought that the territorial problems could be separated from the issue of diplomatic recognition for subsequent solution.⁹⁰ The treatment of the Finnish question would thus follow the Polish pattern: first would come recognition of the State's sovereignty, and then would come the determination of its boundaries. This procedure would not, as mentioned, remove the danger of territorial losses, either.

Mannerheim vigorously opposed granting the Peace Conference authority to decide upon Finland's boundaries because of the risk of her being deprived of the Åland Islands, which had till then been part and parcel of the Finnish domain. Matters had a different complexion with respect to new areas, which had previously been situated beyond the Finnish border. The Regent's stand, in line with which directives were dispatched to Holsti,⁹¹ was in conformity with the one taken by the Government when Sweden sought to get the Peace Conference to settle its border dispute with Finland. In the past, too, Mannerheim's stand toward the issue of

the Åland Islands had proved uncompromising. The governing authorities of Finland had thus refused to submit voluntarily to the judgment of the Peace Conference concerning the country's boundaries.

When the question of recognizing Finland's independence came up on May 3 before the Council of Foreign Ministers,⁹² there did not appear to be any obstacles in the way of a favorable decision. Nevertheless, discussion was raised on the basis of the »general line» that had been adopted as to the form the decision should be given and as to whether any provisos should be attached to it. In this connection, most of the arguments were reiterated that had been presented by the Americans and the British when the principles involved in according Finland diplomatic recognition had been dealt with around the turn of the months of March and April; but certain new points of view were also brought to the fore.

No difficulty was encountered in arriving at an agreement according to which each of the participating great powers would accord its recognition to Finland separately rather than through any joint proclamation. The action of France and several other countries in acknowledging the independent status of Finland in January 1918 had established a mode of procedure that was considered fitting to adhere to in this connection as well.

It did not escape the notice of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the question of granting Finland diplomatic recognition had older political roots than in the cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose claims to recognition were first submitted at as late a stage as the signing of the Armistice. The agreement whereby Finland's independence would be recognized separately by the contracting powers was actually produced by the Peace Conference. But the formal declaration of the action taken was to be made as if each government had reached its decision on its own. The fact that the various great powers intended to issue separate announcements could not, however, conceal the truth, which was that the total series of actions proceeded from a common agreement.

The question raised in the Council of Foreign Ministers as to whether certain provisos should be attached to the act of recognition provoked an exchange of views regarding the principles involved, on the one hand, and regarding the nature of such provisos, on the other hand.

In this connection, British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hardinge proposed — in line with the earlier American recommendation — that the act of recognition include the proviso that the Finnish Government agree to let the Peace Conference settle the matter of Finland's boundaries. On the other hand, he felt that the British delegation's earlier demand for

the granting of an amnesty to the Finnish members of the Murmansk Legion could not, on account of the nature of the question, be incorporated in the document dealing with the recognition of Finland's independence. The matter would have to be arranged some other way, as, for example, by using Western diplomatic channels in Helsinki to bring the wishes of the British Government to the attention of the Finnish Government.

The discussion revealed that, although the initiative in the matter had been taken by the United States delegation, the Americans themselves were unsure as to what form of recognition should be granted Finland. Thus Lansing at first spoke about *de facto* recognition and subsequently considered on a parallel basis the alternatives of *de jure* and *de facto*. Hoover took a straighter line. In his letter of April 26 to Wilson, cited in the foregoing, he had remarked that it was hard to understand why it was necessary to resort to »half-way measures» in dealing with the Finnish question. A memorandum drawn up on May 1 by the secretariat of the United States peace delegation juxtaposed the alternatives. *De jure* would presuppose a promise by the Finns to submit to a solution of their border problem at a later date.⁹³

Lansing had turned to Wilson to inquire whether the recognition of Finland's independence should be defined as applying only to her officially established national territory.⁹⁴ Before the Council of Foreign Ministers convened, Wilson had responded that the granting of diplomatic recognition would not bind the United States to acknowledge the legitimacy of the annexation by Finland of any territory that had belonged to Russia. To the national territory she had hitherto held, he had maintained, Finland had an undisputed right.⁹⁵ Evidently, it was due to this statement of Wilson's stand in the matter that Lansing no longer supported Harding in his demand that the Finnish border problem be brought before the Peace Conference for settlement.

A special contribution to the discussion on the Finnish question in the Council of Foreign Ministers was made by Ambassador Makino of Japan, who proposed the introduction of an entirely new »proviso». It was his idea that in return for diplomatic recognition Finland should grant General Yudenich the right to use Finnish territory for operations against Petrograd. Since Makino had no instructions relative to the matter from his Government, he declared that he was only expressing his personal opinion. His statement represented such a shift in the Council from the special question at hand to the central arena of power politics that the spokesmen for the other major powers were prompted to set forth their views.

French Foreign Minister Pichon, who was indifferent to the issue

of recognizing Finnish independence, enthusiastically seized upon Makino's suggestion — seeing how it accorded with the attitude of his own Government — and was prepared to furnish the French diplomatic envoy in Helsinki with instructions to act in the matter. Both Lansing and Hardinge, on the other hand, sharply opposed the idea of coupling any scheme of intervention in Russia to the business of recognizing Finnish independence.

Lansing emphasized that the recognition of a country's independence was based upon considerations of justice. Accordingly, any provisos designed to serve political ends — as in the case of Makino's proposal — would be out of order. Hardinge, in his criticism of Makino's proposal, pointed out that the British Government opposed Finland's involvement in Yudenich's campaign, which he believed to confront the country with a grave danger.

The question of attaching provisos to the recognition of Finnish independence thus ended up in a negative decision. On the other hand, it was unanimously agreed that, when recognition was accorded, the Governments of the Western Allies would exhort the Finnish Government to accept whatever the decision of the Peace Conference might be regarding the boundaries of Finland as well as to grant the members of the Murmansk Legion an amnesty in a »liberal spirit».

The intention of the Western Allies — excepting Italy, which did not take part in the handling of the Finnish question — was that, after a mutual understanding had been reached on the matter of recognition, the American and British Governments would separately but at the same time notify the highest Finnish authorities. The aim of bringing about a synchronization of this diplomatic move by the two Governments was not realized, however, in practice.

The British communication was cabled on May 6 by Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Curzon to Consul Bell. And on the same day Prime Minister Kaarlo Castrén passed the glad tidings on to Parliament, affirming that the event was a significant one from the standpoint of the country's capability of action in international affairs.⁹⁶

Secretary of State Lansing did not inform the United States Consul in Helsinki directly, as Curzon did the British Consul, but on the evening of May 5 sent his communication regarding the decision to recognize Finnish independence to the State Department in Washington.⁹⁷ This procedure caused confusion and complications.⁹⁸ After Lansing's message had been delivered to the proper desk at the State Department, he received a response that took for granted that the United States peace delegation had already sent a notification to Helsinki concerning the matter of diplomatic recog-

tion.⁹⁹ It was only after he had received this response to his own cablegram that Lansing informed Consul Haynes in Helsinki about the decision that had been made.¹⁰⁰

In the meantime, Haynes had gone about sending inquiries to Paris and Washington as to the reason for the delay.¹⁰¹ The result of all this was that it was not until May 9 that the Finnish Parliament was notified on the favorable action taken by the United States in the matter of according Finland recognition — that is, three days after the British notification had been received. It was therefore deemed advisable to make the announcement that the American and British representatives had reached a simultaneous decision in the matter in Paris on May 3.¹⁰² Then, on May 12, the French envoy in Helsinki informed the Finnish authorities about his Government's having ratified its earlier recognition of Finland's independence, and the Japanese Ambassador to Paris sent his Government's favorable response to Finland's request for recognition the next day.

Recognition by Italy was put off. As mentioned in the foregoing, its delegation had been absent from the Peace Conference during this period on account of the reverses it had suffered in trying to acquire additional territory on the eastern side of the Adriatic; so the decisions made at the conference did not affect the Italians directly. Postponement of Italy's action was not, however, entirely due to its periodic isolation but to other considerations of some significance to that country. Like the French, the Italian political line was strictly anti-Bolshevik. Viewed from this standpoint, according Finland recognition was not a measure that fit in very well with the Italian authorities' desire to maintain close relations with the Russian Whites, who were known to oppose Finnish independence. Endorsement of the decision relating to Finland, based as it was on the principle of self-determination, was in conflict, moreover, with Italy's own territorial demands, insofar as they could be challenged by the right of the inhabitants of the eastern Adriatic coast to self-determination.¹⁰³

The Italian Government's eventual favorable action, communicated to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a note dated June 27, should probably be viewed — after Belgium had accorded Finland its recognition on the 10th of the same month — more than anything else as a demonstration of Italy's desire to identify itself with prevailing opinion among the Western Allies. The Italian delegates had by this time returned to the Peace Conference to work side by side with the representatives of the other victorious powers.

The recognition accorded Finnish independence aroused no significant editorial reactions in leading newspapers in the West. It was reported in

brief news dispatches, and the event was soon thrust into the background by more momentous political developments. One such topical event of major interest was the arrival at Versailles of the delegates of defeated Germany on May 7 to receive the terms of peace. For historical drama, this event was almost without parallel, and it drew the concentrated attention of both the belligerent powers and the neutrals. The weighing of the conditions of peace having begun once more in earnest, the Russian question commanded special interest, what with the color given it by the military operations of the Russian Whites and the new wave of activity on the diplomatic front.

The recognition of her independence obtained from the American and British Governments signified for Finland the attainment of a political goal that cost half a year's diplomatic exertion. However tirelessly the regular representatives of Finland in Paris and London, reinforced at the end of March by the Finnish Foreign Minister, strove to expedite matters, the »conditions» laid down by the Western Allies remained inflexible. On his mission in November and December 1918 to the two great Western capitals, Mannerheim had had to cope with these conditions as well as with the distrust the victorious powers felt toward Finland.

In numerous connections since the beginning of 1919, Western diplomats had demanded the fulfillment of the conditions laid down by their Governments when the Finns had expressed concern over the delay in gaining recognition of their country's independence. For Mannerheim it had been obviously distasteful to concur in bringing about the reform in Finnish domestic politics called for by these conditions — mainly the holding of parliamentary elections and the reorganization of the Government — especially in view of the fact that, in addition to everything else, he ran the risk of losing support through the required changes. No matter how much personal good will he had earned in French circles, he had been obliged to steer a course adhering to the »joint decision» of the Western Powers. The Finnish diplomat who laid heaviest stress upon the necessity of submitting to the Western demands was perhaps Holsti, but his role as informant for the Finnish government expressly in this matter had evidently aroused mistrust and disgust in the minds of many government officials who had been responsible for foreign affairs during the period of pro-German orientation. Although the conditions had been accepted unwillingly, the resolution of the issue, when it at last became known, had been greeted with satisfaction. The independence of Finland had been recognized without reservations, and this made it possible for even Mannerheim to look upon it as a signal achievement of his tenure as Regent.

Having been accorded diplomatic recognition by the victorious Allied powers, Finland had become an operative agent in international affairs. Finland's lack of recognition by the American and British Governments had given aid and comfort to inimical forces, particularly the Russian Whites, who had no sympathy for the idea of establishing any part of the former Czarist empire as a sovereign State.¹⁰⁴ Relations with the Western Allies were viewed by the Finns as becoming normalized, and the result was a feeling of increased security.¹⁰⁵ The prospect of the future was somewhat darkened by the border question, regarding which diplomatic representatives of the Western Powers had delivered an »exhortation», although the intimation of a boundary revision could not — as the Finnish note of thanks to the British Government emphasized — concern the »ancient historical boundaries» of Finland.¹⁰⁶

Government circles in Sweden affirmed that Finland's position as an independent State had become stabilized by virtue of the diplomatic recognition accorded her. As favorable as the Swedish attitude was, it nevertheless was tempered by the knowledge that the dispute over the Åland Islands remained to be settled. Her attainment of recognized international status opened up for Finland opportunities to arrange commercial relations on the basis of bilateral agreements.¹⁰⁷ In this connection, the Finns were primarily interested in Great Britain, which in the past had been the biggest buyer of Finnish exports, and the United States, which through its deliveries of relief supplies had inspired in Finnish commercial quarters a hankering after permanent American markets.

After this Finland's political problems pointed in the direction of the East. In the opinion of many, the question of the country's eastern border was still an open one. The development of the situation in Russia and the attitude taken toward it by political circles in Finland were awaited with a certain excitement: Would Finland collaborate in the intervention or stick to the sidelines? In the last analysis, the issue of intervention involved — though not unconditionally and definitively — Finland's relations with the West, according to the mode of thought concerning Russia that became prevalent in the Western countries.

NOTES

¹ Hultin, *Poliittisia muistiinpanoja* (Political Notes) 18/X.

² Enckell, *Politiska minnen* II, p. 388

³ Mannerheim, *Minnen* I, p. 303. — Mannerheim had made preparations to meet Friedrich Karl during the course of his journey — either in Copenhagen

or in Malmö — but nothing came of this plan. (Mannerheim's subsequent report to M. G. Schybergson. Schybergson, *Privata anteckningar* 13/7 1919. Copy: C. M. Schybergson, Mannerheim under riksförståndartiden. — *Finsk Tidskrift* 1957, p. 59).

⁴ Heinrichs, Mannerheimgestalten I, p. 257.

⁵ Mannerheim, *Minnen* I, s. 307.

⁶ Paasivirta, *Suomi vuonna* 1918, s. 242.

⁷ Mannerheim's report to Lauri Ingman Oct. 14 (en route from Helsinki to Stockholm) on what he would bring to the attention of the Western Powers (Ingman, *Poliittisia muistinpänoja* 14/X).

⁸ Tancred Borenius' account (Field-Marshal Mannerheim, p. 200) of witnessing Mannerheim strolling around Piccadilly in London on Nov. 12 among the victory revelers.

⁹ *Le Temps* 17/VIII *L'Allemagne et les problèmes de l'est*; *Journal des Débats* 25/IX *La Question monarchique en Finlande*; *Daily Chronicle* 19/IX *Finnish King Comedy*; *Manchester Guardian* 11/X *Finland*.

¹⁰ E.g., Lloyd George, *War Memoirs* VI, p. 3167.

¹¹ Mannerheim's report to Schybergson. C. M. Schybergson, *Privata anteckningar* 13/VII 1919.

¹² Information obtained from Edward Hallett Carr.

¹³ Heinrichs, Mannerheimgestalten I, p. 264.

¹⁴ E.g., the treatment given in British and French newspapers to the question of the candidacy of Friedrich Karl for the Finnish crown (*Journal des Débats* 12/X *Le roi allemand de la Finlande*; *Le Temps* 23/9 *Une candidature Hohenzollern*; *Daily Chronicle* 22/VIII *Finland and the World War. Germany's influence explained*; *Pall Mall Gazette* 23/VIII *The Importance of Finland. Its Part in the German Design*; *Manchester Guardian* 15/VIII *Why Finland Counts III German Strategic Designs*).

¹⁵ *Le Temps* 3/XII *Le nouveau gouvernement finlandais*; *L'Oeuvre* 4/XII *Le nouveau gouvernement finlandais*.

¹⁶ *Journal de Débats* 6/XII *Une conversation avec le général de Mannerheim*.

¹⁷ Mannerheim, *Minnen* I, pp. 315, 316.

¹⁸ Kai Donner, *Sotamarsalkka vapaaherra Mannerheim*, p. 214.

¹⁹ Kai Donner, *Sotamarsalkka vapaaherra Mannerheim*, p. 218.

²⁰ *Le Temps* 8/XII *Le Président Masaryk à Paris*.

²¹ Mannerheim, *Minnen* I, p. 323.

²² Mannerheim's statement to the Reuter's and Havas news agencies (*Le Matin* 16 XII *Le programme politique du général Mannerheim. Morning Post* 16 XII *Finland's Future. Statement by General Mannerheim*).

²³ *Daily Mail* 20 XI *Finnish General Here. Manchester Guardian* 19 XI *Interview with »White» Army's Commander*.

²⁴ *Journal de Débats* 6 XII *Une Conversation avec le général de Mannerheim. Morning Post* 13 XII *Finland's Problems. Relations with the Allies. Interview with Gen. Mannerheim*.

²⁵ Mannerheim's cablegram of 14 XII from London to the Finnish government reads: »För aktion mot bolshevismen med Finlands hjälp finnes för tillfället intet intresse» (Copy: *Review of the Situation* issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17 XII. 5 C 1).

²⁶ Stockholms-Tidningen 6 XI, Aftontidningen 6 XI and Nya Dagligt Allehandan 5 XI. News dispatches.

²⁷ Stockholms-Tidningen 5 XI Åland inför utlandet.

²⁸ E.g., Stockholms Dagblad 3 XI Finländsk politik.

²⁹ Herald 30 XI Finland. Le Populaire 16 XII Le Régent de Finlande. Journal du Peuple 19 XII Le Régent de Finlande et le complot tsariste.

³⁰ Decision concerning Finland made on 27 I by the »Council of Ten». — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference III, p. 375.

³¹ Reference was being made to, e.g., Enckell's activity in Berlin in August 1918, when negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Government were conducted under German direction. The information at hand, insofar as it concerned a certain speech alleged to have been made by Enckell on Aug. 3 (Le Temps 7 VIII La Finlande alliée de l'Allemagne), was erroneous (Enckell, Politiska minnen I, p. 343). — The »controversy over Enckell» persisted among the Western diplomats stationed in Helsinki. The British Consul, Bell, defended him but the United States Consul, Haynes, branded him an opportunist and unreliable from the standpoint of the Western Powers (Haynes' cablegrams of Jan. 19 and March 15 to Lansing. State Dep't 860 d. 01/3 and 860 d. 00/383).

³² Journal de Débats 27 III Les Affaires Russes.

³³ Le Temps 5 III Les inconnues de la paix.

³⁴ Journal des Débats 14 III La Question Russe.

³⁵ Communication from Gaillard Lacombe, representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Samuel Morison, United States representative, dated Feb. 26 (State Dep't 860 d. 00/21).

³⁶ Enckell, Politiska minnen I, p. 346.

³⁷ Balfour's speech at the meeting of the »Council of Ten» on Jan. 27. — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 III, p. 734; also Enckell's communication of 1 IV to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 182.

³⁸ Statements by Pichon at the meeting of the »Council of Ten» on Jan. 27. — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 III, pp. 734, 735.

³⁹ Enckell, Politiska minnen I, pp. 416, 417.

⁴⁰ Hufvudstadsbladet 24 I Några ord rörande Finlands oberoende. Helsingin Sanomat 24 I Venäläispakolaiset ja Suomen itsenäisyys (Russian Fugitives and the Independence of Finland), also statements made on Jan. 17 in Parliament (v:n 1918 valtiopäivien pöytäkirjat (Parliamentary Record for 1918), pp. 380, 385—388, 397).

⁴¹ Identical news report on Jan. 26 in the Uusi Suomi, Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet.

⁴² E.g., news headline in Helsingin Sanomat 26 I.

⁴³ Ulkoministeriön tilannekatsaus (Review of the Situation, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 30 I. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, pp. 169—170. Also Poincaré's interview in Helsingin Sanomat 26 I.

⁴⁴ Helsingin Sanomat 26 I Itsenäisyytemme vakaalla pohjalla (Our Independence on Firm Ground). Uusi Suomi 26 I Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen (Recognition of Finland's Independence). Hufvudstadsbladet 26 I Erkännandet av Finlands självständighet.

⁴⁵ Hufvudstadsbladet 26 I Sir Esme Howard (Ossian Donner's article).

⁴⁶ Uusi Suomi 2 II Bernistä tulleita uutisia (News from Berne).

⁴⁷ Enckell, Politiska minnen I, p. 408.

⁴⁸ Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 31 I Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen ja Englanti (Recognition of Finnish Independence and England); 1 II Suomen itsenäisyydestä (Recognition of Finnish Independence).

⁴⁹ Poirot's letter published in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 3 II.

⁵⁰ Helsingin Sanomat 7 II Länsivallat ja Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen (The Western Powers and the Recognition of Finland's Independence).

⁵¹ Poirot's statement of Feb. 3. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen.

⁵² Speeches made by Lloyd George and Lord Balfour on Jan. 27 at the meeting of the »Council of Ten». — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference III, p. 734.

⁵³ Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States I: Finland, p. 133.

⁵⁴ Holsti's cablegram of Feb. 5 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 172.

⁵⁵ Memorandum of Henry White, a representative of the United States, dated 31, I, concerning Holsti's repeated visit to discuss matters with him (White's files); Morris' message of 25 II to A. Gripenberg. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 176.

⁵⁶ Holsti's report of 17 II to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — Ibid., p. 175.

⁵⁷ E.g., Gade, All My Born Days, p. 141.

⁵⁸ Uusi Suomi 15 III Uusi eduskunta (The New Parliament).

⁵⁹ Helsingin Sanomat 9 III Vaalitulokset ja valtiomuotoasia (The Results of the Elections and the Matter of the Form of Government).

⁶⁰ Helsingin Sanomat 11 III Vaalien tulos ja itsenäisyytemme tunnustaminen (The Result of the Elections and the Recognition of Our Independence).

⁶¹ Mannerheim, Minnen I, pp. 342, 343.

⁶² Lindman, Parlamentarismens tillämpning i Finland 1919—1926, p. 49.

⁶³ Leo Ehrnrooth's speech on 15 IV at a meeting of representatives of the Swedish People's Party (Estlander, Anteckningar 15 IV).

⁶⁴ Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States I, p. 135.

⁶⁵ Lindman, Parlamentarismens tillämpning i Finland 1919—1926, pp. 57—59. Ehrnrooth, Från ett skiftesrikt liv, pp. 295, 296.

⁶⁶ Estlander, Anteckningar 8 IV.

⁶⁷ Haynes' communication of 22 III to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 179.

⁶⁸ Foreign Minister Pichon had mentioned to Törngren, in his previously cited statement, a »normally formed government». (Törngren's message of 8 III to Enckell. — Ibid., p. 178).

⁶⁹ Enckell's notes of 22 III on his visit to the British Foreign Office. — Ibid., pp. 180, 181.

⁷⁰ Report of United States Naval Attaché in Copenhagen to State Dep't 21 III on his discussions with Mannerheim (State Dep't 860 d 01/19).

⁷¹ Haynes' cablegram of 22 III to U.S. State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d 00/392).

⁷² Lansing's cablegram of 28 III to Haynes (State Dep't 860 d 00/403). — Only in the event that the Agrarians and the Socialists formed the Government should Haynes try to influence matters so that Mannerheim would remain as head of State — toward preserving a balance.

⁷³ Cablegram sent on 23 III by Halstead, U.S. Consul-General in Stockholm, to State Dep't (State Dep't 860 d 00/394).

⁷⁴ By the latter half of April, the information obtained by Enckell from the French and British representatives (Pichon, Howard) indicated that the question of recognition of Finnish independence might be brought up immediately after the German peace treaty had been worked out, or, according to current estimates, after between four and six weeks. (Anteckningar från minister Enckells utrikesresa till London och Paris 17 IV and 18 IV. Copy: Ulkoministeriö 5 C 6).

⁷⁵ Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution* III, p. 109.

⁷⁶ Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia 1919—1923. The Operations of the American Relief Administration*, pp. 18, 19.

⁷⁷ Holsti mentions as his adviser Mr. J. Simpson, British Foreign Office expert on the Russian question. Holsti, *Eräitä muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1901—22* [Certain Memoranda from the Years 1901—22], Ms.

⁷⁸ Hoover's message of 2 IV to Lansing (State Dep't 860 d 01/23).

⁷⁹ Hoover's message of 26 IV (in Finnish translation) to Wilson. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, pp. 189—191.

⁸⁰ Citing the exchange of opinions among United States diplomats concerning Mannerheim, Hoover observed that there were those who saw the Regent casting a shadow over the new Finnish Government but added that in this selfsame «shadow» the country had established democratic institutions.

⁸¹ Report on the meeting of the «Council of Four» on 28 IV — *Les délibérations du Conseil des Quatre I*, pp. 398, 399; *Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 V*, p. 316.

⁸² Ossian Donner's report of 19 III to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

⁸³ Ossian Donner's message of 7 IV to Curzon (Copy: Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

⁸⁴ Ossian Donner, *Åtta år*, pp. 57—59.

⁸⁵ Polk's cablegram of 19 III to Haynes. — *Foreign Relations of the United States 1919 II*, p. 213; also D. H. Miller's message of 12 IV to Morison. — Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris VIII*, pp. 272.

⁸⁶ White's and Morison's statements of 3 IV to Enckell. Anteckningar från minister Enckells resa till London och Paris 3 IV. Holsti's communication of 23 IV to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, pp. 185, 186, 188, 189.

⁸⁷ Holsti's cablegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 IV. — *Ibid.*, pp. 188, 189.

⁸⁸ Holsti's communication of 28 IV to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. — *Ibid.*, pp. 190, 191.

⁸⁹ Holsti, *Present Political Situation in Northern Europe VIII. Some Strategic Problems. The Question of Eastern Karelia* (Holsti's collection: *Lectures from the Year 1943*).

⁹⁰ Memorandum signed in Paris on 20 IV by Törngren (Copy: Törngren's collection).

⁹¹ Ehrnrooth's cablegram of 27 IV to Holsti. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen, p. 191.

⁹² Account (in Finnish translation) of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on 3 V. — *Ibid.*, pp. 197—201.

⁹³ Memorandum drawn up on 1 V by R. H. Lord and Samuel Morison (State Dep't 860 d 01/31).

⁹⁴ Lansing's message of 1 V to Wilson (State Dep't 860 d 01/32).

⁹⁵ Wilson's reply of 3 V to Lansing (Copy: Hoover's book, *The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson*, p. 125).

⁹⁶ V:n 1919 valtiopäivien pöytäkirjat (Record of the 1919 Session of Parliament), p. 383.

⁹⁷ Lansing's cablegram of 5 V to U.S. State Dep't. — *Foreign Relations of the United States 1919 II*, p. 214.

⁹⁸ Information obtained from Samuel Morison on 15 X 1959.

⁹⁹ Polk's cablegram of 6 V to U.S. peace delegation. — *Foreign Relations of the United States 1919 II*, p. 215.

¹⁰⁰ Lansing's cablegram of 7 V to Haynes (State Dep't 860 d 01/36 a) and of 6 V to U.S. State Dep't. — *Ibid.*, p. 215.

¹⁰¹ Haynes' cablegram of 6 V to U.S. peace delegation (State Dep't 860 d 01/49 a).

¹⁰² V:n 1919 valtiopäivien pöytäkirjat, p. 398.

¹⁰³ Graham, *The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States I*, p. 146.

¹⁰⁴ Helsingin Sanomat 7 V Englanti tunnustanut Suomen itsenäisyyden (England Recognizes Finland's Independence). *Hufvudstadsbladet 7 V Vår självständighets erkännande. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 7 V Englanti tunnustanut Suomen itsenäisyyden.*

¹⁰⁵ *Uusi Suomi 7 V Suuri askel eteenpäin (Great Step Forward).*

¹⁰⁶ Deputy Foreign Minister L. Ehnrooth's message of 9 V to Bell. — *Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen*, p. 223.

¹⁰⁷ *Uusi Suomi 13 V Suomen taloudellinen riippumattomuus (Finland's Economic Independence) Hufvudstadsbladet 10 V Förenta staternas erkännande.*

Chapter VI

The »Murmansk Legion» and Public Opinion in Finland

One of the things the Western Allies, the British in particular, had urged the Finnish Government to agree upon in return for diplomatic recognition was the settlement of the fate of the Finnish legionaries that had served in the Allied Murmansk Force »in a liberal and magnanimous spirit». The fact that many of the legionaries had fought in the Finnish Civil War on the Red side and thus were guilty of having taken part in a rebellion against the legally established Government made it a problem that incensed political tempers, even though its importance diplomatically as a means of smoothing relations between Finland and the victorious powers was understood.

The creation of the Murmansk Legion can be traced back mainly to the closing stage of the Finnish Civil War: the flight across the frontier into northern Russia of Finnish Red troops who had no desire to make common cause with the Bolsheviks. With the Russian empire in a state of disintegration and internal chaos,¹ this group of fugitives, in seeking living space, threw in its lot with a stronger force. It was an act of self-preservation. Preparing to oppose any German thrust up toward the Arctic Ocean, the British Expeditionary Force took the Finnish Reds and other fugitives from the other side of the border under its wing by organizing them into special fighting units. This was one of the ways in which the British command in the far northern sector sought to further its own military plans. It also, for example, maintained contact with the local revolutionary, so-called Regional Council of Murmansk, which was likewise prepared to support measures against German and Finnish Government troops. The Western Powers, for their part, promised to refrain from meddling in Russian internal affairs.²

The British need for reinforcements offered the Finnish Reds a chance of salvation. Their helpless situation was a boon to the Expeditionary Force, making it easy to recruit them for service. It was in June of 1918 that a mutual agreement was made, which led to the founding of the Finnish Murmansk Legion. The legion had its own officers, who took their orders from the Allied military headquarters in this sector. The legionaries received their arms and other supplies from the British, and they were also paid

wages. Their area of operations was East Karelia and the territory around Murmansk, and they were not supposed to be used in any other fighting except against Germans and Finnish Government forces.³ From the British point of view, they were to this extent regarded as politically reliable.⁴ Homesickness and uncertainty about the future, however, were factors apt to affect their morale and lead to difficulties in handling them.

The political liaison officer for the »Finn Legion» was Oskari Tokoi, who, after wandering about in search of a suitable place to establish a colony for the emigrant Finns, had ended up in northern Russia, ancestral home of one branch of the Finnish racial family. The step taken by the Red Finns led by Tokoi⁵ was not to the liking of the revolutionary-minded fugitives from Finland who chose to support the Soviet regime. Although its spokesmen emphasized that the legion was not engaged in fighting against the Soviet Government, the »Muscovite» exiles condemned the legionaries as heretics deserving the death penalty for their »treachery».

When it became known in Finland that Red Finns had formed a military force in Murmansk and that this had been done in collaboration with the British, the result — as indicated in the foregoing — was to stir up public feeling and complicate relations between Finland and the Western Powers. Bourgeois newspapers denounced the legionaries as Bolsheviks, who were bent on taking political revenge on their native country and who were assumed to be preparing for an opportunity to return to Finland by force of arms.

In various connections, Finnish newspapers depicted the British and the Red troops in action shoulder to shoulder. It was rumored that they had operated together in repulsing the advance of the Finnish expeditionary force that in May had tried to capture the Arctic province of Petsamo. Various allegations were made that during the final stage of the Civil War the Reds had negotiated with the British toward continuing the fight as a joint effort.⁶ All these matters, together with the reports that in East Karelia British troops were obstructing the advance of Finnish detachments of volunteers on the other side of frontier, contributed — in addition to the strong pro-German sentiment — to direct the development of political opinion against the British and the Western Allies in general.⁷

Since the issue of the Finn Legion had provoked discussion along the lines indicated in Finland, the British Foreign Office saw fit to make certain observations concerning the matter. They were contained in notes presented to the Finnish Government on August 9 and October 13, 1918, and also published.⁸ The first note asserted that the British authorities had supported neither side in the Finnish Civil War and, accordingly, had not

worked in collaboration with the Red Guards. The second stated that the use of Finnish Reds in the British Expeditionary Force in the Murmansk sector did not mean that the British Government endorsed their political views. Neither would it countenance their making any attack across the border to violate the state of law and order recently restored in Finland and thereby plunge the country once more into the throes of civil strife. When this statement was brought to the attention of the Finnish Government, the victory of the Allied cause and the end of the World War were in sight and a new phase was about to begin in the fortunes of the Murmansk Legion.

When the military operations of the Germans ceased, and since the Finnish legionaries could not be put into combat against the Bolsheviks, the legion no longer had any function provided for by the agreement concluded the previous summer. The course of events had reached a point where the dissolution of this extraordinary military unit was in order.

The immediate disbanding of the legion could not come into question, for, in view of their wartime services, the British Government did not wish to abandon the legionaries to an uncertain fate. The attempt of one detachment of legionaries to force their way into Finland across the border at Kuusamo in January 1919 caused British diplomacy some embarrassment in relations with this country⁹ — not least of all because these Red Finns wore British uniforms.¹⁰ To forestall the spread of rebellious feeling among the members of the legion, the British military authorities were obliged to undertake »pacification measures». The excitement quieted down considerably after assurances were given that the legionaries would be kept on the payroll of the Western Allies by being transferred to the labor service.¹¹ According to an agreement made in April 1919, the British promised to place their prestige at stake in order to arrange an opportunity for the legionaries to return home. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the British Government had expressed the hope at the end of March to the Finnish Government that it would help settle the case of the Finnish Murmansk Legion by granting an amnesty to these former Red Guards — with the exception of the ones who had specially »compromised» themselves — and thereby removing the obstructions to their repatriation. The British Government emphasized that duty required its looking after the fate of men like these, who had served in its military forces. The proposal was made at a juncture when Finland was expecting a decision to be reached by the Western Allies on her request for diplomatic recognition; and this circumstance naturally caused the Finnish authorities to give the matter attention so that it would not develop into a new source of friction in relations determining the country's international status.

Neither the Regent nor the Government was disposed, however, to agree to the granting of the proposed amnesty. The British government took up the matter again and again; and it suggested negotiations to clarify the question. Later on, the Chargé d'affaires of the United States, the United Kingdom and France made a joint appearance to urge a settlement of the issue.¹² Contact was made in Tallinn during the month of June, with representatives of the Finnish Government, the British staff in command of the Murmansk army and the Finn Legion; but, since the negotiations produced no result,¹³ consideration of the question was resumed in Helsinki.

According to the agreement eventually drawn up,¹⁴ the signing of which took place on July 19, 1919, Finland entered into no commitments that might have signified a deviation from existing law. The proposal of a special amnesty having been rejected, an extraordinary repatriation procedure was worked out. The examination of the legionaries was to be conducted as provided for by Finnish law, with the British authorities taking care of their transportation for this purpose to Helsinki, where they would continue to be the responsibility and in the custody of the latter. A Finnish court would try each case and pass judgment in accordance with the laws then in force.

A special clause stated that the agreement did not concern such legionaries as could be deemed to have been instigators or otherwise have played an especially influential part in the rebellion of 1918. Among the names on the list of such persons presented by the Finnish authorities was Oskari Tokoi.

The signing of the repatriation agreement removed the last of the diplomatic obstacles in the way of establishing relations between Finland and the Western Powers on a normal basis.

NOTES

¹ E.g., Oskari Tokoi's letter of Sept. 10 to Santeri Nuorteva (Copy in English: State Dep't 860 d 00/305): »You in America cannot imagine how terrible life in Russia is nowadays. The period after the French Revolution must have been like Paradise by comparison . . .» (Trans. from the Finnish).

² Strakhovsky, *The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia*, pp. 28, 29.

³ *Itkonen, Muurmannin suomalainen legioona* (The Finnish Legion of Murmansk), p. 48.

⁴ Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*, p. 27.

⁵ In August they formed, as a connecting link, the »Finnish Workers' Com-

mittee of Archangel» (Suomalaisten työläisten Arkangelin-komitea), which was headed by some of the best known »pro-British» exiles: in addition to Tokoi, Emil Elo and Aarne Orjatsalo.

⁶ Dagens Press 30 IV England som de rödas bundsförvant; Svenska Tidningen 29 VI När engelsmännen erbjödo de röda hjälp; 18 IX Finlands ställning; Uusi Suometar 12 VI and 29 VI news reports.

⁷ Wasabladet 13 IV England — småfolkens fiende; Svenska Tidningen 24 V Det nuvarande läget III; 25 V Till fredsdiskussionen; 7 VI Ententens hot.

⁸ Helsingin Sanomat 13 VIII Englannin suhde Suomeen ja toiminta Muurmannilla. Nootti Suomen hallitukselle (England's Relations with Finland and Operations in Murmansk. Note to the Finnish Government); Uusi Päivä 14 X Englannin selitys Vienan Karjalan tapahtumista (England's Explanation regarding the Events in Viena (northern East Karelia); also Howard's letter (undated) to British Vice-Consul W. Wilson in Turku (Copy: Abo Underrättelser 5 X).

⁹ Uusi Suomi 6 III Huolestuttavia kuulumisia itärajalta (Disquieting News from the Eastern Frontier).

¹⁰ Bell, Land of Lakes, p. 109.

¹¹ Tokoi, Maanpakolaisen muistelmia (Memoirs of an Exile), pp. 268—272.

¹² Holsti, Muistelmia vuosilta 1903—23 (Memoirs from the Years 1903—23) (Ms).

¹³ Review of the Situation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 5 VI and 17 VII. (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 1).

¹⁴ Valtioneuvoston pöytäkirjat (Minutes of the Council of State) 19 VIII, liite A (supplement A).

Chapter VII

The Åland Question and the Peace Conference

The development of political sentiment among the inhabitants of the Åland Islands following the summer of 1917 was marked by a predominant trend favoring union with Sweden.¹ A popular petition drawn up along these lines in December had given the activity of the Åland Islanders the character of a mass movement. The »grand petition», which carried as many signatures as the number of ballots cast in the parliamentary elections held in the fall of 1917, was aimed to serve as an overt point of departure toward the realization of the separatist ideal. Much was made of the principle of self-determination, on which Finland had based her own claims to political sovereignty.

This trend of opinion was further advanced by the events of the spring of 1918: thanks to the intervention of the Swedish authorities at the end of February, the Russian troops garrisoned on the islands — together with the military units representing both sides in the Finnish Civil War — were made to withdraw. The easing of the local situation increased the Ålanders' security and inspired in them a sense of gratitude to Sweden.

More important than the islanders' Swedish sympathies in determining political decisions was the dominating position of Germany in the sphere of the Baltic Sea. Around the time Germany had decided to take a hand in the Finnish Civil War, Sweden had for her part decided to send troops to the Åland Islands. When the Germans landed in Finland at the beginning of March, the Swedish Government felt that difficulties lay ahead in the implementation of its political aims. Germany's position as the guiding force behind the progress of events compelled Sweden to compromise. Hoping that the step would not endanger the country's neutrality, Sweden in May 1918 gave Germany a pledge that she would not, by appealing to the 1856 Treaty of Paris, demand the co-operation of the Western Powers in arranging matters relating to the Åland Islands. Indirectly this commitment was tantamount to acknowledging German hegemony.² Thus, the question of the Åland Islands had to be settled among the states bordering on the Baltic Sea, that is, Germany, Russia, Sweden and Finland.

The decision to have the fortifications on the Åland Islands destroyed came after this, and it was carried out jointly by Germany, Sweden and Finland; the Soviet Government had forfeited its voice in the matter by

submitting to the terms of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The »enforced» collaboration between Finland and Sweden engineered by Germany did not help to improve future relations between them. Rather did they remain cool. And with the withdrawal from the islands of the Swedish troops by the end of May, Sweden's policy toward the Åland Islands displayed a weakening from the state of assertiveness observed during the previous six months, which, again, caused the Ålander's own strivings to achieve union with Sweden to lose strength.

The idea of a »compensation deal» whereby the Swedes hoped to gain possession of the Åland Islands as a reward for their services in realizing the annexation of East Karelia by Finland cropped up in Sweden at the beginning of July as a product of frustration generated by the emotional climate of the dying phase of the World War. The overall situation being persistently confused and the outcome being clouded by different possibilities, the Swedes seized upon this scheme because the other means tried had yielded no results. The Swedish Government of Liberals and Social Democrats headed by Nils Edén, which was cautious in its general approach to foreign policy, did not apparently wish — in view of the aforedescribed background — to take a position opposing the search for such a solution. As much courage and optimism as the scheme demanded of those who had initiated it, since it called for contacting both Britain and Germany at the same time, its implementation nevertheless depended upon the mere application of the procedures of diplomatic arbitration.

Thus had Swedish foreign policy ended up by Foreign Minister Joh. Hellner's acknowledging as his own the scheme for the solution of the Åland question promoted by zealots, though, it is true, now moderated with respect to the methods applied. The hoped-for solution to the problem of the ownership of the islands was not to be found, however, by the pursuit of this line.

The unfavorable turn in the fortunes of war for the Central Powers had its effect also on the fate of the Åland Islands. Finland's having run into difficulties on account of her pro-German policy, Sweden felt her own chances for action opening wider insofar as she considered herself able, under the changed circumstances, to take up the pursuit once more of her objectives in the Åland Islands.

Around October and November, when the foundations on which Finland's pro-German policy had been built were collapsing and she had yet to establish relations with the Western Powers, the makers of Sweden's foreign policy thought it opportune to define their stand toward the Åland question on the basis of the changed international situation. The point of

departure of the line followed by Sweden was to strengthen the position of Finland as an independent state by offering her good offices.

The Swedes, just across the Gulf of Bothnia, hoped that in the future Finland would not lean on any big power coalition for support but instead would join the neutral Scandinavian bloc and thereby add lung power to the voice of this Nordic »ideological alliance» in international affairs. It was hoped that, by developing close ties with the other Scandinavian countries, Finland's relations with the Western Powers would improve and that the British and United States Governments would recognize Finnish independence — preferably before the Peace Conference convened. Necessary preconditions for a change in the attitude of the Western Powers were believed to be, above all, the evacuation of Finland by the German troops and, then, postponement of the settlement of the issue of the Finnish King until after the peace treaty was concluded.³

This favorable attitude toward the matter of stabilizing Finnish independence encouraged the Swedes at the same time to seek the realization of their unfulfilled hopes with regard to the Åland Islands. Swedish wishful thinking evidently stemmed from a belief that in a new situation, which in the Baltic sphere would leave open to Finland only the possibility of leaning on Sweden for support, the Finns, aware of the weak position of their country, might be prepared⁴ to submit to the Swedish territorial demands as a »favor» in exchange for Sweden's good offices in the field of diplomacy.

The altered conditions did produce certain expressions of opinion in Finland that ran parallel to the line of thought prevailing in Sweden. Especially among those who had zealously championed the pro-German policy there were many who in the crisis were inclined to reconsider their earlier attitudes in the light of the events of October and November.

As the defeat of Germany began to loom on the horizon, the fear of Bolshevism overcame certain of the Activists and their collaborators, including Regent Svinhufvud, whose experiences during the period when the Red Guards reigned in southern Finland increased their sense of apprehension, while their pessimistic view of the future made them grope after every chance of getting foreign support. It was hard for them to adjust to the idea of turning to the Western Allies, a strange bloc of powers, the approach to which they had seemingly made impossible by the political line they had pursued. Sweden remained for them — in contrast to those who had sought to achieve a balance in relations with the major powers — the only state whose support could be obtained without difficulty.

Svinhufvud's stand toward the matter betrayed a certain compulsiveness. In order to bring about better relations with Sweden, Svinhufvud was willing to make a concession: he hinted at Finland's readiness to go along with the referendum demanded by the Swedes as the solution to the Åland question — which, considering the sentiment prevailing among the overwhelming majority of the islanders, would have been tantamount to surrendering the islands peaceably to Sweden. On November 2 the Regent submitted to C. G. Westman, the Swedish envoy to Helsinki, a proposal designed to improve relations between the two countries,⁵ one incorporating the aforementioned concession. This idea, which even in earlier years had not been excluded from the program of the pro-German Activists, apparently gave encouragement to the political leaders of Sweden as they undertook to push their demand for a referendum among the Åland Islanders.

Noteworthy among the voices raised by representatives of the line hitherto pursued by the Finnish Government with the object of promoting better relations between Finland and Sweden was that of Minister Heikki Renvall. At the beginning of October he observed that in general the attitude of Finland toward the question of giving up the Åland Islands was a negative one, but he nevertheless left room for speculation that a bargain might be struck if it included territorial compensation for Finland from East Karelia.⁶

Hinted at by Minister Renvall, the »compensation settlement», which had claimed the attention of the Swedish policy makers in the summer of 1918, reawakened interest and was mentioned in Joh. Hellner's circular letter of October 14 among instructions of topical importance. It was realized that acting accordingly involved difficulties in the arena of big power politics, as experience had shown, but the matter continued to be »in the wind». A condition of success was that at the Peace Conference Sweden manage to get her voice heard and that the victorious Allies feel some interest in territorial adjustments along the lines proposed in the Åland Islands and East Karelia.

Sweden's most immediate goal was to bring about an internationally recognized referendum among the islanders. Prior to anything else, the Swedes thought they should seek an agreement in principle with Finland on this matter even before the Peace Conference met. Action on this basis, it was believed in Sweden, might prevent foreign interference and consequent disagreements. Sweden saw the danger of the Western Allies' taking a position favoring Finland's claims to the Åland Islands in advance.⁷

Accordingly, Mannerheim's mission to London and Paris aroused mixed

feelings in Sweden. On the one hand, it was hoped that the General's efforts would lead to a stabilization of Finland's independence. On the other hand, when it became known that the question of the Åland Islands had figured in his discussions with Allied political leaders,⁸ Swedish observers became mistrustful,⁹ knowing that he opposed the annexation of the islands by Sweden. And these misgivings were also given public expression.¹⁰

It was on December 11 that Sweden confronted the Finnish Government with an official communication proposing that a referendum be held in the Åland Islands.

When the world political situation took its momentous turn during the months of October and November, 1918, the Åland Islanders seized upon the idea of approaching the Western Allies in the matter of their future status. The procedure in itself was nothing new. Previously the islanders had appealed to powerful agencies abroad: at the beginning of February it had been the King of Sweden, in March the German Kaiser; now had come the turn of the belligerents on the winning side in the World War. The action in itself reflected the conception that had become rooted in the political thinking of the Ålanders during the period the prohibition on fortifying the islands was in force after its imposition in 1856, namely, that the big powers played the decisive role in international affairs and that their range of interests embraced even »minor questions» like that of the Åland Islands.

The initiative taken by the Ålanders appeared to serve the interests of Sweden also from the standpoint of its being a means of nullifying the agreement between Sweden and Germany according to which arrangements affecting the islands should be made jointly by the countries bordering on the Baltic Sea.¹¹

The islanders' leaders practiced caution in planning the steps to be taken, however, evidently on account of their earlier failure. Thus, when the matter came up of petitioning the support of the Western Powers for the holding of a referendum among the inhabitants of the islands, it was deemed advisable to turn to Regent Svinhufvud simultaneously with the same petition. Thereby, it was believed, the petition would not appear to be an act of disloyalty to the Finnish Government.¹²

According to the plan of action of the Åland movement, the prominent local leader Julius Sundblom was to contact the Regent of Finland before the executive committee of the local representative assembly, or *Ålands landsting*, which had been formed the previous June, approached the

British, French and United States Governments. Of the triumvirate in control of politics in the islands — the other two being Carl Björkman and Johannes Eriksson — it was Julius Sundblom who from this point on began to appear most conspicuously in the picture. The shift of his position from one of loyalty of Finland to separatism had occurred slowly and, to some extent, even with difficulty.¹³ As an MP representing his Åland constituents, Sundblom had gained parliamentary experience in the Finnish capital. And after the Civil War, which he had been obliged to wait out in Helsinki, he laid emphasis for the benefit of his fellow islanders on the necessity of pursuing a line of compromise.¹⁴ In the summer of 1918 he declined the post of chairman of the Ålands landsting, thereby showing consistency in his adherence to this line.

It was not until the defeat of the Central Powers in the World War appeared inevitable that Sundblom began to blossom out as a separatist. During October and November he was in Stockholm, where he tried to maintain contact with the leading Swedish political circles,¹⁵ but neither did he wish to shut the door on negotiations with the authorities in Helsinki, as pointed out in connection with the petition for a referendum. He continued to be a member of the Finnish Parliament, and he did not dare to burn his bridges back from the past, especially since he steadily doubted the chances of the separatist movement to succeed.

The appointment of the deputation to be sent to Paris at the turn of the years 1918 and 1919 placed Sundblom at the crossroads. The leadership of the separatist movement demanded his participation¹⁶ and, being aware of the prevailing sentiment in the islands, he decided to accept membership in the delegation.¹⁷ Thereafter he played the role of separatist — as a crusading protagonist of the Åland movement and as a political agitator among the participating islanders' ranks.

When word reached the islands that Prime Minister Paasikivi, who had been visited by the deputation, had taken a negative stand toward the Ålanders' petition for a referendum to settle their future status, finishing touches were applied to the petition. It was dated November 9 and two days later it was delivered to the Western Powers through their embassies in Stockholm.¹⁸

The petition made reference to the principle of self-determination as interpreted by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points in January 1918, and the hope was expressed that the Åland question would be settled along this ideological line in connection with the peace negotiations. Such a solution would conform to the aspirations of the islanders, which could be manifested through a referendum. Delivered at the time of the signing

of the Armistice, the Ålanders' petition was the initial step in appealing to the Western Powers. The next step was the sending of the Ålanders' delegation to Paris, where its mission was to contact leading political personalities attending the Peace Conference. The decision to send the delegation had evidently been inspired by political quarters in Sweden. The execution of the diplomatic task involved appeared, however, to be very difficult. Operating in the French capital confronted the delegation with demands of a different order from those required in dealing with the Swedish authorities. After all, it meant moving about in completely strange surroundings, and a further obstacle to effective action was the delegates' unfamiliarity with the languages of the major powers. To prevent a premature collapse of the effort, Sweden helped out by providing the Ålanders with the services of interpreters and trying to arrange contacts.

The Peace Conference had a crowded agenda and, under circumstances where problems concerning the future of Germany and Russia harassed the participants, the question of the Åland Islands could scarcely arouse much interest. On the contrary, the patience of the representatives of the big powers was often put to quite a test by deputations from small states or separate areas knocking at their doors.¹⁹ By the end of February the Ålanders had managed to gain brief audiences with the French, British and Italian Foreign Ministers.²⁰ A French diplomat below the top level might express some cordial sentiments about the separatist aims of the Åland Islanders, but an exposition of the general international situation given on the same occasion was calculated to demonstrate the »secondary» importance of their cause from the point of view of the world conference.

The characteristic noncommittal attitude of the leading Allied politicians was revealed to the deputation when it called upon the British peace delegate Esme Howard. According to a report sent to the Swedish Foreign Ministry,²¹ Howard »carefully and with the utmost amiability avoided giving any promises or raising any hopes.» Outwardly this call was an exceptional one in that, in conversing with the former British envoy to Stockholm, the Ålanders were able to present their case directly in their own mother tongue. Otherwise, in all their calls they were obliged to resort to the services of an interpreter.

In the face of the setbacks they had experienced, the idealism of the Åland Islanders, which had been particularly in evidence during the initial stage of their mission to Paris, began to falter. Power-political factors appeared to run rough-shod over idealistic considerations, and this observation awakened in the minds of the deputies capable of independent judgment, among them Sundblom, a presentiment of the final outcome of

their mission. The calls of the deputation, which interpreted the feelings and opinions of the inhabitants of a cluster of small, remote islands, on diplomats representing the great world powers of the West — in connection with which formalities were overlooked and faith was optimistically placed in a "just cause" — produced in the atmosphere charged with power politics after-effects not unmixed with elements of irony.²²

The Ålanders' mission to Paris yielded a historical picture of the times. It was one manifestation of the state of ideological ferment prevailing at the end of the World War; and what it did was to give multifarious expression to the conceptions of democracy and the right of nations to self-determination. The mission itself ended up as a mere gesture, an attempt to place information where it counted, and it colored the columns of the Finnish press for a long time.

In the consequent rather polemical discussion of the issue in the newspapers, Julius Sundblom began to emerge as the central figure of the separatist movement, personifying the aspirations of the Ålanders to unite their island province to Sweden. In the press of mainland Finland he became the target of much violent abuse: in certain quarters his arrest was even advocated. Relations between Sweden and Finland revealed signs of growing coolness as a result of the foregoing developments.

In delivering the aforementioned note of December 11 to the Finnish Government, Sweden had aimed at a settlement of the issue of the Åland Islands before the Peace Conference convened on the basis of negotiations with Finland, the point of departure for them being a referendum held in the islands.

The task of the Swedish diplomats stationed in the Allied capitals was to ascertain how the victorious powers viewed the matter. Apparently the idea was to seek prestigious support in the West for Sweden's Åland policy as a means of pressuring the Finnish Government but also to determine Sweden's chances of success if she were obliged to take an alternative course of action — in the event of Finnish resistance, to bring the matter before the Peace Conference for settlement. In handing the December note to Foreign Minister Enckell, the Swedish Minister to Helsinki, C. G. Westman, gave notice that the next step contemplated by his Government was along this alternative course.²³

At the turn of the years 1918 and 1919, the Swedish authorities showed a desire to hasten the solution of the Åland problem according to the possibilities opened up by the December note. Evidently, political quarters in Sweden at that time entertained the belief that Finland felt her position

as an independent state insecure²⁴ and would grope for salvation by orienting herself in the direction of Scandinavia. Swedish calculations further took in the aforementioned fact that certain Finnish political leaders had betrayed signs of a willingness to compromise, which was interpreted as an inclination to avoid taking any rigid stand on issues.

The mood of crisis generated in Finnish government circles by the collapse of Germany did not, however, lead into any blind alley. Gradually the view began to gain strength that time was working in Finland's favor as far as the Åland question was concerned. Accordingly, it was considered to be in the interest of the country to delay answering the Swedish note. Recognition of Finnish independence by the Western Powers would, it was believed, bolster Finland's sovereign position in defending her title to the Åland Islands.

Public opinion served as an effective sounding board for the Finnish Government's own views. The various bourgeois factions — though their zeal did not in all cases spring from the same source — supported the Government's determination to preserve the inviolability of the country's historical boundaries. Among the Finnish-speaking population this »defensive measure» inspired expressions of sentiment imbued with a fierce patriotic spirit. Sweden was generally condemned for her desire to annex the Åland Islands; it was even suggested that in the light of this development it appeared difficult to establish close ties with the Swedes.

The attitude of the Swedish-speaking minority living on the mainland with regard to the Åland question was similar — and quite as uncompromising — although the views of this group were to some extent differently based.²⁵ Violation of Finland's territorial integrity had the effect of violating a valuable historical tradition. Repugnance to the idea of a territorial split was all the stronger since it would cut through the ranks of the Swedish-speaking minority, reducing its numbers and weakening its chances of gaining a more influential voice in national affairs.

Common to the thinking of both language groups was the view that applying the principle of self-determination to the Åland Islanders, »a splinter nationality», was not justified. Insofar as the idea of exchanging the Åland Islands for certain parts of East Karelia still claimed adherents, they were to be found among the one-time pro-German Finnish-speaking Activists.

On the other hand, the Social Democratic party did not at first take any consistent stand in opposition to Sweden's bid to annex the Åland Islands. On many occasions the activity engaged in by Sweden was branded as the »right of the stronger» to assert its will. Concurrently, however,²⁶ there

were voices raised in the Social Democratic camp that expressed »understanding» of the islanders' cause. This line was chiefly inspired by the desire, fostered by the party's democratic features, to contribute to the settling of international disputes and to stress the value of the right of self-determination among peoples and of the system of referring issues to popular vote in the general adjustment of postwar conditions in Europe.²⁷

The »delaying tactics» adopted by the Finnish Government in the issue of the Åland Islands were manifested as unwillingness to undertake negotiations with Sweden any more than with the victorious Western Allies. Continuance of the prevailing situation struck it as being most advantageous. Evidently, the leading political quarters in Finland were confident that the passivity of the opposite side would cool down Sweden's eagerness to pursue her ambition of annexing the Åland Islands. On the other hand, the notion was not alien to Finnish thinking, either, that the activeness of the islanders could be tempered by asserting the authority of the Finnish Government and making it plain that this authority could not be challenged without punitive consequences.

As far as satisfying the provincial movement with certain reform measures was concerned, it was felt that the granting of local autonomy would accomplish this, in time taking the wind out of the separatists' sails.

Even though Finland was »accused» of pro-German leanings, she had nevertheless kept out of the great war. And this fact was expected to affect the attitude of the Allies favorably. At a time when there was much talk about the right of small nations to self-determination and they were being awarded territory over and beyond the actual claims of nationality, the Finns felt that it would be contradictory if Sweden were to compel Finland with the support of the victorious Allies to surrender her title to the Åland Islands.

Such were the thoughts in the minds of Finnish politicians. Realizing the faintness of their voice in international affairs, the Finnish authorities could not discount the fact that the Åland Islands posed a problem not for Finland and Sweden alone to decide between them. For, according to historical tradition, it was up to an international forum to offer the solution.

At the beginning of 1919 it did not appear as if the Western Powers felt any compulsion to decide what to do about the Åland Islands; it had no place among the major postwar problems. No guidelines in principle seem to have been laid down officially to indicate the way to a solution, and the whole matter had probably never even been examined in detail

by the Western policy makers. On the contrary, there were circumstances suggesting that the matter had been shelved, one such circumstance being the fact that the Russian question was still »open».

Differences could be detected in the attitude of the victors toward Finland and Sweden. The United States, for one, remained passive and avoided touching the matter before its possible appearance on the agenda of the Peace Conference. Sweden, too, did not appear to stand any chance of receiving support from that quarter.

France, whose political barometer moved with greater sensitivity, was more likely to raise Swedish hopes on this score, as was Italy.²⁸ This hopefulness, which was at times characteristic of Swedish diplomats, tended to be buoyed up by the thought that fear of a resurgence of German power was rooted deep in the souls of French politicians. This line of reasoning ran: in Swedish possession the Åland Islands would contribute more to the security of the Western Allies than as Finnish territory, which had been the scene of German intervention during the civil strife of the spring of 1918.

England pursued a pragmatic course of foreign policy, applying the lessons of the past and trying to reconcile antitheses. From this standpoint, the Åland Islands were liable to provoke less Russian displeasure in Finnish than in Swedish possession. The British attitude was marked by a certain legitimistic point of view as well: Finland had seceded from Russia and the Åland Islands were part of the territory in secession. In conformity to this line of thought, it was also fitting to confirm the islands' former demilitarized status, which England had taken part in creating in 1856.

Worthy of separate attention are certain ideas for a compromise solution that were in the air as the year 1919 opened. British interest in the matter was shown by Howard's proposal in early January that an effort be made to prevent harsh discord between Finland and Sweden by dividing the Åland Islands. His suggestion was that the boundary be so drawn that the eastern groups of islands — Kumlinge, Sottunga and Degerby — would remain under Finnish rule.²⁹ It was Howard who dreamed up this compromise himself; and it was not based upon any decision reached by the British Foreign Office, any more than were other similar recommendations made by British diplomats.³⁰ Likewise aimed at settling the dispute amicably was the scheme hatched by the Italian Foreign Ministry according to which the islands would be organized into a condominium jointly governed by Sweden and Finland.³¹

Neither proposal promised enough to satisfy the demands that had

crystallized out of Sweden's Åland policy. Distasteful to Sweden, too, was the hint that she might buy the islands for a stated sum of money or — in a mitigated form — give compensation for them by assuming the Finnish State debt. This, after all, would have been out of keeping with the grounds on which the Swedes purported to base their claims. It was the right of peoples to self-determination that was intended to justify the holding of a referendum to settle the dispute over the islands.

As the foregoing mediatory recommendations were bandied about, the Swedish policy makers tried to avoid over-optimism, to act with caution and to adopt a flexible point of view. They did not want to reject the idea of a compromise offhand, nor did they want to betray any sign of shifting from their original stand in the matter, either. Thus, in January 1919 the Swedish Ambassador to Helsinki received instructions not to reject the idea of dividing the islands without more ado if it emanated from a Finnish quarter.³² On the other hand, the proposal to create a condominium failed to arouse interest — if for no other reason than the difficulty of organizing such a project in practice. The experience of joint action during the spring months of 1918 and subsequently during the phase of demolishing the fortifications indicated that it only tended to produce friction.³³

When the Finns fell back on the argument that a solution of the Åland question by means of a referendum might prove a deceptive measure — that is, the result might only reflect a passing stage of popular sentiment —, the Swedes sought to contrive a form of voting that would effectively nullify this argument. Accordingly, Hjalmar Branting, the Swedish Social Democratic leader, suggested that two separate referenda be held, the second three years, for instance, after the first one, with the League of Nations supervising the administration during the control period.³⁴ The second vote should, according to this plan, convince even outside observers as to the wishes of the Åland Islanders.

Since the various vague proposals thrown into the air as »trial balloons» promised no concrete solution, the Åland question appeared from the Swedish standpoint to have reached an impasse. It aroused in Stockholm political circles a desire to break the deadlock by means of personal contact. Eyes turned at this juncture to Mannerheim, who was invited to pay an official visit to Stockholm around the middle of February. He was recognized as an independent personality, whose position as Regent added to his prestige. And it was realized that any stand he took in the matter might create a realistic basis for its future treatment. On his mission to the Western capitals, Mannerheim had on occasion spoken his mind quite

straightforwardly, so it was thought that in interpreting the will of the Finnish State in a more modest milieu he would undoubtedly pursue a clearly marked course.

This supposition was not wrong. Finland's official stand in the matter of the Åland Islands was characterized by the uncompromising outlook that generally was reflected by Mannerheim's statements of policy. Finland, it became known, was prepared to make strategic concessions with respect to the islands, but none territorially. Mannerheim explained his rigid position on the ground that his countrymen opposed all territorial cessions and that it was futile to expect the Finnish Parliament to accept any plan based on a division of the islands.

On the other hand, Mannerheim said that Finland was prepared to agree to Sweden's sharing in the defense of the islands.³⁵ With joint defense in view, he considered it appropriate to allow Sweden to undertake control measures in certain parts of the Åland Islands.

The idea of joint Finnish-Swedish defense confined to a neutral Åland subjected to sovereign Finnish rule had been broached by the Finnish Foreign Ministry to Sweden as early as January, 1919, before the negotiations with Mannerheim took place. Those two experts in international law, Rafael Erich and K. G. Idman, appeared on this occasion as interpreters of the scheme.³⁶ Simultaneously, the Finnish Government indicated a willingness to concede the islands home rule. Proof of these good intentions came later in the form of a bill submitted to Parliament. Beyond this Finland was not prepared to go as one of the parties to the dispute.

When Swedish government circles saw that Finland was uncompromisingly committed to her Åland policy, they had no other course open to them — if they wanted to be consistent — than to make another appeal in a new form for the holding of a referendum in the islands or, if too much disagreement prevailed on the matter, to submit their case ultimately to the Peace Conference.

Finland rejected the proposed referendum also in the form in which it was last presented. The continued exchange of views related to the question of an appeal to the Peace Conference. Swedish spokesmen did not lay any special stress on the form the appeal should take; the main thing for them was that the issue of the Åland Islands be dealt with by the Western Powers. They wanted to bring together for a settlement under the direction of the major powers both the matter of demilitarization, which had the character of prior international participation and on which there was no disagreement between Sweden and Finland, and the question of the territorial ownership of the islands, which was "new" and doubtfully within the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference.

Finland, for her part, held back with regard to such a measure. Appealing to an international forum appeared to signify acknowledgment of restricted sovereignty, and it carried the risk of a reduction in the extent of the country's historical boundaries. The Finns had no desire to transfer to the Peace Conference the authority to decide the Åland question as a package settlement, for they viewed the matter of possession as involving their sovereign rights. In the event the Åland question was brought up before the Peace Conference for decision against the will of Finland, it was hoped that she could be represented there as a plenipotentiary member, together with Sweden, and not be relegated to the role of defendant as in a court trial.

In Sweden it was considered plausible that the Åland issue would be linked up with the questions of the possession of East Karelia and of Finland's access to the Arctic Ocean.³⁷

The outcome of the negotiations was Sweden's realization that she would not be rewarded by any favorable response from Finland to her note of December. It further became clear that the Finns had no inclination to appeal to the Peace Conference for a settlement of the Åland question.

Sweden's bid to reach an agreement with Finland on the matter at the negotiating table had failed. According to plan, therefore, Sweden decided to appeal to the Peace Conference.³⁸

That spring, then, the Swedes proceeded to take measures to have the Åland question included in the agenda of the Peace Conference. In the proposal submitted on April 22 to the president of the Conference, Sweden requested that the matter be dealt with in connection with the decision on Finland's future boundaries. As the starting point for a settlement, she proposed the holding of a referendum in the islands, at the same time acknowledging that the Conference had a free hand in exercising its power of decision. »In accordance with the principles of the Peace Conference,» however, the assumption was expressed that Sweden would be given the opportunity to participate in the discussion on the matter. The Swedish Government was not untroubled by the fear that as soon as Finland was accorded diplomatic recognition she would hasten to have the question of her boundaries settled. If she succeeded in this, Sweden would be confronted with a *fait accompli*, after which it would be difficult for her to carry out her designs on the Åland Islands.³⁹

The Åland question had been touched upon in passing on February 27 by the Council of Ten at the Peace Conference. The exchange of views on this occasion had been concerned with certain of the conditions requisite

to dealing with the matter; among other things, the question was raised whether the Conference had the right to offer a settlement of the issue. Who were the legitimate parties concerned was not altogether clear. Thus, the British considered Finland, as owner of the islands, to be a party concerned, whereas the Italian delegate had referred to the power-political side of the matter and argued that the Åland question should be decided in connection with the settlement of the Russian question.⁴⁰ The grounds for dealing with the Åland question were thus wholly obscure. It is noteworthy that, for instance, Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, expressed doubts whether the Peace Conference had any business whatsoever to intervene in the matter.⁴¹ The uncertainty of the situation was bound to shake the confidence of the Swedish Government in the possibilities of its gaining its objective.

The prevailing atmosphere in international politics, which did not seem to favor Sweden's annexation of the Åland Islands, demanded growing political activity on the part of the Swedes, who were also obliged to keep a sharp eye on shifting currents of opinion at the Peace Conference in order to utilize them to their advantage. In view of the possibility that the question of according recognition to Finnish independence might be discussed in Paris, the Swedish Minister there was given instructions to bend his efforts toward bringing about a decision in favor of holding a referendum in the Åland Islands in connection with the general settlement of Finland's boundaries.⁴²

The coupling of the Åland question to these decisions was, the Swedish authorities, too, realized, a delicate matter. Thus, in the plan of action drawn up by the Swedish Foreign Ministry it was emphasized that no demand should be made to have the hopes of the islanders taken into account in connection with the recognition of Finland's independence. If, however, any proposal were made to have the said problems dealt with and settled together, Sweden should undertake to support the move. A certain disposition to accept a compromise was indicated by Sweden's unwillingness to reject Howard's scheme of partition offhand, although the difficulties involved in its implementation should be stressed. Insofar as East Karelia and Petsamo were taken up by the Peace Conference as territorial problems, it was felt that Sweden should in some suitable way back up Finland's claims.

If, however, in spite of Sweden's endeavors, the Åland Islands remained in the possession of Finland, their neutralization should be internationally guaranteed, as earlier. They should not be converted into a territory jointly guaranteed by Finland and Sweden. In the event of hostilities between

Germany and Russia, the combined resources of Finland and Sweden were considered insufficient to protect the inviolability of the islands.⁴³

Because Finland, for reasons already explained, was unwilling to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference over the Åland question, she did not get into touch with the so-called Baltic Commission, which, formed in April as a body of experts, was supposed to do the preparatory work in clarifying the question. In addition to the principles at stake, a certain factor of power politics had emerged to reinforce Finland's resolution not to recognize the authority of the Peace Conference to deal with the matter.

After the middle of May it began to look as if the Western Allies would seek contact with the so-called White Russians and take into account their views on the organization of conditions in Russia. Around this period there were schemes afoot for Allied intervention in Russia, and there were certain influential groups in the West that wanted to reach an understanding with General Kolchak. With regard to the recognition of Finland's independence, the White Russians opposed it, as will be recounted later, and this gave reason to think that they would also insist upon restoring Russia's historical »dominion» over the Åland Islands.

The Peace Conference lacked the will to grapple with the problem of the islands. Notwithstanding Swedish exertions bent on hastening adoption of the proposal submitted by Sweden at the end of April as an item on the conference agenda, the Baltic Commission kept postponing its examination of the question. Vital matters involved in the settlement of postwar affairs continued to press for attention with the result that it was a thankless task to whip up interest in any side issue. On top of everything else, the British in especial had expressed doubts as to whether the Conference had any right to interfere in a dispute between two neutral states.

It was on July 2 that the Åland question was taken up for examination by the Baltic Commission on the basis of the notes exchanged by Finland and Sweden, the Swedish appeal to the Peace Conference and the memorandum submitted by the White Russians. This memorandum sternly opposed the annexation of the islands by Sweden in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, the importance, instead, of military considerations' being primarily stressed. The military considerations, as viewed from the Russian and Finnish standpoints, were represented as running parallel.

No matter how negatively the White Russians reacted to the business of according Finnish independence recognition, they played the role of championing the »common vital interests of Russia and Finland» when

it came to the issue of the Åland Islands — and this indirectly meant a weakening of Sweden's case. The islands were considered to be part of the defense system of the Gulf of Finland: whoever controlled them could maintain military surveillance over the area extending to the line between Tallinn and Porkkala. »The status of the Åland Islands must so be defined,» the memorandum stated, »as to preclude their use by any power hostile to Russia and Finland. The same interests require that the state obliged to defend the Gulf of Finland under conditions of war shall not forfeit the advantages which possession of the group of islands affords strategically.»⁴⁴

The White Russians' memorandum did not expressly say whether the Åland Islands should belong to Russia or to Finland (within the framework of the special political status the White Russians were prepared to accord the country). But the arguments presented indirectly suggested that Russia should take over the military control of the islands.

In this connection the representatives of the Western Powers on the commission defined more clearly than before the attitude of their Governments toward the treatment of the Åland question and the lines of its future settlement. The British spokesman advocated a solution which would prevent any major power from utilizing the Åland Islands toward gaining mastery of the Baltic Sea. The restoration of the islands' demilitarized status in accordance with the arrangement made in 1856 was likewise considered important. Howard went on to suggest that the islands be established on an autonomous basis »sous le protectorat collectif de la Finlande et de la Suède». Accordingly, these two small powers would support each other in defending the islands against any military aggression by a large power.

The British Government would have liked to postpone any further action on the whole question, explaining that no effective arrangements could be made as long as Russia was not participating. Its aim was to pass the whole matter on to the League of Nations for solution, whereupon the task of the Baltic Commission would be limited to preparing a recommendation. Thus the British apparently thought an international guarantee of maximum scope could be arrived at with respect to the future status of the Åland Islands.⁴⁵

The representatives of France, Italy and Japan placed an importance on not overlooking the strategic interests of Russia in arranging the status of the Åland Islands. France demanded that access of German military forces to the area of the islands be effectively obstructed, and this, it contended, could be best achieved with the help of (White) Russia. The French delegate, M. Albert Kammerer, emphasized in a statement made before the

commission that Russia should in this matter be given priority over Sweden. By contrast, the British authorities were against awarding Russia a naval base in the islands. The British considered it important to secure close relations with the Scandinavian countries in the future.

Despite the differences of opinion mentioned, the Baltic Commission was unanimous in its view that no proposal in the matter should be submitted to the Peace Conference but that — as the British Government recommended — the whole question be passed on to the League of Nations for eventual settlement. A memorandum to this effect was approved by the commission on July 4.⁴⁶

Since Finland had not surrendered the settlement of the Åland dispute to the Peace Conference, the Finnish delegates in Paris were left in a position of »wait and see». Efforts were nevertheless made to keep abreast of developments on an unofficial level by contacting members of the commission, notably its Chairman, Esmé Howard, from whom Enckell had received information during the latter half of June⁴⁷ concerning the views held by the commission. At the time the Commission's report was being worked out, Enckell and Törngren summoned Ossian Donner from London to their assistance. His task was to exploit his personal ties with Howard to try to get the points of view represented by Finland recognized. On July 6 Donner did succeed in gaining an unofficial audience with Howard and setting forth Finland's case before him.

The report of the Baltic Commission had, however, been approved two days earlier, so there was no further possibility of influencing its contents but only the communications concerning the decision already made that were supposed to be delivered to the Swedish Government and the Åland Islanders. (Not having joined in the demand to have the matter taken up, Finland was not in line either to receive an official reply.) From the standpoint of Finland, Howard had an important message to present Donner: the question of organizing a referendum in the Åland Islands would no longer be dealt with by the Commission.⁴⁸ Howard had previously told the Swedish Minister to Paris, J. Ehrensvärd, that he agreed with those who did not consider the inhabitants of the Åland Islands a nation apart but as part of the Swedish-speaking population of Finland.⁴⁹ Donner probably was influential, to some degree, in having any mention of the referendum omitted from the communications.

The statement adopted by the Baltic Commission on July 4 was not made public; instead, the wording of the communication to be delivered to Sweden and the Åland Islanders was approved three days later. It observed, on the one hand, that no final settlement of the question could be arrived

at without the approval of Russian representatives, while, on the other hand, doubts were expressed whether the Peace Conference was at all within its sphere of authority in dealing with the matter. It was hoped that the negotiations between Finland and Sweden would settle the dispute or, if such were not the case, that the matter might later be decided by the League of Nations.⁵⁰

The communication as a whole reflected the slight interest that the major powers represented at the Peace Conference felt toward the Åland issue. Its deferment was justified, to be sure, on the ground of Russia's absence, but an important — if not the decisive — factor was a desire to avoid taking a stand in the matter. This is indicated further by the fact that, contrary to general practice at the Peace Conference, the Commission's report remained secret.

Evaluating the significance of the communication, which was also unofficially passed on to Enckell, and considering the other alternatives, such as the proposed referendum, it may be said that, from the standpoint of Finland, the worst danger at this stage of developments had been averted. It had been the hope of the Finnish diplomats that the Peace Conference would bury the Åland question as far as it was concerned and that the question would not be revived again until the League of Nations had begun to operate.⁵¹ If this occurred, it was assumed, Finland would at any rate have gained a useful breathing spell.

In Finland, where the public actively followed the progress of events, chief attention was concentrated on the possibility that the White Russians might actually interfere and give the Åland question a new, unfavorable twist. An effort would have to be made, it was felt, to eliminate the point about »Russia's rights» from any report on the matter that might be referred to the supreme council of the Peace Conference.

At one stage, sentiment favored a joint protest by Finland and Sweden. But this idea was abandoned when a risk of confounding the issue was seen: it was feared that such a move might create the impression that both parties were ready to acknowledge the ultimate jurisdiction of the Peace Conference. Thus, on July 24, Howard expressed his astonishment to Donner over the planned protest. To him, such a joint protest with Sweden was impossible to comprehend. It would mean a protest against a solution the Baltic Commission construed as favorable to Finland, and the rejection of this solution could lead to a situation where Sweden would have the Åland Islands in her grasp.

Recognition of the Russian points of view at some date in the future could not, in Howard's opinion, involve the right of possession but most

likely only insistence upon enforcement of the demilitarization ruling, which both Finland and Sweden were prepared to go along with.⁵² As interpreted by Howard, the Baltic Commission's statement was designed to shelve the issue of the Åland Islands, resulting in a status quo that, as a permanent situation, would certainly favor Finland.

The idea of a protest was left unpursued by the Finns. As a kind of substitute, the Finnish newspapers published vigorous denunciations of any possible Russian move to meddle in matters affecting the settlement of the Åland question. Swedish activity, which was rewarded by Branting's and Ehrensward's gaining an audience in July with no less a dignitary than Clemenceau, must have played a part in causing the »supreme council» on August 4 to instruct the Baltic Commission to reconsider its earlier report. The result was a new report, issued on August 25, which emphasized that since the settlement of the Åland question could not be put off indefinitely it might as a last resort be done without Russia's being heard in the matter.⁵³

The barometer of international politics had oscillated: as a political force the White Russian cause was showing signs of weakening. Looked at from the standpoint of Finnish interests, it meant another step forward. The status quo continued to be maintained. Illustrative of the situation militarily, Finnish troops were stationed on the Åland Islands at the same time as British naval units were cruising in Baltic waters. The impression that the Åland question was quietly being buried grew stronger.⁵⁴ On December 13, 1919, the Finnish emissary Carl Enckell was solemnly notified by the secretary of the »supreme council» that the Peace Conference would no longer concern itself with this question.

The issue of the Åland Islands had been wiped off the political calendar — for the time being. At first, insofar as it involved territorial title, it had amounted to a dispute merely between Finland and Sweden. Public opinion in Finland strenuously opposed any move to separate the islands from the national domain. In this connection, the unyielding stand of the Swedish-speaking minority living on the Finnish mainland in resistance to the attempts to give a small fraction of this linguistic minority the right to decide what country it wanted to belong to proved to be an important factor in creating a unified body of popular opinion. When the issue was forced upon the attention of the Peace Conference, it proved to be the British Government, in the main, that repulsed the action aimed at taking the Åland Islands away from Finland.

NOTES

¹ For a closer examination of secessionist activities among the Åland Islanders, see Paasivirta, *Suomi vuonna 1918* (Finland in the Year 1918), pp. 142—154.

² Gihl, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia* IV, p. 382. — Hellner (Minnen och dagböcker, p. 428) ventures to think that Sweden's submission to Germany in giving such a pledge evidently contributed, to some extent, to the coolness shown by Britain and the other Allies when, in accordance with Sweden's wishes, the proposal was made to decide the future of the Åland Islands by means of a popular referendum.

³ The memorandum dated Oct. 11 written by Torvald Höjer, a Swedish Foreign Ministry official, Hellner's circular letter of Oct. 15 and Westman's message of Oct. 19 to Hellner (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 34).

⁴ Svenska Dagbladet 3 XI Finländska ställningar; Aftonbladet 9 XI Ålandsfrågans lyckliga lösning förestående.

⁵ Westman's telegram of Nov. 3 to the Swedish Foreign Ministry (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 34). Svinhufvud and Westman were in touch a second time on Nov. 19, when the Finnish Regent hinted that the surrender of the Åland Islands might be facilitated by Finland's being given »compensatory territory» in the East (Westman's telegram of Nov. 19 to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 34).

⁶ Westman's communication of Oct. 8 to Hellner (Ibidem).

⁷ Hellner's telegram of Nov. 6 to the Swedish Minister in London, Wrangel (Ibid.).

⁸ Wrangel's telegram of Nov. 17 to Hellner (Ibid.).

⁹ Palmstierna, *Orostitid* II, pp. 250, 259.

¹⁰ Aftontidningen 15 XII Finland under Mannerheim; Stockholms-Tidningen 16 XII Mannerheim och Åland.

¹¹ Palmstierna, *Orostitid* II, p. 225.

¹² Gust. Tamelander's letter dated Oct. 29 to Palmstierna (Copy: Hellner's collection).

¹³ For a more detailed account, see Paasivirta, *Suomi vuonna 1918*, pp. 143, 144.

¹⁴ Views expressed by Sundblom in the newspaper Åland, May 4 (Den sk. agitationen i Ålandsfrågan); Otto Andersson, *Bidrag till kännedom om Ålandsfrågans uppkomst*, p. 89, and information obtained from him on Feb. 13, 1959. — When the Ålands landsting began to function on June 8, Carl Björkman took up the duties of President after Sundblom had flatly refused to accept the post.

¹⁵ Palmstierna, *Orostitid* II, p. 225.

¹⁶ Information received April 10, 1959, from Manne Flood and April 11, 1959, from Nandor Stenlid.

¹⁷ Sundblom attended a parliamentary session for the last time on Dec. 17, and on Jan. 10, 1919, he was granted a release from his duties as an MP — for »reasons of health», as set forth in his request for dispensation (Parliamentary Record (valtiopäivien pöytäkirjat) for 1918, pp. 249, 329).

¹⁸ Palmstierna, *Orostitid* II, pp. 234—236.

¹⁹ Nevins, Henry White, p. 370.

²⁰ Telegram of Feb. 19 from A. Ehrensvärd, Swedish Minister to Paris, to Hellner (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 34).

²¹ Communication of Feb. 4, 1919, from Erik Sjöstedt, an official on the staff of the Swedish Legation in Paris, to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm (*Ibid.*).

²² Gregory, *On the Edge of Diplomacy*, p. 191. — Gregory, a high official in the British Foreign Office, labored under the illusion that the members of the delegation that had called on him spoke a special language indigenous to the Åland Islands.

²³ Enckell, *Politiska minnen II*, pp. 7, 8.

²⁴ Ehrensvärd's communication of Jan. 4 to Hellner (*Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 21 U 50*).

²⁵ They were joined also by the organ of certain Åland Islanders who opposed the movement led by Sundblom, the »Ålands Posten», which was published in Helsinki during the early part of 1919, the central figure behind it being Otto Andersson.

²⁶ Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 11 III, Näkökohtia Ahvenanmaan kysymyksessä (Points of View on the Åland Question) 3 (article written by Väinö Voionmaa); 5 IV Väittelyä Ahvenanmaan kysymyksestä (Controversy over the Åland Question); Kansan Työ 26 III Ahvenanmaan kysymys (The Åland Question).

²⁷ Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 20 III Ahvenanmaan väestön itsenäämisoikeus (The Right of the Inhabitants of the Åland Islands to Self-Determination) (article written by J. W. Keto); 2 III Suomen kysymykset Bernin sosialistikonferenssissa (Questions Relating to Finland at the Socialist Conference of Bern).

²⁸ Gihl, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia IV*, p. 406.

²⁹ The proposal was made by Howard on Jan. 7 to the Swedish Minister to London, Wrangel (Höjer's undated message to Palmstierna, *Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 10 34*).

³⁰ Information received on May 4, 1959, from Edward Hallett Carr.

³¹ The Italian Minister to Stockholm, Fr. Tommasini, acquainted Hellner with the idea (Hellner's message of Jan. 7 to Westman, *Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 c 34*).

³² Höjer's message of Jan. 16 to Westman (*Ibid.*).

³³ Memorandum of Höjer dated Jan. 25 (*Ibid.*).

³⁴ Message to Höjer from Hugo Sommarström, an assistant of the Åland Islanders' deputation, dated March 11 (*Ibid.*).

³⁵ Mannerheim presented as the basis for the strategic concessions by Finland the following: »in order to achieve such an arrangement as would in the best possible way eliminate the threat to the Swedish capital that possession of the Åland Islands by a foreign power might constitute» (Memorandum of the Swedish Foreign Ministry concerning the negotiations conducted Feb. 12. *Ibid.*).

³⁶ Westman's communication of Jan. 20 to the Swedish Foreign Ministry (*Ibid.*).

³⁷ Prime Minister Edén's communication of Feb. 27 to the Swedish missions abroad as well as Westman's report of March 4 to Edén (*Ibid.*).

³⁸ Hellner's message of March 14 to the Swedish envoys in London and Paris (*Ibid.*).

³⁹ Hellner's recommendation of March 27 to the King with regard to instructions to be given to the Swedish emissaries at the Peace Conference (*Ibid.*).

⁴⁰ The session of the Council of Ten on Feb. 27. — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 IV, p. 171; communication dated

March 29 from the Swedish Legation in London to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm (*Ibid.*).

⁴¹ Telegram dated March 3 from the British Foreign Office to the Swedish Foreign Ministry; also Sommarström's letter of March 11 from Paris to Höjer (*Ibid.*).

⁴² Telegram of the Swedish Foreign Ministry dated March 24 to the Swedish Legation in Paris (*Ibid.*).

⁴³ Höjer's memoranda of March 16 and 24 (*Ibid.*).

⁴⁴ Proceedings of the Baltic Commission's meeting of July 2, supplement 1 (State Dep't 181. 21901/12).

⁴⁵ Proceedings of July 2 of the Baltic Commission, and supplement 2.

⁴⁶ Proceedings of the Baltic Commission for July 4, and supplement (State Dep't 181. 21901/13).

⁴⁷ Anteckningar från minister Enckells resa till London och Paris, June 21 (Copy: Ulkoministeriö 5 C 6).

⁴⁸ Ossian Donner's memoirs: *Åtta år*, pp. 108—112, and *Min tid*, pp. 171—174; his report of July 8 to the Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7) as well as the proceedings of the Baltic Commission for July 4. — In his reminiscences Donner claims that his discussion with Howard on July 6 had a decisive effect on the Commission's stand; however, according to the Commission's record, a decision in the matter had been reached as early as July 4.

⁴⁹ Ehrensvärd's message of May 19 to Hellner (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 10 34).

⁵⁰ The proceedings of the Baltic Commission, July, 7, supplement 1 (State Dep't 181. 21901/14).

⁵¹ Ossian Donner's letter of July 10 to Wrede (Wrede's collection).

⁵² Ossian Donner's report of July 27 to the Finnish Foreign Office (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

⁵³ Message of Aug. 25 from the chairman of the Baltic Commission, della Torretta to the president of the Peace Conference (State Dep't 860 d. 014/59). » . . . In the event that the political circumstances that make the stabilization of the Russian situation improbable continue, the Baltic Commission could be convened before the end of the Peace Conference to consider whether in the name of the interest of the nations a final decision might be reached at that juncture.»

⁵⁴ Prime Minister Clemenceau's speech in the French Chamber of Deputies on Sept. 25, in which he rhetorically dwelt upon the safeguarding of Swedish interests in the Åland dispute, revived discussion on the matter, chiefly in Sweden and Finland, where irritable comments were made with reference to it (Enckell, *Politiska minnen* II, pp. 44, 45). The British authorities simultaneously assured Finnish diplomats that their Government would oppose any attempt to rehash the matter (Ossian Donner, *Min tid*, pp. 181, 182).

Chapter VIII

The East Karelian Question and the Attitude of the Western Allies

The annexation of East Karelia had awakened widespread interest in Finland in the spring of 1918, and the nonleftist groups as a whole were in favor of it. Annexation was believed to be justified on various ethnic, linguistic, military and economic grounds, and the Government laid plans for its realization with the support of Germany. The intensification of the conflict between Germany and the Western Allies also in the far northern sector, after the landing of German troops on Finnish soil, had led in April to a »solemn warning» from Britain to Finland against meddling in the progress of events in East Karelia. Subsequently, at the turn of the months of June and July, a new crisis threatened as a result of the aforescribed sharply worded note from the Finnish to the British Government concerning Petsamo. A complicating problem that faced the Finnish groups actively seeking to settle the East Karelian question was the attitude of the native population, which was not united behind any program for its political future.

At the stage of the armistice negotiations, Finland's East Karelian policy was ripe for revision. The notion that the Finnish domain might be expanded with the aid of Germany had proved illusory. Signs of change in political thinking began to appear, as already noted, when Germany's passivity toward the Finnish territorial claims during the Finno-Soviet negotiations in Berlin in August became known.

Disappointment over the terms of the supplementary Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave the impetus for profound changes of opinion. Germany was seen to have acted against the objectives of the Finnish Government in order to achieve collaboration with Russia in line with its own high political interests. By autumn 1918 more hopes had been blighted. The Finnish volunteers fighting across the border had suffered setbacks, and in late September and early October they had retreated back over to the Finnish side.

In the attempts to settle the East Karelian question, no abandonment of objectives had taken place in response to the foregoing developments. But the ideas concerning ways and means to attain them began to undergo revision, at least as far as finding support in the arena of high politics was concerned. This was indicated by the fact that, when the East Karelian

question had blossomed out during the spring and summer of 1918 as an issue involving power interests on an international scale, positions began to be sought, particularly after the Petsamo crisis, that eschewed dependence on either of the embattled sides in the war and rejected military operations as a course of action.¹ The possibility of Finland's being drawn into the World War was taken into account at this stage as a danger, although zealous pro-German circles saw »England» as the foreordained culprit behind this hazardous development.²

The disappointments experienced and the perils that loomed ahead nourished the line of thinking that the settlement of the East Karelian question, too, might be facilitated by Finland's shifting over to a neutral course.³ As the convocation of the Peace Conference in the proximate future began to appear inevitable, the view gained ground that insofar as it was hoped to reach a solution in the East Karelian question, the means would have to be diplomatic rather than military.⁴ Those Finns who had built their hopes upon German support were pessimistic: they did not trust in the intentions of the British authorities.⁵ The withdrawal of the volunteers from East Karelia was felt as a severe blow, which doomed the chances of securing anything by military means for the time being. Uncertainty over what to do led to periodical passivity.

The British response of August 9, 1918, to the Finnish note on the Petsamo crisis had expressed a wish to see that in the final settlement following the war Finland would gain access to the Arctic Ocean. At the earliest this could occur in connection with the Peace Conference. The belief was openly voiced that »as long as Finland was under the influence of Germany», implementation of such a project would enable the Germans to establish submarine bases in Petsamo and operate freely in Arctic waters.⁶

The British showed no inclination, on the other hand, to favor the annexation of East Karelia by Finland. Their view was that if the border were drawn from Lake Ladoga to Lake Onega and from there on up north to the White Sea it would lead to future trouble between Finland and Russia; nor did they relish a settlement that would deprive the Russians of the Murmansk railroad and their ice-free Arctic port.⁷

The center of gravity in the East Karelian question was seen to be shifting to Paris, and, as the deadline for the opening of the Peace Conference approached, political spokesmen in Finland began to stress the need to make an appeal based on the right of nations to self-determination in deciding the status of the province across the Finnish border to the East.

In the new situation on the world political stage, Finland's aspirations

followed a double track: for one thing, a political format representative of the East Karelian people as a whole and convincingly designed to promote the idea of union with Finland should be sought, and, for another, means should be contrived to bring about the desired decision by the Peace Conference. Observations and experience up to that time had revealed the lack of cohesion in the political strivings of the Karelians. In addition to those who desired union with Finland, there were those who advocated bidding for an autonomous status within the Russian domain as well as others whose imaginations were fired by a dream of an independent East Karelian republic, which was kept alive by an instinctive fear that Finland might seek to exploit the natural resources of the province at the expense of the local inhabitants for her own selfish benefit.⁸

Starting in November, 1918, appeals were once more addressed to the Regent and the Government of Finland, in addition to which deputies arriving from East Karelia called on consular representatives of the Western Powers stationed in Helsinki as well as diplomatic officials in Stockholm. The opinions expressed and the persons delivering the messages generally represented some particular commune or group of communes situated in a particular area; and the points of view had been formulated either directly by the inhabitants of the area concerned or by delegates from a group of communes at a special meeting. The building up of Finnish policy on the hope that the Peace Conference would endorse a union between Finland and East Karelia had the effect that the Government authorities endeavored to hold back the Karelians from staging an armed revolt against Soviet rule at this juncture.⁹

No general movement with consistent aims based upon the principle of national self-determination developed, however, in East Karelia. The lack of any homogeneous body of opinion and the isolation of the various communities contributed to this, together with the military situation. The province was the scene of troop movements involving a variety of nationalities, ranging from the British to the Russian Bolsheviks, which further hampered contact and collaboration between groups representing the same political outlook.

The Finnish delegation sent to Paris had assumed the task of publicizing the East Karelian cause, too, one of the members, Lauri Hannikainen, being a specialist on the subject. As long as the central objective of Finnish policy was to gain general recognition of the country's independence, not much attention could be devoted to such a special matter by the delegation; and after the long sought-after diplomatic recognition had finally

been gained at the beginning of May, 1919, the issue of the Åland Islands forged to the surface. Finland's stand in the East Karelian question was explained in memoranda handed to the United States, British and French peace delegations, among others, the conditions prevailing in the province being described along national, historical and geographical lines. All these documents ended up on a note of hope that the East Karelian population might be able to express its political future freely.

By the spring of 1919 the East Karelian question was attracting fairly wide attention and had even aroused some interest at the Peace Conference. This was brought on by the march of an expeditionary force of Finnish volunteers into Aunus, as the southern half of East Karelia is known to the Finns, in April. The operation was of private inspiration though it enjoyed the Government's moral and material support.¹⁰ The force was forbidden, however, to form as a military organization until the participants had crossed the frontier. Evidently, the Finnish authorities were afraid of a high political crisis with the Western Allies, especially the British.

The Aunus venture excited controversy on the home front. The climax came when the Social Democrats confronted the Government with a parliamentary interpellation, which pointed out the risk of conflict between Russia and Finland generated by such activity and warned against the dangers of »adventurous politics». More serious from the standpoint of the political position of the Government was the suspicion the military expedition aroused at the Peace Conference. It was likened to the efforts of certain new states in central Europe to gain their territorial objectives through military occupation without waiting for the great powers to decide matters. Moreover, the peace delegates representing the Western Allies in Paris felt that the military action taken by the Finns was obstructing the work being done to solve the Russian question.¹²

The conference leaders suspected Finland of seeking to conquer Aunus or of otherwise confronting them with a *fait accompli* in territorial disputes. At the beginning of May, 1919, the French Government had discussed the idea of presenting Finland with a stern protest.¹³ Attention was further drawn to the circumstance that both the civilian and military leaders of the expeditionary force had mostly supported pro-German policies. This excited the suspicion that Germany was secretly party to a plot to create friction between the Western Allies and the White Russians.¹⁴

The official stand of the Finnish Government toward the military expedition to southern East Karelia was presented in Prime Minister Castrén's response on April 29 to the Social Democratic interpellation. It was stated

that the Government did not wish to set up obstructions to the activity of volunteers endeavoring to drive the Bolshevik forces out of Karelia and that, furthermore, it was deemed necessary to assist the local inhabitants in procuring food supplies. But, it was emphasized, the Government was not bent on conquering the territory. A similar statement was issued on May 9 by acting Foreign Minister Leo Ehrnrooth when he notified the French and British Governments that Finland would submit to whatever decisions the Peace Conference might make with regard to the eastern boundary of the country.¹⁵ These notes pledged Finland not to seek territory by conquest across her eastern frontier.

Evidently, the Finnish Government hoped and endeavored to influence the course of events in southern East Karelia to the end that the Bolshevik military forces would be driven out and the native, Finnish-speaking inhabitants might thereafter be able to give expression to their true desires regarding their political future. The assumption was that after the situation had changed such a manifestation of popular will on the basis of the principle of self-determination would result in a demand for union with Finland. Insofar as developments took this course, it was thought that political opinion would run parallel at a later date in Vienna, the northern half of East Karelia,¹⁶ which, then occupied by British troops, had thitherto favored the idea of establishing an independent East Karelian state.¹⁷

The advance of the British troops southward from Murmansk — in May, 1919, they had captured the Karelian town of Karhumäki — caused the Finnish authorities to focus their attention on the task of avoiding a clash with them and, at best, of getting them to enter into collaboration with the force of Finnish volunteers that was marching toward Lake Onega. The Finns' objective was the capture of Petroskoi (Petrozavodsk), the main urban center in East Karelia. The Foreign Office in Helsinki sent a representative to Aunus for the purpose of contacting General Maynard, the commander of the British expeditionary force.¹⁸ The contact was made on June 13.

The British, however, both rejected the Finnish proposal of joint operations to capture Petroskoi and refused the request to have the commanding officers of the British troops in East Karelia. What the Finns were aiming to do was to eradicate the Russian military and political influence from the whole area — in concerted action, if possible, with the British.

Instead, in conformity with the prevailing view held at the Peace Conference, the British command demanded a written pledge that after the end of operations the Finnish troops would withdraw from East Karelia and surrender the territory they had captured to the White Russians.¹⁹

No mutual understanding could be reached through these preliminary exchanges. Then the contact was broken when, after advancing close to Petroskoi, the Finns were forced to start their retreat in the face of an attack launched by the reinforced Bolsheviks²⁰

After the latter half of May, the negotiations between General Kolchak and the Western Powers concerning mutual co-operation indirectly weakened the interest of the latter in everything designed to diminish the Russian domain (as measured in relation to the boundaries of 1914) beyond recognition of the independence of Poland and Finland. Therefore, also Finland's efforts to get the East Karelian question brought before the Peace Conference were in conflict with the trend of developments in the arena of high politics.

In Finland there emerged two lines of thought when at this stage it was endeavored to implement a settlement of the issue over East Karelia. One line was represented by Holsti, who — like the pro-Germans before the Armistice in 1918 — tried to construct his solution on the basis of support from the major powers, in his case placing his hopes specifically on Great Britain among the victorious Allies. Holsti went so far in his planning that toward the end of April he was prepared, as previously pointed out, to let the Peace Conference work out Finland's future boundaries. There was a risk that it might mean loss of the Åland Islands, but in that event, Holsti was convinced, Finland would be awarded possession of East Karelia as compensation. Politically this line of thought was fallacious insofar as Britain, the power among the Allies most actively interested in the affairs of northeastern Europe, stood firmly on the ground that East Karelia was of vital importance to Russia. Accordingly, the British certainly had no desire to contribute to any move to unite East Karelia with Finland.

The representatives of the other line saw a different solution to the East Karelian question: Finland's joining the intervention. In the event the Bolsheviks were defeated in the offensive against Petrograd, Finland might, it was calculated, expect East Karelia to be handed over to her as a reward for her military assistance. This line of thinking had certain points of contact with the views of, for instance, Mannerheim and Enckell. The circumstance, however, that the White Russian leaders opposed recognition of Finnish independence within the framework of the country's historical boundaries even at this stage, when the participation of the Finns in the intervention scheme was being contemplated, indicates that the White Russians would be still less enamored of the prospect of a Greater Finland.

As already noted, the East Karelian question entered the discussions at

the Peace Conference only on rare occasions. On July 15, 1919, Enckell was given the opportunity to elucidate the Finnish claims with respect to Petsamo and East Karelia for the benefit of the Baltic Commission, the concerns of which ranged also as far as these remote areas. Under the prevailing conditions, which favored the interests of the White Russians, the Commission took the stand that matters relating to Russia could not be decided until there existed a government capable of representing Russia in the formulation of such decisions.²¹

On July 25 a note from the Finnish Government was delivered to the Peace Conference. Pointing to acts of violence by the Bolsheviks in East Karelia, the note asked that the conference sanction Finland's sending regular troops into the areas of Aunus and Petroskoi.²² The inspiration for this proposal had come from military circles,²³ but the Government authorities had agreed to sponsor it only on condition that implementation of the scheme would be subject to the approval of the Western Powers. The Finnish Government began to explore anew the possibility of collaboration with the British expeditionary force operating in East Karelia. The idea was that the temporary occupation of the area between the Finnish border, on one side, and the Syväri (Svir) river, Lake Onega and the White Sea, on the other side, should be pointly carried out, except that the Murmansk railroad would be left wholly in the control of General Maynard's troops.²⁴ By this time the operations of the army of Finnish volunteers in southern East Karelia, which had at first been successful, had ended in defeat, and a substantial proportion of the total force had already retreated across the frontier back into Finland.

The Baltic Commission refused to lend its support to the Finnish Government's request. The cold attitude toward any move to separate East Karelia from Russia was displayed further by the Commission's decision — made on the occasion of the same meeting at which the Finnish Government's request was turned down — not to give an audience to the deputation from East Karelia that had arrived in Paris to plead the case of the native Finnish-speaking inhabitants of the province.²⁵

The East Karelian question later, at the end of September, reappeared once more on the agenda of the Peace Conference. This time the »supreme council» took up for consideration an inquiry from the Baltic Commission as to whether, in spite of Russia's not being represented by any delegate, it could make a statement on the points of view presented by Finland with regard to changes in her eastern border. The council decided to assign to the Commission the task of preparing a report on the matter.²⁶ The particular significance of this episode was that it reflected the turn that

had taken place meanwhile in the general situation. As the position of the White Russians weakened, the absence of a duly accredited Russian spokesman was no longer considered an obstacle to dealing with questions relating to Finland's boundaries against Russia. The council's decision did not, however, herald any move to submit the revision of Finland's eastern border to the Peace Conference for approval. Rather did it presage the silent burial of the whole East Karelian question, which took place at the same time as the Allied troops were withdrawn from the province.

NOTES

¹ Hufvudstadsbladet, 7 VIII, Vårt land och ställningens krav; Åbo Underrättelser, 14 VIII Vår bekymmersamma situation; 18 VIII Världskriget, Murmanområdet och Finland; Helsingin Sanomat 25 VIII Suomi kansainvälisissä neuvotteiluissa (Finland in International Negotiations).

² Uusi Päivä 10 VIII Englanti vaara Itä-Karjalassa — uhka Suomellekin (England as a Danger in East Karelia — a Threat to Finland, too); Svenska Tidningen 21 IV Hotet från nordost.

³ Ilkka 26 X Mikä pelastaa Suomen valtioelämän umpikujasta (What Can Save Finland's Political Life from Running up a Blind Alley?).

⁴ Helsingin Sanomat 15 X Maailmanrauha ja Karjalan kysymys (World Peace and the Karelian Question); Hufvudstadsbladet 15 X Den östkarelska frågan.

⁵ Svenska Tidningen 18 IX Finlands ställning; 21 IX »Englands långa och kalla fingrar»; Uusi Päivä 15 X Englannin suhde Kauko-Karjalan tapahtumiin (England's Relation to the Events in Far Karelia).

⁶ Helsingin Sanomat 13 VIII Englannin suhde Suomen ja toiminta Muurmannilla. Nootti Suomen hallitukselle (England's Relations with Finland and the Activity in Murmansk. The Note to the Finnish Government).

⁷ Hellner's discussions with Howard in July (Hellner's telegram of July 5 to the Swedish Legation in London and of July 21 to Westman. Svenska utrikesdepartementet 1 O 26).

⁸ Paasivirta, Suomi vuonna 1918, pp. 333, 334.

⁹ Mannerheim said in his speech of Dec. 26 to the deputation from the commune of Repola (Copy: Archives of the Military Affairs Office of the Regent = Valtionhoitajan sota-asiaien kanslian arkisto Ed: 3): »Swords can no longer decide international questions. The roar of artillery has ceased and peace negotiations will before long render decisions on all international questions. The states that have proclaimed the right of nations to decide their destiny, each for itself, have also placed the destiny of Viena (northern East) Karelia in your hands.»

¹⁰ E.g., the discussion held on March 1 at a »private» session of the Government (Enckell, Politiska minnen II, pp. 155, 156).

¹¹ von Hertzen, Karjalan retkikunta (The Karelian Expeditionary Force), p. 17.

¹² Törnngren's memorandum of Sept. 20 concerning the treatment of the questions relating to Finland at the Peace Conference (Törnngren's collection).

¹³ Törngren, Något om Finlands utrikespolitik under det sista året. Memorandum given on Oct. 15 to Ståhlberg [Copy: Törngren's collection].

¹⁴ Holsti's reports of May 20 and 31 to the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 6).

¹⁵ Ehrnrooth's communication of May 9 to Bell. — Suomen itsenäisyyden tunnustaminen p. 223; Enckell, Politiska minnen II, pp. 160, 161.

¹⁶ Kuussaari, Vapaustaistelujen teillä (On the Roads of Battles for Liberation), p. 108.

¹⁷ Ruuth, Karjalan kysymys vuosina 1917—1920 (The Karelian Question in the Years 1917—1920), pp. 41, 42.

¹⁸ Aunuksen retken muistojulkaisu (Publication Commemorating the Aunus Venture), p. 162; Castrén, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja (Political Notes) 30 V; as well as information received from Urho Toivola on June 4, 1959.

¹⁹ Communication from Major Paavo Talvela of the Finnish Jaeger Battalion in Aunus to Holsti, dated Aug. 13 (Ulkoministeriö 11 A III); also Maynard, The Murmansk Venture, pp. 255—257; Jaakkola, Suomen idänkysymys (Finland's Eastern Question), p. 34.

²⁰ Sihvo, Muistelmani II (Memoirs II), p. 32. — In considering the causes of failure after the retreat of the expeditionary force, the lack of «clarity in foreign policy» was also cited (Talvela's memorandum of Sept. 16 to Holsti. Ulkoministeriö 11 A III).

²¹ Proceedings of the Baltic Commission, July 15 (State Dep't 181. 21901/16).

²² Enckell's communication of July 25 to Chairman della Torretta of the Baltic Commission (State Dep't 181.21901/17).

²³ Minister Walden's statements at special, «private» sessions of the Council of State, June 28, June 30 and July 16 (Castrén, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja 28 VI, 30 VI and 16 VII).

²⁴ Enckell, Politiska minnen II, p. 166; Maynard, The Murmansk Venture, p. 259.

²⁵ Proceedings of the Baltic Commission, July 29 (State Dep't 181. 21901/16).

²⁶ Decision of the «Supreme Council», Sep't 30. — Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919 VIII, p. 465.

Chapter IX

The Issue of Intervention, Finland's Position and the Allied Stand

After the Western Allies had recognized the independence of Finland, the country's foreign policy became concentrated — in addition to the unresolved territorial issues — upon the matter of intervention in Russia. Finnish public opinion was divided: some Finns favored military action, some remained passive, and some opposed getting the country mixed up in any risky venture of this kind. The course of events, especially by the latter half of 1919, had the effect of swelling the ranks of the third faction.

As an international political issue, intervention in the affairs of Russia concerned Finland on two scores: how the White Russians fighting against the Bolsheviks stood with respect to Finnish independence, and how, besides the White Russians, the Western Allies hoped Finland would respond to intervention strategy as it affected the northwestern Russian frontier. The attitude of the Allies was an important factor influencing the division of opinion in Finland.

The breakthrough achieved by the October Revolution had placed Petrograd and Moscow, with their surroundings, under the control of the Bolsheviks. It resulted in a situation that began to take on the appearance of a Civil War, although the split in the Russian ranks was not yet clear-cut and the »fronts» that had formed were in a state of flux. On the one side were the Bolsheviks and on the other scattered bourgeois groups and the supporters of moderate labor factions, who had been prevented from governing the country by the October Revolution.

The adversaries of the Bolsheviks considered the position of the Council of People's Commissars, headed by Lenin, to be precarious: they could not believe that it was possible to convert the Russian social order, with its peasant majority, into a Soviet system or to place the land under public ownership.

During the initial stage of interventionist activity, the Bolsheviks had notable conquests to their credit. Not only did they control Russia's vital nerve centers, Moscow and Petrograd, with their industrial facilities and traffic networks, but also the region extending south from Archangel and the East Karelian town of Kemi as well as the largely Finnish-inhabited province of Ingria, bounding the eastern stretches of the Gulf of Finland. Possession of Moscow gave the Bolsheviks an important psychological

advantage:¹ intervention by foreign powers allied with the Czarist regime to overthrow the Soviet Government enabled them to fortify their revolutionary propaganda with patriotic agitation. In short, the Bolsheviks could appeal to the patriotic feelings of the Russian people in rallying the masses to the national defense.

In comparing the ideological arsenals of the Whites and the Reds, the observation must be made that the former had nothing new to offer as a substitute for the socio-political system that the World War had proved to have outlived its time. The Czarist order had spent itself, and the liberal movement of early 1917, which was swept along by the stream of events, lacked the resourcefulness necessary for survival. By contrast, Bolshevism was still an unused and untested ideal, which seemed to be able to rally the people to its colors in the crisis.² Both sides, White and Red, made their appeal in the struggle to the »soul of the Russian people».

Toward the end of 1918 fugitives began to stream away from the areas held by the Bolsheviks toward the peripheral portions of the Russian sphere as well as abroad, to Germany and the new states that had emerged along the European boundaries of Russia as well as, later, France. At this stage, Paris became the center of White Russian political activity. It was in the French capital that the *Conférence politique russe*, which had been established in January, 1919, as the central agency of this activity, began to draw up the lines of strategy for intervention. Contact was accordingly maintained both with the Allied governments, on the one hand, and the White generals preparing for military operations in peripheral parts of Russia, on the other.

As the lines of battle began to emerge, the White Russians controlled distant parts of the vast Russian domain, and it was difficult for their military and political organs of leadership to maintain contact between the separate fighting units. After the German and Austrian forces had withdrawn from southern Russia, followed by the army of the Ukrainian independence movement, the Bolsheviks occupied, among other centers, Harkov and Poltava.

At the end of 1918 the Whites had formed combat units under the command of General A. Denikin, who sought to advance from the Kuban and the Crimea in the direction of the Don and Tsaritsyn. The Whites were assisted from Baku and Odessa, where Allied troops were stationed and could supply them with weapons and place military advisers at their disposal. In Siberia the Whites were in contact with Czech legionaries released from imprisonment and their plans called for joining forces with Denikin's army. They also intended, on the other hand, to seek contact with the

Whites fighting in the region of Archangel in order to tighten the ring of encirclement around the Bolsheviks.

The government of Admiral A. Kolchak, which had its headquarters at Omsk, tried to act as the controlling agency of all the White forces as well as the proper authority in charge of relations with the Western Powers. The Russian »government»-in-exile in Paris, however, wanted to remain independent of its rulers as well as of those of the other White governmental agencies at the front in scattered parts of Russia.

In their efforts to seal off the Bolsheviks, the White Russians sought to obtain reinforcements from the Western Powers. Psychologically, at the final stage of World War I, the bid was made at a bad time: the French, British and American armies were, it is true, flushed with victory — but they were also weary of war. Even those forces whose operations in peripheral parts of Russia had been easier than those on the major fighting fronts had no desire to start a »new war». The authorities in the Western capitals were forced to take into account the war weariness prevailing among both soldiers and civilians. Moreover, opinion in the nations of the West was divided with regard to how to deal with the Russian question, i.e., the merits of intervening in the raging civil strife. Finding a common »official» line of action therefore appeared to involve formidable difficulties.

Of the »Big Three» of the Peace Conference, France was unquestionably the power that displayed the most active interest in the matter of intervention. The French ruling circles openly sympathized with the White Russians, who were looked upon as, for one thing, representatives of the Russian alliance with France, which dated back to the 1890's, and, for another thing, as dedicated foes of the Bolshevik revolution. Lenin and his people's commissars had renounced the alliance, which had inspired a sense of security in the souls of Frenchmen intimidated by the military threat of Germany.

Furthermore, the Soviet Government had refused to honor the earlier Russian bond issues floated in the French money market, with resultant heavy losses to the many bond holders, mostly belonging to the middle class. The French desire to support the intervention was, of course, influenced by the announcement included in Admiral Koltshak's proclamation of November 18, 1918, that the debts incurred abroad by Czarist Russia would be paid back. Characteristic of France's anti-Bolshevik stance was an opposition to any partition of the Russian domain. Only a strong and undivided Russia, the French felt, could be a worthy ally and one capable of squaring its accounts.³

The most noteworthy French plan of intervention was the one proposed by Marshal Foch on January 12, 1919. According to it, the Western Powers would together form an army of intervention, which, using mainly Poland and to some extent other states that had been formed along the western Russian border as bases of operation, should join forces with the Whites, then pitted against the Reds in civil strife. This proposal was opposed, however, by President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George, who around the same time were bent upon persuading the antagonists to enter negotiations, according to the aforementioned Principo plan, designed to effect a conciliation. Nor was Prime Minister Clemenceau favorable to the idea of dispatching French troops to the Russian front.

In a country that had experienced battles on the gigantic scale of the Marne and Verdun, it would have been hard to induce anybody to leave the conditions of peace for more war. The reverses suffered by the French forces of occupation using Odessa as their base and the attempted mutiny in the French Black Sea fleet were factors pitted against any plan of armed intervention. The few French citizens who had resided in southern Russia since the final stage of the World War were soon evacuated, and France's Russian policy began to concentrate in April, 1919, on supporting the White Russians with munitions and money. Correspondingly, a willingness was shown to assist all those who took part in the intervention on the side of the Whites.

With quite special zeal France sought allies to collaborate in pursuing the policy of intervention among the new states bordering on Russia, including Finland. Simultaneously, France began to feel a deep interest in stabilizing the independent status of these countries, notably Poland, because it wanted to form out of them a zone that, according to the so-called *cordon sanitaire* program, which was Clemenceau's particular pet, would protect the capitalistic world from the onslaughts of Bolshevik propaganda. General Weygand's words to the effect that the victors had nothing to fear had by then lost their meaning. Even the leading conservatives of France had begun to have trepidations about the possibility of a spread of the proletarian revolution in its extreme Russian form to Western Europe.

Britain's attitude toward the settlement of the Russian question in the situation following the defeat of Germany was reflected in the memorandum delivered on November 29, 1918, by Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour to the War Cabinet. His argument was that after four years of war the people in the West were unwilling to intervene in the Russian civil war and force upon the Russians a particular system of government. In practice,

however, this did not mean that the British were not concerned about developments in Russia. After all, at the time the memorandum was drawn up, British military activity continued in the Murmansk area, Siberia and the region of Baku, in addition to which arms were being delivered to Denikin and the Baltic peoples. All this activity was tantamount to at least temporary intervention, designed to assist the White Russians. To justify it, reference was frequently made to the course of action taken by other powers of the West.⁴ This sort of Russian policy was also probably influenced by the problem posed by Germany. It was desired to prevent the defeated Germans from courting the Bolsheviks as an ally in the event, specifically, that the latter should win the civil war.

Alongside the official policy, there was a multiplicity of views on Russia among the British. The idea of intervention was primarily upheld by the Conservatives, who viewed the radical revolutionary movement as a threat to the Western social order and its civilization. Not all of them favored armed intervention, however; some did not want to go beyond an economic blockade. Since the active interventionists were to be found mainly among the younger politicians of the Conservative party, its leadership, including Lord Balfour, maintained a stance of »wait and see», which actually amounted to a critical attitude toward intervention.

The Liberals on the whole were unwilling to support military action against the Bolsheviks. In their opinion the Russians should be given the right to choose their own system of government. An exception was the faction headed by Winston Churchill, which was ready to launch military operations to help the White cause. Field Marshal Henry Wilson was among the influential figures behind this faction.

The Liberals felt the Bolshevik dictatorship and its violent methods to be repulsive, but this did not prevent them from seeing in the October Revolution a certain striving for reform. Prime Minister Lloyd George, leader of the Liberal party, to which Churchill belonged in those days, had as his aim the creation of peaceful relations with the Soviet Government. His freedom of movement was restricted, however, by his being head of a coalition government in which the Conservatives had the support of the majority in the lower house of Parliament. It was thus difficult for him to pursue a line of his own choice in Russian policy. As for the Labour party, it had generally given scant attention to foreign affairs, and in view of its weak representation in Parliament and the divergent political creeds of the two parties, it could scarcely be counted upon to strengthen the Liberals' hand.

Labour viewed intervention as an ideological problem: it was a capitalist

action aimed at foiling the Russian revolution. At first Labour hailed the Bolshevik rise to power with delight, but later the measures taken by the Soviet regime met with quite severe criticism. Armed intervention in Russian affairs was categorically opposed by the party, which demanded the withdrawal from Russia of all British troops stationed there.

Of the »Big Three», the United States took the most decidedly negative view on intervention, which conflicted with the principle of national self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson. The attempts to overthrow the Soviet Government by violent means aroused the President's strong misgivings, moreover, on the ground that they would only enhance Bolshevism's chances of spreading. The American attitude toward the White Russians was one of restraint, as generally in the case of representatives of an old system overthrown in war.

When, in spite of everything, American troops took part to some extent in interventionist operations, it was as a gesture of solidarity with the other Allies. American troops were sent not only to Murmansk but also to Siberia, where the United States was bent not so much on fighting the Bolsheviks as on preventing Japan from expanding its power in the Far East.⁵

The White Russians represented the political traditions broken by the revolution of 1917. From the standpoint of Finland, it was by no means a matter of indifference what views they might express regarding the basic structure of the realm. Their political thinking ran along highly obscure lines, which were held together by the idea of unity — the restoration of the Russian boundaries as they were at the outbreak of World War I. Interest in the future political system was very slight, if for no other reason than that the problem involved could be solved only after the defeat of the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, the very subject was generally avoided as long as the Whites were gathering their fighting forces for the offensive against the enemy, for it was feared that talking about it might lead to controversy and dissension.

The burden of their past weighed heavily upon the parties that had wielded power in Russia and upon their leaders. It would have been strange to imagine that the Czarist generals and bureaucrats might ever have become supporters of the constitutional democratic system aspired to by the Cadets or that, in the light of their experiences till then, these Cadets could be converted in their milieu of exile into champions of autocracy.

The vagueness of the White Russians' idea of the state was further disclosed in their attitude toward the right of nationalities to self-determi-

nation. Their objective was, to repeat, the preservation of the old imperial boundaries and the suppression of separatist movements. Their blueprint for Russia called for a federal organization. They were prepared to grant local autonomy to national minorities provided the sovereignty of the state was not weakened. The limited possibilities of forming battlefronts against the Bolsheviks compelled the White Russians to make concessions — notably in favor of Poland and Finland.

Poland was conceded special consideration because its independence had roots dating back centuries, and this circumstance had commanded significant attention during the war in the planning of the country's political future. Thus, in the main apparently for tactical reasons, the German Kaiser and the Austrian Emperor recognized the independence of Poland in October of 1916; on March 30, 1917, the provisional Russian Government accorded its recognition, calculating on this measure's serving to help the attack on the German-held Vistula region; and in his Fourteen Points President Wilson affirmed it to be a task of the Peace Conference to ratify the sovereignty of Poland. As for the Polish boundaries, the White Russians expressed views open to loose interpretation: they made references, for example, to the boundaries of »Congress Poland» (drawn by the Congress of Vienna), but reserved the final decision to the future Russian National Assembly.

As a political problem, Finland received less sympathetic consideration from the White Russians than did Poland, which was bound up closely with the Allied sphere of interests. As a political entity, Finland was of later origin than Poland. She had existed as an autonomous state for more than one hundred years, and she had declared her independence under favorable conditions created by the World War and the Russian Revolution. Even those White Russians who professed to abide by the right of national self-determination as »acknowledged» by the March Revolution were unwilling to accept the Finnish claims to independence.

The attitude of the White Russians toward the Finnish question, as revealed in statements issued at the beginning of 1919 by the *Conférence politique russe* established in Paris, certainly made it plain that they had failed to shake off the fetters of their imperialistic thinking. During the period of Russification, the Cadets and other liberals had, it is true, displayed sympathy for the hard-pressed Finns. Their position changed radically, however, as soon as it became apparent that Finland was out to break her ties with Russia. The »separatist» movement was simply condemned as a product of German agitation.

The Russian emigrés' center in Paris consistently upheld the stand taken

in 1917 by the Lvov and Kerenski governments, according to which the legal and political arrangement between Finland and Russia could not be unilaterally changed; rather would it require an *accord mutuel*, which only the National Assembly was authorized to make on the part of Russia.⁶ The White Russians strenuously contended that the interests of the Russian realm and those of the national minorities could be harmonized within the framework of a federal system.⁷

The White Russians would not acknowledge the politic-juridical validity of the Soviet Government's having recognized the independence of Finland. They seem to have been irritated by the fact that Finland had taken steps to consolidate her new international status. Finland's declaration of independence, as they explained it, had been an *infractio unilateral*, which could not create a sovereign state. They went so far in their criticism of Finland's course of action as to compare it with Stolypin's lawlessness.⁸ In the light of all that had happened, the White Russians concluded that the political situation prevailing before the October Revolution must be restored and that it was on this basis that, insofar as feasible, certain modifications required by the changed circumstances might be made in the position of Finland -- provided the Russian National Assembly voted in favor of them.

Applied in practice, the imperial ideal of the White Russians would, in the event of the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, have called for Finland's conceding Russia military rights in Finnish territory and submitting to Russian control in matters of foreign policy. With respect to their fundamental outlook, Russian bourgeois circles underwent no change either during the revolutionary upheaval or afterward as far as Finland was concerned: they were prepared to grant her national autonomy within the confines of the Russian state -- but no more. Broad hints were given, to be sure, that after seizing power the White Russians had no intention of preventing Finland from developing her political institutions in the direction of eventual »independence» -- but their use of politico-juridical terminology was marked by considerable poetic license. The White Russian concept of political »independence» included, for example, restrictions that deprived it of its essential content.

In expressing their views on the Finnish question, the White Russians presented as their basic point of departure the argument that Russia could not let go of Finland if it wished to preserve its position as a major power. An independent Finland, they argued, would pose a threat to Russian security, particularly that of St. Petersburg. Finland should therefore not be allowed to achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency than *indépendance*

gouvernementale, which they were willing to establish on a basis of international guarantees arrived at, for instance, through a decision of the Peace Conference.⁹

It was Russia's duty, they explained, to defend its boundaries, also in the Finnish sector, and this meant looking after the requirements of maritime defense, particularly as it related to naval operations.¹⁰ Elucidating the problem in more detail, the *Conférence's* spokesmen depicted the Gulf of Finland as constituting a fundamental part of the defense zone of St. Petersburg.

Russia must have the right, the argument ran, to close the mouth of the Gulf of Finland at the point of Tallinn-Baltiski by means of fortifications and military bases situated between Helsinki and the Hanko peninsula in order to give the fleet a chance to operate.¹¹ With emphasis on the same points of view, the White Russians contended that a one-sided solution of the Åland issue in Finland's favor would violate vital Russian defense interests. The defense of Russia's northwestern boundary was not passed over in silence, either. Attention was drawn to the danger of an overland attack on the Murmansk railroad by a hostile power.¹² To forestall any such aggressive move, the White Russians planned on having Finland surrender certain fortification zones, among which Viipuri and Ino were looked upon as particularly desirable. As an added justification for such demands, it was pointed out that the German forces that had landed in Finland in 1918 had advanced across the Russian frontier with the aid of the Finns.

The Finland enjoying *indépendance gouvernementale*, which the White Russians were disposed to accept, would not have been allowed to make independent decisions in the spheres of military and foreign affairs. Thus, guarantees were desired that Finland would not conclude any political alliances with powers regarded by Russia as hostile.¹³ The matter was closely bound up with the foregoing military demands, in connection with which it was indicated that Finland would have to enter into a defensive alliance with Russia.¹⁴

The Finnish policy of the White Russians was mainly directed toward the attainment of two objectives. On the one hand, they sought to win the Western Powers over to their point of view regarding Finland, and, on the other hand, they sought, again through the mediation of the Western Powers, to line up Finland among the countries supporting their program of intervention. In their pursuit of the first of these objectives, the White Russians endeavored to obstruct the appearance of the Finnish question before the Peace Conference.

In its appeal of March 9, 1919, the *Conférence politique russe* recommended that the Peace Conference not deal with the question of any other country that had been included in the Russian domain in 1914 except Poland as well as that it acknowledge the principle according to which no final decisions regarding the political status and boundaries of nations which had been under the rule of the Czar should be made without the endorsement of Russia, i.e., the White Russians' central bureau.¹⁵ What the White Russians wanted, in short, was that the Western Powers would refrain from giving their blessing to Finnish independence. They did not object, though, to the establishment of contact with the government organs of nationalities that had formerly owed allegiance to the Czar, among them the Finnish Government, but only for the purpose of promoting the cause of intervention directed against the Bolshevik regime.

At the end of March, 1919, there appeared a couple of booklets elucidating the views of the White Russians on the Finnish question, *Quelques considérations sur le problème finlandais* and *Mémoire sur la Question Finlandaise*, the latter of which was also published in English.¹⁶ It was through these publications that the negative stand of the White Russians toward Finnish independence became generally known — only vague reports about the matter having previously been made public — together with the nature of their demands with respect to Finland. In their active efforts to prevent the Peace Conference from being confronted with the question of Finland's diplomatic recognition for decision, they appealed particularly to France, whose most prominent government personalities were sympathetic to their interventionist aims. They knew that if Finland were to succeed in stabilizing her position as a sovereign state, it would be harder to persuade her to collaborate in their ventures.¹⁷

When, at the beginning of May, 1919, the American and British Governments made their decision to accord Finland diplomatic recognition, the reaction of the White Russians was strong. On May 8 the *conférence politique russe* issued a protest, at the same time declaring that, without the approval of the central Russian authority, this decision could not have definitive validity but must be construed merely as *une mesure provisoire*. It did not, the protest went on to state, stop Russia from seeking to press its vitally important demands for military concessions from Finland.¹⁸ This declaration was made at a juncture when the question of extending interventionist operations to the Finnish sector was beginning to force itself upon the attention of the Western Powers.

It was around the months of October and November, 1918, that the political activity of the Russian emigrés began to encompass Finland, too. Their aim at this juncture was to use Finland and the Baltic countries as operational bases for the organization of an interventionist front against the Bolsheviks. Up to the middle of October their chances appeared minimal in the light of the cold treatment accorded them, and for this reason they had established their northern headquarters in Stockholm. They turned to the legations representing the Western Allies with memoranda, which in most cases contained requests for assistance in implementing schemes to capture St. Petersburg from the Bolsheviks.

In November, 1918, there arrived in Finland from St. Petersburg General N. Yudenich, who had served as commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Caucasia. After discussions in Viipuri and Helsinki with emigrés,¹⁹ he traveled on to Sweden, where he joined the group of White Russians operating from Stockholm. His contacts there with Allied diplomats revealed to him that, with the exception of the French, they all maintained an attitude of restraint toward interventionist plans. The same restraint was likewise shown by Western businessmen, most of them British, whom he approached. Active participation in intervention was not favored; promises were given, though, to support the White interventionists with munitions, but no direct proposals in this matter were made.²⁰

At the beginning of December, 1918, Yudenich left each of the Allied legations in Stockholm a memorandum, in which he requested troops, weapons and technical advisers for interventionist operations from bases in Finland and the Baltic countries. The Allies were expected to participate by contributing some 50,000 men to reinforce the initial army of between 10,000 and 12,000 Russians, whose numbers were estimated as likely to grow to perhaps 50,000 after the first successes.²¹

The difficulties involved in Yudenich's plans appeared immediately. In contrast to the situation in Siberia and southern Russia, the Whites held no Russian territory to serve as a base for operations against St. Petersburg. Offers from the Baltic region to have Yudenich take over the command of certain military units there did not interest him, for they were too poor in quality and small in size and their operational areas insufficient. Thus, while he vainly waited three weeks in Stockholm for a response from the Western Powers to his communications,²² Yudenich's hopes were directed toward his getting an opportunity to organize an army in Finland; for this, in his opinion, would greatly facilitate the planned campaign against St. Petersburg and subsequently, perhaps, against Moscow as well.

Yudenich addressed an appeal to Kolchak, requesting both material aid and »moral support» for his endeavors, and as a result he was granted monetary assistance out of Russian funds deposited in London. Kolchak later notified Yudenich that he was being assigned to a special task — the formation of a »northwestern army», which was to take part in the general strategy of the Whites to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. It was at this stage of developments, at the beginning of January, 1919, that Yudenich left Stockholm to reach an understanding with the Finnish authorities in Helsinki.

The cold reception given Yudenich's appeals to the governments of the Western Powers caused him to try to create a northwestern army with the support of Finland. The question was not only one of obtaining part of the Finnish territory to serve as a field of military activity for the White Russians but also of persuading Finland to contribute manpower for operations against the Bolsheviks. Both aspects of the matter were complicated by problems of fundamental importance to the Finns, which related to the political status of their country.

Yudenich's earlier efforts to contact the Finnish authorities in Helsinki, made in November, 1918, had not been successful. The prevailing view at that time in administrative circles was that Finland could undertake to support the White Russian's venture if the Western Allies would join it with troops of their own.²³ His reverses had brought Yudenich to the brink of despair. He knew how meager were the possibilities of the White Russians residing in Finland to raise men from their own ranks — they could, perhaps, muster a total of between two and four thousand, the majority of whom would be officers. Yudenich hoped that the Finns would provide them with weapons and other matériel as compensation for Russian property left in Finland.

The White Russians believed that the top Finnish political leadership — meaning not the Regent alone but also the Government as a whole — sympathized with their aims but that »public opinion» prevented this sympathy from being displayed.²⁴ The activities of the Russian emigrés were quite generally looked upon in Finland as portending danger to the nation. Expressions of this view soon began to be made public by individual citizens and civic groups — in the columns of newspapers and in the debating chamber of Parliament. The fact that the country was widely thought to be slipping into the danger zone was attested to by the Government's being confronted at the beginning of 1919 by two parliamentary interpellations.

These interpellations expressed the fear that, if the emigrés were given

encouragement, Finland might be converted into a base of White Russian propaganda and military activity. The suspicion previously entertained was boldly voiced that the White Russians did not look with favor on Finnish independence and that the delay in Finland's gaining diplomatic recognition in the West was due to their political meddling. Criticism was also levelled at the Government's manner of dealing with the situation. It was asked whether a sympathetic attitude was appropriate with regard to emigré elements that were obviously working to promote the cause of intervention in the Finnish sector.²⁵ Particularly sharp critical barbs were aimed at the highest authorities, who were accused of engaging in clandestine activity intended to aid and abet the strategy of the White Russians. The visible target was Foreign Minister Enckell, but Regent Mannerheim was indirectly exposed to the attack, too.

In attempting to analyze Mannerheim's close contact with the White Russians, one must proceed from the fact of his long service, lasting nearly three decades, as an officer in the armed forces of the Czar. It had signified a vital link between his experience of life and the conditions prevailing in Russia, and in many respects this link was bound to determine his manner of thinking. He was the splendid product of an aristocratic social milieu, and his political outlook derived from a military career strongly bound to a solemn oath of loyalty. But this does not yet fully explain the parallel lines of thought followed by Mannerheim and the Russian emigré generals.

Mannerheim evidently was motivated by a powerful ambition to lead a military crusade against Bolshevism. And his specific objective was to take St. Petersburg away from the Reds.²⁶ The victory of the White Army under his leadership over the Reds of Finland in the spring of 1918 was an emboldening factor. Mannerheim was a soldier of tradition, who looked upon the revolution at bottom as an anarchistic and defeatist phenomenon; he could not estimate very highly its capability of organizing military resistance. »Bolshevism is a destructive ideal.» Since Mannerheim was conservative in his outlook and a representative of an aristocratic way of life, Bolshevism in his eyes was tantamount to mob rule, the violent enemy of traditional values, with which no compromise could come into question.

Whereas bourgeois opinion in Finland, according to the traditional outlook created by Czarist tyranny and strengthened by the events of 1918, was characterized by a tendency to brand Bolshevism as something typically Russian and even worse than Czarism, the basis of Mannerheim's thinking was different. He drew a sharp distinction between Russia and the system represented by Bolshevism. Toward the former — as it existed in its old

historical framework — he felt an attachment and, at least publicly, would take no critical stand; but as far as Bolshevism was concerned, his attitude was one of complete opposition. To Mannerheim, Bolshevism as an ideal was not Russian by nature, and he believed that its influence would prove to be short-lived.

Mannerheim's political outlook, rooted in gone-by traditions, became strongly modified, however, by his experiences during Finland's struggle to secure her independence and the strenuous period of crisis that followed. Thus, Mannerheim's thinking began to be guided out of its old, historical groove by the force of change, and his cosmopolitan attitude took on a new — or, more properly stated, revived — nationalistic color. The national interests of his native Finland had begun to hold in leash the will to action egged on by his earlier fate.

The contradictory aspects of Mannerheim's attitude around the year 1919 can probably be explained by the fact that in his mind there ran parallel lines of thought, which, representing past vicissitudes and new historical trends, vied for ascendancy. He was also forced to contend with opposed geopolitical points of view. Mannerheim, in a sense, tended to wrap the solutions to the Russian and the Finnish questions up in a single package; what it amounted to, more or less, was a kind of »Russian-Finnish question», with the result that his view of the Russian situation did not seem to have cleared up under the conditions of change.

Mannerheim lent his role as general in command of the White Army of Finland broad scope with regard to both range of action and general objectives. He envisioned himself engaged in a crusade against all revolutionary activity and everything remindful of Bolshevism. In Finland, after the Civil War, his figure was endowed by the Whites themselves with a strong nationalistic image. And he was looked upon as the policy maker capable of settling Eastern relations. It was this figure of Mannerheim that personified the eventful period of 1918. The object of esteem and adulation, it served to unify the bourgeois ranks. Not until 1919 did he begin to reveal another aspect of his character — a favorable disposition toward interventionist activity — and this revelation caused the circles that had till then strongly supported him to take stock anew, mostly in silence, of their leader's resources in the light of historical experiences over a longer term.

As a consequence, the ranks of his political supporters began to show signs of cleavage. Some of his following of the year before turned away. Indirect evidence of his weakening support was the result of the parliamentary election, and by the summer of 1919 the same trend could be noticed

more clearly. Mannerheim's figure, as delineated by the circle of his active adherents, was thus losing its sharp definition and taking on vaguely drawn outlines as well as, to a certain extent, an »alien» appearance.

These things had the effect of bringing uncertainty into Mannerheim's political position. The emergence of interpellations in Parliament concerning the White Russians, accompanied by aggressive speeches from the floor of the debating chamber, was a disagreeable political development to him. The repeated appeals addressed to him by emigré circles involved him in matters of a delicate nature as far as his position as Regent was concerned, and they exposed him to the risk of being compromised in the eyes of the public. The emigré question was one, however, with regard to which it was difficult for Mannerheim even to consider committing himself to a public stand.²⁷

By the spring of 1919 the idea of intervention was in the air, stirring up rumors of all kinds in Finland. Both the representatives of the White Russians and Finns with interventionist inclinations let loose trial balloons, but no practical plans were at issue.

Yudenich's switch of headquarters from Stockholm to Helsinki in January of 1919 was an indication of a change of mind among the White Russians with regard to the over-all strategy of intervention. The view had begun to be expressed that the fronts in Siberia and southern Russia did not suffice to insure success but that a special »northwestern front» would have to be opened up in addition, activating White military operations in the St. Petersburg sector.²⁸ Two possibilities were considered in particular: by starting operations in this sector the White Russians (reinforced by other troops) might capture St. Petersburg or, then, the mere existence of a new interventionist front would compel the Bolsheviki to pull some of their troops from the other fronts to help repulse the threat there, thus indirectly enhancing the White Russians' chances of success on these earlier fronts.

Looked at from Yudenich's vantage point, the central problem was to win Finland and Estonia over to the cause of the interventionists. In mid-February he had turned to the White Russians' diplomatic representatives stationed in Paris and London with the request that they try to influence the Finnish and Estonian political leaders through the governments of the Western Allies. In order to bolster his arguments, Yudenich dispatched P. V. Struve to explain the situation and his objectives.²⁹ The White Russians were sharply critical of the Western Powers' attitude toward the Russian question. In Yudenich's immediate circle of associates, it was condemned as »apathetic». Typical of these men's thinking was their notion that »German agents» were plotting against them in Finland,

seeking to keep alive the specter of revolution in the West as a means of intimidating the government authorities of the victorious powers.

In response to Yudenich's aforementioned appeal, the White Russian envoy to London, C. Nabokoff, recommended³⁰ to Kolchak that recognition be accorded to Finland's independence, inasmuch as it was a *fait accompli*, which the White Russians were incapable, with the resources at their disposal, of opposing. Besides, it was his belief that the Western Powers would act in the matter without lending an ear to the Russians.

The leaders of the *Conférence politique russe* agreed with the military point of view adopted by Kolchak and Denikin that the success of White operations presupposed the existence of a northwestern front as well, but they were not disposed to make any political concessions in favor of Finland. They joined together the issue of recognizing Finnish independence and the solution to the problem of the security of »future Russia» in the region of the Gulf of Finland. They made the solution of this problem along the lines of their desire a precondition of recognition, which in reality amounted to an attempt to circumscribe Finland's freedom of political action.

»Finland has no right to demand any pronouncement from the Russians that is contrary to Russian interests,»³¹ declared the emigré leader V. A. Maklakov in response to Nabokov's recommendation. D. D. Sasonov, who in his presentation to Kolchak supported the plan to create an army in Finland under Yudenich's command, explained in concurrence with the foregoing that recognition of Finnish independence might take place »conditionally», i.e., provided Russia's strategic interests were satisfied and the final decision were left to the National Assembly.³²

In various connections Mannerheim had brought up in the form of a trial balloon the idea of a campaign to capture St. Petersburg. In the summer of 1918 he had broached it, with reference to the military resources of the respective powers, almost simultaneously to diplomats representing both Germany and Britain. Around the months of October and November he was entertaining schemes, as we have already noted, for the capture of the late Czarist capital through interventionist operations jointly carried out by Finland and the Scandinavian countries. At the beginning of 1919 he broached the idea on one occasion along the variant line that Finland would undertake the intervention on her own, with the participation of the Western Powers confined in the main to moral support. In the two last-mentioned cases, Mannerheim indicated that he was prepared to accept the responsibilities of commander-in-chief.

The general was especially interested in a political problem attached to

the interventionist plans, namely, how the Western Powers might react to the possible rôle of Finland in the plans of military strategy. This interest of his was displayed during his sojourn to London in November and December, 1918, as well as later on in his dealings on various occasions with Western diplomatic representatives. Furthermore, one of the special tasks assigned by Mannerheim to Enckell for his mission to Paris at the end of March, 1919, was to learn as much as he could about Allied views on the matter.

Mannerheim's consistent aim was to induce the Western Powers to pledge their support of Finnish participation in intervention.³³ This was in harmony with the Regent's traditional pro-Entente sympathies. Besides, he evidently surmised, it would provide Finland with a secure political prop to take part militarily in the settlement of the issues of power politics in the East. At the same time, it signified a bid for diplomatic support for Finland against any surprise developments — also against the potential threat of inimical moves by the White Russians in the future. Mannerheim was further motivated in his search for support in the West by the fact that, in estimating the forces likely to be thrown into the fray on the »northwestern front», he could form no favorable opinion of the White Russians' fitness for action any more than of the qualifications of their top commander, Yudenich.

Mannerheim's plans with regard to interventionist operations in the St. Petersburg sector proceeded from these premises: the conditions of political collaboration would have to be worked out between the White Russians and the Finnish Government; but militarily, if the venture was eventually implemented, Finland would insist upon making the central contribution, with the White Russians playing a secondary rôle in the action and the Western Allies providing material and moral support.

The month of May, 1919, witnessed changes in the situation that in several ways placed the interventionist plans in a new light. The recognition of Finland's national independence by the Western Powers was such an achievement from the standpoint of the country's political status that the prospect of participation in military undertakings liable to jeopardize the political gains made became less and less popular.

To join in support of interventionist policy was to take a definite stand toward the issue at stake; it spelled out endorsement of action against the acknowledged foe. But, in view of the White Russians' negative or at least ambiguous attitude toward the independence of Finland, the cause for which the Finnish Army was supposed to fight was obscured in the eyes of the great majority of Finns. If the White Russians were to win the

conflict, would it strengthen or weaken the position of Finland as an independent state?

If Finland's policy were constructed on the basis of assistance to the White Russians, with the dubious prospect held out by their vague promises and nebulous gratitude, what, in short, it was asked, would lie in store for the nation? For sight was not lost of a potent factor lurking in the background — the imperial ideal of the White Russians, with its watch-words of territorial inviolability and the resuscitation of Czarist politics!

The desire of Finnish circles favorably disposed toward the idea of intervention to receive »guarantees» in exchange for participation had only grown stronger in the face of the foregoing problems and the sense of insecurity created by them. Resistance had increased in Parliament after the elections, and opinion was divided in the Government, with the voices in opposition tending to gain ascendancy. Yudenich's attempt to advance against Petrograd at the head of White Russian and Estonian troops south of the Gulf of Finland had failed by the latter half of May. On the other hand, the general offensive launched by the White Russians at this juncture had resulted in ground gained in Siberia and, later on, in southern Russia.

The attempt to obtain support from the Western Powers had given rise to a fairly negative view on the chances of linking Finland's possible interventionist activities to the Allied political program.

France was the only one of the victorious powers to urge Finland to take part in the intervention. For its own part, France was not prepared to contribute manpower to the venture but at most only to make some vague promises of material aid.³⁴ It was also ready to pressure Finland into taking part in the offensive against Petrograd without any pledges being given by the White Russians to recognize Finnish independence or to sanction Finland's annexation of any territory or to grant benefits of any other kind. French political hopes rested simply on the swift overthrow of the Bolshevik regime and the subsequent preservation of as strong a Russia as possible to act as a necessary counterbalance to the feared revival of German power in the future.

British policy, by contrast, continued to be cautious and restrained. The British in their planning looked beyond the overthrow of the Bolsheviks and saw the problems and the dangers of the crisis that could later develop between Russia (under White rule) and Finland. After according Finland diplomatic recognition at the beginning of May, the British Government consistently upheld the new status achieved by this country. And it was expressly in response to British insistence that the joint statement delivered

by the Western Allies to Omsk on May 26 concerning the terms on which Kolchak's Government could obtain their recognition included as one condition the recognition of the independence of Poland and Finland. What Britain wanted was to prevent future disagreements over the matter of recognizing Finland's independence.

The British did not try, like the French, to put pressure on Finland to participate in the intervention. Far from promising, for example, assistance in the form of munitions, Assistant Foreign Secretary Curzon and Under Secretary of State Hardinge actually admonished the Finns against taking part in the campaign to capture Petrograd.³⁵ In certain connections it was also specifically stressed that the participation of Finland could not be accepted without the express approval of Kolchak. British diplomats were also inclined to criticize as »unreasonable» the demands put forward by Finland, notably the ones pertaining to the possession of East Karelia.³⁶ Britain further sought to prevent a situation in which, following Finnish collaboration in operations against Petrograd, not only might the White Russians endeavor to gain advantages at the expense of Finnish sovereign rights but also the Finns might claim as »compensation» certain territorial acquisitions,³⁷ which — like the claims on East Karelia — the British had consistently opposed. It was thus aspired to remove to a maximum extent future causes of friction in Finnish-Russian relations.

After the unsuccessful offensive action launched in May on the southern side of the Gulf of Finland, the White Russians could be observed increasing their efforts to draw Finland into the intervention operations.³⁸ This development was particularly reflected in General Yudenich's attitude. He showed himself to be willing to make concessions as a reward for Finland's participation, in contrast to Kolchak, who would not go beyond giving general promises unsupported by any concrete guarantees. Kolchak emphasized as his political watch-word that he represented »great, undivided Russia».³⁹

The course of events led at this stage to negotiations between Yudenich and Mannerheim. The point of departure was provided by the latter's favorable attitude toward military collaboration between the Finns and the White Russians in operations to capture Petrograd and by the former's readiness to make concessions as compensation to Finland for her services. By the latter half of June the representatives of both parties had agreed that »as soon as circumstances permitted» a definitive pact would be drawn up between Finland and (White) Russia on a basis that would include, among other things, the following conditions:³⁹ Finland's independence would be categorically recognized; Finland's access to the Arctic Ocean

would be decided upon by either the Peace Conference or the League of Nations; the right of both northern and southern East Karelia to national self-determination would be honored; and Mannerheim would be commander-in-chief of all the military operations.⁴⁹

The foregoing draft agreement did not in itself reflect the views prevailing in Finnish government circles. Deputy Foreign Minister Leo Ehrnrooth and Minister of War Rudolf Walden,⁴¹ who participated in the negotiations, represented more than anything else those circles that aspired to collaboration with the White Russians. Alongside this pro-interventionist trend of opinion there ran a counter-current, with which several members of the Government belonging to the centrist political parties were identified — and they either took a skeptical view of the bargaining with Yudenich's representatives or then demanded immediate renunciation of all such contact.⁴² Their suspicions were centered on the matter of whether Yudenich, who had showed himself ready to make concessions to Finland, was authorized to take such action by Kolchak. And they wondered whether the support of the Western Powers could be gained by a pro-interventionist policy. Furthermore, they felt an aversion to any line of policy whatsoever that called for the launching of offensive military operations.

The general attitude of Finnish government circles was thus — in spite of the contrary stand taken by certain key figures — hardly kindly disposed to participation in joint action with the White Russians. This line was strengthened by the return from Paris toward the end of June of Foreign Minister Holsti, who was anxious to avoid any move that was liable to lead to friction with the Western Powers. In a report on the situation sent at the beginning of July to Finland's diplomatic representatives abroad, Castrén's Government revealed that it intended to pursue a »very cautious» line⁴³ with respect to intervention and in dealings with the White Russians. Actually, at this point things had reached a pass where Mannerheim and the majority of his ministers were in clear disagreement over Russian policy. Mannerheim, in short, was prepared to join the intervention, provided Kolchak would make concessions in favor of independent Finland and the Western Powers confirmed their stand in favor of the project.

Yudenich's efforts to establish the political basis necessary for military collaboration with Finland led to trouble with Kolchak, who rejected the terms of the draft agreement as »fantastic». The same attitude was reflected in his response to the Western Powers with regard to their proposed conditions of collaboration. Kolchak was willing to go no farther than to accord recognition of Finnish independence only insofar as it was limited to the »internal social order and political administration».⁴⁴ On the other

hand, Kolchak did try to influence the Western Powers to pressure Finland into joining the intervention.

The idea that Finland should join forces with the White Russians in military operations in the Petrograd sector ran counter to the stand held till then by the British Government, which was determined by the desire to prevent subsequent conflicts. The response of the Western Powers to Kolchak's appeal took the form of a communication delivered to the Finnish Government on July 7 with the intelligence that they had no objections to make with regard to Finland's participation in interventionist activity but that they had no intention to pressure Finland in the matter, either.⁴⁴ The issue of intervention thus remained unresolved at a point where no collaboration pact had been arrived at between Finland and the White Russians or between Finland and the Western Allies, either.

Mannerheim's efforts to link Finland's possible participation in interventionist activity with close collaboration with the Western Allies had not succeeded. Furthermore, his exchange of telegrams with Kolchak had left open the stand of the White Russians' high command toward the demands set forth by the Finnish groups favorably disposed to intervention as preconditions. Even the very basis of every other condition, the recognition of Finland's independence, remained a question mark. The failure of the Western Powers to come across with promises of assistance had thinned down the ranks of the pro-interventionists, and the attitude of the White Russians created suspicion and passivity. The belief of the groups opposed to intervention that it represented a »political adventure» apt to lead the the nation into unexpected dangers began to be shared by an increasing number of people.

In spite of everything, the spirit of intervention persisted, and in Finland its proponents were Mannerheim and certain groups of Activists, or nationalist zealots. Since the hoped-for arrangements with Kolchak and the Western Powers had failed to materialize, the energies of these groups became concentrated upon the problem of mobilizing sufficient support for intervention in Finland. The question of securing support at home arose in mid-July, when Parliament, in view of the domestic situation, had hastened to vote in favor of a republican form of government. The ratification of this measure, which had been declared urgent, was next on the national agenda.

Mannerheim and the Activists' spokesmen contended that Bolshevik propaganda would soon threaten the security of Finland and that therefore preparations should be made to take counteraction. Despite Mannerheim's

probably already having received intelligence concerning the announcement issued on July 9 by the Peace Conference in the name of its high council,⁴⁵ which promised no support to interventionist measures undertaken by Finland and despite Britain's negative response to the request made on Finland's behalf for assistance in the form of weapons,⁴⁶ he seems to have entertained the notion that if the interventionists gained their objective, i.e., took Petrograd, the Western Powers would in the end stand behind him. The Finnish Regent thought the political stock of the White Russians was steadily rising. In his opinion Finland should not »remain on the sidelines» as a passive witness of this trend.

The scheme hatched by the Activists at the beginning of July was highly dramatic in its political calculations.⁴⁷ What it called for was this: after confirming the Form of Government, Mannerheim should, in his capacity as Regent, dissolve Parliament and decree the holding of new elections. Then, during the ensuing »political hiatus», operations against Petrograd could be started.

Without paying attention to the constitutional side of the matter, the Activists projected their intervention on the strength of the hope and belief that a successful military outcome would inspire general public gratification. The elections could then be expected to change the proportional strength of the various parties drastically and lead to a retroactive vote of confidence in a policy boldly executed on the basis of personal initiative. The Activists further expected a powerful surge of popular support for Mannerheim at the approaching presidential election.

On July 13 Mannerheim invited some politicians from the Conservative party to participate in discussions in Helsinki. He notified them that he definitely endorsed the plan drawn up by the Activists⁴⁸ and that he was confident of its proving successful. With regard to the problems of foreign policy involved, he mentioned that Kolchak had given assurances no political trouble need arise between Finland and Russia and added as his own conviction that Finland could expect the fulfillment of the political conditions presented to Yudenich in June. As for the attitude of the Western Allies, the Regent asserted that their governments in reality favored Finland's participation in the intervention but that the negative stand taken by the labor movements in the respective countries made it difficult to deal with such matters openly.

Examination of the internal political factors bearing upon intervention culminated on this occasion in the raising of the question: would it be possible during the »political hiatus» to set up a government that would go along with the Regent in implementing his military program?

The leadership of the Conservative party was in a key position in dealing with this question. Misgivings were strong in that quarter about supporting the interventionist measures along the lines laid down.⁴⁹ On the one hand, it was considered constitutionally questionable to undertake action in the field of foreign policy — aggressive military action, at that — immediately after ratification of the new Form of Government, which gave the head of State no authority to take such radical action without the approval of Parliament. And, on the other hand, the launching of interventionist activity by dissolving Parliament was seen to involve domestic political risks. Besides, the measure appeared to threaten to divide the bourgeois ranks by causing the parties of the center to side with the Socialists in vigorous opposition.

The outcome of the talks was that the leadership of the Conservative party, in which opinion favoring political support was only scantily represented, announced that it could not consider accepting partnership in the administration in such an exceptional situation. This response to the Regent's inquiry was given on July 17, making it plain that the intervention project could be expected to get hardly any political support from any of the groups represented in Parliament. The whole plan was dropped at this stage. This was foreshadowed by Mannerheim's answer the day before to Kolchak's personal appeal to him, in which he emphasized that the primary requisite of parliamentary support for intervention was a guarantee of White Russian recognition of Finland's independence.

During the course of the same 17th day of July, Mannerheim applied his signature to the new Form of Government, and this meant that Finland was headed for her first presidential election. The appearance of Mannerheim and K. J. Ståhlberg as rival candidates reflected not only the political opposition of the republicans and the erstwhile monarchists but also the difference of view held by them on foreign affairs, notably with respect to the Russian question.⁵⁰ On the other hand, no difference could be observed between the candidates in their attitude toward the Western Powers. Where a difference did come in was in the fact that Mannerheim was the better known of the two in London and Paris.

The victory of Ståhlberg on July 25 by a heavy majority reflected — besides a rejection of the Regent's domestic policies, including his formula for healing the breach between the Whites and the Reds — the growing desire to insure Finland's steering clear of intervention. According to the viewpoint of Ståhlberg and his adherents, the independent status of Finland could be best stabilized by keeping peace along the country's eastern border.

The interventionist ideal did not die in Finland even though a strong opponent of intervention had been elected President. It lived on as an issue of foreign policy in the minds of certain private groups.

During the fall some trial balloons were once more let loose. Thus Mannerheim, who at this stage held no official position, expounded his schemes early in the autumn for the benefit of a certain British diplomat.⁵¹ The matter last came up in the late fall at the same time as Yudenich's forces based in Estonia had started off on a new attack against Petrograd.

Mannerheim's view at this juncture, when he was again staying in Paris and London, was that the day was approaching when Allied policy with regard to intervention would become more positive and more decisive. »We are nearing a decision with great strides,» he wrote to a political confidant of his back home.⁵² Obviously, in moving about in the Western capitals — as a private citizen, on top of everything else, and in close touch with former officer comrades of his from the Czar's army — Mannerheim gave full sway to the attraction he felt for intervention.⁵³ Contrary phenomena existent in the Allied political program, which indicated alienation from interventionist activity, such as the evacuation in the month of September of the British expeditionary force from northern Russia, escaped his notice. As Regent he had been more »tied down». He had regarded intervention as Finland's last chance to establish her independence on a firm basis vis-à-vis Russia; while the Bolsheviki remained in power, he believed, Finnish independence would depend on the general international situation.

These observations and opinions were brought out in Mannerheim's »Open Letter» to the President of the Republic published around the turn of the months of October and November, in which a direct appeal was made to Ståhlberg and the Government toward winning them around to sanctioning intervention. At the same time, relying upon the General's personal influence, it was endeavored to sway public opinion and thereby bring to bear indirect pressure upon the governing authorities to make the desired change in their course of policy. The »Open Letter» speaks of Finland's »last chance» and expresses Mannerheim's belief that the doom of the Soviet system was sealed; but it goes on to sound a warning that by not joining the intervention Finland could contribute to a situation where Petrograd would remain in Bolshevik hands. With regard to relations with the Western Powers, the letter declares that by participating in the intervention Finland could, in part, change the general European trend of political evolution.

The »Open Letter» failed in its objective, and instead of winning support

for interventionist action it became the target of harsh criticism. Not even the rightist factions that had been Mannerheim's most dependable adherents raised their voices to champion the line of action he recommended but stayed passive. They wanted to preserve the image they had created of him in the light of the events of 1918 as Finland's »White General». The features that tended to be superimposed upon this image as recollections of his earlier career in the Czar's service were enhanced by his aspiration to become the »general of intervention» — and this latter image they instinctively shunned as alien.

Mannerheim had thus been figuratively left alone. His isolation, which was in part self-imposed, was bound to aggravate the political antipathy he felt toward the circles that were directing the course of Finnish policy — the parties of the center, which drew a certain amount of support from the Social Democrats. Actually, in November, 1919, even those had turned their backs on Mannerheim who had been his most loyal followers.

Europe was returning to a state of peace and the newly independent nations established after the war were turning their attention to the work of internal construction. Domestic politics claimed the concentrated energies of governments and everything requiring military exertions was regarded with a sense of war weariness. As the program of intervention receded into the background, it was replaced in the foreground by a policy of collaboration between Finland and the Baltic countries, all of which shared the destiny of having broken the grip of Russia on their affairs. Finland's relations with the Western Powers were becoming established upon a firm foundation, and the change of head of State accomplished by the presidential election signified no change of policy toward Britain, France and the United States. At most, the episode inspired regrets in the West that after losing the election Mannerheim chose to withdraw completely from public life.

NOTES

¹ Fredborg, *Storbritannien och den ryska frågan 1918—20*, p. 24.

² Paasivirta, *Työväenliike yleiseurooppalaisena ilmiönä* (The Labor Movement as a Europeanwide Phenomenon) II, p. 72.

³ Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs I*, p. 229.

⁴ Fredborg, *op. cit.*, pp. 29—31.

⁵ Williams, *American Russian Relations 1781—1947*, p. 164.

⁶ Publications issued by the Conférence politique russe: *Mémoire sur la Question Finlandaise*, pp. 4, 12—14, and *Quelques considérations sur le problème finlandais*, pp. 4—7.

⁷ Memorandum delivered on Jan. 29, 1919, by the Conférence politique russe to the foreign ministries of the Western Powers (State Department 183.9/Russia 22).

⁸ Mémoire sur la Question Finlandaise, p. 15.

⁹ Ehrensvärd's report of Sept. 12, 1918, to the Swedish Foreign Ministry on his discussions with V. A. Maklakov (Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 34).

¹⁰ Mémoire sur la Question Finlandaise, p. 20.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 30. Also memorandum of March 9 addressed by the Conférence politique russe to the Peace Conference (State Department 860 d 01/38).

¹² Quelques considérations sur le problème finlandais, p. 10.

¹³ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴ Enckell's discussion on April 3 with B. V. Savinkov, Minister of War in Kerenski's Government (Anteckningar från minister Enckells resa till London och Paris on April 3. Copy: Ulkoministeriö 5 C 6).

¹⁵ Memorandum of March 9 addressed to the Peace Conference by the Conférence politique russe.

¹⁶ Memorandum on the Finnish Question. — The authorship of this pamphlet is attributed to S. A. Korff, the deputy of the Governor-General of Finland during the tenure of the Provisional Government.

¹⁷ Enckell's discussion on March 31 with Lvov (Anteckningar från minister Enckells resa till London och Paris 31/3. Copy: Ulkoministeriö 5 C 6).

¹⁸ Communication of May 8 addressed by the Conférence politique russe to the Peace Conference (State Department 860 d 01/38).

¹⁹ Tomilov, Military Operations on the Northwestern Front (manuscript in Russian).

²⁰ Yudenich, Memoirs (MS in Russian).

²¹ Epstein, Intervention to Russia (MS).

²² Yudenich, op. cit.

²³ Ulkoministeriön tilannekatsaus (The Foreign Ministry's Review of the Situation) 10/12 (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7).

²⁴ Tomilov, op. cit.

²⁵ V:n 1918 valtiopäivien pöytäkirjat (Parliamentary Record for the Year 1918), pp. 331, 332, 379—382, 384—389, 741—748; also, e.g., Uuden Suomen Iltalehti (Uusi Suomi's Evening Journal), Feb. 28, Venäläinen vaara (The Russian Peril); March 1, Tuleva Venäjä ja Suomen itsenäisyys (Future Russia and Finland's Independence).

²⁶ E.g., Mannerheim's discussion on Oct. 14, 1918, with Ingman (Ingman, Poliittisia muistiinpanoja (Political Notes) 14/10); telegram of Dec. 14 to the Government (p. 117); Prime Minister Edén's statement of Dec. 11 concerning Mannerheim to Höjer (Höjer's letter of Dec. 12 to Westman. Svenska Utrikesdepartementet 1 o 34); discussion between Mannerheim and the U.S. naval attaché of the Copenhagen Legation (telegram of Feb. 20 from the deputy Chargé d'affaires in Copenhagen to the State Dep't. — Foreign Relations of the United States 1919. Russia, p. 669) and later source references to Mannerheim.

²⁷ Heinrichs, Mannerheimgestalten I, p. 318.

²⁸ Epstein, op. cit.

²⁹ Tomilov, op. cit.

³⁰ Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, pp. 292—295.

³¹ Tomilov, op. cit.

³² Enckell, *Politiska minnen* II, p. 136.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 158.

³⁴ Juva, Rudolf Walden, pp. 173—176, 179—180.

³⁵ Donner's telegrams of May 19 and 22 to the Foreign Ministry in Helsinki (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 7); Holsti's communication of April 28 to the Foreign Ministry (Ulkoministeriö 58 B 1) and his memorandum on the negotiations conducted by the Finnish diplomats in Paris on June 4 (Ulkoministeriö 5 C 6).

³⁶ General Gough's telegram of June 1 to Curzon and Balfour's telegram of June 21 to Curzon. — Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919—1939 I, 3, pp. 382, 394, 395.

³⁷ Curzon's telegram of June 16 to Balfour. — *Ibid.*, p. 381.

³⁸ Enckell, *Politiska minnen* II, p. 133.

³⁹ Kolchak justified his stand toward Finland by declaring, *inter alia*, that »history will never forgive me if I give away that which Peter the Great conquered» (Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution* II, pp. 186, 187).

⁴⁰ Draft agreement (according to a notification sent to England, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919—1939 I, 3, pp. 394, 395) as published by Heinrichs (Mannerheimgestalten I, pp. 329—331).

⁴¹ Castrén, *Poliittisia muistiinpanoja*, June 12 and 28.

⁴² Alkio, *Poliittisia muistiinpanoja*, June 15 and 18.

⁴³ Ulkoministeriön tilannekatsaus 10/7.

⁴⁴ Enckell, *Politiska minnen* II, p. 145.

⁴⁴ Pichon's telegram of July 9 to France's deputy Chargé d'affaires in Helsinki (Copy: State Dep't 760 d. 61/16).

Kolchak's appeal to the Western Powers urging them to pressure the Finnish Government, which was contained in a telegram dispatched on June 24 from Omsk, was first dealt with in Paris at a session of the Baltic Commission held on June 30. The French position was that the Finnish Government should be urged to take action according to Kolchak's wishes. The British representative, Howard, then stressed the fact that the situation had changed. The prevailing impression had been, he commented, that Kolchak had accepted the draft agreement drawn up by Mannerheim and Yudenich, but he made no references in his telegram from Omsk to any promises to Finland but, on the contrary, emphasized his own conditions: participation in intervention would give Finland no rights to extra territory and St. Petersburg would (after a successful attack) be placed under the direct control of Yudenich's troops (proceedings of the Baltic Commission, June 30. State Dep't 181.21901/11). Howard's announcement that Britain would not undertake to pressure the Finnish Government forced France to abandon its line of attack, and the outcome of the Commission's parley was that the above-mentioned non-committal telegram was dispatched to Helsinki as expressing the position taken by the high council of the Peace Conference on July 7.

⁴⁵ Mannerheim, *Minnen* I, p. 351.

⁴⁶ The telegram sent on July 1 by the British Ministry of War to Gough. — Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919—1939, I, 3, pp. 411, 412.

⁴⁷ Ingman, *Poliittisia muistiinpanoja*, July 13.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, July 16. — In expressing his point of view, Mannerheim told the

Conservative leaders: »Frihetskriget är ej ännu slutfördt, det sker först bakom Petersburg.»

⁴⁰ Ingman, *op. cit.*, July 13—17.

⁵⁰ Hirvikallio, *Tasavallan presidentin vaalit Suomessa 1919—50* (The Presidential Elections in Finland from 1919 to 1950), pp. 9—15.

⁵¹ C. Kennard's telegram of Sept. 8 to Curzon. — *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919—1939* I, 3, pp. 539, 540.

⁵² Mannerheim's letter dated Oct. 11 to Ingman (Ingman's collection).

⁵³ Heinrichs, *Mannerheimgestalten* I, p. 361.

Chapter X

The Stabilization of Finland's Diplomatic Relations with Britain, France and the United States

The British and the United States Governments' having accorded the independence of Finland their recognition at the beginning of May, 1919, and France's having ratified its prior favorable decision, conditions had become ripe for the stabilization of diplomatic relations between Finland and the victorious Western Allies.

Following the declaration of independence by Finland, provisional arrangements were sought while the Finnish deputations sent to London, Paris and Washington presented requests for the diplomatic recognition of their country. These arrangements called for the situation of unofficial Finnish diplomatic representatives in the main Western capitals. Owing to the pro-German line pursued by Finland's policy makers, however, the possibilities open to these representatives to do anything useful proved slight or non-existent. For this reason, during the armistice negotiations Finland maintained, as pointed out in the foregoing presentation, a temporary Chargé d'affaires only in London. Simultaneously, by a decision made by the Government on October 15, the Finnish diplomatic representation in Germany and the three Scandinavian countries was placed on a permanent basis by the appointment of Ministers to the respective capitals.¹

The aspiration to establish close ties with the Western Powers, which began to take on vital political importance after the month of November, 1918, was manifested by -- in addition to the circumstances already discussed -- a number of decisions aimed at complementing and enlarging Finland's diplomatic corps. Two representatives were sent to the United States, mainly to look after Finnish commercial interests, but this move was blocked by Washington because it was initiated by a pro-German administration. The Finnish deputation sent to Paris, the locale of the Peace Conference, was steadily augmented. Even the Foreign Ministers, first Enckell, then Holsti, made occasional trips to the French capital, besides which the representatives of Finland stationed in London worked in close contact with the Paris deputation.

In May, 1919, the situation called for the appointment of Ministers to London, Paris and Washington as well as for the augmentation of the Finnish representation in those capitals otherwise, too, and the establish-

ment of the diplomatic missions on a permanent basis. The first appointment, made on May 30, was that of A. H. Saastamoinen, who was named Minister to head the Finnish Legation in Washington, D.C. An expert on economic affairs, he had previously served as diplomatic envoy to Copenhagen and for a time in the spring of 1919 as a temporary representative of the Finnish Government in the United States. The nomination of Ministers to head the legations in Paris and London was delayed, however. The decision with respect to Paris was evidently held up by the internal dissension among the membership of the Finnish deputation there, which had developed during the spring. It was finally Carl Enckell who, on September 6, received the assignment to serve in France, his rival for the post having been Adolf Törnngren. Accordingly, London was the last of the three capitals to see the arrival of a Finnish Minister. The post was awarded on October 7 to Ossian Donner, who had originally acted as Holsti's deputy in the British capital and later, as of July, carried out the duties of *Chargé d'affaires*. Around the same time, regular appointments were made to consular offices: A. J. Norrgrén took over the Finnish Consulate-General in London and M. Nordberg the one in Paris.

Characteristic in many cases of Finland's first diplomats — both those who held high positions during the pro-German period and those who came after — was the fact that before entering the foreign service they had served in some other official capacity or been active in politics.

This previous experience naturally proved valuable to the men choosing diplomacy as a new career. On the other hand, this kind of experience frequently bred strong personal political opinions, rooted, for example, in activity associated with the Jaeger movement (which trained Finnish officers in the German Army for eventual action to free Finland from Russia's grip) or in pro-Allied activity or, in certain cases, in collaboration with the Russian regime preceding the Bolshevik seizure of power. The political line thus pursued at an earlier stage, with the sacrifice of strength and energy, was apt to determine the trend of political thinking of the individual concerned during his subsequent career or to form, as it were, a personal interest.

The existence of such a »background factor» upon a man's embarking upon a diplomatic career was apt to mean that he was unwilling or unable to shake off the influence of his own political convictions or to resign himself to adhering only to the official foreign service line of policy and to following instructions. In practice, this line of independence was further manifested by the fact that the reporting done for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was highly unorthodox. Reports were not confined, according to

regular diplomatic practice, to analyses of the position and policies of the administration in office in the country to which such a diplomat was accredited, as well as of the activities and aims of the political opposition, and to prognostications based on the data accumulated concerning the future course of policy likely to be followed by the country. In addition, the reports frequently tended to offer the reporting officer's own Government »advice» on policy and even to criticize measures already taken by the Government.

It was partly due to the foregoing situation in the evolving administration of Finland's foreign relations that when, toward the end of 1918, her line of policy shifted to the aim of cultivating close ties with the Western Allies, voices were raised demanding that certain diplomats who held high office during the pro-German period should be wholly removed from the foreign service.² Action was also taken in due time against Edv. Hjelt and Alexis Gripenberg, who had served as envoys in Berlin and Stockholm.

At the time the question of intervention was a topical issue, it was not unheard of, on the other hand, for a diplomat advocating Finland's participation to draw — toward the end of 1919 — a reminder from the President of the Republic that, rather than actively airing his personal views, he should confine his attention to the duties »belonging» to his office. It was only gradually that official thinking with regard to the scope of authority and degree of subservience of foreign service officers crystallized.

The following incident is likewise illustrative of the early period in the annals of the Finnish foreign service: When Ståhlberg was elected President at the end of July, 1919, causing the retirement from public office of the rival candidate, General Mannerheim, one Finnish diplomat,³ a supporter of the latter, raised the question as to whether, in response to this »political mistake», he should demonstratively offer his post to the President-elect to be filled by a replacement.

The opposition between Ståhlberg and Mannerheim constituted a kind of political watershed in Finland after 1918, and even among the leading figures in the administration of foreign affairs there could be detected a division into pro-Mannerheim and pro-Ståhlberg factions. No small source of friction in the conduct of these affairs was the circumstance that the first Ministers to Paris and London belonged to the former faction and Foreign Minister Holsti to the latter.

The young men starting their foreign service careers at the time conditions began to become normalized in 1919 belonged to a new generation of diplomats, who differed in many respects from their elder colleagues and among whom the stresses and strains of the momentous period of crisis were no longer felt in the same way.

The Transformation of Finnish Politics

from the mentality governing the struggle to safeguard the nation's constitutional rights against the encroachments of Czarist tyranny to vigorous diplomatic activity had been accomplished through drastic changes in the international situation as well as in the strength and influence of the various political factions at home. Thus did the Finnish policy makers learn to adjust themselves to operating in the largely strange international forum, where the sector formed by the victorious Western Allies proved to be stranger than many of the other ones.

The administration of independent Finland had slowly shifted the course of foreign policy previously set. And the shift was made in the middle of a world crisis. Viewed with the eyes of a foreign diplomat, the men in charge of Finnish policy were apt to appear self-important, heavy-handed and lacking in imagination.⁴ The process of reaching decisions in the field of foreign relations along the lines laid down by the victorious powers was a slow one. Finnish diplomacy had been deficient in neither activity nor zeal, but its capacity to achieve results was limited both by lack of experience and, above all, by a shortage of the resources needed to make one's weight felt in the sphere of power politics.

A typical feature of the period of the breakthrough of Finland's diplomacy was the sharply critical attitude of the Finnish public toward foreign countries. It reflected, on the one hand, the characteristic tendency of the time to mix together the issues of the internal struggle for power and the differences over foreign policy. And, on the other hand, it reflected the human side of the politics of the period of crisis: in addition to scoring victories and experiencing the uplift thereby given their self-esteem, the representatives of practically all the political schools of thought had also made their full share of mistakes and known the bitter taste of failure, defeat and disenchantment.

As the total outcome, however, Finland's position as an independent state had begun to be firmly established. It was this status that provided the basis on which to build the future relations between Finland and the Western Allies as well as, in general, to carry on the affairs of Finland as an active member of the post-World War I European community.

NOTES

¹ The proceedings of the Government Economic Dep't 15/10 1918.

² *Helsingin Sanomat* 20 X Edustuksemme ulkomailla (Our Representation Abroad), *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* 7 III 1919, Suomen ulkomainen edustus (Finland's Foreign Representation).

³ Ossian Donner's letter of July 30 to Törngren (Törngren's collection).

⁴ Gregory, *On the Edge of Diplomacy*, p. 189.

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E. N. Setälä's collection

Memoranda

Adolf Törngren's collection

Memoranda

Letters

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Ernst Estlander's collection

Notes

J. N. Reuter's collection

Letters

R. A. Wrede's collection

Letters

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Notes

Letters

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V. INTERVIEWS¹

A. A b r o a d

Borenus, Anne-Marie, Mrs, Coombe Bisset, Salisbury
Carr, Edward Hallett, Professor, Cambridge
Flood, Manne, business man, Stockholm
Morison, Samuel, Professor, Harvard, Mass.
Stenlid, Nandor, journalist

B. F i n l a n d

Andersson, Otto, Professor, Turku
Rangell, J. W., banker, ex-politician, Helsinki
Toivola, Urho, ex-ambassador
Valkeapää, P. J., ex-business man
Yöntilä, Armas, ex-ambassador, Helsinki

¹ The interviewees (excepting those mentioned in the Preface) either were engaged in diplomatic or commercial activities for Finland in 1918—19 or took part in politics involving the Åland Islands — or, then, in one or another capacity closely followed the developments discussed in these pages.

A SURVEY OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCE MATERIAL AND LITERATURE

For comments on the material borrowed from the *archives of the Swedish and the German Foreign Ministries* for use in the present work as well as in my earlier study »Suomi vuonna 1918», see pp. 369—371 of this previously published volume.

The new category of source material, obtained from the archives of the *United States State Department* (published to some extent in the series entitled »Foreign Relations of the United States», which I have drawn upon before), contains various reports, memoranda, etc., relating to the activities of, *inter alia*, the State Department, the United States Peace Commission to Paris as well as its experts and assistants, the American Consul in Helsinki and the American Minister to Stockholm, etc.

In addition to this American material proper, the category includes communications from British and French diplomats, etc., which cast a broader light upon the lines of policy pursued by the Western Allies.

Special attention is deserved by the material relating to the plenary sessions of the Paris Peace Conference contained in the archives of the State Department (and published in part in the subsidiary section of the »Foreign Relations» series, »The Paris Peace Conference 1919»). Among the unpublished material, noteworthy is the record of the proceedings of the Baltic Commission, with supplements, which deals with, e.g., the Åland and the East Karelian questions as well as the subject of intervention.

The accounts of the meetings of the leading bodies at the Paris Peace Conference included in the material published by the United States State Department give the impression, to the extent they have been referred to for the purposes of the present work, (e.g., the sessions of the Council of Ten held on Jan. 27 and Feb. 27, 1919), of being somewhat loosely interpreted and also unclear. (No minutes of the »summit meetings» at the conference were kept, so the record consists only of unofficial notes). In some part, this particular material may be compared to the notes on the Council of Four meetings during the period of March 24— June 28, 1919, published by Paul Mantoux, interpreter for the French delegation. (The reference to the account of the meeting held on April 28).

Of the private collections of members of the United States Peace Commission kept in the *Library of Congress*, in addition to the ones mentioned in the catalogue of source material, the collections of Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing have been examined. The material dealing with the Finnish question (and related problems) has been obtained as copies of State Department documents or of memoranda of other members of the Peace Commission.

With reference to the affairs of Finland, a source further worth mentioning is the 21-volume »My Diary at the Conference of Paris», published in a private edition of 50 copies, by D. H. Miller, an assistant on the staff of the United States Peace Commission. To the extent that it be consulted for documentary material, subsequent official series of publications have narrowed down its

significance. There being no copy of the series in the Nordic countries, the one in the possession of the British Museum has been used by the present author.

The material of the State Department is complemented at certain points with respect to food deliveries to Finland by the material in the archives of the American Relief Administration at the Hoover Library situated at Stanford, California. A copy of the unpublished collection »Hoover-Holsti Documents 1918—1920» included in this material has been used for the purposes of the present work.

Certain portions of the *material held by the British Foreign Office* (which is not freely at the disposal of researchers insofar as it relates to the period following World War I) have been published in the series »Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919—1939». Its subseries, No. I, dealing with the period starting at the beginning of July, 1919, touches only at a few points — involving the question of intervention — the subject matter of this work. It cannot be denied, however, that in certain instances the series does give grounds for drawing indirect conclusions, too, concerning previous months.

The material pertaining to the *activities of General Yudenich* in the Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture consists of his wife's memoirs from the years 1918 and 1919 (when she had closely followed his movements) as well as an account, treating political and military matters, with citations from relevant documents, by his chief of staff, General P. Tomilov, of the same period.

The portion covering the years 1918 and 1919 of Joh. Hellner's »Minnen och dagböcker», published in 1960, corresponds to the set of notes designated as »Anteckningar från utrikesministertiden II» in the collection bearing his name in the *State Archives of Sweden*, which I had occasion to make use of in my earlier volume. It is on this material that the »Memorandum» on Swedish-Finnish relations in 1917—18, which was also written by Hellner and published by the Swedish Foreign Ministry, is based. This last-mentioned publication, however, contains no account of the policies pursued by Germany.

The material covering the years 1918 and 1919 in the *archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry* cannot, perhaps, for several reasons be considered complete (Suomi vuonna 1918, p. 369). The collection of documents published by Aaro Pakaslahti contains an important part. In addition, the present author has used unpublished material, particularly with respect to many special questions.¹

Many private collections contain material that casts light upon developments in the field of foreign relations and related matters.

A number of diaries, or comparable records, that deal with the events of October and November, 1918, have been available to the author — those of Haataja, Hultin, Ingman, Setälä, Thesleff and others. Of the collections of papers describing the diplomatic activity in London and Paris, the one containing the

¹ When, in certain instances, the original document could not be found in the archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the author was obliged to cite a copy in, e.g., Holsti's collection (p. 75, footnote 25); or, in the case of a missing telegram, to a reference to it in, e.g., the Foreign Ministry's Review of the Situation (p. 110, note 25). Where not even a copy could be found in the Finnish material, it was necessary in one case to cite the copy in the German Foreign Ministry's archives (p. 27, note 3^a).

largest quantity of documents is Rudolf Holsti's. To a large extent, it consists of copies of reports, etc., sent by Holsti to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (to the »Senate», or Government, while it operated out of the town of Vaasa during the period the Red rebels held southern Finland; and to the Committee on Foreign Relations). The originals of certain of the copies included in this collection cannot be found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. Adolf Törnngren's collection contains more material of a »private nature» (notes, etc.), which is not included in official archives, than Holsti's. Yrjö Hirn's collection contains the political observations he made during his stay in Paris in the spring of 1919, as written down by Karin Hirn, as well as letters dealing with the same matters.

As for the treatment of the matter of intervention in June and July, 1919, in high quarters in Finland, in addition to the foregoing, the notes kept by Kaarlo Castrén, among others, have been studied. More light has been shed on Mannerheim's position by Lauri Ingman's notes, which had been kept sealed, insofar as they touched on this matter, until 1960.

With respect to the *literature*, such works were sought out in the line of research studies, memoirs, etc., as might be deemed to have significance not only from the direct standpoint of the subject at hand but also as background material likely to prove helpful in interpreting the general international situation after World War I.

Generally speaking, it may be remarked that the American, British and French *historical literature* gives scant attention to matters directly bearing upon the Finnish question in the years 1918 and 1919. There exist works that deal with the crucial political and military developments of the period (e.g., G. B. Noble, *Politics and Opinions at Paris 1919*. New York 1935; W. A. Williams, *American Russian Relations 1781—1947*. New York 1952; R. Poincaré, *Au service de la France*. Paris 1925; F. Foch, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la guerre*. Paris 1930; C. E. Callwell, *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*. London 1937) but lack any direct mention of Finland. Certain works (e.g., David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs VI*. London 1936) contain some passing references in a critical tone to Finnish politics, while other works, again, include only general observations, for the most part, on the Finnish question (e.g., J. Noulens, *Mon ambassade en Russie Soviétique 1917—1919*. Paris 1933).

In exceptional instances, there have appeared in the countries in question around the period dealt with some studies dealing specifically with the politics of Finland (e.g., C. Jay Smith, Jr., *Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917—1922*. Athens, Georgia 1958, which discusses, *inter alia*, the interventionist plans for the Petrograd sector in the light of the material published in the »Krasnyi Arkhiv»).

An examination of this literature has, in any case, given the basis for the general, indirect conclusion that interest in the Finnish question was slight in the midst of momentous decisions of power politics.

In the *sphere of memoirs*, Finland is given more space, especially when the writer was obliged to have dealings with this country in the line of duty (e.g., Herbert Hoover, J. D. Gregory, C. Maynard, C. Nabokov, A. Ruhl, among other names cited in the catalogue of sources). Only rarely in these cases is any general interest in Finland's politics indicated. In certain cases, moreover, the data given in connection with the rare mention of Finland are erroneous

(Esme Howard, *Theatre of Life II*, which refers to the Baltic Commission's decision of July 4, 1919, concerning the issue of the Åland Islands; actually, the decision was almost diametrically opposite to what it is represented to have been in this book of memoirs). This, too, should perhaps be regarded as a circumstance indirectly indicative of the amount of interest generated by the affairs of Finland.

Among studies published in Sweden, the following might be mentioned: T. Gihl, *Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia IV 1914—19*, and Arvid Fredborg, *Storbritannien och den ryska frågan 1918—20*.

Among works published in the U.S.S.R., noteworthy is the one by B. E. Stein, the original 1949 Moscow edition of which has appeared in German translation under the title: *Die russische Frage auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919—1920*. Leipzig 1953.

The latest general presentations of the Finnish political crisis of 1918—1919 are contained — in association with the main subject matter — in Part I of Erik Heinrichs' biography of Mannerheim and Einar W. Juva's tome on Rudolf Walden.

In studying the autobiographical literature written by Finns — e.g., Ossian Donner, Enckell, Holsti (unpublished drafts), Mannerheim — one is struck by the fact that the accounts of certain central matters, such as the procurement of relief supplies, the final settlement of the issue of the recognition of Finland's independence, the treatment of the Åland question at Paris in the summer of 1919 and attitudes toward the issue of intervention, are discrepant. Neither is that characteristic feature of memoirs, emphasis upon the author's personal contribution to decisive measures, conspicuously absent, any more than is the influence of subsequent political developments.

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