FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

SECURITIZING OF FAILING STATES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Master Thesis

1st Lieutenant
Tomi Lehtoaro

Military Sciences Masters Course 5
Army

April 2016

FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

Course	Branch
Military Sciences Masters Course 5	Army
Author 1st Lieutenant Tomi Lehtoaro	
Name of the Thesis SECURITIZING OF FAILING STATES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
Faculty / Major Strategy	Place of Storage Course library (NDU library)
Date April 2016	Text pages 118 Appendix pages 7

ABSTRACT

The identity of the Western state has been traditionally tied to sovereignty and (national) security. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union changed this. In the 1990s the concept of security widened beyond military-political and state failure emerged as a new threat to the U.S. The concept was coined by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner with the article '*Saving Failed States'*, in 1992. However, the concept remained elusive and the threats related to it in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), localized.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 transformed failing states from a regional problem into a global (strategic) threat. Therefore, how the official discourse of the U.S. created threats had significant effect on its foreign policy. The aim of this research was to analyze the securitization of failing states as part of the U.S. national security discourse. This was done by looking at how the failing state discourse entered into the NSS, as well as how it was framed. The NSS documents and the primary source material on state failure provided information on why failing states were seen as a threat. Primary material was analyzed using Securitization theory and Discourse analysis methodology.

The conceptual base of the failing states discourse was located in the Western definition of state, sovereignty and security. State failure was defined and described in reference to a strong (Western) state. The existential threats needed for the securitization of failing states drew from the definition and identity of the Western state. Failing states were gradually created a threat in the NSS documents with the widening of security in the 1990s. During this process intersubjective and intertextual links formed between different threats. These threats were externalized to the policy documents as security discourses. Failing states discourse evolved from the security discourses of WMD's, regional conflicts and terrorism.

These discourses were objectified and developed an existence of their own with consecutive administrations. The securitization of failing states happened gradually through the different discourses. A regional instability issue associated with Third World ultimately received existential qualities. After 9/11 *all* state failure was defined as a strategic threat equal to former Soviet Union. In the NSS of 2002 failing states were completely securitized. It drew under it all the dominant security discourses. The following NSS documents kept up this securitization by retaining the intersubjective and intertextual links. The securitization of failing states begun in the 1990s was completed in 2002, and remained effective to 2010. These results showed how the NSS created threats through securitizing failing states.

KEY WORDS: Failing states, discourse analysis, securitization, national security, U.S.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Länsimaisen valtion identiteetti on ollut perinteisesti sidoksissa suvereniteettiin ja kansalliseen turvallisuuteen. Kylmän sodan päättyminen ja sitä seurannut Neuvostoliiton hajoaminen muuttivat tämän asetelman. 1990–luvulla turvallisuus laajeni käsittämään muutakin kuin poliittisen ja sotilaallisen sektorin. Samanaikaisesti valtioiden hajoaminen nousi uudeksi uhkaksi Yhdysvalloille. Hajoavien valtioiden käsite ilmestyi vuonna 1992 Gerald B. Helmanin ja Steven R. Ratnerin *'Saving Failed States'* -artikkelin myötä. Käsite jäi häilyväksi. Samalla siihen liittyvät uhkat Yhdysvaltojen kansallisessa turvallissuustrategia asiakirjassa (NSS) jäivät luonteeltaan alueellisiksi.

Vuonna 2001 syyskuun 11. päivän terrori-iskut muuttivat hajoavat valtiot alueellisesta uhkasta maailmanlaajuiseksi ja strategiseksi. Tapa millä Yhdysvaltain virallinen diskurssi muodostaa uhkia on vaikuttanut merkittävästi sen ulkopolitiikkaan. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli analysoida hajoavien valtioiden turvallistamista Yhdysvaltain kansallisessa turvallisuusdiskurssissa. Tämä toteutettiin tarkastelemalla kuinka hajoavien valtioiden diskurssi ilmestyi NSS -asiakirjaan, sekä miten se asemoitiin osaksi tekstiä. Tutkimuksen primääriaineiston perusteella oli mahdollista selvittää, miksi hajoavat valtiot nähtiin Yhdysvalloissa uhkana. Primääriaineisto käsitti NSS -asiakirjat, sekä valtioiden hajoamista käsittelevän kirjallisuuden. Aineisto analysoitiin käyttämällä turvallistamisen teoriaa ja diskurssianalyysiä.

Hajoavien valtioiden diskurssin käsitteellinen alkuperä sijoittui länsimaisiin määritelmiin valtiosta, suvereniteetista ja turvallisuudesta. Valtioiden hajoamisen määritelmän ja kuvaamisen perustana oli vahva länsimainen valtio. Hajoavien valtioiden turvallistamiseen tarvittavat eksistentiaaliset uhkat perustuivat länsimaisen valtion määritelmään, sekä valtion identiteettiin. Hajoavat valtiot turvallistettiin vähitellen NSS -asiakirjoissa osana 1990–luvulla tapahtunutta turvallisuuden käsitteen laajentumista. Tämän prosessin aikana muodostui intersubjektiivisia ja intertekstuaalisia yhteyksiä eri uhkien välille. Nämä muodostivat turvallisuusdiskursseja NSS -asiakirjoihin. Hajoavien valtioiden diskurssi muodostui ja kehittyi kolmesta pääasiallisesta diskurssista jotka olivat joukkotuhoaseet, alueelliset konfliktit ja terrorismi. Nämä kolme diskurssia samaistuivat osaksi NSS -asiakirjoja ja alkoivat elää omaa elämäänsä.

Hajoavien valtioiden turvallistaminen tapahtui vähitellen näiden kolmen eri diskurssin kautta. Hajoavat valtiot oli alun perin yhdistetty alueelliseen epävakauteen. Käsite sai lopulta eksistentiaalisen uhkan mittasuhteet. 9/11 terrori–iskujen jälkeen kaikki hajoavat valtiot assosioitiin Neuvostoliittoon verrattavana strategisena uhkana. Vuoden 2002 NSS -asiakirjassa hajoavien valtiot turvallistettiin lopullisesti. Käsite veti alleen kaikki muut pääasialliset diskurssit. Seuraavat NSS -asiakirjat vahvistivat turvallistettua diskurssia. Tämä tapahtui ylläpitämällä intersubjektiivisia ja intertekstuaalisia yhteyksiä eri uhkien välillä. Hajoavien valtioiden turvallistaminen sai alkunsa 1990–luvulla, toteutui vuonna 2002 ja säilyi vuoden 2010 asiakirjoihin asti. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittivat miten NSS -asiakirjat loivat uhkia hajoavia valtioita turvallistamalla.

AVAINSANAT: Hajoavat valtiot, diskurssianalyysi, turvallistaminen, kansallinen turvallisuus, Yhdysvallat.

SECURITIZING OF FAILING STATES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECURITIZING OF FAILING STATES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

> "The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization."
>
> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), p. 25.

1 INTRODUCTION

–Cave ab homine unius libri

1.1 Why Failing States matter?

States are commonly seen as unchangeable and eternal structures which provide the basic necessities for society to function both internally and internationally. The possibility and concrete reality of state failure has forced the system of states to evaluate the consequences of collapsing polities[1]. This has led to re–evaluate the stand on questions such as security, sovereignty and intervention. Historically empires, civilizations, and kingdoms have come and gone.[2]

---

[1] Robert I. Rotberg (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,* p. 1. Disintegration of states threatens the very foundation of the states–system because states constitute the building blocks of the world order.
[2] Joseph A. Tainter (1988), *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, pp. 5–21.

Regardless of these recurring themes the contemporary international system has to take note when parts that comprise it are disintegrating. During the Cold War the bipolar structure of the competing superpowers stabilized the international system.[3] The international system weakened after the Cold War and this was seen throughout the world as the old ideological competitors decreased and withdrew their support from their proxies. This contributed in part to the re–structuring of the prevailing system of states.[4] Ideology and geostrategy were partly replaced in the West by human rights and humanitarian concerns.[5] The battle over ideological, political and military levels had greatly constituted to the conflicts around the globe. However, in many cases it was not necessarily the initiating factor since majority of the problems of troubled states have roots in their internal dysfunction and history of colonization, or both.[6]

Why failing states[7] matter? If the problem of state failure is localized, what concern does this have to the Western industrialized democracies?[8] A localized problem in a far–away continent does not create a major security concern for superpowers, such as the United States (henceforth U.S). However, the dominant discourse on security and the portrayal of threats in policy documents give a reason to examine the discourses on failing states more closely.[9]

The most obvious answer to the problem of failing states (from here on referred to as FS) would be to look into the causes, mechanisms, indications and direct consequences of state failure. Therefore, the causal explanations and indications of state failure (and collapse) have been the focus in the majority of academic research. This has included policy frameworks and documents of state construction as well as and statistical analysis.[10]

---

[3] John J. Mearsheimer (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 45. Mearsheimer argues that bipolarity as a power configuration produces the least amount of fear. Therefore, due to rough balance of power the fear is less acute. Kenneth Waltz (2008), *Realism and International Politics*, pp. 61–61.

[4] For an in depth discussion on the effects of the superpowers to their proxies to the problem of state collapse, see for example, William I. Zartman (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,* and Mohammed Ayoob (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament.*

[5] Barry Buzan (1991), *People, States & Fear* (2nd ed.): *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 49. Human rights rose to international prominence during 1970s and 1980s. This established individual security as an international issue.

[6] Robert H. Bates (2008), *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late–Century Africa*, p. 85, Ayoob (1995).

[7] 'Failing states' are referred to as 'FS' from here on. This is done interchangeably with the full version.

[8] Francis Fukuyama (2004), *State–Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty–First Century*, pp. 125–126. Failing are states presented as a far reaching security problem.

[9] Thierry Balzacq (2005), "*The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context"*, European Journal of International Relations 11/ 2005, p. 171. Discourses have 'become an important aspect of security analysis.'

[10] For different approaches on state and peace building as well as state failure, see for example, Zartman (1995), Fukuayma (2004), Rotberg (ed.) (2004) and Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (eds.) (2008), *Building States to Build Peace*.

The problem is that most of the research done does not to take into account some of the more abstract ways of how state failure is being created, amplified, or modified by prevailing and ongoing discourses and discursive changes. Here the purpose is to look for how the intersubjective and intertextual links create the state failure discourse and how it is securitized. Changes in policy and wider debate on FS are constantly being re–formulated. Security discourse is a self–referential process[11] and the language choices have an effect on how the concept is integrated into the official foreign policy. The discursive choices have an effect inside the structures of policymaking. As a result, discursive shifts can impact policy as Somalia's 1993 Mogadishu incident and the death of several U.S. servicemen showed.[12]

Therefore, when a discursive concept is implemented by a powerful actor such as the U.S. after September 11th 2001 it pre–structures its use in the wider discursive realm. The discursive approach can make it possible to understand the phenomenon of state failure in a wider context. This gives a different perspective instead of just examining flows of money, number of refugees, or the effective area of control by the state in danger of failing. The interpretation of language by Discourse analysis (from here on referred to as DA)[13], helps to understand how language constructs reality. This allows us to see deeper into the realm of foreign policy.

There are numerous ways to look into the question of FS. However, ultimately it is about security and how threats impact policy implementation. Therefore, the process of securitization is the key element when we are looking at how official policy documents create threats of failing states. With the act of securitization something is made an existential threat.[14] Subsequently, when FS are securitized as a threat to the only superpower[15] in the world, it cannot be without an effect to wider debate on state failure.[16] Furthermore, this process gives important information how discursive changes in the U.S. official foreign policy affect the various administrations security discourse.

---

[11] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p. 24. Designating something as a security issue makes it so through self–referential practice.

[12] Hussein M. Adam, *"Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born"*, in Zartman (1995), p. 85, Ayoob (1995), p. 119, 130. Michael O'Hanlon, (2012), *"Obama's Weak and Failing States Agenda"*, The Washington Quarterly 35:4, Fall 2012, p. 71.

[13] Methodologies will be written with a capital letter throughout the study. Therefore Discourse analysis is written with a capital 'D', and the abbreviation 'DA' is used interchangeably with the full version.

[14] Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21–22.

[15] Ayoob (1995), p. 119. The U.S. is the only major power that defines its interests (political & economic) in global terms and has the will to project power to defend those interests.

[16] Edward Newman (2009), *"Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post–Westphalian World"* Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.30, No.3 (December 2009), p. 424.

1.2 Framing the problem and the research questions

In the previous section the phenomena of FS was given a brief historical introduction focusing on the period from Cold War to the terrorist attacks of the September 11th 2001 (from here on referred to as 9/11). This was done to give temporal perspective and to look how FS can be perceived as a relevant research subject. The first section also opened the discussion on the importance of researching state failure by using Discourse analytical methodology. It iterated the meaning security and securitization have when language is defining foreign policy through discourses.

This second section deals with formulation of the research problem and the adjacent research questions. This is done in an effort to view how FS have been researched and what the previous research accounts for. Moreover, the goal of this problematization is to combine FS, security and securitization. This is done in order to[17] present a research problem from where the research questions can be drawn. This will lay the basis for the conceptual framework and research design of the study.

State failure is a source of for numerous discourses. It has been argued that by understanding the nature of this phenomenon it is possible to establish criteria distinguishing collapse and failure from general weakness.[18] This understanding can be then used to halt or reverse apparent failure that might threaten the stability of the international system.[19] However, this view presents a traditional look into the phenomenon of state failure and it does not take into account the discursive effect of language. Moreover, many of the earlier studies on falling states focused on Africa and similar Third World[20] locations. This created a distinct development discourse tied with 'regional problem' stamp.[21]

---

[17] From here on 'in order to' is referred to as 'IOT'.
[18] Rothberg, (2004), p. 2.
[19] Hans–Henrik Holm (1998), *"The Responsibility That Will Not Go Away: Weak States in the International System",* Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences, p. 1, 12. International system is interlinked and the 'security and welfare' of the system is co–dependent'. Ayoob (1995), p. 5, pp. 174–176. Acceleration of state failure can lead to spilling of anarchy which is a threat to regional and international security.
[20] Ayoob (1995), p. 12. According to Ayoob, Third World is defined as 'underdeveloped and poor'. For him, it comprises of the weak states of Asia, Africa and Latin America'.
[21] Ibid., pp. 56–65. Region is used in the context where states constitute regional subsystems and security complexes. For a detailed discussion on regions and subsystems, see for example, Buzan (1991) and Buzan et al. (1998).

Studies were tuned so that depending on the research focus and funding, they were either very general or very narrow in focus.[22] After 9/11 a new focus was brought to forefront of the policy debate. The U.S. tendency in regard to the issue weak and FS changed from regional towards security related issues.[23] The focus has since been on the threat created (*or perceived*) by the failure and collapse of the nation–state.[24] In the West the perception of these issues was different before 9/11, than after it. This distinction is crucial in understanding the discourses that surround state failure.[25] Therefore, Securitization theory, DA methodology and temporal span from the 1990s to 2010 give the basis for analysis. This is also why these are chosen as the framework of this study.[26]

A number of studies with different focus have been done on state failure. Qualitative and quantitative methods have been applied with different theoretical and methodological frameworks. Furthermore, there is a trend for specific causal explanation of *why* states fail and *what* constitutes failure.[27] This is done in an effort to explain how the process can be stopped or reversed.[28] This has led to an endless search from numerous experiments.[29] This type of research is widely regarded as a terrain of peacebuilding and state–making. It was created in the context of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.[30]

---

[22] Caty Clément (2007), *The Nuts and Bolts of State Collapse: What to do when States Fail? A QCA Analysis of Lebanon, Somalia and former–Yugoslavia*, pp. 1–3. Oliver Nay (2013), *"Fragile and failed states: Critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids",* International Political Science Review 34, p. 328.

[23] Nay (2013), p. 330.

[24] Jarno Limnéll & Jyri Raitasalo (2008), *Georgian sota uhkakuvien näkökulmasta*, pp. 6–8. Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 41–42, 44–45. Buzan et al. argue that the paradox of securitization is magnified by the fact that the actor *(the state*) is also the object of the securitization.

[25] James A. Piazza (2008), *"Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?"* International Studies Quarterly 52, p. 469. According to Piazza after 9/11 U.S. officials, academics and many others saw failed and failing states as international security threats that could not be ignored.

[26] As a temporal baseline for the debate, see Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992/93), *"Saving Failed States"* Foreign Policy Issue 89. For comparison see, Stefan Mair (2008), *"A New Approach: The Need to Focus on Failing States",* Harvard International Review, Winter 2008, pp. 52–55. For a global critical view see, Sonali Huria (2008), "*Failing and Failed States: The Global Discourse",* New Delhi Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), IPCS Issue Brief No. 75.

[27] A discussion on the challenges of an empirical approach and difficulties of causality when dealing with failing states, see for example, Newman (2009), pp. 425–429, and Clément pp. 3–7.

[28] Zartman (1995), p. 5, Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2013), *"'Good governance' and 'state failure': genealogies of imperial discourse"*, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013 Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 63. Zartman refers to broader questions behind case examples as a focus for academic studies trying to establish causes and characteristics of state collapse, whereas Jones argues that the failed state discourse is typically articulated through various tables, rankings and indexes. See for example, Robert H. Jackson (1990), *Quasi–states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World*, Zartman (1995), Fukuyama (2004), Rotberg (2004) and Call and Wyeth (2008) on the problematization of the different concepts of state failure.

[29] Nay (2013), p. 328–329. Nay draws together the various approaches academic studies of fragile and failed states and highlights its problematic nature.

[30] Ibid., p. 327. The concept of 'failed state' is tied to the context of the Cold War and was 'introduced to foreign policy analysts' in the first half of the 1990s.

Hence, there are academic journals, articles and books, as well as an occasional policy document focused on the subject.[31] Moreover, based on indicators gathered from empiric (and other) results, a list or a pattern as well as occasional policy document have been produced to combat state failure. A clear goal can be seen for universal explanation which then could be applied to a multitude of different situations. However, there are number of problems that rise from this universalism and positivism.[32]

First, the acquisition of reliable data from areas in turmoil is impossibility in itself. It is nominal at best and a little more than hear–say at worst.[33] Hence, the results of the analysis based on data like this would be at risk and highly vulnerable to criticism. Second, there would still be issues even if there were a reliable and acceptable way to collect data from instable areas. Specific circumstances would render the results to account for a highly localized solution. Therefore, it would be a *case–study* of the state or area in question. This would not account for an overarching solution for all cases of state failure.[34]

Third, there is an ongoing debate as to what are the wider consequences of state failure. The phenomenon is seen by some a local or regional problem[35] and by others as an international issue threatening the security and stability of the system. This point juxtaposition blurs the situation even more than the previous two. It creates highly politicized arguments because of the nature of the security aspect. Finally, this search for an overarching theory has resulted in inconclusive results.[36] These results have been a series of recommendations with a chart or a map weighed with indicator colors. This is because there are far too many variables to account for every kind of situation.[37]

---

[31] Different National Security Strategies of the U.S. have no mention of *failing states* before 1997.

[32] Positivism is here connected to rationalism and to the traditional natural science which prefers cause–effect type of research. For a summed up account of rationalist, constitutive and postmodern theories in the strategic studies, see Joonas Sipilä, *"Sota tutkimuksen kohteena"* in Pekka Sivonen (ed.) (2013), *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen*, pp. 72–75. For a debate on the nature of positivism, see Pertti Töttö (2000), *Pirullisen positivismin paluu: Laadullisen ja määrällisen tarkastelua.*

[33] This subject has been repeatedly raised as an issue by writers such as, Rothberg, (2004), Zartman (1995), Fukuyama (2004), and Clément (2007), to name a few.

[34] Tainter (1988), p. 3. According to Tainter, explanations of a collapse are usually more or less 'ad hoc' and the general understanding is elusive. Rotberg (2004), p. 25. Rotberg argues that research on failed states is insufficient. This is because by its nature and structure it cannot provide exact information, or a 'tipping point' of when states fail.

[35] Zartman (1995), p. 9, Ayoob (1995), p. 5.

[36] Bates (2008), pp. 133–136.

[37] Rotberg (2004), p. 20. Surveys and the data they produce as they cannot predict future failure and collapse.

However, this is not to say that these studies are useless but to reiterate the importance of context and subjectivity as well as to point out the myriad conditions prevailing in each separate case.[38] Furthermore, the security aspect has linked state failure and security studies in different ways. This has happened on both sides of the Atlantic and created a boon of studies. As a result, a counter–discourse has risen in other parts of the world in response to this Western lead march of policy and academic discussion. Africa and Asia have felt that the discourse on FS and their security implications is motivated by Western neo–imperialism and geopolitical or geoeconomical interests.[39] This topic would require itself a separate study and therefore it isn't the focus here. Nevertheless, for the sake of objectivity these countering views and the discourses they represent cannot be completely excluded or ignored.

Moreover, it is reasonable to limit the scope of the research to the less studied part of the FS phenomenon. To narrow down the field there are two points that need to be taken into consideration. First, the positivist way of cause and effect *has* yielded valuable information.[40] In the field of state–building there are few successes of reversing state failure as well as many failures. These in their own right can provide basis for policy makers to formulate foreign policy on FS when put in to context. Second, there are dozens of studies done on security, securitization, intertextuality, and discourse. However, these address specific subjects such as terrorism, organized crime, refugees, or humanitarian crisis. These specific subjects can be seen as looking into the *effects* or *internal dynamics* of failing states.[41] Hence, they are still in the same area as those of state–building.[42] In the Finnish military there is one master thesis study conducted in the Finnish National Defence University Department of Strategic and

[38] Newman (2009), pp. 428–429, By Newman's estimation, there is an indication for a partial consensus (in some cases). However, in his mind comparison of the different studies measuring attributes, indicators, etc. reveal many discrepancies. He also stipulates that the main message of the academic literature on the subject of different indexes is cautious. For reference, see Global Peace Index (GPI), http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index referred to 3.8.2015, 11:10 hrs, and Failed State Index (FSI), http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview, referred to 3.8.2015, 11:30 hrs.

[39] Ayoob (1995), pp. 125–130. Nay (2013), pp. 330–333.

[40] Piazza (2008), pp. 483–484. In his study Piazza shows *empirical* evidence that 'failed and failing states pose a threat to international community in terms of transnational terrorism'.

[41] Mechanisms of the state failure and collapse are extensively discussed in various studies, for reference see for example, Jackson (1990), Ayoob (1995), Zartman (ed.) (1995), Rotberg (ed.) (2004), Fukuyama (2004), William I. Zartman (2005), *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse,* Call and Wyeth (eds.) (2008), Bates (2008), to name just a few.

[42] For examples of combining Discourse analysis and security studies, see for example Lene Hansen (2006), *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War,* Holger Stritzel (2012), *Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translations of organized crime*, Leif C. Jensen (2012), *Seduced and surrounded by security: A post–structuralist take on Norwegian High North securitizing discourses*.

Defence Studies. This study looks at the use of the failed state concept in the U.S. security policy.[43] The concept is analyzed through the Failed State Index (henceforth FSI).[44]

Furthermore, both the FSI and Global Peace Index (henceforth GPI) can be argued to present a highly politicized picture of the global situation. Therefore, the usability of these indexes as primary material is contestable. These indexes do not account for cultural, historical or normative issues. This means that the reference base of the index is narrow and cannot provide an overarching definition for the concept of state failure. These aforementioned studies leave room for a research where DA methodology is used in a framework of Securitization theory to study how failing states are securitized in the official discourses of the United States.[45]

This study will fill some of that gap. Furthermore, this study will look if securitizing is shown throughout the policy documents of different administrations regardless of the change in policymakers. A post–positivist standpoint is chosen as the philosophical grounds from which the rest of the ontological, epistemological and methodological choices cascade. However, these choices as such do not exclude the possibility for methodological or epistemological variance. The theoretical framework presented in Appendix 1 simplifies the relations of the aforementioned parts and visualizes their interdependencies accordingly.[46]

Hence, it positions the research in relation to other studies.[47] For this research the theoretical framework will consist of Constructivism and Post–structuralism as the constitutive relative theories in the world of International Relations (henceforth IR). Moreover, these will be combined with Securitization theory and DA methodology to create the framework of the study. This is done IOT best accommodate the needs of the researcher and in an effort not to be tied down by specific interpretation of IR theories. Ontological, epistemological and methodological limitations and choices are addressed in detail in chapter two.

---

[43] Pekka Korhonen (2014), Failed state –käsitteen hyväksikäyttö Yhdysvaltojen turvallisuuspolitiikassa.
[44] Failed State Index (FSI), http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview, page visited 5.8.2015 10.20 am.
[45] Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009), *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, p. 35. *"The process through which threats are identified and given meaning is...better understood through an analysis of identity building and institutional transformation that does not lend itself to causality or quantification".*
[46] See Appendix 2, picture 1, for the theoretical framework of this study.
[47] Saaranen–Kauppinen & Puusniekka (2006), http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/kvali/L2_2.html, visited and referred to 26.11.2014, 11:17 hrs. See also, Huhtinen (2002), p. 16, for a discussion on the possibilities of theoretical framework as a way to circumvent some harsh theoretical limitations. Huhtinen also iterates that theoretical framework is a rather loose starting point for a research compared to theory and paradigm.

Based on the need for further study of the discursive effects on the foreign policy, the research problem is framed thusly:

The aim of this research is to analyze the securitization of failing states as part of the U.S. national security discourse. This is done by looking at how the failing state discourse entered into the "The National Security Strategy of the United States of the America" (henceforth NSS)[48], as well as how it is framed. The NSS documents (the official discourse) and the source material on state failure provide the information on why FS are seen as a threat. Primary material is analyzed using Securitization theory and DA methodology.

The act of attaching a distinct meaning (of a threat) to failing states might contribute to the discourse. Hence, it is possibly responsible for constitutive securitization of the concept in the NSS. I argue that intersubjective links between threats and intertextual interaction between various NSS documents presents itself through securitization. Therefore, the effect of securitizing is shown throughout the policy documents of different administrations regardless of the change in policymakers.

Based on the research problem the primary research question is formulated thusly:

How official discourse of the United States creates threats through securitizing failing states?

Secondly, the research aims to look into the complex nature of the failing state concept. This serves as a foundation for the analysis of the NSS documents by providing temporal and logical point of departure. It will also show the difficulties pertained in defining the concept of state failure and the discourses stemming thereof. Hence, a secondary research question is formulated thusly:

How state failure is conceptualized in the academic literature?

[48] This form is used in the general meaning of the 'National Security Strategy' document and all its analogies, as the form varies slightly from administration to administration. For detailed names, see reference.

Thirdly, this research will bring the Securitization theory and the discourses on FS together with the conceptual basis to establish why failing states are seen as a threat by the U.S. Consequently, through the principles and limitations of the theory and DA methodology an intersubjective picture of threats is created. Hence, the tertiary research question is formulated thusly:

Why are failing states securitized as a threat to The United States of America?

Finally, the two main chapters (three and four) are combined in synthesis in chapter five for the purpose of answering the primary research question. Conclusions and criticism as well as the need for further study are presented.

1.3 Conceptual framework and research design

The previous section looked into the research done on failing states and continued on the problematization of the subject. It ended in formulation of the research problem and adjacent research questions. Moreover, the research questions formed the basis for the definition of the conceptual framework and research design. This section continues that process and defines the conceptual framework and research design of the study. It gives a glimpse of the theoretical–methodological choices which will be further presented in chapter 2.

Conceptual framework and research design are the bones that form the 'skeletal' structure of the research. They outline the specific means and methods by which the study is conducted. Therefore, the structure of the study is formed in logical sequence building outwards using the 'skeleton' as a starting point. First, chapter 2 lays out the ontological, epistemological, and methodological grounds of this research. It also combines these with research questions as well as theoretical considerations and limitations that are relevant to the research. The aim of the chapter is to lay out the theoretical and methodological framework. It presents thesis, antithesis and such objectivity and validity as is possible.

Second, chapter 3 tackles with the phenomenon of state failure and the paradigm of failing states discourse. It searches for conceptual history of FS through the jungle of definitions and the history of the state. The purpose is to provide the ground work for analyzing the securitization of FS in chapter 4.

Third, chapter 4 searches for reasons why failing states are seen as a security threat to the U.S. It is logically reasonable to focus on the NSS as the prevalent document as the theoretical foundation is in the Securitization theory. This is conscious effort by the researcher to limit the scope of the research and create a focus for it. It is not to say there aren't any other feasible documents where official foreign policy is dictated.[49]

The aim of chapter 4 is to pull together the different intersubjective discourses of securitization failing states within the NSS by using chapter three as a conceptual and logical point of departure. Furthermore, the analysis will look for intertextual links between the NSS documents that affect the FS discourse. This forms a multilevel picture of the kind of existential threat FS are being perceived as by the official U.S. foreign policy.

Finally, chapters 3 and 4 are combined in a synthesis in chapter five where the conclusions of the research will be shown. Consequently, chapter five is designed as a platform for discussion on the conclusions as well as how objectivity and limitations brought by theoretical and methodological choices might affect the results (criticism). Lastly, a part of the chapter is reserved for problematization for further research.

The design and framework[50] of this research are heavily theory laden. Hence, the emphasis of this research is to show how a chosen theoretical lens can be applied with DA tool to find specific intersubjective and intertextual dependence between discourses. Moreover, the theoretical part of the study will consist of theoretical debate both between the chosen IR–school as well as within the Securitization theory.

For this purpose, chapters two and three are quite extensive as they aspire to create sufficient thesis and antithesis for the purposes of analyzing primary material as objectively as possible. Therefore, it can give a fresh way to look at and study FS and state failure. Consequently it leads this research away from the more common case study and causal logic in an effort *not* to see why states fail, but to see how the failure can be successfully securitized.

---

[49] Discourse analysis ranges from popular culture to academic literature, fiction and official documents (including speeches by heads of state and declarations by governments and parliaments). Therefore it is reasonable to formulate some limitations. Methodological issues and limitation will be presented in chapter two.

[50] See Appendix 2, pictures 1 and 2, for the conceptualization of research design and framework.

2 FROM ONTOLOGY TO METHOD

–Ad augusta per angusta

The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the ontological and epistemological choices of this study as well as the theoretical and methodological ones stemming thereof. The chapter positions the researcher and the subject of the research within the ocean of theories. It starts from the basic tenets of how scientific research is done ending with the methodological choices and limitations of the DA.

Moreover, it presents counter arguments in an effort to find the holes in the chosen framework to aspire for such objectivity as is possible. How the researcher sees reality is what affects the results and the discussion surrounding it. Therefore, theoretical choices and limitations he or she accepts and how analysis is done is how reality is interpreted. Objectivity is always something ephemeral. It is tied down with chosen theories, philosophies, and the cultural as well as socio–economical background of the researcher. Consequently, all of this makes the theory chapter immensely important. Theory is what lays the foundation upon which all other chapters of this research are built.

2.1 Ontology and Epistemology as a foundation

Scientific research is founded on the philosophy of science. It takes form in the ontological and epistemological choices and related theories. These choices and theories define how the researcher views the world and the reality. Through those issues it affects how he or she deals with the empiricism it presents.[51] Hence, one way would be to argue that 'all theoretical positions are dependent upon particular assumptions of ontology, epistemology and methodology.'[52] The philosophy of science can be seen to study the theory and foundations of science. It can also be defined to mean the application of philosophical method into science, research and results thereof.[53]

---

[51] Torsti Sirén (2009), *State Agent, Identity and the "New World Order" – Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era,* p. 23. As Sirén argues that, *"a researcher always needs to clarify his or hers ontological and epistemological assumptions before it is possible to justify and rationalize the relevance of any chosen theory vis–á–vis the research problem(s)."*

[52] Milja Kurki and Colin Wight in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steven Smith (eds.) (2010), *International Relations Theories: Disciple and Diversity, 2nd edition,* p. 15.

[53] Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999), *Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan,* p. 21. Niiniluoto puts the philosophy of science to also mean a segment which studies, in general, the process of scientific research.

Theories are formed to test hypothesis and to make sense of the perceived reality and moreover, they are created to be proven false.[54] This is done by theories being subjected to harsh scientific evaluation and re–evaluation. A theory can be seen as a point of view, an aspect on the nature of reality, or a compressed perspective to a specific phenomenon that gives it understandable form.[55] Theory and the concepts of ontology and epistemology are intimately tied to the notion of philosophy of science. They create the framework of how a specific study or research situates itself in the overall field of science.

Ontology can be thought of in many ways but it can be defined to mean 'the study or nature, of existence'. It studies the concepts of 'what it is to exist' and 'what is existence'.[56] Ontology also studies the fundamental *nature* of existence and it is sometimes called 'the common metaphysics.'[57] Epistemology strives to look into what can be known and how knowledge can be formed to test theories and hypothesis. Thus, epistemology can be seen as the 'science of knowledge'. Therefore, *ontology* is about what kind of things we are able to study. *Epistemology* points towards the relationship between the researcher and his or hers object of research. Hence, it is linked to what we are able to know about things.[58] These concepts and their respective philosophies affect the foundations of scientific research. Together with theories they form the guidelines on how we understand the world to be and how we think knowledge can be attained from it.[59]

Theory is the lens through which methodology is used. It defines and limits one's choices of looking at a specific object(s) of research.[60] Theories generate hypothesis which are prediction of events or 'educated guesses' of what will happen. True to their nature as scientific method, theories should also be potentially falsifiable. The Securitization theory used in this research is just one among many others. The purpose of it is to put together as well as interpret

---

[54] Aki–Mauri Huhtinen (2002), "Sotilasjohtamisen tutkimus", in *Sotilasjohtamisen tutkimuksen tieteenfilosofiset perusteet ja menetelmät* (ed.) Aki–Mauri Huhtinen), p. 13.

[55] Anita Saaranen–Kauppinen & Anna Puusniekka (2006) KvaliMOTV–Menetelmäopetuksen tietovaranto [verkkojulkaisu], http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/kvali/L2_2.html, visited and referred to 3.8.2015 09:15 hrs.

[56] On discussion of ontology and reality, see for example, Sirén (2009), pp. 24–25.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Huhtinen (2002), p. 23. Huhtinen presents ontology as a way to look and theorize existence which is beyond the perception of (and the definition of) human thought. Addition to the common metaphysics he presents specific metaphysics (e.g. theology) which has delineated in various ways to specific areas. These are nature (natural science), soul/spirit (psychology, cognitive sciences) and God (systematic theology). Therefore, metaphysics is what everything else is built on and hence so called 'first philosophy'. See also, Jari Metsämuuronen (2000), *Laadullisen tutkimuksen perusteet*, pp. 10–11, for further definition of ontology and epistemology.

[59] Joonas Sipilä & Tommi Koivula (2013), *Kuinka strategiaa tutkitaan*, p. 15.

[60] See, Sirén (2009), pp. 23–24, for further discussion on the relationship of ontology and epistemology.

information drawn from various sources IOT tie it as a comprehensive framework for study and analysis. Since theories take different forms depending on their disciples as well as ontological and epistemological orientation, they center on specific areas of interest. The theory for this research is chosen for the specific purpose of seeking how the use of language creates threats and through that affects foreign policy.[61] Thus, the theories of Constructivism, Poststructuralism[62] and Securitization are a logical choice.[63] This theoretical choice can be seen as a specialization, like a choice between a telescope and a binocular. For example, in IR this would be a choice between the systemic structure theory of Neorealism and emancipatory theory of Feminism.

Theories also draw together and systemize previously accumulated research data (as in the case of Securitization theory). They are frequently used to present generalized perceptions achieved by intellectual and rational functions.[64] Furthermore, even though theories are a form of specialization they may not be suitable for a research as 'they are', but need to be examined and thought of in a way that they would best serve the study in question. Hence, a composite structure might be needed IOT best allocate the needs of the research.

It should be noted that theories do not exist in some outside realm beyond. They should have concrete ramifications for the object of the research. We sometimes think theories as the opposite of practical reality but they nevertheless have a valid place as the 'glue that binds' everything together. Therefore, one way of conceptualizing how theory works is the use of theoretical framework (paradigm)[65] and research design. These are created for the purpose of giving form to the research. Consequently, theoretical framework lay out the how theory (or theories), methodology (or methodologies) and objects of the research line up, and how they relate to each other.

---

[61] Wæver (2011), p. 469. According to Wæver, Securitization theory has 'political' effects.

[62] Poststructuralism is used in as much as it affects the DA. Specifics of methodological choices and limitations are addressed in section 2.4.

[63] IR theories are written with a capital letter to distinguish them from philosophies of science. Therefore, *Constructivism* with a capital 'C' is an IR theory and *constructivism* is a philosophy of science. All IR theories will be presented with a capital letter for this study.

[64] Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999), *Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan,* p. 23, pp. 193–194. Niiniluoto stipulates that a theory can cover entire field of science, such as information theory. Theories are, on the one hand key elements in explaining and understanding different phenomenon, and on the other hand they are tools for prediction and manipulation. He emphasizes the difference of 'theory' as used in scientific language, to 'theory' used in common analogy in speech to represent something that has no basis in reality.

[65] Ibid., pp. 247–248. Theory, framework, and theoretical framework are sometimes used interchangeably with the word paradigm. According to Niiniluoto, paradigm is drawn from the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn refers to paradigm as a collection of principles, beliefs and riddles inside the scientific community. For Kuhn paradigm meant established ways of procedure in science and that science evolves through changes of paradigms, not as much as changes in theories.

The general ontology and epistemology of this research will be drawn from Constructivism and Poststructuralism. It will be used with the Securitization theory as 'the glue' that binds together the methodological process of DA and the various empiricisms from primary and secondary material. Therefore, the role of the theory is pivotal for analytical purposes as well as for the discussion on the conclusions. Without theoretical lens to give a specific analytical perspective[66] this research would be utterly shallow. It would be more of a report or a literary view in nature.[67] Securitization theory and its limitations regarding this study will be discussed in the specific section allocated for it. The conceptual framework of the research draws upon the DA methodology which in turn is used through the Securitization theory. These are the main tools for conducting the research. However, the ontological positioning of the Securitization theory is how the use of language socially constructs reality. Hence, it locates the meta–theoretical positioning of this research into the reflectivist side of the relativist–reflectivist debate.

2.2 Thesis and Antithesis

The previous section looked upon the general ways in how philosophy of science affects the theories and methodologies. The purpose of this section is to present the theories chosen for this research as well as look into some of the arguments presented by conflicting, or opposite theories. Unfortunately it is not possible to go into a detailed account on the all the theories of IR since it is beyond the scope of this research. Hence, this section also subjects the theory of the research to criticism, and thus follows a good scientific procedure.

The arguments and efforts to 'shake the foundations' of this study will be presented as the mainstream of the theories in question. They will not dive deeply into the abyss that is the philosophical–epistemological ocean of IR theories and subsequent ontologies related thereof. Nevertheless, the opposing arguments give perspective to the chosen theoretical framework of Constructivist–Poststructuralist constellation and the Securitization theory. The previous section dealt with the general analogies and conceptual definitions of ontology and epistemology. The aim of this section is to specify and narrow these generic terms. The section will also form a juxtaposition of competing views of how reality is interpreted and how information is acquired according to respective sides of the debate.

---

[66] Pertti Alasuutari (1993), *Laadullinen tutkimus*, p. 61.
[67] Sipilä & Koivula (2013), p. 21.

This juxtaposition is required as to establish how theories themselves are constituted based on the wider philosophical universe and how they draw their epistemologies. Moreover, by looking beyond chosen standpoint a more comprehensive objectivity becomes possible. This first part is reserved for the definition of the theoretical framework and limitations of the study. The second part will consist of positivist (rationalist or realist)[68] and the post–positivist views. Finally, the third part will narrow down the general views on reality to the Realist and Constructivist frame of thought.

2.2.1 Defining the theoretical framework

The overall ontological side the research is a reflectivist one. It is situated in the constructivist–poststructuralist axel of the reflectivist field. This presents an epistemological challenge. The challenge is that the *rationalist* view thinks social theory cannot create falsifiable hypothesis. Therefore, it is considered not being able present enough epistemological rigor.[69] The *positivist* side looks at the world through observables gained through empirical means.[70] It is thus 'characterized by faith in empiricism, objectivism, and quantitative–behavioral methods'.[71] This makes a valid argument against post–positivism.[72]

However, social theory claims that constitutive theories are theories nevertheless. Constitutive theories can create hypothesis. These should be tested even if this might be difficult to accomplish.[73] There are many ways to arrive to the 'truth' and therefore the problem is mostly for the positivists who need a common reference and universal truths for their theories to be comparable.[74] The methodological choice for this research is Discourse analysis. Its name implies the study of language and thus a constitutive theoretical standpoint for this study is valid.

---

[68] For reference and clarification, *realist and realism* in this context is meant to be about *philosophy of science* (realist ontology) and about the traditional scientific cause–relation (as in natural sciences). Realism (with a capital 'R') is an IR theory in this research.

[69] Hansen (2006), p. 17. Hansen presents a firm argument on the debate between rationalist and post–positivist, such as Constructivists and Poststructuralists. She comments on the nature of epistemological differences and argues that knowledge is historically and politically situated. Therefore, causal epistemology is just a particular discourse of knowledge.

[70] Töttö (2000), pp. 20–22. Töttö criticizes this simplistic definition. For him, it is just one side of positivism.

[71] Raitasalo (2005), p. 53.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Alexander Wendt (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 87. For Wendt, constitutive theories involve inference. The inference (either inductive or abductive) does not make the data to speak for itself. Therefore, constitutive claims concern about how social things are formed rather than the causal relation between independent and dependent variables. For him, it makes constitutive theories no less theory than other theories.

[74] Raitasalo (2005), p. 55.

These preferences define more or less the general layout of the research design and there are few points that should be emphasized. Firstly, the empiricism of the research is two–fold: Conceptual definition and related discourses before analysis of securitization of FS. Conceptual definition of FS is methodologically close to conceptual analysis but DA is the main method. DA will be the theoretical lens as well as the main driving force for analyzing the second part of the empiricism which is the NSS. Secondly, the empiricism of the research is qualitative. However, references in support or criticism of the research are also taken from quantitative side, as necessary.[75] The empiricism consists of primary and secondary material. These will be read and re–read to formulate conceptual and analytical base of the research.

Primary material consists of academic and scientific literature on states and failing states (and its acronyms), as well as the official foreign policy document of the U.S. (the NSS) from 1990 through 2010 temporal span. Secondary material consists of academic and scientific articles dealing with the issues of state failure, either directly or indirectly. Secondary material is not limited to only security related issues or discursive methodology. Other (general) material will be the academic and scientific literature and articles about Constructivism, Poststructuralism, Securitization theory, research methodology (including ontology and epistemology) and other relevant sources. This provides enough material from where to search for the supportive or critical empiricism.

The position of the secondary material is *not* to see how failing states discourse of the NSS documents reflects to elsewhere into the academic domain. Rather, the secondary material is used to either support or criticize the theory and hypothesis of this research. The aim of the research is ***not*** the analysis of wider consequences of a successful securitization within the academic domain.

Finally, an abductive process is used to analyze the empiricism with an intertextual and intersubjective DA. This is done to find the underlying discursive structures of the threats and to locate when they entered the security discourse in the NSS. This way a picture of the securitization of FS can be formulated. I will further limit the scope of the research by conceptual limitations. I will make the state as the unit in this analysis and the structure of international system as the chosen level. Therefore, I will discard domestic policy in its many forms as well as non–state actors.

---

[75] Nay (2013), p. 334. According to Nay there is a lack of ‘in–depth case studies’ that could provide empirical evidence on fragile states.

Conceptually, I will position myself with Alexander Wendt in that 'states are the dominant form of subjectivity in contemporary world politics'. Therefore stares are 'the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled into the world system.'[76] I acknowledge the effect of non–state actors but limit them to the role of *academic source material* and not consider them as an actor. Furthermore, I'll lean onto Wendt for his definition of states as actors and agents who constitute themselves through their decision–makers.[77]

The main reason for choosing the Constructivist theory as the background theory lies in two factors. First, as Wendt puts it 'theories that treat states as autistic cannot explain structures of interaction'. Second, because according to Wendt the international system is 'a social rather than material phenomenon'.[78] Thus, it is not because I don't believe in the structural theory of Neorealism, but because like Wendt I think it is under socialized and should take more into account shared ideas in the constitution of the structure.[79] However, I will delineate from Wendt in that I will not use positivist epistemology even though I accept the general layout of his theory. Instead I will draw upon a post–positivist and reflectivist pool and use Poststructuralism as needed through DA. This is done to find answers to the question of how official discourse of the U.S creates threats through securitizing failing states.[80]

Hence, I position myself philosophically as relativist–reflectivist as to Wendt's realist. Jyri Raitasalo argues that 'scientification of Realism and the quantifiable material variables' present just one of many different ways of study.[81] According to Raitasalo, Constructivism sees differently the end of the Cold War than the Realist or Liberalist theories. His argument is that 'states were challenged to understand the new rules of the international system in the post–Cold War era', and this new understanding was 'constructed'.[82] Therefore, Constructivism looks at states through social dialect. Discourses reflect and mold the beliefs and interests of policy makers and producing acceptable norms.

---

[76] Wendt (1999), p. 9.
[77] Ibid., p. 10.
[78] Ibid., pp. 20–21.
[79] Ibid., p. 184.
[80] See Appendix 4, picture 4, for epistemological concepts of security. Securitization theory is part of the discursive approach because of the speech act theory and self–referential practice. See also, Buzan et al. (1998) p. 21, 24, for further reference.
[81] Jyri Raitasalo (2005), *Constructing War and Military Power After the Cold War: The Role of the United States in the Shared Western Understandings of War and Military Power in the Post–Cold War Era*, p. 44.
[82] Ibid., pp. 4–5. See also, Ayoob (1995), p. 117. Ayoob presents an interesting argument that 'a number of analysts' are describing dominant relationships with just one dimension of a multidimensional global balance of power, and so, have changed Cold War strategic determinism for an economic one.

This can be seen concretely in the example presented in the first chapter. The Mogadishu incident showed that discursive changes can have the power to define policy.[83] Moreover, it highlighted some of the key points which were also visible after the 9/11 incident. This makes the Mogadishu example an excellent prologue for this study. Consequently, Constructivism is particularly useful in researching failing state discourse in the NSS because of the flexibility and the process–like nature of the theory. Hence, I will discard positivism and embrace postmodern epistemology and relativism. This means I will 'discard the notions of empiricism, objectivism, naturalism, and behaviorism and focus on language and discourses'.[84]

2.2.2 Positivists and post–positivists

In this sub–section there will be a brief introduction into the general frame of mind of the positivist and post–positivists camp. This will be followed by the main IR theories which are traditionally seen as situated in the positivist or post–positivist side of the debate. A realist philosophy of science is often used in conjunction with the positivist[85] label. This is done to differentiate the more conventional scientific school of thought from the post–positivists, or relativists[86] who stand juxtaposed to them. Subsequently, theoretical traditions can be broadly divided into rationalist and constitutive categories.[87] Rationalism, realism and positivism build their hypothesis in a way that they can be proven either true or false. This can be done by accumulation and analysis of empirical data. This data will formulate results which are then tested against the theory and hypothesis of the research.

---

[83] Hussein M. Adam (1995), *"Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born"* in Zartman (1995), p. 85, Ayoob (1995), p. 119, 130. Ayoob argues that the domestic political support for the U.S. Somalia operation was so low that even a small number of casualties resulted in change of policy.

[84] Raitasalo (2005), p. 56.

[85] For definition of positivism (in Finnish), see for example *Kielitoimiston sanakirja* 'positivism,' http://www.kielitoimistonsanakirja.fi/netmot.exe?motportal=80, referred to 26.11.2014, 11:17 hrs. This definition is as follows: *"An orientation by which information can only be based on the research of observable facts* (cursive added). See also, Metsämuuronen (2000), p. 11, and Sirén (2009), pp. 39–40. Metsämuuronen argues that in positivism what is seen and can be concretely reached is real (reality and fact). For Sirén it is a tradition founded on traditions of natural science. Hence, positivism can be considered as an outsider's view on IR as well as the social world. Therefore, it is trying to explain human behavior as part of nature. For reference on the juxtaposition of realists and relativists, see for example, Sipilä & Koivunen (2013), p. 29, Metsämuuronen (2000), p. 12, Töttö (2000), pp. 20–25.

[86] Relativists and post–positivist see reality as relative construction, and not necessarily something that can be measured or defined by cause–relation method. Post–positivism tries to understand human behavior as juxtaposed to positivism which tries to explain it. For definition of post–positivism, see for example, Sirén (2009), p. 40. Sirén divides social sciences on two intellectual traditions, positivist and post–positivist. On the difficulty of defining relativists (and realist) view, see for example, Harto Hakovirta, (2002), *Maailmanpolitiikka: Teoria ja* todellisuus, pp. 11–14.

[87] Sipilä in Sivonen (ed.) (2013), p. 71.

Moreover, Aki–Mauri Huhtinen argues that the realist view of reality can be seen as being built on 'an idea of information'.[88] For any one question there are 'a number of facts, true and false'.[89] This has been the leading idea of Western scientific thought for centuries and remains as the foundation of traditional natural sciences.[90] Hence, majority of quantitative research has been based on realist school of thought. This is because realism favors hard data over more equivocal alternatives. Therefore, it can be said that realism and positivism intertwine to form a view and orientation that guide the research.[91] However, for relativists the positivist side 'makes too much noise' on the causal epistemology as the ultimate means to attain knowledge.[92] There are also those who think that the influence of positivism is somewhat 'ill–suited and rudimentary', if not down–right discredited.[93] This view is present in the contemporary philosophy of science regardless of the general acceptance of advocates and critics alike.[94]

Furthermore, as Hakovirta puts it 'the realist side *does* consider social reality as a factor' but still regards it to be independent from the mind and ideas of the observer.[95] One of the arguments from the positivist side has been directed especially toward social science theories that favor relativist views. These arguments have accused social science of creating hypothesis which cannot be proven false.[96] However, I argue that the problem here is not about whether something can be proven true or false. Rather, there exist numerous phenomena to study where causality is near impossibility due to the number variables. State failure is one such phenomenon. In that there is nigh impossible to create an analytical framework which can take into account all the different variables.

---

[88] Huhtinen (2002), pp. 19–22.

[89] Ibid., pp. 19–22. Huhtinen presents knowledge as defined to mean something that can be empirically proven either true, or false. It is objective and consequently without any room for experience or intuition. Thus knowledge is separated from wisdom which can be seen as combining experience and information for practical application. See, also Sirén (2009), p. 24.

[90] For discussion on the ontological differences, see for example, Hansen (2006) pp. 21–22, Sirén (2009), pp. 28–35, and Hakovirta (2002) p. 12.

[91] https://koppa.jyu.fi/avoimet/hum/menetelmapolkuja/menetelmapolku/tieteenfilosofiset-suuntaukset/realismi visited and referred to 26.11.2014, 11:17 hrs.

[92] Hansen (2006), p. 28. Hansen argues, that causal epistemology cannot establish dominance and acclaim itself the one and only truth. This is because the information it generates is always 'discursively historically situated and thus affected by it'.

[93] Kurki and Wight in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 15–16.

[94] Ibid. The argument here is that research underpinned by positivist principles is not invalid but that the view is contemporarily highly contested. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 35. Since IR and International Security Studies is not a laboratory, positivist approach can only approximate state behavior.

[95] Hakovirta (2002), p. 11.

[96] Hansen (2006), p. 9. The discussion here is that, according to Hansen rationalist view 'dictates' that there is no room for research projects in their scope for studies which 'cannot be conceptualized by causal epistemology'. This locates many relativist theories 'outside the range of study due to their lack of clearly defined hypothesis and cause–consequence dichotomy'. For definition of relativist epistemology, see Sirén (2009) p. 25.

The concept of constructivism is generally thought of as one broadly located philosophical school of science where knowledge is considered to be formed in a process. With scientific realism and relativism the reference is on the philosophy of science and how those consider the reality to be constituted. Thus, realism and relativism are different conceptions of social reality and how it can be perceived.[97] Moreover, constructivism is both a philosophy of science as well as an IR theory[98]. It delineates itself from positivism and critical theories due to the relational look on reality. This, according to Metsämuuronen makes 'constructivism think of reality through individuals as relatively created by each of them personally', even though parts of reality might be shared with other individuals.[99]

Consequently, the views of positivists and post–positivist are roughly divided into the rationalist and constitutive ones and further broken down with in each school respectively. This is not an absolute thing, but it does create the basic starting point for the next part of this section which goes deeper into the IR theories themselves. There the effort is to raise some key tenets and in doing so point out the strengths and weaknesses of the theories. In the school of IR there are many great debates which have shaped the disciple over the years. These have usually centered either between opposite ends of the spectrum, like Realist and Idealist[100] or the more recent debate on what the disciple should study.[101]

However, the Realist side deserves special attention due to its long history and significant effect on IR. Furthermore, Sipilä and Koivunen stipulate that Constructivism as an IR theory is distinctly different from the other theories. This is because its philosophy of science differs from the other major IR theories of Realism and Liberalism.[102] This is mostly because of how Constructivism sees reality as being socially constructed. It puts Constructivism on the relativist side of realist–relativist fence hence making it a good opposite for Realism.

---

[97] Saaranen–Kauppinen & Puusniekka (2006), http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/kvali/L7_1_2.html., visited and referred to 24.08.2015, 12:57 hrs.

[98] Constructivism as IR theory is derived from social sciences and thus is sometimes referred to as social constructivism. For reference, here constructivism is presented as a philosophy of science and 'Constructivism' with a capital 'C' as an IR theory.

[99] Metsämuuronen (2000), p. 12.

[100] Raitasalo (2005), p. 67. Raitasalo puts Neorealism and Neoliberalism as rationalist theories and labels them broadly positivists.

[101] Kurki and Wight in Dunne et al. (2010), pp. 16–25. Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 14–15. According to Mearsheimer Liberalism and Realism are the two bodies of theory which are central in the IR theories. He also lists three most influential Realist works that in some way criticize liberalism. These are E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Year Crisis,* Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations,* and Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics.*

[102] Sipilä & Koivunen (2013), p. 29. Raitasalo (2005), p. 67.

2.2.3 Realism and Constructivism

The previous part dealt with the dichotomy of positivism and post–positivism. It located realism and constructivism as the broader schools of scientific though. Therefore, it also started to look into how IR theories are situated within the philosophy of science as well as how the epistemology of each side is drawn together. This part presents the two IR theories of Realism and Constructivism in an effort to create thesis–antithesis of this research.

Realism has its roots in the centuries old tradition dating back to Thucydides and the writings on Peloponnesian Wars. It draws from the famous 'Prince' by Niccoló Machiavelli and stretches all the way to Carl von Clausewitz's 'Vom Kriege' and Hans Morgenthau's 'Politics among Nations'.[103] Moreover, the basis of Realism lies in those old accounts of diplomatic statesmanship and warfare. There is a continuum of theme all the way to contemporary days. In Realism human nature leads to an endless (tragic) struggle for power and to cold, calculative means to–an–ends fight for survival. This is doomed to repeat itself in a historical cycle.[104]

A central position is given to the sovereign state and its internal and external security. Another key aspect is the concept of international anarchy where states are not subject to any will other than their own because there is no power above the state.[105] A more contemporary version of historical Realism of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes was formulated by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. This was to counter the idealist ways of thinking which dominated the early part of the twentieth century following the end of the First World War.[106]

---

[103] Hakovirta (2002), p. 29, 34–35, Sirén (2009), p. 41. According to Hakovirta Western scientific tradition puts Thucydides as the foremost researcher of IR in Realist terms. Machiavelli laid the foundation for statesmanship as understood in contemporary terms, such as deeds should be looked at in the light of results not in the light of ethic or the virtue of means. Sirén argues that the Realist paradigm is based on three basic tenets found in the writings of Niccoló Machiavelli and Edward Hallet Carr. See also, Richard Lebow in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 59, and Fred Blombergs *"Realismi ja strategian tutkimus"* in Sivonen (ed.) (2013) *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen*, p. 5, for summary of the history of classical or 'political' Realism.

[104] Lebow in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 59. According to Lebow, three common questions concern 2500 years of (classical) Realist thought: order, justice and change. These are processed in domestic, regional, and international levels and due to destabilizing effects of actors are bound to repeat the historic cycle of war and peace. For historical comparison of thoughts by Thucydides and Morgenthau, see Ibid., pp. 61–66.

[105] Cynthia Weber (2014), *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, p. 16. Weber stipulates the international anarchy is based on sovereign nation–states which are beholden to no higher power, thus constituting international politics as we know it. Therefore, anarchy is an outcome of a system where no world government or higher power exists that can compel states. Consequently, this is constitutes an international independence for states to act as they see fit. See also, Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 30–33 for reference.

[106] Kurki and Wight in Dunne et al. (2010), pp. 16–17.

After the Second World War (henceforth WWII) a more scientific Realism started to take shape even though it was still in the very early phases of becoming a disciple. It can be said that the 'The Twenty Year Crisis' by E. H. Carr created the layout for Realism in IR and 'Politics among Nations' by Hans Morgenthau pushed Realism finally to the forefront of IR.[107] Moreover, the experiences of WWII and following Cold War cemented Realism in its different forms as the dominant school within the disciple of IR.

The early version of Realism experienced a transformation of sorts after the acceptance of behaviorist methodologies after 1940s. This meant the supplementation of interpretative and historicist form of IR by a positivist look.[108] Furthermore, it meant reliance on observable and measurable data of quantitative research instead of a more qualitative approach.[109] Kenneth Waltz's 'Theory of International Politics' gave form during the Cold War to some of the defining works of the time. Therefore, the positivist side with their explanatory view gained momentum inside the school of Realism.[110]

Waltz's structural realism (Neorealism) argued that 'it is the anarchic nature of the international system' that forces states into mutual power struggle.[111] Consequently, Waltz and the Neorealist side broke free of the classical Realist outlook. They argued against the classical view that 'all politics is an expression of the same human drives and subject to the same pathologies.'[112] Hence, Waltz gave more weight to the systemic effect on the struggle for power among states instead of the more conventional outlook of human nature and statesmanship favored by the 'political' Realists.[113]

---

[107] Hakovirta (2002), p. 34. Hakovirta names others, such as Niebuhr, Spykman, Wolfers and Kissinger as significant contributers to the school of Realism.
[108] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 30.
[109] Kurki and Wight in Dunne et al. (2010), pp. 18–19. According to Kurki and Wright there was resistance towards this kind of austere data collection from persons such as Hedley Bull of The English School, and even from Hans Morgenthau himself. Hakovirta (2002), pp. 35–36. Hakovirta stipulates that the division caused by behaviorism created modernists and traditionalists from the realist and idealist schools. Modernists were those who leaned to positivism and methodology, and those who retained the old ways of interpretative look were called traditionalists.
[110] Hakovirta (2002), p. 40.
[111] Sirén (2009), p. 41, Richard Lebow in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 59, Weber (2014), p. 17. Sirén, as well as Lebow describe Kenneth Waltz as the founding father of Neorealism. Weber argues that Waltz popularity during the Cold War was due to his ability to causally give answer to the question of 'why wars occur', through his systemic approach. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 31. Buzan and Hansen stipulate that Neorealism as a structural theory *assume* a general conception of the state is applicable throughout the international system (cursive added).
[112] Lebow in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 59.
[113] Waltz (2008), pp. 56–59.

However, there are similarities between the schools of Realism and Neorealism that should be emphasized here. There are thee point highlighted by Cynthia Weber. First, both schools accept international anarchy as a defining factor of the international system stemming from the sovereign nation–states.[114] For classical Realists anarchy describes the *environment* where sovereign nation–states act, and for Neorealism the social *relations* among sovereign nation–states. [115] Second, the absence of world government and higher order gives states freedom of action but leaves them vulnerable to aspiration of other states.[116] Therefore, states are compelled to find a way to survive by increasing their power. Third, because there is no higher order above states, the international politics is anarchical by its very nature.[117] Moreover, in classical Realism the *nature of man affects* the chance for cooperation through uncertainty, consequently making world government impossible.[118]

In Neorealism the *nature of man might <u>not</u> affect* cooperation since the nature of man is not a defining factor in explaining conflict.[119] Weber uses these aforementioned three elements as common nominators from which both Realists and Neorealist predict the behavior of states. She continues this line of thought to point out that there are two major points were Realism and Neorealism agree. These are the 'overriding goal of states to survive by maximizing their power', and the continuity of international anarchy as the prevailing system. This is because 'it is unrealistic to think a world government could be formed since states would never be secure enough to give up their power.'[120] Both Realist and Neorealist consider great powers[121] to be the only ones to have significant 'weight' in the international system to have effect on international politics.[122]

---

[114] Weber (2014), p. 17, Blombergs in Sivonen (ed.) (2013), p. 9. According Blombergs, Realists see sovereignty in its Westphalian form as a freedom for states freely to decide about their own internal affairs, as well as ability to function in international politics. The power of the state affects its concrete sovereignty and freedom of action. Therefore, according to the view of Realism only the great powers have complete sovereignty. For an in depth discussion on sovereignty, see Krasner (1999).
[115] Weber (2014), p. 17
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid., Mearsheimer, p. 3. Mearsheimer emphasizes the *structure* of the international system as a force that makes states act like this (emphasis added). This puts him with Waltz and other structural Realists as opposed to classical Realists.
[120] Weber (2014), p. 18, See also Mearsheimer (2001), p. xii. Mearsheimer sees the situation tragic since in the absence of world government a conflict between great powers is inevitable. Like Weber, he argues that strength is the insurance of safety and thus states are bound to clash as they compete over primacy.
[121] Ayoob (1995), p. 116. A definition of a great power is presented by Ayoob quoting John M. Goldmeyr and Michael McFault*: "a country possessing the will and capability to alter events throughout international system".*
[122] Mearsheimer (2001), p. 17.

This dominant position of great powers affect the way Realism can be used. It means that the explanatory power of Realism is severely limited to the great powers and loses viability when used to analyze other states. Furthermore, John Mearsheimer highlights some of the issues that divide Realists both within the school, as well as inside Neorealism. For Mearsheimer, the question of 'why states want power?' is the fundamental divide between Realists and Neorealists. He argues that Morgenthau and classical Realists call attention to the nature of man as a root of all evil. This analogy of the 'original sin' makes every man borne with a desire for power. Consequently, this results in great powers being led by people who desire more power constituting their state to threaten their neighbors.[123]

On the other side of the realist coin, Neorealists argue that human nature is not really a significant variable. Instead, the structure of the system forces states in to the endless pursuit of power due to the lack of overarching authority. Therefore, each state should try to be as powerful as possible. Therefore, the great powers become 'trapped' in an endless competition because there is no guarantee of security.[124] Hence, according to Fred Blombergs the 'defining and timeless elements' of Realism are: 1) Centrality of sovereign states, as the most important actors in the international arena and 2) a somewhat pessimistic look on the nature of international politics.[125]

However, he also points out that rationality, power, survival, and fear of others do not mean that states cannot work together. War is not inevitable, but situation dependent upon time and place.[126] Thus, the main assumptions of Realism can be summed up as follows: First, states are the most important actors in international politics; second, the structure of the international system in anarchic; third, international politics is ultimately about power; fourth, military power plays significant part in international politics; fifth, states in international system act rationally in pursue of their own national interests.[127] Consequently, Realism is very much tied to the scientific realism and positivism with a rationalist look on reality[128] and this view is challenged by Constructivism and the relativist side.

---

[123] John J. Mearsheimer in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 78.
[124] Ibid., p. 78.
[125] Blombergs in Sivonen (ed.) (2013), p. 7.
[126] Ibid., According to Blombergs, Realism sees states in the international system mostly as great powers and the Realist theories are therefore theories about power politics among great powers. This is due to the defining effect of great powers on the international politics. For further discussion on realism, great powers and power politics, see Mearsheimer (2001).
[127] For further discussion and reference see, Blombergs in Sivonen (ed.) (2013), pp. 7–16.
[128] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 35.

Constructivism is a constitutive theory which has its origins in the social sciences. It is a relative broad view which has off–shoots resulting in several different ways of applying it. Hence, IR theory of Constructivism draws upon the contemporary theory of social constructivism. Social constructivism is based upon wide selection of works. Most notably of those are mentioned by Vivien Burr as 'key contributors' such as K.J. and M.M. Gergen, Shotter, Sharpin, Foucalt, Potter, Wetherell, Parker, to name a few. This list of contributors extends from the 1970s to early 1990s. There are especially important works such as Michel Foucalt's which emphasize the constructive power of language and Potter and Wetherell for action–oriented function of language.

Furthermore, Burr sees the writings of Berger and Luckman 'The Social Construction of Reality' as significant, because of the processes of externalization, objectification and internalization.[129] These are mentioned here as an example because of the importance of the language and its prominent use in the Securitization theory. The aforementioned process can also be seen as having familiarity to the securitization process. An example of the processes of externalization, objectification and internalization can be tied to the securitization of failing states. The process could be presented as one where FS are thought of by the policymakers of the U.S. as dens of terrorism and destruction.

This idea is first externalized in the form of a policy document, such as the NSS. The idea inside the policy then enters into a social realm of consecutive administrations and takes on a life of its own. Thus, it is objectified and has developed an existence that continues to live on as an accepted fact. As administrations change the previous policy document still retains its force and a new one is born into a world of the old one. This last was how the idea was finally internalized.[130] This example was based loosely on the one described by Burr, but it nevertheless highlights the similarities of the processes.[131] Burr also underlines the common tenets different facets of constructivism share: 'A critical stance towards taken–for–granted knowledge, historical and cultural specificity, knowledge sustained through social processes and the link between knowledge and social action'.[132] Therefore, a high emphasis is placed on how knowledge is accumulated and processed from the surrounding world.

---

[129] Vivien Burr (1995), *An Introduction to Social Constructivism*, pp. 8–10.
[130] Sjöstedt (2013), p. 149. Internalization is how the 'opinion of the individual may change' in regards to certain issue.
[131] For the original example, see Burr (1995), p. 10.
[132] Burr (1995), pp. 3–5, see also Raitasalo (2005), p. 2.

Moreover, social constructivism underlines the weight of culture and history. It sees everything specifically tied to temporal and cultural context which is only valid for those who made the observation. Therefore, use of language and interaction as the motors of social process are in a significant role. This ties knowledge and social action together instead of just sustaining it. Hence, each social construction creates different reaction from humans.[133]

Constructivism in the field of IR is often referred to Alexander Wendt. His famous article of *'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,'* serves as a basis on for an ongoing debate. It showed how the international system can be studied differently from the overtly imposing Neorealism of the Cold War period. According to K. M. Fierke, Wendt criticized Neorealism that it took the identities and interests of states as given.[134] This was because Neorealism defined these through the structure and environment of international anarchy.[135] Wendt himself argues that Neorealism and Neoliberalism are 'under socialized'.[136] He further continues that the three different main streams of Constructivist IR theory stand juxtaposed to them.[137]

For Wendt, Constructivism in IR to draws upon various social science theories and he argues that most in the field accept two basic points: 1) Ideas rather than material forces determine the structures of human association. 2) Identities and interests are constructed by shared ideas.[138] The former makes emphasis on an idealist approach and the latter on a holist, or structural approach, making Constructivism a form of structural idealism.[139] This approach is sometimes referred to as *reflectivist*, as it stands juxtaposed to the rationalist school of thought. Thus Constructivism can be thought of as a middle ground between rationalist and poststructuralist theories.[140]

---

[133] Burr (1995).
[134] K. M. Fierke in Dunne et al. (2010), p. 186.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Wendt (1999), p. 4.
[137] Ibid., This argument about 'undersocialization' is in Wendt mind the common denominator between the different streams of Constructivism. These three streams of Constructivism are 'modernist', 'post–modernist', and 'feminist'.
[138] Ibid., p. 1, 7, 193. Wendt argues that Constructivism is not a theory of international politics. Instead the theory points to how actors are socially constructed and not to which actors to study, or where.
[139] Ibid., p. 1.
[140] Fierke in Dunne et al. (2010), pp. 183–184, p. 186. Rationalist and reflectivist as well as positivist and post–positivist are used interchangeably by Fierke.

Vivien Burr raises some arguments that support the position taken by Wendt. She denies the realist position that 'knowledge is a direct perception of reality'. For Burr, language constructs the world and 'all forms of knowledge are historically and culturally specific'.[141] This is seen in how 'language is a precondition to thought', and how the 'use of language can be thought of as a form of action'.[142] In comparison rationalist theories such as Neorealism have individualist ontology. This is possible as long as the basic unit of the analysis is the individual state or a human being. Hence, Neorealism draws the analogy of individual human survival to the survival of an individual state in international anarchy.

On the other hand, Constructivism raises social issues as meaningful. This is because it considers both humans and states as social beings and thus inseparable of the normative context.[143] Furthermore, Wendt positions Constructivism so that structures of human association are primarily cultural phenomenon instead of a materialist one. Furthermore, he also makes the point against rationalism in that 'structures do more than regulate', they 'construct identities and interests'.[144] Consequently, Wendt argues that material forces depend on shared ideas and culture which in turn affect power and interest. This means that he puts culture first in an analysis, and power and interest follow in its footsteps.

The main ontological differences of Neorealism and Constructivism are capitalized by Wendt in how these theories perceive the structure of the international system. For Constructivists *ideas* and their distribution are the things that matter, for Neorealists it is the distribution of *material* capabilities.[145] This positioning in the ontological axis affects the answers that can be derived from a set of questions. Therefore empiricism depends on the chosen ontology and epistemology as well as the chosen method. Wendt points to a key difference between his view of Constructivism and Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism in that they both have different ontological commitments. According to Wendt, Waltz has materialist and individualist commitments which are then formed as conclusions. These conclusions are that' international anarchy is the reason behind the self–help world and conflictual international politics'.[146] However, his own commitments of idealist and holist perceptions put him to view anarchy as what states make of it.[147] He argues that there are several 'cultures of anarchy' that operate

[141] Burr (1995), pp. 6–7.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Fierke *'Constructivism'* in Dunne et al. (2010), pp. 180–181.
[144] Wendt (1999), p. 193.
[145] Ibid., p. 5.
[146] Ibid., p. 6.
[147] Wendt (1999), p. 6.

with different logic and tendencies and affect the outcomes in the systemic structure.[148] Hence, Wendt is juxtaposed to Neorealists position that makes anarchy prevalent regardless of the nature and policies of the state.[149]

Consequently, Wendt criticizes Neorealism on the following points: First, Neorealism cannot explain structural change although it notes the possibility of it.[150] The kind of change that Wendt emphasizes is related to social change and can be thought of as a transition from feudalism to modern states, or the end of the Cold War. In his view, Neorealists do not think these changes real due to the fact that they do not remove anarchy or change the distribution power between states. [151] Thus, for Neorealists the Cold War condition would eventually return on its own. Second, Wendt thinks the Neorealism's theory of structure is' too underspecified to generate falsifiable hypotheses'. He argues that' balancing' in Neorealism is an example of 'how (almost) any kind of foreign policy' can be interpreted as such, regardless of the situation.[152] Finally, he confronts Neorealism on its explanatory power of the structural anarchy and self–help system. According to Wendt it is a Neorealist *assumption* that anarchy works this way. His own view is that sometimes states are egoists and sometimes not, and that this logic changes.[153]

2.3 Securitization theory

The previous section narrowed down the academic debate by a descent from the upper echelons of ontology and epistemology. It limited the scope of the discussion into the two schools of IR theories, that of Realist and Constructivist. Furthermore, it arrived to a debate between Neorealist and Constructivist views of the international system. It also provided the basis for the theoretical framework and paved way for the Securitization theory. The purpose of this section is to outline the basic use of the theory as defined by Buzan and Wæver[154] as well as the problematic concept of security. The theoretical limitations and arguments of this research are presented with the adjoining counter arguments which stand juxtaposed against them.

---

[148] Ibid., pp. 156–157.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Wendt (1999), pp. 156–157.
[151] This can be seen as a reference to the processes which underline Constructivism. See also, Burr (1995), p. 8, for notes on structure–process.
[152] Wendt (1999), pp. 156–157.
[153] Ibid. pp. 17–18.
[154] Buzan et al. (1998).

Furthermore, this section binds the Securitization theory as part of the Constructivist camp in the field of IR theories. As with all theories, this theory is burdened with the fact that it can be seen as being formed for someone for some specific purpose.[155] Securitizing theory was developed by the CS[156] within the security studies. It is considered a part of the Constructivist family as one specific theoretical approach whereas a person with 'significant social standing' performs a securitizing speech–act.[157] Securitizing can be also seen as a process where a threat is created of something specific, an issue or an object.[158]

2.3.1 What is security?

This sub–section outlines the problematic concept of security with a short historical background as a prequel of the Securitization theory. The point is not to go through all the possible analogies of security. What is essential is to create an idea of how the concept has been generally thought of and how it became the focus of the security studies. This will pave way for the Securitization theory in the following sub–section.

Security as a concept penetrates society from the international level to the individual person.[159]According to Mohammed Ayoob, the classical dictionary definition of security 'to be free from danger, anxiety and fear' is understood with a particular emphasis in the IR.[160] Therefore the meaning 'security' is different for individuals and for International Relations. IR is concerned about states and their national security, whereas individuals are concerned of personal security. It is also possible for the security interests of states and individuals to overlap. However, to create a focus for this study, the chosen unit is the state and the level international system. Therefore, 'security' is here used in the context of IR and states. Hence, individual security and its analogies are left outside. Furthermore, security is defined in *political* terms 'in relation to threats to state boundaries, state institutions and governing regimes'.[161]

---

[155] Raitasalo (2005), p. 52.
[156] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 212. Core of the Copenhagen School originated from Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver at COPRI. The most notable contribution was the concepts of societal security and securitization.
[157] Christian Perheentupa *"Konstruktivismi"* in Pekka Sivonen (ed.) (2013), *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen*, pp. 100–101.
[158] Jarno Limnéll (2009), *Suomen uhkakuvapolitiikka 2000–luvun alussa*, p. 36.
[159] On the difficulty of defining security, see for example, Hansen (2006) pp. 34–36, Limnéll (2009), p. 43. See Buzan (1991) for extensive problematization of the concept of security and Buzan et al. (1998) on defining what is security and what is not.
[160] Ayoob (1995), p. 5.
[161] Ibid., p. 190.

The traditional look on security has been to relate it to both power and strength therefore associating it with the state.[162] Moreover, the classical concept of security draws heavily from this connection with the state.[163] This is because of historical links and the prerogative of national security over anything else[164]. The state, due to its unique capacity of providing both domestic and international security through sovereignty has been the pre–eminent security actor.[165] Mohammed Ayoob argues that security in IR is 'endowed with a particular meaning'. For him, the meaning draws upon IR literature.[166] It defines itself based on the assumptions that threats to the state originate outside its borders, and that these are primarily of military nature. Furthermore, he stipulates that the national security of states is defined as 'an ability to protect against threats', as well as to 'reduce them'.[167]

National security can be seen to be divided into domestic and international components.[168] Domestic security is usually thought of as the state's internal capacity to provide and exercise a monopoly on the use of force within the state. Its key elements can be seen to include legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens as well as sufficient strength and reach to control the entire area of the state. Conversely, for the population domestic security provides freedom from violence and persecution. It provides law and order as well as the structures of the society to pursue their interests without the need to fear for their lives. [169] International security is commonly thought of as state's sovereignty and freedom from outside influence.[170] Traditionally, sovereignty has been the ability to decide both foreign and domestic policies without outside interference. It has also been about the ability to freely decide participation and membership in international organizations.[171]

---

[162] Buzan (1991), pp. 1–2, Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21–23. Securitization can be seen as a process whereas 'a threat is presented to be existential in nature to the referent object, for example the state'. Traditionally for a state the threat has been either from military sector (a physical attack) or from political sector (sovereignty–ideological).

[163] Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 9–10. 'Political and normative decisions' are involved in defining security. Therefore security is always tied to a 'particular referent object'.

[164] Ulrik Pram Gad and Karen Lund Petersen (2011), *"Concepts of politics in securitization studies"*, Security Dialogue 42, p. 319. Security and politics are contextually tied to modernity and the nation–state.

[165] Hansen (2006), p. 34. Hansen refers to R.B.J. Walker in regards to the historical connection of security and the state. Sovereign state represents 400 years of evolution of political societies.

[166] Ayoob (1995), p. 5.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 21, 25. The dominant concept of security in International Security Studies has been the one of national and international security. Also, concepts of individual and state security are 'inextricably linked'.

[169] Tom Campbell (1981), *Seven Theories on Human Society*, pp. 6–8.

[170] Hedley Bull [1977] (2002), *The Anarchical Society (3rd ed.): A Study of Order in World Politics*, pp. 32–33.

[171] Ayoob (1995), p. 71, pp. 78–79. Sovereignty is the fundamental defining character of 'modern system of states' and it carries with it 'sacrosanct borders, mutual recognition, and nonintervention'.

International security is tightly connected with state's existence. Therefore, it has a very high security context. This can typically be seen in national security issues and foreign policy objectives. With foreign policy articulations states are protecting their vital interests and core values. These include not just external issues but internal ones as well.[172] Foreign policy is connected to international security which has roots in the history of power politics and within the military–political context. This places security related issues as issues about survival.[173]

The Copenhagen School (here on referred to as CS) looks at security as socially constructed. It is considered to be the founding father and main theoretical base for contemporary security studies. CS depicts in the Securitization theory how 'security' is not an objectively ascertainable thing or a place, but the result of a specific social process.[174] Security as a concept is an enabler, it securitizes because it has discursive and political force.[175] Furthermore, both the classical concept of security and the one depicted by the CS are important for this study.[176] There are several links to these concepts that can be drawn straight from the historical development of the state. From thereon it can be traced back to contemporary security studies and failing states.[177]

This means that both the classical and CS security need to be understood IOT understand how and why state failure is such a difficult subject to tackle. Previously the discussion on security was heavily influenced by the Cold War and the related threat of nuclear annihilation.[178] This resulted in overtly military–political context which in turn influenced the security discussion.[179] However, this was acknowledged during the Cold War and resulted in a need for wide definition of security.[180]

---

[172] Ayoob, (1995), p. 6.
[173] Hansen (2006), p. 35, Buzan et al. (1998), p. 21.
[174] Michael C. Williams (2003), *"Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International politics"*, International Studies Quarterly 47 / 2003, p. 513. For summaries about the CS, see for example, Limnéll (2009), Perheentupa in Sivonen (ed.) (2013) and Sipilä & Koivula (2013).
[175] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 214.
[176] See Appendix 4, picture 4, for different epistemological views on security. See also, Appendix 7, picture 7, for different relations and views of security between IR theories (ISS perspectives in relation to the five questions).
[177] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 32. How security is studied dates back to Westphalia.
[178] Bull [1977] (2002), p. 187.
[179] Ayoob (1995), p. 6. Ayoob argues that the concept of alliance security was superimposed during the Cold War. This affected the Western view of security. Furthermore, the concept of state security got systemic properties during the Cold War (external nature, strong connection to alliance blocs).
[180] Ole Wæver (2011), *"Politics, security, theory",* Security Dialogue 42 / 2011, p. 476. Wæver highlights the views of Kenneth Waltz and others on the connection of security and war. According to Wæver, security studies were originally developed to counter the Cold War situation of deterrence. At that time the arguments on security between the two superpowers were political instead of military in nature. In his view, this opening was basis for the eventual widening of the security to entail more than the military–political aspects.

The 'traditional' concept of security eroded as it was challenged by postmodernism and the focus shifted from Cold War issues to other aspects, such as individual security.[181] However, the widening process did not remove the state from its central position in the context of security. The state was retained as the foremost institution with the necessary resources and power to respond to various threats.[182] Hence, in this study it is important to remove individual level threats from international–state level. Although international developments might affect individuals through events like economic depression, market crash, war and international crime, they are not essential here. This does not mean an oversight of interdependence between the different sectors of security, but more of a choice in focus. Therefore, I will leave the individual aspect of security outside the discussion and focus on the state and international level.

Even though the NSS document has references to individual security issues, it is first and foremost directed at the state level. Therefore the main attention about the views of Securitization theory should be directed there. The international aspect of security is highlighted by Barry Buzan, who argues that security is 'foremost about the security of human societies' and after that about 'the security of individuals'.[183] He also acknowledges the need to widen the conceptual basis and as such was pivotal in creating a sectoral approach to security.[184]

The widening of the conceptual basis of security was formulated by Buzan et al. into five sectors of security (political, economic, military, social, and environmental).[185] This was away from the plain military–political framework in what came to be the basis of Securitization theory. It combined wide security and securitization inside the CS.[186] Contemporary wide security entails all sorts of issues from individual to international. It mixes the sectors together as well as creates links between them. An excellent example of this can be found in the Finnish National Security Strategy (YTS). The YTS addresses wide variety of threats from individual to state level.[187]

---

[181] Raitasalo (2005), p. 60. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 13.
[182] Roxanna Sjöstedt (2013), *"Ideas, Identities and internalization: Explaining securitizing moves"*, Cooperation and Conflict 48 / 2013, p. 145.
[183] Buzan (1991), p. 19.
[184] Ibid. See Appendix 3, picture 3, for a look of how security is seen together with its adjacent concepts by Buzan and Hansen (2009).
[185] Buzan et al. (1998).
[186] Ibid.
[187] Puolustusministeriö (2010), *Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia: Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 16.12.2010*.

Needless to say, security remains a complicated concept and its usage as well as interpretations a subject of contest.[188] Consequently, to retain analytical usefulness the concept of security in this study it is connected to the state. Subsequently, security is defined in the international context. In this study 'security' is the ability of the state to protect its territory and political independence as well as its core values from external threats, whether they originate from state or non–state actors.

2.3.2 Security as a discourse, the threat of 'Other'

The previous part suggested that the traditional view of security has had a tremendous influence on how security was perceived. The rationalist approach and the favor of material (military) factors had constituted a measurable way to respond to various threats.[189] However, the widening of security to a more comprehensive approach had included other sectors than just the military. This widening created a chance to see security as something beyond military–political and added multiple links that overlap within and between levels of security. Threats were not reduced just to numbers of tanks and missiles, or political–ideological colors on a map. The widening provided a chance to address complex global issues that are difficult to measure such as environment and human rights.

Even with the widening of security, the national security aspect was still the concern of the state as it had been with the classical view of security. Only the viewpoint had changed and a better understanding of how threats were identified and given meaning was been accomplished.[190] Realism had presented the classical view of security and its self–help materialist–individualist view. Widened security presented the Constructivist–Poststructuralist view, where ideas matter. Therefore, for this study 'national security is a particular kind of identity construction tied to the sovereign state'.[191] For problems to be presented themselves as questions of security, they need to be 'successfully constructed as such within political discourse'.[192]

---

[188] See, for example, Limnéll (2009), pp. 44–64, for extensive look on the conceptual basis of security and its different interpretations.
[189] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 33. Objective conceptions of security are often defined through material factors.
[190] Ibid., p. 35.
[191] Hansen (2006), pp. 33–34.
[192] Ibid., Hansen does not deny the importance of national security, but rather highlights the importance of its historic and discursive specificity. This further emphasizes the effect of culture and the temporal placement in regard to how national security is framed and perceived. Interestingly, Ayoob (1995), p. 8, argues for the 'primacy of the political realm' when defining the Third World concept of security.

However, there is still something that has to be remembered from the classical view of security. That is the triangle of state, sovereignty and security. This is something that remains even when the viewpoint changes from classical to wide, and from Realist to Constructivist–Poststructuralist.

Lene Hansen argues that the connection of sovereignty, state, and security is a particularly strong one. This is because the state is the historically specific political community to which 'the meaning of security' is tied to.[193] Therefore, for her the classical concept of security is 'either explicitly defined as national security or implicitly drawn upon this connection with state'.[194] She concludes that it is due to 400 years of state as the pre–eminent way of people to form up as community that makes 'national security as the front runner for the concept of security'.[195] There are other researchers who draw upon the same conceptual basis and use similar analogy[196]. It can be said that this commonly accepted conceptual connection is a key defining factor when dealing with the meaning of security.

Moreover, the way in which security discourse and identity relate creates ontologically necessity for the state to define its identity through threats. This delineates from the materialistic and individualist view of Realism. In Realism the increase of power is a way to increase security against other states. The discursive conception of security in Constructivist–Poststructuralist view emphasizes how state is constituted through a radical and threatening 'Other'.[197]

Therefore, the national 'Self' knows what it is only in reference of the 'Other' against whom it is protecting itself. As an example, during the Cold War the West defined itself against the Communist bloc of the 'East'. Democracy was referred to and constituted in reference to autocracy and dictatorship.[198]

---

[193] Hansen (2006), p. 34.
[194] Ibid. Hansen specifically stipulates this as a Realist construction of sovereignty and refers to Hobbes as 'state security is not just one precondition of individual security, but that it is *the* precondition for it.
[195] Ibid.
[196] See, for example, Tainter (1988), Charles Tilly (1990) *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* and Ayoob (1995).
[197] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 33. This is a discursive approach to security where through intersubjective process threats 'manifest' on the political agenda and security cannot be defined in objective terms.
[198] Similar process can be seen happening in the 2010s in relation to radical Islamist terrorism. Radical Islamist terrorists are associated with the refugees as well as the migrants coming into Europe. This creates the radical and threatening 'Other' from against which Europe needs to be protected. Therefore, all refugees and migrants are securitized as (potential) terrorists.

Hence, the 'Self' was a mirror image of the 'Other' but with a threatening 'cape' as to underline the radical difference. Moreover, when this difference takes on a security aspect it means that the 'Other' is constructed as a threat to security by 'mobilization of discursively important concepts'. These are usually referred to as 'national– or strategic interests' which gives them 'particular rhetoric and political urgency'.[199] Thus we are then dealing with a securitization to a specific referent object, which in the case of this research is the *state*.

The Cold War juxtaposition of East and West is not the only significant one. When talking about failing states the dichotomy is also between developed and underdeveloped, North and South. Mohammed Ayoob argues that the distinction between 'rich, powerful, developed' industrialized nations of the North[200] and the 'poor, weak, underdeveloped' nations of the South has grown. For him, it is bigger since the Cold War ended and the Communist 'Second World' has disappeared.[201] This basic conceptual definition creates a very distinctive 'Other' in relation to Western 'Self'. It reaffirms the previous paragraphs arguments about how the radically threatening 'Other' is created in reference to 'Self'. Furthermore, there is an important point which is raised by Lene Hansen and it refers to how some threats are labeled national and others international.

This dichotomy is between individual and collective threats which have changed to from classical definition of security to encompass areas such as pandemics and transnational crime.[202] These kinds of collective threats are clearly outside the military focus, even though they also threaten the national 'Self'. As discourses are social it does not matter whether the security issues are collective or individual. However, it matters how these issues are presented and what kind of meaning they achieve.[203] This can be seen also to encompass issues such as normative needs. These needs act not as a response to threats, but are portrayed as moral responsibility to intervene for example 'on behalf of the beleaguered to reduce the loss of life.'[204]

---

[199] Hansen (2006), pp. 34–35, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 32.
[200] 'North' refers here to Western Europe and North America.
[201] Ayoob (1995), pp. 12–13.
[202] Widening of security is not without its critics as, for example, Ayoob (1995), p. 10, shows. He argues that a cautious approach should be used in how you use 'security' IOT retain its analytical usefulness.
[203] Hansen (2006), p. 36. The argument here is that some issues are politically presented individual and others as collective. Buzan (1991), pp.114–115.
[204] Rotberg (2004), pp. 31–32. Rotberg argues that the peace of the world is dependent upon how the failed, failing and collapsed states are dealt with. Those who have the means have strategic and moral responsibility to act before these failings states 'have become threats to themselves and others.'

2.3.3 Positioning Securitization theory

As previously stated theories together with ontological and epistemological choices form the framework for any research. A theory can be formulated and given shape by an attempt to join a previously collected empiric data within a specific field of science. Therefore, studies that might have been nominal by themselves can be given additional significance and a new kind of explanatory power. Hence, a theory which binds them together such as Securitization theory can combine various strategic, social, political, and economic studies to formulate a different kind of study.[205]

Securitizing theory was introduced to international politics by Ole Wæver in mid–1990s. It finally broke through with a publication by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.*[206] Securitization theory was originally intended to offer a possibility to conceptualize security outside the military framework.[207] It took some time for the theory to gain popularity and it was in the early 2000s when it gained momentum.[208] The slow progress was due to the heavy influence of traditional strategic and security studies.

Securitization theory has its wider roots in the Constructivist constellation of IR theories. Within that constellation reality is socially constructed, relative, and emphasis is placed on the use of language and processes thereof. Therefore the main roots lie in the speech act theory, Schmittian understanding of security, and traditionalist security debates.[209] Securitization theory has been applied to analysis of foreign policies between states, the structure and effect of international crime, pandemics, 'war on terror', and so on.[210] It is an alternative to the classical security studies as it made possible to address issues beyond the scope of military–political. Moreover, it can be seen as useful tool to analyze how threats are created within the political process. This way it is possible to see what is raised and why on the agenda by the decision makers.

---

[205] Dahlia K. Remler & Gregg G. Van Ryzin (2011), *Research Methods in Practice*, pp. 27–29. Remler & Van Ryzin emphasizes the constitutive meaning of theory. For Securitization theory this can be seen as various security issues linking previously homogenous fields into one wide framework. Wæver (2011), p. 470.
[206] Matt McDonald (2008), *"Securitization and the Construction of Security"*, European Journal of International Relations 14 (4), p. 567.
[207] Wæver (2011), p. 476. According to Wæver, security studies 'emerged as a response to nuclear challenge.'
[208] Gad and Petersen (2011), *"Concepts of politics in securitization studies"*, Security Dialogue 42, pp. 315–316, p. 322.
[209] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 213.
[210] McDonald (2008), p. 566.

Securitization theory is also often connected to Carl Schmitt. Schmitt's views on politics were developed during the 1920s and 1930s and they give Securitization theory an authoritarian look.[211] This is mostly because Schmitt is often considered to have been the supporter of authoritarian policy (radical realpolitik), and his thoughts can be seen in the background of Hans Morgenthau and classical Realism.[212] However, Ole Wæver himself points out that the Securitization theory *does not* entail Schmitt's concept of politics, but it *does* have Schmitt's concept of security. Schmitt's concept of security is defined through exception, emergency and decision making.[213]

Ole Wæver's point about exception, emergency, and decision making is significant in that it tears the theory away from a Realist world. It positions the Securitization theory somewhere between Realist, Constructivist and Poststructuralist perception of reality. However, Schmitt and his 'realpolitik' are not the only critical points directed towards the theory. There are a lot of criticism directed toward the pivotal role of speech act and how it is interpreted in the theory. Thierry Balzacq has argued against the CS that the basis for the success of securitization has to lie in some kind of reality. Attaching 'security' to an issue cannot automatically make the issue about security through self–referential practice. Thus, for him securitization speech act needs to have some base in reality and not only depend on constitutive act.[214]

The criticism presented by Balzacq is also directed toward the question 'can anything become a security issue through securitizing?' Some arguments also point out that the theory cannot address new and modern threats outside the framework of the nation–state.[215] Furthermore, it is interesting how much discussion securitization and its effects have brought up. On one hand it is linked to the 'value' of the word 'security', and on the other hand it is a fear of securitization been used as an excuse to justify any kind of political action.[216]

---

[211] Wæver (2011), p. 468. According to Wæver, the concepts of politics in Securitization theory, is Ardentian.
[212] Williams (2003), p. 512.
[213] Wæver (2011), p. 470. According to Wæver Securitization theory's conception of politics is Ardentian and not Schmitt's. Gad and Petersen (2011), pp. 319–320. According to Gad and Petersen, Wæver 'connects the speech act of securitization and the rise of the modern nation–state'. They also stipulate that the CS' concept of security 'resembles Schmitt's concept of politics'. 'See also, Paul Roe (2012), "*Is securitization a 'negative' concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics*", Security Dialogue 43 (3), p. 250.
[214] Balzacq (2005), p. 182. Ole Wæver (2011), "*Politics, security, theory"*, Security Dialogue 42 (465–480), p. 469. Wæver admits for that the Securitization theory locked in the speech act form creates a "blind spot".
[215] Gad and Petersen (2011), p. 317, Roe (2012), p. 251. Securitization theory derives from the context of Western liberal state.
[216] Roe (2012), p. 251. Roe stipulates that the usual fears of securitization lie in that it 'disrupts and destroys the openness and accountability' of democratic legislative process.

Furthermore, there are criticism directed that point to Securitization theory being tied to 'modern form of politics'. It also has normative and contextual problems of wide security and is tied to Western notions of 'legitimacy and power', which limit its use elsewhere.[217] Counterarguments by Buzan and Wæver remind that not all the speech acts are equally powerful due to the social status and cultural context of the performer of the act.[218] Hence, limits to 'security' are provided internally. Not 'any security' can be 'any speech act' or social construction. It is a *specific* act and the nature of the existential threat to the survival of the referent object makes it a securitization act.[219]

2.3.4 Securitization process

The main argument of Securitization theory is to define something as an existential threat to a referent object (usually the state), as a precondition for securitization to be possible. Hence, when something is defined in such a radical format, it cannot escape reaction or otherwise it could prove fatal to the object being protected.[220] Ole Wæver defines security as a speech act, thus making it ephemeral and not necessarily anything concrete in nature. By speech act he means that uttering 'security' a *securitizing actor*[221] is giving the subject a security stamp.

The securitizing actor moves the issue (subject) to a special zone by giving it priority and authorizes all means to address this threat.[222] Therefore, when we look at how an existential threat is created with a *conscious* use of language, a different kind of approach can be used than the more conventional Realist or Liberalist theories.[223] With a strategically significant document such as the NSS, it opens new interpretations.[224]

---

[217] Gad and Petersen (2011), p. 320, Balzacq (2005), p. 173. Balzacq presents securitization as a 'socio–philosophical approach'. Thus if one changes the theoretical 'premises' it affects also the empiria.
[218] Ayoob (1995), p. 191. State and regime security depends upon political elites, thus 'their perceptions are important in defining security problems'.
[219] Williams (2003), p. 514, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 34.
[220] Limnéll (2009), p. 72, Hansen (2006), p. 34.
[221] Buzan et al. (1998), p. 36, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 214. Securitizing actors are 'those who securitize issues'. These are usually governments, political leaders etc. Referent objects are 'things that are seen existentially threatened'.
[222] Buzan et al. (1998), p. 21, pp. 23–26. For Buzan and his colleges the referent object and related existential threats depend on the sector which we are looking at. The threats and referent objects differ between military, economic, and so on. Therefore, context should always be taken into consideration. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 214. The discursive power of securitization brings together securitizing actor and the referent object.
[223] Gad and Petersen (2011), p. 319.
[224] Call and Wyeth (2008) p. 2, Fukuyama (2004), pp. 127–128.

Moreover, the actions of the U.S. as the dominant great power in the contemporary world cannot be without an effect. Therefore, it provides good reason to look at how failing states were securitized as an existential threat. Furthermore, to understand the basic process of securitization a brief look into the theory is in order.[225] The precondition for securitization process[226] to be enacted is the speech act[227]. Hence, the speech act is the focal point in the Securitization theory around which everything else is built. The language and philosophy works of Austin and Searle contributed much to the speech act theory which accounts for the tight connection between Securitization theory and speech act.[228]

Securitization and politization share a commonality. Securitization can be seen as an extreme version of politization where the utterance of 'security' lifts an issue above normal politics to a special status. Thus, when a special status and emergency procedures are approved it justifies going outside normal day–to–day political procedure. Circumstances, temporal placement and the state in question affect the process.[229] Who securitizes what and for what reason is an open book. Moreover, for Finland securitization of culture (as a xenophobia) is more probable than for the U.S. Vice versa, the securitization of failing states is more likely for the U.S. than to Finland. This is due to great power interests of the former and a relative small effect of the phenomenon to the latter.[230]

There are several points that Buzan and his colleges make on the use of the theory. Firstly, the meaning of the concept lies in its usage and not in how we would think it could be defined analytically. In case of security the emphasis is on that an issue can be *argued* to be important, and therefore it takes precedence over anything else.[231]

---

[225] See Appendix 5, picture 5 for Ole Wæver 's (2011) presentation of the securitization process.
[226] Wendt (1999), p. 170. Wendt uses the term 'socialization' to describe a process where identities and interests are formed. This has partial familiarity to securitization and politization. Wendt describes socialization 'a process of learning to conform to one's behavior to social expectations'.
[227] Balzacq (2005), p. 175. According to Balzacq, Austin stipulated that in the speech act theory 'certain statements do more than describe reality'. Therefore they 'cannot be judged true or false because of their performative nature.' Other statements just report state of affairs and 'do nothing'.
[228] Thierry Balzacq (2011), *Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve,* p. 4.
[229] Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 23–24, Wæver (2011), p.477. Successful securitization depends on 'causal mechanisms'
[230] Both Finland and the U.S. can be seen to suffer from the effects of state failure. However, the issues are at different levels as are the interests of the respected states in question. Finland might find a moral obligation a heavier burden than the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. is more concerned of the strategic effects both regionally and globally (terrorism etc.). Interestingly, for Balzacq (2005), p. 181, language only acts as a modifier of our perception of reality, it does not construct it. For him what is said about the problem does not 'determine its essence'. 'External objective context and developments' also affect the securitization.
[231] Wæver (2011), pp. 471–472.

Moreover, this makes security a self–referential practice because, 'it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue.' No real threat is needed, just something that is presented as a threat.[232] Therefore, securitization is taking place when an argument can be presented as a threat and is accepted as such by the audience for which it has been presented to. This places the issue above normal political procedure and breaks conduct. Moreover, the issue being securitized is presented to the audience in a way that if it is not addressed immediately the results will be disastrous.[233]

However, there are dangers related to securitization. It raises important issues into the political agenda but at the same time it can polarize the field heavily. This is why securitization should be used with caution.[234] A contemporary example of securitization can be drawn from the Europe in 2015. That year Europe saw enormous increase of asylum seekers and refugees pouring over the European Union (henceforth EU) outer borders. The issue was securitized in many member countries who directed the flow onward to their neighbors. This polarized it between the member states and paralyzed the Schengen Agreement. These events are an excellent example of what damage securitization can do. It echoes the creators of the theory as well as its critics in that securitization is not a desirable state of affairs.[235]

Furthermore, the argumentative process of speech act can be thought of as an emergency vehicle running through red lights and against one way traffic. The vehicle is trying to get to the accident site as soon as possible and if this cannot be done something terrible will happen. The lights and the sound of the siren are the argumentative means by which it tries to persuade other vehicles to give way. Consequently, it breaks normal procedure, traffic laws and regulations with its actions. No real or visible threat is needed to be present for other vehicles to see, just something that is presented as a threat by the light and sound of the siren.

---

[232] Buzan et al. (1998), p. 24, Hansen (2006), p. 35, Gad and Petersen (2011), Gad and Petersen present various ways to look at politics in securitization studies. One of them is 'politics as ongoing activity'. Here identity and meaning are constantly 'written and rewritten' thus making them unstable. In this view securitization can be either a willful act produced in the utterance of security with effect measuring its success, and thus can be evaluated. Or it can be *intersubjectively defined inside texts* with effects measurable only in context to other texts. (cursive added). The latter view (intersubjective) is how politics is viewed in this study.

[233] Roe (2012), p. 251, Balzacq (2005), p. 173. Balzacq argues that 'audience, political audience and context' are essential for securitization analysis, of 'threats in world politics. For him these are not given sufficient emphasis in the original Securitization theory.

[234] Williams (2003), p. 523.

[235] For detailed discussion see, for example McDonald (2008), Buzan et al. (1998), Williams (2003), Wæver (2011).

Secondly, there is a distinction between a *securitization move*[236] and successful securitization. By presenting something as an existential threat and labeling 'security' on it *does not* by itself mean automatic securitization of the issue. There needs to be an acceptance of the audience to whom the issue is presented that the argument is valid. Audience does not need to conduct a comprehensive democratic discussion, but it needs someone with enough authority to apply the relevant policy change.[237]

Herein lay a difficulty for a wider democratic process. Those who make the securitization move are usually part of the state structure (e.g. government and president) and the object is either parliament or the state's highest decision maker. Therefore, it makes both the audience and the maker of the securitizing move part of the same structure. If the securitization move accounts for nothing (e.g. no policy change, course of action, or wider acceptance), then it has remained just a move.

An analogy for unsuccessful securitization can be drawn from the medical field. New vaccines and vitamins are constantly being offered by pharmaceutical companies for various reasons. The securitization of diseases, pandemics, or nutritional values is ongoing all the time. Depending on the wider acceptance of organizations such as the World Health Organization (henceforth WHO), United Nations (henceforth UN) and national health officials of governments, this type securitization can account to a new policy or next to nothing. If there is no policy change in any of these key organizations, then securitization has remained just a move.

Thirdly, securitization of anything is possible and the relevance is ambiguous at times. Hence, there is a need to look at the follow–on effects of securitization to see if it has been successful. Because securitization is very dramatic in nature it can cause mistrust. By overriding rules of normal procedure and conduct it can create uneasiness and even fear (such as fear in other states). Moreover, this 'self–based violation of rules due to security act and fear of survival as a motivation for it' creates a difficult situation. The one that feels threatened discards social resources and common rules (shared with others), and demands a right to action by its own priorities.[238]

---

[236] Sjöstedt (2013), p. 146. Sjöstedt defines securitization move as 'framing of an issue as national threat added with a strategy for action'.
[237] Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 29–31. Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer, but by the audience of the 'security speech act'.
[238] Ibid., p. 26.

An excellent analogy can be drawn to the terrorist strikes against the U.S. on 9/11. After the attacks terrorism was heavily securitized. This led to mostly unilateral action by the U.S. against the Taleban and the al–Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The securitization of terrorism and the interventions it caused were more or less widely accepted. A failed securitization can be seen in the case of Iraq in 2003 when the threat of Saddam Hussein to international security was not widely accepted.[239] Invasion of Iraq occurred regardless of the sovereignty principle or the lack of UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, states use security discourses in more ways than one to widen the concept of security to other areas of interest, such as 'economics and drugs'.[240]

Finally, there are three components to successful securitization as presented by Buzan and his associates: (1) existential threat, (2) emergency action, (3) effect on inter–unit relations by breaking free of the rules.[241] These combine the speech act as part of the process of securitization. This is because of the 'shared understanding of what is considered and collectively responded to as a threat' thus making the 'utterance itself the act'.[242] However, the permission and responsibility for action are not always easily acquired. As noted before, securitization is always tightly bound in politics because security related issues are within the political decision making domain.

For the securitization be effective, the security discourses have to succeed in giving a legitimate power for exceptional actions to those invoking the speech act. Simultaneously these discourses label them with a responsibility. Thus, when someone presents a threat and receives the power to skip conventional political procedure they are responsible for addressing it accordingly and without delay. Alexander Wendt presents the four interests of the state (physical survival, autonomy, economic well–being and collective self–esteem) that collectively make up the *national interest* of the state. These four must be met or the state will 'die out'.[243] Moreover, it can be said that if *any* of these key interests would become threatened, it would constitute an existential threat to the state.

---

[239] Buzan et al. (1998), p. 30. The point is emphasized by Buzan et al. For Buzan et al. it *does* matter 'how others judge the reasonableness of a securitization'. This is because this influences how 'other actors in the system will respond to a security claim'. This could be compared to the reactions of Russia, China and some European powers (such as Germany) on the issue of U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Later action in 2010s in Libya, Syria and Ukraine has caused similar negative responses.
[240] Hansen (2006), p. 36.
[241] Wæver (2011), p. 473. These three and 'an advantage of security handling to non-securitized handling', is needed.
[242] Buzan et al. (1998), p. 26.
[243] Wendt (1999), p. 238.

Therefore, securitization always reflects the normative and ethical views of the securitizing actor.[244] Thierry Balzacq stipulates, that 'for politicians to be able to counter a threat they need to seek both moral and formal support from the audience'.[245] According to him, this makes securitization volatile for fluctuations if there's a dichotomy between the moral and formal. If these are in harmony, the chance of a successful securitization is greatly increased.[246]

Another problem for a successful securitization comes from the fact that the securitizing actor is often an expert in a specific and narrow field (e.g. military). This makes his or her case acceptable for the audience only in regards to that sector of security. It is difficult for the securitizing actors to act successfully over the 'sectoral boundaries' in trying to convince the audience of the validity of the existential threat.[247] Therefore, the documents that have gone through the political process are a composite of several different securitizing actors. In them each actor aspires to influence a broad audience. Most national security strategy documents fall into this category as they are created together by various ministries and departments of governments.[248] The documents are finally approved by the political leadership.

Thierry Balzacq emphasizes the role of *identification* in the role of successful securitization. He argues that the one making the securitizing move needs to have 'an ability to identify himself or herself with the audience'.[249] This is a needed IOT successfully securitize an issue. Moreover, the securitizing message has to be structured in a way which is easily acceptable by the audience to gain the desired effect. Hence, identification is the perspective through which securitization is able to change the thinking of the audience.[250] This is significant because the audience is the one that ultimately decides whether or not the securitization is successful.[251] Balzacq's view on importance of identification is echoed by Jarno Límnéll. He argues that in order for a threat to exist 'it needs communal or societal phenomenon'. This phenomenon is bound among other things by 'culture and the nature of those making the securitization'.[252]

---

[244] Williams (2003), p. 524.
[245] Balzacq (2005), pp. 184–185.
[246] Ibid.
[247] Perheentupa in Sivonen (ed.) (2013), p. 101, Sjöstedt (2013), p.144. According to Sjöstedt, different actors might not 'interpret threats similarly' which affects 'threat construction'.
[248] The NSS is an example of this.
[249] Balzacq (2005), pp. 184–185.
[250] Ibid.
[251] Buzan, et al. (1998), p. 31. See also, Williams (2003), Limnéll (2009) and Balzacq (2005).
[252] Limnéll (2009), p. 77.

2.4 Foreign Policy as a Discourse

The main topics of the previous sections were theoretical choices, counter arguments and the framework of the research. Thus, what is left is the methodology of Discourse analysis and how it can be used as an analytical tool in the study of foreign policy discourses. The purpose of this section is to lay out the basic tenets of DA. It will show how it is used for analysis of foreign policy. Specifically, the section will present the idea how DA is applied to study the discourses of failing states in the NSS. Furthermore, it will present what kind of discourse the research is interested in and what is left out.

2.4.1 Principles of Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is located in the realm of qualitative research methods and is used to study the use of language and sign related actions. It is a broad methodology consisting of several different analytical methods which vary depending on the theoretical orientation and ontological and epistemological choices. One way of defining DA would be to describe it as *a study of language and signs* which analyzes in detail how social reality is being constructed.[253] Signs can be images, media and many other forms as language can be speeches, policy documents, academic writing etc. All of these create sign systems which depending on their relation, either support or contradict various discourses.

Moreover, different sign systems are alternatively defined as discourses or interpretative repertoires. The difference between sign systems is not the issue rather it is how one defines them in a particular research. This is because both discourses and interpretative repertoires are constructed by social interaction and thus construct social reality.[254] Therefore, discourses not only construct reality, but also describe it. They act both subjectively and objectively.[255] Even though DA can be applied to various theoretical frameworks it leans heavily on social constructivism[256]. This ontological dependence affects as well as limits its use. Social constructivism affects DA through language. Language constructs reality and creates meaning and in so doing constantly re–constructs different versions of reality.[257]

---

[253] Jokinen, Arja & Juhila, Kirsi & Suoninen, Eero (eds.) (1993), *Diskurssianalyysin aakkoset*, pp. 9–10.
[254] Jokinen & Juhila & Suoninen (eds.) (1993), pp. 26–27.
[255] See, for example Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckman (1994), *Todellisuuden sosiaalinen rakentuminen.*
[256] In this instance social constructivism is not referred to Constructivism in IR theories, but the original social theory. Constructivism with a capital 'C' refers to the IR theory.
[257] Hirsjärvi, Sirkka & Remes, Pirkko & Sajavaara, Paula 1996 [2009] *Tutki ja kirjoita*, p. 226.

Consequently, this makes social constructivism as the broader framework for all discursive methods. Constructivism in IR is derived from the social theories and it has the process nature of knowledge. It also retains the social constructivism's cultural and historical specificity as well as the importance of language.[258] It emphasizes ideas over material facts and identities and interests as a product of shared ideas. In the foreign policy it is the national interests which need to be legitimized, and this is done through reference to identities. Furthermore, because of the process nature of Constructivism these 'identities are simultaneously constituted and reproduced through formulations of foreign policy'.[259]

2.4.2 Relational construction of identity

Foreign policy outlines national interests and in doing so it reflects the identity of the state. Hence, it has a heavy cultural setting which is further amplified by the formal authority of those who proclaim it. Moreover, foreign policy discourses are always situated in a wider setting and conceptualized in reference something they are not. Thus, when speaking of failing states it is in reference of what the state is supposed to be when it is *not* failing.[260]

For FS, this intersubjective context directs the discussion to the nature of statehood, sovereignty, and so forth. Therefore, it is necessary to 'theorize foreign policy as a discourse'.[261] This is done for the purpose of using DA to look at how failing states are securitized in the security discourses of the NSS policy documents. Furthermore, this also means that it is necessary to argue that 'identity and policy stand in a constitutive, rather than causal, relationship'.[262] Identity and policy form a multifaceted picture since policies depend on how various threats are depicted. [263]This affects what kind of image is created by words as well as what kind of cultural dichotomies or juxtapositions are present. Foreign policies draw these different strands together to form a picture of the situation by assigning meaning to different objects. The conceptualization of 'identity as discursive, political, relational and social differs from Constructivism'. [264]

---

[258] Huhtinen (2002), p. 43.
[259] Hansen (2006), p. xv, 1.
[260] Ibid., p. 6. Hansen argues that identity is always given in reference to something that it is not. Thus, undeveloped is referred in regard of what is developed, weak states in regard to strong etc.
[261] Ibid., p. xv.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Sjöstedt (2013), p. 147. According to Sjöstedt, ideas and interest are 'viewed as the key concepts in Constructivist accounts on international security issues'.
[264] Hansen (2006), p. 6.

This conceptualization is drawn from Poststructuralism where the dependence of the foreign policy is somewhat different than the one portrayed by Wendt in his Constructivism.[265] The main point of divergence is located in relation to identity. Lene Hansen argues that 'there are no objective identities in some extra–discursive realm' vis–á–vis Wendt who stipulates that 'identity need not be constructed as relational difference'.[266] This means that Wendt accepts the possibility of pre–social identity and Hansen does not. Furthermore, Hansen considers identity to be a constructed through discourse where Wendt accepts both possibilities.

This does not mean that the basic tenets of Constructivism are unusable in this study. However, I'll discard 'Wendtian intrinsic conception' of identity and favor a Hansen's Poststructural 'relational conception' of it.[267] Furthermore, I'll think of foreign policy as an intertextual thing where the authority and arguments draw strength through references to other texts. I'll also deviate from Wendt in that identity could be considered to have potentially causal effect on policy. Instead I'll adopt a poststructuralist view of 'identity and policy as ontologically inseparable'.[268] I'll agree with Wendt in that states with their monopoly on violence create a situation where societies are formed top–down, and different policies act as a guiding principle. For Wendt, foreign policy is seen as a 'guiding principle' as it tries to guide how people see common threats emanating from 'external Others'.[269]

2.4.3 Analyzing foreign policy through discourses

In this research discourse is the way social activity (decision making) presents itself in the context of the NSS through the use of language.[270] A simplified example of this process is given by Hussein M. Adam. He argues that the president Clinton changed the U.S. policy on Somalia immediately after the death of 18 U.S. troops in Mogadishu on July 12th 1993. A political solution was pushed forwards instead of intervention and confrontation. Thus, the discourse surrounding the humiliation of dead soldiers affected foreign policymakers.[271]

---

[265] Hansen (2006), p. 6. In Hansen's view this is a Poststructuralist argument which *"implies a conceptualization of identity existing insofar as it is continuously rearticulated and uncontested by competing discourses".*
[266] For further discussion, see Wendt (1999) and Hansen (2006).
[267] Interestingly, Hansen points out that 'ontological questions cannot be answered at the level of empirical analysis'. If one uses discursive epistemology, it affects identity in way that it 'makes pre–social corporate and intrinsic identity impossibility, and vice versa'. For a look at the entire argument, see Hansen (2006), p. 8.
[268] Hansen (2006), pp. 25–26.
[269] Wendt (1999), p. 210.
[270] Sjöstedt (2013), p. 145. For Sjöstedt, the analytical focus in security studies is always related to national security. This is because of the role of the state as the foremost institution to 'handle all types of threats'.
[271] Adam, in Zartman (1995), p. 85.

Therefore, it matters how language is used to securitize failing states and how social reality is being structured accordingly. The use of language affects the way a securitized discourse is amplified. It forms intertextual and intersubjective links to create and sustain itself as an existential threat.[272] This affects how FS are being perceived as a threat and thus affects foreign policy accordingly.

Moreover, it places the discourses of the primary material (the NSS) in political context. In the analysis the focus is on how policy texts try to create stable arguments of FS as a threat to the U.S. Additionally, there is interest in if the stability of these arguments can be upheld even with a change in the administration. Moreover, there are always constraints in the policy making which affect the content of the document. Hence, the importance of the effect of securitization is significant. Examining this effect is seen as way of looking at how once established discourses are remobilized and re–enforced to retain the dominant discourse, or modify it to suit specific needs.[273] There are significant convergence in how key subjects and points of interests, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (from here on referred to as WMD's), rogue states, and terrorists, are connected to different discourses including failing states. This intersubjective link is visible in the chosen temporal span of 1990 to 2010 where certain themes carry on, while others wane and disappear only to resurface later.

This is done IOT ascertain sufficient empirical material and to look for how the discourses on FS surfaced, developed and evolved. Therefore, it covers the significant temporal nexus events such as the end of the Cold War, and the 9/11. These are focal points which are used to map the stability of the official discourse. Furthermore, these temporal nodes are used to analyze what happened to the discourse. How facts or events affected them either changing, amplifying or downplaying their importance. The temporal span specifically leaves out Arab Spring and the events after 2010 in an effort not to extend the research too much. There is significance in how facts are embedded and read into discourses as to have effect on the policy.

---

[272] This research acknowledges the premises of the Securitization theory as presented by the CS but uses a slightly modified version of the basic theory modelled after Hansen (2006). For the complex roles of speech act and intersubjective practices and their relations, see Balzacq (2005).

[273] To quote Hansen (2006)*"*, p. xvii: *"That official foreign policy is always speaking to and from contemporary as well as historical discourses indicates the convergence between the Discourse analysis….and writings on identity and discourse from series of other fields.."*

Official policy might use existing discursive framework to acknowledge facts (terrorists, rogue states and WMD's are a threat) and combine them with a new situation (post–9/11 and the threat of failing states as harbors of terrorists). However, there are always counter discourses, criticism and failures. These might lead to further emphasis on the argumentations on behalf on the official discourse, or to complete silence.[274]

The purpose of the DA in this research is to show how facts and related events are 'dependent upon a particular discursive framing of the issue and that this framing has political effects'.[275] In the case of FS this is the securitization and creation of an existential threat. It also presents an interesting question of why certain categories, statistics and indicators are used in the definition of state failure, and others are not? This will be addressed in chapter 3. Some of the problems in DA are linked to the relational nature of Constructivism. If causality is abandoned, a conundrum of how to show the effects of discourse becomes evident. Therefore, it is a question of 'how much discourse matters' in the face of material and causal attack against it, and 'what is the causal effect of identity on foreign policy'.[276]

Also, discourses are constantly in a flux in trying to assert themselves against counter–discourses that are trying to weaken or supplement them. This leads to a situation where it can be said that discourses never reach complete stability. Hence, it is only possible to analyze 'the relative ability of a discourse'.[277] There are also several other points of attack against DA. Most them come from the positivist side and are directed towards the ability of the DA to attain sufficient empiricism. How does one decide which DA is the best? Can you acclaim all readings of a text equally valid? This criticism can be seen as directed towards Poststructuralism more than Constructivism. It is due to the juxtaposition of the question of identity mentioned earlier and so it is more in the nature of theoretical debate than a methodological question.

---

[274] Hansen (2006), pp. 32–33. Hansen presents an excellent example of how the failure of G.W. Bush's administration to find any WMD's in Iraq was conveniently sidestepped without a comment. It thus blocked some of the counter discourses raised against the war in Iraq. Moreover, according to her the 'link between al–Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq was so preposterous' that the concurrent discourse disappeared very quickly, as it had no factual weight behind it. On the other hand, she argues that the Taleban ruled Afghanistan and the al–Qaeda's connection with it were 'a more fertile ground' for the securitizing discourse and threat creating. This made the military intervention more acceptable.

[275] Ibid., pp. 22–23.

[276] Ibid., pp. 25–26, p. 29.

[277] Ibid., p. 29. Hansen argues on the effect of stability as a factor in how well an analysis can be performed. A highly unstable discourse is the product of internally inconsistent identity, thus making it difficult to analyze.

However, Lene Hansen points out this 'attention to theoretical debate is misleading'. For her what really matters is the reading of the text and 'the explicit discursive articulations of signs and identities'.[278] Moreover, she argues that it is about the methodological rigor of the analyst and his or her 'interpretation of the signs' that matters.[279] The stability of the discourse and the interpretation of the analyst affect how and in what way the link between identity and policy can be found. This is what makes the reading of a text a good one or a bad one. This reiterates the fact that there is no one reading to account for everything and that every text can be the subject of a multiple readings and interpretations.[280]

2.4.5 Failing states as a discourse

Security discourses are constructed by the references and juxtapositions of 'Self' and 'Other'. They create threats of those who in some way are different than us. Through speech act the label of security is attached initiating the process of securitization as the 'Other' is described as an existential threat. Hence, power is acclaimed to step outside conventional procedure. At the same time responsibility to address the issue is required of those who invoke 'security'. In this way language is used to structure reality giving form to policy and action.

The same process as is described above happens in the NSS. It is usually connected to identities and interests as well as to culture and society. These create national interest which creates various security discourses. The discourses have intersubjective links into various key events and threats. The NSS also draws intertextual strength from other policy texts (other NSS documents) as possibly from the academic and scientific community.

To see FS as a discourse in the context of foreign policy one needs to look at how the concept was first coined, and how it evolved and eventually was securitized.[281] Moreover, failing states is far from a simple concept and it involves other concepts and discourses. Of these, the most important ones are sovereignty, state and security. These discourses also affect each other in one way or another. The concept of FS and its acronyms will be addressed in chapter three. The next part is a prequel to chapter three as it gives an idea of the FS as a discourse.

---

[278] Hansen (2006), p. 45.
[279] Ibid.
[280] See Appendix 6, picture 6, for the discourse analytical research design of this research.
[281] For discussion, see Call and Wyeth (eds.) (2008). See also, Fukuyama (2004), p. 2.

Tuomo Takala & Anna–Maija Lämsä presents an argument that the explicit definition of a concept is impossible. This is because 'a concept is not defined by any object outside language but instead the definition is created through other concepts and definitions'.[282] This argument hits in the epicenter of the paradigm of state failure discourse because it links three 'impossible' concepts together: state, security and state failure.

The origin of the FS discourse was tracked to the beginning of the 1990s when the concept of failing and failed states was coined[283]. Most sources refer to the article by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992/93) "Saving Failed States", in the *Foreign Policy* magazine as the source which brought the concept to prominence. It was adopted in the academic and policy debates during the 1990s.[284] This was because of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Soviet Union (from here on referred to as SU) into their constituent parts. Hence, the concept of state failure was born at the end of the Cold War, even though empires and states had risen and fallen well before that.[285] Interestingly, during the Cold War several states ceased to exist but at the time the discourse was about a collapse or regime change.

The 9/11 incident pushed the concept of state failure and its acronyms to the forefront of the academic community, and also into the awareness of foreign policy makers around the world.[286] In order to study the securitization of failing states with DA methodology there needs to be a definition of what a 'non–failing state' is. In addition, there needs to be an understanding of the context in where the concept is used. If the discussion is about FS then one needs to know when a state is not failing. Likewise, if we are using Securitization theory the knowledge of the thoughts of Buzan and Wæver are essential to the research. An excellent analogy on the nature of the failing state discourse can be given by comparing it to how a person can be recognized to be insane.

---

[282] Tuomo Takala & Anna–Maija Lämsä (2001), *"Tulkitseva käsitetutkimus organisaatio– ja johtamistutkimuksen tutkimusmetodologisena vaihtoehtona"*, Liiketaloudellinen aikakausikirja 50, p. 383. Takala and Lämsä note that most of the concepts in a study must be left as intuitively understood. Thus the focus should be on the most important concepts.

[283] Most sources refer to the article by Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992/93), "*Saving Failed States"* Foreign Policy Issue 89, pp. 3–18, as the source which brought the concept to prominence. The popular usage gained momentum after events of the September 11th 2001 both in bibliography and in policy documents.

[284] Call, Charles T. (2008), "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 8, p. 1491.

[285] For historical account, see for example, John. A. Hall (ed.) (1986) *States in History*, Tainter (1988), Tilly (1990) and Jackson (1990).

[286] Fukuyama (2004), pp. 125–126, Newman (2009), p. 421.

Insanity can be defined according to person's behavior by comparing it to one's own. Because the person's behavior differs from your own, they are deemed 'insane'. By reading enough signs of 'insanity' a diagnosis can be created which *proves* the person to be insane, whether or not this is actually true.[287] Likewise, a definition of a failing state is created by Western cultural context by using the Western sovereign state (an entity with 400–500 years of evolution) as a reference point.[288] This context is then used to create various discourses and definitions of collapsing, failing, and weak states. This can lead to securitization, as these entities are considered a threat to the 'non–failing' states. Successful securitization can lead to action and intervention IOT repair the 'damaged and dangerous' states. However, as it was with the insanity example the failing state discourse can be the interpretation and diagnosis created out of one's own cultural viewpoint, and not something that has a base in facts.

Furthermore, voice of criticism is especially directed at the cultural–historical context. Branwen G. Jones argues that the entire state failure discourse is disputable and highly subjective. For him, the conceptual 'language' of state failure draws from pre–existing Western notions of specific locations (such as Africa) as 'primordial and chaotic'.[289] Thus, 'an ahistorical and Eurocentric' account is accepted as the starting point. This results in distorted conceptualizing of what state failure is about.[290] The criticism is well placed, but it focuses primarily on the indicators or analyses which are created IOT assess the condition of various polities. Hence, it does not prevent analyzing foreign policy through discourses but it does create 'warning signs' in regard to the objectivity of the concept that should be remembered.

2.5 Objectivity, reaching for the unattainable

This part of the chapter 2 looks at how the objectivity of the research is affected by various issues. Hence, the section strives to interpret the voices of criticism, not in effort to silence them but rather to acknowledge the limitations we each bring with us. Social constructivism puts a lot of weight in the use of language. Language can be seen to construct reality and is in a very important role in how we define ourselves and our surroundings.[291] This is why it is

---

[287] Jokinen & Juhila & Suoninen (1993), pp. 32–33. Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen use Dorothy Smith's (1990) example of an analysis of an insanity as an example how cultural context affects deductions and conclusions.
[288] Ayoob (1995), pp. 29–30, Tilly (1990).
[289] Jones (2013), pp. 49–52.
[290] Ibid., Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 244. Construction of the Western Self as superior, strong and civilized is typical.
[291] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 33. 'Discursive approaches' argue that security is not definable objectively.

considered to be ‘a key stone of social constructivism’.[292] The power of language is seen in the concepts we use, the cultural background we exhibit, and in the norms of the society.[293] Because I am of Finnish background, I am also a product of that society. This means I have inherited all of its linguistics, concepts, and cultural implications. It positions me in a certain way when I’m reading literature in English and transcribe it into text. Moreover, it affects the concepts and texts without my knowledge. I am not a native speaker of English, nor have I the cultural and societal background of those who have written the material I study.[294] This is something I cannot change but it is something I must take note of.

Furthermore, the context in where concepts are used defines them. It leads to the fact that same concepts are found in different connections with different meanings. Therefore, the meaning of concepts varies due to ontological, theoretical, epistemological and methodological positioning. They are also affected by cultural and social context.[295] This comes quite visible in the following chapter where the concept of failing state is defined. The DA methodology and intersubjective and intertextual interpretation can cause its own variance. This happens, since every time a text is read there’s a possibility that that reading differs from the previous one. Hence, the information can change with consecutive readings. This is something that one cannot change (for example compared to statistical empiricism), but it have to be taken into consideration. There are also several points that should be noted in regards to cultural views, norms and values.

First, as a Finn I represent a Western cultural–normative background with the adjoining historical–ethical baggage. This applies also to the theoretical base of the study since the state system, IR, and the current concept of security originate from Western view.[296] This puts me into a position where everything I see and experience is through a set of specific ‘glasses’. This is bound to affect both the analysis as well the conclusions of the research.[297] A person with an Asian or African background would probably draw different conclusion and interpretation from the same material. This is something to be aware of and to accept the fact

---

[292] Burr (1995), pp. 32–33.
[293] Ayoob (1995), pp. 3–7. All of the concepts and definitions associated with state, security, international relations, state failure (with its analogies) are heavily colored by Western view due their origins.
[294] Burr (1995), p. 37. Vivien Burr argues that, ’the concepts we operate with are tied in with the kind of society we live in’. Thus, they are not arbitrary and they do not exist ‘out there’ for us to attach arbitrary labels. Therefore our conceptualization is the product of our society.
[295] Takala & Lämsä (2001), p. 383.
[296] Ayoob (1995), pp. 6–11, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 19.
[297] Sipilä & Koivula (2013), p. 15. According to them, voiced and unvoiced theoretical assumptions create our subjectivity. Therefore, researcher’s cultural–normative background can be seen to create our subjectivity.

that there cannot be a completely value–free research.[298] Second, this research does not have a hypothesis as such as. Instead it has a solid theoretical basis from which it strives to find new viewpoints on the chosen subject. Moreover, the lack of hypothesis can be seen to improve on the objectivity of the research. This is because there is no need to prove anything absolutely true or false, but to open new ways of looking at the phenomenon.[299] This positioning makes the theory of the research as means to analyze primary and secondary material from a specific, explicit, viewpoint.[300] This explicit viewpoint is created with Constructivism, Poststructuralism and Securitization theories, which leaves out other theories.

Third, quantitative research can provide additional objectivity by providing supporting or critical empiric data. However, because of the chosen theories and methods its use should be carefully considered. Fourth, material of the research consists of official documents and academic source material. Official documents (the NSS') have validity since they are prepared by a wide board of experts and politicians and are approved at the highest level of the government (president). However, the weaknesses of these documents are their heavy subjective nature which comes from the fact that they represent power (of the state). In them are embedded the motives and aspirations of those who have drafted them as well as the identity and interests of the state. Regardless, they are concrete decisions that have real world consequences and thus a valid source. Academic literature and articles strive by their very definition to be objective. Therefore, they retain a smaller amount of subjectivity than the official governmental documents but still have the same cultural–normative variance mentioned earlier. Peer review and cross–referencing in them also greatly increases the validity of a given study or article.

Finally, it should be remembered that all observation and conclusion of a given research are tied to the theory being used. Therefore no research can ever uncover the 'absolute truth'.
As Aki–Mauri Huhtinen puts it, 'absolute observation is possible only for a rock because it cannot choose the object of its action, environment, or create its own world.' [301]

---

[298] As noted, there are criticism directed toward Western notion of the conceptualization of state failure discourse and accusations of ahistorical and Eurocentric positioning.
[299] Jari Eskola & Juha Suoranta (1998), *Johdatus laadulliseen tutkimukseen*, p. 20. Qualitative research can test theories and see how it behaves even though there is no cause–relation.
[300] Alasuutari (1993), p. 61.
[301] Huhtinen (2002), p. 19. Huhtinen by this example reiterates the fact that living things cannot possess absolutely objective observation, and they cannot step outside their environment to observe reality. Thus, living things always create their own world and observations.

3 THE PARADIGM OF FAILING STATES DISCOURSE

–Ad fontes

The previous chapter defined the theoretical and epistemological grounds of this research. It showed the process of securitization and the significance of the speech act. Addition to this, methodological issues where addressed and the use of DA was defined. Moreover, the chapter also brought up counter arguments, criticism and the limitations of this research. This chapter takes a look in to the historical background of the modern state and ends in with conceptualizing and defining failing state. In order to analyze the securitization of failing states it is critical to understand the definition of what a state is. This is because concept and definition of the state affects the analysis of the primary material.

Buzan and Hansen argue that 'understanding the state is crucial if one is to debate about the state as the referent object of security', since questions of security 'evolve around the status of the state'[302] Therefore, the concept of state has to be addressed, before analysis of the NSS. This is because the analysis of the NSS documents relies on understanding how the concept of the state affects the discourse on FS. Furthermore, Sonali Huria argues that 'the concept of the state is central, since the discourse on the state failure is inescapably tied on the idea of statehood'.[303]

Therefore, IOT adequately define and understand state failure one must take a look how the state was perceived in the West. This can be done by looking at sovereignty, identity and the system of states. Western norms are the dominant defining factor on the background of the whole international system and the recognition of other states has this normative element embedded to it.[304] Conceptualizing and defining failing states through the origins of the Western state acts as a prelude for the analysis of the NSS in chapter 4. The Western view is ever present in the various definitions of state failure. Hence, it also affects the securitization of the failing states in the NSS documents.

---

[302] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 22.

[303] Huria (2008), p. 1. Nay (2013), p. 328. Nay argues that in the early 2000s 'there were no critical academic studies looking at the underlying issues' of the new policy debate in regards to failed and fragile states. This was problematic since it had already started to affect U.S. foreign policy. It was 'after 2005 that some academics started to stress the conceptual limitations'.

[304] Holm (1998), pp. 2–3. Holm argues that state weakness is a result of states system's foundation and having a confrontation between principles of sovereignty and power. Moreover, he refers to Martha Finnemore, RBJ Walker and Herbert Wight in that all states are evaluated and legitimized through the norms of the dominant states. Thus weak states are the consequence of how the system has been constituted.

3.1 Defining the sovereign state through Western view

This section opens up the discussion on the paradigm of failing states discourse. Its purpose is to look at origins of the state and how the concept is affected by the Western view. It shows how the concepts of state, sovereignty and security are tightly bound by history. As these concepts affect the definition of failing states, the connection between them is important to understand. The first discussion is how the Western world[305] sees state both historically and culturally and it will lay the basis for the next part and the discussion of states identity.

The 'Western view' is a generalized term[306] which can be seen to cover almost anything from geographical borders to culture and history. In this study it was regarded as the common conception of how the world is perceived by looking at it from a European and North American perspective. It is affected by cultural and societal factors developed over hundreds of years.[307] The importance of the Western view comes to fore with the definition of the state and sovereignty.

The concepts of state and sovereignty are more than anything a Western invention.[308] Therefore, the Western view affected the conceptualization of what a state *should* be and how sovereignty *should* be understood. Through these two concepts it contributed to how a failing state was defined and perceived.[309] All of these key concepts are referred to or described by in reference to something they are not.[310] Furthermore, to understand how the Western view was created it should be looked as knowledge constituted through culture. The process of how culture affects perception can be seen in the way common knowledge constitutes intersubjective understandings.[311] Hence, common knowledge is a kind of a group belief.

---

[305] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 1. Western view or reference group is difficult to define and not without problems.

[306] The main tenets are the shared cultural and societal heritage that emphasizes democracy, human rights, equality, and personal freedoms. Furthermore, *this study will not take into account* for theological or economic issues. 'Western view' will be considered a civilizational hybrid limited to the aforementioned areas and values.

[307] Barry Schutz "*The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for Governmental Legitimacy in Mozambique"* in Zartman (1995), p. 123. These factors can be seen in how issues such as corruption are thought of.

[308] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 19. According to Buzan and Hansen the Western concept of state has limited empirical and political significance for large parts of the 'non–Western world'.

[309] Rotberg (2004), pp. 40–41, For Rotberg failure of the state equals un–ability to perform as a state, thus the state is *failing.*

[310] Burr (1995), p. 38. See also, The White House (2010), *National Security Strategy*, p. 36. The U.S. defines itself through 'universal values' that set it apart from 'enemies, adversarial governments and potential competitors'.

[311] Zartman (1995), p. 2. For Zartman the discussion on state collapse as a concept is linked to the 'assumption by the current era' that everything (people and territory) should be divided into states.

According to Alexander Wendt, this kind of 'group belief' has 'collective memory' that affects the way the group views things. The cognitive resource of this sort helps policymakers to persuade people for action, and once created can be extreme difficult to shake.[312] Collective memory can be seen in effect when something is successfully securitized as an existential threat. It makes it easier to support a particular security discourse and harder to de–securitize it back to the realm of normal politics.

How this affects the discourse on failing states? Branwen G. Jones argues that the concept of state failure has over time become an integral part our thinking of what a state should be.[313] For Jones, 'the conceptual language of state failure is tied to long standing Western ideas of chaos and anarchy in Third World regions like Africa'. Jones' argument can be thought of as Wendt's form of 'group belief'. Similarly, the Western concept of security (of states) is tied to external threats and systemic security. This is different as posed to Third World concept of security which if connected to regime and state security.[314] Moreover, the following history shows how the constitution of the identity of the state is significantly affected by the Western view. It also links sovereignty and security as part of the state's identity.

The present identity and history of the state originated from ancient times in what is now known as Middle–East. There are similarity between these early polities and contemporary states.[315] This similarity could be thought of through geographical borders of city–states or empires.[316] There were also organized political groups and actors which had interaction with other polities such as theirs.[317] After the breakdown and collapse of the Roman Empire the Christian world was divided into what became Orthodox and Catholic empires. This state of affairs existed until 'the local rulers shed religious oversight of the Pope'.[318]

---

[312] Wendt (1999), pp. 163–164. This kind of process can be seen to be in effect in 2010s in regards to the global terrorism and violent Islamism. After 9/11 it is far easier to persuade subsequent actions for against threats of the same 'portrait'. See also, Balzacq (2005), pp. 186–187.
[313] Jones (2013), p. 49.
[314] Ayoob (1995), pp. 6–11.
[315] For an extensive discussion on the history of the Western state, see Tilly (1990).
[316] Peter Burke (1986), "City–States" in Hall (ed.) (1986), pp. 147–148.
[317] Wendt (1999), pp. 212–214. Interestingly, he argues that geographical borders do not equal state. Therefore, he challenges the Realist view that geographical boundaries equal also the borders of identity and interest. He extends the state's sense of 'Self' beyond its territory. Wendt's point can be seen historically in the cultural 'spheres' created by the Romans, the Greece and the Macedonians, respectively. Contemporary example is West in general and the U.S. in particular.
[318] Holm (1998), p. 3. The end of the Thirty Years of War in 1648 heralded the ending of the political authority of the Papal state. Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 22–24. A transformation from medieval to the modern system was significant because it changed the system of governance form. The change was from two overlapping (religious and political) to territorial sovereignty. See also, Pekka Visuri (1997), *Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia*, p. 194.

This event made warfare the main tool for settling grievances and arguments between rulers and defining borders.[319] Moreover, the physical dominance of its area and monopoly on the use of force freed the state of foreign influence in its internal affairs. It made 'modern states the successors of sovereigns'.[320] This solidification of authority within borders would eventually become the sovereignty of modern states. It initiated contemporary state formation and created the basis for the international system. The sovereignty in the Westphalian sense gave rise to a worldwide definition of state.[321] Therefore, the international system can be seen born in Europe with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Against this historical background the idea of specific geographical area is understandably at the epicenter of statehood.

However, Alexander Wendt argues that the *social meaning* of states borders can vary. He suggests that states can extend their 'Self' outside their borders and 'define their interests in collective terms'.[322] As an example, the U.S. extended its 'Self' to Europe after the WWII and made the effect permanent through allies and economic ties. Therefore, a war in Europe during the Cold War (involving allies) would have presented an existential threat to the U.S. The extended 'Self' would have been threatened regardless of the geographical distance of the actual borders. Identity and extended 'Self' are key elements that are addressed in all of the NSS documents. That also locates them at the epicenter of why failing states evolved into an existential threat to the U.S.

By a Weberian definition 'states are an organization possessing sovereignty and territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence'[323]. However, some commonalities should be emphasized to make the state something beyond the Weberian definition.

---

[319] Tilly (1990), p. 76. *"War wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of the states within it"*, Carl von Clausewitz [1832] Heikki Eskelinen (1998), *Sodankäynnistä*, p. 27. The often quoted phrase by Clausewitz is that 'Warfare is the continuation of politics by other means' Although, Clausewitz though war as a part of foreign policy he did not think it as inevitable continuation of it. Only when political means had been exhausted, war could be necessary. Moreover, he though war as an interaction between people that should be avoided, if possible. See also Wendt (1999), p. 213.

[320] Rotberg (2004), p. 3, Ayoob (1995), p. 23, Wendt (1999), pp. 206–207. Wendt argues that internal sovereignty is what makes states as the only power within a society which can make binding political decisions. Thus, it replaces other actor such as church and corporations.

[321] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 24, Rotberg (2004), pp. 2–3, Stephen D. Krasner (1999) *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, p. 20. Krasner stipulates that the significance of Westphalia was in that in defined the sovereignty of state as resting upon the duality of internal authority and external freedom of action.

[322] Wendt (1999), p. 212. This phenomenon as described by Wendt has excellent contemporary examples in Ukraine where Russia has extended its 'Self' to Crimean peninsula and Eastern Ukraine.

[323] Ibid., p. 199, 206, Adam in Zartman (1995), p. 87. By definition, this makes any territory held by rebels, revolutionaries, or criminals a state. The issue of the Islamic State (IS) is a contemporary example of this. IS has declared a Caliphate in areas that are part of the states of Syria and Iraq.

First, a state should have some sort of institutional–legal order to enforce laws and create governmental institutions. Second, it should have an organization successfully claiming the legitimate use of force. Third, the state should possess internal and external sovereignty. Fourth, there should be a society and territory.[324] A state's area may vary from an island to continental dimension. Its institutions can be democratic, autocratic or theocratic. Sovereignty may be implicit or weak, and state's society may be homogenous or heterogeneous. Regardless of these, organized violence is always about the coordinated use of deadly force. Therefore, this control over force of violence as a means of destruction is 'the ultimate and distinctive basis of state power and only thing essential to stateness'.[325]

Even states which have no armies to speak of have police force and vice versa, a state can have an army but not an effective police force.[326] However, both of these dimensions must be within the states control. This can be seen as how most Western states are constructed and it subsequently affects how Western states view other states in the system.[327] Hence, it is also significant for defining the concept of failing states.[328] Alexander Wendt's Constructivist view of the essential state crystallizes the different aspects from above. He defines state as:

> *"organizational actor embedded with institutional–legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and has territory over which it has legitimate monopoly on organized violence"*.[329]

This can be tied to the prime responsibility that the state has for its citizens, which is the provider of the 'political good of security.'[330] Geographical territory and identity are embedded in the concept of sovereignty.[331] This makes sovereignty central for both the definition of the state and the failing state.[332]

---

[324] Call and Wyeth (eds.) (2008), pp. 7–8, Wendt (1999), p. 201–214. Michael Mann *"The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results"* in Hall (ed.) (1986), p. 112. For a detailed historical account, see, Tilly (1990), and Hall (1986). For a societal look, see Tainter (1998) and Bull [1977] (2002).
[325] Wendt (1999), pp. 204–205.
[326] Ibid., pp. 204–205. According to Wendt the legitimacy of the violence by state is a problematic definition because of the competing actors such as criminals or insurgents. In his mind, the right of the state to exercise the power of violence has to be accepted by society.
[327] Christopher Clapham *"The Global–Local Politics of State Decay"* in Rotberg (2004), pp. 80–82, Ayoob (1995). Clapham and Ayoob both see IR as biased in that every form of 'state' can more or less be accepted for the purposes of the system. This emphasizes the idea that in the eyes of the system states are the only 'legitimate and acceptable form of rule'.
[328] Nay (2013), pp. 332–333.
[329] Wendt (1999), p. 213.
[330] Rotberg (2004), p. 3.
[331] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 11. The connection of sovereignty and security 'places threats within boundaries.
[332] Krasner (1999), pp. 98–99.

There are numerous reasons why sovereignty is a paradigm of modern times.[333] Traditionally sovereignty was seen as the ability to decide both foreign and domestic policies without outside interference. It is also about the ability to freely decide participation and membership in international organizations.[334] Therefore, sovereignty is the precondition for a state to exist and to be recognized by its peers. The widely accepted norms of reference are the Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty.[335]

However, a contemporary Westphalian sovereignty is far from problematic as various cases (the Balkans in 1990s, Iraq and Libya in 2000s, and Syria and Ukraine in 2010s) have showed.[336] There are also other reasons to question the validity of sovereignty. Pekka Visuri and Francis Fukuyama argue that for various reasons (e.g. economic development and transnational operations) the meaning of sovereignty has been eroded. Hence, it does not have the same meaning it did during the Cold War.[337] This view also binds Western conceptualization of 'new threats' into the development of globalization and makes threats transnational.[338]

This conceptualization of 'new threats' can create intersubjective and intertextual links. These links can then connect existential threats to problems (like failing states), thus securitizing them heavily. This process can be seen in effect in chapter 4 where securitizing of FS is presented.

---

[333] Zartman (1995), pp. 1–4, p. 98, Rotberg (2004), p. 27. Rotberg, like Krasner, Clapham and Herbst think that state failure reflects misplaced forms of sovereignty. According to all of them, sovereignty should never have been accorded to post–colonial entities. See also, Buzan (1991).

[334] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 24. The non–interference in domestic matters of states was seen as the precondition for international stability.

[335] Holm (1998), pp. 10–11. The nature of the state is considered by Holm to be amidst change but its survival is guaranteed. However for him, problematic is the un–stability of weak states and the intervention by strong states to preserve the status–quo.

[336] Clapham, in Rotberg (2004), pp. 80–82. Only the superpowers had the privilege of assuring their sovereignty without resulting to 'sovereignty–sapping alliances'. Ayoob (1995), p. 173. The normative change from post 1945 to post–Cold war relaxed attitudes. There was a change from strict sovereignty and territoriality and affected state failure. Great powers had less interest in keeping up the status–quo in the 'peripheral areas', including the Balkans.

[337] Visuri (1997) p. 216, Fukuyama (2004) pp. 129–131, For further discussion on sovereignty, see Buzan et al. (1998) and Krasner (1999).

[338] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 8, Wendt (1999), p. 208. International therefore limits what states can do, even though they might have the power to do what they want. Wendt's argument is proven somewhat invalid by the actions of the U.S. after 9/11. A lone superpower has considerable more freedom of action, of which the Iraq war of 2003 is the case in point.

3.2 Identity of the state and the international system

The previous section looked at the historical background of the state. It brought up the cultural–normative issues as well as how sovereignty and identity affect the definition of the concept. This section continues by focusing on the identity creation of the state and how the 'Self–Other' dichotomy is created. Furthermore, it will provide the starting point for the definition of the failing state concept in the next section.

The model of a Western state was transported to other parts of the world in many forms. Of these the best known is that of colonialism. Colonialism divided the entire world in to the European style states.[339] By doing so, it made stateness *the* perquisite for any polity to act as legitimate actor in the system.[340] Moreover, Hans–Henrik Holm argues that the dominant states created the normative basis from which the international system was built. Therefore, they provided *the idea of what a state should be* as well as the legal framework associated with it.[341] Moreover, this relationship of states and the system is also capitalized in the Constructivist view of Alexander Wendt. He argues that the system cannot exist without states as the units (states) make the system possible.[342]

Wendt's thoughts put Robert Rotberg's (and others like him) in a new light. Rotberg and many others argue that 'a state's violent disintegration and weakness constitutes a threat to the states system'.[343] These ideas reflect the fears of the established states system that if its constituent parts fail, the whole system will fall like dominoes with them.[344] It also highlights the fact that a domestic acceptance is less important than international. Hence, what ultimately matters is the ability to force your existence into being.

---

[339] Clapham in Rotberg (2004), p. 79. Clapham iterates the difference of European states (including the U.S. and Canada), and the rest. Clapham's notion is based on the European states contiguous existence and high interest in territoriality. This contiguous existence affected the idea that the globe should be divided as states.

[340] Ibid., p. 80, Ayoob (1995), pp. 26–27. According to Ayoob, 'Western model is essentially a state system rather than nation system'. In this model the state takes precedence over the nation.

[341] Holm (1998), p. 1, Ayoob (1995), p. 83. Ayoob presents a view where the increase of 'failed and semi–failed' states is caused by the international norm. It adds to a 'paradoxical situation' because the norm provides protection against disappearance of states. See also, Michael Stohl, (2011) *Fragile, Failed and Failing States: State Terrorism and the International Community*, Department of Communication University of California, Santa Barbara, pp. 15–16. Stohl argues that the UN represents the Westphalian system through states and not peoples. Therefore the UN makes 'Self' about existing states and not ethnicity, language or culture.

[342] Wendt (1999), p. 193–194. Wendt raises this argument against Realism and its dominance in the field of IR. He provides and alternative way of defining and thinking about the states system. See also, Holm (1998). In Holm's view, the threat to the states system comes failing states because failure undermines the normative 'underpinning of the system'.

[343] See, for example Rotberg (2004), p. 1, and Ayoob (1995), p. 196.

[344] Stohl, (2011), p. 2.

This relationship of states and the system provides a view on how failing states could also be perceived as an existential threat. It extends the threat of state failure beyond any singular polity or region and creates a systemic threat of FS. States exist as part of the system and they define their identities in relation to other states. Hence, they create various threats through these identities. Threats to state (and to its identity) are often depicted through national interests. Alexander Wendt argues that states identities and interests contribute for the state as national interests, which define its existence.

For him, states identity 'generates motivational and behavioral dispositions'.[345] These are subjective qualities are somewhat dependent on how others see the state in question.[346] This intersubjective reference causes traffic both ways in the formation of the identity. Therefore, it affects how state sees itself internally and how it is seen externally.[347] This can be seen as a process in which Western developed states compare themselves to undeveloped states. It can also be a comparison of welfare and prosperity *within* the collective of Western states (e.g. European Union [EU] or G–8 and G–20 nations).

This way intersubjective links work as a way to define 'Self' by comparing it to the 'Other'. Furthermore, it makes the 'Other' to create its identity by looking through 'Self'. Because of this reference and comparison, the 'Other' might not create a distinct identity of its own. This can be seen in how failing states are defined by Western democracies by comparing these states to their 'Self'. Subsequently they define the 'Other' as something they are not. Therefore, a non–failing state creates the failing state and vice versa. There are also numerous other 'identities' that affect how the identity of the state is formed.[348] These bind together the collective 'Self' to form up the identity of the state.[349] In addition, Hans–Henrik Holm argues that there exists 'an interaction between power of the state and the international norms'. For him, the identity of the state is constituted by a combination of international norms and state's own norms.[350] This adds a transnational normative element to the identity formation.

---

[345] Wendt (1999), p. 224–225.
[346] Ibid., Holm (1998), p. 4. Holm argues that 'states cannot exist without a system of states' and also they cannot be 'sovereign without other sovereign states'. The states have to 'give away sovereignty in able to be sovereign'. Wendt's interdependence and its relation to the very existence of states, is similar to Holm's.
[347] Wendt (1999), p. 224. For Wendt there are four different kind of identity: personal (or corporate), type, role, and collective. These affect the character of the internal–external structure of identity. States are seen as 'group self' presenting corporate identity. Type identities correspond to state forms such as democracy. Role identities exist in relation to 'Other', and collective identity is a combination of type and role identities.
[348] These 'identities' include for example cultural distinctiveness, form of state and perception of 'Self' in relation to the 'Other'.
[349] Wendt (1999), pp. 225–229.
[350] Holm, (1998), p. 4.

Holm emphasizes more than Wendt the influence between the state and the system as a factor for identity construction. On the other hand Wendt sees the identity construction as an intersubjective process, where the state's 'Self' creates its identity through 'Other' (other states, not the *system* of states).[351] The differences aside, both Wendt and Holm regard the state's own norms as a factor in defining its identity. By doing this they give weight to the argument that the Western view is inseparably presented in the model of the state. In this study the argument of Wendt and Holm can be seen in the way the U.S. identity is created in the NSS documents. It displays the 'Self–Other' relation through national interests and existential threats. There is also the international normative element through NATO and EU.

Furthermore, for Wendt interests define what states want and exhibit some of the same cultural properties as identities. They give light to some of the actions that are not explained by identities alone.[352] This connection between identity and interest is described by Wendt:

> *"The US cannot be a state without its monopoly on organized violence (corporate), a capitalist state without enforcing property rights (type), a hegemon without its clients (role), and a member of the West without the solidarity with other Western states (collective)."*[353]

It is interesting how Wendt sees this connection of identity and interest where the interests of the state motivate it through the aforementioned four identities. He also argues that this combination is what generates 'national interest'. National interest is a very important factor when we look at how state defines threats and securitizes various issues.[354] Moreover, national interests also build threats to other nations as a byproduct. This is because they are portrayed in the national security strategies of the great powers and therefore have world–wide effect.[355] Essentially, national interests are the discourses that give clues to what the state thinks are its vital interests. Existential threats can be derived either straight from these or by looking at the intersubjective links created between various threats and issues. For all the states these include sovereignty and physical safety, but for great powers there are also issues such as critical energy resources and free access to transport routes.

---

[351] Wendt (1999), pp. 230–231.
[352] Ibid., This connection is mutually important. Without interests there is no motivation, and without identities there are is no direction for interests.
[353] Ibid., p. 232.
[354] William J. Foltz, "*Reconstructing the State of Chad"*, in Zartman (1995), p. 25. Foltz describes how in Chad during Habré's reign "Libyan imperialism" replaced European colonialism as 'an all–purpose external enemy'. Hence, it can be said that Libya was *securitized* successfully by Habré as the 'Other'. Therefore, Libya became the threatening 'Other' which was an existential threat to 'Self'.
[355] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 6.

However, it is important to take note of Wendt's own argument of how 'states are not inherently self–interested' and as such not by nature Realist.[356] For Wendt sovereignty has special meaning as the recognition of other states carries with itself the label of nominal equality in front of 'Other's'. According to him this makes the state less keen on securing itself by destroying other states.[357] This can be seen as a stabilizing effect on the fear of being conquered, or being left without notice or prestige.[358] Consequently, there is a connection between identities and interest's which is mutually constitutive. Interests are presented to have objective and subjective properties which are always balancing against one another. This balancing of subjective and objective interests can end unsuccessfully (in disharmony) causing state failure.[359]

3.3 Conceptualizing and defining failing states

The previous sections dealt with how state became to be the preferred political entity in the West. It also showed how the concept of sovereignty is tightly bound with the Western concept of what constitutes a state.[360] Furthermore, it showed how the identity of the state forms and what are the discourses on the nature of the state. This section uses that premise to conceptualize and define what constitutes a failing state. States have collapsed throughout the history but the more contemporary state failure can be divided into two periods.[361]

---

[356] Wendt (1999), pp. 233–234, Ayoob (1995), p. 130. Ayoob presents a bleaker view than Wendt. For him, humanitarian interventions are selective. They depend largely upon great power interests, and as such are quite Realist by nature. Mohamed Ayoob (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament*, p. 208.

[357] Zartman (1995), p. 9. Physical threat in particular can take the form of predation by neighboring states. Zartman argues that the neighboring polities take advantage of the weakness of the state. Hence, they intervene on its affairs and breach its sovereignty. This results in expansion of the problem and makes 'the collapsing state broader than its borders'.

[358] Wendt (1999), p. 237. The effect of prestige as presented by Wendt, can be seen in in contemporary Russia. Russia emphasizes the sovereignty of states and the power of the UN Security Council. It is very sensitive about its status because of the legacy of the Soviet Union and its possession of nuclear weapons.

[359] Ibid., pp. 233–234. For Wendt, the critical point is the balance between the objective and subjective interests. If this cannot be accomplished it will eventually lead to the failure of the actor (the state). For comparison, Rotberg (2004), p. 13, describes destructive leadership as the predominant explanation of how a state can fail and then collapse. Is this 'destructive leadership' then the weight that tips Wendt's scale of 'objective' and 'subjective' interests? Or can it present itself as one or the other? There's no simple explanation and as the purpose here is not to find causal explanation of state failure, however it opens an interesting point of view on Wendt's conceptualization. See also, Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 24–26.

[360] Manjikian (2008), p. 342. According to Manjikian, 'current thinking about failed states rests on Realist assumptions'. This is characterized by the Realist notion of power and how it defines the existence of the state.

[361] For a look on collapse of complex societies, see Tainter (1988). For detailed historical account of states, see Tilly (1990) and Hall (ed.) (1986). Robert Rotberg (ed.) (2004), p. 2, 20, localizes the explosion in the number of polities to the year 1914. First World War and the disintegration of Austro–Hungarian and Ottoman empires were the first wave. The second wave was WWII and it would lead to the explosion in the number of states as a result of de–colonization.

In the first period are states that experienced failure and collapse during the Cold War[362]. At that time state failure was already a recurring event in many parts of the world. Failures resulted from de–colonialization and they were the legacy of colonial borders and an attempt by the local populations to emulate their former masters.[363] These collapses and failures were mitigated by superpower support which made them less catastrophic.[364] In the second period are those states that failed after the Cold War ended and the interests of the West moved into a different direction.[365] Hence, the interests of this research lie not in the former, but with the latter period. The Cold War period is used as necessary for conceptualization purposes.

After the Cold War, rise of the U.S. and the disintegration of the Soviet empire heralded a new era. This era saw states (such as Yugoslavia) failing all around.[366] The concept of state failure was first coined in the early 1990s by Gerald B. Hellman and Steven R. Ratner in the famous article of *"Saving Failed States"* in the Foreign Policy Magazine.[367] The post–Cold War concept of state failure was tied to the break–up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia, but it had its conceptual roots in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, it served as a catalyst and a reference point from which the current security discourse on failing states originated. Hence, the contemporary periods of state failure needs to be situated for the analysis of FS and their securitization in the NSS documents. Therefore, there should be a definition of what constituted failure in the post–Cold War period. The following discussion represents a (mostly) Western view of what constituted failure and what did not. As such, it does not necessarily coincide with the views of the rest of the world.[368]

---

[362] Bates (2008), pp. 11–12. Bates point to 1980s and 1990s when African governments reformed, and states failed.

[363] Ayoob (1995), pp. 47–49. For example in Africa, the cultural, ethnical, and local tribal structures did not fit inside areas divided by colonial great powers. Bates, (2008), pp. 33–34, Jackson (1990), p.198, Kalevi J. Holsti (1996), *The State, war, and the state of war*, pp. 62–65.

[364] Holm (1998), pp. 7–8, According Holm the Cold War security logic suppressed the internal legitimacy principle. Hence, the super power support kept up 'weak states' with external recognition and abundant material support. One example of the complexity of the post–Cold War situation is described by Martin Lowenkopf, *"Liberia: Putting the State Back Together"* in Zartman (ed.) (1995), p. 91. Lowenkopf highlights the international dimension of the conflict in Liberia in 1990s. He lists as participants no less than Liberia's West African neighbors, the UN, the U.S., France and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is a significant change in regards to the Cold War situation. During Cold War the superpowers themselves where the main sponsors. This made them also the main orchestrators of state failure and resuscitation. See also, Ayoob (1995), p. 70.

[365] Tilly (1990), p. 208, Holm (1998), p. 5, Strachan (2016), Ayoob (1995), p. 80. Cold War can be seen to have led to a number of polities to be considered as 'quasi–states'. For a definition, see Jackson (1990), p. 5, 21.

[366] Nay (2013), p. 327, Bates (2008), p. 28.

[367] Helman and Ratner (1992/93).

[368] Mary Manjikian, (2008), *"Diagnosis, Intervention, and Cure: The Illness Narrative in the Discourse of the Failed State"*, Alternatives 33, p. 336. Ayoob (1995), p. 13. Ayoob highlights the problematic nature of the concept of Third World and how individual states within the Third World are defined according to the common perception. This applies also to the concept of failing state.

3.3.1 Strong and 'non–failing' states

Most definitions of state failure and subsequent concepts in the source material break down into the question of how strong a state is. Hence, failure is about the dichotomy between strong and weak states. This basic issue of strength has transformed into a wide variety of categories for state failure. These include strong, weak, collapsed, failed and failing states, as well as many which are somewhere along the spectrum.[369] Robert Rotberg has argued that all of these different categories have the same basic demands. They 'buffer external forces and mediate challenges of the international arena as well as internal economic, political, and social realities'.[370] Therefore, these functions and demands are the same regardless of the category (or strength) of the state in question.

Alexander Wendt stipulates that 'strong state structures enable state actors to mobilize significant resources from society'.[371] Conversely, a weak or a failing state would be 'a polity which has weak or non–existent state structures'. This would make it 'unable to mobilize resources form within society'.[372] These generalizations coincided well with the NSS documents as we see in chapter 4 where the 'Self–Other' dichotomy of the U.S is presented. For Robert Rotberg, a *strong state* is one which delivers various political goods. These include (among many others) security, law, property rights, effective judicial system and political freedom, medical and health care, and working infrastructure. This list exhibits the comprehensive government structures and is an example of how Western states see themselves.[373] The strength of states could also be defined through the four interests of the state (physical survival, autonomy, economic well–being and collective self–esteem).[374]

---

[369] Nay (2013), p. 327, 338. For Nay, the concepts of 'fragile and failed state' have conceptual flaws and limitations. They are 'policy oriented labels' and based on 'state–centric and ahistorical' perspective. According to him they are useless for policy and 'shallow, confusing and imprecise'. This is why he thinks they should not be used by scholars. See also, Call (2008), p. 1492.

[370] Rotberg (2004), p. 2. See also, Stohl (2011), p. 3 and Bates (2008), pp. 130–131.

[371] Wendt (1999), p. 203. According to Wendt this would imply to a 'strong connection' between the power structures of institutions and officials of the government (including the use of force). Wendt points out that 'systemic IR theorists implicitly consider states strong if the state–society complexes are under the control of the state'. His counterargument is that 'in reality most state structures are considerable weaker'.

[372] Ayoob (1995), p. 74. For Ayoob, state weakness in Third World states is 'a function of the lack of unconditional legitimacy of state structures and governing regimes'.

[373] Rotberg (2004), p. 4, 10. Interestingly, Francis Fukuyama (2004), pp. 7–11, raises the question can the United States be considered a weak or a strong state because of the conscious effort to limit government regulative power? This opens an unconventional look into the definition of statehood. Generally the Western states and their cohesion and statehood have been somewhat of a given thing. Buzan (1991), p. 113.

[374] Strength of the state can be evaluated not just through performance or governmental structures. It can be evaluated also by looking at what constitutes the state's interest, and how these are addressed. The White House (2006), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, p. 4. The NSS of 2006 lists qualities of an 'effective democracy' thus creating the identity of 'Self' as a strong state.

These four are in the NSS and can be seen to relate to Wendt's four identities. These collectively make up the *national interest* of the state and must be met, or the state will 'die out'. Moreover, an existential threat to the state would be constituted if *any* of these key interests became threatened.[375] These four points of Alexander Wendt's described the basic tenets of a *Western* state which have been the standard model for other polities around the world. They are also typical for democratic states with a high respect for human rights. The four interests thus lay the basis for a stable structure from which the state can continue to develop. Consequently, strong states have set the standards by which other states evaluate themselves, and by what they strive to become.[376]

3.3.2 Weak, failed and collapsed states

The concepts of weak, failed and collapsed states are significant since they are used interchangeably with the concept of failing states. These conceptual analogies applied to primary and secondary source material, including the NSS documents. The strength and identity of the (Western) state was derived from industrialized and effective democratic society. How the weak 'Other' was transformed and got defined as threatening based on this? According to William Zartman, the 'state project' should not have been thought to work everywhere. In the places it didn't take hold it was 'spatially and temporally insufficient'.[377] Moreover, the borders that were drawn by colonial powers were a factor, as was the culturally specific nature and structure of local politics. This created a condition where locals were unable to create systems to match European states and their long development.[378]

---

[375] Wendt (1999), p. 238. According to Wendt there are problems in interpreting national interest. He suggests that it should be looked at inductively instead of deductively. This is because 'states need to do certain things to secure their identities.' In this research the interpretation is abductive. Buzan (1991), pp.119–120.

[376] Azzedine Layachi, *"Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating a Civil Society"*, in Zartman (ed.) (1995), pp. 186–187. Layachi argues that 'a strong states is one in which the state is able to make decisions while ignoring any *specific* interest the society might harbor. Ayoob (1995), p. 84. According to Ayoob, human rights 'owes its empirical validity to the successful industrialized Western state' which is both democratic and responsive, thus 'setting the standards for effective statehood'. Mark James (2012), "*The Other Civil Society: Organized Crime in Fragile and Failing States"*, Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2012), p. 227.

[377] Zartman (1995), p. 6. Zartman argues that there is no causality visible in different cases that would deem a specific Western style state incompatible to Africa. The problem was that in 60 years people should have been able to create states to match Europe's 400 year process.

[378] Christopher Clapham, "*The Global–Local Politics of State Decay"*, in Rotberg (2004), pp. 84–86. Clapham argues that the costs of the statehood (social, economic and political) have been more than the benefits it provided in Africa. Europeans have endured these costs as well, but it was done so long ago that it is usually forgotten. Ayoob (1995), pp. 28–32. Ayoob echoes Clapham, and stipulates that postcolonial Third World states are under pressure to present themselves as adequate states. This is done in a very short time span compared to the European state–making. Schutz, in Zartman (1995), p. 112. For Schutz, the international community is pre–occupied in trying to put together states that have lost legitimacy. He points out the vulnerability of African states due to 'claims and consequences of internal dispute and conflict and external ambitions and operations'. According to him this is a legacy of European power politics of the nineteenth century.

Even the modern European states system continued its evolution in the 20th century. In Europe the SU collapsed 70 years after its conception. After the collapse some of its constituent parts were categorized as 'developing countries' by the World Bank (henceforth WB). Moreover, this created division of poor and rich on Western terms and named those states something less than their Western European counterparts.[379] William Zartman's work gave a temporal starting point for the failing state concept by being situated at mid–1990s. He presented a thought that important transitions were followed by 'waves of collapse'.[380] Furthermore, Barry Buzan (like Zartman) did not contribute de–colonization as the pre–eminent cause of state collapse. Instead, he emphasizes the combined effect of internal and external factors.[381]

There is a similarity with the Third World states and their characteristics that resembles the later definitions of various forms of failure. According to Mohammed Ayoob, 'the prototypical Third World state' usually presented the following characteristics: Lack of internal cohesion, unconditioned legitimacy of borders, weak institutions, vulnerability to internal and interstate conflicts with external actors, distorted economic and social development, and marginalization in regards to international economic and security concerns.[382] These account for a number of humanitarian issues that draw attention from international community. Furthermore, these characteristics have also been one major indicator in different studies of what constituted state failure (and what constituted a state for that matter). Moreover, these humanitarian issues have been the source of Western intervention discourse (and justification).[383] Humanitarian reasons have also been used to breach the established norms of sovereignty in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya.

---

[379] Leonid L. Fituni, "*The Collapse of the Socialist State: Angola and Soviet Union"* in Zartman (1995), pp. 145–146. In Europe, this categorization to 'rich and poor' has been repeated as recently as 2010s. It was done with the economic crisis of member states of the EU. Namely this affected Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. Nay (2013), pp. 328–329. Holsti (1996), pp. 80–81. Several of the states 'born after 1945 and 1989 were weak'.

[380] Zartman (1995), pp. 2–4. These transitions would be such as de–colonialization, détente and the end of the Cold War. He stipulates that the state collapse in Africa cannot be solely contributed to de–colonization and it's after effects. It is a more complex condition containing nationalist, second–or later generation regimes ruling over established states. See also, Rotberg (2004) and Ayoob (1995) for discussion on colonialization and state failure in Africa.

[381] Buzan (1991), p. 98. According to Buzan most notable of these factors were a momentary surge of nationalism and lack of coherent cultural group. It was this condition that was left as the political legacy by governments. These were 'a state without a nation, and many nations in a state. See also, Zartman (1995), pp. 1–4, and Wendt (1999), p. 9. Wendt (like many others) also refer to the article of Helman and Ratner (1992/93) for the concept of state failure. He takes a note of the issue by linking it to the monopoly on the use of violence. For him this struggle has been going on from pre–modern days and still continues. As a result some states have failed in the process.

[382] Ayoob (1995), pp. 15–16. Insecurity is the 'defining' characteristic of Third World states. Holsti (1996), p. 79.

[383] Ibid., pp. 84–85, Human rights have become part of the norms that govern the international system.

Consequently, this has opened a way of defining failing states in Western terms.[384] Rotberg's categories of political goods coincided well with Ayoob's definition of a 'Third World state'. Through evaluation of the performance of the state in these categories, a further definition could be applied. Hence, states were defined *weak* or *failed* depending on how much deficit is evaluated to accumulate within the categories.[385] There are also institutional approaches to failure and collapse of states. With these the different dimensions of stateness[386] were evaluated for various degrees of weaknesses. The discourse is then related to the concept of 'good governance'. Good governance has been one of the major elements for state strength looked at by Western governments, including the International Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF) and the WB. It has been the pre–condition for support to the developing countries.[387] Good governance has also been generally associated with the effectiveness of the state. Mohammed Ayoob argues that 'the lack of effective statehood' created *quasi–states* which in turn were the 'precursors of failed states.' [388] The end of the Cold War then helped to evolve some of these quasi–states into failed states.

It can be said that quasi–states were an analogue for weak, failing, failed and collapsed states. Therefore, the concept of quasi–states created a *conceptual* point of departure for the state failure discourse. Furthermore, the concepts of quasi–states and weak states were frequently used interchangeably. Both concepts described the same conditions that prevailed at the closing days of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. *Weak states* (like quasi–states) had problems in various categories of effective statehood. The more difficulties they had, the more they leaned towards failure. Weak states could be seen as 'lacking social cohesion, institutional core and organizational capacities'[389]. This extended the definition of the weak state beyond security, territorial sovereignty and political system. Moreover, the weakness of

---

[384] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 2. According to Limnéll and Raitasalo the use of military force has grown to be commonplace. In part the military threat to West is seen to be caused by weak and failing states. Ayoob (1995), pp. 82–83. Military force has been used to prevent state failure (and destruction) in Lebanon (by Syria) and Kuwait (by the U.S.).

[385] Rotberg (2004), p. 4, 10. Rotberg raises the issue of human agency as the cause of states sliding from weakness to failure and collapse. He does not consider structural flaws or institutional insufficiencies to be the as decisive.

[386] Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "*State Collapse and Reconstruction in Uganda"* in Zartman (1995), p. 34. 'Stateness' can be understood as the ability to guide human action 'towards expectations and rules of procedures'. Also, it can be the institutions capacity to set rules and force obedience. See also, Fukuyama (2004).

[387] Holm (1998), pp. 8–9, Ayoob (1995), p. 171. In 1991 Somalia 'slid into acute state of un–governability' and thus became 'prime contemporary example of a failed state'. For critical view, see for example, Jones (2013).

[388] Ayoob (1995), p. 172. For in depth discussion on quasi–states, see Jackson (1990).

[389] Khadiagala in Zartman (1995), p. 35. Khadialaga puts these properties as specifically the problem of African states.

the state presented itself through the very *nature* of the state.[390] This meant that the nature of the regime (ideology) was also a factor in the creation of the 'Self–Other' dichotomy. Hence, it affected the creation of identities and can be seen through intersubjective links.[391]

Juxtaposed to strong states, the concepts of *failed* and *collapsed* states reside with weak states in the utmost end of the spectrum. The state could be *considered failed* when it was deemed to have disqualified in most, or all of the criteria mentioned above. This makes a *failed state* 'conflicted, dangerous, and contested by warring factions'.[392] The most significant factor is the 'enduring character of the violence'.[393] Violence has led to a loss of control in various regions and the polity is no longer 'able or willing' to act as a state. Moreover, this condition has degenerated into a situation where the state has lost its international legitimacy.[394]

These descriptions of failure reflect also on the definition of the state itself. To be effectively named a state, the polity should have retained internal control and monopoly on the use of force within its borders. It also needs the recognition of other states in the system. Without these preconditions, the state is considered to be a threat to the system and to other states. The systemic threat is related to the (partial or complete) un–ability of the state to control what happens inside its area.[395] Furthermore, if the loss of the control leads to a situation where failing and failed states are completely consumed by anarchy, they become *collapsed* states. Collapse of the state is a situation where the institutions of the state vanish, and it cannot meet the requirements of a state anymore. Hence, the 'purposeful entity disappears' and 'the regulative and penetrative capacity' of the state broke down.[396]

---

[390] Shipho Shezi, "*South Africa: State Transition and the Management of Collapse"*, in Zartman (1995), p. 191. Shezi argues that the South African apartheid regime was weak from the beginning due to its 'immoral ideology'. This made its weakness a chronic one and the failure of the state a certainty. By this argument the, Soviet Union was bound from the start to end in a collapse and failure. Interestingly, the NSS documents define rogue states and state failure often through ideology and the nature of the regime (autocratic, theocratic, tyrannical etc.).

[391] This is a significant factor in how the U.S. defines the Self and the radical threatening 'Other'. The NSS documents typically portray the 'Other' as autocratic (Russia and China), theocratic (Iran), tyrannical (N–Korea, Gaddafi's Libya and Saddam's Iraq). Therefore, they are a threat to the democratic U.S. (and the West) which values freedom of religion, freedom of speech and human rights. For reference, see the NSS's 1990–2010.

[392] Rotberg (2004), pp. 5–6

[393] Ibid., p. 9.

[394] Ayoob (1995), p. 173. For Ayoob a failed state is 'the combination of juridical sovereign, but empirically non–functioning central authority. Kasfir in Rotberg (2004), p. 71, Clapham in Rotberg (ed.) (2004), pp. 79–80. Kasfir refers specifically to the unsuccessful replacement of social norms to replace the absent public authority. For him state failure is defined by the complete collapse of public authority without anything to take its place. Clapham ties the failure to historical development of colonialism. The forceful implementation of the state into places which had no prior history of such organization created the conditions for failure.

[395] Piazza (2008), pp. 471–472.

[396] Khadiagala in Zartman (ed.) (1995), p. 33, 35.

Therefore, a *collapsed state* transforms into an 'extreme version' of a failed state. In a collapsed state there are no structures to provide any of the political goods (security, infrastructure etc.), authority is absent and everywhere chaos and anarchy is rampant.[397] Most sources mentioned Somalia and Liberia starting early 1990s as an example of a complete and utter collapse of a state.[398] Hence, *strong* or *non–failing* states performed well in all of the functions of a state. *Weak* states performed well in some, but poorly in others. *Failed* states were deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested. *Collapsed* states became the more extreme version of failure exhibiting a complete vacuum of authority. Furthermore, in the source literature the subcategory of *'failing'* was reserved for the states that hang between weakness and failure.[399]

Consequently, inability to meet the demands of their populations constituted as failure of the state which was seen by Rotberg as what 'failure was ultimately about'.[400] Based on this it was relatively easy to separate the opposite ends of the spectrum. On one hand there was a fully functioning (Western) state, and on the other end a Somalia–type entity where complete chaos and anarchy rule. This conceptualization on the scale of failure was important for the identity creation and related dichotomy between 'Self' and 'Other'. However, Sonali Huria has criticized the discourse on state failure. She has argued that it juxtaposes 'successful' and 'failed' and seems to highlight the latter either by design or chance.[401] This cannot be without an influence on the discourse itself, and therefore it has probably affected how we perceive the issue of state failure.[402]

---

[397] Rotberg (2004), pp. 9–10. Sub–state actors have taken over when the prime polity has disappeared.
[398] Lowenkopf in Zartman (ed.) (1995), p. 92, 94. Over half of the population of Liberia was displaced and over 700 000 refugees lived in neighboring countries and the U.S. Zartman (1995), p. 3. According to Zartman, a number of states have over time teetered on the edge of collapse. Of these only two have completely collapsed, Somalia and Liberia. Call (2008), p. 1501. The concept refers to a complete collapse of a national state.
[399] Rotberg (2004), (2004), pp. 4–10, Manjikian (2008), p. 349. There are many different ways to look at state strength and failure, for further discussion and reference see, Jackson (1990), Ayoob (1995), Zartman (ed.) (1995), Fukuyama (2004), William I. Zartman (2005), *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse,* Call and Wyeth (eds.) (2008), Robert H. Bates (2008), *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late–Century Africa.*
[400] Rotberg (2004), p. 22. Rotberg stipulates that 'democratic states fail to fail' because they take a note of their populations demands and hopes, and address them accordingly. Clément (2007), pp. 18–22. There is an interesting point presented by Caty Clément. For her it is *precisely the lack of international interest* that can attribute to the survival of the state in peril. Thus, a 'non–failing state' can be either a state recognized by international community, or one which just happens to be sufficiently ignored by it.
[401] Huria (2008), p. 1, Manjikian, (2008), pp. 338–339.
[402] Jones (2013), p. 62, Nay (2013), p. 330, Manjikian (2008), p. 341.

3.3.3 Failing states and perceived threats prior to 9/11

In the previous parts of this section, state failure was conceptualized and different aspects and angles were pointed out. This laid the basis for the conceptualizing state failure in post–Cold War context and paved the way for the effort to define failing states.[403] The parallel concepts of *weak, failed* and *collapsed* were shown to be integral part of the FS concept. These other concepts constituted a model of the failing state concept by intersubjective and intertextual links.[404] In this part the concept of FS is finalized and linked to various threats prior to 9/11.

Severe failure and collapse of a state usually cause a wide range of problems from internal and regional conflict to mass refugee flows and humanitarian catastrophe.[405] The same effect is seen presently in the ongoing civil war in Syria with refugees flooding into adjacent countries and Europe. The current situation in Europe and on its borders echoes Francis Mading Deng who described a post–Cold War global strategy in dealing with state failure and resulting afflictions. Deng referred to the statements of the former U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker (1992). Crocker's statements highlighted the effect of the Soviet disintegration had on the stability of the international system.[406] Crocker acknowledged that the collapse of the Soviets had 'profoundly destabilized the previously existing order without replacing it with anything'.[407] This process created vacuums that set off new conflicts elsewhere.[408] A contemporary example of this can be seen with the cases of Iraq and Libya. The collapse of authoritarian regimes created conditions that spread chaos and war to the whole region.[409] One of the more serious results is the ongoing civil war in Syria.

---

[403] Helman and Ratner (1992/93), pp. 3–18, Call and Wyeth, pp. 11–15, Fukuyama (2004), pp. 7–11, and Zartman (1995) pp. 5–11, for defining and categorizing state failure in the post–Cold War world.
[404] Piazza (2008), pp. 470–471, Rotberg (2004), p. 4.
[405] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 1. Limnéll and Raitasalo stipulate that the gradual change from optimism following the end of the Cold War gave way to new wars. These promoted humanitarian crisis, devastation and suffering in Ruanda, Somalia, East–Timor and elsewhere.
[406] Francis Mading Deng, "*State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United Nations"*, in Zartman (1995), pp. 207–210.
[407] Ibid., Bates (2008), p. 116. Changes in 'the international environment' affected states in Africa.
[408] Holm (1998), p. 7. Ayoob (1995), p. 33, pp. 58–59, argues against this simplified notion. According to him 'the intrusions of great powers exacerbate and mitigate Third World conflicts'. The superpower blocs could have easily influence Third World affairs. Instead they 'retained autonomy of initiative on conflict and issues of central regional security concern'. He also reminds that international norms created at the time of de–colonialization prevented 'change of juridical sovereignty'. This left even the 'least viable states' to remain as part of the system. See also, Buzan (1991), pp. 198–200 for the specific effect of superpower suppression in Europe and elsewhere. Ayoob (2005), p. 208.
[409] Bates (2008), p. 111, Ayoob (1995), pp. 48–49, 74–75. According to Ayoob, the superpowers had not wanted a confrontation in mainland Europe due to the possibility of an escalation to a nuclear war. Balkan borders (like many in Third World) were 'imposed' by great powers. As such these had none of the cohesion of 'evolved' European states. Therefore, states (like Yugoslavia) were eager to maintain and support the status–quo and to preserve international order. Bull [1977] (2002), pp. 191–192.

Moreover, state failure was also one factor in causing security dilemmas between states that neighbor one another. This was because the security interests of the polities bordering failing states were heightened due to unpredictability of the situation.[410] If the situation was left to develop on its own, it might cause a wider regional un–stability that eventually threatens international security.[411] Furthermore, the regional instability issue was seen as one factor in the weakening of the principles of non–intervention and sovereignty.[412] Therefore, weakening of non–intervention and sovereignty principles affected to how much weight humanitarian issues received. These had previously been a low–key area in the time of the Cold War due to the overriding superpower geostrategic interests.[413]

However, humanitarian issues had always been part of the Western agenda in international politics. This was because they were seen to be a fundamental building block of a democratic state and society and as such, important for identity creation of the Western 'Self'.[414] Human rights rose to international prominence during 1970s and 1980s and established individual security as an international issue. According to Barry Buzan, this was to address the relationship between the state and its citizens.[415] Moreover, the humanitarian discourse was notable since it highlighted the change that occurred after Cold War in Western predisposition toward state failure.[416]

---

[410] Kasfir in Rotberg (ed.) (2004), p. 65

[411] Ibid. Kasfir uses the term 'competitors who believe they are secure covet the possession of others.' He further continues his though that this leads these states to trying to 'reconstitute' the world to better suit their needs (Serbia and Croatia in former Yugoslavia as an example). This could be extended to think of the interests of the West and the U.S. in the Middle East (oil producing areas). Or colonial powers interests in general in Africa.

[412] Clapham, in Rotberg (2004), p. 88, Nicolas Van De Valle, *The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid and Policies* in Rotberg (ed.) (2004), p. 102. Van De Walle directs attention to the fact that states that have high value resources are more likely to receive attention and assistance from the international community. Conversely, as stated by Stohl (2011), p. 12, states with no or limited international significance are more 'immune to international intervention and pressure'. Jackson (1990), p. 192.

[413] Ayoob (1995), p. 84, 95. Superpower interests were independent of the Third World and dependent upon the logic of the Cold War, and as such functioned according to that logic. Examples of this are given by Adam, in Zartman (ed.) (1995), p. 69. He names Somalia as satellite of USSR, and Ethiopia as that of the U.S., receiving military aid to support their individual goals. Thus the superpowers fought "proxy wars" through their satellites without the danger of direct conflict.

[414] Holm (1998), pp. 7–8.

[415] Buzan (1991), See also, Visuri (1997), pp. 216–217 for notes on the interdependences of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention regarding post–Cold War era, and the problems related thereof.

[416] Visuri (1997), pp. 216–217, Van De Valle in Rotberg (2004), p. 96, and Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), pp. 1–3, Layachi, in Zartman (1995), p. 183. According to Layachi democratizations demands in the West for various states around the world peaked in 1990 because the USSR 'was on its knees'. There is a direct causality for heightened interest in humanitarian issues as well as democracy issues and humanitarian ones are usually tightly linked.

However, the reasons for supplementing previous concepts and definitions or 'updating them' for contemporary use were at times somewhat dubious.[417] Therefore, what has made the humanitarian discourse difficult in its own right is the way in which other issues are tied to it. It creates a complex web where the interests of states and normative ideals mix.[418] An example of this was seen in the case of Liberia in the 1990s where numerous 'players' acted all according to their own design while veiling their actions as humanitarian intervention.[419] In Liberia the U.S. first supported its Cold War ally against Libya and then withdrew to 'neutrality'. Finally, it gave a major role to the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (henceforth ECOWAS). Simultaneously, the French intervened to protect their economic interest and tried to reduce U.S. influence in the region. Consequently, Liberia was defined by the UN as and international security threat due to enormous flows of refugees and the collapse of the state structures.[420]

The aforementioned description portrayed the elements of a securitization of a discourse. It showed how the individual interests and normative concerns created a package which could be 'sold' to the international community. Securitization gave a good reason to act as well as tools to overcome restrictions like sovereignty.[421] Thus, it can be said that Liberia was *successfully securitized* by the international community as a threat. Extraordinary measures were approved by the United Nations Security Council (henceforth UNSC) to deal with the threat, or face consequences. Similar situations were seen throughout the 1990s (e.g. Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo) where state failure and the threats they presented were defined through the humanitarian discourse.

---

[417] Holm (1998), p. 9, Ayoob (1995), pp. 126–129. According to Holm, safeguarding economic interests have taken priority after the Cold War. Donald Rotchild, *Rawlings and the Engineering of Legitimacy in Ghana*, in Zartman (ed.) (1995), p. 59. For Rotchild, humanitarian issues have links to other 'levels' of intervention aside from the military option. These interventions are done by the economic power of the IMF and WB which can give or withhold resources. He argues that because these organizations are largely in Western hands, their structures intertwine to those of the great industrialized states. Therefore, the ability to make decisions on loans to Third World states 'is the very essence of power' and can lead to accusations of neo–colonialism.

[418] On the humanitarian discussion and Western disposition, see Deng in Zartman (ed.) (1995), pp. 207–211. See also, Buzan et al. (1998), p. 49 and Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), pp. 2–3 on the link of maintaining armed forces in the post–Cold War situation and existential threats to the Western European states. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 220. A poststructuralist view argues that in the 1990s the 'Other' was no longer a radically different threat but as a 'victim' in need of rescue, thus making interventions easier. Ayoob (1995), pp. 128–129. According to Ayoob, humanitarian interventions have been undertaken under the UN Charter Chapter VII. This chapter is used to argue for 'threats to international peace and security', and has been used very flexibly.

[419] See, for example, Huria (2008), p. 3, Holm (1998), p. 12 and Jones (2013), pp. 62–63, Ayoob (1995), p. 126.

[420] Lowenkopf in Zartman (ed.) (1995), pp. 97–98. Ayoob (1995), pp. 98–99. Same kind of account is presented by Ayoob of Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s where superpowers had common interests. They supported Iraq against to prevent Iran from gaining victory. Iran with its theocracy and Islamic revolution was considered by both superpowers as a threat to the stability of the critical oil producing region.

[421] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), pp. 7–8. Threats can be 'updated' to suit the needs of governments or created upon need, if necessary.

The 'insanity example' from chapter 2 should be reiterated here. The concepts of state failure were created in the context of Cold War and Western culture. This was done by using a 'successful' (Western) state as a reference point. Therefore, the failing state discourse was an interpretation (and diagnosis) created out of one's own cultural viewpoint, and not something that necessarily had any factual basis.[422]

For the purpose of this research I used my own composite model which took elements from the other definitions of failure, including collapse. This was done IOT see why the U.S. sees a failing state as an existential threat. In my view, the other models or definitions were not suitable for this task. They represented either state building– or peacebuilding views, or disregarded possible great power interests.

Therefore, based on the discussion so far I defined a failing state to be:

> *"A failing state is no longer able or willing to act as a state and has lost international legitimacy. It has none–existent sovereignty and the institutions of the state cannot meet the requirements of a state anymore. Consequently, authority is partially or completely absent. Therefore, the state has no control over what happens inside its borders, and is considered a threat both regionally and internationally."*[423]

It should be emphasized that Francis Fukuyama and many others highlighted two key events in regards to state failure debate. One of these was the end of the Cold War and the second one the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These two have affected to the ongoing discussion about state failure.[424]

---

[422] Herbert Weiss, "*Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Polity"* in Zartman (1995), pp. 157–158, p. 165.The international community (UN) can create or destroy states depending on their behavior. It is the international community that will decide whether the state is able to perform the functions required, thus making the final call on the definition of the state's status. Manjikian (2008), p. 345.

[423] Nay (2013), p. 332. Many scholars have created their own definition of state failure by combining various factors. According to Nay, this limits the analytical usefulness of the concept due to infinite number of criteria. I am aware of this caveat. My effort here is not to define failing state to encompass all possible scenarios, but only to adapt it to suit this research and its methodological needs. Therefore a composite structure of the definition is required.

[424] Fukuyama (2004), p. xi, Zartman (ed.) (1995). According to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War left state failure still more or less a localized problem. 9/11 created state failure as a strategic challenge to the United States and other countries. Zartman and his colleges don't regard state failure to amount to an international threat. However, their views represent mid–1990s and have not taken into consideration the effect of 9/11 incident. The White House (2010), p. 8. 9/11 was 'a transformative event' for the U.S.

To illustrate this, Edward Newman argued that *failing states* were initially understood as Somalia –type disintegration. The meaning of FS was transformed by 9/11 and caused it to be understood as an existential threat. This brought the issue of stat failure worldwide attention.[425] This described well the discursive transformation of the concept of FS. It showed that the discursive realm is never stable, but in constant flux.[426] However, it has been argued that sometimes threats such as FS were created if there was need for them.[427] Hence, the significance of the 9/11 has been debated in the International Security Studies (henceforth ISS). In the ISS some saw 9/11 as a revolution (e.g. the end of the Cold war) but others just one event amongst more important ones (e.g. the rise of China).[428]

To sum up the points discussed in chapter 3. Sovereignty, state and security were strongly linked because 'the meaning of security' was tied to the state. Security was previously explicitly defined as national security, or implicitly drawn from this connection. Furthermore, states constituted their identity and interests in reference to the threatening 'Other'. This formed national interest which defined threats and securitized issues. The lack of statehood created quasi–states that evolved into failing and failed states. This led to fears that if states fail, the system of states would fail with them. Moreover, majority of definitions of state failure were about the dichotomy between strong and weak states. Therefore, the discourse on state failure juxtaposed 'successful' to 'failed'.[429] Also, the various concepts were tied to the context and conditions under which they developed and as such could not be used without taking these factors into account.[430] As Barry Schutz accurately described it:

> *"It is unlikely that much international concern would manifest itself if Mozambique fell apart"*[431]

---

[425] Newman (2009), p. 424.

[426] Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), p. 8. This argument by Limnéll and Raitasalo about creating threats stipulates the ever present situation in 'threat environment'. According to them, if you look hard enough 'there's always something that can be presented as a threat'. See also, The White House (2002), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, for an example how Saddam's Iraq was created as an existential threat prior to the invasion of 2003.

[427] Manjikian (2008), pp. 350–352.

[428] Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 254–255. Buzan and Hansen have argued that the debate about U.S. grand strategy 'dating back to the 1990s' has been more about power politics and potential challengers to the U.S., than 9/11. As the rise of China and the U.S. 'pivot Asia' has shown, the argument of Buzan and Hansen carries significant weight. Moreover, the events surrounding Syria and Ukraine are a lot more in the area of great power politics than in the realm of terrorism.

[429] Nay (2013), pp. 327–328. Nay argues that the problem of different concepts of state failure is that each describes a specific situation and as such cannot be used in overarching terms.

[430] Ibid., pp. 329–330, Manjikian (2008), p. 342. According to Manjikian, definitions of state failure are socially and culturally constructed.

[431] Schutz in Zartman (1995), p. 113, Stohl (2011), p. 13, Nay (2013), p. 330, Buzan (1991), p.133.

4 SECURITIZING FAILING STATES

–Casus belli

Chapter four is dedicated to the discussion of why a superpower like the U.S. sees failing states as an existential threat and how this is portrayed in the NSS document. It is built upon chapters two and three for theoretical and conceptual basis. Chapter three begun the analysis by defining threats from FS and located the discourses related thereof. Chapter four continues the process and analyzes the primary material (NSS') to see how FS were securitized in the official discourses of the United States. It further shows the intertextual effect of the NSS'.

The analysis also looked if the effect of securitizing was shown throughout the policy documents of different administrations. Hence, it looked for intersubjective links between different security discourses and threats. These links either amplified and supported the existing discourses, or created new ones. They were also essential for securitizing FS when they drew together multiple threats and thus amplified them. Furthermore, as security in this study was considered a discourse, the analysis of NSS was not about concrete threats as such. It was about the nation's identity production and reproduction that made threats discursive. This process made the NSS about the radically different and threatening 'Other'.[432]

This research discussed about the importance of sovereignty in chapter three, section 3.1. Here that discussion is connected to state's identity and its place as a referent object in the Securitization theory. The distinction between referent object (the state) and the securitizing actors (the NSS document policymakers)[433] should be noted. For the state to have been thought of as a referent object, the survival of the state would have been about sovereignty and identity. Therefore, any attacks against the state counted as a threat to sovereignty and identity and through that link also as a threat to the existence of to the state.[434] This is because sovereignty was one of the preconditions for a Western state to exist, even though its meaning had diminished in the post–Cold War era.[435]

---

[432] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 143, Roe (2012), p. 258, Buzan et al., (1998), p. 24.
[433] Buzan et al. (1998), p. 40. Securitizing actor can be a group or individual, such as political leaders.
[434] Ibid., p. 36, Buzan (1991), p. 88, Mearsheimer (2001), p. xi. For further examples on the problems of sovereignty during and after the Cold War, see for example Zartman (ed.) (1995) and Krasner (1999). See also, Blombergs in Sivonen (ed.) (2013), p. 9, for a Realist view on sovereignty.
[435] For further discussion on sovereignty and the role of Westphalian model of state as a referent object, see Buzan et al. (1998).

Furthermore, Barry Buzan has pointed out that the state has official 'speakers' on its behalf.[436] This is usually the government as the legitimate representatives of the state. He has also argued that this meant that the referent object spoke for itself through the government.[437] In the U.S., government and administrations are pointed by the president who verifies the NSS. Therefore, in the case of the U.S., it is the president which needs to accept the securitizing speech act made by the administration and the government. Moreover, in the NSS various security issues are usually presented as threats to sovereignty, identity, or both.

How did the dichotomy between 'Self' and 'Other got 'manifested as existential threats? This happened because contemporary sovereignty is more broadly located and threats that might have been perceived affecting the state were not limited to military. These threats were also focused against the people who constituted the state and its government.[438] Hence, national interests and identity issues had to be addressed if the state wanted to exist. How these presented themselves varied. For example for Wendt, parts of a state can secede or be conquered without it losing its 'life'. In his mind, autonomy was equaled to internal and external sovereignty and economic well–being was referred to a capability to acquire resources and maintain production. Furthermore, collective self–esteem referred to how the state saw the 'Self' in relation to the 'Other' and how it created its collective self–image.[439] This was seen in the NSS how various existential threats were linked in the similar way.

In the NSS existential threats were linked to physical, sovereignty, economic, and identity issues. *Physical* issues were such as WMD's or invasion. *Sovereignty* issues were blended with the physical and in addition covered ideology and freedom of action. *Economic* issues were such as vital resources or regions, freedom of navigation in sea, air, space and cyberspace. *Identity* issues were values, sense of security and order of the international system.[440]

---

[436] Buzan et al. (1998), 41–42.
[437] Ibid.
[438] Buzan (1991), pp. 92–93, and Buzan et al. (1998), p. 52. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 143. The historical link of sovereignty and security is iterated by Buzan and Hansen.
[439] Wendt (1999), pp. 235–236. Wendt points out that economic growth was not the requirement in the past when slavery and feudal society where dominant. He also puts contemporary Fourth World to this category and raises an interesting question of economic growth as a necessity for particular state *forms*.
[440] Sjöstedt (2013), p. 148–149. Identity is important for threat construction, as a 'source of threat, or a catalyst'.

Consequently, existential threats were discursively created by intersubjective links from these issues to actors (such as states and non–state actors), and further linked these actors to each other. This is how the radical and threatening 'Other' was constituted and as such it was not a about concrete threats but producing and reproducing the national identity. This not denying that there might have been concrete missiles, WMD's and terrorists somewhere. Instead the argument was that an existence of a concrete threat (or the lack of it) is not the ultimate cause for the threat manifestation.

4.1 National Security Strategy of the U.S.

The first part of this chapter looked how dichotomy between 'Self' and 'Other got 'manifested as existential threats. It also recapped on the importance of sovereignty and how it was connected to identity. Finally, it ended with significance of the national interests and identity issues and gave an example how these are portrayed in the NSS. In this section the NSS documents were analyzed for the securitization of FS. Moreover, the section also created understanding of *why* failing states were eventually seen as a threat to the U.S. This understanding and the discourses on FS provided the material for the conclusions in chapter 5.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union[441] changed the international security environment. It constituted the emergence of a new world order, one with a single superpower[442] (the U.S.) as the pre–eminent actor.[443] The argument for the supremacy of the U.S. is not meant to an absolute statement.[444] However, it would be naïve to dismiss the military, economic, cultural, and political power of the U.S. in regard to any other actor or group of actors. Therefore, the U.S. can be placed in a leading role in the absence of a similarly inclined opponent.[445]

---

[441] For reference, see for example, Zartman (1995) and Ayoob (1995). Numerous states in Africa were affected by the withdrawal of superpower economic and military aid. This contributed to a *regional* de–stabilizing effect.
[442] Ayoob (1995), p. 119. The U.S. is the only major power that defines its interests (political & economic) in global terms. It also has the ability and the will to project power globally. These attributes make the U.S. the sole superpower.
[443] Mearsheimer (2001), p. xiii, pp. 2–4. Mearsheimer argues that multipolar systems containing an especially powerful state are especially prone to war. For additional argumentations on the change of the international system after Cold War, see for example, Buzan et al. (1998), p. 9, pp. 49–50.
[444] There is an ongoing debate on the number of poles in the post–Cold War international system. Depending on what theoretical view one is inclined to use, there are several possible answers.
[445] For the status of the U.S. in international system after the Cold War, see for example Limnéll and Raitasalo (2008), pp. 1–3, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 51. Also, the NSS documents from 1990 to 2010 emphasize the leading role of the U.S. This is especially because of military, economic and political strength and global reach.

The period of the Cold War had suppressed effectively the security discourse in regard to failing states.[446] It had directed the discourse towards political rivalry and to the support of the superpower proxies. This changed when a more humanitarian look took place in the foreign policy of the U.S. in the 1990s. Humanitarian reasons, national interest and the weakening of the sovereignty principle resulted in interventions in Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans.[447]

This was seen in the way the Bush and Clinton administrations focused the NATO and U.S. military to a new direction in the absence of the Warsaw Pact.[448] This led to the emergence of the concept of FS in the 1990s by Gerald B. Hellman and Steven R. Ratner in the article of *"Saving Failed States"* in the Foreign Policy Magazine.[449] This coined the concept but left it 'floating' with the other subsequent concepts.

The academic literature used different concepts for state failure and was focused more on Africa than other parts of the globe.[450] Hence, part of the dilemma surrounding FS was the question of *why were they being seen as threat?* Or *were they consciously being presented as a threat?*

The most obvious answer would be to look at the 9/11 terrorist attacks.[451] But as discussed, the whole concept of state failure is tied to the Western notion of the state. Therefore, sovereignty, identity and national interest created threats or made Western states perceive issues as such. Depending on one's position and viewpoint anything and everything could have been drawn under the umbrella of state failure.[452]

---

[446] Bull [1977] (2002), pp. 186–187.

[447] Ayoob (1995), p.75, 81.

[448] Ayoob (1995), p.75, 81. Ayoob argues in reference of the UN Charter: *"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations".* According to Ayoob what makes all of this problematic is that the UN Charter and UNSC 1541 leave out right to self–determination for an ethnic minority. This is because it only applies to 'overseas colonies of European empires and not to the components of the people which these states are made of'. Therefore, rules of the system have prevented 'unrestrained interplay of internal dynamics' and partly prevented states being absorbed or destroyed by other states. Holsti (1996), pp. 75–78.

[449] Helman and Ratner (1992/93).

[450] See, for example, Jackson (1990), Ayoob (1995), and Zartman (ed.) (1995).

[451] For an empirical study on the connection of terrorism and state failure, see for example, Piazza (2008). Call (2008), p. 1504. For Call, state failure is 'tied to the context of the post–9/11 period'. This has affected to why failing states are seen as a threat to the West.

[452] Deng, in Zartman (1995), pp. 208–210. Deng presents Chester Crocker's thoughts how the international system should be renewed. This would create 'a new set of norms' that would 'direct the actions and discussion'. For him, 'the lack of institutions to address security problems' emanates from the global norm deficit. Crocker would also like to define the criteria of under what conditions sovereignty can be breached.

In this section the primary material of National Security Strategy documents was divided by various administrations. The analysis started with Georg Bush (NSS 1990–1991) and continued to Bill Clinton (NSS 1993–2000). These two presidents and their respective administrations presented the end of the Cold War and the 1990s widening of security. Georg W. Bush (NSS 2002 & 2006) and Barack Obama (2010) presented 9/11 and the 'global war on terror', as well as the change that followed in its wake.

The analysis highlighted the dominant security discourses and existential threats present during each administration. This made comparison of discourses possible and provided the possibility to see if there were intertextual connections between administrations. As a result there was an image created of how the failing states discourse entered into the NSS and how it was securitized.

The NSS gives broad lines of the U.S. national security presenting important issues both domestic and international.[453] The document is 'a mix of normative statements and strategic analysis'.[454] It is drawn together by the Whitehouse and signed by the president which gives it a high level of executive power and credibility. [455] There were several continuous themes which carried throughout the years. These were such as security of the U.S. (in face of an attack), WMD's and nuclear proliferation, economy, international stability and transnational threats (environment, crime, terrorism etc.), to name a few.[456]

The interest here was not in the full context of the NSS documents but in the concept of 'failing states' and its analogies. The first read of the NSS tracked the appearance of the concept of FS as well as the context where it presented itself. This was done IOT create a base line from which the securitization of the concept can be analyzed. The more detailed second read of the NSS documents traced the intersubjective and intertextual links. This created an image of how the FS concept entered the NSS documents and what threats were linked to it. Consequently, this provided the information on how the securitization process happened.

---

[453] William W. Newmann (2004), *"The Structures of National Security Decision Making: Leadership, Institutions, and Politics in the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush Years"*, Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 no. 2 (June), Center for the Study of the Presidency, pp. 274–275.
[454] J. Brian Hehir (2003), *"The New Security Strategy"*, America, April 7 2003, Vol. 188, No. 12, p. 8.
[455] Roe (2012), p. 252. Sovereign is the one who decides whether there is 'an extreme emergency' and if extraordinary measures can be implemented.
[456] Ibid., p. 255. Roe quotes Juha Vuori (2010) in that 'specific words such as terrorism automatically bring the logic of danger and as such don't need to be argued every time'. Buzan (1991), p. 166.

4.1.1 George Bush (NSS 1990–1991)

In the early 1990s SU neared its collapse and many of the Cold War threats and interests remained prominently present in the NSS.[457] Therefore, majority of the national interests and threats were tied in one way or the other to the Soviets. SU was still considered to be the most prominent threat to the U.S. due to strategic nuclear forces and superpower rivalry.[458] Because of this premise, the survival of the U.S. with its sovereignty (political–physical) intact and its population secure was at the very top on the list of both NSS' national interests.[459]

The category of 'biggest threats' to national interests covered several issues and threats from strategic to minor. These were such as military attack, terrorism, strategic arms control, human rights and the spread of 'military critical technologies' & WMD's to hostile countries or groups.[460] The 'biggest threats category' contained mostly issues that could be accounted to present a threat to the very existence of the U.S. Therefore, these threats can be said to have been *existential* by the classification of the Securitization theory.

However, there were some existential threats located elsewhere within the context of other interests. It was because of the global nature of U.S. interests included issues such as free access to energy resources in vital regions. This particular interest was further connected to the freedom of seas. Moreover, energy resources and strategic geographical locations (regions) enabled the projection of power as well as international commerce and energy shipments.[461]

---

[457] Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21–23. Traditionally the threat for the state had been either from military sector (a physical attack) or from political sector (sovereignty–ideological).

[458] The White House (1990), *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 2, 9, 23, The White House (1991), *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 5, 25. The basic geopolitical necessities remain' and the 'deterrence of nuclear attack remains the cornerstone of national security'.

[459] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 52. The Soviet threat was sufficiently global and challenging to carry through the Cold War. Buzan (1991), pp. 92–93, and Buzan et al. (1998), p. 52. A threat to the state's territory can vary greatly depending on the aspects of the source.

[460] The White House (1990), p. 2, The White House (1991), p. 3. Buzan (1991), p. 9. The strategic questions relating to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons put the securitizing discourse entirely into a different context.

[461] The White House (1990), p. 17, 22, The White House (1991), p. 15. Adam in Zartman (ed.) (1995), p. 75. Adam argues that intervention occurs in many of the locations where there are valuable resources (such as oil). Furthermore, he points out that some of these places are also situated in geostrategic locations. An example of this he presents Somalia's position on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. This makes it along the major shipping routes between Europe and Asia and that affects how the interests of the great powers are directed.

Therefore, regional instability and denial of access to critical resources (such as oil) presented an existential threat to the U.S. Furthermore, the regions of Europe and the Middle East were presented from all the regions of the world to be of vital importance to the U.S. security. Europe was vital because it was the strategic heartland of industrialized world and main arena of East–West competition[462]. Middle East was deemed critical because of oil, allies (Israel), WMD's, and state sponsored terrorism.[463]

Regional threats gained prominence in 1990 as the superpower competition waned. They became the main context to which the WMD's and proliferation issues were tied to. There were signs of a securitization move being made to present WMD's (of regional actors) as a new and 'ever greater danger' due to proliferation. Importantly, this threat was presented to be directed not just against U.S. military forces abroad, but possibly to the U.S. itself.[464] This intersubjective link made regional threats existential in nature. Moreover, in the following NSS of 1991 (a post–Gulf War document) securitization of WMD's in a regional context was clearly visible. In the NSS of 1991 Iraq's WMD's and ballistic missiles were demanded to be demolished according to UNSC resolutions.

Subsequently, Iran was accused of being a state that supports terrorism and Libya was connected to both terrorism and WMD's.[465] Consequently, the end of the Cold War was visible in these two documents as they portrayed both old and new threats. National interests were somewhat categorized but threats were spread and embedded all along the documents without clear categorization. The most prominent securitization was the case of WMD's, ballistic missiles, and their proliferation. It cut across the various sections and was tied to different interests and issues. State failure or the concept of FS was not present at this point on either document.

---

[462] The White House (1990), p. 1, The White House (1991), p. 7, 21. Ayoob (1995), p. 96. Ayoob stipulates that Europe was of vital importance for both superpower blocs economically and strategically. Nuclear weapons ruled out conflict in Europe and moved it to the Third World. This was because in the Third World there were no significant vital interests for the superpowers. Sir Hew Strachan (2016), "Geopolitics and Strategy in the 21st Century", lecture at Finnish National Defence University (Santahamina) on 28 of January 2016.
[463] The White House (1990), p. 6, 13, The White House (1991), p. 7, 10.
[464] The White House (1990), p. 17.
[465] The White House (1991), pp. 15–16.

4.1.2 Bill Clinton (NSS 1993–2000)

The Clinton administration inherited a post–Cold War world where security discourses had begun to change from the old 'geopolitical necessities' of superpower rivalry.[466] Moreover, the Soviet threat of conventional arms had disappeared and the nuclear threat had greatly reduced. This had 'fundamentally changed the strategic environment'.[467] The discourses on regional crisis and the (potentially existential) threats to the U.S. was kept form the NSS' of 1990–1991. Same applied to the threat of WMD's, transnational drug trafficking, terrorism and to the importance of critical regions.

Retaining old threats portrayed an intertextual effect between the NSS documents. This trend would continue and strengthen toward the end of the century.[468] As the threat of SU disappeared, a more diverse set of issues was put forth.[469] Implementation of 'new threats' coincided with the general widening of security from the Cold War context and included areas such as environment, international crime, disease and humanitarian concerns.[470] Furthermore, what was visible was a strengthening of the securitization of specific threats. As a result, this securitization affected the dominant security discourses.

The Balkan civil wars of 1992–1995 and the Gulf War of 1990–1991 were prominently presented. They formed a nexus around which many of the new security discourses started to take shape. In addition to this, physical security and sovereignty of the U.S remained as the primary national interests. Only the source and gravity of the threat changed.

---

[466] The White House (1995), *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,* p. 17. Broader meaning of National Security in post–Cold War era is presented.

[467] The White House (1993), *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 1. The White House (1994), *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,* p. 1, The White House (1995), p. 1. The White House (1996), *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 1.

[468] Kasfir in Rotberg (2004), p. 72. Kasfir criticizes the ample use of security dilemma as an explaining factor when the actor itself is very secure, and directs the focus more into fear and greed.

[469] The White House (1993), p. 13. The White House (1994), pp. i–ii, The White House (1995), p. 7, Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 21–23. According to Buzan et al., during the Cold War the threat of nuclear annihilation affected the dominant security discourse. In the post–Cold War era the dominant security discourse was heavily affected by the humanitarian concerns. Similar mechanism can be seen in the 21st century with the 'war on terror'.

[470] Call and Wyeth (eds.) (2008), pp. 1–2. As an example, Call puts transnational crime and state failure in post–conflict states as threats to international security due to their de–stabilizing effect. Newman (2009), p. 421. According to Newman, the humanitarian discourse is notable since it highlights the change that occurred after Cold War in Western predisposition toward state failure. It didn't replace the national interest and security discourse, but it cleared room for a way to re–establish the reason for the continued existence of Western armed forces, most notably presented in NATO.

In the NSS of 1997 the process of designating clear categories for national interests and threats was finally achieved. Prequel to this was the NSS' of 1995–1996 where national interest were categorized as vital, important and humanitarian. The context was the limits of the *use of military force* in defense of these interests.[471] *Vital* interests were of overriding importance to the survival and security of the U.S. Therefore, the threats to them were of existential in nature (e.g. Gulf War, WMD's). *Important* interests were those which connected to values and national well–being, but did not affect national survival (e.g. intervention in Bosnia). *Humanitarian* interests comprised the third category and were not primary concern of the military, but possible in case of immense catastrophes (e.g. Somalia and Rwanda).[472]

The NSS of 1997 intertextually retained the previous categorization of national interest. It added categories that presented threats to those interests. These were labeled *regional* or *state–centered threats*, *transnational threats* and *threats from WMD's.* These were not unitary categories and were intertwined between each other. Most importantly for this research, regional threats were created by states, failed states, terrorists, 'outlaw or rogue states', criminals and humanitarian issues.[473] Therefore, this intertextual linking of threats from previous NSS' to the NSS of 1997 created the framework for the securitization of failing states. It also used intersubjective links to create connection between different categories of threats that would later become significant.

Furthermore, the categorization of threats was modified in the NSS of 1998 when the section of *failed states* was added.[474] Hence, the NSS of 1997 was the first document where state failure was mentioned. In the NSS of 1998 it had for the first time its own category. Hence, there was a clear case of the concept entering the security discourse at those temporal moments. Simultaneously, connections begun to be formed between different types of threats and these started to link up to FS.[475]

---

[471] The White House (1995), p. 12.
[472] The White House (1996), p. 18. Newman (2009), p. 424. Interestingly, Newman stipulates that failing states were initially understood as Somalia –type disintegration, but the meaning was transformed by 9/11 attacks which caused it to be understood as an existential threat. This brought the FS worldwide attention. Also, the geostrategic location of Somalia is probably a factor that caused it to be mentioned in the NSS.
[473] The White House (1997), *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, p. 4.
[474] The White House (1998), *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, pp. 6–7.
[475] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 241.

There were several prominent existential threats which carried through the Clinton administration. The *most prominent one* was the threat of WMD's and proliferation. It was presented throughout the eight documents and received increasing space and visibility from just seven (7) pages of NSS of 1993 to twenty–nine (29) pages in NSS of 2000.[476] This threat originally emanated from the disintegration of the SU. It transformed into regional context and was specifically connected to those regions vital to the U.S. interests (Europe, Middle East and Korean peninsula).[477] Moreover, WMD's were originally a state–centered threat (as Saddam's Iraq demonstrated)[478] that developed to include non–state actors, such as terrorists and criminals[479]. They replaced SU as the priority one threat to the U.S. which accounts for the heavy securitization. [480] Therefore, this successful securitization kept WMD's as the prevalent security discourse throughout the Clinton administration NSS documents.

The *second* one was *regional conflicts* and their threat to the U.S. vital interests. From the original critical regions of George Bush (Europe and the Gulf) the list was broadened to include East Asia and Southwest Asia.[481] The common theme between these areas is that they had either significant energy resources (oil) or states with WMD's (or aspirations to acquire them)[482]. Moreover, some areas were located along vital transport routes like the Gulf, and sections of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.[483] Other regions were connected to values and allies, such as Europe. Regional conflicts were prominently displayed as being caused by 'rogue states' which were also designated as 'hostile nations. The list included Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Sudan. [484] This identity creation securitized them further. At first, the threat that was the spread of instability because of ethnic violence, refugee flows, and control of vital regions.[485] Towards the end of the 1990s the emphasis changed to WMD's as well as harboring and supporting terrorism.

---

[476] The White House (1993), p. 1, 3, 7, pp. 16–18, The White House (2000), *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, p. iii, 3, 5, 7, 9, 19, 26, 28, 38, 52, 73, pp. 12–16, 22–23, 30–32, 46–47, 58–60, 69–71.
[477] See, for example, The White House (1998), pp. 37–38, 41–45, 51–53.
[478] The White House (1995), p. 18, Weapons of mass destruction classified as a strategic threat. For the threat of Iraq and Iran see, for example The White House (1995), pp. 30–31, and The White House (1999), *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, p. 16. The NSS of 1999 depicts ICBM threats 'in the next 15 years' *likely* from North Korea, *probable* from Iran and *possible* from Iraq (cursive added)..
[479] See, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 241, for the intersubjective linking of WMD's, deterrence, and BMD to rogues states and Third World states.
[480] The White House (1995), p. 13.
[481] The White House (1997), p. 6.
[482] The White House (1996), p. 14.
[483] See, for example, The White House (1998), p. 27. The U.S. must have global access and freedom of navigation to protect its vital interests.
[484] The White House (1996), p. 14.
[485] See, for example, The White House (1994), p. 1, The White House (1995), p. 21, 25, 30, and The White House (1996), p. 35.

As an example, for Bosnia (NSS' of 1994–1996) the securitization of ethnic violence was not as prominent as was in case of Kosovo (NSS's of 1998–2000). It reiterates the slow change from Cold War geopolitical priorities to post–Cold War widened security. Moreover, in the case of Kosovo there was a direct violation of Serbian sovereignty by the U.S. and NATO without UNSC approval.[486] This breach of international law further emphasized the 1990s normative change and the problems of defining state, sovereignty and state failure. The normative effect was also present and visible in the security discourses of the Clinton administration NSS documents.[487] The humanitarian argument of the 1990s reached its climax in the NSS of 2000 where 'ethnic cleansing and genocide' were more strongly tied to regional stability via national security. In the case of Kosovo, ethnic cleansing was created as an existential threat by intersubjective securitization. This happened by combining values, national interests and vital (critical) region, hence making it 'imperative to take action'.[488]

Herein under the regional threats were the first connections to the state failure and with the concepts of failing and failed states. Moreover, here the conceptualization of failing states becomes very important. In the previous NSS documents there were definitions of rogue states, rogue nations and outlaw states. These definitions were connected to specific states, most frequently to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. However, this same definition was also applied to Yugoslavia. So, as to reiterate the composite definition of a failing state created in section 3.3 (shortened):

> *"A failing state is no longer able to act as a state and has lost international legitimacy. It has none–existent sovereignty and institutions. Consequently, authority is absent and the state has no control over what happens inside its borders, and thus is considered a threat."*

The NSS of 1997 placed 'failed and unstable states' in the category of regional and state centric threats. The context was a *possibility* to 'further destabilize regions of interests'.[489] This coincides with the conceptual definition above. Therefore, 'failed and unstable states' *could have* presented a threat or an existential threat to the U.S., depending on the location and significance of the region.

---

[486] Strachan (2016).
[487] The White House (1999), p. 26. Interestingly, there is an argument presented that the international response to ethnic conflict depends on 'the perception of countries of their national interests'.
[488] The White House (2000), pp. 42–43, 49–50, p. 46.
[489] The White House (1997), p. 3.

Within the span of 1993–2000 Yugoslavia was not only a rogue or an outlaw state, but by definition also *a failing* or *a failed state*.[490] This was because of the disintegration of the federal Yugoslavia into its constituent parts. Furthermore, at this junction the securitization of failing states was not completely successful. However, it can be said that the first *securitization move* was done here in relation to the failure of the Yugoslav state on both sides of the mid–1990s. This created a conceptual definition of sorts for failing and failed states in the NSS documents.[491] At the same time different threats were linked to each other. Consequently, intersubjective and intertextual effect had started to show in the concept. This reiterates the complex nature of the concept and underlines the need for a broad understanding of state failure, as discussed in chapter 3.[492]

The *third* prominent threat was different. Previous two were state centric threats but this one was non–state, asymmetrical[493] and it penetrated through all the categories because of its transnational nature. *Terrorism* continually gained prominence in the threat categorization during NSS of 1993–2000. It was first mentioned as part of other transnational threats[494] and one of 'potential threats'.[495] However, that stared to change when terrorism was first attached to the regional context of 'states that support terrorism' and especially coupled with WMD's.[496] Iran and Libya were most frequently connected to state sponsored terrorism in the early NSS documents. Additional securitization of terrorism originated from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the plotted assassination by the Iraq of former president George Bush.[497]

---

[490] Mair (2008), pp. 52–53. Mair argues that it is not enough to create various definitions of state failure. The critical difference between these definitions should be reiterated. This is because of the significance they hold in regards to security in the post 9/11 security paradigm. He stipulates that the key element is making decision makers to understand the difference of *failing* and *failed* states. For Mair, failing states are (immediately) the more dangerous ones than failed states. This is because they will keep the problems longer at a regional level. In retrospect, his views bring an interesting angle on the definition of state failure and perceived threats prior 9/11.

[491] The White House (1999), p. 2. The concept was broadened to include 'states that succumb to inflammatory rhetoric of demagogues'. This broadened it beyond poor governance and internal security issues.

[492] White House (2000), p. 3. 'Fragmentation of states' is causing instability in several regions.

[493] The White House (1997), p. 11. Asymmetrical threat was defined to be WMD's, information operations or terrorism.

[494] See, for example, The White House (1994), p. 1, 6.

[495] The White House (1993), p. 18.

[496] The White House (1993), p. 18. There was no mention of specific states, just a general statement. See also, for example, The White House (1994), p. 8, The White House (1995), p. 10. 'Terrorism involving WMD's is a particularly dangerous *potential* threat' (cursive added).

[497] The White House (1994), p. 9. Saddam's intelligence service was accused of plotting to assassinate George Bush Senior.

Moreover, there was a significant shift in the security discourse on terrorism in the NSS of 1996. In 1996 intersubjective connection of terrorism in the mainland U.S. to rogue states was established. Rogue states were described to 'breed and harbor terrorists'.[498] This in turn securitized both terrorism and these states. Part of the securitization move also drew intertextual power from the previous NSS'. In those documents the security discourses had been established of WMD terrorism as well as state sponsors of conventional terrorism.

Another clear securitization move was done in the NSS of 1998. There the severity, destructiveness and immediacy of the terrorist threat were emphasized. Terrorism was strongly tied together with WMD's and inserted into the categories of transnational and WMD threats. Furthermore, this type of terrorism was depicted of being able to 'inflict terrible damage to the U.S. and it was 'increasingly likely' that the attack on U.S. soil will be done by WMD's and the target will specifically be 'civilians, cities, and gatherings in events'.[499] Thus the need to 'deny safe havens' and to 'strike terrorist bases', was underlined.[500] This major shift was clearly visible in the section on terrorism. It clearly stated that the U.S. 'will seek to uncover and eliminate foreign terrorists and their sanctuaries', both by law enforcement and by force. Furthermore, a significant articulation of an existential threat was presented:

> *"..when our very national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.. ..we reserve the right to act in self–defense by striking at their [terrorist] bases and those who sponsor, assist or actively support them."*[501]

This had all of the elements of a securitization act as presented by Buzan et al.[502] It emphasized the existential nature of the threat, the need for immediate action, and underlined the fact that special circumstances exist where normal process is considered too slow or inadequate.[503] Moreover, the NSS of 1998 created a specific security discourse by this securitization act which carried onto become a major factor in securitizing failing states.

---

[498] The White House (1996), p. 12. 'The destructive forces in the U.S. have often their origins in rogue nations'. Already at this point the intersubjective links were forming between terrorism and rogue states. Hence, state failure was also drawn in to this process.

[499] White House (2000), p. 3. There was 'an increased importance of defense of homeland against WMD terrorism'. See also, The White House (1998), pp. 6–7, p. 19.

[500] Ibid.

[501] The White House (1998), pp. 15–16. The same rhetoric was used by Georg W. Bush and his administration after 9/11 in the NSS of 2002. For more details, see The White House (2002).

[502] See Appendix 5, picture 5, for Ole Wæver's (2011) presentation of the securitization process.

[503] Limnéll (2009), p. 72, Hansen (2006), p. 34, Williams (2003), p. 514, Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 23–24.

Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan were here tied to the terror attacks against American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The former was the organizer and financer and the latter (with Sudan)[504] was the harbor and supporter of terrorism. This securitization was further amplified by the 'Self–Other' dichotomy created between the U.S. and the terrorists. These terrorist groups were presented as sharing:

> *"..hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against."*[505]

The case of Osama bin Laden demonstrated how the question of terrorism could be very easily made also about identity, instead of just physical security.

Furthermore, an intersubjective element was added to the security discourse by connecting WMD's to bin Laden and his network. This was done by stipulating that a military attack by U.S. forces was not just against Afghanistan, but also against Sudan where chemical weapon components had been produced for bin Laden's network.[506] These issues were somewhat de–securitized in 1999 but the NSS of 2000 brought back the hard line arguments. This further securitization was because of terrorist attacks against the USS Cole in Yemen and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the U.S. Moreover, because of these attacks the right of retaliation in self–defense was emphasized.[507] Subsequently, there was also an additional strengthening of the 'Self–Other' dichotomy between the U.S. and Afghanistan. This was done by labeling Afghanistan as 'a serious threat and primary save haven for terrorists who threaten to the U.S.', including Osama bin Laden.[508]

---

[504] The White House (1998), p. 55. Libya and Sudan are depicted as posing a 'threat to regional stability and the national security and foreign policy interests of the U.S.' See also, Manjikian (2008), p. 353.
[505] The White House (1998), p. 16.
[506] Ibid., p. 16, The White House (1999), pp. 14–15. Countries that harbor terrorist have no rights to be safe havens. The justification is presented as 'self–defense' with a 'proportioned strike' against Afghanistan and Sudan, since 'they had been warned for years to stop supporting terrorist'.
[507] The White House (2000), p. 25. There was rhetoric about how terrorist attacks had been prevented in the mainland U.S. which added to the feeling of threat.
[508] Ibid., p. 72. Piazza (2008), pp. 471–472. Piazza stipulates that some scholars argue that theoretically failed and failing states provide ideal conditions for international terrorism to thrive, while others argue against it. An example the complexity is given in relation to 9/11. The idea for 9/11 was created in Afghanistan, but the logistical planning was conducted in Germany and Spain. Hence, both views are partially correct.

Consequently, the most significant points of the Clinton administration security discourses were: 1) Intersubjective connection of terrorism, WMD's, and rogues states with the clear example of a securitization it presented. This would later become a major factor in securitizing failing states. 2) Creation of the state failure discourse and the broadening of its definition to include those states which also qualified the category of 'rogue states'. This created an intersubjective 'bridge' between these separate concepts.[509]

Moreover, the intersubjective linking of threats and the intertextual effect between the NSS' created a mix. In this mix anything from any of the separate categories could be combined to either create a new securitization or amplify an existing one. This came apparent in 2002.

4.1.3 George W. Bush (NSS 2002 & 2006)

The administration of George W. Bush received from Bill Clinton a set of security discourses which had been created in a globalizing and increasingly interdependent post–Cold War world. A lot of threats were de–securitized[510] during the closing years of Clinton administration. On one hand, this positive trend had reached even to such old state–centered threats as Libya and Iran. On the other hand, numerous threats had been amplified and the connections between them had grown increasingly complex.[511]

These interconnected threats included (amongst others) terrorism, WMD's, rogue states, state failure, and information network attacks.[512] Moreover, the normative change in the post–Cold War world had created a situation where sovereignty of states was eroding and humanitarian interventions were being conducted without UNSC resolutions. The U.S. as the lone superpower had immensely more freedom of action to project its power and to protect its interests.[513]

---

[509] Balzacq (2005), pp. 172–174. According to Balzacq, securitizing actor can 'induce or increase' the susceptibility of the audience. This is related to what the audience 'knows about the world' and what is the context. Therefore, the culture of the audience and the role of the political agency affect the outcome.
[510] McDonald (2008), p. 580. De–securitization is considered by McDonald as normatively difficult because usually someone benefits from created threats and the power of determining them.
[511] The White House (2002), p. 13, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 226, 234. Buzan and Hansen argue that a lot of threats were already present in the policy documents before 9/11. The terrorist attacks just accelerated their implementation.
[512] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 231. Interestingly, Buzan and Hansen argue that terrorism was lifted in the ISS literature from a marginal position of the Cold War and 1990s to a central position after 9/11. This describes the difference between academic and scientific literature, and the policy documents in the second half of the 1990s.
[513] Waltz (2008), p. 88. Waltz argues, that 'in light of the structural theory' unipolar system 'appears as the least stable of international configurations'.

To this framework came the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and an enormous shift in the dominant security discourses happened.[514] The NSS of 2002 was created nearly a year after 9/11 and it displays very concretely how the primary threat changed. The prime position of WMD's and rogue states changed to terrorism. The 'task of defending the nation had dramatically changed' and a 'war against terrorism', was declared.[515] The previous administrations categories of threats and national interests were replaced by a somewhat vague categorization of goals. It did not clearly define which of these threats were considered vital (or existential) and which not. This structure described well the effect 9/11 had for the 2002 document.

Terrorism was presented as *the main threat* to the world from the very beginning of the NSS of 2002. The 'allies of terror' were the 'enemies of civilization' and all the great powers were allied against terrorism.[516] This articulation created a powerful amplification of identity. It affected the 'Self–Other' dichotomy created during the Clinton administration by strengthening it.[517] An argument for action was presented that supported this securitization and drew strength from it. It was a simple statement that appealed to 'a common sense for self–defense and preemptive action' before threats became a reality'.[518] The core idea was taken intertextually from previous NSS documents. Therefore, there was no need for additional argument or justification as this was in line with vital interests and survival of the nation.

The NSS of 2006 reiterated the severity of the situation:

> *"America is at war".*[519]

---

[514] The White House (2002), p. 28. The event of 9/11 *"fundamentally changed the context of relations between the United States and other main centers of global power".* Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 51. U.S. policymakers and many security analysts defined a birth of a new era because of 9/11. See also, Fukuyama (2004), Rotberg (2004), Call and Wyeth (eds.) (2008) and Newman (2009).

[515] The White House (2002), p. i.

[516] Ibid., pp. ii–iii, 25–26. NATO invoked the Article V of common defense for the first time in the alliance's history. It stated that the attack on the U.S. was also an attack on NATO. Also, Australia invoked the ANZUS agreement and declared the 9/11 as an attack on Australia. This is also noted by Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 238.

[517] Roe (2012), p. 252. Roe quotes Huysmans in that 'securitization affects politics' and makes it to define 'Self on the basis of hostility'. See, for example Balzacq (2005), pp. 184–186, for the importance of the identity dichotomy for successful securitization.

[518] The White House (2002), p. ii, pp. 5–7. Afghanistan was referred to as a weak state with an ability to pose 'great danger' to a strong state like the U.S. Ayoob (1995), p. 129. Ayoob warned in 1995 that humanitarian interventions would create a situation whereas intervention would be used beyond the 'category of failed states'.

[519] The White House (2006), p. i.

Most importantly, *failing states* were securitized as an existential threat and tied tightly to terrorism by a widely quoted part of NSS 2002:

> *"America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones."*[520]

With this one sentence an image was created that *any* state torn by unrest, war, bad governance, radicalism, poverty, and other problems associated with state failure, is more of a threat to the only superpower in the world than great powers such as Russia and China. Hence, a new extended dichotomy was cemented for the 'Self–Other' and a new identity for FS was created. This new identity was a composite of the old rogue state of regional threats and aspirations of WMD's. It was a supporter and harbor of terrorism, a place of ethnic and religious violence and persecution.

Moreover, it was something that threatened the very survival of the U.S. and was the gravest threat to international security.[521] Whether intentional or not, Afghanistan had become the 'model' of a failing and failed states. Because of Taleban, Afghanistan and al–Qaeda, the concept of a failing state was associated after 9/11 with every evil imaginable.[522] Therefore, Afghanistan and 9/11 had created the 'Sammy Doe factor' for failing states.[523]

---

[520] The White House (2002), p. 1. Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 229–230. Buzan and Hanse stipulate that Realists considered the 9/11 as an attack on U.S. territory, thus making it 'a classical threat to the state's sovereignty and a priority issue'. This was a change from the humanitarian context of 1990s and reiterated the Realist notion that 'an absence of conflict', such as the superpower rivalry, did not mean' that the structure of the system had changed'. However, 'Realists could not predict that which followed afterwards', hence the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan took them by surprise. According to them, this created problems for Realists since the ones that had originally attacked the U.S., were not states.

[521] Balzacq (2005), p. 179. According to Balzacq, effective securitization is 'highly context–dependent, audience centered, and its dynamics are power–laden'. Nay (2013), p. 330. 'Rhetoric of failed states provided grounds for interventions (regional conflicts, terrorism etc.) and justified political interference of internal affairs of nations'.

[522] This is also noted by Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 230, 251. For them, the Bush administration used significant discursive resources to link a non–state actor (al–Qaeda and terrorists) to a state. Buzan and Hansen further argue that the issue here was 'whether or not terrorists could be compared to states' (as rational actors)'.This would decide if 'Realist theories would be applicable' in the way Neorealists think states to be interested in survival. According to them, Realists fought hard against U.S. going to war in Iraq. This was because 'to Mearsheimer and Walt' (and others) it was not 'in America's national interest'.

[523] Lowenkopf in Zartman (1995), pp. 100–101. Lowenkopf describes how Samuel Doe of Liberia became to be a synonym in coups to describe unpredictable events. This same process happened with Afghanistan. It labeled failing states (by Western definition) as harbors of international terrorism and thus a threat to the international security and world order.

Furthermore, a significant articulation of an existential threat was presented:

> *"The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction. The United States is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach....The enemy is terrorism… ...We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor them…"*[524]

The separately securitized threats of rogue state, WMD's, terrorism, and regional instability had been 'spilling over' from their respective categories in the NSS' of 1993–2000.[525] A powerful securitization was made when the NSS of 2002 created intersubjective and intertextual connection of failing states and the 9/11 attacks.[526] Moreover, this type of devastating terrorism was conceptually placed with 'slavery, piracy and genocide'. With the articulation of 'freedom and fear were at war' it was designated as an enemy of the U.S. cultural–normative identity. This further amplified the identity dichotomy and thus further affected to the securitization of FS.[527]

Furthermore, there was another issue which tied terrorism, failing states, WMD's and rogue states strongly together. Chapter V of the NSS of 2002 was about WMD's and the threat they posed to the U.S. and its friends and allies.[528] The entire chapter was a major securitization move. It drew intertextually upon previous discourses starting from Cold War era of deterrence. As part of the securitizing act, the chapter included the 1990s rogue states, the Gulf War and terrorism.[529]

---

[524] The White House (2002), p. ii, 5. There is a reference to 'evidence that proves' that the terrorist are trying to accumulate WMD's but this is not presented. Also, terrorists are compared to 'murderers' which demonizes them further, hence the identity dichotomy becomes absolute. You are either 'with us or against us'.

[525] This is also noted by Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 232.

[526] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 241, Balzacq (2005), pp. 180–183. Balzacq stipulates how circumstances, context and culture can create favorable conditions for successful securitization. Roe (2012), p. 257. Roe describes how an intersubjective threat was established in the wake of 9/11 to change the laws of the U.K.

[527] The White House (2002), pp. 6–7, The White House (2006), p. 1, 7, 11. pp. 9–10. Balzacq (2005), p. 180. Balzacq presents security as a context modifying force where the 'abductive power of the words' activates new context, 'or converts existing one into something new'. Nay (2013), pp. 330–331. 'Poorly defined concept (such as failed state) can be manipulated by government authorities'.

[528] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 239. The War on Terror boosted concern about rogue states and proliferation which were already present in the 1990s.

[529] This is also noted by Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 234. All of the 'old staples' of Middle Eastern policy were suddenly interpreted through the War on Terror.

In the chapter V an extensive definition of a rogue state was presented, and Iraq and North Korea were named with qualities fitting to the description.[530] Great emphasis was placed on stopping the 'rogue states and their terrorist clients'. These arguments were based on the devastation capabilities of WMD's in the hands of these 'hostile' actors.[531] This not only attached terrorism to rogue states, but created an intersubjective link (by chance or by purpose) between rogue states, terrorism and FS.[532]

Majority of the threats and vital interests in the NSS 2002 were in one way or other connected with terrorism.[533] The following NSS of 2006 depicted itself as 'a wartime security strategy' which gave it very high security content.[534] The existential threat of terrorism was already successfully securitized in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2002. Hence, in the NSS of 2006 there were additional emphasis placed on the "*the legitimation of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat"*[535]

Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks were referred to as 'violated international norms and laws of warfare'. The subsequent civilian casualties of the attacks were seen as the prime objective of the terrorists. Therefore, attacks with WMD's would be exponentially worse.[536] The link between rogue states, terrorism and WMD's was reiterated to drive home this point. In 2006, FS were not specifically named as a threat in context of the WMD's. However, the intertextual power of the previous NSS' and intersubjective links created between threats made them appear so also in this context.[537]

---

[530] The White House (2002), pp. 13–14. Gulf War is presented as 'irrefutable proof' that Iraq's WMD's were not limited against previous use of chemical weapons against Iran and secessionist, but there was a program for biological and nuclear weapons as well. The White House (2006), p. 1. The fundamental character of a regime is what matters.

[531] In the NSS it is argued that the Cold War deterrence was workable, but 'traditional concepts of deterrence' won't work against rogue states and terrorists. This is also noted by Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 230, 232. According to them, aggressive statements appeared in the U.S. national security strategy after 9/11. Also, Saddam Hussein was *discursively constituted* as irrational and dangerous. This did not fit the old Realist and Neorealist theory of a rational actor. Therefore substantive discursive resources were applied to make him look irrational and threatening. This is particularly visible in chapter V of the NSS of 2006.

[532] The White House (2006), pp. 14–15.

[533] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 236. Interestingly, Buzan and Hansen see the NSS of 2002 articulated in a way that the U.S. 'would not tolerate any rivals to its power'. According to them, this underlying message was directed specifically toward China and the EU.

[534] The White House (2006), p. i.

[535] The White House (2006), p. 15.

[536] See also, Brussels (2003), *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003, pp.3 –4.

[537] The broadening of rogue state concept to include indicators formerly associated with failing states happened during the Clinton administration (1993–2000).

In the NSS of 2006 the Cold War 'long struggle' was compared to the 'War on terror'. Importantly, it emphasized *the similarities* of these two such as the opponents 'intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement and repression'.[538] During the Cold War, Communism and the SU were the overriding threat to the U.S. Therefore, placing terrorism to the same threat level as the Soviets was a significant articulation. The significance of this is amplified by the fact that the Soviet threat was intertextually drawn from several decades of nuclear deterrence and imminent worldwide annihilation.[539] This comparison also placed FS within the same context. Consequently, it continued to strengthen an already strong dichotomy between the 'Self' and 'Other' and further solidified the identity of the 'Other' as the existential threat to 'Self'.[540]

There was an effort in the NSS of 2006 to support the discourse on securitization of Iraq and WMD's in the wake of the invasion of 2003 by arguing on behalf of a credible threat.[541] Subsequently, the importance was placed on the 'fundamental character of regimes' and the goal of ending tyranny. In 2006 tyranny was listed as regional and international security issue using the same arguments that previously were made by the Clinton administration about FS.[542] Moreover, *all* tyrannies were tied together as a list of ideologically opposed states. These were presented as trying to acquire WMD's which made them an existential threat and a national security issue for the U.S. Hence, these states were linked intertextually to the NSS of 2002 and an intersubjective connection was made to the securitization of Iraq.[543] The definition of tyranny presented many of the characteristics formerly associated with failing or failed states as well as with rogue states. This formulation mixed values, ideology, stateness, terrorism, WMD's, state failure and rogue states. In this complex web basically everything could be connected to anything. Therefore it made securitization (of any issue) easier and de–securitization harder.[544]

---

[538] The White House (2006), p. 1, 11.
[539] Ibid., p. 13. The NSS of 2002 emphasizes that the new threats 'rogue states and terrorists' cannot equal with the destructive power of the Soviets. Interestingly this is turned around in the NSS of 2006 when the comparison is not through strength, but through ideology. In this instance the intersubjective link reaches much further than just the post–Cold War NSS documents.
[540] The White House (2006), p. 4. Qualities of an 'effective democracy' are presented which created amplification for the identity of the 'Self'.
[541] This is also noted by Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 234. WMD's, terrorist and 'old grievances' against Iran and Iraq were 'instrumental' for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and for its justification. The White House (2006), p. 23. There is an effort to re–establish the security discourse on Iraq by presenting Iraq and Afghanistan as 'successes'. Piazza (2008), p. 482. There are studies that have shown that transnational terrorism originates more likely from democracies and as such the nature of the regime would not be a defining factor.
[542] The White House (2006), pp. 9–12.
[543] Ibid, p. 3, 19.
[544] Ibid., pp. 12–13. An example of this is the 'four step list' presented in the document. In that terrorism is the common denominator. Rogue states, WMD's, 'allies of terror' (Syria and Iran), ungoverned areas (e.g. failing or failed states) and 'strategic countries (located in vital regions) are all connected to it.

The FS discourse was kept stable in the NSS' through the multiple links attached to it. It was connected to Taleban, Afghanistan, terrorism and to the notion of how state failure could become an existential threat. In the NSS of 2006 the WMD's section reiterated this equation. It continued to contextually associate state failure to WMD's through other threats such as rogue states. This argues on behalf of the intertextual and intersubjective effect. There was also significant effort placed in strengthening the dominant security discourses and countering de–stabilizing effects that could lead to de–securitization. Moreover, there was effort to counter de–stabilization of the dominant discourse by separating Islam as a religion from the concept of terrorism. This was done by giving a detailed account of the reasons behind terrorism and it supported the initial securitization made in the earlier NSS documents.[545]

With these action and articulations Islam was de–securitized and the dichotomy between Islam and Western democracies, de–stabilized. At the same time the ongoing securitization of terrorism was strengthening the prevalent identity dichotomy. The problem here was that this process created a very complex web of intertextual and intersubjective moves of securitization and de–securitization. The original structure of the different security discourses was created over a length of time in the NSS documents leading up to 9/11. Therefore, it made the changes and de–securitization harder to accept. Also, because of intersubjective links between different threats any de–securitizing attempt affected adversely to securitizing acts and vice versa.[546]

In the NSS of 2002 a number of security issues were left unaddressed due to the overpowering terrorism agenda. In 2006 there was a clear effort to return to these themes and use them to strengthen the prevalent security discourse. Regional threats were addressed, but the connection was far from being as equivocal in relation to FS as it was in 1997.[547] The NSS of 2006 stipulated that regional conflicts form conditions that create FS and ungoverned areas (a synonym for FS) which then 'spawn' terrorism.[548] Furthermore, rogue states and FS then cause instability in these regions which affects the availability of critical resources. This argument was also the core idea of several NSS documents before 9/11.

---

[545] The White House (2006), pp. 9–11, p. 20. Same format is used to distinguish Iranian people as not responsible for the actions of their 'illicit' leaders.
[546] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 216.
[547] The White House (1997), p. 3. Failed and unstable states were in the category of regional and state–centric threats. The context was a possibility to 'further destabilize regions of clear interests'.
[548] The White House (2006), pp. 14–17. Regional conflicts can have a variety of reasons behind them, such as poor governance, internal revolt etc.

This discourse changed with the NSS of 2006. Regions of strategic importance remained but now the terrorism discourse modified the resource discourse to include 'funding terrorist activities through oil revenues' and the use of plutonium from nuclear reactors to build nuclear weapons.[549] The development discourse was now also connected to terrorism. It previously had a distinct emphasis on humanitarian, health and democracy issues. Now the discourse underlined the danger of abuse of 'weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas' by tyrants, criminals and terrorists.[550] This definition of 'weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas' matched that of the FS.[551] Therefore, it strengthened the connection between FS and 'war on terror'. Moreover, it contributed in keeping up the FS discourse and hence stabilized the securitizing of it further.

Finally, the NSS of 2006 provided a new categorization of threats at very end of the document tied to the section of National Security Institutions. These new threats were labeled 'challenges' and divided into four: *Traditional*, which included conventional militaries of states. *Irregular*, that included state and non–state actors using terrorism, insurgency, and criminal activity. *Catastrophic*, that included WMD acquisition, possession and use, by state and non–state actors. *Disruptive*, that included technologies and capabilities used by state and non–state actors to counter U.S. military advantage.[552]

Consequently, the two NSS documents of George W. Bush administration created failing states as a strategic threat by associating it with terrorism (9/11, al–Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan). This intersubjective link provided 'why'. The documents also amplified the 'Self–Other' dichotomy of the U.S. in relation to terrorism and tyrants. This created an identity for FS that associated it with the 'evil' ideology of terrorism and rogue states. Therefore, it made the threat of FS to the U.S. not just physical, but also ideological. Moreover, the existential threat of WMD's was strongly linked to FS through terrorism and rogue states providing the 'how' to 'why'. Nearly all segments of the two documents were tied to terrorism, 'rogue states' and WMD's in some way. This further contributed in securitizing FS and kept up its discourse of as an existential threat.

---

[549] The White House (2006), p. 29.
[550] Ibid., p. 33.
[551] For reference, see chapters two and three.
[552] The White House (2006), p. 44.

4.1.4 Barack Obama (NSS 2010)

Barack Obama's administration took over after a decade of 'global war on terror'. The U.S. prestige and identity had suffered a global decline because of occupation of Iraq. The prevalent message that the NSS of 2010 carried was *change*. This was an effort to distance itself from the identity created by the NSS of 2002 and 2006. Threats of terrorism, state, non–state and failed state still remained, but there was a return to the themes of the Clinton administration. The Clinton NSS' had also presented other important issues as significant threats, such as climate change and cyber.[553] In the NSS of 2010, national interests were in four major categories which described enduring interests that all linked to one another. This subsequently connected threats to categories with same logic. These categories were *security, prosperity, values, and international order*.[554] This division was not used in 2002 and 2006, or in the same format in the NSS' of 1995–2000 (then *vital, important and humanitarian*).

The fact that *security* was a category of its own placed a significant linguistic power to all of the subjects under its heading by the premises of the Securitization theory. Moreover, *international order* was tightly linked to security due to its nature. Importantly, both aforementioned categories are tied to *values* through the creation of identity and the 'Self–Other' dichotomy. The category of international order covered the old segment of regional issues and retained many of the discourses of 2006. The NSS of 2002 and the 'global war on terror' had skipped over many these discourses or combined them under FS. Some of the old discourses returned with the NSS of 2006 but were still linked to terrorism in some way. NSS of 2010 changed this with the category of international order. It highlighted multilateral cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and proliferation and once more widened the scope to include a broader range of issues.[555]

A significant shift happened in that *regions* were no longer categorized as vital or critical. They were now strategic (e.g. Middle East), and defined through nations (e.g. Mexico and Canada), or through access to resources and transport routes (e.g. sea lanes and air corridors). Therefore, a specific region (e.g. Europe) was not what mattered but various segments and actors *within* that region.

---

[553] The White House (2010), pp. i–ii.
[554] Ibid., p. 17.
[555] Ibid., pp. 40–45.

Therefore, it was the *interaction* within the region and the *interdependence* of the world that linked these actors to existential threats like WMD's, terrorism. This was seen in NSS in the way international norms, law and order, sovereignty, and 'responsibility to protect' was promoted. New structure was created to address global and local threats from states, non–state actors, or 'fragile states such as Afghanistan and Haiti'.[556]

From the very beginning of the document the security discourse of WMD's was presented as the one which carried the most significance. There was a 'determination to prevent proliferation of the deadliest weapons.' WMD's were described to be 'the greatest threat to the American people', especially if obtained by 'violent extremists'.[557] This articulation draws intertextually from the previous NSS documents. WMD's and proliferation was categorized as the *number one* threat to the U.S. The concern was shifted toward nuclear weapons. Hence, this choice in focus returned the discourse to its roots. In the 1990s states acquiring nuclear weapons were the major concern, not non–state actors. Interestingly, the label and definition of a rogue state is completely absent from this and other contexts. This can be seen as a wider effort to de–securitize and distance the issues put forward by the NSS of 2002 and 2006.

For the NSS of 2010 terrorism remained important was now focused again to 'al–Qaeda and its affiliates'. They were described as a network of 'hatred and violence' with and agenda of 'murder and extremism'. However, there was still a clear presentation of the link between WMD's and terrorism. 'U.S. citizens have no greater or more urgent threat' than terrorist attack by nuclear weapon.[558]

Therefore, this argument kept up the intersubjective link between these threats which was established in the previous NSS documents. The discourse about WMD's (in general) existed intertextually for a long time and was kept up or slightly modified over the years. As such the only significance made in 2010 was the reversal of the prime position of terrorism by the WMD threat. This was because during the Obama administration the U.S. engagement in the world was not 'defined by terrorism' anymore.[559]

---

[556] The White House (2010), pp. 45–50.
[557] Ibid., p. 1, 4, 8, 17.
[558] The White House (2010), p. 4, pp. 22–23. According to the NSS, risk of nuclear attack has increased since the Cold War. Proliferation is a threat to international peace and security because there are a lot of nuclear weapons left in the Cold War stockpiles. Furthermore, nations and terrorist try to build, buy, or steal nuclear weapons.
[559] Ibid., p. 8.

Regardless, the identity dichotomy of 'Self–Other' between the U.S. and the terrorists was kept up. A clear articulation of this was the statement about the general nature of war. War was seen not as one of *ideology* but a one of *identity*.[560] This point is underlined by a strong effort to distance the 'Obama administration's identity' from the 'G.W. Bush's'. Moreover, it was emphasized that the U.S. will not 'impose its values by force', or 'narrowly pursue its interest'. The U.S. will be an example and use the rule of law and international norms as the basis for its actions.[561] Hence, the changed nature of the situation is iterated. The U.S. was not waging a *global* war against terrorist [tactic] or Islam [religion]. The war was directed towards a *specific* network of al–Qaeda and its affiliates.[562]

For the NSS of 2010, FS part of threat definition was created by the G.W. Bush documents, specifically the NSS of 2002. Additionally, in the NSS of 2006 regional conflicts with reasons such as poor governance, internal revolt etc. created conditions for state failure. These conditions of state failure produced ungoverned areas which spawned terrorism.[563] Furthermore, in 2006 the development discourse traditionally tied with state failure, was connected to terrorism.

Abuse of 'weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas' by tyrants, criminals and terrorists was the source of threat.[564] The NSS of 2010 still had majority of those previous links and analogies of state failure. It connected them (as the previous NSS') either directly or indirectly to the existential threats of WMD's and terrorism. In the NSS of 2010 9/11 was considered a 'transformative event'[565]. This still tied FS through intertextual reference as a direct threat to the U.S.[566]

---

[560] The White House (2010, p. 1.
[561] Ibid., p. 5, 22, 25, pp. 10–11.
[562] Ibid., p. 20, 22. al–Qaeda is described as *killers and slaughter of innocents*. Their affiliation to any religion is denied. This is done in an effort to de–securitize Islam.
[563] The White House (2006), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, pp. 14–17.
[564] Ibid., p. 33.
[565] Fukuyama (2004), pp. 127–129. Fukuyama emphasizes that poverty and underdevelopment are not by themselves a cause of terrorism. Therefore, the connection to security issues experienced by the West and the U.S. is somewhat strenuous. Moreover, he refers to the U.S. 2002 *National Security Strategy* as the defining document on the U.S. actions post–9/11.
[566] The White House (2010), p. 20. This is a condition which is referred to as a future threat. Thus it keeps up the definition and identity of failing state as a threat to the U.S. as it was portrayed in the NSS document of 2002 (and Afghanistan dating back to NSS' of 1998 and 2000).

Furthermore, the global and regional nature of the FS threat was reiterated and a need to address this issue was emphasized by the U.S., but also 'by the international system'.[567] The FS discourse was strengthened and tied to the same context of extremists and hostile states by placing it in the *security* category of national interest.[568].

There is also an additional term of *'At–Risk States'* (henceforth ARS) which combined a majority of the definitions of FS. This blurred even more the difference between ordinary developing Third World states, and those harboring terrorists. ARS' were described as places where a–Qaeda and its 'terrorist affiliates' are trying to establish safe havens. Therefore, no real situation like 'case Afghanistan' had to exist. Even *potential* safe haven was considered an ARS as well.[569] The 'Self–Other' dichotomy was used here through measuring the quality of governance (a typical issue in the development discourses). This was done to establish the need for assistance and thus to 'avoid these states becoming a terrorist safe havens'.[570] The ARS were also defined by effectiveness of sovereignty (external–internal), promotion of human rights, rule of law, civilian society, and the effect of the ARS to the regional security.[571]

These definitions of ARS are again connected to the questions of 'how a strong state is defined?' and 'what is the nature of the state?' This reiterates the connection of state, sovereignty, and security and creates difficulties when failing states are defined by Western standards. Furthermore, Western standards of 'strong state' and the images created of ARS and FS in the NSS documents further amplify the existential threat of 'Other'.[572]There was also a creation of a new identity for the 'Self'. The Obama administration emphasized the difference between them and the G.W. Bush's administration. This new identity was used to de–securitized the U.S. and it re–structured its identity to appear less aggressive and unilateral. It was created by acknowledging other centers of influence such as China, Russia, and India.[573] International laws and norms were promoted in a system based on rights and

---

[567] The White House (2010), p. 8, 11, 13.
[568] Ibid., p. 17. Failing states referred as 'states that face internal collapse'.
[569] Ibid., p. 21, 48.
[570] Ibid., ARS countries where safe havens for terrorists have been successfully established included Yemen and Somalia. Of these Somalia is a classical literature example of state failure and collapse.
[571] Ibid., p. 27, 33, 46. Afghanistan and Haiti are defined as 'fragile states' which are also classical literature examples of state failure.
[572] Ibid., p. 35. The NSS described 'Self' as democratic and free and the 'Other' as backward, repressive, and autocratic.
[573] Ibid., p. 3, 11.

responsibilities.[574] The U.S. advocated rule of law, power of an example, understanding cultural difference, and acceptance that 'not everyone agreed with the U.S. view'.[575]

This was a de–securitization of the 'Self' created during the Iraq invasion and 'war on terror'.[576]

> *"America will not impose any system of government on another country, but our long–term security and prosperity depends on our steady support of universal values, which set us apart from our enemies..."*[577]

However, the re–structured identity still portrayed the Western state's basic idea of universal values and democracy. It described other models of statehood and governance either as enemies, adversaries, competitors or FS. Consequently, the problem was in the relationship between 'Self' and the 'Other'. 'Self' was created through the radical threatening 'Other' by emphasizing the difference. Simultaneously the 'Other' was created through 'Self'. Hence, the identity of the U.S. was created through enemies (e.g. Iraq, Iran, North Korea etc.) and threats (regional conflicts, terrorism etc.).

FS were created based on qualities of strong Western states and other measurable indicators. For the concept of FS there was no escape from the shifting definitions. These were drawn from the identity dichotomy and also constantly adjusted through intersubjective links. Intertextual effect between the NSS' kept up, solidified and stabilized these discourses. Therefore, regardless of the change in administration FS continued to be associated with terrorism, WMD's, rogues states, regional conflicts etc.

This subsequently securitized the FS as an existential threat and kept up the securitization. The securitization of FS first started to take shape during Clinton administration. It was completed and became effective during G.W. Bush administration, and was still present and effective during the Obama administration.

---

[574] The White House (2010), p. 12.
[575] Ibid., p. 5, 10, 16, 36, pp. 21–22. A considerable amount of discursive resources are used to present the change in the U.S. identity and policy. An example of this is prohibiting torture as a means of interrogation, using fair procedures and prosecution by courts, and providing transparency for costs of warfare.
[576] Ibid., p. 25. The NSS emphasizes that the U.S. pursues no claim on Iraqi territory or resources.
[577] Ibid., p. 36.

4.2 Summary of the securitizing discourses

In the previous section the discourses were spread out within and between the NSS documents for the reason of focusing on the specific administrations. The purpose of this section is to draw together and sum up the failing state discourses as well as subsequent explanations of why failing states were seen a threat to the U.S. Furthermore, it strives to show how the securitization of the FS in the NSS' eventually became a reality. Identity and policy form a multifaceted picture when foreign policy is seen as a discourse. Policies depend on how various threats are depicted and what kind of cultural dichotomies or juxtapositions are present.[578] Therefore, foreign policy is an intertextual and intersubjective thing where the authority and arguments draw strength through references to other texts.

During the Cold War the logic of security and the normative idea of a 'strong state' had created an understanding between the competing superpowers. Weak states needed to be upheld because otherwise the underlying structure of the system would be at risk.[579] In the post–Cold War world there was no single all–consuming threat for which to direct national security interests. Therefore, there was no plausible way to define 'Self' through the juxtaposition of the 'Other'. If there was nothing for the U.S. to fear, how could it define itself and continue to be presented as the vanguard of Western civilization and democracy?[580] The disintegration of SU and related events in the Balkans and the Gulf created the appropriate atmosphere for this re–definition. The widening of security gave rise to a new kind of security problematic.[581] In the early 1990s there were discussions about 'new global threats' of collapsing states, disease, mass migration and regional wars turning into global problems.[582]

---

[578] Hansen (2006), p. 6.

[579] Holm (1998), pp. 7–8, p. 12. According to Holm, there was a period after the Cold War when democracy and internal legitimacy was 'highly valued' because it was seen as 'key part' of the state structure. It had been suppressed in the Third World by the superpowers due to the security logic, but became the key element in obtaining financial and other aid from the international community

[580] See, for example, Buzan et al. (1998), p. 49 on the link of maintaining armed forces in post–Cold War situation and existential threats to Western European states.

[581] Ayoob (1995), p. 165. The increasing legitimacy of ethno–nationalism by international community and increased incidence of failed states created new security challenges.

[582] Huria (2008), p. 1. Sonali Huria argues that a lot of this notion of 'the threat of the Third World to the West' was popularized in 1994 by Robert Kaplan's article *"The Coming Anarchy"*.

Moreover, this widening of the security from military to other sectors constituted in part the re–focus of the U.S. perception of threats.[583] Threats became interdependent and transnational. However, regional instability (in vital areas), denial of access to critical resources (such as oil), and direct attack as to the U.S., remained as existential threats. The first appearance and distant analogies to failing states in the NSS documents was that of rogue nations and 'mad men'. These appeared after the Gulf War (1990–1991) in 1993 in the part dealing with the proliferation of WMD's.[584] The following two NSS documents from 1994 and 1995 exhibited a similarity in that they both mentioned the threat posed by *rogue state*s. This was the first time a *state* was presented as the source of threat.[585] Furthermore, the context where this was presented carried a sense of widening of security.

However, it still emphasized the *regional* nature of the threats.[586] It can be said that the first *securitization move* of FS was done in relation to the failure of the Yugoslav state on both sides of the mid–1990s. This created a conceptual definition of sorts for failing and failed states in the NSS'.[587] Subsequently, the wars in the first half of the 1990s together with the Cold War legacy constituted the discourses of WMD's and regional conflicts. These discourses started to link up with the FS discourse. After the midway of the decade the terrorism discourse became also a part of this family.

The connection between terrorism and rogue states surfaced first time in 1996. The points mentioned above were still valid but a new formulation was added. The section 'Enhancing our security' contained a very descriptive phrase:

> *"the destructive forces we face inside our borders often have their origins overseas in rogue nations that breed and harbor terrorists"*[588]

---

[583] Newman (2009), p. 421. According to Newman, the humanitarian discourse is notable since it highlights the change that occurred after Cold War in Western predisposition toward state failure. It didn't replace the national interest and security discourse but it re–established the reason for the existence of Western armed forces (NATO).

[584] The White House (1993), p. 17. The WMD threat is depicted as general in nature and not specified to a geographical location. Emphasis is placed on the need to protect allies and own forces.

[585] Ayoob (1995). pp. 122–123. Iraq was one of the major regional threats to the U.S. in the 1990s. Ayoob presents Iraq as having the misfortune of being located in a geostrategic and geoeconomical important region for vital U.S. interests. Thus U.S. made sure that after the Gulf War UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq were 'implemented to the last punctuation mark'. This resulted in 'unprecedented violation of state sovereignty since the occupation of Germany and Japan' in the wake of the WWII.

[586] The White House (1994), p. i, The White House (1995), p. i.

[587] The White House (1999), p. 2. The concept was broadened to include 'states that succumb to inflammatory rhetoric of demagogues'. This broadened the concept of failing and failed states beyond poor governance and internal security issues. Therefore, the concept became also associated with rogue states and dictators.

[588] The White House (1996), p. 12.

This marked a clear shift in the articulation from solely regional issues into a threat to the mainland U.S. It also connected the *'rogue'* label into many different sections of the NSS document. Furthermore, the concept of *'failing states'* made it first appearance in the following year in the NSS of 1997. Failing state partly supplemented the rogue –label but restricted the term solely to a regional context. However it attached a state–centric meaning to it and connected it to a threat of a more military in nature. Therefore, it can be said that at that point in the 1990s the discourses on regional conflicts, humanitarian issues, and a multitude of other transnational threats (such as terrorism) had finally solidified in the NSS documents. Hence, in 1997 the intersubjective and intertextual linking was well on its way.[589]

It was in the next three NSS documents from 1998 to 2000 where state failure took its place along the rogue state in the list of issues threatening the U.S. However, in the *structure* of the NSS document the issue remained low in the priorities compared to more serious threats.[590] Threats from rogue states and terrorism became more prominent and FS finally supplemented rogue states in 2000. The context remained tied to regional conflicts that could spread and affect vital areas of interest. The NSS of 2000 was the last document published before events of the 9/11 created a stronger connection between terrorism and various other threats throughout the spectrum.[591]

In 2001 a significant shift happened in the security discourse. The magnitude was almost at the same level as the one that had happened with the fall of the Soviets.[592] It partially re–structured a large part of the security environment.[593] Before the attacks of 9/11 the problem of state failure was localized and regional. It suddenly evolved into a one where 'states that could not perform' were a threat to all the others. Failing states presented dangers beyond their borders and 'should be delisted and their sovereignty stripped of them.'[594] 9/11 was such

---

[589] Sjöstedt (2013), pp. 150–151, Balzacq (2005), p. 187–188. Balzacq stipulates about the difficulty of Discourse analysis in regards to securitization.

[590] For details, see, The White House (1998), p. 7, and The White House (1999), p. 2. State failure remained a localized problem and the emphasis was more in the direction of rogue states, WMD's and the terrorism threats. These were considered to constitute a more definite threat to the mainland U.S.

[591] The White House (2000). Roe (2012), p. 252. *"Politics of unease can create contexts for securitization within which there is no clear discursive framing of threat".*

[592] The White House (2002), p. 13.

[593] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 55. Buzan and Hanse stipulate that events can change academic paradigms as well as relationships between powers. This can change understandings and relationships in wider strategic domain (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and 9/11 terror attacks).

[594] Rotberg (2004), p. 31, 41. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 227. Terrorism was considered in the literature of ISS as a regional problem before 9/11, much like failing states. Mair (2008), pp. 53–55. Mair argues that failing states are the ideal ones for nurturing terrorism, international crime etc., because some the physical structures of the state are still available (airports, etc.). The state has lost control on the monopoly of violence which enables actors to pursue their interest with a relative freedom. James (2012), pp. 245–246.

a powerful event that little argument was needed to present FS (such as Afghanistan) as harbors of terrorists and their organizations.[595] It shifted the basis of the definition on how failing states were conceived in the U.S., and showed how a localized problem could cause damage regardless of the geographical distance.[596] Moreover, the interests of the U.S. in Afghanistan after 9/11 were also related to the enormous hit its sovereignty and identity suffered as a result of the terrorist attacks.[597]

Consequently, the U.S. identified Afghanistan (for one) to be a 'safe haven' (of sorts) for terrorism because of 'failed and failing state' status derived from various indicators. Most significant of those was the lack of control of territory and population.[598] Previously both Cold War and post–Cold War situations had exhibited similarities in regard that they did not for the most part account the failure of states to present an international security issue.[599] State failure had displaced the nuclear war and the Soviet armies as the key threat to the existence of the U.S.[600] The concept of FS drew other transnational and global threats under it and created new intersubjective links.[601] Therefore, the most definite turning point in the discourses was the 9/11.[602] Furthermore, this event brought the problem of FS to international awareness because of acknowledgement by the U.S. and hence turned a localized problem into a global one.[603]

---

[595], Call and Wyeth (2008), p. 2, Jones (2013), p. 62. A critical view is presented by Jones who argues that since 9/11 the 'category of failed state' was used not only as an excuse of intervention, but also a tool to 'suspend Geneva III' in regard to the status of Taliban prisoners of war (POW).

[596] The White House (2002), p. i, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 55. Buzan and Hansen point out that 'events are politically and intersubjectively constituted'. Therefore, the importance of them is created by politicians, media etc.

[597] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 52. According to Buzan and Hansen, the U.S. reacted heavily to 9/11 due to its history of insulation against many threats and a high expectation of security. When the 'shock of vulnerability' hit it was much stronger than others could imagine.

[598] The White House (2002), p. 2. Huria (2008), p. 2, Huria refers to Liana Sun Wyler's 2007 CRS report to the U.S. Congress where 'it is commonly argued that weak and failing states are the primary bases for most foreign terrorist organizations'. See also, Call (2008), p.1493.

[599] The viewpoint adopted here is that of a superpower, hence, there are great differences amongst states in what they perceive to be *an international security threat*.

[600] Jones (2013), p. 62. Jones argues that the state failure discourse is *specifically* (cursive added) situated in the post–Cold War era.

[601] Huria (2008), p. 2. Huria refers to statements by Condoleezza Rice (in New York Post 2005), that stipulate an 'unparalleled threat to the U.S. from "weak and failing states". These include pandemics, transnational crime, and weapons proliferation. See also, Call (2008), p. 1493.

[602] Newman (2009), p. 421. For Newman, the security dimension created by the 9/11 as one major cause which attracted many analyst and scholars to the paradox of failing states. This created a link between great power politics and wider academic discussion.

[603] Fukuyama (2004), pp. 125–126, Raitasalo (2005), p. 1. Raitasalo depicts the epic changes constituted by the end of the Cold War and subsequent War on Terror by the U.S. after 9/11.

5 COMBINING ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

"Politics of unease can create contexts for securitization within which there is no clear discursive framing of threat".[604]

–Paul Roe

The previous chapters went through the conceptual origins of FS. They searched for the appearance of 'failing states' in different forms and connections. It is the task of this final chapter to pick the parts which have meaning and to provide an explanation on how the concept was securitized. Moreover, the final goal here is to present the analytical results and conclusions as well as provide incentive and thought for further research.

The process of securitization needs the speech act, the utterance of 'security', and the relevant audience which accepts this argument. Therefore, 'security' should be attached to an issue that is presented as an existential threat. This special label makes the case much stronger than conventional argument. This study used a discursive conception of security.[605] Security was seen as 'a discourse through which identities and threats were constituted, rather than an objective material condition.'[606]

Threats were securitized according to the Securitization theory where existential threat is created with a conscious use of language. Based on these theoretical and methodological guidelines, FS were not seen as actors and objective threats in the classical material sense of security. Instead, they were seen as discursively constituted radical and threatening 'Others'. FS were gradually created as an existential threat through intersubjective and intertextual links between various threats and discourses.

---

[604] Roe (2012), p. 252.
[605] Appendix 4, picture 4.
[606] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 243.

The intersubjective links between dominant security discourses

There were several discourses over the temporal span of 1990–2010 that eventually constituted failing states as existential threat and securitized it. *The First* of these was the WMD discourse which originated from the Cold War deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction (henceforth MAD) with the Soviet Union. It gradually changed when the concept of security widened and included regional actors (namely states) as well non–state and transnational actors (e.g. criminals and terrorists). Furthermore, it was simultaneously linked to technological progress, globalization and to fear of proliferation. This created a global proliferation discourse where WMD's was everything from components and precursors to actual weapons and ballistic missiles. Within this discourse, those who sought these weapons and abilities to create them were deemed rogue states, irrational, tyrants, dictators, demagogues and a danger to both regional and international security. It created the radical and threatening 'Other' while presenting 'Self' as a stable and responsible actor that was a vanguard of democracy and human rights.

The second discourse was the regional conflict discourse. This was similar to the WMD discourse because it was also a legacy from the Cold War. The discourse was originally situated outside the industrialized heartland of Europe. It was prominent in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In these regions the superpower competition had at times escalated into proxy wars and regional (inter– and intrastate) conflicts. This discourse evolved after the Cold War in the 1990s due to unipolar world of U.S. global dominance and widening of security. It was embedded with humanitarian and development discourses that had been suppressed during the superpower rivalry. Moreover, during the Cold War regional conflicts had not presented much of an international security threat. The widening of security, a general normative shift in the West and various conflicts in critical regions (e.g. Balkans and Gulf) later constituted regional conflicts as an existential threat (of sorts) to the U.S.

Furthermore, the WMD discourse was linked to the regional conflict discourse through the concept of rogue states. Hence, it was used as an intersubjective nexus. It amplified the 'Self–Other' dichotomy and conceptually linked both dominant discourses. Regional conflicts created instability that could spread and become larger problems. Conflicts were being originated by weak, fragile, failing and failed states, as well as rogue states and autocracies. All of these had severe problems. They oppressed their populations, could not govern or control territory, were corrupt, and involved in ethnic cleansing or genocide.

Consequently, this resulted in creating the threatening radical 'Other' through a successful, strong, democratic and industrialized Western 'Self'. Therefore the 'Other' was constituted in a reflection of a Western model of a sovereign state.

The third discourse one was the terrorism discourse which was originally a marginal threat. After the Cold War it rose steadily in significance toward the end of the 1990s and reached the culmination point with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Like the previous two, the terrorism discourse evolved with the widening of security and was embedded with technological elements such as WMD's. The threat was originally mostly to U.S. service personnel and civilians abroad but widened and strengthened from regional to global, and from marginal to existential. Furthermore, WMD terrorism was portrayed as a particularly great danger. The discursive shift of combining terrorism to WMD's coincided with the changes in the other two major discourses. In those two similar intersubjective links were established. Consequently, near the end of the century WMD's 'were spreading globally' and connected in almost all of the threat categories. Non–state actors and rogue states supported terrorism, whereas regional weak and failing states provided bases of operation.

Furthermore, in 1998 a significant shift in discourses happened when the terrorist 'Other' was strongly constituted in the aftermath of strikes on the U.S. embassies in Africa. Not only was the threat named severe enough to warrant extraordinary measures, it was articulated very strongly. The 'Other' was described as fanatical and hateful that glorified violence and murdered innocents. Therefore its identity was placed against the identity of the virtuous, moral, civilized and benign 'Self'. At this point the intersubjective and intertextual links between the discourses of WMD's, rogue states, failing states and regional conflicts were connected to terrorism. Consequently, 9/11 acted as a catalyst. The event strengthened and speeded up[607] the intersubjective constitution of various threats. It also drew the other dominant discourses under the 'failing state' discourse.

Consequently, the FS discourse was a composite of the three dominant discourses (WMD's, regional conflicts and terrorism) and it developed gradually over time. The conceptual base was located in the Western definition of state, sovereignty and security. This was because the discourse on the state failure was tied to the idea of statehood and failing states were referred, defined and described in reference to something they were not. Existential threats needed for

[607] Roe (2012), p. 251.

the securitization drew from this connection of state and security because of historical links. They were discursively created by forming intersubjective links from issues (e.g. WMD's) to actors (such as states and non–state actors). These existential threats (e.g. rogue states or terrorists) constituted dominant security discourses that were linked intertextually between NSS' documents. The dominant security discourses (e.g. terrorists) were further connected by intersubjective links to other discourses (e.g. FS) as well with each other. This was how the radical and threatening 'Other' was constituted. Therefore, it was not necessarily about concrete threats but about producing and reproducing the national identity.

The securitization of failing states in the NSS documents

I would argue that the securitization of failing states happened first in the NSS of 1997. Its roots were in the disintegration of Yugoslavia as well as in the general strategic–normative shift created by the end of the Cold War. This is supported by an argument of Branwen G. Jones, which states that the colonialism discourse was modified into a development discourse during the Cold War. This created the conditions for post–Cold War state failure discourse. Hence, state failure discourse was used to justify intervention in 'non–Western regions' the same way as colonialism discourse had been in the 1800s.[608]

The first part of the securitization was completed in the NSS of 1997 when the intertextually drawn security discourse from NSS 1994–1996 was combined in the threat categorization mentioning 'failed and unstable states'. Therefore, the discourse in the NSS of 1997 can be seen as a starting point of the state failure discourse (with its analogues) within the NSS documents. This discourse was further strengthened and kept up by creating a threat category of its own for 'failed states' in the NSS' of 1998 and 1999.[609] The second part of the securitization happened between 1998–2000 when terrorism gained prominence and was linked to WMD's and rogue states. Within this period the intersubjective and intertextual links between WMD's, rogue states, failing states, regional conflicts and terrorism were formed. This created the framework for the final securitization.

The third and final phase of the securitization happened after 9/11 when failing states were acknowledged as one of the key existential threats in the 2002 NSS document. This was done with a powerful framing on the first chapter: *"America is now threatened less by conquering*

[608] Jones (2013), p. 62.
[609] The White House (1998), p. 7.

states than we are by failing ones"[610] This was in itself an enormous securitizing move as it created a link with the old Soviet nuclear and ideological threat to the contemporary one of terrorism and state failure. Devastating terrorism was placed as a threat which resided in the ruins of failing and failed states.

Moreover, FS drew under it all the dominant security discourses from the previous NSS documents. These included rogue states and WMD's. In 2002 the securitization of FS was successful to an extent that for a time it suppressed all other discussion on state failure. The FS theme continued in the NSS's of 2006 and 2010 in a way that shows its effectiveness. It also proved the success of the securitizing act done in the 2002 document and showed the stability of the discourse.[611] Consequently, failing states were securitized as an existential threat to the U.S. by presenting them as the place where devastating and catastrophic terrorism (e.g. 9/11) originated from. 9/11 had violated heavily the identity and sovereignty of the U.S. It created the feeling of shock and vulnerability that also affected the reaction that followed. The outrage at a massive attack on civilian population on the mainland of the U.S. amplified the already strong dichotomy between 'Self' and the 'Other'. This tied sovereignty and the Western notion of state as part of the discourse. Therefore, 9/11 was the nexus that connected the previous descriptions, definitions and analogies of state failure (and that of rogue states) present in the various NSS documents. It also brought together all the dominant security discourses and linked them with FS. This strengthened and stabilized the discourse and made the securitization successful.

The research process

The aim of this research was to analyze the securitization of failing states as part of the U.S. national security discourse. This was done by looking at how the failing state discourse entered into the NSS as well as how it was framed. The NSS documents and the material on state failure provided information on why FS were seen as a threat. Primary material was analyzed using Securitization theory and DA methodology. As a result, it could be shown how FS were securitized as a threat to the U.S. Moreover, I argued that the interaction between various NSS documents presented itself through securitization. Hence, the effect of securitizing would be shown throughout the policy documents of different administrations. I found out that the official discourse of the NSS created a threat of FS gradually.

---

[610] The White House (2002), p. 1.
[611] Call (2008), p. 1493.

I also discovered the significance of the primary material on state failure. Without it, the analysis of the NSS would have been possible, but very superficial. The material provided critical information on the Western view of what state is (or should be) as well as how the identity of the state is created. This information on states and state failure made possible to understand why states see threats and how the securitization process gets initiated. Therefore, I learned that there is great value in thorough background information and looking at the research subject from different angles. However, at the same time there was the conundrum of what is enough? How much theoretical and academic source material is sufficient? Should I devote more time for a detailed description of how state was formed and how theories develop etc.? The more you read, the more information is available with links yet again to more information. This produces huge amounts of text in the process and can lead to endless loop.

Therefore, the re–examining of my own text and taking out 'excess' was probably one of the hardest, but most instructive things of this research process. Furthermore, the DA methodology was proven to be excellent for this type of research regardless of the criticism directed against it. The NSS was structured in a way that it was not always clear what threats are existential and what less important. Even with the categorizations given by the document significant effort was needed in finding and examining the different intersubjective and intertextual links. For this very reason the chosen methodology proved to be suitable for the task. Constructivism, Poststructuralism and Securitization theories provided the necessary theoretical framework and 'glasses' for the methodology.

It could be shown that throughout the NSS documents previous threats were externalized, objectified and internalized in a way which is consistent with Constructivism.[612] This processes happened when FS were thought of by the policymakers of the U.S. as dens of terrorism and destruction. Originally this idea was discursively created by intertextual and intersubjective linking of threats during the 1990s and externalized in the form of a policy in the NSS. The separate security discourses entered into a social realm of consecutive administrations and took on a life of their own. Therefore, the security discourses were objectified and developed a factual existence. These continued to live on as an accepted fact and culminated after the 9/11. In the NSS of 2002 failing states became 'the ground zero' of the dominant discourses.

---

[612] Burr (1995), pp. 8–10.

Consequently, as administrations changed the previous policy documents still retained their effect and new ones were born into a world of the old. Hence, the security discourses retained much from the old NSS documents. The new NSS' shifted the discourse accordingly by providing additional securitization. This happened through support for dominant discourses or creating new intersubjective and intertextual links. However, this was not always without problems. The opposition in the West (and elsewhere) towards the war in Iraq (no WMD's were found) demonstrated this concretely.[613]

Criticism and debate

The theoretical and methodological framework and the results of this study leave room for criticism. Social constructivism puts a lot of weight in the use of language. I am of Finnish background with all of its linguistics, concepts and cultural implications. This positions me in a certain way when reading English literature and transcribing it in a form of an English text. For a constructivist–relativist (ontology) language creates social and concrete reality but for a realist (ontology) language presents a picture of reality as it is. Therefore, a realist could would view all the source material 'as it is' without considering the cultural–normative issues and draw different conclusions from it.

Moreover, both the researcher and the source material of this study are from Western origins.[614] This creates 'a set of lenses' which is vastly different than if it were to be looked at by Russian or Chinese or African researcher. Culture, society, and previously accumulated knowledge affect the premises of the study as well as the interpretation of the results.[615] Hence, there is a no way to ascertain that the material of this study (primary, secondary and general) would be understood in similar way by other researchers. During re–reading of the same material the context and meaning can vary depending on the cumulative information and intertextual and intersubjective links. Furthermore, even though official documents have high validity the weaknesses of these (NSS) documents are their heavy subjective nature. This comes from the fact that they represent the power of various administrations. Therefore, the way threats are described and presented either existential or not, is not just a matter of interpretation of the researcher.

---

[613] Buzan and Hansen (2009), pp. 244–245.
[614] Ibid., p.19.
[615] Call (2008), p. 1494.

It is also part of the motives and interests of those who draft the documents.[616] Hence, it is nigh impossible to ascertain for a fact whether (any) securitization is done on purpose. The process could be just happening through a constitutive effect of different events creating discourses which converge and link up, eventually constructing something new.[617]As an example, a threat from the wars in the Balkans affected the security discourse in the NSS' because Europe had been articulated as a 'vital' region to the security of the U.S. However, it was pointed out in some of the NSS' that the situation in the 'former Yugoslavia does not pose a direct threat to the security of the U.S.'[618]

Even with this controversial stipulation it warrants sufficient emphasis to interpret the document the way that the Balkan wars were a sort of existential threat to the U.S. This is because a threat to the stability of the strategic region of Europe was a very high priority for the U.S. This was further underlined by the fact that Europe was presented as a 'vital' region in all of the NSS documents. This presents a problem for the researcher as how to interpret the conflict. The intertextual effect of discourses draws support from other NSS documents as well as *within* them. This makes the conclusion dependent upon the interpretation of the reader as well as that of the policymakers who wrote it. This makes securitization sometimes difficult to pinpoint as it does not always present itself as clearly as is dictated in the theoretical principles.[619]

The criticism towards Securitizing theory is more within the post–positivists camp than outside it. The common accusations towards non–causal theories have been that they are not valid theories since they do not produce hypothesis to prove either true or false. Thierry Balzacq has pointed out that the CS is 'extensively relativist' and does not understand 'non–discursive power'. Therefore, they make assumptions of the speech act that contradict the theoretical principles presented in the Securitization theory.[620] This criticism is directed at how the theory should be interpreted and also to the usability of the theory in regards to the use of language. This could affect the analysis and results and should be noted. However, the chosen ontological, epistemological and methodological limitations always give out conclusion limited to those premises.

---

[616] Balzacq (2005), p. 176, Wæver (2011), p. 467.
[617] Gad and Petersen (2011), Balzacq (2005), p. 190.
[618] The White House (1995), p. 25.
[619] Balzacq (2005), pp. 177–178.
[620] Gad and Petersen, (2011), pp. 318–319, Balzacq (2005), Roe (2012), p. 254.

Furthermore, methodological critics have expressed concern of the 'silent security dilemma'.[621] This happens when something important is not securitized just because the potential securitizing actor has no means of speaking out their concern. Therefore, it is about the ability to interpret 'security issues'.[622] Because this interpretation is a cultural thing it can lead to a situation where cultural aspects affect whether or not something is considered a valid security issue. The second similar problem lies in the de–securitization of securitized issues as they are moved from the realm of security to the realm of the political. This should be done so that the securitized issue does not 'fade away in silence', but is (possibly) politicized and thus put into context, hence 'returning its normative status'.[623]

This is a valid point also in regard to the NSS documents as those who draft them choose what kind of threats are presented and what is the severity and context. Moreover, if threats are left without de–securitization even though changed circumstances would have warranted it, it distorts the analysis of the discourse thus affecting conclusions of the study. Also, the lack of empirical facts and the Schmittian understanding of security as the foundation of the CS place some restraints on the theory. The exceptional nature of security politics is a 'political and normative' assumption which is challenged for the implications it holds.[624] There is a valid question posed by Buzan and Hansen which states: 'Are state identities dependent upon threats and enemies for keeping up their identities and can this logic change?[625]

According to them, the end of the Cold War was 'problematic for Poststructuralism' because it put into question whether states were dependent upon threats to maintain their identities. The formation of 'Other' was deemed so pressing that even if state's identity could be constructed by 'relations of difference'[626]. It would eventually be not enough and these would be turned into 'radical and threatening Otherness'. Hence, if state would always define their identities through enemies it would align Poststructuralism with Realism which thinks states as being circled by hostile actors.[627]

---

[621] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 216.
[622] Ibid.
[623] Roe (2012), p. 254, Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 216.
[624] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 217.
[625] Ibid., p. 217.
[626] Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 218.
[627] Ibid., pp. 217–218.

These arguments raise a good point since the formation of the U.S. identity and its interpretation are key elements for this study. They also point out weaknesses for implicitly adapting certain theoretical standpoint and point towards the benefits of theoretical hybrids. By constructing a combined theoretical approach for a study, both objectivity and validity would be served. For this study, a combined approach provided the needed perspective and adaptive capability.

Possibility for further study

There are several avenues of approach which could supplement and widen the research done in this thesis. One of those would be to include the academic and scientific community into the analysis and look for a constitutive effect of the securitization of failing states concept in the articles written during the same temporal period. This way selected journals and studies could be analyzed in an effort to determine whether the securitization of the FS concept in the NSS affected to the securitization of the concept in the wider academic community. Moreover, did this securitization reflect back to the NSS in some way? This could be supplemented with a more detailed historical analysis of the concepts of state, sovereignty and security and their mutual links.

This way the Western state's identity creation and its underlying paradigms could provide additional information for the conceptualizing of state failure. A Realist theoretical view with a classical view on security could be used to create a parallel analysis using the same material. This would create a thesis–antithesis that could be used to further broaden the research and its results. Moreover, the temporal period of the analysis could include the Arab Spring and wars in Ukraine and Syria to see how or if the securitization of the failing state continued or not.

The overall ambition of a wider and in–depth research would be to see if the securitization of the failing states had lasting effect on the foreign policy of the U.S. and if this affected academic and scientific community as well as policies elsewhere. Consequently, this research provides an opening for further study of this subject and one theoretical–methodological viewpoint.

Conclusions

The conceptual base of the FS discourse was located in the Western definition of state, sovereignty and security. State failure was defined and described in reference to a strong (Western) state. The existential threats needed for the securitization of FS drew from the definition and identity of the Western state. This historical–cultural background and identity formation provided the answer to the question of *how* state failure was conceptualized in the academic literature.

Failing states were gradually created a threat in the NSS documents with the widening of security in the 1990s. During this process intersubjective and intertextual links formed between different threats. These threats were externalized to the policy documents as security discourses. Failing states discourse evolved from the security discourses of WMD's, regional conflicts and terrorism. These discourses were objectified and developed an existence of their own with consecutive administrations. The securitization of FS happened in phases through the different discourses. A regional instability issue associated with Third World ultimately received existential qualities. After 9/11 *all* state failure was defined as a strategic threat equal to former Soviet Union. This together with the conceptualization part provided the answer to the question of *why* failing were securitized as a threat to the U.S.

In the NSS of 2002 failing states were completely securitized. It drew under it all the dominant security discourses. The following NSS documents kept up this securitization by retaining the intersubjective and intertextual links. The securitization of FS begun in the 1990s was completed in 2002, and remained effective to 2010. By combining 'what?' and 'why?' this research was able to provide answer to the question of 'how?' As a result it could be shown, how the official discourse of the U.S. (the NSS) created threats through securitizing failing states.

REFERENCES

Alasuutari, Pertti, (1993), *Laadullinen tutkimus,* Tampere: Vastapaino.

Balzacq, Thierry (2005), The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations* 11, pp. 171–200.

Balzacq, Thierry (2011), *Securitization theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve*, Chippenham,Wiltshire: CPI Antony Rowe

Bull, Hedley [1977] (2002), *The Anarchical Society (3rd ed.): A Study of Order in World Politics*

Burr, Vivien (1995), *An Introduction to Social Constructivism,* New York: Routledge.

Buzan, Barry (1991), *People, States & Fear* (2nd ed.): *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era,* Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, de Wilde, Jaap (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene (2009), *The Evolution of International Security Studies,* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Berger, Peter L. & Luckman, Thomas (1994), *Todellisuuden sosiaalinen rakentuminen,* Helsinki: Kirjapaino–Oy Like.

Blombergs, Fred (2013), "Realismi ja strategian tutkimus" in Sivonen, Pekka (ed.) (2013), *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen,* National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Tampere: Juvenes Print.

Campbell, Tom (1981), Seven Theories of Human Society, New York: Oxford University Press.

Clausewitz, Carl von [1832], Eskelinen Heikki (trans.) (1998), [vom Kriege], *Sodankäynnistä*. Smedjebacken: Fälth & Hässler.

Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja, and Smith Steve (eds.) (2010), *International Relations Theories: Disciple and Diversity 2nd edition,* New York: Oxford University Press.

Eskola, Jari & Suoranta, Juha, (1998), *Johdatus laadulliseen tutkimukseen*. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Gad, Ulrik Pram, and Petersen, Karen Lund (2011), "Concepts of politics in securitization studies", *Security Dialogue* 42, pp. 315–328.

Hakovirta, Harto (2002), *Maailmanpolitiikka: Teoria ja todellisuus,* Jyväskylä: Gummerus kirjapaino.

Hehir, J. Brian (2003), "The New Security Strategy", *America,* April 7 2003, Vol. 188, No. 12, pp. 8–12.

Hansen, Lene (2006), *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War,* New York: Routledge.

Hirsjärvi ,Sirkka & Remes, Pirkko & Sajavaara, Paula (1996) [2009], *Tutki ja kirjoita,* Hämeenlinna: Kariston Kirjapaino Oy.

Holsti, Kalevi J. (1996), *The State, war, and the state of war*, Cambridge: University Press.

Huhtinen, Aki–Mauri (2002), "Sotilasjohtamisen tutkimus", in *Sotilasjohtamisen tutkimuksen tieteenfilosofiset perusteet ja menetelmät* (ed.) Aki–Mauri Huhtinen, Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy.

Jensen, Leif C. (2012), "Seduced by security: A post–structuralist take on Norwegian High North securitizing discourses", *Cooperation and Conflict* 48(1), pp. 80–99.

Jokinen, Arja & Juhila, Kirsi & Suoninen, Eero (eds.) (1993), *Diskurssianalyysin aakkoset*, Tampere: Vastapaino.

Korhonen, Pekka (2014), Failed state –käsitteen hyväksikäyttö Yhdysvaltojen turvallisuuspolitiikassa, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Limnéll, Jarmo & Raitasalo, Jyri (2008), *Georgian sota uhkakuvien näkökulmasta*, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 28, Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Limnéll, Jarmo (2009), *Suomen uhkakuvapolitiikka 2000–luvun alussa*, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 29, Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton & Company Inc.

Metsämuuronen, Jari (2000), *Laadullisen tutkimuksen perusteet*, Viro: Jaabes OÜ.

McDonald, Matt (2008), "Securitization and the Construction of Security", *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (4), pp. 563–587.

Niiniluoto, Ilkka (1999), *Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan.* Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava.

Newmann, William W. (2004), "The Structures of National Security Decision Making: Leadership, Institutions, and Politics in the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush Years", *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 no. 2 (June), Center for the Study of the Presidency, pp. 272–305.

Perheentupa, Christian (2010), *"Konstruktivismi",* in Sivonen, Pekka (ed.) (2013), *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen,* National Defence University,

Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Tampere: Juvenes Print.

Puolustusministeriö (2011), *Yhteiskunnan turvallissuusstrategia: Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 16.12.2010*, Vammala: Vammalan kirjapaino.

Raitasalo, Jyri (2005), *Constructing War and Military Power After the Cold War: The Role of the United Statesin the Shared Western Understandings of War and Military Power in the Post–Cold War Era,* National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 21, Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Remler, Dahlia K. & Van Ryzin, Gregg G (2011), *Research methods in practice*, London: SAGE Publications Inc.

Roe, Paul (2012), "Is securitization a 'negative' concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics", *Security Dialogue* 43 (3), pp. 249–266.

Saaranen–Kauppinen, Anita & Puusniekka, Anna (2006), *KvaliMOTV –Menetelmäopetuksen tietovaranto* [verkkojulkaisu], http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/kvali/, page visited 3.8.2015 09.15 am.

Sipilä, Joonas (2013), "Sota tutkimuksen kohteena" in Sivonen, Pekka (ed.) (2013), *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen,* National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Tampere: Juvenes Print.

Sipilä, Joonas & Koivula, Tommi (2013), *Kuinka strategiaa tutkitaan,* Helsinki: Juvenes Print Oy.

Sirén, Torsti (2009), *State Agent, Identity and the "New World Order" – Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era,* National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 26, Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Sivonen, Pekka (ed.) (2013), *Suomalaisia näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen,* National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 1: Strategic Research No 33, Tampere: Juvenes Print.

Sjöstedt, Roxanna (2013), "Ideas, Identities and internalization: Explaining securitizing moves", *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, pp. 143–164.

Stritzel, Holger (2012), "Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translations of organized crime", *Security Dialogue* 43(6), pp. 549–567.

Strachan, Hew (2016), "Geopolitics and Strategy in the 21st Century", *lecture at Finnish National Defence University (Santahamina) on 28 of January 2016.*

Takala, Tuomo & Lämsä, Anna–Maija (2001), ”Tulkitseva käsitetutkimus organisaatio– ja johtamistutkimuksen tutkimusmetodologisena vaihtoehtona”, *Liiketaloudellinen aikakausikirja 50* (48), pp. 371–390.

Töttö, Pertti (2000), Pirullisen positivismin paluu: Laadullisen ja määrällisen tarkastelua, Tampere: Vastapaino.

Visuri, Pekka (1997), *Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia*, Juva: WSOY.

Wæver, Ole (2011), Politics, security, theory, *Security Dialogue* 42, pp. 465–480.

Waltz, Kenneth (2008), *Realism and International Politics*, New York: Routledge.

Williams, Michael C. (2003), Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics, *International Studies Quarterly* 47, pp. 511–531.

Weber, Cynthia (2014), *International Relations: A Critical Introduction*, New York: Routledge.

Wendt, Alexander (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Primary material

Adam, Hussein M. (1995), "Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born" in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Ayoob, Mohamed (1995), *The Third World Security Predicament,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Ayoob, Mohamed (2005), Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Bates, Robert H. (2008), *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late–Century Africa,* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Burke, Peter (1986)," City–States" in Hall, John A. (ed.) (1986), *States in History,* New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.

Call, Charles T. and Wyeth, Vanessa (eds.) (2008), *Building States to Build Peace*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Carment, David (2004), "Preventing State Failure", in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,* Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

Clapham, Christopher (2004), "The Global–Local Politics of State Decay", in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,* Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

Deng, Francis M. (1995), "State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the United Nations" in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.*

Fituni, Leonid L. (1995), "The Collapse of the Socialist State: Angola and Soviet Union" in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.*

Foltz, William J. (1995),"Reconstructing the State of Chad", in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Fukuyama, Francis (2004), *State–Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty–First Century,* London: Cornell University Press.

Hall, John A. (ed.) (1986), *States in History,* New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.

Jackson, Robert H. (1990), *Quasi–states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World,* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kasfir, Nelson (2004), "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation", in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,* Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

Khadiagala, Gilbert M. (1995), "State Collapse and Reconstruction in Uganda", in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Klare, Michael T. (2004) "Paramilitary Bands, Small Arms Diffusion and State Failure", in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,* Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1999), *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Layachi, Azzedine, (1995), "Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating a Civil Society" in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Lowenkopf, Martin (1995), "Liberia: Putting the State Back Together, in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Mann, Michael (1986), "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in Hall, John A. (ed.) (1986), *States in History,* New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.

Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

Rotchild, Donald (1995), "Rawlings and the Engineering of Legitimacy in Ghana," in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Schutz, Barry (1995), "The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for Governmental Legitimacy in Mozambique" in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Shezi, Shipho (1995), "South Africa: State Transition and the Management of Collapse", in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Tainter, Joseph A. (1988), *The Collapse of Complex Societies,* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles (1990), *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990,* New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.

The White House (1990), *National Security Strategy of the United States,* Washington DC.

The White House (1991), *National Security Strategy of the United States,* Washington DC.

The White House (1993), *National Security Strategy of the United States,* Washington DC.

The White House (1994), *A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement, Washington DC.*

The White House (1995), *A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement, Washington DC.*

The White House (1996), *A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement, Washington DC.*

The White House (1997), *A National Security Strategy for a New Century,* Washington DC.

The White House (1998), *A National Security Strategy for a New Century,* Washington DC.

The White House (2000), *A National Security Strategy for a New Century,* Washington DC.

The White House (2001), *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,* Washington DC.

The White House (2002), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of the America,* Washington DC.

The White House (2006), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of the America,* Washington DC.

The White House (2010), *National Security Strategy,*Washington DC.

Van De Valle, Nicolas (2004), "The Economic Correlates of State Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid and Policies", in Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences,* Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

Weiss, Herbert "Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Polity" in Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Zartman, William I. (ed.) (1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Zartman, William I. (2005), *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Secondary material

Call, Charles T. (2008), "The Fallacy of the 'Failed State'", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 8, pp. 1491–1507.

Clément, Caty (2007), "The Nuts and Bolts of State Collapse: What to do when States Fail?" *A QCA Analysis of Lebanon, Somalia and former–Yugoslavia*, Harvard University.

Brussels (2003), *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003.

Failed State Index (FSI), http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview, page visited 5.8.2015 10.20 am.

Global Peace Index (GPI), http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index, page visited 5.8.2015 10.20 am.

Helman, Gerald B. and Ratner, Steven R. (1992), "Saving Failed States", *Foreign Policy* Winter 1992/93, Issue. 89, pp. 3–18.

Holm, Hans–Henrik (1998), "The Responsibility That Will Not Go Away: Weak States in the International System", *Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences*, Purdue University 25–27 February.

Huria, Sonali (2008), "Failing and Failed States: The Global Discourse", *New Delhi Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)*, IPCS Issue Brief, July 2008, No.75.

James, Mark (2012), "The Other Civil Society: Organized Crime in Fragile and Failing States", Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2012), pp. 218–256.

Jones, Branwen G. (2013), "'Good governance' and 'state failure': genealogies of imperial discourse", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2013 Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 49–70.

Mair, Stefan (2008), "A New Approach: The Need to Focus on Failing States", *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2008, pp. 52–55.

Majikian, Mary (2008), "Diagnosis, Intervention, and Cure: The Illness Narrative in the Discourse of the Failed State", *Alternatives* 33, pp. 335–357.

Nay, Oliver (2013), "Fragile and failed states: Critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids", *International Political Science Review* 34, pp. 326–341.

Newman, Edward (2009), "Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post–Westphalian World", *Contemporary Security Policy*, December 2009, Vol.30, No.3, pp. 421–443.

O'Hanlon, Michael (2012), "Obama's Weak and Failing States Agenda", *The Washington Quarterly* 35:4, Fall 2012, pp. 67–80.

Piazza, James A. (2008), “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?”, *International Studies Quarterly* 52, pp. 469–488.

Stohl, Michael (2011), “Fragile, Failed and Failing States: State Terrorism and the International Community”, *Department of Communication University of California, Santa Barbara.*

LIST OF APPENDIXES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	September 11th 2001
ARS	At–Risk States
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CS	Copenhagen School
DA	Discourse analysis / Discourse analytical
G–8 / G–20	Group–8 / Group–20
GPI	Global Peace Index
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FS	Failing States
FSI	Failed State Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOT	In order to
IR	International Relations
ISS	International Security Studies
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
SU	Soviet Union
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.	United States
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WWII	The Second World War
YTS	Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia (Finnish National Security Strategy)

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN



Picture 1. Research framework of the study.



Picture 2. Research design of the study.

SECURITY AND THE ADJACENT CONCEPTS



Picture 3. Buzan and Hansen (2009) p.14, figure 1.1, security and the adjacent concepts (re–drawn from the original).

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

Objective conceptions	Subjective conceptions	Discursive conceptions
-The absence/ precence of concrete threats	-The feeling of being threatened or not	-Security cannot be defined in objective terms
-Usually defines security in relative material terms	-Emphasises social context, history and the psychologies of fear and (mis)perceptions	-Security is a speech act
	-Maintains an objective reference	-Focuses on the intersubjective process through which threats 'manifest' themselves as security problems on the political agenda

Picture 4. Buzan and Hansen (2009) p. 34, figure 2.1.

Epistemological distinctions of security (re–drawn from the original).

THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS



Picture 5. Wæver (2011), p. 477, figure I. Action, event and effects in Securitization theory.

DISCOURSE ANALYTICAL RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE SECURITIZATION OF FAILING STATES IN THE NSS



Picture 6. Discourse analytical research design, modeled after Hansen (2006).

ISS PERSPECTIVES

ISS perspective	Referent object	Internal/ external	Sectors	Views of security politics	Epistemology
Strategic studies	The State	Primary/ external	Military (use of force)	Realist	Positivist (from quite empirical to formal modelling
Neo(realism)	The State	Primary external	Military-political	Realist	Rationalist
Poststructuralist security studies	Collective-individual	Both (constitution of boundaries)	All	Change of Realism possible, but not utopian/Idealist	Deconstructivist and discursive
Post-colonial security studies	States and collectivities	Both	All	Change of Western dominance possible, but difficult to accomplish	Critical Theory, deconstructivist, historical sociology
Peace Research	State, societies, individuals	Both	All (negative: predominantly military)	Transformation possible	Positivist (from quantitative to Marxist materialists)
Human Security	The individual	Primarily internal	All	Transformative	Mostly highly empirical or sof-constructivist
Feminist Security Studies	Individual, women	Both	All	Mostly transformative	From quantitative to Poststructuralist
Critical Security Studies	Individual	Both	All	Transformative (emancipation)	Critical Theory (hermeneutics)
The Copenhagen School	Collectivities and the environment	Both	All	Neutral	Speech act analysis
Conventional Constructivism	The State	External	Military	Transformation possible	Soft-positivist
Critical Constructivism	Collectivities	Mostly External	Military	Transformation possible	Narrative and sociological

Picture 7. Buzan and Hansen (2009), p. 38, table 2.2. ISS perspectives in relation to the five questions (re–drawn from the original).