

FINNISH NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

**INTERAGENCY COOPERATION – A PHENOMENOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE
THOR LIBERTY CASE**

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<p>Viranomaisyhteistyötä koskevaa tutkimusta tekevät yleensä viranomaistahot itse. Tutkimus kohdistuu pääasiallisesti heidän omaan toimintaansa, jolloin tarpeellisen tiedon tuottamisen lisäksi tutkimus sisältää mahdollista puolueellisuutta, eikä objektiivisuutta voida aina taata. Usein viranomaisyhteistyön tutkimus on myös käyttörajoitettua. Ulkopuolinen tutkija todennäköisesti pystyy tutkimaan aihetta objektiivisemmin koska ilmiöön ei liity samoja velvoitteita eikä rajoitteita.</p> <p>Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on tutkia miten eri viranomaistahot kokevat viranomaisyhteistyön Thor Libertyn tapauksessa. Tapaustutkimus kohdentuu viranomaisyhteistyön tarkasteluun, jossa oli mukana 15 viranomaistahoa, jotka hoitivat yhteistyössä 159 tonnin vääripakatun räjähdelainestain sekä 69 ventiluvattoman Patriot ohjuksen vaaratilanteen hallinnan sekä rikostutkinnan.</p> <p>Tutkimusaineisto kerättiin teemahaastatteluilla, jotka kohdistettiin kahdeksaan osallistuneeseen viranomaistahoon. Haastateltavat edustivat seuraavia viranomaisia: Rajavartiolaitos, Tulli, Poliisi (vastuualueena yleinen järjestys ja turvallisuus), Poliisi (tutkinnanjohtaja), Keskusrikospoliisi, Pelastustoimi, Trafi sekä HaminaKotkan satama. Haastattelut nauhoitettiin ja litteroitiin, ja litteroitu aineisto analysoitiin fenomenografialla.</p> <p>Tutkimustulokset osoittavat viranomaisyhteistyön toimivan Suomessa hyvin. Toimivuus perustuu luottamukseen, johon vaikuttavat viranomaisten tuttuus, yhdenvertaisina toimiminen sekä diskurssi. Vaikka tulokset osoittavat että viranomaisyhteistyötä voidaan parantaa, kohdistuvat mahdolliset parannusehdotukset lähinnä yhteistyön jatkokehittämiseen ja toiminnan edelleen parantamiseen. Tutkimuksen tuloksena voidaan todeta muun muassa, että moniviranomaistilanteet voitaisiin käsitellä yhdessä kaikkien osallisten tahojen kanssa jälkikäteen. Tällöin voitaisiin keskustella ja paremmin ymmärtää miksi ja miten eri tavoin sama tilanne nähdään ja käsitetään. Viranomaisten organisaatioiden eri tasot voisivat myös osallistua yhteistoimintaharjoituksiin, jolloin ymmärrys toimintaan viranomaisyhteistyötilanteessa vahvistuisi. Lisäksi, uusien ihmisten mukaantuloa ja perehdyttämistä harjoitus- ja yhteistoimintaan voisi helpottaa paitsi hiljaisen tiedon, myös luottamuksen riittävällä siirtämisellä seuraajalle.</p>	
AVAINSANAT	
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<p>ABSTRACT</p> <p>Research on interagency cooperation is usually undertaken by authorities and agencies, focusing on their own area of authority and interest. While this provides good information for the individual agency, it may also give rise to bias in the outcome. In addition, the research results and reports are often restricted. Therefore, a researcher outside an agency might be able to focus on the research from an unbiased perspective and evaluate the phenomenon without liability issues.</p> <p>The objective of this study is to understand how different agencies perceive interagency cooperation. Case study research is used as a research strategy to focus on the interagency cooperation phenomenon. The Thor Liberty incident is a good example on a multiagency cooperation situation and provides excellent material for a case study. The Thor Liberty incident involved fifteen entities cooperating to resolve the wrongly stowed 159 tons of explosives and 69 Patriot missiles without required export permits in Finland in 2011.</p> <p>The research data were collected from thematic interviews. Eight interviews were conducted with participants presenting as many participating agencies involved in the Thor Liberty incident: The Finnish Border Guard, the Finnish Customs, the local Police, the Police's Chief Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Fire and Rescue Department, The Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi and the Port of HaminaKotka. The recorded and transcribed interviews were analyzed using phenomenography.</p> <p>The research results suggest that the Finnish interagency cooperation works well due to familiarity, working as peers, and discourse, while the foundation for it is trust. Even though there is room for improvement it only concerns further developing the cooperation. The main conclusion is that when the requirement for multi-agency cooperation arises, effective interagency communication is required to understand and to be aware of the potential differences in perceptions and expectations of personnel in each agency. In addition, different hierarchical levels within each agency could participate in shared exercises, which would lead to better mutual understanding of the requirements of the situation. Finally, new personnel should be integrated into the interagency cooperation to ensure tacit information and trust, which appears to be shared similarly, are passed on sufficiently.</p> <p>Key Words: Interagency cooperation, Thor Liberty, situation coordination, four-fold typology on Leadership, phenomenography</p>	

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INTERAGENCY COOPERATION – A PHENOMENOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE THOR LIBERTY CASE

1 INTRODUCTION

Interagency cooperation is both easy and challenging. It is easy since cooperating with experts from another area of expertise can be meaningful, dependable and straight forward. People, however, create challenges as they think, act and operate differently, and approach the shared cases with a different agenda. While the necessity for interagency cooperation is acknowledged, it usually requires many aspects to come together: will, mutual trust and a reason amongst others. In general, the will and trust to cooperate are usually self-evident, but they are also individual traits and depend on the people involved in a case. Both the need and the reason arise in shared operations, which are complex and fall under several authorities' jurisdictions. However, the differences in the jurisdictions may also lead to misinterpretations, miscommunication, and differences in opinion in the approach on what to do in the case. Indeed, as with any operation, organization or incident where many entities are involved, there usually are different opinions and approaches as to what to do, what factors should be prioritized and what has to be taken into account.

Interagency cooperation takes place when two or more agencies are working together on a shared case or agenda. It is regulated by law and is undertaken on all levels: from the ministries and administrative level down to the operational level. On the operational level, one agency assumes the overall situation command, and the responsibility depends on the relevant laws. The goal of the overall situation command is to confirm that all joint action is coordinated, and that people's safety is taken into account without compromising the possible evidence.

In Finland, interagency cooperation has a long tradition. It is undertaken at all levels, and in the government it has its own concept: Comprehensive Security¹, as defined in the Security Strategy for Society². The framework for interagency cooperation is in the legislation, which both gives power and obliges authorities to support each other with special skills, resources and capabilities. After all, one reason for cooperation between agencies is to save money, and to use scarce, and difficult or expensive-to-maintain resources as efficiently as possible. In addition to interagency cooperation, executive assistance is also a form of cooperation, but the

¹The comprehensive security model involves the whole nation in making security: The government and authorities, the private sector, the voluntary organizations i.e. NGO's, and the general public.

² Ministry of Defence 2010.

legislation behind it differs significantly. Executive assistance is tied to time, place and operation, and involves cumbersome administrative tasks. Regardless of the respective differences in the relevant legislations, the *Interagency cooperation* –term covers also executive assistance in this thesis.

This thesis focuses on interagency cooperation of the Finnish security authorities on an operational level. While studies and reports on the subject in Finland exists, they are usually not public. Mr. Vesa Valtonen's dissertation³ is the basic research on how interagency cooperation works in Finland, and the only publicly available academic study. As a consequence, this thesis builds on concepts and processes identified in his research. However, while Valtonen's dissertation studied interagency cooperation of the security authorities in general, this thesis focuses specifically on interagency cooperation in the Thor Liberty case.

The Thor Liberty case took place in 2011-2012 and began when a cargo ship Thor Liberty docked in the port of HaminaKotka (also known as Mussalo harbor) in December 2011. The stevedores discovered cardboard boxes and their spilled contents in the cargo hold with signs indicating explosives attached to the boxes. The stevedores called in the first authorities, and after a few days in the operation to prevent a large scale emergency, a total number of 69 ground-to-air Patriot air defence missiles were discovered. More authorities joined in the operation after the discovery of the missiles, and a criminal investigation operation began. In total 15 authorities took part in the Thor Liberty case between December 15th 2011 and January 6th 2012.

In any multi-agency cooperation situation, there are several jurisdictions, some of which are overlapping with one another. Regardless of this complication, the situation needs management and coordination, as governed by the legislation. Prevention of a large-scale emergency situation was managed by the Fire and Rescue Department, and the criminal investigation by the authorities with powers for preliminary investigation. Interagency cooperation on a similar scale does happen occasionally, however the Thor Liberty case had some unique features: it took place in Kotka⁴, which meant that the preliminary preventive action was seen to mainly by the local authorities. The incident was far more serious than what they were accustomed to handle and this is evident in their interviews⁵. In addition to the scale, also the media coverage on the Thor Liberty case was extensive by both national and international media agencies.

³ Valtonen 2010.

⁴ A city at the shoreline some 100 kilometers from Helsinki.

⁵ Interview with the Fire and Rescue Department representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.

The local authorities managed the situation well but admitted that they faced a new situation and needed to adjust their existing knowledge accordingly.

Research on interagency cooperation often faces challenges with publicity. The operational work conducted by the authorities, and the majority of related reports, are restricted under the Act on the Openness of Government Activities⁶. Therefore, to conduct this case study, additional measurements had to be taken into account in order to verify that no restricted or classified information is disclosed in this thesis. This process is of vital importance as my intention is to make it publicly available, especially since there are not many public studies on interagency cooperation in Finland. Details of this approach are fully described in chapter 6.1.

This thesis is done for the Department of Management and Leadership in the Finnish National Defence University. Interagency cooperation is one of the three tasks for the Finnish Defence Forces, as dictated by legislation⁷. Studying in the interagency cooperation master's programme it is integral to understand the interagency cooperation as a phenomenon. In reference to the wide media coverage on the Thor Liberty case, I also followed the reporting intensively. The objective of this study is to understand how the participants perceive interagency cooperation. The Thor Liberty incident is a good example on a multiagency cooperation situation and provides excellent material for a case study. Moreover, as all participants have different perceptions on what happened and why, a logical choice for analyzing the interviews was phenomenography, which aims to understand the differences in perceptions.

This thesis consists of 6 chapters. The first chapter will introduce the substance and explain the aim of this thesis. Chapter two (2) introduces the theoretical background and previous research on interagency cooperation and leadership. Methodological choices are described and explained in chapter three (3). Chapter four (4) begins with the case study on the situation where the multi-agency cooperation took place, and continues with details of the phenomenographical analysis of the data that was collected from the interviews. Discussion is found in chapter five (5) and conclusion, critique and further research topics are detailed in chapter six (6).

⁶ Laki viranomaistoiminnan julkisuudesta 621/1999.

⁷ Laki puolustusvoimista 551/2007 § 2 2.

2 LEADERSHIP, COOPERATION AND BEYOND

This chapter first describes the research problem. Then, it goes through how interagency cooperation has been previously studied. With the relevant theories and definitions from the research the theoretical background of this study is then presented. The last section focuses and outlines the Finnish interagency cooperation on a general level, and then concentrates on situation coordination.

2.1 Research question

Coordination and cooperation are tools for leadership. On an organizational level, leadership is indicated by the status and position within the organization. However, in situations where several organizations are involved in a common project, leadership becomes a management task of the cooperation. The authorities can take roles with equal responsibilities, forming a management board, where the commanding officers from all participating organizations act as experts or consultants and then delegate the tasks to appropriate levels within their own organizations. However, to be able to delegate the tasks the management board needs to come to a consensus. As the board assembles the participants will have initial expectations on the case. Based on the expectations each agency forms a perception of the respective responsibilities

This thesis' research question is *How interagency cooperation worked in the Thor Liberty Case?*. It investigates the interagency cooperation phenomenon based on the perceptions of the personnel within each of the agencies involved with the Thor Liberty incident. These agencies are: The Finnish Border Guard, the Finnish Customs, the local Police, the Police's Chief Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Fire and Rescue Department, The Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi and the Port of HaminaKotka. An additional request was sent to the Finnish Defence Forces, but they did not participate in the interviews.

The goal of this thesis is to understand *how* interagency cooperation works by comparing the differences in perceptions of the personnel at the participating agencies. The thematic interviews concentrate on leadership, coordination, communication, preparedness and mutual trust.

While this thesis could be used as a "Lessons Learned" case study or an overview on issues that could be improved, this is not the intention. The purpose of this study is to raise awareness of issues that may arise in situations such as the Thor Liberty incident. This requires understanding of what happened, how cooperation worked between the different agencies and

entities, and how the perceptions of the personnel involved differed from one another. If the participating entities want to use this thesis to improve their reciprocal cooperation and coordination, they will do it according to their own interest.

2.2 Previous research

Leadership and management are present in all organizations, and are a widely studied phenomenon in a variety of disciplines. According to Hannele Seeck's book *Johtamisopit Suomessa*⁸, the roots of leadership and management in Finland are with Frederick Taylor's theory on *Scientific Management*, and in the military. Seeck has been studying how leadership theories circulated to Finland and refers to⁹ Aki-Mauri Huhtinen's article¹⁰, where the military education is seen as a significant contributor on how and what theories are taught. Military plays a significant role in Finland because of the mandatory conscript service to all men where everyone is being lead. Some also receive leadership training. Due to the military being a central contributor in the Finnish leadership training, I will use the fourfold typology on leadership that is thought in the Finnish Defence Forces, and has been scientifically studied.

Cooperation and especially its concept has been studied in many disciplines. The relevant ones for this thesis are Leena Paukkunen's dissertation *Development of Collaborative Competence in Social and Health Care*¹¹, and Vesa Valtonen's dissertation *Collaboration of Security Actors – an Operational-Tactical Perspective*¹². Paukkunen studies how teaching in a cross-sectoral environment helps cooperation in social and health care. Due to her approach on how the studied people's different backgrounds affect cooperation her dissertation is relevant to my thesis, because my case study also presents cooperation of people from different backgrounds, or in this case organizations. Paukkunen's research will be further discussed in chapter 2.4. Valtonen's dissertation's relevance has two dimensions: he has made a comprehensive concept analysis on cooperation of security actors, and his research is the ground work for studying interagency cooperation.

As stated previously, Valtonen's dissertation is the only academic research conducted on interagency cooperation in Finland. He focuses on interagency cooperation between the security authorities in Finland, and begins with a concept analysis on cooperation. One of the key find-

⁸ Seeck 2008.

⁹ Seeck 2008. 20.

¹⁰ Huhtinen 2006, 207.

¹¹ Paukkunen 2003.

ings is that despite cooperation being studied in many disciplines, interagency cooperation at an operational level is not¹³. Valtonen also states that many times in interagency cooperation research the end-result and / or the research data is classified.¹⁴ I also noticed the same issue when searching for other similar studies: the case study in my thesis is not the only incident with interagency cooperation¹⁵, which means that the other research or reports are not publicly available. The publicity of this thesis is further discussed in section 6.1.

Even though Valtonen's research is the only relevant dissertation in terms of interagency cooperation in Finland, it has also been studied in many theses and other research papers. They are produced mainly at the agency's own colleges or schools, which might create biases and certainly limits the perspective to answering their own needs. These are the Emergency Services College that researches the Rescue Department's operations and cases, and the Police University College, which studies the Police. Also the Finnish Border Guard's Border and Coast Guard Academy concentrates on borders and border security issues. The Finnish National Defence University has produced some studies that seek to understand interagency cooperation at the governmental level, but concentrate greatly on how the military cooperates and supports the civilian authorities. As candidates and masters theses are seen as a proof of learning rather than academic research, they are mainly excluded from the references. However, the most relevant ones regarding interagency cooperation and interagency cooperation between the security authorities are included in this section.

The Defence University's publication *Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 56: Joukko ehdotuksia Puolustusvoimain tulevaisuuteen 2030*¹⁶ briefly discusses interagency cooperation. As Valtonen's dissertation, also this study states that it is a hard and complex entity to study, as it is cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary.¹⁷ While the study discusses the same issues what Valtonen discovered in his thesis, it also states that the two major flaws in the study of the interagency cooperation phenomenon are the ambiguity of the concepts and the practical cooperation in field is hindered by inadequate guidance. The latter may result into failure of using the scarce resources as efficiently as possible¹⁸.

¹² Valtonen 2010.

¹³ Valtonen 2010, 21.

¹⁴ Valtonen 2010, 69.

¹⁵ The Myyrmanni bombings in 2002; The school shootings in Jokela (2007) and in Kauhajoki (2008); The shopping center Sello shooting in 2009; etc.

¹⁶ Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2014.

¹⁷ Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2014, 3.

¹⁸ Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu 2014, 3.

Lauri Holappa's master's thesis *Viranomaisyhteistyön johtaminen suuronnettomuustilanteissa*¹⁹ concentrates on the coordination of interagency cooperation in a large-scale accident. He focused on the coordination of Fire and Rescue Department, analyzing how it was conducted in three rescue situation cases. His main conclusions were that coordination plays a crucial role in all levels, including the administrative level. His other main result was that role of shared exercises is significant, and that a sufficient amount of preparedness and resources should be allocated in interagency cooperation.

Anssi Munkki's Post-graduate thesis *Merivoimat ja viranomaisten tukeminen 2030*²⁰ studies how the Finnish Navy's cooperation and support for other authorities should be developed to meet the 2030's operational environment. He uses a Delphi-method to construct a comprehensive understanding of what the operational environment will look like from interagency cooperation's viewpoint. Munkki concludes that interagency cooperation will play a key role in constructing and maintaining security. He points out that developing interagency cooperation will have to be actively furthered, but that also the local and environmental aspects have to be considered in the development work.

Internationally there are some academic research on interagency cooperation. Many of them, like Usman Hameed's dissertation²¹ *Mandatory obligations under the international counter-terrorism and organised crime conventions to facilitate state cooperation in law enforcement* approaches cooperation from a very different angle. Hameed focuses on the international law that directs interagency cooperation on international and national level concentrating mainly on terrorism and organized crime. While the topic is interesting the study focuses only on the Police, and thus is not relevant to my study due to my scope with eight different agencies.

Another example of interagency cooperation research is Christine Hallett's dissertation²². Her thesis' title is *A case study of interagency coordination in child protection services*, and she approaches cooperation from the health care sector's point of view. As Hallett, also my thesis is a case study on a specific case, which creates a good focus on the research. However, her dissertation is not relevant to my thesis as I focus on interagency cooperation from many different sectors while she focuses on child protection services.

¹⁹ Holappa 2015.

²⁰ Munkki 2009.

²¹ Hameed 2014.

²² Hallett 1993.

In addition to dissertations, the EU agencies have also published some reports on interagency cooperation. A good example is the Study for the LIBE committee²³ that was published in 2014. The title is *The inter-agency cooperation and future architecture of the EU criminal justice and law enforcement area*²⁴ and the main objective is to establish interagency cooperation between different EU agencies works and how it could be improved. The study is important on the EU-level, and certainly is useful for the national authorities. However, while the study concentrates on the decentralized agencies, the cooperation amongst them cannot be compared to the national institutions which are in my interest. Hence, that study is not relevant to my thesis.

All in all, there are no similar research available in public than my thesis. A similar setting might not be available, but other research with multiagency cooperation could have been interesting. The lack of such research suggests that it is either not a widely studied subject, or that the data cannot be publicized. While this is merely a master's thesis and as such does not contribute to the academic discussion *per se*, it could be used as an example on how interagency cooperation could be studied.

2.3 Leadership

Leadership can mean a variety of things. One of the most clear and simple definitions is what also Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan have used, leadership is interaction between the leader and the lead²⁵. A more complex definition was provided by Hannele Seeck: leadership can be defined as performance with which someone's effort and resources can be efficiently acquired, allocated and utilized in order to achieve a set goal²⁶. Seeck's definition is also used by the Finnish Defence Forces, where the objective is to get individuals with different backgrounds, ranks and influential power to work together to achieve the set goals²⁷. Indeed, there are several different approaches and the presented three are merely a drop in the sea.

The Finnish Defence Forces and the National Defence University²⁸ use a four-fold typology of leadership as the ground for studying and teaching leadership. The four approaches are

²³ Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.

²⁴ European Parliament 2014.

²⁵ Smircich & Morgan 1982, 258.

²⁶ Seeck 2008, 20.

²⁷ Johtamisen käsikirja 2012, 12.

²⁸ Kiuru 2009, 18.; Huhtinen 2006, 45-49. etc.

management, leadership, organizational cultures and organizational structures. This structure is illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1: The fourfold typology of Leadership

Leadership means leading people, and approaching people on a personal level. Leaders are interested and conscious on how things are ordered and also on the needs and wellbeing of the subordinates. Management is about coordination and managing issues, such as time tables and administration. Managers concentrate on the clarity of the message / order, and that it is given on time. Organizational culture defines how things are done in an organization and affects the perceptions of the people in that organization, whereas organizational structures define the management relations such as hierarchies, and is closely related to jurisdiction.²⁹

Even though the idea of the four-fold typology is to study leadership from different aspects, they are still all interdependent with one another. According to Huhtinen, the interdependence comes from the development of leadership and organizational thinking, and correlates with how the perception on people and work develop³⁰. Mika Aalto argues³¹ that dividing actual leadership into four field is artificial, as a good leader knows (or should know) how to balance the different traits. However, as means of studying the four-fold typology works well as it

²⁹ E.g. Kiuru 2009.

³⁰ Huhtinen 2006, 27.

³¹ Aalto 2012, 133.

emphasizes the different aspects of leadership that should be taken into account when learning *what* leadership is, and implementing it to *how* it is done.

As disclosed earlier, the four-fold typology is very interdependent with one another, and has been criticized for it. Mika Aalto ponders the reason why and suggests another way of approaching it. As leadership and its context are inseparable, there are certain approaches that have to be emphasized in order to succeed in leading. Aalto perceives the division at two ends of a line: organizational structure and organizational culture on one end, and management and leadership on the other. The former end is perceived as stable, as the *context*, whereas the latter end may be influenced by the leader.³² Indeed, the organizational culture and organizational structures are constant and form the context in which management and leadership are done.

Leadership requires understanding the context. In my opinion, to ensure that the context is properly taken into account it requires skill, experience and intuition. This is supported by the idea that people grow into leadership rather than intuitively having that quality or skill³³. In other words, experience is a significant factor in leadership, especially in a complex, multi-agency cooperation situation, as was the Thor Liberty case.

According to Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan³⁴

*...the concept and practice of leadership... [is] so powerfully ingrained into popular thought that the absence of leadership is often seen as absence of organization.*³⁵

Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan

This direct quote from Smircich's and Morgan's paper is an interesting approach. They claim that the absence of leadership is like living, working or operating without structure. Moreover, this though can be implemented into interagency cooperation, as the organizations work together, structure is needed to enable the cooperation to function. Yet, as many of the interviewees stated, leadership in between the involved authorities was coordination rather than anything else. I endorse this view since the cooperative functions were agreed upon in the managerial meetings of the management board.

³² Aalto 2012, 137 - 138.

³³ E.g. Johtajan käsikirja 2012, 23, 26, 29.; Markkula 2011, 26.

³⁴ Smircich & Morgan 1982.

³⁵ 257.

However, according to Valtonen, coordination between the security authorities is seen as the preliminary process for interagency cooperation. Again, interagency cooperation has been included in Valtonen's term *Collaboration of Security Actors*³⁶, which is the core factor in the cooperation between authorities. To conclude, leadership is a key element the lack of it creates uncertainty. Leadership in interagency cooperation appears as coordination, which is also Valtonen's dissertation's conclusion, albeit simplified.

2.4 Cooperation

Cooperation has been studied since Charles Darwin³⁷ from many perspectives and in many fields of research. Although it would be reasoned to discuss the origins and how cooperation is seen by many disciplines, a general overview is sufficient for this thesis.

Martin A. Nowak³⁸ has studied the evolution of cooperation. He presents five different rules on why people – or any living organism – cooperate in a competitive world. These five reasons are *kin selection* (cooperating with relatives), *direct reciprocity* (immediate gain for all participants), *indirect reciprocity* (random acts of kindness or help to gain a good reputation, and thus get help from other strangers.), *network reciprocity* (cooperating in a community with the people in your network to succeed) and *group selection* (helping one another in a group to succeed as a group).³⁹ Nowak concludes his study in claiming that cooperation should be seen as the third fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and natural selection, as it is a significant method of survival and prosper. In short, cooperation is needed to succeed regardless of the reasons behind it.

The natural history of cooperation exemplifies how primal action cooperation is also amongst humans. Cooperation is a standard method both in an individual level as well as on an organizational level. Many different forms of it is studied such as strategic partnerships or strategic alliances, which occur at the organizational level. Mitchell Koza and Arie Lewin, for example, have studied how strategic partnerships increase the odds of success⁴⁰ by cooperative competition. The main idea is to form alliances so that firms gain a variety of benefits, such as market power also on new market areas, acquiring technology, skills or resources, or shar-

³⁶ 247–248.

³⁷ Pennisi 2009, 1196.; Nowak 2006, 1.

³⁸ Nowak 2006.

³⁹ Nowak 2006, 6.

⁴⁰ Koza & Lewin 2000.

ing high-risk research projects⁴¹. Regardless of the importance of the strategic alliance research is, it is not comparable to interagency cooperation, as the authorities do not cooperate to gain profit, but to be able to conduct the necessary tasks.

Another research area of cooperation happens within an organization. It appears in teams or sections. For example, Knut Pipping studied group phenomenon during the World War II, and wrote his ground breaking dissertation *Infantry Company as a Society* after the war. His sociological study focuses on the formal and informal organization in the Finnish wartime army.⁴² Interagency cooperation could be studied as a sociological phenomenon, but it is not the objective of this study. Also, in the Thor Liberty case the involved authorities did not form a group *per se*, but rather an executive management board, where decisions on the actions were made in consensus, and the actions were executed with their sectors.

In addition to the previously mentioned strategic partnerships and team work with group phenomenon, another form of teams exists. They are usually referred to as the *ad hoc* teams or temporary teams, which is a very figurative term. These teams are formed either suddenly – *ad hoc* – to complete a task or to respond to a situation. They can also be temporary because a project has an end-date, after which the team is no longer needed⁴³. According to, for example, René M. Bakker, Smaranda Boros, Patrick Kenis and Leon A.G. Oerlemans this temporary team model is popular especially on knowledge-intensive industries⁴⁴. The temporary teams cannot be directly compared with interagency cooperation since these teams have a deadline before which the project has to be completed, and the time pressure affects the team's dynamics⁴⁵. The authorities are not restricted by time and will take the time they need. The temporality of the authorities cooperation emerges from the task itself: regardless of the time it takes to solve whatever issue the case is about, the cooperation as such will end eventually.

As already mentioned earlier, Leena Paukkunen's dissertation⁴⁶ provides an interesting approach to cooperation. She studied teaching in a cross-sectoral environment, and how it helps cooperation in social and health care. She claims that teamwork competence is a learned practice⁴⁷, and means that students learn skills and competences in a group where the members are from different backgrounds. The provided tools for learning together were group

⁴¹ Koza & Lewin 2000, 146–147.

⁴² Pipping 2008.

⁴³ Bakker, Boros, Kenis, & Oerlemans 2013, 391.

⁴⁴ Bakker et. al. 2013, 384.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 383.

⁴⁶ Paukkunen 2003.

reflection activities and multi-discipline and contextual learning, where emphasis was put on group discussions. The discussions reflected on what was learned individually and in groups, resulting into an understanding on different perceptions of the same issue, and tolerance and understanding on different views.⁴⁸ These skills make the premises for cooperation, which needs practice and experience. By means of discussion the different views can be used by everyone in the group, widening their thinking and developing reasoning. Similarly, experience enables interagency cooperation: The different backgrounds of the involved authorities' affect on how the shared case is perceived, and with discussing the situation may be analyzed to bring forth the best option on how to proceed.

As presented in this chapter, cooperation can be studied as a phenomenon in many different context. It has been stated after each paragraph why they cannot be compared with interagency cooperation, which in itself is a relatively exceptional way of cooperating. Only Paukkunen's approach on learning from one another appears to serve the interagency cooperation phenomenon.

2.5 Interagency cooperation in Finland

Valtonen also discusses the terminology and meaning of cooperation. However, in this thesis the focus is not on the terminology, but the contents or the operational cooperation – how cooperation is done and why. Before focusing on interagency the term has to be defined. Given that this thesis concentrates on studying interagency cooperation between authorities in a joint case or operation, I will apply Valtonen's definition:

*Collaboration of security actors means concrete collaboration between security authorities, which is based on a joint decision, agreement or other such arrangement.*⁴⁹

Vesa Valtonen

Valtonen states that not all traits of cooperation can be applied to the cooperation of security authorities, since many times cooperation is done due to necessity rather than something else. Again, as all participating entities in this case study are, or were in 2011, authorities, interagency cooperation is defined by Valtonen:

⁴⁷ Paukkunen 2003, 47.

Interagency cooperation is joint action between authorities, obliged parties and authorized parties coordinated by competent authorities in order to achieve common goals. This means that, for example, power play amongst the participants is irrelevant as it is defined in the legislation or with agreements.⁵⁰

Vesa Valtonen

Interagency cooperation is based on legislation, with the fundamentals coming from the Constitutional law § 2⁵¹. The authorities' tasks are to implement the law, provide public services and where necessary, use public power against individuals and entities. The authorities' jurisdiction, laid down in the legislation, provides the framework on what the authorities are allowed and obliged to do. This also means that any authority cannot transfer their tasks to another entity if it has not been defined by the relevant legislation.⁵² There are also some overlapping jurisdictions such as with powers of preliminary investigations or coercive measures, which can be performed by the Police, the Customs or the Border Guard.

Kari T. Takamaa discusses in his article *Oikeus, laki ja johtaminen*⁵³ how the legislation is to be used when defining which authority is responsible for the overall situation in a multiagency cooperation situation. He states that the leader has to be aware of the jurisdiction and their boundaries that create the framework in which the overall situation leadership⁵⁴ takes place.⁵⁵ Takamaa concludes his article stating that studying leadership requires understanding also the legal framework of the situation itself.

Legislation provides only one aspect of how interagency cooperation works. It defines the protocol on how and what sort of assistance one authority may provide to the other, and it separates two legal terms: Interagency cooperation and executive assistance. Interagency cooperation is administrative⁵⁶ and is defined above in this thesis' context, but the definition for executive assistance means:

A situation where one authority assists another by using its jurisdiction in a way, that the other authority could execute their tasks. It requires that the task

⁴⁸ Paukkunen 2003, e.g. 82, 84, 92.

⁴⁹ Valtonen 2010, Appendix 1. Note, translation made by the author.

⁵⁰ Valtonen 2010, Appendix 1. Note, translation made by the author.

⁵¹ Perustuslaki 731/1999.

⁵² Sisäministeriö 2015, 3-4.

⁵³ Takamaa 2006. As published in Huhtinen 2006.

⁵⁴ Overall situation management means the responsible authority dependent by the situation at hand and defined in the law.

⁵⁵ Takamaa 2006, 176 – 177.

*for which executive assistance is requested is defined, including the definition of time, place, duration, resources and equipment.*⁵⁷

Ministry of the Interior

In practice, however, executive assistance and interagency cooperation mean the same, and will be addressed both when talked about interagency cooperation in this thesis.

According to Valtonen's research, one possible criteria for interagency cooperation is cost-effectiveness⁵⁸. Even though his research indicated it is not the most relevant criteria on the operational level, I see it as relevant to address briefly. Cost-effectiveness is not the reason why authorities cooperate locally, but it is in-built into the administrative structures. This though was brought up by the interviewees from the Finnish Border Guard. There is no need to acquire overlapping capacity in terms of resources, know-how and equipment, as they are relatively easily available via interagency cooperation or executive assistance. For example, the Finnish Border Guard and the Finnish Defence Forces are the only authorities who have helicopters. However, due to the cooperative structure they are used for Search and Rescue operations both land and sea, extinguishing forest fires and also for airlifting of medical patients⁵⁹.

The Finnish authorities cooperate with one another frequently, and some do it on daily bases. In fact, the Police, the Customs and the Border Guard have formed a model of cooperating to combat crime. The cooperation is based on law. According to the act:

*A PCB [Police, Customs Border Guard, writer's note] authority may, on request, carry out a measure relating to the combating of crime on behalf of another PCB authority in the area of responsibility of the PCB authority in question, using the powers that it may use in its own crime-combating tasks in its area of responsibility*⁶⁰.

Laki poliisin, tullin ja rajavartiolaitoksen yhteistoiminnasta

This is but one example on how interagency cooperation can be done to prevent crimes. However, in a more complex situations such as the Thor Liberty case, there were many authorities

⁵⁶ Sisäministeriö 2015, 11.

⁵⁷ Sisäministeriö 2015, 11.

⁵⁸ Valtonen 2010, e.g. 187, 193–195.

⁵⁹ Rajavartiolaitos 2016.

⁶⁰ Laki poliisin, tullin ja rajavartiolaitoksen yhteistoiminnasta 687/2009 § 2.

present whose cooperation are scarce⁶¹. Juhani Kivelä claims in his dissertation *Hiljainen hälytys*⁶² that the legislation for aforementioned PCB cooperation has proved to be successful⁶³. In contrast, the other authorities whose own laws regulate on interagency cooperation would also benefit from similar compound laws.

In my view, interagency cooperation is also the key to local preparedness planning. In addition to the preparedness made by the government⁶⁴, all municipalities should prepare for emergencies together with the local authorities. Juhani Kivelä's dissertation provides a good overview on how it should be done. He has made a comprehensive empirical research by interviewing over 100 people, who represent different authorities that are responsible for preparedness planning in Finland. They represent the administrative level, the regions and municipalities and also relevant authorities, such as the Police and the Fire and Rescue Departments, to name a few. Even though the structure for preparedness planning seems relatively clear as all agencies have their own areas of responsibility, the common coordination is missing. As Kivelä addresses in his dissertation, there are also non-functioning issues and the silo-effect is visible⁶⁵. For example, the Regional State Administrative Agencies were intended to be the coordinating entity of preparedness planning on a regional level, but as the regulatory base was constructed in 2012 it lacked the jurisdictional power to do so.

However, while planning is not sufficient also joint exercises and close-call situation investigations could be arranged to learn from past errors or difficulties. Kivelä argues that shared exercises should be arranged to improve coordination in interagency cooperation situations on five levels: regulatory, shared exercises, organizational level, situational leadership and mind set⁶⁶. He claims that:

*The current lack of coordination impedes significantly the coordination of exceptional situations.*⁶⁷

Juhani Kivelä

Even though the quotation above is alarming, Kivelä also states that despite the lack of coordination, the overall trust and control over exceptional situations between 2012-2014⁶⁸ suc-

⁶¹ Interview with the NBI representative.

⁶² Kivelä 2016.

⁶³ Kivelä 2016, 191.

⁶⁴ Ministry of Defence 2010.

⁶⁵ Kivelä 2016, 187, 192.

⁶⁶ Kivelä 2016, 194.

⁶⁷ Kivelä 2016, 195.

⁶⁸ Kivelä's dissertation focuses the preparedness in Finland between 2012 and 2014, hence the timeline.

ceeded satisfactorily. He states that the Finnish authorities are innovative, which could be claimed as a factor of national strength. Yet, he continues it might also be a weakness or a threat if it prevents the Finnish policy-makers from acknowledging the underlying issues.⁶⁹ As to learning from the past, Kivelä discloses that multiagency cooperation has been performed many times, including at the school shootings in Jokela⁷⁰ and Kauhajoki⁷¹, but the same issues with coordination is present. He claims that the biggest issues are with situation command⁷².

Even though Kivelä presented that lessons had not been learned from the two school shootings, the Finnish authorities still do preparedness-related interagency cooperation by arranging shared exercises locally. They are especially regular in areas with critical or high-risk places, such as harbors and airports. The common exercises provide a possibility for the authorities to get to know one another (personal relations) and also to familiarize themselves with the different backgrounds and organizational cultures. It also provides a possibility for the authorities to see and learn the jurisdiction of another authority, and meet the people with whom cooperation will be made in a real situation. The additional value in this is that knowing people makes cooperation easier, as it establishes trust⁷³.

*Leadership is realized in the process whereby one or more individuals succeeds in attempting to frame and define the reality of others. Indeed, leadership situations may be conceived as those in which there exists an obligation or a perceived right on the part of certain individuals to define the reality of others.*⁷⁴

Linda Smircich & Gareth Morgan

Smircich's and Morgan's suggestion that the leader is picked amongst the peers does not comply with an interagency cooperation situation. Specifically, the overall situation command responsibility goes to the authority under whose jurisdiction the case belongs to. I.e. in a rescue situation the situation command is with the Fire and Rescue Department, where as the Police is responsible in a criminal or public order and security.

The previously mentioned situation leadership combined with interagency cooperation are problematic. Indeed, Kivelä questioned the authorities' ability to coordinate exceptional situa-

⁶⁹ Kivelä 2016, 195.

⁷⁰ Investigation Commission of the Jokela School shooting.

⁷¹ Investigation Commission of the Kauhajoki School shooting.

⁷² Kivelä 2016, 138-142.

⁷³ Interview with the Finnish Border Guard representatives; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the Customs representatives.

⁷⁴ 258.

tions in a multiagency cooperation situation. Also, a study has been conducted in the Ministry of the Interior, called *Yleisjohtajuutta moniviranomaistilanteissa selvittäneen työryhmän lopuraportti*⁷⁵ or *A report on overall situation command in a multiagency cooperation situation*, as translated freely. The report displays similar difficulties as what were addressed by Kivelä. It appears that different authorities may have a differing perception on the shared situation, its management and the other authority's jurisdiction⁷⁶, which might lead to positive discrepancy if there are two or more entities claiming the overall situation command. In contrast, a negative discrepancy is formed if no authority claims the overall situation command. If the legislation does not provide a clear jurisdiction to any one authority, it can be agreed upon in between the participating entities.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, the study provides a disclaimer that the Rescue act provides power for the officer in charge of the rescue operations to make an explicit decision on starting or ending the rescue operation. To clarify, this means that the overall situation command is to be transferred to the authority, under whose jurisdiction the operation then falls, e.g. the police in a criminal investigation.

According to Kivelä, a shared multi-agency training would help especially with the problems with the coordination or situational management in an exceptional situation.⁷⁸ However, not all authorities seemed to be interested in shared training⁷⁹. Yet, as he states, the problems and issues with coordination and overall situation command arise as both the Fire and Rescue Department and the Police got on-scene in the Kauhajoki and Jokela school shootings. Noteworthy is that the school shootings were very similar incidents, but it appears that despite the time in between the shootings (There was one (1) year in between the incidents), the lessons were not learned and the same errors were repeated⁸⁰. The Investigation Commission's reports on Kauhajoki and Jokela School shootings did not discuss whether the participants had had a debriefing discussion and discussed about what was done and what could be learned from it (Lessons Learned). Therefore, it can only be speculated that if such a method were used, it might have enabled learning from the past and to improve cooperation for the next case. For example, if Paukkunen's model was applied and the situations discussed afterwards, there is a possibility that the authorities could have understood the operational difficulties faced on-scene by other authorities.

⁷⁵ Sisäministeriö 2015.

⁷⁶ Sisäministeriö 2015, 4.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Kivelä 2016, 190.

⁷⁹ Ibid. 191.

⁸⁰ Kivelä 2016, 138.

2.6 Leadership and interagency cooperation

In the first five (5) subchapters I built this thesis' theoretical framework. In this final subchapter will built the combined framework of leadership and interagency cooperation. As stated earlier, it is not clear as to how the situation leadership in a multiagency cooperation situation works or should work. However, by combining the fourfold typology of leadership with Valtonen's research, I will propose a model on how it could be approached.

As Aalto proposed, the fourfold typology can be divided into two components: one that can be affected on-scene by the leader (leadership and management) and the other that creates the context in which the leadership takes place (organizational culture and organizational structure). In order to be able to perform as a leader in any context or the operating environment, including in a cooperation situation, a set of skills and tools are required. Valtonen named them the *Driving Forces*⁸¹, or the fundamentals, of cooperation: the fundamentals of the operating environment and the characteristics in cooperation. Valtonen also concluded that in addition to the fundamentals of cooperation, there are *Weak Signals* which affect cooperation but are either in hiding or not talked about.⁸² Table 1 lists Valtonen's fundamentals and weak signals. They are elaborated under the table by directly translating them⁸³ from Valtonen's research. It should be noted that even though they are represented in the same table, they have no correlation or correspondence between each other.

Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation	Fundamentals of the Operating Environment	Weak Signals
Trust	The Finnish Interagency Cooperation works	Power
Professionalism / Teamwork Competence	Successful cooperation on all operative levels	Personification
Willingness to cooperate	International cooperation works	Hidden agendas
Commitment	Synergy from limited resources	Working together is enough
	Safety and security overpowering disputes	Rhetorical cooperation

Table 1: Valtonen's Driving Forces and Weak Signals

⁸¹ Valtonen 2010, 241.

Table 1 presents Valtonen's Driving Forces for cooperation, which are listed under Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation and Fundamentals of the Operating Environment. The third column presents the Weak Signals. These aspects affecting cooperation were the results of Valtonen's Delphi method analysis. They have been verified with the participants as being the key elements in making cooperation work. The weak signals may affect cooperation directly, or might be overridden during cooperation. These fundamentals are very much applicable to this thesis since they are collected from the experiences of the authorities, and I will study the perceptions on interagency cooperation in the Thor Liberty case.

Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation⁸⁴

Trust is a key element in cooperation, and it was emphasized in the security authority context. Trust means mutual respect for one another in the cooperation situations, as well as before it.

Professionalism / Teamwork Competence is a complex characteristics. On the one hand it expects knowledge and adaptive ability, which brings added value to cooperation, especially from information sharing and confidentiality perspectives. On the other hand efficiency is expected.

Willingness to cooperate is about attitude and activity. Other authorities are expected to be cooperation-oriented at the operational level.

Commitment combines trust and professionalism. In practice commitment means availability and willingness to cooperate in shared situations.

Fundamentals of the Operating Environment⁸⁵

The Finnish Interagency Cooperation works. The authorities' are trusted to be objective and professional, and to follow the rule of law.

⁸² Valtonen 2010, 241 – 244.

⁸³ The translations are made by the author with no professional linguistics background.

Successful cooperation on all operational levels means that cross-administrative and cross-sectoral cooperation works.

International cooperation works, i.e. Finland has established its role in an international context, especially with the neighboring countries.

Synergy from limited resources refers to two things. Firstly, Finland is a small country with limited resources, so cooperation enables authorities to gain benefit from other authorities' equipment, know-how and resources if needed. Secondly, the shared cultural background, personal relationships and comprehensive security thinking furthers cooperation.

Safety and security overpower disputes means that despite there might be personal, sectoral or silo issues, security always comes first. No case will be left unmanaged even if there is competition present.

Weak Signals⁸⁶

Power refers to jurisdiction and overall command of the situation. If power is used right it will become the coordinative and clarifying element. In turn, if it is misused it will lead to adverse outcome in terms of cooperation.

Personification means that if the persons subsist well, cooperation is easy. However, if there is personal conflicts cooperation may become difficult. Another aspect is that many times persons of contact for cooperation remain constant, which makes forwarding know-how and tacit knowledge ineffectual.

Hidden agendas refer to underlying issues that might occur behind the "official" interagency cooperation. They are usually based on self-interest, and are believed to lead to the ending of cooperation if they are revealed.

Working together is enough relates to the entities only working together rather than aiming to improve cooperation. The abovementioned fundamentals are not fundamental to everyone.

⁸⁴ Valtonen 2010, 423.

⁸⁵ Valtonen 2010, 422.

⁸⁶ Valtonen 2010, 424.

Rhetorical cooperation means that everything looks good on paper but in practice what is spoken and what is done do not meet. This is not conventional at the operational-tactical level.

Valtonen also presented areas that should be developed regarding interagency cooperation. However, they are not included into this thesis. This limitation has been made as the thesis will not focus on improving cooperation, but rather collect insights on how it works.

Since interagency cooperation cannot be lead in the same way as contemporary teams, it has to be addressed from another approach. By combining Aalto's suggestion with Valtonen's fundamentals, cooperation can be addressed in conjunction with leadership in a situation, or as the interviewees stated, in situation coordination. Figure 2 clarifies how the fourfold typology, the fundamentals of cooperation, and the weak signals positions with one another so that situation coordination can be analyzed.




Figure 2: Situation coordination

Figure 2 above illustrates one model for analyzing how well coordination works in a multi-agency cooperation situation. In this thesis, Valtonen's fundamentals listed above will be compared with the studied case, and the results can, in theory, be placed under the relevant fundamental division. This way it is possible to see whether the coordination and the overall command was balanced, as suggested by Huhtinen.

The fundamental characteristics are carried out through the study as the phenomenographical analysis on the data is conducted. They will affect the sub-categories, as the theoretical framework will guide the approach in the analysis. In chapter five (5) the results will be discussed with Valtonen's fundamentals.

3 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Ilkka Niiniluoto⁸⁷ discusses why research and science are necessary. According to him, all research needs to be well justified, and preferably should be better defined than to merely pursue the overall and general interest.⁸⁸ Then again, Antti Eskola⁸⁹ discusses that social institutions such as the Police or any other authority as an organization, strives to fulfill their assigned duties, whereas the researchers and research institutions strive to provide resources for the society. These studies should participate in maintaining societal functions and objectives⁹⁰. This thesis is a case study research relying on qualitative research methods and aims to provide insights on how interagency cooperation works. The case study research focuses on the subjective perceptions on how interagency cooperation worked in the Thor Liberty case. The thesis is constructed on individual thematic interviews, which are analyzed with phenomenography. This research is based on a need to understand interagency cooperation, which will be done by comparing the different perceptions so that we can understand the possible difficulties and confrontations between the participating agencies. This is important if the agencies want to improve the cooperation, which is needed to be able to function in complex situations.

The research is positioned in the philosophical field of empiricisms. Empiricism is a logical choice since its approach presumes that knowledge is based on experiences and senses⁹¹. It argues that knowledge builds upon the previous knowledge and experiences. This thesis focuses on the subjective understanding and experiences of the represented authorities that were involved with the operational action at the Thor Liberty Case. All of the interviewed representatives acted as the person-in-charge in their organization, and attended the overall duty command's management board⁹². Therefore the approach is the same in this case study as empiricism is.

While empiricism presumes knowledge is gained through experiences, Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic approach social sciences require human factors such as memory and life experience⁹³. He presents the hermeneutic approach on knowledge, meaning that knowledge is processed by portraying issues and their contexts, and the phenomenon is regarded with

⁸⁷ Niiniluoto 1980.

⁸⁸ Ibid. 60.

⁸⁹ Eskola 1967.

⁹⁰ Eskola 1967, 318.

⁹¹ Niiniluoto 1980.; Hirsjärvi, Remes & Sajavaara. 1997; Määttänen 1995; Mason 2002.

⁹² According to the Rescue Act § 35 2, *The officer in overall charge of the situation may appoint a management group with representatives of the authorities, agencies and voluntary units taking part in the operations as its members and invite experts to provide assistance.*

⁹³ Gadamer 2004, 6.

other simultaneous ones and their development.⁹⁴ Here, the case study research defines the *Thor Liberty's case* as the context and *interagency cooperation* as the issue. Consequently, the experiences that the attendees had received previously were used to perform all necessary tasks in this case while interacting with the surroundings and other authorities.

The gained experience was also a factor in Vesa Valtonen's dissertation. Valtonen states that security authorities cooperate with a primary objective to prevent or lessen suffering, or to help recovering from it.⁹⁵ This applies partly also to my thesis, as the initial incident which lead to the case was to prevent a large-scale emergency from happening due to the discovered explosives. Then again, the second part of the incident was to investigate what laws had been broken, why, and whether a legal punishment should be imposed on those responsible. Still, I agree with Valtonen's conclusion that the phenomenon can be studied from Gadamer's viewpoint that the issue is bigger than the sum of its parts, or that experience takes time to accumulate⁹⁶.

In order to study interagency cooperation, which is a vast and complex phenomenon, case study research was used as the research strategy. Case study research can be seen as a study on one incident in a phenomenon, or a set of incidents in a phenomenon⁹⁷. Case study research investigates issues in the real world rather than in artificially created settings⁹⁸. According to Yin⁹⁹ case study research is a widely used strategy in the Social Sciences and Public Administration¹⁰⁰, under which this thesis also falls. It is used often when the researcher has little or no control over the research situation¹⁰¹. This is true in this study, as the studied case happened in 2011 – 2012, and the researcher was not there. Therefore, as the case presented in chapter 4.1 is built upon the interviews, the media releases and news, the researcher will only handle the data as it is, and cannot affect the situation. At the same time the data will be analyzed to discover the different perceptions of interagency cooperation.

A case study can be applied to research where the research question is a *how* or a *why* – question. As the research question in this study is *How interagency cooperation worked in the Thor Liberty case?*, case study as a research strategy is reasoned¹⁰². It could be argued that also other research methods or strategies could answer the *how* and *why* questions instead of a

⁹⁴ Koppa.

⁹⁵ 26.

⁹⁶ Gadamer 2004, 7.

⁹⁷ Gomm; Hammersley & Foster. 2000, 4 – 5.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 5 – 6.

⁹⁹ Yin 1994, xiii.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 1.

case study, but given that the research data is collected from the involved participants who were on the scene and in the situation command role in their organization, it limits the possibilities. No quantifiable data is needed but the key person's subjective views. This is supported by the case study research strategy.

The research methods used in this thesis are qualitative. Qualitative research enables to study the social world in many dimensions, including everyday life and its perception and experiences. The experiences are the essence that help us to understand how things work in a particular context and what their significance is. Qualitative research is often claimed to be anecdotal or illustrative¹⁰³ whereas quantitative research aims to find correlations and statistic regularities¹⁰⁴. As the aim is to illustrate the different perceptions on interagency cooperation, qualitative research methods for collecting and analyzing research data are a logical choice.

Qualitative or quantitative research may both be criticized by their shortcomings but in order to do so the logic behind the chosen methodology should first be understood.¹⁰⁵ Some of the methodologies may be used in both qualitative and quantitative research¹⁰⁶, which illustrates the fine line between the two approaches. Although this research is a qualitative-one, it is mainly so because of the case study approach. Should the focus be on, for example, how the authorities' see something in general without it being tied to a specific case, then it could be studied quantitatively focusing on the number of the answers rather than the content of the interviews. In this study the content and quality of the interviews is more important than their quantity. The research method used for collecting data is individual thematic interviews, and the data is analyzed with phenomenography.

Interviews as a data collection method is very common in qualitative research¹⁰⁷, especially if the researched phenomenon is relatively unknown. According to Hirsjärvi, Remes and Sajavaara (1997) interviews are also a good choice if the interviewees are likely to expand the previous knowledge and understanding on the studied issues, and also explain the issue in a wider context than what the researcher can predict¹⁰⁸. As the preliminary understanding on the Thor Liberty case was built upon the media releases, all of the aforementioned points were true. A thematic interview, also known as a focused interview, means that the interview is

¹⁰² Yin 1994, 5 – 6.

¹⁰³ Mason 2002, 1, 4.

¹⁰⁴ Hirsjärvi et. al. 1997, 198.

¹⁰⁵ Mason 2002, 1, 4.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.* 4.

¹⁰⁷ Hirsjärvi et. al. 1997, 192.

¹⁰⁸ Hirsjärvi et. al. 1997, 192; Mason 2002.; Routio 2007.

constructed of themes.¹⁰⁹ According to Hirsjärvi et al. the themes are often known, but the final form and order of the questions are not set¹¹⁰, and was vaguely also the case with these interviews. Indeed, the questions were already set, but how they were asked and in which order varied. This was due to the fact that the interviewees were let to talk freely, and the questions were used to guide the discussion back to the topic, and to keeping the focus on the case.

Phenomenography was chosen as the methodology of my thesis as the core scope is to understand the different perceptions on how the authorities viewed and experienced interagency cooperation. A phenomenographical perception is based on fundamental understanding of a phenomenon¹¹¹. According to Michael Uljens¹¹², a person forms a perception of a phenomenon by using the earlier experiences and thoughts regarding it. Thereupon that perception means the ratio or relationship between the individual and the context or environment¹¹³. The perception, however, can be influenced after additional experience and pondering, and they can be categorized with the phenomenographic method. The categories are usually equal with one another rather than hierarchical, and thus allows the perceptions to be compared with each other.¹¹⁴ As Marton states, phenomenographers:

*Do not try to describe things as they are, nor do we discuss whether or not things can be described 'as they are'; rather, we try to characterize how things appear to people.*¹¹⁵

Ference Marton

According to Marton, interviewing is the primary method of phenomenographic data collection¹¹⁶. He emphasizes that the questions, and the method how they are asked, are important when using the phenomenographical method. He advises to use open-ended questions so that the interviewee may choose how to answer and what to include to it (the dimension). The dimensions reveal then how the interviewee perceives the world¹¹⁷. In this thesis I used thematic interviews where the interviewee is asked questions related to specific topic¹¹⁸. Rather than having a sequences set of questions the structure was more flexible, and the situation was kept

¹⁰⁹ Vilka 2005, 182.

¹¹⁰ 1997, 195.

¹¹¹ Uljens 1992.

¹¹² Uljens 1992, 86, 95–101.

¹¹³ See also Häkkinen 1996.

¹¹⁴ Uljens 1992, 86, 95–101.

¹¹⁵ Marton, 45.

¹¹⁶ Marton 1981, 153.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Mason 2002, 62–63.

unofficial. To ensure the interviewees had the possibility to choose how to answer, they were let to speak even though it was not always related to the question and the topic.

Phenomenography seems to support the case study research strategy well. According to Niikko¹¹⁹ the empirical research can be conducted with a set group. As this case study focuses on what happened as the Thor Liberty was stopped at the Mussalo harbor, and its related inter-agency cooperation with set authorities and individuals, the case offers a good and logical framework. However, phenomenography has been criticized on that the results are very context-dependent¹²⁰. That is true, but again, as the scope of this thesis is to understand the inter-agency cooperation with the set case, in my opinion this critique is invalidated.

According to Ference Marton¹²¹, people with different cultural backgrounds should not be compared when the studied phenomenon is of the same reality. These people view the world differently, not just interpret it. As to phenomenography, it is about studying the same reality by comparing its different conceptions. This is evident with my interviewees, as they all are experienced authorities in their own fields, attending to the same case. Yet the conceptions differ from one another due to the organizations they represent, with their working histories, as well as with their education.

3.1 Data Collection

The data was collected with eight (8) thematic interviews and one complementary set of written questions and answers. All interviews were arranged individually with the exception that there were two people from the same organization present with the Finnish Customs and the Finnish Border Guard interviews. The themes that the interview questions concerned were leadership and coordination, communication and preparedness as well as trust. The questionnaire is attached to this thesis and can be found in Appendix 1.

My initial goal was to interview all parties involved in the case, but I later narrowed it down to the authorities that were operational on the scene at the Port of HaminaKotka. The interviewed people were from the Finnish Border Guard, The Finnish Customs, Kotka Police department from the public order and safety section, Kotka Police Department's Chief Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigations, a representative from the harbor, The Fire and Res-

¹¹⁹ Niikko 2003, 7, 43.

¹²⁰ Huusko & Paloniemi 2006, 166.

¹²¹ Marton 1981, 179–180.

cue Department and the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi). Also, a request for interview was sent to the Finnish Defence Forces, but no interview was granted. The interviewees were chosen according to their participation in the incident. If any agency would have suggested some other person than the situational command for the interview it would have been rejected so that the interviewees' role and position in all agencies remained equivalent.

Six interviews were arranged face to face, out of which four were arranged at the interviewees' premises. One interview was arranged at Santahamina in the National Defence University's facilities, and one was arranged at the Ministry of Defence premises. One interview was conducted by using Microsoft Lync, a Skype-type web-based programme. The final interview was held as a teleconference by using a cell phone. Each of the interviews were recorded. A consent for the recording was asked verbally from each interviewee prior to starting the recording. As the Finnish Customs interview was ended before there was time to go through all the interview questions, a questionnaire was sent to the two Customs representatives via email. This creates an anomaly to the data, as the respondent had time to think and review their answers and might not be as spontaneous as with a live interview either face to face or by electronic means. This is further discussed in section 6.1, Critique. Still, in terms of the content the answers supplemented the interrupted interview well.

According to Syrjälä, Ahonen, Syrjäläinen and Saari¹²² the interview has to be an interactive situation, where the discussion should flow freely. Every interview had the interactive element, and supplementary or additional and clarifying questions regarding the interview themes were made when necessary. As stated before, the interviewees were allowed to talk freely even though the discussion was not focused on the topic, but it was redirected if it did not return on its own. This was partly due to the time that had passed between the case and the interviews. Some interviewees used their notes from the case to refresh their memory, where as some simply stated they would rely on their memory.

Media was actively reporting the case from the first press conference until weeks after the ship left Finland, and even after that but less frequently. The last news was released in December 2015, as the preliminary criminal investigation was ended in Finland¹²³. To complement the case, a light media collection was done on the case, but it was not analyzed. The data was used to build the case study, which is present in chapter 4.1. It illustrated how vast the media attention was directed towards the case.

¹²² Syrjälä, Ahonen, Syrjäläinen, & Saari 1994.

¹²³ E.g. Lesssheikki 2015.

The media collection had news releases from 28 different online media houses. There were 66 releases with slightly different content. Out of these eight (8) were from outside of Finland, and the rest, 20, were Finnish media houses. The media and press releases often aim to create interesting headlines, and the industry is under constant time pressure¹²⁴. Therefore, the data is not always verified, creating a reliability issue with the media. Because of this the media was not used as a primary source. Still, the media data set could have been analyzed separately, but as it does not support or give any added value in this thesis to the opinions and perceptions of the interviewees it was left aside.

3.2 Data Analysis

All of the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. At this point they were anonymized by removing all features that could be identifiable to the interviewee. All parts of the interviews that were not relevant to the study were removed, like when a phone rang and the interviewee answered it, and other similar incidents. If the interviewee did not finish the sentence and instead jumped to another issue, it was marked with three dots (...). All together it added up to approximately 8,5 hours of recorded interviews and 61 pages on written text. The different transcribed interviews were combined into one document and mixed in as logical order as possible. A timeline of how the operation proceeded was formed. Then, the rest of the data was categorized according to the interview questions so that following each question was the related answers of all interviews. After the combination the whole data was read through carefully to get a good overview on the answers.

The data can be seen as having in two sections: What happened in the Thor Liberty case, and how the interviewees perceived the interagency cooperation. The two sections are partly overlapping. This is relevant since the first section was also used to get a clear picture on what happened at the case, and the interviewees mainly kept with facts. This section can be compared with Marton's¹²⁵ first-order, which is a statement about reality¹²⁶. The second section collects the subjective experiences on the case, and thus can be equated with the second-order, which is seen as a statement about people's conception of reality¹²⁷.

¹²⁴ Julkisen sanan neuvosto.; Stearns & Kille 2015.

¹²⁵ Marton 1981.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 177 – 178, 182.

¹²⁷ Marton 1981, 177-178, 182.

4 THOR LIBERTY AND INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

This chapter presents the results of the phenomenographical analysis. As is the purpose of phenomenography, the authorities had different perceptions of how interagency cooperation worked with the Thor Liberty case. It should be noted that the perception presented in this chapter are the subjective perceptions of the interviewees. However, in order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees they will be referred to by their agency. Nonetheless, the perceptions do not present the agency's official stance on interagency cooperation.

As stated before, the Finnish Defence Forces was not interviewed for this thesis, which has to be acknowledged. It is relevant because in addition to that they were involved in the case, they were also referred to in the interviews, and they are also referred to in this thesis. Thus, it should be noted that all references to the Finnish Defence Forces and their actions are second-hand information, meaning that their subjective perception on what happened is not covered. Simultaneously their role in this situation was relevant and for that reason will be included into this thesis.

After reviewing the data many times it was evident that there was a clear difference in perceptions between the two situational organizations. In other words the perception on the case was influenced and dependent on which operation the entity was involved with. The operation of preventing a large-scale emergency (hereinafter *the rescue operation*) involved the Fire and Rescue Department, the local Police, the Finnish Border Guard, and Trafi. In turn, the preliminary investigation operation (hereinafter *the criminal case*) involved the local Police's Chief Inspector, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Finnish Customs. The Finnish Defence Forces provided executive assistance to both operations, and the Port's representative was involved in the whole Thor Liberty case. This division is essential as the categorization enables the comparison of the different perceptions also on this level.

This chapter has two sections. Subchapter 4.1 presents the case study as it happened according to the interviews. The narration is supported by media. It also includes a brief description on the authorities that were present in the operations. Because of the many steps of the incident, a timeline has been constructed, and is found in Appendix 2. Chapter 4.2 focuses on the results from the phenomenographical analysis and is divided into the categorization formed during the analysis. Chapter 4.2.4 presents the phenomenographical outcome spaces. The framework constructed in chapter 2.6 for analyzing situation coordination will be used in chapter 5.

4.1 Thor Liberty

On December 13th 2011 a cargo ship called Thor Liberty was sailing to Finland, and contacted the Finnish Port of HaminaKotka for a pilot¹²⁸. The ship sailed under United Kingdom's flag, and is registered in the Isle of Man¹²⁹, but is operated by a Danish company called Thorco Shipping A/S¹³⁰. As the ship docked in port on December 15th, the stevedores started to stow the anchor chain into the hold as was the original intention for the ship coming to Finland. Stowing the chain created sparks when metal hit metal¹³¹. The stevedores then noticed some regular cardboard packages that were dislodged¹³² and tilted against the hold wall, and some packages were broken with the insides spread around the floor¹³³. The boxes had labels indicating they contained explosives, as is visible on Figure 3. There were no ceiling or bulkheads to separate the sections. The boxes appeared to be damaged and as it was discovered that some of the explosives had leaked out the work was interrupted, and the authorities were called to inspect the damage.¹³⁴ The tilted piles of boxes are visible in Figure 4.

¹²⁸ Yle Kymenlaakso (a); Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the Trafi representative.

¹²⁹ Taylor 2011; Yle Kymenlaakso (b).

¹³⁰ Mikkelsen 2011.

¹³¹ Interview with the Customs representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.

¹³² Yle Kymenlaakso (a).

¹³³ Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.

¹³⁴ Interview with the Trafi representative; Interview with the F&R D representative.



Figure 3: Explosives-label visible on the left¹³⁵

The HaminaKotka port operator and the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) were contacted first¹³⁶. Trafi conducted a Port State Control¹³⁷ on the ship, which was suitable for transporting such cargo but the method of stowage was wrong¹³⁸. The explosives should have been stowed into closed transport units, not on cargo pallets. Next, Trafi called in the Fire and Rescue Department (F&R D)¹³⁹ to assist in assessing the situation in the ship¹⁴⁰. The ship was officially detained¹⁴¹. As the state of the cardboard boxes and the fact that they contained explosives were discovered, a large rescue operation to prevent a large-scale accident began. Approximately 159 tons of explosives were found in the hold.¹⁴² The F&R D also contacted

¹³⁵ The picture was received from the Finnish Transport Safety Agency.

¹³⁶ Interview with the port representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.

¹³⁷ Trafi 2011; Laki alusturvallisuuden valvonnasta 370/1995, § 5 and § 9; Laki eräiden irtolastialusten turvallisesta lastaamisesta ja lastin purkamisesta 1206/2004, § 15.

¹³⁸ Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.

¹³⁹ Pelastuslaki 379/2011, § 32, § 42.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid; interview with the port representative.

¹⁴¹ Laki eräiden irtolastialusten turvallisesta lastaamisesta ja lastin purkamisesta 1206/2004, § 15; Laki alusturvallisuuden valvonnasta 370/1995, § 5 & § 12.

¹⁴² Interview with the F&R D representative; Yle Kymenlaakso (c).

the local police in Kotka¹⁴³, the Finnish Border Guard's Gulf of Finland Coast Guard District¹⁴⁴. They agreed that a Patrol vessel was to be sent to the harbor¹⁴⁵. Furthermore, the Safety Investigation Authority (SIA) was contacted due to the significant amount of explosives, and the potential for a massive accident¹⁴⁶.

The operation started with a joint meeting on December 19th 2011, where the Fire and Rescue Department assumed the overall situation command¹⁴⁷. In addition to the Fire and Rescue Department and Trafi, also the Finnish Border Guards (BG), local Police, The Finnish Defence Forces (DF), SIA, and the local hospital district (HD)¹⁴⁸ participated due to the raised preparedness in the area. All of the other authorities also had a person-in-charge, who worked closely together with the overall situation commander, forming a management board¹⁴⁹. In other words, as the rescue operation was going on, the overall situation commander had a panel of experts aiding him in the situation.

The first press conference was arranged on Monday the 19th in December, and all the previously mentioned authorities were present. At first Trafi was appointed as the responsible authority for the situation, but as the overall situation command was assumed by the F&R D, the responsibility also passed to it¹⁵⁰. It was later agreed that every authority was responsible for their own communications with the media.

In addition to the rescue operation, the local Police's Chief Inspector started a preliminary investigation on whether there was a reason to suspect a crime¹⁵¹, which was a different operation than what the F&R D was leading. The two parallel operations are illustrated in Table 2. To verify that the explosive was the substance it was claimed to be, the Police explosives

¹⁴³ Poliisilaki 872/2011.; Interview with the Fire and Rescue Department representative; Interview with the local Police.

¹⁴⁴ Rajavartiolaitos 578/2005 § 3 1; Interview with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with the Finnish Border Guard representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the National Bureau of Investigation representative.

¹⁴⁶ Turvallisuustutkintalaki 525/2011 § 8 and § 2 4.

¹⁴⁷ Pelastuslaki 379/2011, § 35 1.

¹⁴⁸ Even though the Hospital District and the Safety Investigation Agency are mentioned here, they are not included into the study. The motivation for mentioning them is to show the variety of entities involved.

¹⁴⁹ Pelastuslaki 379/2011, § 35 1.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative; Interview with the Border Guard representatives.

¹⁵¹ Interview with the local Police representative; Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Interview with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the NBI representative.

team as well as the Finnish Defence Forces were called in to assist¹⁵². The analysis done by the Finnish Defence Forces that the explosive was nitroguanidine¹⁵³.

A decision was made that the cargo has to be re-stowed into ship containers¹⁵⁴. The team of experts from the Police, the Defence Forces, Trafi and the Fire and Rescue Department calculated and cordoned a safe area, which reached to 1,000 meters in every direction¹⁵⁵. The local Police cordoned the area from land, whereas the Finnish Border Guard cordoned the area from the sea¹⁵⁶. Before the re-stowing began in the hold, a further inspection was done on other cargo and the ship's cargo manifests.



Figure 4: Some boxes had fallen¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Laki puolustusvoimista 551/2007, § 2 2.

¹⁵³ According to the F&R D representative, nitroguanidine is an explosive that can be compared to gun powder by its explosives qualities. It requires high temperatures and extensive friction or hit for a reaction. According to Yle Uutiset (a) the cargo's destructive force was massive, yet the risk for it to explode was small.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with the F&R D representative; Interview with the Trafi representative.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*; Joki 2011.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with the local Police representative; Interview with the Customs representatives; Interview with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the F&R D representative.

¹⁵⁷ The picture was received from the Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi.

In addition to the explosives, the sea cargo manifest also listed other items. The manifest stated “rockets”, which was interpreted as fireworks by the harbor in Germany¹⁵⁸, and located in the containers amongst the explosives’ boxes. In order to be able to open and re-seal the sealed containers to check the goods¹⁵⁹, the Finnish Customs inspection group was asked to open the containers¹⁶⁰. The containers revealed the declared rockets to be 69 missiles which were identified by the Finnish Defence Forces to be Patriot air defence missiles. While the Fire and Rescue Department contacted the Ministry of the Interior, the local Customs contacted the Ministry of Defence to check whether an export and transit permit had been issued for the missiles¹⁶¹. The initial notification was received already on December 20th in the early afternoon, declaring the lack of the permission. The Finnish Customs Economic Crime Investigation Unit became involved with the case, and also kept the Prime Minister’s Office’s Situation Centre informed on the criminal investigation process¹⁶².

In regards to the criminal investigation, the attending authorities were the Finnish Customs, and the Police Chief Inspector. After discovering the missiles, cooperation on the criminal investigation continued, while the prevention of a large-scale accident operation was still ongoing. This meant that there were two situations and two situation management structures¹⁶³. The two separate situations are illustrated in Table 2.

On Wednesday December 21st the National Bureau of Investigation took over the Police investigation¹⁶⁴. As stated by the interviewee from the National Bureau of Investigation, even though he was assigned as the situation commander for the criminal investigation the allocation of duties and responsibilities was done by the head of the Customs operation in cooperation with him¹⁶⁵. The arrangement on the jurisdiction was agreed on the administrative level, while the duties and responsibilities were agreed locally. This was due to the Customs having the best knowledge of the situation and the offences. Both authorities have the same jurisdic-

¹⁵⁸ Interview with the Chief Inspector; Interview with the F&R D representative; Yle Uutiset (b); Yle; Helsingin Sanomat.

¹⁵⁹ Goods is a general Customs term, used for all goods moved in international trade.

¹⁶⁰ Tullilaki 1466/1994 § 14.

¹⁶¹ Laki puolustustarvikkeiden maastaviennistä ja kauttakuljetuksesta 242/1990 § 1.

¹⁶² Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives. Even though the Situation Centre was involved, it is not included into this study, as their role was to keep the relevant government officials aware of the incident’s development.

¹⁶³ Interview with the Border Guard representatives; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the local Police representative; Interview with the Chief Inspector.

¹⁶⁴ Laki poliisin hallinnosta 110/1992 § 9.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with the NBI representative; interview with the Finnish Customs representatives.

tion in terms of pre-trial investigation¹⁶⁶ and coercive measures¹⁶⁷. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service also conducted their own tasks¹⁶⁸.

	December 2011														January 2012													
	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.	30.	31.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.					
Prevention of the large-scale emergency -operation																												
Criminal Investigation																												

Table 2: The two simultaneous operations

During further inspection of the manifest and transport documentation, the Customs along with the other investigative parties¹⁶⁹ contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire if the cargo had an export license. The explosive, nitroguanidine, is a dual-use substance and requires an export permit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁷⁰. The Finnish Customs seized the missiles, and the explosives¹⁷¹ were detained under customs control on Wednesday December 21st. The Patriot missiles were eventually transferred to a secure location¹⁷² in cooperation with the Finnish Defence Forces and the Police. The Customs and the Police detained the captain and the first officer of the vessel, but were almost immediately advised by Trafi that they were not to be removed from the ship¹⁷³. Thus, the questioning was done onboard. An overall inspection of the vessel was also conducted.

The re-stowage of the explosives began during Christmas holidays when the harbor quieted down¹⁷⁴. The airspace was also closed for that time by Trafi¹⁷⁵. In order to prevent curious citizens and the media from endangering themselves the area was also cordoned off by the Police and the Border Guard¹⁷⁶. The stowing lasted until December 26th, after which Trafi released the ship. However, the criminal investigation was still ongoing after the release by

¹⁶⁶ Esitutkintalaki 805/2011 §1 2.

¹⁶⁷ Pakkokeinolaki 806/2011 § 2; Tullilaki § 43.; Maritime Executive 2011.

¹⁶⁸ The FSIS's line of investigation is not included into this study; Yle Kymenlaakso (d); Email from the FSIS.; Aamulehti 2011.

¹⁶⁹ The other parties were the Finnish Defence Forces and the Police.

¹⁷⁰ Laki kaksikäyttötuotteiden vientivalvonnasta 562/1996, § 2.

¹⁷¹ Laki puolustustarvikkeiden maastaviennistä ja kauttakuljetuksesta 242/1990 § 1.; Finnish Customs 2012.

¹⁷² Interview with the Chief Inspector; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the Finnish Customs representatives; Yle 2011; Taylor 2011.

¹⁷³ Interview with the Trafi representative; Interview with the NBI representative; Interview with the local Police representative.

¹⁷⁴ Joki 2011.

¹⁷⁵ Ilmailulaki 1194/2009 § 8.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with the NBI representative.

Trafi, and the ship stayed in Kotka. The transit and export permit for the missiles were issued on December 29th and 30th, after which the seize was reversed and the missiles loaded back on the ship on January 3rd 2012. As to the explosives, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs found that a permit had been issued in Germany, which was sufficient to transport dual-use substances also via Finland.

The situation was resolved after four (4) weeks. The captain and the first officer were issued a fine for neglecting the seaworthiness of the vessel¹⁷⁷. Also, the Finnish Customs continued the investigation of the export offence. The missiles and the explosives were declared as lawful business and cargo, but the export and transit permits were missing, and the explosives stowage had been done wrong. As the interviewee from the National Bureau of Investigation stated:

It was a large scale incident but administratively dealt with by issuing a fine. The enormous media interest and the size of the cargo made it such a hassle.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation

Ultimately there were fifteen (15) different entities involved. These entities are pictured in Figure 5. Out of these fifteen officials, I interviewed eight (8), and requested for an interview from additional two (2). Additionally there are five (5) more entities that have been left out of the study due to their supporting role in the case. The arrows in Figure 5 indicate which entity initiated the contact.

The eight (8) interviewed instances were the local Police, the local Police's Chief Inspector¹⁷⁸, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Customs, the Finnish Border Guard, the Fire and Rescue Department, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency Trafi and the Mussalo harbor. The additional two requests were sent to the Finnish Defence Forces as well as the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. The Finnish Defence Forces' role will be further elaborated below, but as stated earlier, the FSIS's role remained unclear and has been excluded from this study. Each of the agencies have their own area of responsibility, but as many authorities are involved in one case, there is bound to be overlapping jurisdictions as was referred to already in section 2.5.

¹⁷⁷ Valtakunnansyyttäjänvirasto 2012.; Käkelä 2012.

¹⁷⁸ The local Police and the Chief Inspector will be explained in the same paragraph.




Figure 5: Involved entities in the Thor Liberty –case

Figure 5 presents the agencies were invited to join the case. The arrows indicate which agency contacted whom, but it does not indicate the situation management structure. Instead, the situation management structure is illustrated in Figure 6.

Eight (8) authorities from where an interview was requested are described in the following paragraphs, after which they are presented in Figure 6. An additional interview was requested from the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS). It was left out of the picture as no interview was granted. After that they were left out of this thesis completely as because of their line of work, there is not much information available from public sources. With their decline¹⁷⁹ it was simple and easy to redefine the more strict research problem, involving only the operational parties. Thus, without the interview FSIS is irrelevant to the case.

While the Port is not an authority, it's involvement in this study is justified since they control the area. Also, they are obliged to hold certain facilities to authorities, and they were responsible for managing the media journalists during the case. All the involved entities are shortly introduced below, with also a brief description on their role in the studied case.

¹⁷⁹ Email from the FSIS.

The Finnish Border Guard is a “cooperative, internationally renowned expert in border management and maritime safety, an authority that increases the safety and security of people”¹⁸⁰. It is responsible for border surveillance, border checks, crime prevention, maritime safety, international cooperation and national defence. The Finnish Border Guard operates at on land, at sea and in the air.¹⁸¹

The Finnish Border Guard joined the operation on Sunday December 18th. During the Thor Liberty case the Finnish Border Guard was called into the operation to ensure that the ship would not depart from the Port of HaminaKotka. They deployed a patrol ship to Kotka to patrol at the port and that was operational around the clock. At first their first task was to support the Fire and Rescue Department. Eventually, their main task was to assist the police by cordoning the port from the sea. Since it is not in the Finnish Border Guard’s jurisdiction, they were providing assistance to the Fire and Rescue Department with their capabilities, i.e. maritime capability.

The Finnish Customs “is a state agency steered by the Ministry of Finance. The Finnish Customs cooperates with the trade community as well as with domestic and foreign authorities.” It facilitates smooth international trade, and supervises the trade’s legality, goods safety, collect some 30% of the Finnish taxes and duties, and offer services for both individuals and companies.¹⁸²

The Finnish Customs joined the operation on Tuesday December 20th due to a request to open one of the containers containing the Patriot missiles. The Finnish Customs launched their own preliminary investigation, regarding the missing documentation and the export offence. The Finnish Customs mainly worked together with the National Bureau of Investigation, and was responsible for verifying the legitimacy of the explosives and missiles transportation.

The Finnish Defence Forces have three (3) main tasks, which are the military defence of Finland, supporting other authorities and participating in international crisis management¹⁸³. During normal conditions the Finnish Defence Forces focus, amongst other things, on devel-

¹⁸⁰ The Finnish Border Guard (a).

¹⁸¹ The Finnish Border Guard Functions (b).

¹⁸² The Finnish Customs.

¹⁸³ Laki puolustusvoimista 551/2007 § 2.

oping their ability to support other authorities, such as the Police, with dangerous situations, explosives and weapons cases, and search and rescue operations, etc.¹⁸⁴

The Finnish Defence Forces had multiple roles in the Thor Liberty case. They were called in to assess the situation regarding the spilled explosives and also to identify the substance. They also identified the Patriot missiles, and aided in transferring the missiles to a secure area. As they are more of an external security authority, they were performing executive assistance with the situation commander, Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Finnish Customs.

The Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) develops the safety of the transport system, promotes environmentally friendly transport solutions and is responsible for transport system regulatory duties. It supervises transport, and develops transport safety. It is divided into maritime, air, road, and railroad transportation.¹⁸⁵

In 2011, as the Thor Liberty reached port, Trafi was the first official the stevedores contacted. They conducted the initial inspection, the Port State Control, and seized the ship to the harbor. Their main concern was that the 159 tons of explosives had been stowed in violation of the international maritime regulations, and ordered them to be re-stowed before releasing the ship. Eventually, the ship was released by Trafi, but it could not leave as the captain and the first officer were prosecuted. Additionally, their cargo was seized by the Customs.

Port of HaminaKotka, also known as the Mussalo harbor, is located at Southern Finland, and includes seven (7) different sections. It is the biggest and most diverse harbor in Finland. It has excellent logistics routes both to and from the harbor, and operates regular lines around the most significant European harbors. Mussalo is part of the HaminaKotka harbor area. The terminals are amongst the busiest in Europe, and the majority of the Finnish transit and export transportation go through it.¹⁸⁶

The Thor Liberty was piloted to the harbor, and was later on moved to a more isolated dock for unloading and loading. The HaminaKotka personnel were responsible for maintaining the

¹⁸⁴ The Finnish Defence Forces.

¹⁸⁵ The Finnish Transport Safety Agency.

¹⁸⁶ Port of HaminaKotka.

harbor security and assisting the officials in all needed tasks, including taking the media to the site, but keeping them safe and maintaining the uninterrupted area for the authorities.

The local Police and its Chief Inspector at the Kotka Police Station. The Kotka Police Station is a local Police Department under the South East Finland's Police Department. It is responsible for general order and safety in Kotka region, and also license services¹⁸⁷.

The Kotka Police Department joined the operation on Monday December 19th. In the 2011 incident, Kotka Police Station's role was two-fold: supporting the Fire and Rescue Department in their actions to prevent a large-scale accident, and investigating whether there was any offences in the case. On Tuesday evening on December 20th the Chief Inspector was appointed to the situation command, but was released from his duties as the National Bureau of Investigation took over the task.

Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department (F&R D) is a regional¹⁸⁸ authority. It operates in the Kotka area, where Mussalo harbor is located. It is responsible for fire and rescue services, chimney sweeping, training and first aid.¹⁸⁹

During the Thor Liberty case, the Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department had the overall situation management responsibility, with the rescue chief acting as the duty commander. This was a natural choice, as the initial alarm regarded a potential explosives incident, and the Rescue Act provides sufficient jurisdiction. The Rescue Chief was the second entity on-scene, and was invited there by the Finnish Transport Safety Agency's representative.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is a unit of the Finnish Police. It is responsible for preventing international and organized crime, and other serious criminal activity. It is also responsible for preventing money laundering, financing terrorism, amongst other things. They operate throughout Finland and is a national Police sector.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ The Finnish Police.

¹⁸⁸ Kymenlaakso is a Finnish province including 7 regions east from Helsinki. It is home for some 180 000 people. Ref: Kymenlaakson liitto.

¹⁸⁹ Kymenlaakso Rescue Department.

¹⁹⁰ The National Bureau of Investigation.

The National Bureau of Investigation's representative was appointed as the overall situation commander regarding the criminal investigation. He replaced the local Police Chief Inspector on Wednesday December 21st. Even though he was assigned overall command, a local agreement was made between the NBI and the Finnish Customs on the investigative responsibilities. It was agreed that the neglect on the seaworthiness of the vessel was the NBI's responsibility.




Figure 6: Situation Management structures within the Thor Liberty case

Figure 6 pictures the situation management structures. The National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Customs and the Fire and Rescue Department are illustrated with a darker circle as they are the overall situation commanders with their operations. Finnish Transport Safety Agency is in an advice-giving position, and is hence with a different color. The Finnish Defence Forces was providing executive assistance, and while its role is not significantly different in this thesis, it is noted in this Figure. All the other agencies were providing interagency cooperation, and are thus noted in a coherent way. The arrows indicate which agencies worked directly with one another on the scene, and is indicated with a constant line, as with for example Customs (C) and the local Police (P). The dotted line indicates that the agencies were in contact with each other, like the Finnish Transport Safety Agency and the Finnish Customs. The purpose of this picture is to clarify the two situation management structures in the incident.

4.2 Interagency Cooperation with the Thor Liberty case

As the objective of this research is to understand the different perceptions on interagency cooperation as it worked with the Thor Liberty case, the phenomenographic analysis was conducted with keeping the objective clear in mind. The first round of categorizing was used to highlight the interview statements that were directly or loosely related to interagency cooperation. The statements were then moved to a separate document in order to concentrate on the way the statements are said and explained, while still keeping the source (interviewee) code attached to the statement (E.g. the Fire and Rescue Department's answers were marked with PH, Pelastustoimen haastateltava). These statements could be categorized into three themes that arose from the data, but are also tied to the questionnaire. Due to the thematic interview the categories were emphasized in the data: Cooperation, Situation Coordination and Communication. After this categorization, the statements in one category were divided according to the authority so that the perception of each agency could be established. After this initial categorization the analysis began.

While reading and analyzing the three categories, subcategories began to emerge. The categories and the sub-categories that emerged from the data are illustrated in Figure 7.




Figure 7: Categorization of the data

The sub-categories that emerged from the text related to cooperation are experience, personal relations and exercises. For situation coordination the subcategories are overall situation command and management board, whereas for communication the discovered subcategories are internal, external and organizational (communication). While some parts of the interviews

could be placed in more than one category, the overall context of the statement indicated where it eventually was categorized. The next step was to describe the different perceptions on how the participating entities perceived the subcategory issues.

4.2.1 Theme 1: Cooperation

Cooperation was a predictable category in this study. However, my focus was to understand how cooperation is done and how it is perceived. The subcategories that arose from the data were experience, personal relations and exercises. In this chapter, all sub-categories for Theme 1: Cooperation will be analyzed. The sub-categories are visualized in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Sub-categories for Cooperation

Experience

Experience emerged from the data and was referred to in two ways. On the one hand it was discussed as operational experience, meaning that the operational environment and the situation was familiar. On the other hand it was also referred to as routine or everyday work. In this case, the routine in working with other authorities and experience with cooperation was evident. While routine could be seen as a risk factor, in this case it appeared to further cooperation.

Yes, we cooperate a lot locally. Nonetheless, these situations are not very common.

The Fire and Rescue Department representative

This is a very typical interagency cooperation situation. It was handled with routine.

The local Police representative

In a short period of time there were many organizations present with a positive attitude. The case was taken seriously and the dangers were understood.

Trafi representative

Everything went smoothly with us [between the Customs and the NBI]. The administrative level, on the other hand, had some controversy in responsibilities.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation

Locality is a key element in experience. The familiar surroundings including the harbor as a critical operational environment require experience to understand who the relevant stakeholders are, and where and why they are needed. The interviews suggest that the experience on how to work with other authorities, and what authorities should be present in the situation, is extensive in the Kotka region, as is evident from the Fire and Rescue Department representative's quotation above. For example, the cordoning of the area requires the overall situation command (F&R D) to ask the Police to cordon from the land side, and the Border Guard to cordon from the sea side. Thereby the safety of the curious people (general public) and the media could be ensured, as was brought forward by the local Police's Chief Inspector. Locality is also relevant to exercises which are discussed in section 4.3.3.

However, the Fire and Rescue Department representative also states that the situation itself and its magnitude were uncommon which contradicts with the local Police representative's perception, as indicated by the second quotation. For the Police, the situation itself as well as the cooperation were routine, which comes from experience. The differences in the perception are interesting, and could suggest the Police has more experience in big cases and multiagency cooperation situations than the Fire and Rescue Department.

The quotation by the National Bureau of Investigation representative indicates that cooperation between two agencies may have different approaches depending on the hierarchical level. Experience in cooperation can simplify the cooperation locally, even though the agencies internal administrative levels might have different opinions and perceptions. Both the Finnish Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation stated that the local cooperation succeeded well. It succeeded because the person-in-charge from both agencies agreed on the cooperation measurements and responsibilities. The agencies' administrative levels had evidently agreed that the NBI will take over the situation command on the criminal case, but the Customs had already begun with their own preliminary investigations. In order to proceed with the preliminary investigation an agreement was made of the situation coordination that the responsibilities were shared in accordance with the special knowledge of the issues.

Experience was also discussed and used as synonyms for routine and everyday work in the interviews. Especially the local Police, the Chief Inspector and the NBI representatives emphasized that interagency cooperation is routine, and only the scale with the Thor Liberty incident was an anomaly. An interesting contradictory statement relating to routine emerged as well. As is suggested by the first quote in this section by the F&R D, these situations are rare. Regardless of the risk for routine which may lead to complacency, the discussion and the attitude towards the case showed that the case was taken seriously, as the Trafi representative's quote indicates.

The differences in perception are expected, as the experiences in cooperating with one another differ between the agencies and the persons-in-charge. While drawing the line between experience and routine may seem artificial, the purpose was to indicate that people perceive experience differently. Being familiar with the environment and how cooperation works enables the participants to focus on the situation rather than concentrating on what should be taken into account and with whom.

Personal Relations

Personal relations means knowing the other actors from either previous cooperation or personally. The previously mentioned locality explains why the authorities are familiar with the other authorities. However, if cooperation is dependent on the selected people, it creates a risk. Personal relations emerged strongly from the data, as is evident in this subchapter.

Personal relationships are extremely important. It is a part of trust. When you can trust that people will do their jobs... ...If my experience and expertise is not enough, why wouldn't I trust the expert? We have to trust.

Chief Inspector [1]

Personal relations affect a lot. It's human. You work better with people you know, whether in cooperation or when providing executive assistance.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives

You know your counterparts [from other organizations] and building trust is easy. It takes time to get to know people, but then you don't have to think if the work will be done, and you will trust them. Also, if someone is, so to say, escorting another person [into the situation] they are vouching that this guy knows what he's doing, you don't have to question it.

Chief Inspector [2]

I would assume familiarity with one another makes information exchange easier than if you are involved with the situation only through official duty. You'll know what can be told and to whom.

The local Police's representative [1]

Cooperation here [in Kotka] works very well. We cooperate a lot. However, it is very dependent on personal relations. If the people change the cooperation might not work as well anymore.

Port of HaminaKotka representative

We have discussed also this case in coffee table discussions with Trafi and the head of the rescue operations.

The local Police representative [2]

All the interviewed authorities agreed that personal relationships and chemistry are an important factor when studying why and how interagency cooperation works. It affects trust, and as with experience, when you know the people you work with you can concentrate on your own tasks. In addition, personal relations are taken for granted. As stated by the interviewees from the Finnish Border Guard, any theory regarding leadership or management agrees with it, and makes cooperation easier.

When asked if cooperation would have been as easy or clear if the participants had not been familiar from previous occasions, the NBI representative stated the situation may have been different. This suggests that while trust is eminent amongst the different agencies, it is emphasized if there is previous and existing personal relations. However, it appears that while trust emerges from being familiar with the other participants, it can also be passed on to other people by introducing them along with the regular point of contact. However, the representative from the Port of HaminaKotka suggests that cooperation might not work if people change, meaning that cooperation is person-dependent. The data did not reveal if there is a contingency plan when bringing in new people, but it was indicated by the Chief Inspector [2].

The local Police representative's quotation [1] suggests that trust and tacit information are both gained through working together. The knowledge of how things are done and with who, are transferred from the more experienced people to the less experienced ones, enabling smooth transition between people. This is important especially in information exchange,

which was indicated in the quotation. However, while knowing people was seen as being passed on with the general introductions on the scene, it was also seen as a threat. While familiarity and shared experiences are good, they might create inner circles. When asked whether the case had been reviewed with other participants, the common answer was that mainly only within the agencies. As stated by the F&R D, Trafi and the local Police, they have worked together for a long time. Naturally, cooperation works well but it was also stated that cooperating too much creates groups, as with the local Police representative suggested. Only the local Police, the Fire and Rescue Department and Trafi representatives, who knew each other well already before the case, had had a casual review on the case. They had processed the case sitting in a coffee table, while the other participants had not had a similar debriefing or Lessons Learned -discussion.

While trust appears to be the corner stone in cooperation and is part of personal relations, the data suggests that trust is not affected by chemistry. Cooperation works and trust maintains with personal relationships, even if chemistry does not exist. Personal relations and familiarity with the people you work with are important in cooperation. It works better in all cooperation, be it between two or more organizations, or just within an organization. While trust can be built by proving the professionalism and expertise in a shared situation, it can also be passed on. This requires planning from within the organizations as people are reassigned and the successor comes along. When comparing the significance of personal relations with other themes that emerged from the data, this raised the most unanimous perception within the interviewees. Also, a debriefing on the case was done unofficially and only amongst three participating entities. This might explain why the perceptions between the different authorities were so different, as the interviews were conducted 4-5 years after the case.

Exercises

As stated before, experience and shared exercises are both typical in local cooperation. Exercises were another emerging sub-category from the data. Exercises are regular in Kotka because of the harbor, where the cargo also includes dangerous goods and substances.

We cooperate a lot locally. The different entities in this region have good preparedness plans, including the harbor. A big exercise is arranged approximately once every year.

The Fire and Rescue Department representative

Interagency cooperation is big. However, even in the exercises it is not always clear who is in charge.

Port of HaminaKotka representative

It was lucky that the person happened to be on duty then, although he would have been assigned to this case anyway.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives [1]

If Customs is involved with the exercises at the harbor, not including them from the beginning to the case is against the general practice.

The Chief Inspector

There could be some exercises. Maybe even desk-top or map exercises. However, I think the operation went well without them as well.

Trafi representative

Lessons Learned from this case have been applied, and the situation management system has been improved.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives [2]

Regardless of the regular exercises, the same issues emerged in the real situation as in the exercises. It seems that the responsibility of the overall situation command appeared to be unclear to many participants who either observed the situation or joined in when the criminal case emerged, as indicated by the representative from the Port of HaminaKotka. However, despite the previously referred quotation, the exercises are also valued and seen as a positive effect on how interagency cooperation works in the case. The Finnish Border Guard stated that the Fire and Rescue Department representative had been involved in the local exercises many times in planning and executing them. The differences in perception suggest that the Finnish Border Guard is in an assisting role in the exercises as with the Thor Liberty case, which clarifies the situation. However, as it was unclear for some other participants it can indicate the debriefing or Lessons Learned were not conducted after the exercise, or that the Lessons Learned were not implemented. This issue could be discussed amongst the different agencies

Even though the F&R D representative has been organizing and attending the many exercises, it was unclear why the Customs were not included in the case from the very beginning. There is a clear division in perceptions here. While the Customs is included in all exercises at the harbor, their presence in a case taking place in the harbor was not evaluated necessary as they have no role in a rescue operation. Albeit this comes from the legislation, Customs is the only authority stationed regularly in the Mussalo harbor. Also, as cargo and goods inspection falls under Customs jurisdiction and the cargo was what was causing the danger, so the debate emerging from the interviews is interesting.

The again, when asked about taking part in the exercises, it was evident they are conducted on the operational level. The Customs Economic Crime Investigation Unit had not been involved with the exercises, but the operational level had. Also, the National Bureau of Investigation disclosed they have not been involved into similar exercises. Also Trafi pointed out, some sort

of exercises, even the so called map- or table top exercises would be welcome. This indicated that exercises could be elaborated to cover more agencies and hierarchical levels as well.

Even without exercises lessons can be learned. The Finnish Border Guard expressed they had implemented a new situation management system, but it had not been tested in a real situation. By reviewing the situation their own system has been improved.

All in all, exercises are a good way to get to know the other authorities' representatives, and to build trust. Gaining experience from working together and from shared situations in exercises can further cooperation. Interestingly the same issues emerged in this case as with the exercises in terms of leadership and coordination. Also, the different levels and functions from the participating entities might not have had the same experience, which is logical. Local exercises focus on improving the local operational functions and cooperation and the Economic Crime Investigation Unit and other more administrative entities and levels are not included. Whether arranging such exercises is possible should be assessed by the experts and cooperative bodies.

4.2.2 Theme 2: Situation Coordination

Situation coordination is at the center of the theoretical model I introduced in chapter 2.6. The data revealed it can be viewed from two levels: overall situation command and the management board. The overall situation command is the responsible authority, which is dependent on the situation and the related legislation. The sub-categories are also illustrated in figure 9 below.




Figure 9: Sub-categories for Situation Coordination

Overall Situation Command

The emerging themes from the data reveal a significant difference in perceptions related to which operation the interviewees took part in. The rescue operation was initially agreed in the management board by all participants, meaning that the overall situation command was assumed by the Fire and Rescue Department. As stated in chapter 4.1, another situation management structure emerged as the criminal case began. These two organizations appeared not to be very clear to all participants, and the data suggests a silo effect was also evident.

We assumed the overall situation command. We laid down the legislation and the sections, and nobody challenged it.

The Fire and Rescue Department representative [1]

The head of the shared preliminary investigations group and the head of the Customs preliminary investigations coordinated with one another with the operations conducted at the harbor and the vessel. Also, we both coordinated with the overall situation command of the security issues, i.e. the Fire and Rescue Department's representative.

Finnish Customs representatives [1]

§36¹⁹¹ was not given up, so we could get things done more easily... ...With a rescue operation the Fire and Rescue Department's jurisdiction is more extensive than in a normal situation.

Fire and Rescue Department representative [2]

The overall situation command was clearly with the Fire and Rescue Department until a certain point, when they stepped aside.

The local Police representative

In a multiagency cooperation situation, the coordination of situation command of all participating authorities is highlighted.

Finnish Customs representatives [2]

There was a slight confusion in who had the overall situation commander. As long as there was the dangerous situation [due to the explosives] of course it was with the Fire and Rescue Department. To get the acute danger under control.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [1]

¹⁹¹ Pelastuslaki § 36 1: In order to extinguish fires and prevent them from spreading and to prevent other accidents... ... have the right, when the situation cannot otherwise be controlled, to: 4) take any other action as required by rescue operations.

[The head of the NBI investigations unit told me] to assume overall situation command of the criminal case. If the other party doesn't know about it how should I take it? Should I go there and stamp my feet to get it? It would not get us anywhere... ..everything worked well with the local agreement on cooperation.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [2]

There was no silo effect. There might be situations where the situation command is not clear... ..is it clear who has what jurisdiction? It is very important.

The Fire and Rescue Department representative [3]

As long as people keep to their own jurisdiction, everything goes well regardless of the number of entities present. However, the minute you cross the line, there is going to be trouble. Now, the participants in the rescue operations had also talked to the media about the criminal case, which in the worst case scenario can harm the investigation. It is important to mind your own business.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [3]

Initially the case was clearly managed by the Fire and Rescue Department. This was also stated by all other authorities. However, as the Patriot missiles were discovered the overall situation command was challenged. The National Bureau of Investigation was commanded to assume the overall situation command of the criminal case, where the two main cooperating authorities were Customs and the NBI. As is visible in the quotations, the situation command maintained with the F&R D.

The different perceptions and the confusion in the overall situation command is referred to the jurisdiction. As indicated, the Fire and Rescue Department representative perceived the whole case as the emergency situation, whereas the NBI and the Customs representatives viewed it as the criminal case. While the division of the two separate command structures appeared to work, it might indicate a silo effect and a slight power play.

This might be confusion on my side, or it might be a difference in opinion. Despite which one it is, this issue was also discussed by Kivelä in his dissertation. As already stated in chapter 4.2.1, an analysis of the situation afterwards, or collecting Lessons Learned, might help in similar situations and confusion. The other interpretation of this situation could be that the different perceptions were created by the silo effect.

The criminal investigation was managed in cooperation with the Customs and the NBI. However, it also had some issues, mainly on the administrative level. The perceptions that emerged from the data were very similar, but the National Bureau of Investigations representative addressed frustration towards the agencies administrative level of the head of the NBI Investigations unit and the National Board for Customs, as was also discussed in section 4.2.1.

With the situation command the silo effect emerged in a different way as well. What makes this interesting is that the majority of the interviewees stated there was no silo effect present, however some did call for it. The Fire and Rescue Department representative's [3] and the National Bureau of Investigation representative's [3] difference in perception is significant and interesting. Since the silo effect in general is seen as bad it mostly is not desired. However, it appears that the silo effect could also prove to be useful or necessary, as the criminal cases usually have critical phases where especially communicating to the media is restricted to the minimal.

All authorities agreed there were not too many authorities present, but it was acknowledged that the more there are different entities, the more coordination it requires. Especially coordinating the media proved to be difficult. The participating entities had agreed that they would answer to the media on issues concerning themselves, which worked well for the most part. However, the National Bureau of Investigation stated that by commenting to the media about the criminal case the preliminary investigation was nearly compromised.

Despite the many issues that emerged from the data, the interagency cooperation worked. These issues arise in the exercises and the real situations, but do not hinder the cooperation. Hence, the points of improvement could be seen as refining cooperation. And, as stated by the Finnish Border Guard representative, the only thing that can be improved on a national level is to clarify the legislation, which directly affects and mandated the jurisdictions of the agencies. This was also argued by Juhani Kivelä.

Management Board

The management board formed to assist the overall situation command was another aspect of the situation coordination. The management board included a representative of each participating entity. The management board worked as a board of experts, where all issues could be discussed and a decision could be made jointly. All of the authorities had the same perception about this.

Situation coordination happens when many people-in-charge get together to coordinate. The authorities may have overlapping jurisdiction, but different objectives. They just need to be coordinated.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives

The good thing with a management board is that you have the different authorities around one table. All decisions will base on all the expertise.

The local Police representative

That is why the persons-in-charge sat in the press conference. Because they all had their own sectors.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives

As the management board was discussed more, its benefits were explained. It was emphasized that the group worked like colleagues or peers rather than a hierarchical organization. Even with the overall situation command all decisions were made together.

The management board's expertise was also perceived as very good in a press conference. There all questions could be answered by the entity under whose jurisdiction any one issue fell. Even when the media's need for information was criticized, all entities seemed satisfied

that all the responsible persons-in-charge attended and assembled around the table. This was indicated by the Finnish Border Guard representatives, and is seen in their quotation before.

Even though the management board was not discussed extensively during the interviews, it is significant that all participants were very satisfied with the temporary body. The board acted as an organization of specialists, or an ad-hoc organization, where everyone was perceived as an equal. It also brought together the authorities that would not necessarily otherwise cooperate closely, like for example the Customs and Trafi with the Thor Liberty case. The Customs wanted to detain the captain and the first officer and take them into custody onshore. Trafi advised that it was not possible due to the weather conditions and because the two people in question were the responsible personnel for safety onboard. Thus, the interrogations were conducted onboard the vessel instead. Without the management board the information flow to Trafi might have taken longer, and was another reason why it was perceived as good and functional.

4.2.3 Theme 3: Communication

Communication is a key part of leadership. Some even say leadership is communication. Therefore it was initially included into the questionnaire. Interestingly it emerged strongly from the data with three different aspects: internal communications meaning the communication within the situation amongst the authorities, external communications with the media, and organizational communication within the participating entities and their steering ministries and hierarchical levels in their administration. The sub-categories are visualized in Figure 10 below.




Figure 10: Sub-categories for Communication

Internal

Here, internal communication refers to information exchange between the participating authorities including both cases. Information exchange is considered critical when working together, and especially when some participants join the operation later than others. Then, collecting the real time picture of the situation defines what has been done and what needs to be done. However, there appeared to be some issues hindering the information exchange, and also some room for improvement.

We found it problematic that the Customs, as the supervisory authority on cargo, could not get the information on what had been done with the cargo and the vessel prior to calling us when we first came to the situation.

The Finnish Customs representatives

Information exchange works well when you are sitting in a table agreeing on issues. But as the electronic means like the TETRA-network with restricted call groups... ...it might be that people do not know [about the limitations] or that they don't remember.

Port of HaminaKotka representative

At some point it would have been good if we [the rescue operation and the criminal case] would have sat down and agreed on certain principles on what and how to communicate with the media. As we did with the Customs in the preliminary investigation case.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation

I'd say the most challenging issue in these cases is information exchange. The media may be providing information that has not been delivered within the organization.

The Chief Inspector

With these cases where the time span is long, there are fewer approaches as to how information should be exchanged. It was evident in the management board – we wanted to have a person-in-charge there.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives

As the representatives from the Finnish Customs indicated, it was hard to receive all information on the case when they first entered the situation. It was also brought forward by the National Bureau of Investigation. Also, the two lines of operation had some difficulties in communications. As the Port of HaminaKotka representative's quotation above suggests face-to-face meetings were good at updating and sharing information. A possible explanation on why information exchange was challenging could be that the persons-in-charge on the criminal case were at times spread around the South of Finland, which may have hindered to coordination of information exchange. Eventually the information was received and the situation picture was established.

Internal information exchange means leadership, and vice versa. While this issue was not discussed too much, some entities had a wishful perception that it should be improved. The Chief Inspector perceived internal communications as a worrying challenge, as is indicated by his quotation. Media was an additional stake holder that had to be taken into account, and information flow should to be ensured within the case participants.

While the quotation suggests that information was not shared within the situation organization, it can also mean that the ad-hoc organization did not get all necessary information. No solutions for improving internal communications emerged from the data. Interestingly the management board was not actively referred to as means of information exchange *per se*, but in chapter 4.2.2 it was seen as a way for internal communications. The references towards the Management Board were discussed previously.

Information exchange by any means necessary is important. As there are two parallel situations it also meant that the exchange should have been verified and emphasized. In this case it proved to be difficult partly because of the technical equipment, but also partly because of the different situation commands. The slow pace may have had an effect on the case, and could be focused on in some of the exercises already mentioned previously.

External

External communication emerged in the interviews abundantly. It was perceived as an external stress factor, which created additional pressure when dealing with the case. Also, the media attention appeared to take a great deal of time from the participants.

Interagency cooperation worked well. What could be improved was the general mayhem, the journalists' need for information and the additional work from the media coverage. And other additional pressure

The Chief Inspector

The majority of work in the beginning was communications. There was no time for anything else.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [1]

All the [media] attention focused on the Patriots whereas the explosives were what made the situation dangerous.

Representative from the Port of HaminaKotka

The mayhem in this case was purely media-related. You get cautious.

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation [2]

The limited resources of the participating agencies emerged from the data in relation to the media. They provided all the substance knowledge to the journalists. However, the press was logistically managed by the harbor. Thus, as they were toured in the harbor it was done in conjunction firstly due to the limitation in movement at the harbor, but also to keep them safe. Still, while the media was managed physically by the representative from the Port of HaminaKotka, the phone kept ringing, as indicated by the representative from the National Bureau of Investigation. As to the continuity of the media attention, it lasted the whole incident until January 2012.

The general perception of all the authorities that participated to the rescue operation perceived the initial situation, albeit dangerous due to the explosives, still manageable and calm. As the Patriot missiles were discovered the media became even more interested in the situation. As stated by the representative from the harbor, all media attention focused on the Patriots even though the explosives were causing the threat for a large scale accident. As the media became more interested, the authorities gained more pressure, as is indicated in the quotation of the representative from the National Bureau of Investigation.

While the media and the general public has the right to know and all government activities are to be open and public¹⁹², the authorities need to make sure the operations are not compromised. To make sure that only the public information was released to the press, the responsibility for communicating the organizations' responsibilities was agreed to the organizations themselves. I.e. the Finnish Border Guard was to comment on their own tasks etc. However, emerging from the data was that initially the responsibility was with Trafi, and then it was transferred to the Fire and Rescue Department. As stated by the NBI representative and quoted in the previous sub-category, there could have been more discussion between the two operations. The need for this appeared to increase as the distance between the participants increased, as the Customs and the NBI were discussing with the Office of the Prosecutor General in Helsinki, meaning that the spatial distance increased significantly.

Organizational

The organizational communication means providing information within an organization. As the steering ministries also need to be informed about the on-going security situation especial-

ly when it is interesting to the media as well, the operational level needs to ensure the right information reaches the relevant entities. This was very visible also in the Thor Liberty case. Yet, the interest seemed to be extensive also from the administrative and ministry side.

The president did not call but it was not short from that.

The Chief Inspector

It wouldn't be too hard to use project files on a SharePoint or some other platform. Something like a diary. But then who would manage and update it...

Representative from the National Bureau of Investigation

In less than one hour the Commander of the Gulf of Finland Coast Guard was informed as well as out general headquarters, which is significant because then the information goes also to the ministry. However, the information was probably at the Ministry of Interior already delivered by the Fire and Rescue Department.

The Finnish Border Guard representatives

The general perception amongst all interviewees was that keeping their steering ministries updated on the situation was important. However, as stated by the different Police representatives the hierarchical levels were very interested in the case. Amongst all the media trying to reach them on the phone also the high command called for information. This indicates that information exchange or information sharing within the organizations was dependent on one person, but also towards the media.

As suggested by the representative from the National Bureau of Investigations, a technical solution could help with internal communications both within the organization but also within

¹⁹² Laki viranomaistoiminnan julkisuudesta 621/1999.

the case amongst all participating agencies. However, implementing a shared platform or system for cooperation or situation picture without agreeing on the responsibilities beforehand was seen as a risk, as was stated by the representative from the National Bureau of Investigation.

With the Ministry of the Interior being the steering ministry for the Fire and Rescue Department, the Police and the Finnish Border Guard, information flow to that ministry was good. It indicated how exceptional situation the Thor Liberty case was. This was indicated by the Finnish Border Guard representatives.

All in all, the internal information flow within an organization was perceived challenging by the participants in the criminal case. Initially it was difficult to form the situation picture for the crime case as the Finnish Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation joined the operation later on. But then providing information within the organizations to the National Police Board, the head NBI crime unit or the General Headquarters with everything that was happening on the scene required coordination. As the Fire and Rescue Department and Trafi indicated nothing similar, it made me ponder whether it was because the attending people were the ones to whom the reports usually are delivered. Indeed, whatever the reason is, organizational communication required coordination.

4.2.4 Outcome Spaces of the sub-categories

The Outcome space of the sub-categories are said to be the essence of a phenomenographic analysis. They are formed from the sub-categories, and can be seen the underlying common nominator of all sub-categories. My interpretation of the outcome spaces, or the common nominators from the sub-categories, are *Familiarity*, *Working as peers* and *Discourse*. The whole categorization process is illustrated in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Phenomenographical categorization

Familiarity withholds experience, personal relations and exercises. By attending shared exercises also trust can be shared onwards, similarly as tacit information is gained or brought forth. Experience in working together can be practiced in shared exercises. Hence, all three aspects form an outcome space where cooperation can be enforced, and experiences shared with one another. Familiarity in personal relations, whoever, should not be limited to the most familiar people, when it comes to reviewing the case. As was stated, the review was done in casual conversations or locally, rather than in with all the participating entities by collecting Lessons Learned.

The outcome space *Working as peers* covers the overall situation coordination and the management board. As emerged very clearly from the data, leading interagency cooperation is coordination. The overall situation command can be a discussed or challenged position and

may be changed during the whole duration of a case, depending on what the situation is. However, the ad-hoc team or the management board will remain. This means that regardless of the steering legislation, the participating entities will still be working together as peers, providing input from their own area of expertise, i.e. their jurisdiction. Hence, Working as peers outcome space describes the operation on the scene.

Discourse is the third outcome space in this thesis. Communications is all about discourse regardless between whom it is done, or by using what means. Communications is enormously important in everyday life but especially in shared situations like the Thor Liberty. It could be safe to say that some issues emerging from the data, and the perceptions of how interagency cooperation worked, may have been different with proper discourse.

5 HOW DID IT WORK AND WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM IT?

Familiarity means knowing and having personal relationships with other people as well as shared experiences, either from exercises or from real operations. Indeed, as was emerged from the data, it could be argued that familiarity means trust. Cooperation is easier if the participating entities trust one another, so it simplifies and facilitates working together and the mandatory information exchange.

On a wider context familiarity and trust can interestingly be passed on to the successor or other colleagues. That is, if an organization has enabled a smooth transition phase, and the substitute or successor can join in and learn tacit information alongside with the experienced personnel. Likewise, it can be perceived as an inner circle, and the easiest way in is to join someone who is already in the circle and perceived as trustworthy.

Trust was also pointed as one of the fundamental characteristics of cooperation. It logically falls under leadership in the fourfold typology, as trust is usually personal. Even though a general trust between authorities exist, it is usually personified with someone, which creates a risk. If cooperation is dependent on one person, what happens to it when the personnel is re-signed?

Similarly, over-familiarity creates a risk. If there are people who know one another very well, and other people who are not as friendly, communication might be affected. This might be intentional or unintentional, with the latter option being the most probable. Some issues are discussed within the peers and closest colleagues while it should also be communicated to the less-familiar people. This is but a natural habit, as lunch, coffee or other social happenings are many times spent with friends. The spatial distance might also come into question whilst pondering the difficulties and reasons behind the problems with information exchange.

Cooperation was very evident as a local phenomenon. Many of the participating entities had worked together before the Thor Liberty case, and regular exercises are held in the Mussalo harbor. This enabled the assembly of the different authorities efficiently as the threshold of calling to the contact points was low. In contrast, if a similar case was happening in a larger city like Helsinki, the results of a similar study would likely differ. The differences would most probably be with familiarity and shared exercises, as the more there is people in the local agencies the more likely it is that their paths have never crossed before. However, some of the entities such as the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Border Guard and the Customs Economic Crime Investigation Unit are national, but they were also familiar to the local

authorities. Hence, my research complies with Valtonen's Fundamentals of the Operating Environment, more specifically the *synergy from limited resources* section, as familiarity goes beyond locality.

Therefore, despite the general perception in the data that familiarity is seen as a positive phenomenon, the risks need to be managed to ensure continuity of well-functioning cooperation. While familiarity and the associated trust could be seen as a significant factor in cooperation, the mutual trust amongst the different agencies should overcome the possible situations, where personal relations are still being developed.

The second outcome space *Working as Peers* is basically leadership and interagency cooperation. Interagency cooperation requires a situation commander as any operation. However, a hierarchical structure creates disputes amongst the participants. Still, the management board was perceived as a neutral and well-functioning body that was described with the words *colleague-like* and *peer*.

Indeed, for a near hierarchical commanding structure to work, the resources and jurisdiction should be almost identical. If the jurisdiction and tasks differ significantly, it is unlikely that the other authority's jurisdiction is sufficiently familiar as to know what can be done and what not, as was set as a requirement by Takamaa. In these situations it is important to have the support and expertise in the management group, whose objective is, after all, to support the overall situation commander. This belongs to the fundamentals of the operating environment: issues that the coordinator needs to acknowledge, but cannot affect directly.

Inviting people to work as peers rather than subordinates might also be easier to comprehend and accept. It is very similar to project work, where the project manager is responsible of the overall situation, but the operational work is done by the people who have know-how. However, the key would be to communicate and agree on the terms and tasks so that no assumptions are left to hinder the situation or operational work. This could also be discussed with Leena Paukkunen's dissertation's results, which suggest that working together (as peers) with people from different organizations (backgrounds) will develop cooperation.

As to the fourfold typology of leadership, overall situation command falls under management, where tasks are identified and allocated to others. However, it cannot be completely separated from the organizational structure and culture, i.e. the operational environment. Coordinating any situation is highly dependent on the environmental factors: who is involved due to the special characteristics of the location, what legislation applies to the case, to name a few.

The third outcome space *Discourse* is, in my opinion, the key to functioning cooperation. Some might argue the key to cooperation is trust, but I perceive trust as the foundation for cooperation, on which everything else is built upon. Discourse, however, covers all sorts of communication: communicating within the case; communications with the media; and communications within the respective organization. If information is not shared first and foremost within the operation, it could create difficult situations with regards the media, and also within the organizations.

As the data revealed, the easiest and the most clear way to exchange information is through face-to-face meetings. Still, as the operations (the rescue operation and the criminal case) are different by nature, shared meetings are not always an option. While it is unlikely that anyone would deliberately not share some information, it is a risk as long as the operational systems and agreements are not established. One option could be to create a shared platform, as suggested by the NBI representative. Nevertheless, the management board is again to be considered as a viable option for interagency cooperation.

Situation picture is the culmination point of communication. While it is a useful tool for coordinating the situation on-scene, it is also needed and used at the governmental level. Especially in situations such as the Thor Liberty case information flow down to the administration is important. To elaborate, cases where the international dimension is strong due to e.g. the unauthorized missiles and the violation of international maritime legislation, media will be interested. In addition to that, the authorities represented or were steered by four ministries¹⁹³, and hence the situation requires clear information exchange and coordination. The situation picture needs to be timely, comprehensive and verified, which requires discourse between the participating entities. This has already been developed further by implementing the Prime Minister's office's situation center. Indeed, while the structure already exists its role in such cases could still be not only practiced but regularized by legislation, as was suggested in reference to situation command. While the Situation center would not be in charge of the situation, the role could be to ensure information is shared to the ministries.

As with the outcome space for *Working as peers*, also *Discourse* is related to management and the fundamentals of the operating environment. However, leadership should also be considered. As with familiarity, discourse should be easier with mutual trust and respect.

¹⁹³ The Customs is steered by the Ministry of Finance; the different Police, the Fire and Rescue Department as well as the Finnish Border Guard are steered by the Ministry of Interior; the Finnish Defence Forces is steered by the Ministry of Defence; and Trafi is steered by the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

The results suggest a significant resemblance to Valtonen's driving forces. Trust is evident. Indeed, in my opinion this thesis' outcome spaces and Valtonen's other Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation are in harmonization with one another. While trust was evident also with my thesis, it merely emphasizes how important mutual trust is. It also can facilitate cooperation and coordination. As stated before I think trust forms the foundation on well-functioning interagency cooperation.

Team work competence reflects to the management board, where receiving information and providing expertise and input on the relevant jurisdiction enables efficient cooperation. Furthermore, willingness to cooperate and commitment emerged also from the data. While the research regarding multiagency cooperation is limited, I suggest my thesis supports Valtonen's research, and adds to its validity.

As to the Fundamentals of the Operating Environment, the same themes emerged from my data. While the analysis does not directly support all fundamentals, like *the successful cooperation in all operational levels* due to the disputes on the administrative level, the themes were still found from the Thor Liberty case. The most significant of these driving forces in relation to the phenomenographical analysis were *The Finnish Interagency Cooperation works* and *Safety and Security overpowering disputes*. Despite the differences in opinion the cooperation worked, and all participating entities trusted it would. The details that emerged from the analysis can be seen as refining the routine to make cooperation even more easy and better.

As to the weak signals, I was surprised that they are identifiable from the analysis. Power play creates risks in the success of cooperation. It is closely related to the overall situation command, and could be avoided by emphasising on the management board. To get a clear picture on what happened, and in order to identify the risks, all the participating entities could (have) hold a Lessons Learned- or a debriefing session. The overall perception I got from listening to the interviews repeatedly, transcribing them and then analysing the data is that people tend to assume and expect things, resulting into a possible misscommunication situation as they are not said out loud.

The weak signal *personification* was an identified risk. While it supports trust and facilitates coordination, also the continuation of the tradition could be taken into account. Eventhough trust can be tranferred in a similar way as tacit information, the contingency planning requires time where the successor is learning routine from the expert. That is to ensure the traditions and customs are not lost as someone is reassigned.

Paukkunen's research on how individuals learn by working and discussing in groups, where the people are from different backgrounds, is interesting. In my opinion, the model could be applied to interagency cooperation. While the agencies design and complete regular shared exercises where they can learn how the other agencies work, the briefs on how the exercise went are usually about the operational work. As stated by many interviewees, additional exercises with unconventional levels or branches of the organizations attending could be organized. In such case it could provide fruitful to discuss also the perceptions on interagency cooperation as was done in Paukkunen's research. The end result could firstly increase familiarity of the attendees, and secondly also help them understand the different agendas of the agencies, and also to see how and why the shared case is handled differently.

All in all the results received with phenomenography are somewhat similar that what Valtonen suggested in his comprehensive research. Thus, it is safe to assume that the fundamentals for interagency cooperation have been identified, and apply very well to this specific case study.

As to the research question *How did interagency cooperation work with the Thor Liberty case?* and *why?*, the collective opinion of the interviewees is it worked well. It worked well because it is necessary due to the jurisdiction restriction, the small country with limited resources, the will to do so and the multilateral trust. While there appeared to be some aspects to improve, it is merely a good thing. As the operational environment changes, the cooperation and coordination measures also need to follow the change.

In terms of the situation coordination figure presented in chapter 2.6, situation coordination is not an easy task. It was evident with the interviews and was also suggested by Juhani Kivelä in his dissertation. The Finnish Border Guard suggested it would be regulated by law. Whether or not it would work I have no answers or competence to try and evaluate it. According to the interviews, however, an apparently successful alternative is to coordinate the situation with the management board. Also, should there be overlapping jurisdiction as was with the criminal case, a local agreement appeared to work well. All in all, this issue should be discussed on many levels, and practiced in exercises.

6 CONCLUSION

The Thor Liberty case displays the complexity of interagency cooperation. The timely topic of interagency cooperation can, and has been, studied from many different angles. Indeed, the research that is publicly available is just the tip of the ice berg as many studies and reports concerning the operational level are restricted. Therefore ensuring this thesis is public was a key concern from the beginning of the research process, and naturally contributed to the definitions and research approach of this thesis. The research problem how did interagency cooperation work with the Thor Liberty case? is wide, and could also be approached from many disciplines and thus the definitions were constructed with leadership and the case study research method.

Leadership was an obvious selection as the research approach due to the department to which this thesis is done. Also, by studying how interagency cooperation was lead and directing the questions on how the attendees perceived the situation was lead, the publicity of this thesis could be predicted. The chosen research method in addition to the data collection method were logical choices for this research. Thematic interviews are usually used as the primary data collection method with phenomenography. Naturally, collecting the subjective opinions of the representatives and analyzing them with a method that requires also the researcher's own experience affects the objectivity and repeatability of the research, and the generalization of the results. This is further discussed in chapter 6.1.

The main results indicated that Vesa Valtonen's results were applicable also to this case. Or, inversely, the results of this thesis support Valtonen's research. Either way, it could be considered significant as there are so few public research on interagency cooperation. However, while the results are similar they are not comparable due to the sampling and research methods. The critique is further discussed in the next chapter.

Phenomenography proved to be a fine choice to analyze the data. The categorization emerged themes and categories: The themes were cooperation, situation coordination and communication. These were also directed by the thematic interviews. The sub-categories for cooperation were experience, personal relations and exercises. They all contribute to cooperation. Situation coordination was divided into two sub-categories: overall situation, and management board. They can see as tools on how situation coordination can be done. And finally, communication was divided into internal, external and organizational (communication). The three outcome spaces of the sub-categories are familiarity for the sub-categories for cooperation; working as peer for the situation coordination sub-categories; and discourse for the communi-

cations sub-category. As the thesis was sent for the review round for the interviewed authorities, the results were also agreed with by them as an unofficial side product. This creates validity to the thesis, while still reaffirms the subjectivity. Still, it also indicates that I have managed to be true to the data.

As for the discussion, Valtonen's Fundamentals were complemented by the research results of this thesis. While the Weak Signals were not extensively discussed in the interviews, they emerged from the data. This might be explained with the differences in the research methods as well as the extensiveness and comprehensiveness of the research. Still, it was surprising that they emerged from the data.

Also Kivelä's research results were very visible in this analysis. The silo effect and the problems with coordination and leadership were still unclear. Hence, the outcome space Working as peers, meaning that rather than leadership the authorities could have a management board, and the possible misunderstanding on who is in charge could be avoided.

Familiarity as an outcome space describes the situational context. People know one another personally or professionally and they also have experience in working and cooperating together, but also they have attended joined exercises. While this result presents a great likeness with Valtonen's results and the Fundamental Characteristics of Cooperation, it also echoes towards the weak signals and a risk for too much familiarity. If the personal relations are not spread around it may hinder the cooperation as there are personnel changes. This is somewhat pitiful as the results indicate that trust can relatively easily be passed on to another person by simply involving them into the cooperative situations.

As to the Discourse outcome space, it is a very typical issue to improve, and it is a central part of leadership. While the issue is acknowledged there seemed not to be any direct improvements available, in addition to the technology. Discussion was also raised that if there were the technological solutions for keeping and sharing the situation picture, who would be responsible for updating it.

Paukkunen's approach on developing coordination by discussion with people from different backgrounds in exercises could work as a method for collecting and sharing Lessons Learned, or in a debriefing situation. While the objective of this thesis was not to present suggestion on improvements, my wish is to offer some thoughts and arise awareness on the issues to the agencies as to what could be used to improve cooperation.

All in all the situation coordination is the most significant issue to improve. While the management board or local agreements appeared to work, I believe they were very much dependent on the situation as well as familiarity. Management board enabled the different agencies to work as peers, and it also enabled good communication while it was assembled. As such, the three outcome spaces that emerged from the data keep appearing in accordance with the situation command, indicating the results form a coherent overview on what situation coordination is about, and how interagency cooperation works.

6.1 Critique

As with all research, also this thesis has to be evaluated critically. There are especially three aspects I want to concentrate on: the writer and the related ethics, the methodology, and the references. I will focus on the writer, the research and the report first, the review the used methodology, and conclude this section with the used references.

Indeed, as was discussed in this thesis, all people have background and previous experience and knowledge that affects how the issues are seen and understood. The previous experience is reflected upon how we perceive the phenomenon, and in this case how I understand interagency cooperation. I have previously worked at the Finnish Customs for 20 months, which may cause bias on the research results. The bias could occur in two ways: what I wanted to say and find from the data, and how I perceived the Customs' role. It was evident in the recorded interviews and the questions asked in addition to the ones in Appendix 1 that I was interested in the Customs, but my aim was to study the data as objectively as possible. Still, there is a possibility that it had an influence in the results as well. Also, as a former authority I feel the biasness might also extends to other authorities, especially in assessing the possible failures in action, as in general there is no need to questions other authorities' decisions. As a researcher this is a problem as all findings whether they are desirable or not should be reported, and still the researcher has to remain faithful for the research results.

In reference to the legal anchorage, it should be taken into account that I have not studied law. Therefore all legal references should be considered as my interpretations of the law. However, at all stages I have concentrated in interpreting it to the word, and also to reference it as it is. An additional aspect is provided by the fact that not all laws used in this thesis were available in English, but had to be translated. The translations were done by me, which reveals another subject that has to be noted in the next paragraph. While law should be understandable to the

general public, without proper training some interpretations may be too vague or too precise. In any case they have been reviewed carefully many times during the process, also by the supervisors and the interviewed authorities. Yet, the responsibility and interpretations are mine alone.

Without the proper education of a linguist, the translations of the law, as well as the interviews, might not provide the same meaning as to what was originally written. I also am not a native English speaker even though my professional language has been English for three (3) years. I also studied my high school in the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme (IB), which provided me a strong understanding in spoken and written English. Still, regardless of my best intentions and effort the terminology and meanings needs to be addressed as written by a person with English as her second language. An additional resource has been the University's linguist with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss and review parts of the thesis.

As stated earlier in Chapter 2 of this thesis, interagency cooperation as well as all research where authorities are studied will risk approaching confidentiality. As theses generally are public, I have taken the confidentiality into account by agreeing with all interviewees that the content is checked, so that no confidential information regarding their own organization is left to the thesis. In practice this is conducted by sending the thesis to a review round in March 2016 to all interviewees. After the feedback it is taken into account and the risky sections amended. Still, as the combination of information could have some restricted material, so the thesis review round extends and advice was sought from a representative of the Secretariat of the Security Committee. The Committee was selected as they are responsible for promoting and coordinating cross-administrative security preparedness. This heavy review process potentially affects the phenomenon and the analysis of the data, and thus has to be acknowledged.

As to evaluating the methodological choices critically, they are assessed in the next few paragraphs. The thematic interviews were a logical and very typical choice for data collection both in qualitative research in general, and when phenomenography is the method for analysis. However, as a research method it should be also observed critically. The interviewees may provide information that is bias or what they believe the interviewer wants to hear. Also, in some cases the situation may be intimidating. These factors all alter the data, which ultimately affects the study. The interview situations were all designed to be as normal as possible, which was especially important with the two unconventional interviews that were conducted

by phone and the teleconference application. With the special aspects of the interviews it creates a real possibility for amended results. While there is no way of being completely sure, the review round amongst all participating agencies did not reveal any anomalies, or questions as to what other agencies' representatives had stated. Still, this also could be assumed as the representatives were asked to check whether there was anything that should be classified, rather than focusing on the validity or truthiness of the data.

As to the interviewees and why I asked these people, it was because they were involved in the case in a similar position in comparison to one another. In this case they were the logical choice, and provided good information from an equal perspective. However, by choosing individual interviews instead of a group interview, I believe I received more in-depth information with this method. In a group interviews situation the more quiet people may have been left to the background whereas the more extrovert people would control the situation. The individual interviews ensured that all voices were heard, and enabled that even the more uncomfortable opinions and experiences as indicating the possible mistakes other people made could be said.

Indeed, the interview process could have been designed differently. The initial interview could have been designed to collect preliminary information on the perceptions and on the case. If a second round of interviews had been arranged, the data could have been analyzed and additional information gained. This way there could have been even deeper understanding on the interagency cooperation phenomenon. However, the second round was not conducted mainly because of the researcher's time limitations, which can be seen as a defect of this thesis.

The case study research method usually requires more than one types of data collection methods. In this thesis the only method for data collection was interviews. Observations, which in addition to the interviews, is a common method in case study research, was not an option due to the time passed from the case. Also, as a group interview was not arranged, the interviewees' personal relations could not be observed and analysed. Still, as the personal relations were not the primary focus of this thesis, I do not see the latter being a significant factor when the validity of this study is evaluated. However, the fact that only one data collection method was used does question whether the research strategy was implemented and conducted properly. Indeed, if the case study method had been the only guideline and framework for this thesis it would be a very valid question. However, as the case study provided the framework

for the phenomenographical analysis and the structure for the case presented in section 4.1, it should not affect significantly the validity of this thesis.

Phenomenography is affected by the researcher's own personal experience as much as the interviewees' experience. In practice this means that should the same data be collected by someone else, or only analyzed with the same methodology as what was done in this thesis, the results would likely differ from one another. While the results should show similarities, the nuances are dependent on the personal experience, and hence will result into differences. All in all, the same issues arise with all qualitative research methods, creating a unique aspect in each study, while still maintaining a perception worth acknowledging.

Phenomenography is also subject to criticism as it strives to understand the perceptions. They are subjective, and very much dependent on the context. Hence, the results are not generalizable, as there cannot be two exactly the same situations in which the data is collected and the experienced gained. However, when combined with a case study approach this issue can partly be dismissed. By comparing the perceptions in relation to the cases, the cases and their successes could be compared.

As to reviewing the references critically, a few aspects need to be taken into account. Firstly the interviews are reviewed with a special attention directed at the time between the interviews and when the case happened. Then, the case as a research method is discussed, after which the interviews, questionnaire and the additional data via email.

The core data for this thesis was collected with eight individual interviews. As a method, it proved to be successful for gaining the interviewees subjective opinions on interagency cooperation in the Thor Liberty case. However, since the interview situations varied from one another, a possibility of variations within the answers remain. Two of the interviews were conducted by not meeting the interviewee, but by using a telephone and the Microsoft Lync-application. The variation with the lack of face-to-face interaction could possibly result into the interviewee discussing the case with a bias. However, the discussion within all the interviews was free, and as my understanding as a researcher compiled on the case, the additional questions could be directed to the more comprehensive path. The aim was to be as objective and open as possible in all situations regardless of the interview method.

Another anomaly was the supplementary questionnaire sent to the Customs. The initial interview with the Customs representatives was unfinished because of tight timeschedules. The written questions provided the interviewees time to think how to answer the questions,

leaving out the spontaneity that a free discussion on a face-to-face interview enables. The answers were still processed the same way as everything else, and thus coincide with the data set. Yet, this anomaly might create unnecessary and unwanted objectivity to the answers, and might affect the end result. Also, it enabled the respondent to think how the issues are discussed and what opinions and how they are expressed. Hence, they had a unique opportunity to affect on the research results.

The answers were the subjective perceptions of the interviewees on the Thor Liberty case. Thus, the data cannot be used to generalize how interagency cooperation works somewhere else. A significant aspect in this is that the personal relationships or chemistry affects how the case is perceived, as was also evident in the research results. While the subjectivity complemented the research method perfectly it does not provide an objective understanding on the phenomenon.

The incident happened in 2011-2012. Since the study is conducted in 2015-2016, it should be stated that some nuances have been forgotten. It was also stated by many, if not all, of the interviewees. Some interviewees had taken their case notes with them, where as some pursued to remember the case from the relevant parts. This is a relevant factor as it may affect the perception of the interviewees as well as the accuracy of dates, incidents, processes, and so on. Also, as the rotation of tasks in some involved organisations is two to three years, and they might have already had two assignments since the studied incident, meaning that the details are assumed to be blurred. Interestingly some interviewees also stated that the Thor Liberty case was not a significant incident, where as to other organisations it was the complete opposite. Due to these differences in the perceptions, the memories of the incidents may have even greater variation and should be assessed when the case is reviewed as a whole.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is that Valtonen's Fundamental Characteristics may have had an unintentional influence in the phenomenographical categorization. It is as with empiricism: knowledge is based and built upon the previous knowledge and experiences. The theoretical framework was completed before the analysis began, providing a possibility of bias. However, as phenomenography is affected by both the data subject's and the researcher's experiences and perceptions, these possible biases are almost, if not completely, impossible to avoid. Thus, when evaluating the reliability and validity of the results it has to be taken into account.

6.2 Further research topics

As stated many times before, interagency cooperation is a complex phenomenon. It could be studied from many angles, and even the same data could be used to do many other studies. This thesis concentrates on the experiences and perceptions on cooperation due to the limited space, time and requirements of a master's thesis, but many other aspects would have been interesting as well. Here are some topics for further research, however it should be acknowledged that this data was collected for this study alone, and thus cannot be used by anyone else than me. However, should someone gain access to similar data or think about what could be studied on interagency cooperation, hopefully this section will rise some thoughts.

Media played a big role in this case, and was also a major factor in why I became interested in the Thor Liberty case. One approach I also pondered when trying to decide what to concentrate on was communication. The difference between what the authorities communicated to the media, and what the media communicated to the general public appeared significant. It was already clear with the media review and the interviews that they differ significantly from one another. By involving media representatives and approaching the research problem from the media research discipline, an interesting study on the communication and miscommunication of the authorities could be conducted.

This thesis is a qualitative study on interagency cooperation. The results show the different perception on how interagency cooperation works. It would be interesting to conduct a quantitative research within the participated organizations with, for example, the Delphi method to gain a wider understanding on the phenomenon. With the quantitative data it would be possible to make careful generalizations. The results could provide a tool to further develop interagency cooperation.

Interagency cooperation could be studied as a sociological case. Even in this case there were two small groups, which were related to the two cases. Also, unconventional groups due to the personal relations occurred. This approach could answer *Why* interagency cooperation works, in addition to the *How* as Valtonen and myself have done.

Yet another possible further research topic would be a case study comparison. My suggestion is to conduct a series of case studies by using the same approach on similar cases. Indeed, the results would be somewhat comparable, and the phenomenon could be further analyzed. The difficulties with this approach is that, as stated before, the data collection might face difficul-

ties due to the restricted nature of the operational work of authorities. Also, to find cases that are comparable might prove challenging. Still, the comparison could help understand why interagency cooperation works, and to verify for example Valtonen's research.

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Interview with Kotka Police Department, representative from the daily activities, on 15.2.2016. The transcribed interview and notes are at the researcher's possession.

Interview with Kymenlaakso Fire and Rescue Department on 30.4.2015. The transcribed interview and notes are at the researcher's possession.

Interview with the Finnish Border Guard on 16.11.2015. The transcribed interview and notes are at the researcher's possession.

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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- How did Thor Liberty's case proceed / evolve?
- When did you / your organization get involved, and who contacted you?
- What was your role with the case??
- When did your role end?
- In your opinion, how did interagency cooperation work between you and other authorities?
How about between other authorities? And as a whole?
- What was successful with interagency cooperation, and what would you improve? Please elaborate.
- Who had the overall situation command?
- How was information exchange managed?
- All in all 11 authorities were involved in the case. Were there too many entities involved?
Was some entity missing? Please specify.
- Had you prepared for such incidents as the Thor Liberty case?
- How would you grade interagency cooperation with the scale from 4-10, 10 being the best?
- If you were to do this again, so that you already had the experience from this case, is there anything you would do differently?
- What is the role of personal relationships / chemistry in interagency cooperation?
- What is the role of trust in interagency cooperation?

APPENDIX 2: TIMELINE OF THE THOR LIBERTY CASE

Date	Authority	Law, if applicable
15.12	Trafi informs the Fire and Rescue Department	Trafi was called in due to it being the supervisory authority responsible for the safety in vessels (Laki alusturvallisuuden valvonnasta 370/1995, §5).
	F&R D	Fire and Rescue Department was called in according to the Rescue act §2, as it is obliged to prevent fires and other accidents.
	Trafi seized the vessel	According to law, Trafi has to stop the vessel should there be any anomalies in it's safety (§12). Trafi is also the supervisory authority with loose cargo (Laki eräiden irtolastialusten turvallisesta lastaamisesta ja lastin purkamisesta 1206/2004, §15).
17.12	F&R D informs the Safety Investigations Authority	Since there was a threat of a large scale accident, the Fire and Rescue Department notified the Safety Investigations Authority. Turvallisuuustutkintalaki 525/2011 §2
	F&R D informed the Local Police / Public order and safety	The Police was called in to oversee the public order and safety and to evaluate if a crime has been committed. Poliisilaki 872/2011 §1
	F&R D informed the Border Guard's Maritime Command Center. The Patrol boat is commanded to sail to Kotka.	According to the Act on Border Guard 578/2005 §22 and §26 the Border Guard is obliged to assist the Fire and Rescue Department in rescue services when asked and the Police in public order and safety tasks when asked
18.12	F&R D contacts the Finnish Defence Forces to identify the explosives	The rescue act 379/2011 states in §46, 2 that the Finnish Defence Forces is obliged to provide executive assistance by means of expertise, resources and equipment should it be requested.
19.12	First situation management meeting. Attending entities: F&R D, BG, Trafi, DF, SIA, Health District. Overall command to the F&R D.	The first joint meeting was held on Monday December 19 th , and the first press conference was held then as well. The F&R D assumed overall situation command on the rescue situation, as is laid down by law in the Rescue Act (Pelastuslaki 379/2011 §35)
	A secure zone on land and sea is formed, 1000m in all directions	Enforced by the F&R D, executed by the local Police on land (Pelastuslaki 379/2011, §46, 4) and by BG on sea (Rajavartiolaki 578/2005, §26)
20.12	Police Criminal Investigation and the Chief Inspector joined the case	Explosives were stowed against the international maritime legislation
	Finnish Customs inspection on the missile containers	Tullilaki 1466/1994 §3
21.12	Additional Customs Inspection, seize of missiles	Tullilaki 1466/1994, §14. Unauthorized military equipment (Laki puolustustarvikkeiden maastaviennistä ja kauttakuljetuksesta 242/1990, §1), Unauthorized dual-use substances (Laki kaksikäyttötuotteiden vientivalvonnasta 562/1996, §2)
	Missiles transferred to a secure place in cooperation with the Police and the NDF	
23.12	Airspace 1000m from Thor Liberty is closed	Enforced by Trafi in accordance with the Aviation act (Ilmailulaki 1194/2009 §8)
	Stowing of the explosives begins	

26.12	Stowing complete, closing of airspace discontinued,	
	Trafi reverses the seize of the explosives	
	The F&R D declares:large-scale emergency situation reduced to an emergency situation	
4.1	Release of the missiles by the Ministry of Defence	
6.1	Thor Liberty sails away	