



**National Defence
University**

Enhancing human security through crisis management

– opportunities and challenges for learning



Ulla Anttila

**Department of Leadership and
Military Pedagogy**

Publication Series 1
Number 9/2012



National Defence University

Ulla Anttila

**Enhancing human security through
crisis management
– opportunities and challenges for learning**

**Department of Leadership and
Military Pedagogy**

**Publication series 1
Number 9/2012**

© National Defence University/Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy

Kannen kuva: Puolustusvoimat

ISSN 1798-0399

ISBN 978-951-25-2356-6

ISBN 978-951-25-2357-3 (PDF)

Juvenes Print Oy

Tampere

2012

Contents

Preface	6
1. Introduction	8
2. Research questions, research procedure, and methodology	10
2.1 Research questions	11
2.2 Main concepts in the research	12
2.3 Research procedure	13
2.4 Methods and methodological choices	15
2.4.1 Futures research.....	15
2.4.2 Delphi method.....	16
2.4.3 Qualitative interviews.....	19
3. New conflicts and human security	22
3.1 Recent development in armed conflicts	24
3.2 Concept of new conflict	27
3.3 Human security and responsibility to protect	31
3.4 Cultural, religious, and political dimensions of conflicts	33
3.4.1 Civilizations: cooperation or combat	34
3.4.2 Conflicts based on identity, ethnicity, and religion	37
3.4.3 Terrorism	38
3.4.4 Politics, power relations and limits of cultural explanations	40
3.5 Economic, social, and ecological factors explaining new conflicts.....	42
3.6 Development of weapons and arms trade and prospects for futures warfare	45
3.7 Conclusions	48
4. Crisis management and peace-building	51
4.1 Conceptual and historical development and challenges	52
4.1.1 Peace-building and conflict prevention	52
4.1.2 Crisis management as a concept and its recent development.....	56
4.1.3 Military crisis management and peacekeeping	57
4.1.4 Civilian crisis management, cooperation and comprehensive crisis management	60
4.2 International organizations and national development in crisis management and peace-building.....	61
4.2.1 Role of the United Nations	62
4.2.2 European Union.....	63
4.2.3 NATO	64
4.2.4 Humanitarian agencies, regional actors, and non-governmental organizations	65
4.2.5 Finnish model: towards comprehensive crisis management.....	66
4.3 Kosovo as a crisis management environment	67
4.4 Conclusions	70

5.	Social reality, organizations, and personnel	72
5.1	Organizations	73
5.2	Personnel	75
5.2.1	Practical challenges	75
5.2.2	Social categorization, prejudice, and dynamics between personnel groups	77
5.2.3	Identity and related concepts	79
5.2.4	Being a professional in crisis management	81
5.2.5	Gender in crisis management	83
5.2.6	Finnish crisis management and military personnel	84
5.3	Competences.....	86
5.4	Conclusions	89
6.	Learning.....	91
6.1	Contemporary perspectives on learning.....	91
6.2	Levels of individual learning in relation to explicit and tacit knowledge....	92
6.3	Organizational learning and change in crisis management	95
6.4	Crisis management operation as a learning environment and challenges to education and training.....	97
6.5	Conclusions: Skills and learning processes needed in crisis management.....	101
7.	Futures challenges for crisis management personnel in the light of the Delphi panel process	104
7.1	Consistency of the Delphi Panel	104
7.2	First round of the Delphi panel process	105
7.3	Second round of the Delphi panel process	106
7.4	Summary and conclusions from the Delphi Panel process	120
7.4.1	Consensus theses	120
7.4.2	Non-consensus arguments of importance	122
7.4.3	Results in a thematic order	123
7.5	Critical details from the Delphi results	125
7.6	Summary of the Delphi panel process	126
8.	Meanings of crisis management work described by the personnel.....	129
8.1	Facts about the crisis management personnel interviewed for the study.....	130
8.2	Preference for crisis management duties in the past and in the future.....	131
8.3	Identity and professional meaning of crisis management work.....	133
8.4	Positive and negative experiences from crisis management.....	141
8.4.1	Positive experiences	141
8.4.2	Negative experiences.....	143
8.4.3	Dangers and worries	146
8.4.4	Multiple meanings	147
8.4.5	Interpretations of crisis management experiences and learning: Mostly positive but partially contradictory perceptions.....	148
8.5	Cooperation.....	149
8.5.1	Cooperation with local inhabitants.....	149
8.5.2	Cooperation between civilian and military actors in crisis management.....	154
8.5.3	Findings from the cooperation activities	158

8.6	Education and training for crisis management duties	161
8.7	Feedback and support to the return to Finland	166
8.8	Summary of the qualitative interviews	173
9.	Learning in crisis management: conclusions from the results	177
9.1	Evaluation of the methods and the significance of the research.....	177
9.2	Results of two empirical parts concisely	179
9.3	How to improve learning, feedback systems, and training	184
9.4	Combining individual and institutional levels	187
9.5	Prospects for further research.....	189
	References	190
	Abstract	229
	Tiivistelmä	231
	Appendix 1.	233
	Appendix 2.	234
	Appendix 3.	235
	Appendix 4.	236
	Appendix 5.	237
	Appendix 6.	243
	Appendix 7.	247

Preface

In July 1995, there was a massacre in Srebrenica in Bosnia. The international community, which had sent troops with a UN mandate to the conflict zone could not prevent atrocities from emerging. At the time, I was a Parliamentarian at the beginning of my second mandate and a mother to one-and-a-half-year-old daughter whose behavior had become abnormal. Amidst the confusion of not knowing what was happening to my child, at least one idea became clear in my mind. If I ever had an opportunity to influence the resources, equipment and mandate sufficient for ensuring peaceful circumstances for the civilians, this was it. As an active member of the Human Rights Group of Parliament and later as a member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, I had plenty of opportunities to emphasize peace-building and peacekeeping ensuring the rights of the civilians in conflict and post-conflict areas. I tried my best in this regard.

Questions of peace and war have interested me since my childhood. Therefore, having decided to end my parliamentary career I had the idea of studying conflicts and crisis management. Because of the importance of military actions in crisis management, I decided to apply for the right to produce an academic dissertation on the same theme at the National Defence University. In this process, the roles of Professor Jarmo Toiskallio and Rector, General Major Pertti Salminen were of the utmost importance. I want to thank them for their encouragement and freedom from prejudice. In January 2007, I was the first civilian approved as a doctoral student at the National Defence University.

Supervisors of my work, Professor Juha Mäkinen and Professor Emeritus Reijo E. Heinonen, and my additional supervisor, Dr., Auli Keskinen, receive my warm thanks due to their active work in supporting my dissertation process. I owe special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Rainer Peltoniemi who encouraged me to start to study crisis management and has commented on an early version of my dissertation manuscript. I would also like to thank Ms. Elina Rusanen, who worked as my research assistant in 2008 and transcribed the interviews of my research. I also own my gratitude to the pre-examiners of this thesis, Professor Franz Kernic and Dr. Osmo Kuusi for their constructive comments. With regard to the challenges of the English language, I would also like to thank Mr. Jussi Rosti and Mr. James Morrison (Aakkosto Oy.), Mr. Arif Khan, and Mr. David Schlaefer for their comments on the text. Ms. Heidi Paananen and Captain Juha Tuominen also receive my warm thanks for their help when finalizing the thesis into the form of a book.

I have had several opportunities to receive ideas from persons involved with human rights, crisis management and research. In particular I would like to thank Dr. Tarja Cronberg, Mr. Pekka Haavisto, M. -P., Dr. Jarno Limnell, Ms. Pauliina Parhiala, Professor Anna-Maija Pirttilä-Backman, and Professor Helena Ranta for their time and valuable thoughts.

My former colleagues in Parliament, namely Mr. Aulis Ranta-Muotio and Mr. Matti Väistö, deserve my thanks because they encouraged me to attain the highest academic degree in the form of a doctoral dissertation during a conversation before a late parliamentary vote in November 2005. At the time, I do not think they thought that their encouragement would be so influential.

I am grateful to my friends Jaana Lahti, Leena Linkola, Leena Savela-Syväjärvi, Pauliina Ståhlberg, Sirpa Vahtera, and Miina Weckroth for their support on this project. I would also like to thank human rights activists with whom I have worked since the 1990s for their inspiration. My colleagues from KIOS also receive my special thanks.

I would like to thank the following foundations for their economic support for my research: Suomalaisen strategisen tutkimuksen ja seurannan tukisäätiö, Maanpuolustuksen kannatussäätiö and Suomen Marsalkka Mannerheimin Sotatieteellinen rahasto. At the Parliamentary Library, I had an opportunity to work in the cabinet for researchers, for which I am grateful. Staff of the Parliamentary Library and the National Defence University helped find relevant literature and they deserve my thanks as well. The Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy and its staff provided me with expertise and resources for my research. In particular, I would like to thank them for enabling the work of my research assistant during and after the interview phase of my study.

Last but not least I want to thank my husband Tero Taponen and my daughters Alli and Taru Taponen for their support during my research process. They, along with my mother Liisa Anttila and brother Tero Anttila, have given me great inspiration at different times in my life. Thank you!

The writing process is over. We will see later whether it has any impact on the ways armed conflict are handled or prevented.

Vantaa,
May 2012

Ulla Anttila

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, researchers have been interested in how contemporary armed conflicts have changed. For example, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 raised awareness of the fact that the end of the Cold War did not serve to end armed conflicts. Most armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been low intensity in nature where civilians are targeted as part of the tactics of the warriors and at least one party in the conflict consists of one or several insurgent groups. Such a conflict may have its roots in the regional colonial history, and the lack of democracy and welfare may be linked to the regional violent development. Parties in conflict may define the causes of conflict in different terms and their mutual perceptions may be controversial, which complicates peace-building.

This study focuses on crisis management. The areas of particular interests are new conflicts and how they influence the development of crisis management, and even how the field experiences of expatriate personnel affect their identities and learning. The study also focuses on cooperation and personnel as well as on organizations and individuals' challenges for learning in crisis management. The intersection of individual and collective activities is interesting in crisis management and the framework of the present research is human security. In the study of crisis management, I intend to find ways to support sustainable peace.

Studies that focus on crisis management personnel and their competences and learning can provide information that promotes human security. The present research analyzes the changes in armed conflicts and crisis management, as well as the competences and learning required to respond to the challenges of contemporary warfare from a human security perspective. From a social sciences perspective, all these branches of research are rich in terms of definitions and alternative interpretations, which means that this type of multidisciplinary research requires theoretical clarifications in several fields.

Understanding crisis management work at the grass-roots level in conflict areas is a key question for developing related organizations and practices. Research on human security in conflict areas may help to improve peace-building and crisis management practices. However, research in peace processes is not interest-free. Studies on peace operations have been criticized for being instrumental, for seeking answers to simplified questions and for being uncritical regarding the background of the operations and the assumptions related to it (see Bellamy 2004). Human security and local people's needs should be a major topic in the education and training of personnel in peace operations.

Human security challenges the analysis of security and crisis management. Long-term reduction of violence requires crisis management personnel to be able to cooperate with local inhabitants in order to enable the development of local communities. Local ownership in peace-building facilitates sustainable peace processes. Further analysis of local ownership is needed in order to develop more successful peace-building methods. The human security discourse has shown that security conceptions that focus merely on national security are insufficient.

In this research, the analysis of armed conflicts and crisis management focuses on the era since the Cold War. The implications of the recent development are scrutinized in relation to their future prospects. The theoretical background to this dissertation will rely on the analysis of new conflicts, crisis management and human reality in it, as well as on major learning processes in crisis management.

This research is multidisciplinary in nature. Chapter 2 introduces the various scientific perspectives and also introduces and evaluates the research questions (RQs) and methods. Some methodological triangulation is conducted. The research procedure and the methodological questions including the interview and futures studies choices are also discussed in detail. Chapters 3 to 6 analyze the theoretical background of the research. Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the research, several theoretical perspectives as well as more practical findings related to conflicts and peace building will be introduced briefly and reflected towards the research questions in these chapters. Chapter 3 introduces new conflicts and evaluates potential explanations of contemporary warfare. Due to the multitude of theories, the introduction to each of them is relatively short. Chapter 4 analyzes the recent evolution and potential future development of crisis management. In this study, crisis management is assessed in the context of new conflicts. Crisis management has not been created to respond to warfare between major powers. Chapter 4 deals briefly with the history of Kosovo as an example of a new conflict and because all the crisis management personnel interviewed for the empirical part of this research had some work experience from Kosovo. Theoretically and practically relevant findings related to crisis management may be needed for the future development of crisis management; therefore chapter 4 included both types of information. Chapters 3 and 4 provide background information regarding the core competences in crisis management that are defined in chapter 5. The theoretical framework necessary for analyzing human factors in the development of crisis management is introduced in chapters 5 and 6 the latter of which is focused on learning. Learning takes place when adopting the core competences and reflecting on how to develop at one's duties. The framework of organizational learning will be introduced as well.

Chapter 7 consists of analysis of the results of the Delphi panel process, and chapter 8 covers the results of the crisis management personnel interviews. Chapter 9 compares the results of the two empirical parts and discusses the implications and various meanings of the results.

2. Research questions, research procedure, and methodology

This research is based on pluralist epistemology. It relies on the idea of using various types of knowledge considered as suitable information sources (Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti 2006, 13). Integrating disparate values, epistemologies and knowledge has been considered as a way of dealing with complexity (Miller et al. 2008). Similarly, the ability to use different methodologies and theories is an advantage for futures studies (Inayatullah 2010). As mentioned in chapter 1, perspectives from several fields of research are applied to this study and the empirical part consists of two kinds of material.

Pluralist epistemology does not require theoretical triangulation. Using different methods on the same theme or object of study means methodological triangulation (Cohen et al. 2007, 142). The present research used both the Delphi panel process and qualitative interviews. The empirical parts of this research partly focus on the same themes, which means that the analysis is partial methodological triangulation.

Primarily, this study underlines the importance of a multidisciplinary approach to the broad research themes. Secondly, the study is anchored to military pedagogy¹ and to a larger framework of behavioral and social sciences and military studies. A military-pedagogical framework works out holistic and critical views of soldiers and officers as learning, growing and acting human beings who interact with their environments (Toiskallio 2000a). The present research studies the work of soldiers in crisis management in a holistic and multidisciplinary manner, which is consistent with the nature of military pedagogy. Military studies cannot be isolated into military contexts only. It is necessary to study the military so that other actors in crisis areas, including local inhabitants and civilian crisis management personnel are also under scrutiny.

Although the military-pedagogical literature has recognized recent and on-going changes in warfare, efforts to enlarge the scientific conceptualizations based on empirical studies have been rare in this field. Due to the strategic focus on crisis management, military-pedagogical research based on the empirical data is needed in the future in order to develop military education, training, and organizations. A similar kind of research related to civilian crisis management and peace-building is also required.

Thirdly, because of my scientific background in social psychology, I wanted to extend my study into this direction. Comprehensive views on crisis management cannot rely only on military studies, due to the civilian nature of crisis management. In peace-building, besides peacekeepers the local and expatriate civilian actors are of extreme importance. Military systems are also dependent on civilian systems.

Fourthly, this thesis is grounded on futures research. My work has a future orientation on requirements for crisis management structures, training and personnel in terms of facilitating peace-building. In order to understand these phenomena, it is necessary to have a conception of the potential evolution of futures crises and conflicts.

¹ According to Toiskallio (2000a, 7) military pedagogy (MPED) is known as a scientific discipline in Continental and Nordic Europe.

2.1 Research questions

There is a shortage of theoretical contributions in the research on peace operations (Aksu 2003; Bellamy 2004). In Finland, the limited number of studies have focused on crisis management personnel, and which means there is a need for more knowledge about their thinking. However, their considerations are important for a comprehensive understanding of crisis management, especially when the crisis management institutions are developed. Meanwhile, more information on the thinking and perceptions of the crisis management personnel would be required in order to better understand the challenges that are part of everyday life of the personnel. The views of personnel's views affect the implementation of crisis management and, therefore, human security.

To understand the futures trends, it is necessary to comprehend the contemporary development that influences the future. Results of this type of research may facilitate conflict prevention. Crisis management evolves in relation to contemporary conflict development and crises leading to international operations. In order to develop crisis management, some assessment of futures conflicts is needed. This development work requires learning, so it is one of the main focuses of this research.

The main research question (RQ) in this study is:

What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

This main RQ is both theoretical and practical. The theoretical linkage between learning and crisis management is weak, so it is important to try to connect these concepts. The practical dimension of this RQ is connected with the need to develop crisis management practices. The framework of evolving crisis management in this research is human security which emphasizes the human rights of every individual. The main RQ is divided into the following three RQs:

1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

This RQ is linked to the change in armed conflicts.

2. How do field experiences affect the personnel's identities and self-concepts?

The individual level of this RQ is crucial for understanding employees working for crisis management as individuals.

3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

This RQ is mostly practical in its character because the framework of crisis management has not been broadly conceptualized.

2.2 Main concepts in the research

This section briefly defines the main concepts of this study which are in detail in chapters 3–6. *New conflicts* consist of armed conflicts and wars that mostly take place in developing countries and involve non-state actors (see section 3.2). Tactics in new conflict differ from conventional warfare. This type of warfare is known from the history of warfare, but it has become the most typical type of armed conflict since the end of the Cold War.

The concept of *human security* was launched in the UNDP's Human Development Report in 1994. The core issue in human security is that the individuals' rights for security are regarded as the first topic on the security agenda. Security policy has traditionally focused on the security of the states. The human security concept is based on the idea of the universal human rights. It can be seen as a normative concept that is connected with an obligation to promote human rights. It is different from the state-based security thinking, although these views are considered complementary. Regarding human security, there are two basic definitions of the concept; a broad definition and a narrow definition. According to the broad definition, all kinds of threats against human beings should be analyzed. According to the narrow definition, however, human security exists in relation to violent threats. (Nuruzzaman 2006; see also Human Security Report 2005.) Both perspectives are needed, but this thesis relies on the narrow definition due to its empirical focus. Human security issues are introduced in section 3.3.

Crisis management consists of a wide range of efforts to deal with an armed conflict or a humanitarian catastrophe and stabilize the situation to enable peace (see chapter 4). It is divided into civilian and military crisis management. Military crisis management focuses on stabilizing conflict. *Peace-building* is a wider concept than crisis management that refers to the use of crisis management means and the long-term peace process, that may require reconstruction and reformation of post-conflict society. Crisis management and peace-building issues will be introduced in chapter 4.

Peacekeepers refer to personnel working in military crisis management. In the Finnish context, both reservists and professional soldiers serve in these capacities. *Civilian crisis management personnel* work for civilian crisis management and have different professional backgrounds. Challenges to the personnel will be introduced in chapter 5.

Competences signify both individual skills and collective abilities. Their development requires learning processes (see section 5.3). *Self-concept* answers the question: who am I? (see section 5.2.3.) *Identity* is a wider concept that consists of an individual's self-concept and its social meaning to oneself. It can be conceptualized both in individual and collective terms (see section 5.2). *Learning* refers to different processes when adapting new knowledge and skills, which induces cognitive transformation at the individual level. It is studied in different research branches, but the present research has focused on changes due to learning. Learning may also be seen as a process that promotes organizational change and development (see chapter 6).

2.3 Research procedure

This research consists of a literature analysis and two empirical parts. The literature analysis is multidisciplinary because it is necessary to analyze issues related to new conflicts, evolution of crisis management and various human factors that influence crisis management and the personnel involved with it. Each chapter in the literature analysis is intended to facilitate the analysis of the research questions in a progressive manner. The analysis starts from the end of the Cold War and focuses mostly on the latest development in conflicts and crisis management. Two empirical phases make it to answer the research questions that were first introduced earlier in this chapter. These empirical parts are, firstly, the interviews of three professional groups that have work experience from Kosovo, and, secondly, the futures panel process in regard to the future of crisis management and special skills required from crisis management personnel.

1. The first empirical phase of the research consists of the analysis of crisis management relying on futures studies, with particular focus on education, personnel and organizations in crisis management. The level of analysis in this part of the study is mostly organizational and institutional. Both special experts of crisis management (15 in total) and the interviewees representing crisis management personnel (27 in total) were interviewed for the first round of this part of the study. The interviewees of the second part of the study were asked to participate in the panel process regarding the future of crisis management, but the crisis management personnel interviewees did not attend the second round of the panel.

The method of the panel process is the Argument Delphi technique as described by Osmo Kuusi (1999). Historically, the Delphi technique has been criticized because of its narrow perspective on expertise (Linturi 2007, 106). Therefore, in order to avoid a restricted choice of experts, individuals with practical field experience in crisis management and experts with more traditional expertise are included in the first round of the panel process. The knowledge of people having practical experience from crisis management is especially valuable when the requirements for future crisis management personnel and education are analyzed. The challenges of the current development in crisis management are taken into account.

2. The second empirical phase of the research will consist of qualitative interviews. Between February and June in 2008, I interviewed: nine officers of the permanent staff in the Finnish Defence Forces who have experience with peacekeeping, 10 peacekeepers recruited from the reserves (five women and five men), and – eight people who had worked in one or several civilian crisis management operations (five women and three men). This part of the study focuses mostly on the personal and individual level of crisis management; that is, the personal experiences and views of the personnel. However, some of the questions regarding education, training and feedback systems are related to the organizational and institutional level of the analysis. In this research, soldiers serving in military crisis management are systematically called peacekeepers, not crisis management soldiers, although I prefer to use the term military crisis management rather than peacekeeping when referring to contemporary military operations of this type. A typical feature of Finnish peacekeeping has been the high proportion of reservists. Therefore, it was adequate to interview both reservists and professional officers who have peacekeeping experience.

All the interviewees had experience with crisis management in Kosovo. Each interviewee was interviewed once. The interviewees had worked in Kosovo in either 2006 or 2007. At the time the interviews took place, every interviewee had worked in Kosovo at least for several months and either continued to work there or had returned home. The longest period between the end of the duties in the operation and the interview was less than a year and a half. In most cases, the interviews occurred within a year of the interviewee's return. Due to the limits of human memory and the continuous changes in Kosovo, it would not have been reasonable to interview people who had worked in Kosovo much earlier. The civilian crisis management has become stronger in Kosovo due to the reinforcement of the EU mission in Kosovo since 2008. The recent development of the region has been peaceful and the prospects for Kosovo are positive.

Immediately before the interview phase Finland had had a relatively large presentation in military and civilian crisis management both in Kosovo and Afghanistan.² The conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan can therefore be regarded as "new conflicts". In order to compare the interviews, it was reasonable to interview personnel who had experience from the same region. Because of the higher risks of the operation in Afghanistan, one could argue that studying personnel who have worked in Kosovo could describe some features typical of peace missions, regardless of their risk level. Due to the different nature of the missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, I decided to concentrate on the personnel who have experience from Kosovo. If I had interviewed personnel from both missions, it would have been difficult to evaluate the impact of the operation in relation to personal differences.

Because gender issues affect collaboration with local civilians, it was preferable that at least some of the interviewees would be women. Because the proportion of female professional officers in Finland is small, I attempted to balance the gender proportion in the sample of the peacekeeper interviewees recruited from the reserves. According to Kousa's (2008) study, only 2.3 percent (N=14) of the responding Finnish peacekeepers were women³.

The interview procedure was checked after the first interview, which was considered as a pre-interview. The positive outcome of the first interview meant that it was included in the data that was analyzed for this study. The interview questions of the civilian and military crisis management personnel were partially differentiated according to the varying roles of different actors in the region. Because of the lack of the studies of the realities of these people working in the field, I have emphasized understanding their thinking and ways of interpreting the surrounding realities. I decided to study individuals in order to understand their thinking in depth. This part of my empirical research is connected with the individual level of analysis.

From an ethical perspective, this study should not be problematic. The interviewees remained anonymous during the study process. The dual roles of the interviewees when expressing personal experiences and when participating in a Delphi process made it necessary for the interviewees to remain anonymous, even during the Delphi process.

² Another alternative would have been to interview personnel who had worked in Afghanistan. Finland's involvement in Afghanistan has been relatively strong since 2002. However, because of the security situation, plenty of expatriate civilians employed in Afghanistan require the protection of the international ISAF troops and the civilian crisis management often relies of the military activities. The NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan is risky for the peacekeepers and the risks have increased since the beginning of the operation (Salonius-Pasternak 2009). Therefore, ISAF is a riskier operation for peacekeepers than KFOR.

³ Military service in Finland is based on a male conscript system (see Suomalainen Sotilas , 2009) and is voluntary for women.

Two empirical phases of the research can be categorized according to their potential relevance when responding to the four research questions. The results of the interviews of the crisis management personnel potentially provide answers to all four research questions. Additionally, the results of the Delphi panel process provide answers to all of the research questions, except RQ2.

With regard to both the interview material and the Argument Delphi process, the future prospects of crisis management are analyzed by taking into account the educational issues and the cooperation of civilian and military actors and issues related to local ownership. The analysis of the crisis management and peace-building and the related education and training emphasizes the systemic level of developing crisis management and the methods of futures research. The opinions and perceptions of both military and civilian personnel in crisis management are relevant when emphasizing “people-centered” views on human security and crisis management. The interviews with crisis management personnel concentrated on the individual level, although they also built a bridge from the individual level to the systemic level which is based on the futures studies. Institutional and individual levels of crisis management are intertwined. Comprehension of both levels enables the development of crisis management as a system and, consequently, of the activities of individuals.

Table 1. Main focus of the chapters in relation to the research questions

Chapter	Research questions (RQ)
Chapter 3	RQ:s 1 and 3
Chapter 4	Main RQ and RQ 3
Chapter 5	All RQ:s
Chapter 6	All RQ:s
Chapter 7	Main RQ and RQ:s 1 and 3
Chapter 8	All RQ:s
Chapter 9	All RQ:s

The chapters focus on responding to the research questions consistently with Table 1. The main focus of each chapter is on responding to the research questions in accordance with Table 1. Chapters from 3 to 6 are based on theoretical analysis as well as on the description of the development of conflicts and crisis management, which are important themes regarding the research questions as well.

2.4 Methods and methodological choices

2.4.1 Futures research

A research community seldom becomes unanimous regarding the quality of knowledge about the future (Kuusi 1999, 5). Futures thinking is not neutral because it depends on subjective choices from the research problems, hypotheses and goals of a study (Godet 2001, 13). From a scientific perspective, futures research is multidisciplinary and it aims to create comprehensive alternative futures scenarios that take diverse alternative parts of reality into

account. Futures paths are often comprised of arguments – or chains of arguments. For futures research, it is relevant to imagine and identify the actions required in order for the desirable, possible, probable or avoidable alternatives to come true. (Kamppinen et al. 2003, 25–30; Keskinen 1999, 61.) The aim of the research is often to create the most desirable alternatives for the future (Aaltonen & Wilenius 2002). Futures research is not a value-free science because it aims at both the true and the good (Bell 1997b, 319). It has not attained the phase justifying the values that underlie the images of preferable futures (Bell 2009, 43). Because the objectives of this field of study are both the true and the good, one should be aware of the mixed subjectivity and objectivity of futures studies, in which the human values are used as parameters. The epistemology of futures research is based on the understanding that futures data, information and knowledge are provided for strategic decision-making based on studying the concurrent understanding of phenomena and assessing their conditional alternative development paths. (Keskinen 1999.)

I believe that truth-seeking and argumentative futures research clearly provides a better basis for futures thinking and futures images creation than argumentation without any assessment that relies on futures studies as background information. In this research, the agenda that focuses on preferable futures relies on the concepts of human security and sustainable development. Although these objectives may be attained by means that are assessed in partly controversial terms, depending on the evaluator, at least it is more suitable to make these assumptions explicit.

The conception of knowledge in the futures research is broader than in scientific thinking in general, but this does not make futures thinking unscientific (Malaska 1993, 7). Bell (1997a, 235) concluded that “although futurist methodological procedures are reasonably well developed, no generally agreed upon theory of knowledge for futures studies yet exists.” The ontology of futures research is systemic. The limit of the systemic ontology is that the reality is conceptualized as a system and parts of reality – which are not seen as part of any system – extend beyond this kind of analysis. (Kamppinen & Malaska 2003.)

2.4.2 Delphi method

The Delphi technique was chosen as the method with which to assess the future of crisis management. The Delphi technique is one of the most frequently used methods to gather argumentation of several experts in order to assess the possibilities in the future development of the phenomenon under study (Kuusi 2003, 205). Originally, the Delphi method was used to induce a consensus between different opinions among experts in a group after a series of questionnaires following each other (ibid., 207). The Delphi method was invented specifically to assess the future in the United States in 1953 (Bell 1997a, 261). In the Delphi method the experts argue anonymously and, in a way, the researcher filters the information from the experts' arguments. The research process evolves in rounds based on the responses of the experts in the panel. The qualitative interviews have been used as background material to the first round of the futures panel work and the crisis management personnel were interviewed in accordance with the first round Delphi Panel process. In this way, the Delphi method could be combined with the analysis of the results of the qualitative interviews. In the second round, the experts could comment on the others' arguments made during the

first round. The idea of combining various types of expertise in a futures panel guarantees various types of expertise in the process.

The Delphi method has been criticized methodologically (Kuusi 1999, 73–74), but the criticism has ignored the basic point of the Delphi technique: namely, the main idea of a Delphi study is to find relevant arguments regarding futures developments. The Delphi method is not best at identifying accurate judgments concerning future events, but at revealing valid and substantial arguments for the judgments. However, what really happens in the future is typically not based only on valid arguments. (Ibid. 77–85.) Apart from criticizing the loose way in which the Delphi techniques has been used, Sackman (1975) criticized the method due to its inherent conformity pressures, its reliance upon what is little more than educated guesswork, and the absence of a formalized scientific basis for the legitimization of the outcomes that resulted from the use of the method. (Rescher 1998, 96.) However, Rescher (1998) presumed that the Delphi technique remains an alternative in the futures assessment because there are often no better methodological alternatives that rely on a theory-based framework.

Nowadays, the Delphi technique is mostly used in order to obtain justified arguments about the futures development, rather than to obtain a consensus among the experts (Kuusi 2003, 210–211). The use of this method is justified, especially if certain development is only starting and the panel process facilitates an understanding of the weak signals that co-exist with this development and provide information about the potential futures development. A successful Delphi study more closely resembles a tool for futures making than a prediction. (Kuusi 1993, 138–139.)

As it was originally developed, three key characteristics of Delphi are anonymity, iteration, and feedback. Anonymous participants consisting mostly of experts are approached by mail or computer. Iteration means that there are several rounds the first of which can be an inventory in which participants are asked about events to be forecast or parameters to be estimated. In subsequent rounds, participants are asked to give quantitative estimates. The number of rounds is either fixed or determined to fulfill consensus criteria. Feedback signifies that the first round's results are clustered and sent back to all participants. Before the second and later rounds, the results of the entire group are fed back in a statistical format to all the participants. In the second and subsequent rounds, the participants are asked for arguments for their deviating opinions. Before the third and subsequent estimation rounds, these arguments are sent back with statistical results. (Woudenberg 1991, 133, ref. Kuusi 1999, 71.)

There are different applications of the Delphi method. According to Kuusi (1999, 35–36), the three types of experts regarding futures are scientists, decision-makers, and synthesizers. Regarding technology development, the scientists are aware of scientific invariance as well as the limits of knowledge of non-experts, the decision-makers are aware of the practical facts regarding development work and the synthesizers are masters of the relevance (ibid. 35–36). Thus, based on the elaboration of Osmo Kuusi (1999), the present study applied the Argument Delphi method.⁴

⁴ The participants of the panel process in this research remain anonymous although Kuusi (1999, 128) states that the panelists are usually informed about the other panel process within an Argument Delphi process. However, Kuusi (1999, 231; 2003) recommends the anonymity of the panelists.

The aim of the Delphi process is to find out the challenges in the future of crisis management. In particular, the analysis is focused on the future paths necessary for developing education and training and solving personnel questions in crisis management. Because the qualitative interviews of the crisis management personnel are more focused on the personal relevance of experiences from crisis management, this part of the study focuses more on the structural factors that are relevant for human capacities in crisis management. In the Argument Delphi method, the first round of the expert panel is usually arranged through an interview process. In this phase, it is necessary to find arguments about which the experts clearly disagree. During the second round or iteration, the experts comment anonymously on the arguments and the reasons given by the experts. The third round is usually where the experts meet and assess the results, but this discussion does not affect the results. During the process, it is important to obtain the valuable arguments under consideration and to find - new essential questions to the theme. All of this is enabled by the anonymity of the experts during the first and second iterations. Anonymity is crucial during the argumentation phases of a study. The optimal number of experts in this process is between 15 and 50. (See Kuusi 2003, 213–218.)

In a successful Delphi process, the panel creates a vision that is relevant from several perspectives and in several categories. Its ability to produce a lot of information is also valuable. Through a panel process, it is possible to obtain information that would not be produced in other ways. (Linturi 2007, 111.) The major distinction between a survey method and a Delphi method is related to the basic samples of the study. Because a Delphi panel consists of experts, the limited number of experts usually prevents any sampling from being used. A significant phase in using a Delphi method is the second round of the research, in which the feedback opinions of the experts are sought. The anonymity of the experts may enable expression of opinions that they would not express if they had to commit to them publicly.

Questions regarding crisis management in the future may be sensitive in that an official opinion or guideline restricting “official views” on the subject may limit how openly an individual expresses his or her opinions. However, even weak signals related to such issues should be found and interpreted. Therefore, the Delphi method, which provides anonymity to the respondents, probably strengthens the validity of the results in the panel work.

One of the relevant questions is whether to look especially after the so-called weak signals in the research process. According to Mannermaa (2004, 117) weak signals are methodologically challenging because they are often not repeated. They sometimes become visible or understandable due to their differentiation. Weak signals only live for a while. Analysis of weak signals is open to errors – but they can also be a source of innovations. Experts do not automatically identify weak signals: their expertise may be too narrow to observe simultaneous processes outside their field. Listening to experts does not necessarily reveal or help identify weak signals. (Ibid. 117–122.)

Weak signals can be interpreted as tacit knowledge, neither of them is explicit in its nature. Tacit knowledge is a substantial concept for learning at work and other forms of learning outside classroom situations (Paloniemi 2008). In relation to learning, tacit knowledge is discussed in chapter 6 of this dissertation. The Delphi panel processes and other techniques

of futures research have been seen as a way of eliciting experts' tacit knowledge and making it explicit (Eerola & Miles 2011, 273).

It is necessary to ask what weak signals in crisis management could be and how they could be studied. The interviews with crisis management personnel and the Delphi panel process are attempts to make tacit knowledge and weak signals in crisis management more tangible or visible. However, the relationship between tacit knowledge and weak signal has not generally been considered close because tacit knowledge has been studied in pedagogy and organizational studies and weak signals have been studied in futures studies.

The Delphi method has been used in Finnish military studies on several occasions. Rainer Peltoniemi (2007) interviewed military experts to identify the core competence areas of the Finnish Defence system and how they would change if Finland became a member of NATO.⁵ The strong support of the experts covered the hypothesis that Finnish capabilities of receiving military resources, as well as the ability to maintain defence capabilities, would increase and Finland would take care of the control and surveillance of its territorial integrity. However, the experts did not believe that any of the core ability functions of the Finnish National Defence Forces would completely disappear because of NATO membership. (Ibid.) Another example is Vesa Valtonen's (2010) use of the Delphi method to study the cooperation between various military and civilian officials from an operative and tactical perspective. Methodological triangulation was applied when comparing the results of action research with those of the Delphi method. Trust was found as a basic factor for good cooperation between civilian and military actors (ibid.). In general, the need for futures studies and futures orientation is obvious in military and security-oriented studies because the development of the military sector depends on various changing factors related to the threats and security development in the future. Various scenarios are made in order to find out probable or risky trends in the future (e.g. Ministry of Defence 2007). Results from the Millennium Project regarding the future of armed conflicts are discussed in detail in section 3.6.

2.4.3 Qualitative interviews

Since the 1980s the discourse about the use of quantitative and qualitative research methods has been vivid in social sciences. Research methods are crucial for the validity and reliability of a study (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2004, 59). Alasuutari (1995) described the qualitative research as solving a riddle. In the analysis of qualitative data, the question always concerns the concept of the meaning. According to Mäkelä (1992, 43), describing the research object is always a theoretical task.

There are some differences between qualitative and quantitative methods in relation to knowledge. However, the use of qualitative and quantitative methods may be combined. In qualitative research, a researcher has a responsibility to identify various decisions related to the research process (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2004, 69). With regard to qualitative interviews, the interpretation depends on the researcher (Alasuutari 2001, 160). Qualitative methods

⁵ Anonymity as part of the Delphi technique has advantages and disadvantages. Outsiders may have difficulty estimating the competence of the experts. On the other hand, the anonymity may facilitate the expressive ability of the experts because they do not feel dependent on their background organizations. (Peltoniemi 2007, 214.)

rely more on post-modernism and more relativistic views about science than quantitative methods. Qualitative research has acknowledged the existence of contextual factors affecting the results. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 16–21.) In the present study, qualitative methods were chosen to ensure flexibility in the interviews and to facilitate gathering new type of information about crisis management.

An interview is a method of gathering information and is one of the most common methods in human and social sciences. It is a flexible method and it can be applied to different purposes and used in various circumstances. Interaction is a major feature of a process such as an interview. Free and profound discussions may reveal things that could not be found with other types of research methods. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 11.) In practice, the flexibility of an interview process allows the research questions to be repeated and the interviewer to ensure that the questions have been understood correctly (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2004, 75). Although the interpretations of the interviewees regarding the research question may vary, it is essential that there is a minimum level of common understanding among the interviewees to ensure the credibility of the interviews.

An interview situation involves interaction and conversation between the interviewers and the interviewees. Consequently, the interactive nature of the interview should be taken into consideration during the planning, analysis and reporting of any study. (Tiittula & Ruusuvoori 2005, 13.) Both the interviewer and the interviewee have specific roles and the interviewer gives the interview process direction (Ruusuvoori & Tiittula 2005, 22).

In qualitative research, the analysis often begins during the interview. A researcher may reach conclusions based on the research material or the theoretical framework of the study. The techniques of analysis are multiform. There are only a limited number of standardized techniques of analysis and there are a number of ways in which the interviews can be classified. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 136–137). In any empirical research, the material is handled in order to condense the information before it is analyzed. In the categorization and analysis, different rules are applied and logical reasoning is required for the analysis. (Ehrnrooth 1992, 37–38.) In a qualitative study, observations are studied as clues from an explicit perspective, which is called a theoretical framework (Alasuutari 1995, 69).

In qualitative research, it is necessary to base the analysis on the material especially when basic information on the essence of a phenomenon is required (Eskola & Suoranta 2000, 19). The material may be analyzed in a classifying or interpretative manner. Classifications mean relatively direct interpretations of the material, while interpretations require contextual factors to be taken into account (Vesala & Rantanen 2007, 11–13). In the present study, the lack of information about the essence of crisis management from a field perspective meant, it was important to keep the analysis techniques open prior to the analysis.

Structured interviews are generally based on an interview form (Metsämuuronen 2001, 41). It is assumed that all the interviewees understand the questions in the same manner. In unstructured interviews, the questions are open to new modifications. The interviewer deepens the information by asking further questions in order to get the interviewee to reconstruct their experiences in relation to the object under scrutiny. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme

2006, 44–46.) Half-structured interviews which fall somewhere between structured and unstructured interviews may be referred to as focused interviews. As a method, it is closer to unstructured interviews, although the theme of the interview is precise. In focused interviews, the position of the hypotheses is problematic: whether hypotheses can be made or not depends on the subject of the study. Pre-interviews make it possible to specify the interview procedure. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006.) The nature of the interviews is fully comprehended only during the interview process and the significance of interaction should be taken into consideration in their interpretations. Half-structured or thematic interviews are considered to be a reasonable method if intimate issues are discussed in the interviews or if the themes being studied are not well known. (Metsämuuronen 2001, 42–43.)

This study used the *focused interviews* interview method which is used as a method of studying the thinking of crisis management personnel. The interviews were relatively structured which left opportunities to ask detailed questions about the themes that were of particular interest for a particular interviewee. The interviews in the present study can be described as highly structured focused interviews, which means that the analysis of the material is open for both classifying and interpretative methods. Focused interviews allow a certain amount of variation between the individual interview processes and, they are also comparable. A restricted amount of knowledge about crisis management personnel's views regarding what their experiences mean to them also makes the descriptive nature of the interview material relevant. The interview procedure was intended to allow the free expression of thoughts on behalf of the interviewees, which may allow them to talk about phenomena that might not become articulated when responding to a questionnaire.

The aim of the qualitative interviews is not to find information by describing the average situation of crisis management personnel. The interviewees represent a non-randomized sample of Finnish crisis management personnel. Even one deviant informant will oblige the researcher to reinterpret the theory that would get support from the interviews of the majority of the informants (Alasuutari 1995). Therefore, the interviews will be interpreted as authentic expressions of the interviewees although they may be impacted by situational factors. The interviews are narratives that emerge as a result of social interaction and they may help interpret some phenomena that would otherwise remain invisible.

3. New conflicts and human security

The aim of this chapter is to respond to RQs 1 and 3 which:

RQ 1: What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

RQ 3: How can crisis management practices, organizations and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

In order to answer to these RQs, it is necessary to study recent developments in armed conflict and their impact on crisis management. The recent history of armed conflict will be handled in section 3.1. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will discuss the concepts of new conflict, human security and responsibility to protect, while sections 3.4 and 3.5 analyze studies related to the causes of warfare will be analyzed in. In order to understand how to construct peace, it is important to understand how the causes of contemporary warfare are explained. The causal explanations of warfare may have an impact on how crisis management and peace-building would be developed. The focus of this research is on new conflicts signifying warfare in which non-state actors are involved, not in wars purely between states. In peace-building and crisis management, it would be important to be able to break the link from peace back to warfare and ensure peace processes. A bridge between new conflicts and crisis management is built at the end of this chapter. This could be helpful for comprehending what features in new conflicts are critical for a peace process and crisis management and peace-building as part of it. The focus is peace-oriented: armed conflicts and conflict cycles are not inevitable.

The literature analysis does not rely on a single school within military, international relations, or peace or conflict studies. Sections 3.4–3.5 discuss the theme of explanatory factors of armed conflict. Motives for various actors to start or continue warfare may not always be explicit, likewise when there are motivating factors to continue warfare. Explanations of contemporary warfare in the forms of new conflicts vary consistently with their theoretical background. Figure 1 categorizes the various factors explaining new conflicts.



Figure 1. Types of explanatory factors behind new conflicts

Understanding the causes of warfare makes it easier to comprehend how to stop conflict circles. According to Allardt (1976, 38) the three main dimensions of welfare are: “having,” which is related to the standard of living; “loving,” which is related to the community relations; and “being,” which signifies self-expression. Causes of warfare and armed conflict can be divided into these categories; this categorization mostly expresses a lack of welfare, which makes the society more prone to armed conflict. Allardt’s (1976) typology has similarities to Abraham Maslow’s theory on basic needs. It represents the results of the welfare studies from the 1970’s (Allardt 2004). In peace and conflict studies, some theories that explain causes of armed conflicts have used Maslow’s categorization of basic needs as a basis (see T. Väyrynen 2010). Maslow’s categorization is hierarchical: physiological needs are located on the base of the structure and self-actualization on the top (Maslow 1998, xx)⁶. Ecological and economic factors that create the risks of armed conflict relate to the standard of living (“having”) – and at least partly to basic things in an individual’s life like income, housing and nutrition. Religion, ethnicity, identity and political rights belong to community relations (“loving”) – and to self-expression (“being”). Conceptually, however, identity issues and political rights are described in more individual terms than ethnicity which is a more collective phenomenon and is therefore closer to the “loving” dimension of well-being. These factors are intertwined in different ways in conflicts.

Explanatory factors of new conflicts are inter-related and manifold. Ethnic and religious factors may be connected with politics (this is discussed in detail in section 3.4). They consist of identity-based factors. The other types of factors may also have some political dimensions. Politics may have quite different meanings than the classical Clausewitzian

⁶ Hierarchical order of an individual’s needs from the basis to the top is as follows: physiological needs, safety, social needs, esteem, and self-actualisation (Maslow 1998, xx).

ones, which refer to war as a different means for politics to occur when other relevant means have already been used (see Clausewitz 1968). Each conflict has its unique background and history and provokes questions about how it could have been prevented. The objective of the present study is not to create a model for explaining new conflicts. However, it is crucial to understand their complexity in order to prevent them and to develop crisis management and peace-building. Through a multitude of perspectives, it is difficult to see any single “grand theory” that explains new conflicts. Before analyzing the explanatory factors of warfare, the next section will examine the challenges to humanitarian work.

3.1 Recent development in armed conflicts

The end of the Cold War was a watershed in conflicts and conflict literature. Since 1990, only four wars have taken place between nations (Gulf War (1990–1991), US-Afghanistan (2001–2003), Anglo-American invasion of Iraq (2003), and the Russian invasion of South Ossetia, Georgia (2008)) (Lebow 2010). Between 1990 and 2002, 58 different armed conflicts were registered in 46 regions, with only three of those conflicts occurring between states (Rekkedal 2006, 555). Since the 1970s, there has been a sharp decline in international wars due to the demise of colonialism and the end of the Cold War. However, the picture is not as positive with regard to civil wars (Human Security Report 2005).

The militarized and state-centric view on security has been challenged since the Cold War, which has led to a broadening of security agendas from issues of national defence to broader questions (Coticchia & Ferrari 2009, 239). In contemporary international relations, identifying causes of “war” has been problematic (Holsti 1991, 272). The Cold War was not warless because there were many revolutionary and guerrilla wars in which millions of people died during that period (Malkki et al. 2008, 191). Many conflicts since 1945 have initiated by new and weak states (Holsti 1996). In a way, there is a continuum from the colonial conflicts of the Cold War period to today’s conflicts with non-state actors. Since 1945, the problem of war has mostly consisted of state maintenance and state failures (ibid.). It would be a simplification to limit wars to the use of force of two distinct national armies causing at least 1,000 casualties (Holsti 1991 272–273).

Different schools in international relations and military studies, as well as in peace and conflict studies have diverse explanations for contemporary warfare. Despite their limitations, it is possible that different theories can partly explain conflicts and their root-causes. According to Holsti (1991, 2), there is no answer to the ancient question of “why war occurs” – and the causes of war remain obscure although they have become slightly clearer.

Regarding warfare, at least four lines of development have taken place since the Cold War. Firstly, high technology in warfare has been acknowledged. Secondly, instead of the risks of larger wars between countries, smaller regional or internal conflicts with non-state actors have been emphasized. Thirdly, almost real-time information sharing about on-going conflicts has raised awareness about crises. Finally, terrorism and the US war on terror have increased the visibility of non-state actors in warfare. (Malkki et al. 2008, 208.)

Raimo Väyrynen (2006b) made reference to Rapoport's (1968) distinction between political and cataclysmic models of war. The former one refers to the Clausewitzian model, in which war is seen as a rational military instrument used by governments for political goals (Rapoport 1968, 13). In the latter version, wars are caused by historical and structural forces that are seen as being mostly beyond human control and therefore prone to escalation. Cataclysmic and eschatological theories of warfare consist of a wide set of views that are not as clearly articulated as Clausewitz's theory (ibid., 31). Väyrynen (2006b, 1) found this distinction to be an essential one because human instrumentality matters in the political model, but the cataclysmic view says that laws of society and culture modify the hostilities. Tarja Väyrynen (2010) argued that explanatory causes of conflict have been a major part of peace and conflict studies. In this field of studies, explanations are based on the basic needs theory, the theory of structural violence, the theory of relative misery and cultural explanations (T. Väyrynen 2010, 254–255 and 260).

A central question regarding the conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War is the extent to which they are the result of conscious political efforts and the extent to which they can be explained in cataclysmic terms. A lack of knowledge about contemporary warfare only partly explains why the media often describes new conflicts in cataclysmic terms. These conflicts just “happen” as a result of ethnic or religious hostilities. The political part of the warfare may be complicated and political motives may be “camouflaged” under a new cover in order to get support. According to a Clausewitzian approach, war is not deviant behavior but a political instrument (Holsti 1991, 13). From a human security perspective, however, avoiding warfare is one part of the strategy to advance human security, which means that the measures taken in conflict prevention are important. Finding causes of warfare would be relevant for promoting conflict prevention and would be necessary in order to be able to answer to the question: “Why war?”

Soon after the end of the Cold War, Holsti (1991, 323) predicted that the future agenda of international relations would be full of “civil wars, wars of secession and the breakdown of multi-community states - all with the possibility of foreign intervention.” Although civil wars were foreseen, the international community has not been sufficiently able to provide political means to deal with new forms of warfare. The humanitarian catastrophes which took place in the wars of the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s reminded the international community about the vulnerability of the civilians in failed or fragile states. Jonathan Glover (2001, 136) describes the events leading to the massacre of 7000 Bosnians, mostly men, as follows:

“In 1993 the UN declared six ‘safe areas’, but the troops of UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) were allowed to use their weapons only to protect themselves, not to protect the Bosnians. The Serbian forces bombarded the ‘safe areas’ and captured two of them in 1995, at Srebrenica and Zepa. ... General Morillon led a convoy of vehicles with food, medicine and a few soldiers into Srebrenica, which the Serbs were shelling and were about to capture. ... After Morillon left, the Serb forces renewed the shelling and killed many people, including children in a school playground. ...

The Serbian forces under General Mladić captured Srebrenica. They held the women and children of the town in pens. The men were taken for ‘questioning’ and killed. The Dutch UN troops who saw this had no authority to stop it and could only urge the victims not to panic.”

The actions of the UN in Srebrenica in 1995 were insufficient to protect the civilians. The international press followed the atrocities that took place in Srebrenica closely. The inaction of the international community in several recent crises has made the protection of civilians one of the major goals in the on-going development of peace processes. When explaining the UN failure in Rwanda, less attention has been paid to the complexity of structures and mechanisms of the UN that contributed to the failure (Piiparinen 2010, 76). Therefore, the responses of the international community should not be analyzed without paying attention to the structural impediments that may make the actual responses more difficult.

Since the warfare in the Balkans in the 1990s, the international community has taken several steps forward on the path to prevent genocides and other kinds of armed conflicts. Today’s conflicts raise international awareness but show in practice that stronger international mechanisms and involvement are required to solve on-going wars⁷. By 2008, the death toll in the conflict in Darfur was assessed at 450,000 (Beardsley 2009). Since the Cold War, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the most devastating in terms of its outcome of 5.4 million deaths, only about six percent of which are direct battle deaths. Although this conflict has been of a large-scale, the international community’s focus on it has been modest. (Hawkins 2008.)

Terrorism and counterterrorism have become important parts of the international agenda since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) changed conflict analysis. The evolution of conflicts in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003 is a consequence of counter-terrorist strategies of US-led coalitions defending guerrilla groups. The number of civilian casualties in these conflicts has gained attention in the media and attracted criticism.⁸

There has been a rise in the number of conflicts involving a mix of state-based and non-state actors, which usually function in extensive trans-national conflict networks (Lindberg & Melvin 2007, 55–78). The central role of the non-state actors is one of the major changes in new conflicts compared to conventional wars. Mary Kaldor (1999/2001) and Francois Thual (1995) both emphasized the role of identity-based factors in the new conflicts. Enemies are classified according to their differing identities from the combating groups’ perspective. These varying identities may be based on religion or ethnicity, and the conflict increases the tendency to exaggerate identity as a separating factor. On the other hand, without neglecting ethnicity-based and similar kinds of factors, poverty has been regarded as a key factor that both maintains and leads to conflict cycles (e.g. Collier 2007).

Contemporary regional and local military developments have the potential to be of global significance (Evans 2004, 28–29). Today’s conflicts largely occur within society rather than

⁷ In 2006, Africa, Asia and the Middle East were the principal geographical locations of armed conflicts. In particular, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan commanded a lot of international attention. The publicity that armed conflicts attract is not in direct relation to the devastation which they have caused.

⁸ According to Amnesty International (2011) 2,428 civilians were killed in Afghanistan as a result of the conflict and the majority died due to the violence of the Taliban and other anti-government forces in 2010.

between bordered states, in relatively remote places, and are generally only of regional relevance (Cheeseman 2004, 222). On the other hand, a conflict that is local in character may extend over borders and have regional implications. While risks of armed conflicts between the great powers have been declining since the end of the Cold War, the probability of aggression by marginalized states and failing states remain as true security risks (Ryan 2004, 108–109). It is necessary to enlarge the study of warfare to include the interaction between interstate, sub-state and trans-state conflict, and the diffusion of contemporary military capabilities (Evans 2004, 34). However, asymmetry has been an inherent part of warfare across history (MacFarling 2004, 139).

3.2 Concept of new conflict

Due to the changes in armed conflicts, several scholars have worked on a new paradigm in conflict literature which has been called the new-wars paradigm (Malesevic 2010). For example, Mary Kaldor (1999/2001) referred to these new kinds of conflicts as *new wars* but I would prefer to describe these low-intensity conflicts with non-state actors – as *new conflicts*. New conflicts consist of armed conflicts that have taken place since the end of the Cold War; these conflicts involve non-state actors and, potentially, state-actors as well. Civilians are typically victims of warfare and factors related to identity issues and ethnic and religious factors are also often involved. Various types of warfare may be regarded as part of violence, which is a much broader concept. Wars between states, colonial wars, and new conflicts are types of warfare. Because violence is a broad concept, it includes phenomena such as like terrorism, organized crime, violent acts of crime, and domestic violence.

New conflicts involve irregular warfare, which can be divided into five main types: *coup d'état*, terrorism, revolution, insurgency, and civil war (Kiras 2008, 232). New conflicts are typically civil wars but may also involve states. Asymmetry is often typical to these conflicts because state actors and non-state actors may use different tactics in warfare. One of the most typical features of contemporary armed conflicts is complexity, which also extends to achieve peace (Egnell 2009).

Battlefield mortality is often low in new conflicts, at least compared to conventional warfare in major wars. Because the concept of war would require 1,000 battlefield deaths annually and new conflicts do not always exceed that number of casualties, the concept of a new conflict is in accordance with the conflict literature. In new conflicts, civilians are targeted as part of tactics, and at least a large number of combatants are non-state actors.

Wars are armed conflicts that exceed 1,000 battlefield deaths annually. Consequently, the same conflict may be considered as a war some years and as an armed conflict in others. Salenius-Pasternak and Visuri (2006, 8) defined a crisis as an aggravated conflict. Although their conceptualization differs slightly from the definition of a conflict based on mortality, I prefer to use the concept of a new conflict to describe the type of current warfare that is mostly combined with low battlefield mortality.

Armed conflicts generated by non-state armed groups will remain a major cause of violence and instability in many regions of the world for the foreseeable future. Ethnic, tribal, clan,

religious, and communal groups operate based on traditional ways of war, often adapting them to the settings in which they are fighting. Armed non-state groups mobilize rapidly for war and adapt their traditional tactics to fight modern foes. The fighting units of these armed groups are almost always small, decentralized, and unconventional. (Shultz & Dew 2006, 259–270.) Armed non-state groups typically have a high degree of decentralization, control over the local population, and the availability of funds, as well as the role played by civilians in their support structures (Springer 2006, 61).

The changes in contemporary warfare have been described as a paradigm shift that started with the emergence of nuclear weapons in 1945. The end of the Cold War made the paradigm shift visible. The old paradigm was one of interstate industrial war and the new one is that of war amongst people. (Smith 2006.) According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), paradigmatic changes in science have meant a fundamental revolution in terms of understanding knowledge and the concept of paradigm has also been applied to other contexts. The basic scientific concepts may change radically within a paradigmatic shift. A paradigmatic shift in a conflict context means that contemporary warfare mostly consists of a quality that is not usually found in conventional warfare or in major wars. Because our understanding of warfare is based on the old paradigm, it is difficult to understand the new paradigm, which is grounded on “a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing a state or a non-state actor” (Smith 2006, 16–17). War amongst people conceptually refers to civilians as victims of warfare, as well as to warfare that media transfers to ordinary people. (ibid.)

In today’s warfare, the tactical level is the most important. The political and military institutions have been developed in the previous industrial model based on the old paradigm of warfare, but it is now necessary to learn new ways of applying the use of force that are appropriate for the current model of warfare (ibid., 16–26). All of the changes in conflicts have not taken place suddenly, however. The Second World War was the last large scale conflict in which states were combating actors. According to the Human Security Report of 2005, the most devastating wars (that is, those causing over a half of the battlefield casualties during the period between 1946 and 2002) were: the civil war in China, the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the war between Iran and Iraq, and the wars in Afghanistan. The USA-linked coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 are examples of conventional wars that have taken place recently between states.

Each year, armed conflicts directly cause approximately 100,000 deaths, most of which are caused by the use of small arms. (UNDP 2005, 12). In the 1990s, 95 percent of the conflicts were internal conflicts, not interstate conflicts (Human Security Report 2005, 18.) The apparent decline in war may be seen in a wider context, because in the developed world at least, there has been a move away from the acceptance of intentional killing (Mueller 2006, 65). A war is usually defined as a high-intensity conflict in which the mortality rate rises over 1,000 casualties annually. A conflict, on the other hand, has between 25 and 999 annual casualties. According to the tradition applied in Uppsala genocides and similar kinds of acts of one-sided mass destruction are excluded from the statistics regarding conflict mortality. (Human Security Report 2005.)

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the only international actor to have published information on mortality rates of wars. WHO's mortality estimates are higher than other estimates which could be the result on a broader definition of war mortality. The WHO statistics may have included deaths other than those caused directly in warfare. (Ibid., 30.) The 1990s saw conflicts that involved brutal violence against civilians. Although the battlefield mortality rate decreased in the 1990s, the visibility of human rights violations in new conflicts was especially high in the mass media (ibid.). However, one-sided massacres and genocides are not included in the Human Security Report's criteria for war.

Leitenberg (2006) has criticized the Human Security Report and some other analyses that exclude one-sided massacres and indirect deaths caused by warfare from the mortality rates. Limited analysis of warfare mortality can lead to the devastation of new conflicts being under-estimated. On the other hand, mortality rates in warfare are often far from exact (Human Security Report 2005; Vesa 2010)⁹. Typologies vary regarding the definition of war and conflict and the continuum of intensity of conflict has been emphasized without excluding genocides from the analysis (see Chirot 1991, 3–7). Direct conflict mortality is lower in today's conflicts than in conventional wars, although brutalities do take place in new conflicts. (Ibid., 29–30). The Human Security Report of 2005 states that the decrease of conflict mortality has been caused by the end of the Cold War and colonial wars. Knowledge about direct conflict mortality is limited and it is even more difficult to estimate indirect conflict mortality.¹⁰ In 2010, 14 armed conflicts exceeded 1,000-casualty threshold for a war (Millennium Project 2011a).

Armed conflict causes social development to deteriorate in war-torn communities and societies in many ways. The recruitment of child soldiers is a growing problem. The situation of girls recruited as child soldiers is especially difficult because they become victims of various kinds of abuse. (ILO 2006, 42–43.) Militarization and the recruitment of internally displaced persons and refugees can endanger peace processes (Nahm 2006). In many conflicts, the combatants consist of relatively heterogeneous groups. Modern armed conflicts are typically socio-international because they are not purely a social or international type of conflict (Romeva i Rueda 2003, 37). The unclear and unstable state between war and peace aggravates the position of civilians in conflict areas.

As victims of armed conflicts, women may face gender-specific threats. Acknowledgement of rape victims has been reported in some conflict areas (Lindsey 2005, 113). Rape has been a tool of ethnic cleansing in conflicts such as Bosnia and Rwanda (ibid., 118). These examples show how seriously women's rights can be violated in armed conflicts. As civilians, women have suffered in armed conflicts throughout history. Women's organizations started to pay attention to women's position and sexual violence in armed conflicts at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (Mäki 2007). Although sexual violence in warfare has occurred for centuries, the phenomenon was rarely studied in academic research before the 1990s (ibid.). The position of male civilians should not be ignored either. The concept of "civilians" is gendered, which may cause differentiation of the treatment of

⁹ In the Vietnam War, 58,000 American soldiers died, but the estimation of Vietnamese casualties vary from one million to two million. Deaths that were caused by the war but occurred after it are not included in conflict mortality rates. Higher mortality due to diseases is not included in warfare mortality estimates either. (Vesa 2010.)

¹⁰ The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is one example of one-sided large-scale violence which is probably considered as a war in the eyes of majority of people though it is not officially defined as a war due of the criteria utilized in Uppsala.

women and men in armed conflict (Carpenter 2006). The discourse on civilians defines women in terms of vulnerability and innocence, but men are not typically described in a similar way. Belligerents are somewhat less likely to kill women and children than they are to kill unarmed adult men. (Ibid.)

The progress from peace to war and back to peace after the stabilization has traditionally been visualized as a continuum. Today, the situation is not so clear in many conflicts. The stabilization phase often fails, which means that the development can be regarded more like a vicious circle than a continuum leading from warfare to peace. Conflict that ends due to crisis management and peace building often fails to remain peaceful but instead leads to instability and back to conflict. Approximately half of all contemporary civil wars are outcomes of post-conflict societies relapsing back to warfare (Collier 2007, 177). Most of the conflicts in the 1990s were crises of a continuous character: by the end of the decade 65 percent of the ongoing conflicts had lasted at least five years (Grasa 2003, 17). Many peace processes are unsuccessful and lead to re-newed violence (Newman & Richmond 2006, 1). Within 5 years of cease-fire, 44 percent of countries affected by conflict return to war (Glenn & Gordon 2007). Preferable development would mean a continuum from conflict via peace-building to peace. Of course, the ideal solution would be to prevent conflicts from emerging in the first place. The human and economic costs of warfare are huge which means that the international community should work hard in order to develop policies for conflict prevention. The peace process of Aceh is an example that shows that conflict cycles are not inevitable.

Since the end of Cold War there has been a lot of debate regarding changes to warfare. Unlike conventional wars, new conflicts have several typical features: they involve non-governmental fighters; the conflict takes place within a country rather than between two or several states; civilians are likely to be victims of the conflict; the conflict is likely to take place in a non-democratic and poor country; fights over natural resources may hinder the peace process; warfare and more peaceful phases may follow each other; identity-based factors are the basis of the distinction according to which some people or groups are seen as enemies; and although the annual number of battlefield casualties is under 1,000, indirect devastation, cruelty by fighters and one-sided violence including massacres may be remarkable. In the new-wars paradigm, a lot of attention has also been paid to the external financing of warfare and that traditional divisions within conflicts; the blurring of traditional divisions within conflicts; and the deployment of different kinds of combatants including criminal gangs and private armies (Malesevic 2010, 312).

3.3 Human security and responsibility to protect

“Human security is about the security of individuals and communities rather than security of states, and it combines both human rights and human development.”
 – Mary Kaldor (2007, 183)

The human security concept was launched to a wider audience by the UN Development Report in 1994. Human security is a universal concern, its components are interdependent, and early prevention is a major part of guaranteeing human security, which, as a concept is people-centered (UNDP 1994, 22–23). Human security means safety from chronic threats as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life (*ibid.* 23). Human security has become one of the key ideas upon which the UN and EU have been developing their security policies. It is relevant in conflict analysis because armed conflicts have a devastating impact on human rights (see Fagan 2010, 50–51).

The idea of human security has altered security thinking which has focused on nation-state-based security. However, it has remained a controversial idea. There are two basic interpretations of the concept. According to a broad, inclusive view, human security requires the attenuation of a wide range of threats to wellbeing of individuals and communities. A narrow view on human security would limit it to the attenuation of the threat of physical violence. (Henk 2007.) As mentioned in chapter 1, the present study has used human security in the narrow sense, meaning freedom from violence. This conceptual constraint is used for practical reasons because, in the empirical parts of the research, the wider concepts would be too broad. In many other circumstances, the use of the broader definition of human security is justified (see Coticchia & Ferrari 2009).

Although the human security discussion involves the “development first” and the “security first” schools, these two positions are not mutually exclusive (MacFarlane & Khong 2006, 201). The co-existence of both dimensions is important for peace processes and development. According to Kaldor (2007, 196), it is impossible to separate security and development and distinctions between foreign and domestic policy are breaking down. On the other hand, human security has also been defined as a precondition for human development (Martin & Owen 2010, 222).

The human security paradigm in security studies and international relations in the early 1990s signified a paradigm shift in security thinking (Nuruzzaman 2006; Kaldor 2007). Although the human security paradigm received attention, it was not completely new because it shares the realist concerns for the status quo and its positivistic problem-solving approach. The most essential factor strengthening its popularity was the changed role of threats at the end of Cold War. (Nuruzzaman 2006, 299–300.) Warfare related to human rights principles did not emerge only with the human security paradigm conceptually, human security fortifies the primary position of the protection of the civilians at war and in crisis management and other means by which the international community intervenes in armed conflict. New conflicts that followed the Cold War made the need to protect human rights even more visible. The human security approach pays more attention to “bottom-up” and “people-centered” perspectives (Ewan 2007). Therefore, it has implications on research objectives and methods as well.

Human security does not contradict or replace national security (Thakur 2006, 90). National security remains in use in some contexts, but in some others, the framework of human security is more suitable (*ibid.*). The roles of national or state security and human security have been widely discussed and the concepts of national and human security have even been regarded as controversial. In practice, however, this is not the case. Natalia Florea Hudson (2010) argued that state structures are needed to ensure human security including women's rights for living in freedom from violence. Therefore, functioning state security is a condition for human security. National security should strengthen human security.

The concept of human security is based on human rights. National security does not have such a direct connection with human rights, although it is linked to them if states accept the international obligations adopted by the UN and other organizations that focus on human rights standards. Human rights violations that contradict the rules of war should be condemned, even though they are results of the activities of armed forces that have support from the national government. War crimes have been condemned as a result of international humanitarian law. Crimes against humanity are the violations of absolute moral requirements concerning group-based torture or murder of the innocent (May 2007, 71). Humane treatment is a cornerstone in the Hague and Geneva Conventions regulating warfare (*ibid.* 90).

The human rights culture in international politics, which started to emerge after 1945, has been criticized as an outcome of the Western culture and values. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a positive signal of strengthening human rights at the international level. (Boucher 2009, 371–376.) The ICC may have a significant role for post-war justice in resolving war crimes. Although human rights in general are open to debate, David Boucher (2009, 310) argued that “there are certain rights so fundamental that social relations as we know them would be inconceivable without such rights.” An international debate on the content of basic human rights will certainly continue and this debate will also have an impact on the debate on human security. In order to achieve accurate human rights policies, fact-based information on human rights is required (Landman 2009). This perspective is relevant for human security policies as well, although it can often be challenging to get reliable information about the human rights situation from a conflict area.

Human security represents similar kinds of values and thinking as the responsibility to protect which means that the international community should be able to protect the civilians if the local or regional state actors are not able to guarantee their safety. A high-level commission, “The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” based on a Canadian initiative, published a report entitled “Responsibility to protect” (2001). The principle of the responsibility to protect was adopted in the World Summit Outcome in the UN in 2005 and by the Security Council (resolution 1674) in 2006. This principle states that every member country of the UN accepts its responsibility to protect its own population from genocides, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (Seppä 2008; Bellamy 2009).

Human rights violations are an indicator that a conflict might take place, and therefore, the observance of human rights is part of the strategy to avoid civil war (Miall 2007, 117). Although the responsibility to protect is potentially a vital innovation for promoting human

rights, powerful countries may consider that they are actually responsible to protect when their own interests are involved in a crisis (Dove 2009). The responsibility to protect should primarily signify the responsibility to prevent, which means that the policies should focus on preventing armed conflict from emerging (Bellamy 2009, 52). The emergence of the responsibility to protect is a watershed in world politics although it has not yet significantly impacted the willingness of the governments to contribute resources to prevent mass atrocities (Bellamy 2011, 196–199).

Conflict-related arguments are often politically sensitive. Even humanitarian ideas may be criticized for the legitimizing objectives other than humanitarian ones. The level of devastation of a conflict, such as genocide, may cause a dispute within the international community and even among the scholar who specialize in these issues. Nevertheless, people suffering from any armed conflict should have the right for protection. It is necessary to provide human security in a systematic way and the rights of the individuals living under threat in conflict or post-conflict areas need to be acknowledged.

Strengthening human security may be seen as an ethical principle that has implications on practical policies related to conflicts. It is important that various humanitarian, peace-building, and crisis management operations take aspects of human security seriously. Protection of civilians and the ability to cooperate with them should be of importance in humanitarian, crisis management and peace-building missions. Providing human security requires comprehension of on-going or past conflicts. Human security must be analyzed in its cultural, historical or political contexts. Individual differences in the demand of protection should be taken into account and particularly vulnerable groups, like children, should receive special attention.

3.4 Cultural, religious, and political dimensions of conflicts

Culture consists of various meanings linked to attitudes condensing into patterns of thought and behavioral institutions. It is largely transversal to societies although it is affected by transmitting, modifying and maintaining phenomena. Therefore, it must be understood that individuals learn to live in a culture within a socialization process (Todisco 2009, 189–190). The role of culture has been analyzed in order to explain new conflicts. Cultural issues can have an impact on individuals and groups as well as on international relations. Consequently, they are also linked to globalization which revives local cultural identities (Giddens 1999, 13). Culture affects inter-group conflicts in two ways. Firstly, it separates people into an in-group and an out-group. Secondly, it shapes an individual's perception of conflict and the ways that individual can respond to it. (Worchel 2005.) Cultural impacts extend to religious, ethnic, and political issues related to identities.

Cultural, religious and identity issues related to violent conflicts can be essential at both the local and national levels. Another issue is whether these issues can explain conflicts. An assessment of the factors that influence violent conflict may be culturally dependent which means that an actor's cultural background has an impact on his or her estimations of causalities in conflict or warfare. In international relations, cultural differences may be linked to various

roles in the power structures. Research on international relations has mostly underestimated the role of the religion, and the major scholars of international relations theory have been Westerners (Fox & Sandler 2004, 163). An individual's religious interpretations have an impact on how that person assesses different symbols including whether they are restricted to a narrow meaning or can be interpreted as part of a more common cultural heritage (Heinonen 2000, 135–142).

3.4.1 Civilizations: cooperation or combat

According to Todisco (2009, 195) civilization means “the set of professed ideas, adopted customs, traditions and characteristics at a given time, belonging to people in a particular society, together with the development of an individual's physical, intellectual and moral faculties, towards a continuous progress.” Conceptually, therefore, the term *civilization* refers to progress (ibid.). The term has been used more widely in international relations due to Samuel Huntington's argumentation.

Huntington's views on the differences between the civilizations for explaining violent outbursts have been debated since the 1990s. According to Huntington (2003), cultures and cultural identities have modified the world since the Cold War to a point of uniformity, disintegration, and conflict. Huntington (2003) described the on on-going changes as follows. For the first time in history, global politics is multi-polar and multicultural. The power balance between different cultures is shifting; and the relative power of the West is decreasing. The new world order, based on cultures, is being brought forth, with: similar kinds of cultures cooperating. The universalistic goals of the West have more often led it to conflict with other cultures, especially with China and Islam. The existence of the West is grounded on the idea that the USA acknowledges its Western identity and that westerners accept that their culture is not a universal one and they are unified in order to reform and preserve it from the challenge of the non-Western societies. It is possible to avoid a global war if the world leaders accept the multicultural nature of world politics and start to cooperate in order to preserve it. (Ibid . 21–22.)

Huntington (2003, 26–31) divided the world map after the 1990's into nine regions: Western, Latin American, African, Islamist, Chinese, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. In this new world, local politics is a politics of ethnicity and global politics is a politics of cultures. There is no colonial power: instead of fights for independence, there are struggles between liberated countries. Conflicts between rich and poor countries are less likely. At the beginning of 1993, there were 48 ethnic conflicts, slightly fewer than half of which took place between groups coming from different cultures. (Ibid.)

Empirical studies on Huntington's hypotheses have been made in conflict analysis and the results have mostly been negative towards his theory. However, a recent analysis on post-Cold War interstate conflicts found some empirical support on Huntington's theory has been found (Charron 2010). In a way, Huntington's (2003) view on “the clash of the civilizations” is partially justified by the conflict between the Islamist al-Qaeda and the Western Christian countries. However, not all the conflicts since the end of the Cold War have taken place over the cultural borders defined by Huntington. Although Huntington's thesis of the clash of

the civilizations fits fairly well when al-Qaeda and Western countries are studied, his claims seem to be too categorical to fully explain new conflicts that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Cultural and religious factors often exist in the background of new conflicts, but it would appear to be impossible to build a theory of new conflicts based on culture and religion.

Huntington's views were criticized by Amartya Sen (2006), who argued that potential cultural controversies cannot be described as controversies between entire cultures because there are differences between individuals from the cultural areas that Huntington introduced. Conflicts between religious views may take place between different symbolic levels, which means that there are controversies between the levels of abstractness with regard to the interpretations (see Heinonen 2002, 90–93). Therefore, there are various interpretations of a religion within the same cultural sphere. This aspect could explain diversity within cultures in regard to the impact that religions have on conflicts. According to Bottici and Challand (2010, 135), “the myth of the clash between Islam and the West has become one of the most powerful myths of our time”. Francois Thual (1995) also criticized Huntington for simplifying the reality and neglecting the identity concept as well as the geopolitical background of several crises.

Historically, there have been more conflicts within the large “civilizations” in Huntington's map than between them (Nye 2003, 244). Although Huntington has been criticized, the political role of the religions has already been previously rising (Heinonen 2004a, 75). Different forms of fundamentalism may restrict the interpretation of the religion and this simplification may cause religion to become a politically indoctrinating ideology (Heinonen 2004b, 51–52).

In assessing the relationship between the West and Islam, the West has considered Islam as a threat only for a short time. In modern times this feature emerged only after the oil crisis in 1973 and after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979s. (Männistö 2003, 132.) The view of Islam in Western countries is two-fold. On one hand, it is a religion of peace – as many Muslims believe it to be – on the other hand the violent interpretation of Islam by the extremists has attracted a lot of attention in the Western mass media. (Hämeen-Anttila 2003, 110.) Western views of Islam and non-Western cultural phenomena have been criticized for being one-sided (e.g. Sen 2006; Said 1978/2003).

Edward Said (1978/2003) described Orientalism as an academic and ideological principle that affects the Western thought and representations of the Orient in ways that are not scientifically justifiable. It uses stereotypes to perceive cultural differences and consists of a system of representations that are part of Western consciousness. Thus, the influence of a culture on an individual is not determined because individual differences and civilizations are interrelated and interdependent. (Ibid.) Therefore, cultural determinism exaggerates the meaning of a culture for individuals. Huntington's views have been criticized as an outcome of Orientalism. Huntington's (2003) views are often criticized to the extent that his own criticism of Western-centered policies is forgotten.

Intercultural relations can evolve in four types of categories: assimilation, homogenization, communicative segmentation, and separateness. Assimilation refers to the full attainment

of globalization of the dominant culture. Homogenization signifies a new form of society emerging by somehow including all the parts of the original cultures. In communicative segmentation, every specific culture expresses itself by becoming part of global interdependencies that have already been defined in the international system. Separateness means a refusal to have dialogue or mix with other cultures. (Todisco 2009, 213–214.) Although the typology tends to refer to the development within a society, it may also be applied to international relations. National cultures are not prone to changes, which means that even cultural tendencies for cooperation or avoiding it may be stable (see Hofstede 2001, 34).

Intercultural relations are very around the world and in various times in history and change continually. Cultural relations extend across the cultural borders that Huntington has presented and there is a variation of interpretations within a cultural sphere of its meanings. For example, there are many forms of Islam within Islamist networks (see Linjakumpu 2009, 31). Cooperation may overcome combat or clashes. These types of development also depend on international and local politics. Therefore, no determinism should take place in relation to cultural clashes. In Todisco's (2009) typology, separateness refers to potential cultural clashes, not the other alternatives included in his categorization. Although the rise of Islamic terrorism may partly justify Huntington's argumentation, it does not represent the entire community of Islamic religion nor the other borderlines between the cultural regions that Huntington introduced.

Cultural cooperation is a potential future alternative to cultural clashes. Huntington's (2003) views have been criticized, because cultures are not actors, but individuals are, and because civilizational borders are misleading (Melasuo 2009; Bottici & Challand 2010, 136). From this perspective, clashes of civilization are not logically possible, although cultural cooperation is. However, disputes related to cultural domains may exist between the representatives of different cultures, which means they may be perceived as cultural clashes. The distinction between cultural borders and their meanings to an individual comprise a complex reality. For example, Islam has become more political (Linjakumpu 2009, 19). A person's cultural background has an impact on how he or she interprets of various phenomena. In today's globalizing world which is based on networks, different cultural interpretations may have far-reaching consequences (see Castells 2009).

Information about violent conflict is mostly transferred to people by the mass media. "War amongst the people", as Rupert Smith (2006) described contemporary warfare, referred to how ordinary people perceive news when they watch the TV or follow the news on the Internet. Therefore, cultural perceptions and misperceptions are sensitive to the processes through which warfare or violence is described in mass media. Misperceptions on behalf of Americans related to the reasons behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have been widely described (e.g. Castells 2009). Misperception of facts may also lead to cultural misperceptions or strengthen them.

3.4.2 Conflicts based on identity, ethnicity, and religion

Identity becomes a major feature for a group if it feels threatened. Identity-based conflicts are grounded on an existential fear. They are conflicts of survival – not only materially, but especially from a cultural and psychological perspective. Although such conflicts have existed, something new is included in their internal and external intensity. There are a large number of the identity-based conflicts. (Thual 1995.) Processes related to identity and social categorization are discussed in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 in the context of crisis management personnel, but, it is also important to remember these concepts in the context of conflict. Understanding the dynamics of majority and minority may help understand the background of a conflict. Uncertain majorities emphasize national feelings and discriminate against minorities to defend their position, while some minorities emphasize valuable parts of their difference (Liebkind 1996, 200). Identity differences are complex because their influence varies and they do not necessarily cause conflicts.

Ethnicity does not automatically lead to conflict (Nye 2003, 151) and ethnic identities do not inherently conflict. Individuals are not naturally in conflict simply because of their different characteristics. Broadly defined, competition for power, wealth, or status may provide the basis for conflict (Deng 2000, 142). Ethnic conflicts often take place when established mechanisms for negotiation break down. After this collapse, the inability of governments to mediate leads to conflicts, and armed conflict or war may commence when a former administration ceases to exist or loses its legitimacy because of external intervention. (Nye 2003, 151.) Colonial background may also reinforce ethnic tensions.¹¹

There are three types of ethnic conflict: (1) Conflict (no war, occasional violence), (2) no serious conflict despite a high level of awareness about differences, and (3) past conflict followed by reconciliation. (Chirot 2001, 3–7). Ethnic conflicts are also divided into two subgroups. In the first, the ethnic groups are equal; and in the second, one ethnic group is subordinated to the other one. In the latter subgroup, it is more likely that an element of inequality is included. (Horowitz 2000, 15–22.) Ethnic and cultural conflict is more likely if social changes accompanied by modernization and globalization, challenge identities (Nye 2003, 244). Ethnicity may be mirrored towards other ethnic groups or cultural influences coming from outside. In an ethnic conflict, it may be crucial to acknowledge the position of a group (Lahikainen 2000, 82). Ethnic and religious identities may explain differences in perception and interpretation of reality. “Racialization” of a conflict from outside may make reconciliation difficult (Mamdani 2009, 7). An ethnic distinction that has been of historical importance may have a long-lasting impact on the future of a region. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, ethnic explanations of the genocide in Rwanda have been criticized for neglecting its historical roots (Piiparinen 2010). Ethnic conflicts are complex and similarities between them are limited. Thus, the unique features of ethnic conflicts must be taken into account in strategies to resolve them. (Wimmer 2004.)

The significance of religion in international affairs has been increasing recently and religion has been the motivation for several terrorist attacks have been motivated by it (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2009, 299). Religion may be connected with violence and ethnic distinctions

¹¹ Belgian colonialism strengthened ethnic distinction and, after 50 years, led to the genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani 2009, 277). Although this genocide has often been regarded as an ethnic conflict, it was more complex than simply an outcome of ethnic violence, and its socio-historical background has mostly been underestimated (Piiparinen 2010).

and is an option for groups that feel excluded (Heinonen 2004a, 80). Feelings of oppression may lead to the emergence of “a culture of violence” (Juergensmeyer 2006, 12–13). The feelings of exclusion may explain the power of religion in conflict processes. Although religious ideas do not necessarily provoke conflicts, they are important factors in many conflict processes because the conditions that lead to armed conflict often have some relation to social and political identities (Juergensmeyer 2008, 253). Religions are also interpreted as a source of legitimacy regarding various actions (Fox & Sandler 2004, 163). The meaning of the religion depends on the interpretation of religious symbols and inter-religious dialogue require a common understanding of these symbols. (Heinonen 2002).

Identity-based and ethno-political and religious explanations can partly be used to understand new conflicts and provide tools with which to build peace and confidence. Confidence building and other efforts showing that warfare is not inevitable can be part of the peace process. Culturally affected perceptions of other cultures or ethnic groups do not necessarily determine individuals’ representations or they are not evident of their nature. Ethnicity, religion and identities have political dimensions in today’s world. Historical feelings and past events may be used to manipulate communities and individuals (Linjakumpu 2009, 85). Although ethnic or religious distinctions may prevail in peaceful societies, manipulation based on ethnic, religious and identity-based issues is typical of many modern conflicts. Ethnic conflicts should not be simplified and a complexity framework weaves together ethnic conflicts together with their structural background.

3.4.3 Terrorism

The word “*terrorism*” comes from the Latin word “*terrere*” which means to scare or to frighten. It was first used for a political purpose during the French Revolution. (Malkki et al. 2007, 25.) Terrorist acts have historically been motivated by a diverse set of phenomena. Terrorism may be part of tactics in warfare, while terrorist acts may also take place in countries not at war. It is often linked to the sphere of cultural controversies (see Linjakumpu 2009). Events such as 9/11 and terrorist acts as part of contemporary warfare have meant that terrorism also exists as part of new conflicts. According to Malkki et al. (2007, 32) terrorism is the use of threat of violence for the purpose of causing terror and fear in order to obtain political influence. The idea of civilian targeting or soft targets is often regarded as the analytical core of terrorism (Kivimäki 2003a, 2).

Terrorism can be distinguished from conventional warfare and other types of violence due to its psychological nature, which is based on creating fear. Political purposes are part of terrorism. Terrorism may be seen as a weapon or a tactic that is utilized by both state and non-state actors. (Horgan 2005, 11–22.) Socially, terrorism is dependent on mass media, which makes a wider audience aware of terrorist acts (Rantapelkonen 2006, 97). The diverse social meanings and consequences of terrorism should not be neglected. Terrorism may lead to a spiral of revenge and function as both a consequence and a cause of differences between the communities it affects (Eckert 2008, 21). Terrorism has even been seen as a result of the myth of the clash of the civilizations, which has become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Bottici & Challand 2010, 111).

Terrorists do not respect the rules of war (May 2007, 303). Terrorism is a tactic, but its strategic role may vary (Gurr 2006, 85; Sheffer 2006, 128). It is part of the tactics of many insurgent groups and international terrorism linked to al-Qaeda has received a lot of attention after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While it is possible to make a distinction between conventional war, guerrilla war, and terrorism, terrorist attacks may be part of both guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare (Malkki et al. 2007, 35-38). There have been four eras or waves of terrorism (*ibid.*), the latest of which is characterized by religion or by religious fanaticism. There has been a change from terrorism having concrete material objectives to terrorism supporting spiritual goals (Heinonen 2004a, 78).

Since the 1980s most terrorism has been Islamic in origin, although most of the recent terrorist acts in Europe have not been of this kind (Fox & Sandler 2004, 165; Limnell 2011). Al-Qaeda and a new generation of terrorists have combined traditional features of terrorism with new ones, including the abilities to utilize new information technology and media (Rekkedal 2006, 558; Heisbourg 2003, 43–47).

Terrorism has existed in different religions (Juergensmeyer 2003). A religion makes a conflict more absolute and demonizes its enemy. For religious terrorists, religion provides justification for violent acts. In this era, religious terrorism is one of the responses to secularism in a globalizing context (*ibid.*). Terrorism is found more often in developing societies than in extremely poor or rich societies (Gurr 2006, 86). Some explanations have been made in the context of so-called relative deprivation. The deepening distinction between real and weak actors in globalization may lead to an environment that is more susceptible to terrorism (Gotchev 2006, 105). Fundamentalist terrorism evolves in circumstances of economic and political grievances and a lack of public goods may lead to tolerance of terrorism (Kivimäki & Laakso 2003). Terrorists need communities and networks that support them on a practical and moral basis (Juergensmeyer 2003, 11).

As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the UN adopted resolutions and policies supporting the cooperation of the international community to prevent terrorism (Fox & Sandler 2005, 165). Before 9/11, only some terrorist attacks were seen as requiring a military response. The United States adopted a strategy that was active and based on the idea of pre-emptive action in the war on terror, while the European view of the military use of force has been more conservative. (Raitasalo 2005, 153–154.) After 9/11 the Western defence communities were convinced of a vision that focused on the “global war on terror” (Lonsdale 2008, 55-56). In late 2001, the US and its allies started a military operation against Afghanistan in order to break the cooperation of the terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden and the country’s Taliban administration. Failure in peace-building has led to a worsening security situation in Afghanistan (Dobbins 2008).

In the security strategies of the EU (2003) and the USA (2002 and 2006), terrorism and failed states are seen as the most relevant threats for the Western countries. The “war on terrorism” launched by the Americans divided opinions around the world. Since 2009, the Obama administration has used other terms to describe policies of counterterrorism. It has replaced Operation Iraqi Freedom with Operation New Dawn and has focused on advising, assisting, and training Iraqi security forces and increased military, diplomatic, and civilian efforts in Afghanistan (Salonius-Pasternak 2011a). Efficient counterterrorism requires an

exact focus, influencing the direct causes of terrorism, and halting radicalization: there is minimal evidence that the use of force would lead to a decline in terrorism (Richardson 2006, 9; Eckert 2008, 21; Malkki et al 2007). Counterterrorism should be worldwide and efficient when focusing on an international actor like al-Qaeda, and large-scale UN initiatives in this field are important (Harmon 2008, 186–187).

The next phase of al-Qaeda may be a re-localization of the network, which may lead to the fading of the global Islamist *jihad*. The network may have a strong social impact on Muslim communities, even without terrorist acts. (Linjakumpu 2009, 99–100.) In late 2010 and early 2011, several demonstration movements – some of which aimed for democratization – were active in the Arab world. These movements may have several impacts on al-Qaeda. In the long run, they appear to have favored a process of democratization and peaceful changes, although, if civil wars begin due to them, al-Qaeda may exploit such conflicts. (Byman 2011; McCants 2011.) The death of al-Qaeda's leader, Osama Bin Laden, in 2011 may have an impact on both terrorist acts and international efforts in crisis management. Because a majority of Americans oppose the current military operation in Afghanistan and because the original reason for the military operation begun in 2001 was to neutralize al-Qaeda and capture Osama Bin Laden, the probability of withdrawing more troops from Afghanistan is increasing (Salonius-Pasternak 2011b).

According to recent statistics, 95 percent of all terrorist events cause risks which are close to the human risks of moderate or serious car accidents. An analysis of 40 years of terrorist attacks shows that 25,000 terrorist attacks have led to about 34,000 deaths and 82,000 non-fatal injuries. These statistics would change dramatically, if a terrorist attack would occur using a nuclear weapon or other effective means of mass destruction. (Smil 2008.) The face of terrorism may also change rapidly. In July 2011, a Norwegian man killed 77 people in a terrorist act that was not foreseen as part of Norway's national risk assessments.

3.4.4 Politics, power relations and limits of cultural explanations

Power relations within a country affect the probability of armed conflict. The risk of violence increases if a majority of people are marginalized. There is a similar affect if political elites are afraid of losing their power in elections due to the lack of mobility within society from one sector to another. For such parties, losing political power would mean losing their ability to influence. In many African countries, the transformation from conflict to peace will take time because it is difficult to rapidly change structures of societies. Therefore, power relations within society have an impact on the potential conflict development of any country. (Gounden 2011.)

In the next 10–15 years, globalization will be a major trend that will influence global development in diverse ways (Shapiro 2008; Mannermaa 2008). The effect that globalization has on cultural identities and awareness, as well as on potential conflict development, is manifold. Conservatism may rise as a response to globalization, while understanding of other cultures may be facilitated by new contacts between representatives of different cultures. Global policies or the lack thereof regulating globalization will certainly have

an impact on cultural contacts as well. Existing conflicts are interpreted in diverse ways globally. Different cultural orientations and power relations in international politics affect how the international community reacts to potential and actual violent conflicts. How the Western countries adapt to the development in which their power decreases and new major powers will emerge will be crucial. Today's world is strongly affected by globalization and the rise of network society which enables the evolution of information, making trust an important source of power (Castells 2009, 16). Cultural globalization is neither a single great promise nor a single great threat but it is a continuation of modernization and potentially a challenge to pluralism (Berger 2002, 16). Globalization enables networking via the internet, for example, and therefore dialogue between people with different cultural backgrounds, although the potential for more conflict-prone future remains open as well.

Regarding hegemony, there is no consensus among the theoreticians regarding how power shifts induce conflict-prone situations, but many of them do agree that a world war is not inevitable because of history (Jacoby 2008, 178). The United States may compete with India and China and potentially with Europe. The structural differences that affect the US and the EU will probably make their cooperation more difficult in the future. (Haftendorn 2008, 156.) The growth of China and India has raised interest in their futures policies. Historically, the relationship between China and India has been uneasy and this situation continued today, having both positive and negative future prospects (Malik 2009, 207–208). According to Robert Shapiro (2008), in 2020 the USA will be the only remaining military superpower, although globalization favors the rise of China on the global scale. Understanding Western influence is a complex process and Western power and influence is steadily being de-legitimized (Mahbutani 2008). Questions related to potential political and cultural disputes are not limited to the gap between the West and the non-West. Changing global power structures may influence stability and the regulatory international systems.

There are linkages between discourses on the great powers and cultural borders. Globalization and the development of hegemonies can be analyzed in the context of cooperation or clashes of civilizations (Huntington 2003). The re-emergence of autocratic regimes and reinforcement of Islamic radicalism have been predicted (see Kagan 2008, 105). Today's world is economically multi-polar and a diffusion of power will evolve when the information revolution progresses (Nye 2003, 256). Globalization will probably continue in the coming decades while failed states pose a risk for global security (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 14). It is in the interest of all countries to reduce risks of armed conflicts and insecurity in failed states. In the decades to come, various international actors may find common views regarding how to strengthen international cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management. Without real communication, "cultural lenses" and interests related to power may make international politics and peace processes difficult. Cooperation in resolving existing or potential contradictions is needed to ensure peaceful development.

Ethnic and religious issues are also used as tools to justify violence. Violent ethnic outbursts after a peaceful history cannot be explained only in ethnic terms. Ethnic or religious groupings and identities may have a profound influence on the members' perceptions and interpretations of modern realities. When ethnic and religious dimensions are present in conflict and international politics, the communicative issues related to peace processes may

be extremely sensitive. Consciousness about various interests and “cultural lenses” facilitates peace processes. The option of a broader collective identity, identification to humanity instead of single groups of people may be constructive when dealing with global threats (Lahikainen 2000, 84).

3.5 Economic, social, and ecological factors explaining new conflicts

“War no longer appears as a simple breakdown but as a self-sustaining rational economic system.”

- Kumi Naidoo (2010, 136).

The quantitative research literature and comparative literature on violent conflict support the idea that political and economic variables are important for the structural prevention of conflict (Miall 2007, 120). In recent years, much attention has been paid to the interconnectedness of stability and development (Metsola 2008). There are more conflicts in poor countries than rich ones and in non-democratic regimes more than in democracies. Between 1997 and 2001 two percent of internal wars took place in the most developed countries, 30 percent in countries of mid-level development and 56 percent in the least developed countries. (Smith 2005, 10–14.) According to the democratic peace literature, democracies do not fight wars with each other (Fox and Sandler 2004). Societal and structural levels of conflict analysis remain part of the explanation of warfare, although identity-based features are seen as essential factors in new conflicts.

Although the concept of failed states is imprecise, their characteristics can be identified as the inability or unwillingness to protect the citizens of a state from violence. Another feature of failed states is “their tendency to regard themselves as beyond the domestic or international law” and therefore able to carry out aggression. (Chomsky 2006, 1–2.) A failed state can only guarantee the functions of the state in an imperfect manner (Väyrynen 2003, 37). Although the phenomenon of failed states has been discussed at great length, it remains misunderstood. The factors explaining the weakness of these states are similar: corruption, elites monopolizing power, an absence of the rule of law, and severe ethnic or religious divisions. However, the responses to these similar kinds of problems are not necessarily the same because failed states are very diverse. It can be difficult to modify actions to enable long-term solutions for stabilization of failed states. (Foreign Policy 2007.)

The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy constructed a Failed States Index based on 12 social, economic, and military indicators. The index covers almost the whole world, ranking 177 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration. The countries heading the 2009 index were Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Sudan; in 2011, the top three were Somalia, Chad, and Sudan. There were eight Sub-Saharan states among the 10 most vulnerable both in 2007 and 2011, and seven in 2009. (Foreign Policy 2007; Foreign Policy 2009; Foreign Policy 2011.) Many of the contemporary global crises have arisen from the 40 to 60 countries that can be termed failed states. Although these crises have been largely ignored, it is essential that the international community pay greater attention

to them because they cause larger-scale risks to security. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 23; Ruohomäki 2008, 13–14.)

Corruption and criminality erode the credibility of failed states, and the common people in these countries do not believe that they can influence the development of their home countries (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 24). According to Thoms and Ron (2007), violations of civil and political rights are more obviously identifiable as conflict triggers than abuses of economic and social rights. However, although democracy has a positive impact on promoting peace, efforts to achieve democracy may lead to conflict. (Ibid. 702–705).

Constructing functioning state structures and governance is a key to getting out of conflict cycles and violent development in fragile states (see Ghani & Lockhart 2008). This argumentation relies on the meaning of trust at various levels: it is essential for citizens as well as for the international community or the global economy. At best, functioning state structures promote human rights and decrease ethnic hostilities by providing equality standards (ibid.). Therefore, failed states can be regarded as one of the causes of violence.

A lack of interest in peace-building may be caused by the economics of warfare, that is, the peace could reduce the income of an insurgent group. Because the aim of the fighters is not to gain political support from local inhabitants, they may fight without paying attention to the needs of local people. (Renner 2002.) The World Bank conducted a research project to study civil wars, based on the assumption that it was assessing civil wars as development problems. This approach was justifiable because civil wars mostly take place in poor countries and can retard economic development regionally. (Collier & Sambanis 2005.) The project's researchers found a set of statistically significant correlates of civil war. Based on statistical data the Collier-Hoffler model (henceforth CH model) presumes that civil war is not caused by political and social grievance, but that fuelled by grievance, the opportunities to organize and finance a rebellion determine whether a civil war takes place. The model identifies the features that make rebellion financially profitable. (Ibid.) In many instances, rebellion is of ethnic nature, although factors such as oil can increase risk of violence (Bannon & Collier 2003, 5–6). Natural resources can be related to armed conflict in three ways: they can be a cause or a means of conflict or a potential resource for economic recovery (Wennmann 2011, 74).

At a general level, there is a negative association between economic development and the onset of civil war (Sambanis 2005, 304). However, the CH model is less effective at theoretically proposing exactly what kind of mechanisms explain these correlations (ibid.). The poorest countries of the world, most of which are situated in Africa and Central Asia, evolve in development traps that have been difficult break. In order to respond to the challenge of conflict cycles and insufficient development conditions, comprehensive actions should be taken to tackle a multitude of problems. These policies include long-term poverty reduction. (Collier 2007.)

Human security could progress within the wider developmental agenda, although it has some conceptual restrictions in terms of determining conditions for preferable actions (Niemelä 2008, 126–127, 86). Economic rewards may motivate some warring party to

spoil a peace process (Newman 2006, 147). External actors may support insurgent groups and, in so doing, fuel armed conflict (see Salehyan 2009).

Most of the wars between states have not concentrated on natural resources (Väyrynen 2003, 40). Oil and water are the resources that most typically cause full-scale combat between armies of established nation-states. Certain other resources are sufficiently valuable to provoke conflict within states, usually between already existing ethnic and political factions. Internal warfare over gold, diamonds, valuable minerals, and old-growth timber and similar kinds of resources has become part of this political epoch. Such conflicts are typically interwoven with long-standing ethnic, political, and regional antagonisms. (Klare 2002, 190.) Natural resources have prolonged several armed conflicts (Väyrynen 2003, 42). Resource wars of the post-Cold War era are not random or disconnected events. The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods and resource wars will become the most distinctive feature of the global security environment (Klare 2002, 213). In order to avoid this, it is important to establish a global system of resource conservation and collaboration (ibid. 226).

Climate change may not be the most probable source of violence, but competition for oil and gas has already been a factor in armed conflicts (Miall 2007). Ignoring climate change and its energy-political implications may lead to stronger contradictions in energy-political interests and even to potential conflict (ibid. 167). In the era of climate change, energy scarcity in particular may lead to security risks (Giddens 2009, 203). The developing and the poorest countries will be the most affected by climate change (Brown 2008, 31; Global Humanitarian Forum 2009, 66). Climate change involves a systemic challenge to security policy that requires a coordinated, long-term, and preventive approach to security. The necessary policies can be based on a soft security agenda and conflict prevention approach to develop capabilities required in a climate-changed world. Cooperation is needed for a transformation to a global low-carbon economy. (Mabey 2008, 58–65.)

In many countries, population displacement redraws the ethnic map (Brown 2008, 33). Twenty years from now, the number of climate displaced people may be three times as large as it is today (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009, 49). At least some level of migration linked to climate change will take place but the strength of the phenomenon will depend on the policy of the international community (Brown 2008, 41). Environmental problems cause migration but more information about the processes affecting environmental migration is clearly needed in order to avoid exaggerating the meaning of environmental factors (Hugo 2008, 48). Although migration flows do not necessarily signify risks of conflict, it is important to remember the potential complexity of the explanatory factors of conflict. Human impacts of climate change may lead to social tensions that cause instabilities leading to risks of violence or armed conflict (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009, 54). In terms of conflict prevention, there is a need to integrate climate change issues into holistic instability and conflict analysis (Mabey 2008, 107).

In many regions, localized water stress will be a probable source of conflict both in rural and urban areas. An essential part of conflict prevention is managing various solutions for higher variability in water flows due to climate change. Access to fertile land will be a major cause of climate-driven conflict and this question will be connected with complex issues of land

tenure, privatization and traditional management regimes. Many of the problems related to responding to the security challenges of climate change are connected with the broader difficulties in driving effective preventive action to tackle threats. (Mabey 2008, 84.)

In an analysis of the onset of civil war, Jeffrey Dixon (2009) sought to find explanatory factors for civil wars by analyzing 46 quantitative studies. Due to the quantitative measurement, the scope of explanatory factors is limited, although both conflicts and variables in the studies under scrutiny are not similar. Most of the variables are related to the issues handled in this section. (Ibid.) The following table describes Dixon's most confident and consistent findings.

Table 2. Consensus determinants of civil war based on high confidence in a sample of quantitative studies (Dixon 2009, 720)

Variables	Direction
Population	Positive
Oil exports	Positive
Prosperity	Negative
Growth	Negative
Peace years	Negative
Democracy	Curvilinear (inverted U)
Regime instability	Positive

Table 2 shows that population, oil exports, and regime instability increase the probability of civil wars, while prosperity, growth, and a growing number of peace years decrease the probability. Extreme democracy and extreme autocracy decrease the risk of civil war while anocracy increases it. The picture is far less clear regarding many other quantitative factors, such as when assessing ethnic and religious relations. Increasing the reliability of these studies, as well as taking a more qualitative stance on these issues, may help find more credible methods for studying explanatory factors in the civil wars. (Ibid.) However, not all of the factors affecting violent conflict are easily quantifiable. Contemporary warfare is a complex outcome of different factors (Naidoo 2010, 136). The days of "grand theories" of armed conflict may be over, and perhaps the main focus should be on the processes that raise the probabilities of violent conflict. However, the Human Security Report 2005 concluded that, in the long run, warfare diminishes if economic growth, good governance, and democratization prevail.

3.6 Development of weapons and arms trade and prospects for futures warfare

Throughout history, the development of technology has enabled greater destruction in warfare (Keegan 1994; Wright 2010). In the context of new conflicts, the technological development of weaponry is a controversial question. High technology may be used in new conflicts but not necessarily as applications of sophisticated military technology. Computers and cell phones often facilitate the work of belligerents but weapons in use represent conventional technology. Even in Rwanda 1994, belligerents mostly used knives as weapons

instead of firearms. So, in new conflicts a mixture of weapons will probably be utilized which also has implications for crisis management.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western countries led by the United States have tried to solve the classic problems of warfare by developing technology. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, issued a warning on the limits of technology (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen 2007, 17–18.) Development work on defence materials is going to accelerate in the near future. Cooperability of defence materials is essential in the future because the actors involved represent diverse states and organizations. The price of defence materials is estimated to double every seven years and maintenance expenditure is related to the price of the materials at the time of purchase. New defence technology consists mostly of high technology. (Defence Command 2004, 9–11).

Military units relying on high technology are less dependent on human soldiers because human beings will be the weakest link of the machinery. Warfare is led and conducted by a small number of people. (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen 2007, 20.) In theory, civilian casualties in warfare can be kept to the absolute minimum due to the development of weapons. In warfare conducted by high-tech countries this technological optimum can be reached. (Wirtz 2003, 35).

A stronger connection of information and information technology with the armed forces has changed how people affect warfare and how the wars are fought (Huhtinen & Rantapelkonen 2007, 20). Post-modern war is grounded on high-tech aerospace power, limitation of casualties and exit strategies. The latest strategic analyses have taken the fragmentation of warfare into account. (Evans 2004, 30–33.) High information technology has become one of the indicators of military strength. (Raitasalo 2008b, 58.) The criteria of functional armed forces have changed since the 1990s and now consist of net-centric leading and weapon systems abilities and the usefulness of the systems outside their own regions (Malkki et al. 2008, 208–209). The latter feature is of extreme importance in military crisis management.

Technological development of weapons in developed countries has an impact on conflict development. According to the Small Arms Survey 2006, global military production is rising due to the military modernization. The arsenals of modernizing countries will contain a large number of surplus small arms and light weapons (ibid. 26). The arms trade is difficult to measure, particularly when assessing the trade of small arms (Smith 2009, 143). The easy access to conventional arms may render armed violence more serious (Muggah & Krause 2009). The flows of older models of small arms and light weapons from developed to developing countries could potentially raise risks of violence. Therefore, international arms control is essential with regard to future armed conflicts. The surplus arms of the rich countries from the Cold War era have accelerated wars in the Third World, which means that the arms transfers to the poor countries play a major role in the continuation of warfare (Cronberg 2003, 50; Keegan 2000, 180). Somehow, it is a paradox that the value of the arms trade only represents 0.5 percent of all global trade but the average civil war costs approximately 40 billion euros annually, in addition to its uncountable human costs (Stohl & Grillot 2009, 185).

New equipment in warfare often leads to changes in tactical and organizational principles. Technological changes in warfare are usually adopted more quickly than tactical and organizational ones. (Ibid., 208–214.) In countries like Finland, new military and civilian technology should be adopted while developing military crisis management. Military crisis management organizations are developed to envisage various military threats in conflict and post-conflict areas. However, the future development of crisis management cannot depend only on questions related to military technology. From a military perspective, technological development concerns new conflicts. High technology is going to have an impact on military crisis management in the future. For military purposes, higher technology may ensure better protection of troops in military crisis management. In trust building, however, technological development of weapons is of limited importance.

The Western intention of carrying out a military revolution through new technology is nearest to the new formulation of renewed warfare (Raitasalo & Sipilä 2004). However, most high-tech scenarios have however, mostly focused on the armed forces of the developed countries, although the belligerents in new conflicts may be armed with much less sophisticated technology which can cause broad devastation. Military forces relying on high technology can be resisted with new methods: namely by relocating the battlefield within the civil society (Raitasalo 2008b, 55). The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) is changing warfare, making it more complex, increasing defence budgets, and challenging the skills of military personnel (Smith 2004, 184). The realities in warfare have been changing and now the conventional high-tech Western militaries must be able to face the world of failed states consisting of ethnic paramilitaries and regimes having ballistic missiles and poison gas, as well as radical groups favoring mass-casualty terrorism. In the future, the merging of modes of armed conflict will probably mean warfare in which national, trans-state and sub-state forces may coalesce or confront each other. (Evans 2004.)

As theorists in futures research have stated, today's thinking affects how we see the alternatives for the future. Therefore, today's theories on armed conflict may have an impact on tomorrow's conflicts. As Bottici and Challand (2010, 136) noted, global political theory can help create alternative world views. Similarly, research on armed conflicts may assist in understanding the complexity of conflicts and the ways of enabling conflict resolution. The evolution of new conflicts will also depend on the international community's willingness to develop diplomatic means of preventing and ceasing warfare. However, a slight increase in civil wars and armed conflicts has been predicted in developing countries, mainly in Africa, until 2030 (Lintonen 2007, 118). Some scholars in international affairs, such as Heikki Patomäki (2007, 15–16) see a future that is more prone to major conflict development than others, such as Raimo Väyrynen (2006a, 305).

One of the global challenges of the Millennium Project founded in 1996, is "peace and conflict" (Millennium Project 2011b). Due to several factors, including the evolution of the UN and regional organizations, a more peaceful world is becoming increasingly probable. However, terrorism and nuclear attacks will remain as threats in the future and a large number of armed conflicts will probably be asymmetrical, including the activities of non-state actors. (Millennium Project 2009, 10–5 – 10–13.) A central part of the conflict picture in the future will probably resemble the new conflicts introduced in section 3.2. However,

factors such as adequate policies for tackling climate change may reduce conflict risks (Glenn et al. 2010, 66–68).

There have been three recent contradictory trends in warfare: a decline in the overall frequency of war, an increase in its lethality and a growth of anti-war sentiment (Lebow 2010, 141). According to Mueller (2006), only two types of war will remain – with few exceptions. The most common are unconventional civil wars, which mostly take place in the poorest countries. Although they have been termed as “new wars” or a “clash of civilizations”, they are mostly carried out by criminals, bandits, and thugs. The other remaining type of war could be referred to as “policing wars” which are characterized by militarized efforts by developed countries. (Ibid., 73–74.) Future warfare is assessed as being tied to the power inequalities between the South and the North based on the revolution in military affairs. Thus, the dominant coalition of the industrial democracies may unilaterally take action against Third World states that are considered “rogue” states. (Ayoob 2000, 166.) This view has similarities with Mueller’s (2006) statement about “policing wars”: therefore, apart from the intentions regarding the protection of the civilians, power politics may be of importance when explaining the possible conflicts between rich and poor countries. Wars in Iraq (2003) and Georgia (2008) may be included in Mueller’s category of policing wars and they represent conventional warfare in their character. Both of Mueller’s categories may represent new conflicts. The intensity of conflicts may vary and “mixed” types of warfare may take place simultaneously, although the risks of conventional war have reduced in comparison to the Cold War era.

3.7 Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed various factors explaining new conflicts. New conflicts, as defined earlier in this chapter, are complex. Their explanation should take historical, social, political, international, ethnic and economic, and even ecological factors into consideration. The various schools explaining armed conflicts have no consensus regarding the explanation of conflicts (Forsberg 2010). The widest unanimity regards the fact that there are multiple causes of conflict (ibid.). Even with regard to internal conflicts, there is no wide consensus on explanatory factors, although some of them have been found in quantitative research (R. Väyrynen 2010, 41; Dixon 2009). Lack of welfare is not a sufficient explanation of new conflicts although it may exist in their background. In the aftermath of the conflicts in the 1990s, ethnicity was a popular explanation of conflicts because many armed conflicts had a distinction between warring parties consistently with ethnic groups. However, the conclusions from explaining armed conflicts in ethnic terms have been accused of methodological individualism (see Piiparinen 2010). On the other hand, Huntington’s theses on clashes of civilizations have gained support regarding interstate conflicts (see Charron 2010). In a broad sense, identity based factors have been important in armed conflicts although their role as explanatory factors should be assessed with caution. At least they may fuel a conflict as a result of provocation. They may become instruments in a political game that are prone to conflict development: for example, religion may be interpreted as legitimizing violence. Although economic factors (included in “having,” according to Allardt’s (1976) typology) have certain roles behind the conflict, the justification of violence may be interpreted in the context of religion, ethnicity or identity (factors related to “loving” and “being” in accordance

with Allardt (1976)). Religion has historically been underestimated in international relations theories. As a conclusion, identity-based factors have an impact on armed conflicts but these factors should be analyzed in regard to the other ones. Economic factors may partly explain conflicts but religious, ethnic or identity-based factors may be used as justification for warfare or violent acts. Explanatory factors for new conflicts are intertwined.

Earlier in this chapter, I introduced “new conflict” as a description for most contemporary armed conflicts. New conflicts are learning challenges due to their complexity. These types of learning challenges for both crisis management organizations and personnel are part of the answer to the main RQ and RQ1.

Table 3. Learning challenges to crisis management organizations and personnel posed by new conflicts and development goals related to them

Entity	Challenge	Development goals
Organization	complexity	complexity management
	multiculturalism	cultural knowledge
	ensuring security	negotiation capacity
		military capability
		human security
Personnel	complexity	complexity management
		problem solving
	multiculturalism	cultural understanding
	ensuring security	negotiation skills
		combat skills

In Table 3, learning challenges are categorized to address to RQ1 and development goals to RQ3. With these research questions in mind, Table 3 shows what kinds of development goals can be derived from the learning challenges. The challenges refer to RQ1 and the development goals to RQ3. These development goals concern the competences required for crisis management both at the levels of the organizations as well as of the individuals working in crisis management duties. Although the development goal of complexity management is described in similar terms at both levels, it signifies different things to personnel and organizations. In this context, the complexity consists of different intertwined background factors related to history, culture, religion and society as well as to the economic factors explaining why armed conflict emerged.

Although new conflicts are demanding learning environments for crisis management personnel there is variation in the degree of violence that occurs in different conflict areas. With regard to human security, in connection with RQ3, it is relevant to remember that peace-building and crisis management aim to stabilize peace processes, which should ensure protection for civilians. Changes in armed conflict have been evaluated as having an impact on military theory, which has traditionally relied on military force but should instead rely on civil-military relations (Egnell 2009). For example, learning and cultural understanding should be part of the tactics in today’s peace operations (ibid.). A comprehensive approach to warfare and crisis management may help create broad strategies for ensuring human

security. From the perspective of human security, cultural, identity and religious issues related to conflict may be especially challenging because they are prone to misinterpretations that may cause a conflict cycle to continue. The handling of these issues may be culturally and politically sensitive in a peace process, both for the parties in the conflict as well as for international mediators and other actors trying to promote peace. Local interpretations of warfare may maintain a culture of violence that impedes peace-building. Identity-based factors could be used as tools for political provocation and making public opinion or opinions of a specific group to accept the use of violence.

Because of the complex and devastating nature of new conflicts, it is important to develop a new “human security” type of approach towards them. An important issue regarding the work of military and civilian actors in crisis management is the institutional adaptation in the changes of crises and the ability to react to them in functional manners. The questions related to the recent evolution of conflicts are essential when analyzing the experiences of crisis management personnel and the changes required in crisis management organizations and education practices in the future. Understanding the multitude of explanatory factors may help understand how peace processes might be facilitated to break vicious circles of continuous conflicts.

Chapter 4 analyzes the implications of new conflicts on the international crisis management and peace-building. Violent conflicts and their development in the near future will influence crisis management challenges as well as the requirements for peace-building personnel. After warfare, peace-building in terms of establishing well-functioning state structures is necessary for the society recovering from armed conflict. Challenges in peace-building processes represent opportunities for learning both in war-torn societies as well as in international institutions. The individual level of the personnel employed in crisis management and peace-building should not be neglected either. Conflict development is a factor that impacts the answering of the RQs of this research and consequently: from the perspective of human security, crisis management and peace-building practices should evolve in order to respond to the needs of local populations in conflict and post-conflict areas.

4. Crisis management and peace-building

The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and to RQ 3:

Main RQ: What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

RQ3: How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

In order to respond to these RQs, it is necessary to understand contemporary challenges in crisis management. This chapter will review the recent history of contemporary actors in crisis management and peace-building and analyze efforts by the international community to prevent armed conflicts and to work in post-conflict areas to ensure stability mostly at the institutional level. Apart from answering RQ3, this chapter focuses on the conceptual and developmental analysis of crisis management and peace-building. The conflict of Kosovo and the crisis management and peace-building mission since 1999 will be analyzed as an example of a new conflict and a crisis management mission because the crisis management personnel interviewed for this study have worked for this mission.

The ways in which we understand contemporary conflicts impact the ways in which we try to resolve them (T. Väyrynen 2010). In order to ensure security development, it is crucial to strengthen our peace-building and crisis management capability. A peace agreement is a basis for stability, but it does not guarantee sustainable peace. Peace-building has been traditionally based on a peace agreement signed by the parties of the conflict. Today even this is not guaranteed. As chapter 3 showed, peace-building and crisis management efforts take place in complex environments because the causes of armed conflict usually are manifold and complex.

There are no “ready-made” or “one-size-fits-all solutions” for peace: instead, peace processes should focus on the essential issues and rely on legitimate presentation, justice, confidence building and commitment of the parties (Ahtisaari 2009, 47–49). Contemporary peace processes are not regarded solely as outcomes of high-level peace agreements but rather as multi-level processes, which means that they should involve top, midrange, and grassroots leaders in peace process (Talvitie 2011; Sandole 2010 44–49). Until recently, the international community has largely ignored the role of civil society in peace-building (Theros 2010, 152). Warfare destroys social ties, which means that war-torn society tends to remain divided for a long time (Naidoo 2010, 147). Comprehension of the involved parties’ different cultural conceptions is required in conflict resolution (T. Väyrynen 2010, 261). Therefore, efforts to ensure human security are part of long-term peace-building, which requires an understanding of local cultures and people’s needs.

Crisis management is part of peace-building. The objective of any third-party intervention is to move from war to peace – which is the theme of this chapter – although military intervention as part of counter-terrorism may raise questions about the factual peace-orientation of crisis management. The external actors can only build capacities that increase

the likelihood of peace (Naidoo 2010, 140). Therefore, it is worth trying to identify how peace operations become successful.

How do conceptualizations affect thinking and deeds in crisis management and peace-building? Does a terminology make a difference regarding crisis management and peace-building? Both terms should be used in the processes that aim at long-lasting peace. Peace-building is oriented more towards prevention and broad peace-strengthening processes while crisis management refers more to efforts to end warfare. Having said that, crisis management may function as prevention if it prevents the aggravation of violence.

A serious problem concerning peace operations, peace-building and crisis management is the lack of conceptualizations and theory-based studies. Peace operations have mostly been studied in the context of problem-solving theories and have been under-theorized. Most of the theoretical work on peace operations has been made in order to make such operations more efficient. These perspectives can be accused of non-reflexivity, which means that the basic assumptions of the peace operations are taken for granted. Critical theories that focus on peace processes are an alternative perspective that may broaden the scope of analysis. Therefore, in the framework of human security, critical theories are better at describing the realities of a peace process and even the views of the local population. (Bellamy 2004.) The lack of theorizations partly explains why the terminology in peace operations is so diverse.

4.1 Conceptual and historical development and challenges

4.1.1 Peace-building and conflict prevention

Peace-building aims to reform society, including its social institutions (Franke & Warnecke 2009). It is a widely used concept that refers to a similar kind of process as state-building or nation-building. Peace-building aims for a peace process by attaining trust and sustainable peace. In a new post-conflict situation, the need for humanitarian aid is usually the most topical issue with the need for military crisis management: civilian crisis management methods are increasingly being used (Koskela 2008, 7).

With regard to security contexts, the motive for peace-building is derived from human security in a conflict zone. Nevertheless, peace-building is also needed to strengthen the national security of any country recovering from armed conflict. In a globalized world a remote conflict may also threaten the security of Western countries. Therefore, Western countries may have interests to finance peace-building efforts in developing countries due to their interest to strengthen their national security.

The effectiveness of peace-building depends on its strategic adequacy and available resources. Unity in warring factions to promote peace, local capacities in the country, and the level of efforts on behalf of the international community to support peace are needed to acquire durable peace. (Doyle & Sambanis 2006, 334–5.) There is a clear need in peace-building to understand how the international community could help the recovery of failed states (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 27).

Most of the contexts in this study have used the term peace-building instead of similar kinds of terms. In American terminology nation-building means approximately the same as state-building – the European term that means constructing political institutions, or promoting economic development (Fukuyama 2006b, 3). Nation-building, state-building, or peace-building can be divided into four components: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term economic and political development. Not all the components are always included in the process. (See Fukuyama 2006a, 232–3).

Security functions predominate in the early phases of peace-building: after the stabilization, the focus is on the civilian dimension (Fukuyama 2006a, 233). The need for peace enforcement varies. Regarding new conflicts, the dismantling and deactivation of armed groups is demanding and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes are always complicated (Springer 2006, 62–63). DDR processes should be linked to long-term structural, social, environmental, and developmental frameworks of conflict areas (Springer 2006, 293; Porto et al. 2007, 2). Military crisis management is essential for the security development of a post-conflict area and civilian crisis management is crucial for founding reliable institutions and ensuring trustworthy governance.

Peace processes need trust. Peace agreements generally induce political reforms such as political inclusion and demobilization, but previously warring factions generally do not trust each other enough to enable promised concessions even after an accord has been signed (Bekoe 2008, 12). Political changes take place because a transition from war to peace leads to profound changes in relations between a country's military and political groups (Poulligny 2006, 57). The legitimacy of peacekeepers is built up during the mission, and the legitimacy of any intervention is never secure, which means it is important to understand the local people's interpretation of the idea of the mission (ibid, 180). In a post-conflict situation, humanitarian aid is needed initially: the need for military crisis management is larger and the role of military crisis management decreases while the role of civilian crisis management increases. After peace-building, the society needs to stand on its own feet. (Koskela 2008, 7.)

Reconstruction and development can be controversial concepts. Reconstruction means returning society back to something like the historical status quo, whereas development requires the creation of new economic or political institutions that should be self-sustaining after the departure of the international community. Unfortunately, extensive international reconstruction can actually impede long-term development and international involvement can breed dependence and weaken local institutions. The reconstruction phase strongly affects the target country's prospects for institutional development (Fukuyama 2006a).

Success in peace-building requires a multidimensional strategy and mechanisms to integrate the work of various agencies. The integration mechanisms should ensure the unity of efforts during the planning and execution of the operation. Peace-building operations are not purely or predominantly military operations. (Flournoy 2006, 88.) In post-conflict societies, there is an urgent need to arrange governance that enables reasonable coordination of various agencies. If the DDR process successfully leads to stabilization, the role of military crisis management will be reduced.

Accountability requires paying attention to the ways in which peace-building is organized. It is important to establish governmental structures that are accountable to the citizens. The role of NGOs and contractors should not impede the link of accountability between the state and the citizen. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008.) The work of various international actors should be coordinated in order to ensure the effectiveness of peace-building, and environmental aspects must be integrated into peace-building processes (UNEP 2009). Humanitarian aid always affects conflict areas (Anderson 1999), and similarly, civilian and military crisis management has an impact on conflict or post-conflict areas. Awareness of this impact may help assessments of whether activities from outside strengthen civil society's ability to remove itself from vicious conflict circles or whether these activities reinforce the social structures that maintain the conflict.

When Finnish concepts are compared with Fukuyama's (2006a) terminology, military crisis management can be seen as peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Civilian crisis management supports post-conflict reconstruction and development work: reconstruction and development aspects may both be part of development cooperation. The distinctions between these terms are not always clear and it can be difficult to determine the exact difference between civilian crisis management and development aid (Liesinen 2007). The effects of crisis management should be analyzed as carefully as the effects of humanitarian or development aid.

It is important to learn lessons from previous and on-going operations for developing post-conflict reconstruction in the future (Fukuyama 2006a, 244). For the people living in a crisis area, the end of the conflict rarely means the end of security problems, and these problems are often related to the difficulties in reintegrating former combatants and creating or reforming police forces (Pouligny 2006, 257). The broader information and transparency that peacekeeping operations provide could strengthen a peace process because the lack of information can cause in the continuation of hostilities (Lindley 2007). Most inter-group conflicts have an identifiable social-psychological component (Hewstone & Cairns 2001, 336). It is essential that the peace-building is based on a reasonable strategy that aims at reducing hostility from a social-psychological point of view.

The liberal peace framework is dominant in most of peace-building policy documentations. This framework seeks to provide equilibrium between an empowerment of the individual and the institutions of governance guiding the behavior of the individual. It is based on democracy, free markets, development and the rule of law. The objective of the liberal peace framework is to establish a self-sustaining peace under liberal governance and social, economic, and political models that function in accordance with liberal models and to remove both overt and structural violence. It is questionable whether this framework provides social and economic support for a population that mostly lives in poverty. (Miall 2007, 82–99)

An inclusive framework is necessary for the involvement of all groups within the state, even the potentially marginalized ones (Deng 2000, 144). Civil society in a conflict area may be divided because some parts of it may support the peace process and some others may oppose it (Naidoo 2010, 134). In peace processes, local involvement and ownership should ensure that peace is sustainable. Therefore, local conditions and cultural issues should be taken into

account in resource preferences and distribution and institution building. In a post-conflict area, it is important to get the local population involved in the process of fulfilling the objectives of transitional justice (Kerr & Mobekk 2007, 180). Local ownership is needed in all institution building, although there is no one-and-only model for appropriate institutions in a post-conflict area. However, peace-building that focuses on democratic administrative structures and collaboration with civil society are processes that must support each other.

The criteria for legitimacy of governance vary, both culturally and in relation to different political opinions. It is important to understand several sources of legitimacies in conflict areas. These issues require interactive negotiations, and external actors can support them by facilitating systematic and peaceful interaction to resolve potential problems. These actors should identify pre-existing local capacities before constructing new ones. In peace-building, flexibility on the part of both the local inhabitants and the international community facilitates the identification of good practices. (Wuiff Moe 2010.) Resolving political problems locally by people themselves seems to be an emerging trend in peace-building. A emerging trend in peace-building is to have the local people to resolve the local political problems. The following factors may facilitate the creation of long-lasting peace: fortifying local ownership, minimizing the unintended effects of peace operations, contextualized procedures enabling the engagement of civil society, understanding and analyzing the short- and long-term influences of a mission including the distinction between empowerment of local people and attaining timely results, and understanding the role of the regional actors in a peace process (Werther-Pietsch & Roithner 2011).

The responsibility to prevent is the most essential single dimension in the principle of the responsibility to protect. Conflict prevention consists of early warning systems, preventive diplomacy, ending the impunity of war criminals, and preventive peace operations. (Bellamy 2009.) It requires efforts to promote development, democracy, good governance and human rights. For conflict prevention, the communities must have the capacity to change peaceably and to regulate their conflicts peacefully. For this purpose, people and groups need ways to reconcile their conflicting interests. Apart from different interests, the groups also have common interests. The main way to balance these competing interests is to establish communities that adopt rules, norms, relationships, laws, procedures, habits and institutions that regulate concurring interests. (Miall 2007, 120–168.)

If peace-building and crisis management can help stop a conflict cycle, they also function as a form of conflict prevention. It is necessary to develop methods of conflict prevention which are most effective before hostilities begin (Worchel 2005, 752–753). Early warning systems for potential conflicts are part of conflict prevention. Unfortunately, the early warning system for the prevention of armed conflicts has only evolved only modestly (Conflict and Fragility 2009). Because the information required for well-functioning early warning appears to exist within the UN system, effective use of this information would improve conflict prevention (Zenko & Friedman 2011).

4.1.2 Crisis management as a concept and its recent development

Crisis management means actions that are intended to avoid aggravating of crisis and to prevent war (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006; Rantapelkonen 2000) and it extends from prevention to recovery and reconstruction (Martin & Kaldor 2010, 5). International crisis management has been described as international cooperation and primarily includes actions taken with the UN authorization and without UN Security Council authorization, military action potentially assessed as a crime against peace (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006; Haas 2008). Crisis management encompasses all phases of crisis and conflict, including conflict prevention, acting in armed conflict and post-conflict stabilization. Crisis management, which may require all levels of violence from peaceful cooperation to high-intensity battle is used as a broad formulation of actions (Wedin 2005, 11–13). Successful crisis management may function as a base for reconstruction (Laakso 2003, 283). The term conflict management is used in a similar way as crisis management in some sources (see Piiparinen 2010).

Crisis management efforts may be motivated in similar kinds of ways in peace-building with regard to the contexts of human and national security (see section 4.1.1). The incentives for crisis management activities are often based on a mixture of human and national security argumentation. For example, Finland justifies its involvement in crisis management with national security and international responsibility argumentation (see Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). Human security motives focus on preventing violence in a conflict zone. National security argumentation depends on the idea of removing a threat to the countries that send troops to a military crisis management operation. Financial support from the UN may also strengthen the motivation of some countries to contribute to an operation.

In Finland, the concept of crisis management has been used broadly. The EU has developed a comprehensive approach to crisis management, referring to its military and civilian sides and the need to develop them in a coherent and flexible manner. To one person, comprehensive crisis management may mean a joint civilian and military mission, while to someone else it may mean improved cooperation of civilian and military actors.

Crisis management consists of civilian and military crisis management. Civilian crisis management signifies the civilian field of crisis management, including the establishment of governmental structures that enable trust-building in a society. Military crisis management refers to the military activities of crisis management that are often described as peacekeeping. As a whole crisis management is part of the wider process of peace-building. Crisis management is organized from outside of a war-torn society.

Table 4. Crisis management, types of aid, and peace-building

Activity form	Main function	Current trends/challenges
Peace-building	+ large process	+ local involvement
	+ sustainable peace	+ coordination
		+ accountability
Military	+ ensuring security	+ new functions
crisis management	+ peacekeeping	+ risky operations
	+ peace enforcement	
	+ security sector reform	
Comprehensive	+ combining civilian &	+ flexibility & responsiveness
crisis management	military crisis management	
Civilian	+ governance building	+ local involvement
crisis management		+ trust-building
Humanitarian aid	+ enabling survival	+ aid employees endangered
	+ immediate basic aid	+ neutral position
Development aid	+ ensuring development	+ strategic development

Crisis management has changed since the end of the Cold War. Traditional peacekeeping has transformed into more demanding forms of military crisis management (see Ramsbotham et al. 2008).¹² Civilian crisis management has emerged as a new entity with which to respond to the need to reconstruct civilian society. The end of the Cold War has made it easier for the international community to react in order to take actions against these kinds of brutalities. In the UN, several processes have advanced to prevent the mistreatment of civilians in armed conflicts.

New tools in crisis management have been motivated by human security. The human security perspective emphasizes the safety of civilians and the human rights of every individual. To provide human security, various international actors who focus on conflict prevention and peace-building should be able to cooperate and be aware of the needs of local inhabitants. A comprehensive approach to each conflict is required and should be extended to humanitarian and development aid although they do not belong to crisis management functions.

4.1.3 Military crisis management and peacekeeping

Peace operations are as much a source of criticism as they are both indispensable and imperfect responses to armed conflicts (Tardy 2004, 1). According to Salenius-Pasternak and Visuri (2006, 8) military crisis management is a broad concept consisting of crisis management actions of a military character. It has been referred to as crisis management that is conducted by military means and having its “primary goal to restore and maintain stability in a crisis area” (Government of Finland 2009a).

¹² Due to the terminological differences, Ramsbotham et al. (2008) did not use the term of *military crisis management*, although they did refer to the ability to respond to more demanding crises.

A crisis management operation can be divided into three phases: enforcement, maintenance, and withdrawal. In the enforcement phase, the volume of the military crisis management grows and the need for emergency aid is large. The volume of civilian crisis management increases gradually, while stabilization leads to a reduction in military crisis management. (Kurkinen 2001, 10–11.) Crisis management troops function both under international law and in accordance with national legislation. The mandate includes the objectives and restrictions for the mission. (Lundelin 2008, 1 & 119.)

A peacekeeping operation is a third-party intervention that involves the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state. The operation functions in accordance with the mandate that separates conflicting parties, monitors ceasefires, maintains buffer zones, and takes responsibility for the security between the conflict parties. The operation is neutral towards the conflicting parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their actions (Heldt & Wallensteen 2006, 11). A more refined conceptualization of peacekeeping is needed on the basis of a demand-driven and human security-oriented approach (Wiharta 2007, 128).

The increase in the number of the peacekeeping missions since the end of the 1980s signaled the commitment of the international community to preventing humanitarian disasters. The number of troop-contributing countries in the UN operations grew from 26 in 1988 to 103 between in 2004 (Ramsbotham et al. 2008, 135). Although the UN's growing commitment to peacekeeping has led to a decline in armed conflicts, the costs of UN peacekeeping are minimal compared with worldwide military expenditures (Sheehan 2011).

Peacekeeping roles have also changed, due to the higher involvement of developing countries in UN crisis management and the richer countries' involvement in NATO-led operations. The Asian contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping is noteworthy. In June 2010, 100,692 persons were deployed in UN operations as police, military experts, and peacekeepers and 30 percent of them came from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (see UN 2010). Altogether, NATO troops consisted of 129,742 persons, which was almost 30 percent higher than the number of the UN troops (NATO 2010a; 2010b). The growing number of UN troops coming from developing countries has been described as a division of labor between "the West" and "the Rest" caused by the lack of interest from the Western countries in deploying a large number of troops to developing countries (see Piiparinen 2010, 133–134). A contribution to UN peacekeeping is economically beneficial for most developing countries because UN reimbursements generally cover more than is needed for these countries to train soldiers (Sheehan 2011, 145).

Peacekeeping has been divided into three chronological phases. The first generation of peacekeeping, so called traditional peacekeeping, took place during the Cold War. In this phase, all the warring parties were involved with the peace process. The second generation of peacekeeping existed between 1987 and 1991 and was transitional in character. The third generation of peacekeeping from 1992 the present, has signified an increase in the number of operations. The third generation of peacekeeping enhances human security: it combines capable military force with international standards of humanitarianism, but it is also linked to risks that military force would be utilized without the permission on behalf of the UN. (Ramsbotham et al. 2008; Berdal 2008.)

Humanitarian intervention is one of the most difficult questions in international relations. Only after the end of the Cold War did the UN start to mandate the use of force in humanitarian purposes, relying on the idea that large-scale human rights violations are a threat against peace and international security. Even after the publication of the “Responsibility to protect” report, there has been reluctance within the international community to accept the idea of a humanitarian intervention. (Ryter 2003, 1–2.) In several instances, states have claimed to be making a military intervention for humanitarian purposes, but have actually been primarily pursuing their national security interests (Carey et al. 2010, 185). Any use of force for humanitarian purposes requires clear arguments supporting it over other means. According to Kaldor (2007, 71), a humanitarian intervention should probably be re-conceptualized as international presence in conflict-prone areas and this international presence extends from international agencies and peacekeeping troops to civil society actors. The dramatic nature of humanitarian interventions may become less dramatic in the future if operations are improved to more carefully take into account the humanitarian needs that exist in single conflict or post-conflict areas.

When analyzing the generations of peacekeeping, military operations motivated by counter-terrorism have blurred the picture of military crisis management. United States-led interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were not humanitarian in nature, although the US has emphasized humanitarian arguments to justify them (Carey et al. 2010, 179). The visualization in the strategic communication of ISAF maintains orientalist views when making an impression of the local population of Afghanistan as underdeveloped people (Kotilainen 2011). Visualizations of local populations in the material of some other operations may be criticized in a similar kind of way. When such visualizations are influential, they may make support to local ownership more difficult.

The current situation in Afghanistan shows that an increase in violence can occur instead of stabilization. There has been even a debate over whether a country like Finland sending troops to Afghanistan actually is one party in warfare (Salonius-Pasternak 2010). This is not legally the case, but incessant fighting and statements of NATO mean that another interpretation can be drawn (see Salonius-Pasternak 2010). Such an interpretation may also lead to the conclusion that countries involved in humanitarian interventions would also be parties of warfare.

Accountability is a key issue to the development of crisis management. Privatization of the security sector may be a threat to accountability, while the international community has handled the privatization of peacekeeping extended to the use of lethal force in a critical manner. The UN has refused to send troops in cases where private troops have been the only alternative (Lehnardt 2009, 221). At the international level, privatization, even with regard to the assisting duties, would have an impact on future development.

4.1.4 Civilian crisis management, cooperation and comprehensive crisis management

Civilian crisis management can be defined as crisis management carried out by civilian experts in a peaceful manner. It is a broad concept that refers to crisis management arranged by civilian actors (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 8). The aim of civilian crisis management is to prevent conflicts, to maintain peace and stability, and to strengthen local governance in crisis areas, when necessary. Civilian crisis management supports democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance and a properly functioning civil society by different means (Government of Finland 2009a, 129). It may cover actions required to protect people and guarantee the basic functions of society in a crisis area, both before and after the conflict. (Jortikka-Laitinen 2006, 125.) The term has been mostly in use in the EU with similarities to military crisis management, which refers to the military activities of crisis management.

Civilian crisis management has been developed due to the complexity of new conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping does not guarantee an enduring peace process in complex post-conflict situations. Peacekeeping that kept the former combatants from attacking after well-resolved peace negotiations has transformed into more complex military crisis management. Humanitarian and development aid and work of various UN organizations and non-governmental organizations have historically played a role that is partly the same as that of civilian crisis management today. The development of a more systematic concept of civilian crisis management has become a necessity for responding to the needs of civilian population in conflict. There are many civilian crisis management actors, including the UN and its sub-organizations, other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. It may function independently or it may be combined with military crisis management. Thus a comprehensive crisis management operation is taking place.

Peace-building and the civil-military cooperation within it must be adjusted to the unique conflict or post-conflict situations they are dealing with (Kristoffersen 2006, 27). Recently, the need to strengthen the civil-military coordination (CMCO) has become more salient. This coordination will become even more important in the future because crisis management for more complex conflicts will require diverse combinations of civilian and military means. (Jortikka-Laitinen 2006, 143.) Military intervention is sometimes needed to prevent or cease insecurity, but military action alone cannot solve problems related to human insecurity. However, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is challenging. (Knight 2008, 28.) Due to a comprehensive approach, cooperation of various actors is a prerequisite for a progressive outcome. Civilian and military crisis management utilizes complementary means (Government of Finland 2009a, 100). Cooperation and coordination of civilian and military crisis management can take various forms, which partly depend on the organizational structure of a crisis management mission. Civilian and military pillars can co-exist under a or without a joint command, or a civilian part may exist within a military mission, such as the cooperation that occurs in PRT:s in Afghanistan (UNAMA exists in collaboration with ISAF). In principle, a military unit may also exist within a civilian mission.

Civil-military relations are a core issue in the functions of the military in contemporary peace operations. Cooperation and coordination of civilian and military objectives and activities has been considered as a key for success in crisis management. Integration is important at

both the strategic and tactical levels. (Egnell 2009.) This question is discussed in detail in the following section.

The ongoing development of civilian and military crisis management may mean that both “pillars” will be mixed in different ways in the future. Separate and/or combined structures may be needed for civilian and military crisis management. Unfortunately, the conditions for various alternatives have not been widely studied despite the fact that this kind of knowledge might facilitate the development of crisis management organizations. Joint efforts are needed to improve the conditions for coordination and cooperation which are necessary in comprehensive crisis management.

4.2 International organizations and national development in crisis management and peace-building

Table 5 introduces the main functions and challenges of several organizations in regard to crisis management.

Table 5. Roles of selected international institutions in crisis management and peace processes

Institution	Main functions	Current development and challenges
UN	+ global peace + UN Charter	+ increase of UN troops
	+ governmental forum	
EU	+ European cooperation	+ comprehensiveness
+ supra-governmental	+ renewal of security agenda	
NATO	+ defence alliance	+ increase in crisis management + challenges in Afghanistan + comprehensiveness
OSCE	+ European security	+ observing and monitoring
AU	+ African cooperation + African security	+ AU troops
Red Cross	+ humanitarian law	+ humanitarian aid
Amnesty International	+ human rights + NGO	+ national & thematic reports

Table 5 illustrates the various actors involved in humanitarian aid and civilian and military crisis management. The broad representation of various actors in a conflict or post-conflict area makes the entire peace-building process quite complicated, both for the personnel involved and for the local people. Communication and division of the duties may also be complex. Comprehensiveness has been seen as one answer to the complexity of peace-building.

4.2.1 Role of the United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 after the end of the Second World War, its charter was written to maintain security and global stability and prevent warfare. The United Nations Charter is the constituting instrument that regulating the rights and obligations of the member states (Kennedy 2006). The first priority of the charter was peace, which was motivated by the second priority – human rights. (Haas 2008, 74–75.) The General Assembly of the United Nations approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (*ibid.*, 81). These two documents expressed a clear commitment to human rights in the post-war era.

In international relations, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force is prohibited except for self-defense – and for collective security under the regulation of the UN Security Council. The prohibition of the use of force is globally accepted in international law. (Aro & Petman 1999, 7–12.) Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have had more demanding mandates, focusing on work with local communities (Salminen 2003, 182). UN-led peacekeeping increased until 1995 and even doubled in comparison to its extension during the Cold War. However, difficulties in Somalia, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia at the beginning of the disintegration war proved the need for new working methods apart from traditional peacekeeping. For a long time, the views about how to develop peacekeeping were diffuse. UN member countries were only moderately interested in enhancing peacekeeping. As a result of this process, there was a lack of interest in commencing new UN-led operations at the end of the 1990s. (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 6.) After the reforms took place, UN peacekeeping was strengthened at the beginning of the new millennium. (*Ibid.*, 7.) Since 1992, an expansion of UN peacekeeping operations has taken place, both in the numbers of the operations as well as in their scope and complexity (Berdal 2008).

Despite the criticism focused of the UN, its position in conflict prevention and peace processes will be central in the future. The UN has a duty to coordinate international humanitarian aid efforts (Finskas 2010). The UN's decision to establish a new peace-building commission is a significant step forward on behalf of the international community to mitigate the influence of conflict and prevent its recurrence. Post-conflict peace-building has close links to structural conflict prevention, and the two areas overlap because peace-building aims at achieving a sustainable peace and avoiding a relapse into war. (Miall 2007, 120.) Ethically, the adoption of the principle of the responsibility to protect by the UN has been a step forward in international relations (see Bellamy 2009). However, the selectivity of the international community when responding to humanitarian catastrophes of armed conflicts remains a systemic problem and the selectivity in these responses should focus on the conflicts' large-scale devastation (Hawkins 2008, 204). As mentioned in section 4.1.1, information about an effective early warning system already exists within the UN, which means that more efforts to utilize this information for coherent preventive actions would be needed (Zenko & Friedman 2011).

The goals of the UN state-building agenda are to create stability, to establish a liberal democratic political system, to establish the rule of law system, to protect human rights, to establish functional public administration, to ensure a functioning governmental capacity, to create a sustainable and market-based economy, and to stabilize external relations (Bull

2008, 33–35). The role of the UN in state- and peace-building will be relevant in the future. A threat to the UN's capabilities is that, in several Muslim countries and other Third-World countries, the UN is considered as an organization that promotes the interests of the US and other Western countries: this feeling is also reflected in assessments of the UN-led peacekeeping operations (Brahimi 2006, 15). The veto right of the five member countries in the UN Security Council may paralyze the organization in the future, even in the cases of large-scale human rights violations. Humanitarian interventions may take place in the future. As long as power politics plays a major role in international relations, humanitarian interventions will be widely suspected and it will be difficult to achieve international unanimity. (Ryter 2003, 25–61.)

In the development of the UN peacekeeping, the so-called Brahimi report (Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, 2000) represented progress. Following a thorough assessment process, it presented guidelines for UN peacekeeping. Regarding the future, the idea of compact and rapid UN troops has also been proposed because the contemporary rapid reaction troops may not easily be taken into use for humanitarian purposes (Langille 2008). Although the UN's ability to prevent crises has been criticized, it remains a key actor in security policy and crisis prevention, and its charter is a central document in international relations. However, the actions of the UN are dependent on the member states' foreign policies (Weiss et al. 2010, 391).

The UN Security Council's resolution 1325 from 2000 emphasized that women's position in peace processes should be strengthened (Abugre 2009). The resolution pays attention to the importance of women in peace building and conflict resolution and their equal participation in peace processes. In 2008, resolution 1820 complemented and strengthened resolution 1325 in regard to rape and other forms of gender-based violence. Resolutions 1325 and 1820 are examples of the new role of human security in international affairs. (Ibid.) Although UN resolution 1325 obliges member countries to promote the role of women in conflict areas, efforts to push this goal forward have been limited. Mainstreaming resolution 1325 is far from complete and the bottom-up approach which gives a stronger role to women in peace-building has not been implemented (Hudson 2010). In regard to another vulnerable group, resolution 1612 focuses on children in armed conflict (Save the Children 2011).

4.2.2 European Union

The European Union (EU) is a supra-governmental organization that can make binding laws affecting individuals and governments (Haas 2008, 281). Finland became a member of the EU in 1995. The EU divides crisis management into civilian and military crisis management. It has also emphasized a comprehensive view regarding cooperation and coordination of civilian and military crisis management. In 1999, the European Union decided to strengthen its cooperation in crisis management. In accordance with the Headline Goal, the construction of the military's capability for carrying out military crisis management missions, including the most demanding ones and consisting of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops at 60 days' notice, has taken place (Koivula 2005, 11). The EU has created the concept of the EU Battle Groups in order to react rapidly. The creation of EU Battle Groups

was motivated by the idea of protecting civilians in conflicts that rapidly become large-scale threats towards civilians. In the EU's military crisis management, it has been important to develop interoperability, deployability, and sustainability in order to reach the Headline Goal 2010 (Savola 2006, 87). However, the EU Battle Groups have not yet been deployed in any operation, although they have been in a state of preparedness (Raitasalo 2008a, 8; IISS 2010, 104). In the EU, a civil-military cell was established in 2005 for coordinating of the activities in civilian and military crisis management in 2005 (Kokkarinen 2008, 25).

Civilian crisis management has become essential for the crisis management of the European Union since the beginning of the new millennium. In 2004, the EU adopted an action plan on civilian crisis management, including the guidelines of the Security Strategy and more efficient utilization of civilian crisis management resources of the member countries (Halonen 2005, 24–25). The EU's capabilities to plan and execute crisis management operations are strengthening (Government of Finland 2009a, 97).

The EU works systematically to develop civilian crisis management, and it has set goals for this work. The EU's ability to plan and execute crisis management operations are going to be strengthened (Government of Finland 2009a, 97). The member countries inform the EU about how and to which extent they can allocate resources to this work. Better cooperation of the civilian and military dimensions of the crisis management of the EU is under development. Finland is in favor of comprehensive crisis management executed by the EU (*ibid.*). A comprehensive approach to crisis management helps the development of cooperation both conceptually and practically.

4.2.3 NATO

During the Cold War, the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO), was clearly a defence alliance. In the 1990s, NATO was obliged to a central role in peacekeeping because its functions as a military organization suited it to such a role more than any other existing security organization (Tardy 2006). NATO planning processes are based on the RMA thinking, and countries outside the technological development are considered as having the will to isolate. Since the 1990's, NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) has developed military cooperation between NATO and partner countries and the cooperation has focused on military planning, education, training, material and troops. Finland is not a member of NATO, but has participated in PfP.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) shows the changes that take place emphasizing capabilities regarding rapid mobilization and high technology (Raitasalo 2005, 259–288). NATO has renewed its strategic concept recently and is seeking a balance between defence duties and crisis management for the organization (Salminen 2009, 22). Since the 1990s, NATO has been expanding Eastwards in Europe. The ISAF operation in Afghanistan is central for NATO (Medcalf 2008) because it is the first peacekeeping operation to transform towards involvement in a protracted conflict in a failed state and it also represents the change of perceptions of people in industrialized countries regarding conflict in a remote country (Giustozzi 2010, 69). Civilian casualties of the military operations of ISAF have attracted public attention and raised public discussion in Western countries. In the foreseeable future,

however, it is unlikely that NATO would leave its global role and return to its former role in the European defence (Medcalf 2008).

Comprehensiveness has been on NATO's agenda for several years and will be a key concept in its new strategic concept development (Petersen et al. 2010, 75). In order to coordinate cooperation between civil and military actors, NATO published its "Civil-Military Cooperation" (CIMIC) doctrine in 2000 (Kurkinen 2001, 41–69). NATO has been developing a civilian component based on the CIMIC-concept. Civil-military cooperation is based on the idea of supporting rebuilding and stabilization after the end of the conflict (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 8). However, NATO has not created broad civilian capabilities (Salminen 2009, 21). They are seen as being more like a supportive part of the action needed for the military goals and have not achieved the same level as in the EU.

4.2.4 Humanitarian agencies, regional actors, and non-governmental organizations

Humanitarian agencies have traditionally been impartial, neutral, and independent, which has meant they have not taken sides in a conflict. In contemporary conflicts, the work of humanitarian agencies has been endangered by violence against aid workers (Kennedy 2009). Coordination of humanitarian aid has been improving since the early 1990s (Finskas 2010) and it is probable that humanitarian agencies want to remain as neutral and independent as possible in future conflicts. This means that the Red Cross will not want military protection for its missions. The work of the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies should not be regarded as civilian crisis management, but as humanitarian work. Because of changes in conflicts and in crisis management, the role of humanitarian agencies is problematic.

Borders between various kinds of humanitarian work, as well as crisis management are not always clear. Humanitarian agencies have collaborated with military actors in crisis areas in order to achieve efficacy (Kennedy & Kotilainen 2009). On the other hand, military personnel have worked in the field of humanitarian aid. Therefore, it may be difficult for local inhabitants to make a distinction between the roles of various actors in the area (*ibid.*). Humanitarian agencies have also criticized blurred identities of various actors in the humanitarian field (Niemelä 2008, 61). In contrast to this and because of the demanding security circumstances, the humanitarian work on behalf of soldiers has been seen as a necessity (*ibid.*). From the humanitarian agencies' perspectives, the distinction between diverse actors in crisis areas should be clear. In the context of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, the interests of humanitarian agencies differ from the interests of civilian and military crisis management actors because independence is more likely to ensure security and neutral working conditions for them. However, even as independent actors, personnel of humanitarian agencies are easily targeted by attacks of armed groups.

The regional agencies are not a substitute to the UN collective security system. These agencies have various capacities for peace operations. The challenge is how getting the regional agencies and the UN to work together in order to enhance peace and security in a manner that enables the optimal use of capacities. (McCoubrey & Morris 2000, 243–244.) In crisis management, the importance of the regional actors is probably increasing. The growth of

NATO and EU capabilities are good examples of a growing interest in crisis management at the regional level. In Africa, the African Union's (AU) peacekeeping troops have been in action in Darfur, for example. The aim of the AU has been to enhance its capabilities in peacekeeping in order to respond to the conflicts taking place in Africa. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) focuses on collective security in Europe and has also been active in post-conflict areas such as Kosovo. In August 2009, OSCE had 18 civilian operations in Europe and Asia (OSCE 2009). The field work of the OSCE can mostly be described as civilian crisis management.

Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) work in conflict areas, both on a local and international basis (Palm 2008, 38). There are about 500 donor organizations and up to 10,000 NGOs working in the field of conflict prevention, peace mediation, and peace-building (Werther-Pietsch & Roithner 2011, 153). The peace mediation and resolution activities of NGOs increased in the 1990s an even greater extent than the UN peacekeeping, which also intensified during this period (Jacobsen 2000, 3). Many NGOs like International Crisis Group work in the field of conflict prevention (Bellamy 2009). The objective of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is to reinforce the capacity of the international community in conflict resolution and crisis management (Liesinen 2008, 42). Information on human rights gathered by human rights NGOs like Amnesty International or the Human Rights Watch is necessary for conflict prevention if official information sources are not credible. NGOs have multidimensional roles: some NGOs work in humanitarian fields and others. NGOs have also promoted women's rights in peace-building (Hudson 2010). However, NGOs have been criticized due to the lack of accountability in peace-building processes in the field (Ghani & Lockhart 2008). Consequently, the functions of the NGOs in peace-building and crisis management should be clearly defined and accountable.

4.2.5 Finnish model: towards comprehensive crisis management

By attending international UN-led peacekeeping, Finland has supported the UN in its main task, which is to maintain international peace and security. The first Finnish peacekeepers traveled to Suez in 1956 and returned the following year (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 3). Attending various operations is a political decision and Finland must choose which operations it attends. International crisis management is one of the main tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces, in addition to the national defence of Finland and cooperation with civilian officials (Finnish Defence Forces 2010). Over 30,000 Finnish soldiers with over 40,000 departures have served as peacekeepers. Traditionally, professional soldiers have represented 10-20 percent of the total number of peacekeepers. The number of Finnish casualties in the UN peacekeeping operations between 1956 and 2008 was 45 (Suomalainen sotilas 2009, 230–234). Finland's annual contribution to civilian crisis management means that about 100–150 Finnish civilian experts travel to work in conflict, conflict-prone, or post-conflict areas in order to promote stability, good governance and reconstruction (Ministry of Interior 2008a). Comprehensiveness has been a crucial concept for Finland while developing crisis management and Finland has adopted a strategy for comprehensive crisis management (Kokkarinen 2008, 27; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009).

In order to promote peace, security, and development, Finland is strengthening its participation in international crisis management consisting of both civilian and military dimensions. In crisis management, Finland contributes to EU-, NATO-, UN- and OSCE-led operations. (Government of Finland 2009, 78.) Participating in crisis management was also one of the guidelines in the previous national security and defence policy report (see Government of Finland 2004). Finland aims to participate in demanding operations in military crisis management and to strengthen civilian crisis management. This field requires respect for human rights and equality, coordination, and comprehensive approaches. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 7.)

Finland helps develop the EU Battle Groups. Finland has also been active in developing the EU's civilian crisis management. For these reasons, the EU plays a major role in Finnish crisis management. Cooperation with Nordic countries has traditionally been strong when developing peacekeeping (Anttila 2009). The Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) was established in the 1990s. Strengthening Nordic cooperation in crisis management and peace-building has been initiated by Thorvald Stoltenberg in his report for Nordic foreign ministers in 2009 (see Stoltenberg 2009).

Finland has made a national action plan on resolution 1325, the aim of which is to increase the number and the proportion of women recruited into crisis management duties. Human rights and equality perspectives need strengthening in both civil and military crisis management, and gender and human rights agenda should also be extended to the training of the personnel. Field experiences of Finnish experts specialized in human rights should be utilized in educating and training crisis management personnel. It is extremely important that crisis management personnel do not participate in any practices that violate human rights. (Government of Finland 2009b, 44–45.)

4.3 Kosovo as a crisis management environment

The crisis management personnel interviewed for this study all had work experience from Kosovo. The conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the crisis management mission that followed is described here as an example of a new conflict and contemporary crisis management. In order to understand the historical context of the interviewees' work, Kosovo's recent history and some assessments of crisis management are introduced briefly in this section. Finnish participation in military crisis management in Kosovo started in 1999, since which time Finnish experts have also worked in various civilian duties in Kosovo.

Kosovo is located in the Western Balkans and it was part of the former Yugoslavia. After the Second World War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded. Following the death of President Tito in 1980, Serbian communists sought to re-establish Serbia's hegemony over the federal state, although in Yugoslavian constitution adopted in 1974 devolved power to six republics and two autonomous regions, including Kosovo (Blitz 2006, 3). Since the 1960s, the proportion of the Albanian minority grew and Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo both felt their positions threatened in the 1980s (Visuri 2000, 19–20; Korhonen et al. 2006, 133). As the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina became internationally acknowledged in April 1992, the warfare started in Bosnia (Haavisto 1999, 20–21).

In the late 1980s, the Albanians in Kosovo started a non-violent movement to promote their independence policy. The Kosovo assembly was dissolved by Serbia in 1990 and the province of Kosovo was ruled by Belgrade. Although Slovenia and Montenegro gained international support for their independence claims, the independence struggle of Kosovo did not receive similar support. Kosovo made a declaration of independence in 1991 and Kosovar Albanians elected Ibrahim Rugova as president in unauthorized elections. Kosovo was left in the hands of Yugoslav authorities in the Dayton Peace accords and the EU statements of that time. In 1996 and 1997, the role of the UCK guerrilla group strengthened and the group killed about 20 Serbs in its attacks. In 1998, the security situation in Kosovo worsened rapidly. In March 1998, the United Nations Security Council of the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The conflict over Kosovo was a conflict of national ideologies, which motivated each of the ethnic groups in the conflict. (Visuri 2000; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005; Korhonen et al. 2006; Pavkovic 2001.)

To prevent Serbia's violent ethnic policy in Kosovo, NATO started its bombings in Serbia in 1999 (Haavisto 1999, 23–26). Kosovo is a case of a significant growth in human rights abuse indicating an escalation in the conflict (Miall 2007, 118). The attacks against Kosovo ceased after NATO's 78-day military air campaign against Serbia. Despite its lack of Security Council authorization, the NATO air campaign has been generally found to be legitimate by international commentators (Korhonen et al. 2006, 134–135). According to Visuri (2000, 12) the experiences from the warfare in Bosnia had an impact on the NATO decisions of the bombings because there was no willingness from NATO to repeat the inability to make decisions as had been the case regarding the conflict in Bosnia.

On June 10, 1999, following peace negotiations led by president Ahtisaari, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 on the establishment of the civilian administration of Kosovo (Visuri 2000). The presence of several institutions (UN/UNMIK, NATO/KFOR, OSCE/OMiK) has promoted the stability and reconstruction of Kosovo (Buerstedde 2005). The reconstruction process in Kosovo has been slow and time-consuming, although the activities of the KFOR have led to some progress (Ahtisaari 2000, 268–269). The Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) was established in July 1999 to promote local decision-making; a 120-seat Assembly was elected in November 2001 and government was formed in March 2002 (Bull 2008).

The status negotiations for Kosovo started in 2006 under the leadership of Martti Ahtisaari (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2006; 2007). After the elections in November 2007, the goal of the new government was the independence of Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. The planned organizations to start to work in Kosovo were an EU-led mission and the ICO (the International Civilian Office). On the day before Kosovo's declaration of independence, the EU made a decision regarding the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). The objective of the EULEX is to monitor, mentor, and advise on the issues related to the rule of law, and the mission's objectives include local ownership. (Judah 2008; EULEX 2010).

The peace process in Kosovo has been criticized due to mistakes and a lack of local ownership (see Bull 2008; Murphy 2007). Poverty is a problem that motivates people to migrate from Kosovo both legally and illegally, and conditions encouraging corruption, crime, and illegal

migration have increased (Häikiö 2008, 159–160). Organized crime and human trafficking have occurred in Kosovo as consequences of poverty, restless circumstances, weak structures for law and order, and mobilization of criminals (Nieminen-Mäkynen 2008, 181–182).

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) which consists of peacekeeping troops, took over the region for two weeks in 1999. At the beginning of the operation the Finnish participation consisted of one battalion. The first Finnish unit to focus on intelligence came to Kosovo in July 1999, and the remainder of the battalion arrived at the area a month later (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 22–23). Since 2006, Finnish troops were part of the Multinational Task Force -Center (MNTF(C)), which consists of five companies with regional responsibilities. (Ibid. 25–26.) The number of KFOR troops decreased from about 50,000 to approximately 15,000 by the beginning of 2008 (Raitasalo 2008a, 4). From 2009 until early 2010, the number of troops continued from 10,000 to 5,000, and this same trend is continuing (Salminen 2009, 22). The major deployment of Finnish troops in KFOR ended at the end of December, 2010 (Finnish Defence Forces 2011). There are still 20 Finnish peacekeepers serving in Kosovo (Finnish Defence Forces 2012). Finland has been involved in the civilian crisis management of Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999. In June 2011, 56 Finnish citizens worked for the EULEX and one for the EUPOL in Kosovo (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2011).

Kosovo is an example of a new conflict because it involved non-state actors and it and civilians were targets of warfare as had happened in Bosnia earlier in the 1990s. Initially, immediately after the war in 1999, there was an urgent need for stabilizing forces, mostly consisting of peacekeepers. After and during the stabilization process it has been possible to work for the reconstruction of the society as well as for the establishment of the necessary administrative structures including the governance, democratic institutions and judicial system. Therefore, the development of Kosovo since the war may be seen as phases of stabilization and establishment of democracy.

In theory, the operation in Kosovo has been carried out in a comprehensive manner (Räty 2008, 128). As described earlier in this chapter, a number of various agencies have worked in Kosovo: their roles may have changed, but the need for cooperation has been clear in the peace- and nation-building. Today, the progress in Kosovo is a process from an armed conflict towards a democracy living in peace, although the stabilization has not been a linear process. Compared to several of today's conflict or post-conflict areas, Kosovo has been recently peaceful.

Personnel working for crisis management should pay attention to the historical, cultural and religious background of the conflict in Kosovo. The ethnic division can also be regarded largely as a religious one. Understanding of the arrangements of the international community's efforts to guarantee the peace facilitates the work of the personnel towards crisis management in Kosovo. Since 2008, Kosovo's independence has changed the country's status and the focus of the international community has been on the national capacity building. Stabilization has taken place although the peace-building has taken time. The risk of violence has declined significantly since 1999.

4.4 Conclusions

Derived from the changes in warfare, there is a need for a new description or paradigm for crisis management that strengthens human development and legitimates the use of force for this purpose. The advancing paradigm could facilitate a development program for crisis management that the international community could adopt (Pyykönen 2008, 130). The nature of crisis management differs from that of warfare. In a paradigmatic manner, crisis management should consist of “winning the peace” as warfare involves “winning the war”. An essential question is how to combine different means in ways which lead to stabilization and durable peace. From a theoretical perspective, there may be a controversy between civilian and military crisis management regarding human security at the paradigmatic level. Civilian organizations and actors are focused on the civilian side of conflict management – and therefore winning the peace. For military actors this situation may be different. At least in militarily demanding operations, the focus may be on “winning the war”. When using capable military force, a crisis management operation may be found in a grey area between warfare and crisis management. When necessary and motivated by the responsibility to protect, “winning the war” is part of “winning the peace”. The paradigm of crisis management should be based on the idea of durable peace¹³.

The use of force requires ethical justification, which means that the international community usually prefers to have a UN mandate for any peace operation. The principle of the responsibility to protect is applied to promote human security. This means that, there may be dilemmas regarding the operational priorities in crisis management and the question of the circumstances under which the use of force is necessary or inevitable. Such dilemmas may need answers on behalf of single peacekeepers, and are discussed will be handled in the following chapter.

As mentioned in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, peace-building and crisis management activities may be based on a combination of different motives relying on human security and national security interests. If human security interests are more explicit in the involved countries’ policies, national security motives may remain more implicit. However, they still often have an impact on the decisions made about peace-building and crisis management. Other factors outside the security sector including the economic situation affect decisions in peace-building and crisis management as well.

Civil-military relations need to function well in peace-building. The dilemma is how to acquire integrated collaboration and coordination structures, that satisfy the needs of both civilian and military actors. The objectives should be integrated and similar to all the agencies involved, as well. Comprehensive crisis management requires common objectives and consistent actions on behalf of all the actors involved. Comprehensive approach to crisis management works better in theory than it has been applied to practice (Shea 2010, 24). It is not an answer to the questions of crisis management in itself but it may help develop cooperation and better functioning crisis management organizations and practices. Only

¹³ When studying crisis management, a similar kind of discrepancy may exist between civilian and military studies. For example, stabilization in Afghanistan has been described in terms of a battlefield (see Nurmela 2010). The agenda of an international mission like the one in Afghanistan may be controversial with regard to the responsibilities of different organizations involved in the mission (see Olson & Charron 2009.)

calling civilian and military crisis management as comprehensive crisis management does not guarantee any difference.

A peace process requires trust-building. The involvement of local inhabitants is an emerging trend in peace processes. The international society carries a responsibility for ensuring even “silent” groups can contribute to these processes. The trend of strengthening local ownership will probably continue in the future and have an impact on the development of peace-building and crisis management organizations. Chapter 5 will examine its meaning to the crisis management personnel and organizations.

Dilemmas related to unresolved conflicts remain open. Should attempts be made to resolve them even without a peace agreement? Is there an obligation for justified and well-planned attempts to pacify the situation in terms of human security? These questions may be politically and culturally sensitive and have an impact on how different means in peace-building and crisis management are prioritized. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, peace-building and crisis management efforts are based on motives that rely both on human and national security interests, as well as on some other potential interests. Therefore, the diversity of motives behind a mission may be as complex as the conflict that the mission aims to resolve. The lack of conceptualizations and theory-based studies is a problem regarding research on peace-building and crisis management. Further research may facilitate an understanding of the obstacles to peace and may create more efficient forms of working in post-conflict zones.

5. Social reality, organizations, and personnel

“As a peacekeeper, taking the people you deal with seriously – whether it be a commander, militiaman, political leader, simple peasant or shanty-town dweller – requires understanding how these individuals actually regard you. There are expectations – positive and negative – present before the mission’s arrival, and they change during its presence in the country.”

– Béatrice Pouligny (2006, 96)

Peace operations take place in multi-cultural environments. In most cases, both the military and civilian operations are planned on an international basis. Participating countries represent diverse cultures which mostly differ from the culture or cultures of the region in which a crisis management operation takes place. In order to promote local ownership, cooperation between local inhabitants and the personnel of crisis management operations is needed. Organizational cultures of agencies and organizations participating in crisis management and peace-building differ from each other. All this requires adaptation and learning from crisis management personnel that make decisions relying on their own competences.

The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and RQs 1, 2, and 3, which are as follows:

Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

RQ 2. How do field experiences affect the personnel’s identities and self-concepts?

RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

Chapter 6 will discuss learning in crisis management in detail. The present chapter will pay special attention to the question of competences required from crisis management. Competences are relevant for both individuals and institutions active in crisis management and therefore, for the analysis of both the personnel and organizations in crisis management. In addition, personnel in peace support operations can be fairly isolated from local inhabitants or have difficulty creating appropriate interaction with them (Pouligny 2006).

Development work of crisis management should take into account the need of sensitivity in regard to the local cultural reality and opinions. It is necessary to develop coordination and cooperation of military and civilian crisis management (Pyykönen 2005). These actors face an insecure environment, colleagues who may have different occupational and cultural backgrounds, and civilians whose ability to rebuild and develop their own societies require support. This chapter introduces central perspectives on organizations, personnel on both military and civilian sides, identity questions, and competences in terms of core competences and action competence in crisis management.

5.1 Organizations

Peace-building systems consist of a large number of diverse but interdependent programs and organizations. The result is a complex system that the conflict in a way that would be impossible for a single organizational actor to achieve. A central feature of complex peace-building systems is that the coherence and information flows are related (De Coning 2008, 58–70). Crisis management organizations are planned to ensure the continuation of a peace process, interaction with local people, prevention of violent outbursts and collaboration of various international and local agencies in the region. Coordination and collaboration are key issues for a successful peace operation. Potential competition between various agencies reduces the effectiveness of an operation as a whole.

Cultural aspects in crisis management are central, both because of the multi-nationality of peace operations and because of cultural differences between foreign crisis management personnel and local people¹⁴. Military and civilian organizations differ from each other. Military organizations rely on military principles and are characterized by discipline. In military crisis management, troops coming from different countries are organized to collaborate and fulfill an operational mandate in accordance with common military principles. Historically, military organizations have been mostly male or male-dominated (Goldstein 2001).

It is difficult to change existing organizational cultures (Schein 2009; Ylöstalo 2009). Culture has not been widely used as a scholar or policy concept when assessing peace operations (Rubinstein et al. 2008, 541). Military and civilian cultures differ to such a great extent that it is an impediment for coordination (Shea 2010, 24). Various agencies and organizations in a peace operation represent different cultures and their employees come from different countries. Cooperation between expatriate personnel and local population is intercultural and multiculturalism takes different forms in crisis management. To promote multicultural cooperation in and between organizations, one option could be a dialogue format leaving floor to each participant's reflectivity (see Schein 2009). When applied to crisis management, the dialogue concept would require time for open conversation and explicit analysis of the cultural differences. A basic understanding of cultural differences between the organizations involved would facilitate the work for common objectives.

An organization can be analyzed according to Coghlan and Rashford's (2006) typology of sub-systems or according to hierarchical structures. In hierarchies, the higher levels in leadership and management structures are more powerful for representing an organization's objectives, while the lower levels may be practically crucial within its representation in a conflict area. An organization consists of the following sub-systems: the individual, the face-to-face working team, the interdepartmental group of teams and the organization (ibid., 3). At each of these organizational levels, an individual's tasks are: membership and participation (at the individual level), creating effective working relationships (at the face-to-face team level), coordinating joint efforts (at the interdepartmental group's level), and adaptation (at the organizational level). Outcomes at the same levels are matching needs (at the individual level), creating a functioning team (at the face-to-face team level), coordination

¹⁴ Countries based on individualistic cultures have traditionally developed the methods of crisis management that should function in collectivistic cultures. In individualistic cultures, behavior is based on attitudes and in collectivistic cultures it is based on norms (Triandis 1997).

(at the interdepartmental group's level), and adaptation (at the organizational level). (ibid., 5–6.) This typology can be applied to the analysis of crisis management organizations. The organizational development of crisis management can be evaluated either within one organization or between two or several organizations and the employees are actors at several levels.




Figure 2. Levels for analyzing organizational and inter-organizational functions

In the civilian crisis management, the personnel consist of the police, NGO employees, the UN employees, and the personnel of various other organizations. Work in humanitarian and development aid should be distinguished from civilian crisis management, although there may be similarities in the activities. The focus of civilian crisis management is to reconstruct the administration for the recovering society while humanitarian aid is required to ensure the primary living conditions for local inhabitants. Trust-building requiring competences for intercultural dialogue are also needed. As Figure 2 shows, cooperation between various levels of organizations occurs mostly between similar levels of organizations.

Crisis management organizations are planned to be temporary, which may affect how people work in them. High-performance organizations usually have a high level of employee engagement because employees give their best if they really feel valued and have the opportunity to contribute their ideas (Holbeche 2006). Regardless of their temporary nature, crisis management organizations should strengthen the personnel's motivation and engagement to them. In civilian crisis management, few individuals believe that they have a long-term post: from this perspective, the situation is similar when analyzing reservists in military crisis management. The professional officers may see the military crisis management organization more as a continuum to the national armed forces.

In a joint operation, civilian and military actors are separate but they collaborate within the same structure. The ability to combine different crisis management activities in the way that would be optimal for enduring peace-building would be relevant for the further development of crisis management. In Afghanistan, for example, the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), including Finnish involvement have recruited civilians as experts. Disarmament processes may be arranged by both civic and military organizations. For example, the civilian crisis management operation in Aceh organized disarmament.

Crisis management actors and emergency agencies and organizations in a conflict area may compete with each other and stereotyping of representatives of other organizations may occur (Liesinen 2007). Stereotypical views may have an impact on mutual perception. Different organizational languages complicate collaboration between civilian and military actors (Valtonen 2010), and even cooperation between the civilian missions of the EU may be challenging (Mustonen 2008). These results from studies on cooperation may be applied to international cooperation in crisis management. Concepts and working methods in crisis management may be unclear, which makes crisis management duties more complicated. Collaboration in crisis management may be endangered by the lack of coordination between different actors (Nieminen-Mäkynen 2008, 174).

In peace operations, a lack of knowledge about local realities can cause problems (Poulligny 2006). One explanation of the operational success of a peace operation can be its ability to learn from the local environment (Howard 2008, 86–87). Good vertical interoperability signifies that cooperation between the expatriate personnel of a peace operation and local population works well (Rubinstein et al. 2008, 544). The outcome depends on how the mission is perceived, understood and accepted by local inhabitants and how well their needs are comprehended by the operational personnel. Cross-cultural communication sometimes leads to misunderstandings because the communicators cannot interpret each other properly due to their different cultural backgrounds (Adler 1997, 70–71). Such misunderstandings may take place in communication between peacekeepers who come from different countries as well as between local inhabitants and peacekeepers. Mutual understanding facilitates communication at any level.

Factors such as changes in conflicts, potential rivalry between agencies, and a lack of awareness about local realities can challenge crisis management organizations. An answer to this could be to develop education and more flexible organizational structures. Differences in military cultures are sometimes found to be a factor that causes inconvenience, and these differences strengthen the requirements for similar military norms in international operations.

5.2 Personnel

5.2.1 Practical challenges

More profound understanding of the behavior and thinking of crisis management personnel would make it easier to develop their education, as well as comprehensive leadership and better organizational structures for crisis management. Duties in civilian and military crisis management differ in that civilian crisis management focuses on the rebuilding the governance, while the main focus of the military crisis management is to ensure security. Diverse objectives may make a peacekeeper's work controversial (Johansson 2001, 61). Judging social processes in a conflict zone includes understanding of different power sources and other complexities. Instead of re-building, it may also be necessary to create something new based on the existing society in order to ensure durable peace. (Wennmann 2011.) Due to the complexities of peace processes, personnel should be able to deal with them.

Serious stressors of peacekeepers, outcome measures related to their well-being, their attitudes, and cultural issues related to multinational peacekeeping environments should be analyzed in order to make progress in the position of the personnel (Adler and Britt 2003, 313–314)¹⁵. These four themes are important in terms of all the dimensions of action competence. Serious stressors challenge both the physical and psychological dimension of the action competence, and the outcome measures of psychological and physical dimensions are related to the same dimensions of the action competence. Peacekeepers' attitudes are part of the psychological, ethical and social dimensions of the action competence.

The psychological strains in conventional warfare are acknowledged and known but this is not the case regarding irregular warfare (McMaster 2009, 19). Stress reactions are higher in peace enforcement operations than comparison to traditional peacekeeping and low-intensity conflicts can cause even more stress among soldiers than conventional warfare because the enemy is clearly identifiable in conventional warfare (*ibid.*). Military crisis management tasks in the context of irregular warfare may vary from peaceful duties to combat (Lucas 2009, 5).

In the context of the work of Danish peacekeepers in Kosovo, military risk management in peacekeeping operations has been considered to be a combination of the accomplishment of two tasks: (a) creating security and stability in the mission area and (b) reconstructing the civil and political infrastructure. Security, politics and humanitarianism are profoundly connected and they must be managed simultaneously. There is a tendency to have more decentered and situational type of risk management that makes individual soldiers capable of exercising an increasing amount of situational and context-dependent decision-making. The external control is replaced by internal control. In the civil-military contacts of peacekeeping operations, the military ethos and its social technologies are re-contextualized and generalized. (Norgaard 2004.) There are two parallel and mutually connected tendencies in peacekeeping operations: a transition from a centralized and bureaucratic type of management to a decentralized risk management which allows an individual soldier to control himself or herself: and a transition from a territorially defined discourse of security to a value-oriented discourse of security that makes the construction of a civil-military "trust capital" and political cooperation into military security issues. These two tendencies mark a transition to a humanitarian security mechanism and constructing a new global governmentality connecting humanitarian, political, military, and local civilian actors in an extensive network of strategic power relations (*Ibid.*, 217).

International military missions usually meet as part of a specific mission, on training exercises and on actual missions. NATO or UN operations are not conducted by a single country. Military forces depend on each other because there is a lack of adequate resources, personnel, and logistics to conduct independent action, and international coalitions

¹⁵ In the conclusions of "The psychology of the peacekeeper," Adler and Britt (2003, 314–6) advised the leaders of peacekeeping operations that peacekeepers must understand the relevance of the operation. Placing the operation in a meaningful context helps promote positive attitudes. Adequate pre-deployment training for situations that peacekeepers probably encounter should be arranged. Peacekeepers need accurate knowledge of the groups involved in the peace agreement. Although it is not possible to eliminate the stressors', their effects can be reduced. Understanding of the common military culture and cultural differences should be supported. It is necessary to understand the impact of the decisions made at a political or strategic level on the ground. Potentially traumatic events require early intervention. Individual coping efforts and a coherent understanding of the mission should be promoted. (*Ibid.*) The above list underlines support for coping, understanding of the mission, education, training, and therefore adequate leadership and management in contemporary military crisis missions.

sometimes strengthen the legitimacy of an operation. The militaries in the various countries show substantial international culture differences. Tensions between military staff and the UN civilian staff have been observed in several peace support missions. However, there is a certain level of military professionalism that can surmount national borders and cultural differences. Mutual trust and cohesion are more likely to occur when the level of activities is high, when the personnel are drawn from a small labor pool, and when interdependencies are large. These variables could be taken into account when designing training and modules for working in an international military context. (Soeters & Bos-Bakx 2003.)

The problems facing military profession are current questions in various armed forces in many parts of the world. Current development raises the question what a military professional does and what the purpose of the military profession is. Soldiers have traditionally been trained to fight in wars, but the probability of conventional war has diminished significantly (Smith 2004, 188–192). Officers' and soldiers' professions are challenging; Micewski (2005, 13) described the core question of being a soldier: "The aptitude and, if necessary, readiness to apply force and thus put one's own and the life of the others at risk, necessitates personalities who are actually and in the true sense of the word able to take responsibility, not only for themselves but, above all, for others." In complex crisis management environments, soldiers' tasks are complicated and require the ability to make ethical assessments from them.

5.2.2 Social categorization, prejudice, and dynamics between personnel groups

Due to a diverse number of actors in crisis management, prejudice between different groups may cause problems for collaboration. Differences that potentially lead to prejudice can be categorized in accordance with several dimensions. The following dimensions are substantial in crisis management: local people and employees of the peace operation, recruits in different organizations and agencies in accordance with the agencies, and different nationalities within an organization. People are identified in one or several social groups (Gergen 2009, 51). The "contact hypothesis" is a set of ideas regarding how to reduce inter-group prejudice and discrimination. It is based on the idea that unfamiliarity and separation feed hostility between groups and that under the right conditions, contact among members of different groups reduces hostility and promotes positive inter-group attitudes. (Brewer & Gaertner 2005, 298–299.)

Contact research, social categorization and social identity theories were combined in order to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the cognitive mechanisms that enable cooperative contact. Three alternative models are de-categorization, re-categorization, and mutual differentiation. De-categorization is based on the idea that inter-group interactions are structured to reduce the salience of category distinctions and promote opportunities to get to know out-group members as individuals. In re-categorization, it is crucial to structure a definition of group categorization at a higher level of category inclusiveness in order to reduce inter-group bias and conflict. The mutual differentiation model differs from the former two. The model favors groups working together in order to get complementary functions by recognizing and valuing mutual superiorities and inferiorities in the context of interdependence in task attainment or common super-ordinate goals. (Ibid., 304–308.)

Mere social categorization has broad consequences. In-group members are more often regarded as individuals and out-group members as similar to each other. There is a tendency to assess in-group members as having human feelings and out-group members as being less prone to such emotions. The social psychology of morality cannot be understood without taking the influences of in-group-out-group –categorization into account. (Helkama 2009, 142–143.) Consequences of mere categorization are essential for various group relations in a conflict area because it may affect relations between local people as well as between them and crisis management personnel or between various personnel groups in crisis management. Negative attitudes towards an out-group can be reduced by intensifying cooperation between the groups and unifying the goals set by the groups (Turner & Oakes 1997, 361). A negative relationship between the groups can be reduced by changing it into a positively interdependent one (Brown 2000, 252).

Identification with a group has an impact on an individual's readiness to use a given social category in self-definition. Self-categorization forms a substantial part of the basis of our orientation towards others. When inter-group conflict takes place, it is difficult to solve communication problems between the groups rapidly. A growing number of studies support the view that conflict between groups would be solved by allowing both sub-group and super-ordinate group identification. (Haslam 2004.) In some cases, social categorization may be rejected in order to prevent stereotypical representations. People may actively resist social categorization given to them from the outside, and acts of this tendency may be called identity activism (see Gergen 2009, 51–52).

A sense of common identity is effective at reducing inter-group bias. However, it is not always possible to induce a common in-group identity. Developing a common in-group identity does not require groups or individuals to forsake their original identities. (Dovidio et al. 2006, 79–83.) Two categories can be united if they are considered as part of a super-ordinate category (McGarty 2006, 30). The perception of greater inter-group similarity promotes re-categorization at a higher and more inclusive level of categorization (Crisp 2006, 91). It is relevant to alter the context of group relations, for example to support common and more inclusive social categorization or to re-engineer group memberships and identities. Group representations may play a mediating role in various circumstances when group relations are considered. Re-categorization can take various forms. (Dovidio et al. 2006, 83–84.)

When applying these results to the contexts of crisis management, the cooperation between various actors in crisis management could be strengthened by either changing the stereotypical picture on members of an out-group (civilian/military crisis management organization) and/or reinforcing the cooperation between these organizations and trying to build bridges by super-ordinate group identification knitting together various sub-groups. No studies have examined the question of whether stereotypical views of various crisis management personnel groups on each other exist or cause problems. Changing stereotypical views on out-group members would require conscious efforts to change stereotypes. This policy would not exclude strengthening of cooperation or creating new sub-ordinate identification. Because efforts to reduce stereotypes requires the stereotypes to be revealed, which may be a complicated process, the easiest way to enhance cooperability might be through creating common identity for crisis management personnel. However, this subordinate identity construction should not hinder the existence of other identities.

5.2.3 Identity and related concepts

Identity is an integrative concept which helps understand crisis management actors at the individual level. Self-concept and identity provide answers to the questions of “Who am I?”, “Where do I belong?”, and “How do I fit in?” (Oyserman 2005, 5). Our ability to remember is influenced by our self-concepts in a diverse range of ways (ibid. 7). A person’s sense of identity often includes a perception of who they were, who they are, and who they will be. Individuals’ assessments of their abilities, personalities, and self-worth are based on their memories of their past. Their memories also influence their well-being and behavior, and their thoughts about the future influence how they process information. (Ross & Buehler 2005, 25–7.) A person’s identity is always related to his or her biographic continuum. Identity should be assessed as a process, not as a result. It functions like an intersection between the individual and societal dimensions. (Eteläpelto 2007, 97–141.) Identity connects an individual’s personal self-concept with wider social and historical contexts. The social aspects of identity issues are relevant for this study. Self-concept and identity comprise our theories about our personality (Oyserman 2005, 5). Social dimensions of identity are partly related to social categories people make and perceive from their social environment.

Identity makes it possible for individuals to understand the meaning of societal changes. Identity is discussed in a broad field of studies, such as sociology, social psychology, cultural studies, anthropology, and history. Identity has been analyzed as group identity, national, cultural and linguistic identity, gender identity, and professional identity. (Eteläpelto 2007, 93–96.) However, the lack of definitional clarity regarding “identity” and “self” makes research coordination difficult in psychology and sociology (Côté & Levine 2002, 87). This difficulty exists regarding various fields of identity studies. Identity issues related to learning will be handled in chapter 6.

An identity is divided into social and personal aspects (Turner & Reynolds 2005, 261). In addition to these two, the Eriksonian approach to identity also contains ego identity (Côté & Levine 2002). As one moves from defining self as an individual person to defining self in terms of a social identity, group behavior becomes possible and emerges. When a shared social identity is psychologically operative, a depersonalization of self-perception takes place so that collective perceptions of mutual and collective similarities are enhanced. (Turner & Reynolds 2005, 261.)

Social categorization affects the social dimension of identities and it may also link prejudice issues to identity formation or preferences. The social identity approach emphasizes that categorization involves differentiation of ourselves and others into meaningfully distinctive categories (Abrams & Hogg 2005, 155). The use of categorization changes over time, both at the individual and cultural levels (Crisp & Hewstone 2006, 16). Social categorization locates people in various categories. The categorization process exaggerates similarities among individuals in the same group, as well as differences between people in other groups. Self-enhancement and uncertainty reduction seem to be factors that help explain social categorization. (Hogg 2004, 206–207.)

According to Tajfel (1978; ref. Brown & Capozza 2006) social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept that derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social

group”. According to social identity theory, people discriminate in favor of in-group. The theory relies on two basic assumptions: that people wish to evaluate themselves and to be evaluated positively, and that the value of self and the value of the in-group are defined through comparison. The in-group is positively evaluated if it is perceived as being superior to major out-groups on meaningful comparison dimensions. (Ibid., 3–4). A social group is defined in various ways in different parts of the world (see Brown & Capozza 2006). Ethnic identity is part of social identity and cultures have a strong influence the development of one’s identities and worldview (Verkuyten 2005; Laungani 2007, 81).

Self-concept and identity are gendered and the neglect of the gender has often meant the omission of the female gender (Wager 1994). Gender can be regarded as an on-going social construction that is part of social practice referring both to everyday social interactions and larger historical and also institutional contexts in which interactions occur. In Western societies, socialization takes place in the context of gender dichotomies of the male and female. (Martin & Jurik 2007, 31–34.)

Identity is also related to action competence which has an ethical dimension (see section 5.3). Identity construction is, by its very nature, ethical (Värri & Ropo 2010). Social identity may also play a major role when an individual thinks about existential questions. By shifting from a personal, finite identity to social, abstract identity, a different level of existence that is not threatened by biological fate may be experienced. In a study of Castano et al. (2006, 82–83) individuals, who were reminded of their mortality in a test situation, listed a greater number of social identities and perceived their group of friends as more bounded; this indicates that social identity may serve as an anxiety-buffer mechanism. In crisis areas, crisis management personnel face questions related to mortality in conflict: therefore, this could be a factor that would strengthen crisis management personnel’s social identities.

In the social identity theory, individual identity is seen as a point along the continuum between personal identity and social identity at either end (Worchel & Coutant 2004, 184). Individual identity operates on several levels: personal identity, group membership, intra-group identity, and group identity. These levels have their own continuums which range from high to low salience. Groups play an active role in focusing comparison process and in shaping individual identity (ibid., 184–198). An important process is how a group membership creates a reference group, which involves that an individual psychologically transforming his or her speech from saying “I” into saying “we” (Turner & Reynolds 2004, 263). This difference may be important in the context of crisis management as well. Who are the “us” with whom an individual working in crisis management identifies himself or herself?

In the sociological discourse, identity issues have been linked to life politics. In the post-modern world, life politics requires emancipation from hierarchical traditions, which means “a politics of self-actualization in a reflexively ordered environment” (Giddens 1991, 214). This concept connects identity issues with the personal choices and global scope because these levels influence each other (ibid.). Therefore, the decision to work in crisis management duties is an option in one’s life politics. The identity discourse could integrate both the professional and social issues related to the work and learning processes of the crisis

management personnel. This is important, even when analyzing the personnel's abilities to work in complicated situations and their capacity to learn.

5.2.4 Being a professional in crisis management

Employees usually develop multidimensional professional identities. The instability of working life has changed the process of constructing identity. Work influences identity as well as other, more private fields of life. Professional identity is always adopted within a community of practice in which socialization, learning and interaction are key elements. Occupational traditions provide a framework that helps individuals identify with work. (Eteläpelto 2007; Kirpal 2004.) Due to occupational segregation regarding gender, some occupations are considered male and some others female (Kinnunen 2004, 74). Occupations in military crisis management are typically male-dominated, which has an impact on the representations of the work in this field.

According to Schein (2004, 20), occupations involving intensive periods of education and apprenticeship are connected with a shared learning of attitudes, norms, and values, which become taken for granted for the members of these occupations. In accordance with this assumption, personnel with a common background in professional officers' education make a more homogenous group from a professional perspective compared to those deployed from the reserves to a military crisis management mission, as well as to those deployed into a civilian mission. The latter groups have no common occupational socialization.

An organizational identity is seen as having a collective character and it contains the major features of an organization (Puusa 2005). Presumably, therefore, there is a variation in both the work cultures in different crisis management organizations and the identities in different professional groups. From a global perspective, Finnish military peacekeeping is a special case because a large number of reservists work as peacekeepers. This phenomenon may have an impact on the organizational identity processes in military crisis management, although it has not yet faced scientific scrutiny. In civilian crisis management, the recruited employees are professionals who have special skills that are needed for defined tasks. Because of various tasks and objectives in post-conflict areas, the professional backgrounds of the personnel must be diverse as well. In civilian and military crisis management, there are often various relations between historical occupational and social psychological factors.

Military crisis management has extensive historical and institutional roots in the armed forces. Civilian crisis management does not have a similar institutional background. On the other hand, the professional roles of the personnel in civilian crisis management and the reservists in military crisis management have been diverse, and the professional officers in military crisis management have had similar kind of professional roles in their careers. In military crisis management, professional officers have strong traditions because they mostly work within a military organization. Professional officers have been found to identify themselves with their professions (Limnell 2004).¹⁶

¹⁶ According to Limnell (2004, 27), 94 percent of the professional officers and cadets who responded to a questionnaire study agreed with the statement "Officers have a strong professional identity". Most of the respondents were also proud of their education and their profession compared to civilian academic professions.

Professional officers' work contracts usually vary from six to 12 months in military crisis management when recruited by the Finnish armed forces. Reservist peacekeepers work in military organizations with strong military traditions when they work in a military crisis management operation. However, the level of adaptation to military crisis management is significant because the environment is quite different from that of reservists' everyday life. Reservists usually have 6–12-month contracts in crisis management and come from widely varying professional backgrounds. For the civilian crisis management employees, the level of traditions within the crisis management organizations varies greatly. More "mature" governmental organizations may have certain traditions but individuals may find the organizational and cultural working contexts in many civilian organizations in post-conflict areas to be new. Therefore, it is probable that these changes pose a challenge for the adaptation of civilian crisis management personnel.

The concept of social identity is divided into subgroups of person-based, relational, and group-based social identities in addition to collective identities (Brewer 2001, 20). These dimensions have different meanings for individuals. When related to the professional groups interviewed for this study, this means that professions in crisis management may present an individual with several types of social identities. Due to the variation of social identities, their meaning will also vary. Group-based social identities are at least perceivable in crisis management. An open question is how these identities and the meanings of operation develop during and after an operation. Because of Castano et al.'s (2005) findings related to the mention of death as a factor that strengthens social identities, identity change in crisis management is an interesting research question. In crisis management, personnel face the traces of a former conflict, or at least the risks related to the potential growth of mortality due to a failed peace process or failed crisis management.

Few studies have focused on the professional identities and attitudes of peacekeepers and civilian crisis management employees. In these studies, the focus has mostly been on the peacekeepers. Kurashina (2005) studied the professional identities of Japanese peacekeepers and found institutional and historical background to be a crucial explanation of these individuals' self-perception. That study found that participation in international peacekeeping had had a positive impact on the image of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces.

According to Franke (2003), soldiers' warrior identity may be controversial in relation to peacekeeping. One way to solve this problem is to integrate warrior and peacekeeper identities so that they would both comprise positive parts of the soldiers' identities (*ibid.*). A similar type of identity dilemma has also been described in a study describing CIMIC cooperation (ISAF) in Afghanistan where Norwegian soldiers' tasks were connected with the civilian-humanitarian field (see Kristoffersen 2006). Traditionally Nordic peacekeepers have emphasized contact with civil society in their work. On the other hand, peacekeepers must have capabilities related to both civil-oriented peacekeeping and combat. Hedlund and Soeters (2010, 412) noted that Swedish soldiers in Kosovo and Liberia had been overly oriented towards peacekeeping if they actually needed to attend combat tasks. Therefore, the significance of civil-oriented peacekeeping and combat skills varies depending on the tasks required.

In military crisis management missions, reservists comprise a heterogeneous group from a professional and educational perspective. Civilian crisis management personnel consist of a professionally diverse group. Due to differences in their educational and professional background, the professional identities of these two groups are probably multiform. It is relevant to ask whether working in a crisis management mission influences personnel's identities and thoughts in different ways in the three professional groups of this research. More generally, does a mission change an individual's perception of himself or herself?

5.2.5 Gender in crisis management

Many of victims in armed conflicts are women. Therefore, the ability of peacekeepers and other expatriate personnel to cooperate with local women in conflict or post-conflict areas is a broad task. The employees engaged with peace-building must be able to collaborate with local women. In their professional background, women in military crisis management had chosen to attend voluntary military service, while men who served in military crisis management had attended compulsory military service. In civilian crisis management duties, there was no obligation for personnel to have done military service¹⁷. The implicit idea of deploying women in peace operations has been to prevent the issues of sexual exploitation and abuse of local women, which have caused problems in several peace operations; this view has been criticized, however, because work against sexual exploitation and abuse require more explicit and clearly defined forms (Simic 2010). Based on the results of a number of studies on women in peacekeeping, Valenius (2007, 28) concluded that the participation of female peacekeepers makes operations more effective.

Occupations in crisis management are generally male-dominated. This is especially the case in military crisis management because a clear majority of soldiers are men. The situation is similar among police officers. Regarding these occupations, the recruitment of female employees is a special challenge. It is necessary to take the gender segregation of the occupations into account when developing the recruitment. A majority of Finnish women work in female-dominated workplaces and men in male-dominated ones (Kauppinen & Veikkola 1997, 21). Work abroad in crisis management missions is especially demanding, if an employee has family obligations including children. This may also have some implications on the recruitment in regard to gender, because women have traditionally taken stronger responsibility for children within families.

Military service and the armed forces are often interpreted as an institution of masculinity, and women's role in armed forces has been restricted (see Tallberg 2003; Mäki 2007, 106; Goldstein 2001, 406). The position of women in armed forces may be complicated and seen as "tokens"; therefore, women in military crisis management may find their situation challenging. Peacekeeping has been regarded as a male-bound and therefore gendered social construction (Tallberg 2009). According to an analysis of the armed forces in 18 NATO member countries, the United States had the largest number and proportion of female military personnel with 14 percent. There has been a tendency to connect a higher proportion of women deployed to armed forces connected with the professionalism of soldiers (Carreiras 2006).

¹⁷ Contemporary Finnish legislation makes military service compulsory for male citizens and voluntary for women. In Finland, women gained the right to apply for military service in 1995.

UN resolution 1325 has strengthened efforts to promote women's position in peace operations. In UN peacekeeping forces between 1957 and 1989, less than 0.1 percent of the personnel were women and most of these were nurses. Since the increase of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s, the proportion of women among the personnel has risen to the level of almost two percent (Goldstein 2004, 11). There have been no female leaders in any UN peacekeeping operations. Women constitute only one percent of the military personnel and four percent of the police personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and only 30 percent of the civilian international personnel (10 percent in leading positions). Twenty-two percent of the nationally or locally recruited employees are women (Skjelsbaek 2007, 27). Expectations regarding the opportunities of international actors to improve the position of local women are usually too high when related to the situation on the ground (Olonisakin 2011).

In civilian crisis management, the proportion of recruited women has been rising. In Finland, the proportion in civilian crisis management rose from approximately 20 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2009 (see Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 51; Tiilikainen 2007; Pitkänen et al 2010, 80). In Finland, only one percent of young people participating in military service are women (Jokinen 2010, 128). Military service is a voluntary choice for women in Finland; prior to service, a majority of female conscripts have been found to be interested in a career within the security sector, but only 40 percent retained this interest after their service (Määttä 2007). The proportion of women among military crisis management personnel has been low – in September 2009 it was only three percent (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009, 51). Female peacekeepers are considered “tokens” because they comprise only a small minority of peacekeepers. Because women working in civilian crisis management are mostly a minority, their position resembles that of women in military crisis management in respect to professional segregation. Personnel may need to work with both local men and women, although the approved interaction between the sexes may be restricted in traditional communities, and it is necessary for personnel to be aware of these traditions.

5.2.6 Finnish crisis management and military personnel

Civilian crisis management only has a brief tradition in Finland and few studies have concentrated on civilian crisis management personnel (see Raatikainen 2004; Mustonen 2008). In December 2009, 37 percent of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts sent abroad were police officers. It has been difficult to recruit female police officers for civilian crisis management duties because the number of women in these professions is limited. (Pitkänen et al. 2010.) Because of the short history of civilian crisis management, little is known about the experiences of Finnish civilian crisis management personnel. Finnish peacekeepers have been studied in several research projects (see, e.g., Kauppinen & Huida 1994; Kangas 1999; Röberg 1999, Väinölä 2005; Ahtiainen et al. 2007; Kousa 2008; Tallberg 2009). The focuses and the themes of these studies vary considerably. Table 6 briefly shows the results of Finnish studies on crisis management in relation to their relevance to the present study.

Table 6. Selected findings on Finnish crisis management personnel's positive and negative experiences

Research	Positive experiences	Negative experiences/ Challenges	Other results
Kauppinen and Huida (1994)		- segregation of duties	
Kangas (1999)	+ self-esteem + communality		
Röberg (1999)	+ effects on family	- effects on family	
Lahdenperä & Harinen	+ meaningful duties		
Raatikainen (2004)		- divorce risk	
Väinölä (2005)	+ self-esteem	+ new skills	learning organization
Raatikainen			
Ahtiainen et al. (2007)	+ operation easy + making friends	- need to concentrate - growth of problems - lack of privacy	cultural differences
Kousa (2008)			low trauma level
Mustonen (2008)			operational coordination
Tallberg (2009)	+ recreation activities	- disputes (reservists/professional soldiers)	

According to Kangas (1999) and Väinölä (2005) the peacekeepers' self-esteem strengthened during the time they spent in the operation. However, Lahdenperä and Harinen's (2000) finding that the peacekeepers had found their duties important can be interpreted as an expression of their motivation for their duties. Ahtiainen et al.'s (2007) finding that the peacekeepers would have expected their duties to be more demanding may be interpreted in Norgaard and Holsting's (2006) framework of boredom. Approximately 1.2–3.6 percent of Finnish peacekeepers suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which is a low rate in international terms. However, it is possible that the peacekeepers who participated in the study had more positive experiences and that those who had bad experiences related to the risks of the post-traumatic disorder did not participate (Kousa 2008). However, the low prevalence of post-traumatic disorder is a good sign that suggests fairly high levels of adaptation (see Kousa 2008). Work in crisis management duties may consist of controversial experiences that have been reported in different ways in these reports.

Few researchers have focused on family issues of crisis management personnel. Monica Röberg (1999) studied the influence of peacekeeping duties on peacekeepers' family life and dating and found that peacekeeping and being away from home for a relatively long time may have both negative and positive consequences on a peacekeeper's marriage or dating. In some cases, crisis management duties had led to a divorce (Röberg 1999; Raatikainen 2004). Maintaining good family relations was found to be more difficult at the beginning of the duties, when it was more difficult to deal with daily routines (Raatikainen 2004,

73). However, some peacekeepers a crisis when they returned home because they found it difficult to adjust to the realities at home (Suomalainen sotilas, 2009, 233). Younger women who were interested in attending civilian crisis management duties felt it would be difficult to work abroad in crisis management because of family reasons (Pitkänen et al. 2010).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a large majority of professional officers identify themselves to their profession. A majority of respondents (80 percent) had a vocation for their profession as officers. (Limnéll 2004.) The values of the armed forces and the national defence have been traditionally based on patriotism and national security. In one study, only 51 percent of respondents who were young professional officers felt that work in international duties should be required from the individuals aspired to positions as officers. For young officers, the major reason for working abroad is to gain experience (Limnéll & Moberg 2008, 2–8.) Ninety-four percent of young officers felt that duties abroad should remain voluntary (Limnéll 2008, 41). Identity change, learning processes or the institutional challenges to change practices in crisis management have not been scrutinized in Finnish crisis management studies.

5.3 Competences

Competences can be analyzed at the individual or organizational levels although the concept is mostly used in reference to individuals' abilities. Organizational competences refer to collective abilities, while individually, competences can be considered as attributes that an individual is able to apply (see also Illeris 2011, 50). Individual competences are responses to the requirements inherent in a specific situation but a competent person is also able to apply his or her professional knowledge or other abilities in practice (ibid. 50). Competences may also refer to qualifications (Ellström & Kock 2009), although this concept is not used with this meaning in the present study because it cannot be reduced to a list of qualifications; instead, it is part of an individual's ability to react in appropriately in new situations. An essential part of an individual's competence is his or her general ability for reflection. Competences also include the potential to deal with unknown challenges (Illeris 2009c).

Understanding what changes in conflicts require from crisis management personnel and organizations helps identify core competences in crisis management. New multinational operations challenge military leadership (Smedberg 2001, 274), the general principles of military command have not changed over time. However, changes are taking place for a paradigmatic shift in leadership that focuses more on shared responsibility and decentralization (Nissinen 2001, 97–99). Broadening the spectrum of civilian and military crisis management may also require reanalyzing the crisis management leadership and management as well. Good horizontal interoperability means that cooperation between various agencies and organizations functions well within a peace operation (Rubinstein et al. 2008, 543). As concluded in the previous section, knowledge about the on-going situation among local inhabitants facilitates a crisis management operation.

The core competences of an organization are "success factors" that are reflected from past achievements. They are the highest-level, longest-lasting units for strategy-making, and future strategic decisions should be based on analysis of the competencies. Discussion about

the core competencies has been part of the analysis of how organizations can build and profit from their capabilities (Holbeche 2006). The concept helps to find out how to develop the major capabilities in crisis management. Two essential questions in this research are: (1) What are the core competences in crisis management? and (2) What are the differences in core competences at the individual and organizational levels? Civilian and military crisis management has special skill requirements for various particular duties. In peace-building, interaction is relevant to local civilians, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations active in the region. The ability to collaborate and awareness about the local environment are both important. Because there are potential controversies in a conflict or post-conflict area, the ability to ethical assessment is also required from both civilian and military crisis management personnel. Due to the complexity of new conflicts, reflectivity is also needed.

The core competences in crisis management can be defined as collaboration skills, local awareness, ability to make ethical assessment and complexity management. These can be seen as the core competences for both civilian and military crisis management at the individual level. Local awareness improves an individual's ability to communicate and cooperate. The significance of these factors can be derived from the essence of communication for providing human security to people living in a conflict or post-conflict zone. Complexity management is a core competence because new conflicts are complex and therefore require reflection. The ability to make ethical assessment in crisis management can be seen as a result of the complexity of conflict, which may lead to ethical reasoning. The objectives of military crisis management are restricted to ensure security; therefore, combat skills belong among the core competences of military personnel. In civilian crisis management, the objectives are broader. The core competences of crisis management at the individual level are visualized in Figure 3.

The individual level of analysis focuses on the experiences and views of the personnel in crisis management. Complex missions consisting of inter-dependent projects and organizations are complicated and demanding working environments. Naturally, the number of challenges one faces at work depends on the tasks involved. The core competences introduced above are required from both individuals and organizations in crisis management, although individuals and institutions cannot be assessed in the same ways. The competences required from individuals in particular are analyzed below.

Contemporary peace operations are multidimensional and complex; consequently, troops in military crisis management require diverse competences because they may need to respond to both civilian- and military-type challenges (Räty 2010). Soldiers face new, alien situations with risky elements creating a basis of learning. Contact and combat skills are needed in peace support operations. Contact skills involve a personal competency that specifically means context awareness, cooperation, communication, flexibility and conflict handling. In civil-military encounters, trust capital is needed. Trust is a tactical concept that enhances readiness while reducing the uncertainty of civil-military decision-making. Contact skills and reflexivity are less known military competencies although discipline and combat skills are already well-known by the military. From an organizational point of view, five competencies (context awareness, cooperation, communication, flexibility, conflict handling) included in communication skills have new meanings. Contact and combat skills should not be seen as exclusive, but as mutually reinforcing competencies. (Norgaard & Holsting 2006.) Collaboration, contact, and communication skills are part of an individual's

social skills. Social skills are the ability to deal with social situations and are different from sociability, which is based on an individual's preference to be in the company of other people (Keltikangas-Järvinen 2010, 17). Social skills can be learnt and competence development in general requires learning processes (ibid.; see Illeris 2011, 60). Therefore, core competences will be handled from the perspective of learning in the following chapter.




Figure 3. Individual's core competences in crisis management

When reinforcing a change within an organization, it is necessary to train people in new skills, recognize new behaviors and institutionalize change within the organization's systems especially regarding measurement, performance management and reward (Holbeche 2006, 312). The new challenges in crisis management should change the education and training of the peacekeepers and civilian crisis management personnel. New forms of education and training have emerged since the civilian crisis management started to evolve. Chapter 6 discusses core competences related to learning.

Action competence is part of a holistic model regarding human action and is introduced here as a view on competences that are relevant for crisis management. Action competence is divided into physical, psychological, social, and ethical dimensions (Toiskallio 2009, 49). The ethical dimension of action competence combines the other three dimensions (Toiskallio 2000b, 50–60). The inclusion of the ethical component enables a holistic framework of analysis for circumstances underlining the meaningfulness of moral reasoning. The social component makes it impossible to analyze an individual in isolation from social reality. Social identity is at the core of action competence (Toiskallio 2009, 58). Holism represented in action competence has similarities with contemporary learning theories (see Jarvis 2009); this issue is discussed in chapter 6.

The framework of action competence can be applied to crisis management. Mikkonen (2008) has studied the ethical dimension of action competence. Military personnel with experience in military crisis management had diverse experiences requiring ethical thinking. In the context of military crisis management, decision-making requiring ethical thinking was divided into the following sub-groups endangering one's own troops or oneself in order to accomplish a particular task or to aid civilians; decisions to save local civilians' lives or to distribute humanitarian aid; decisions to use armed force, exceeding one's powers to achieve

a goal; and a leader's remarkable military, administrative, or disciplinary decisions regarding his or her own unit (ibid). Complicated security environments are ethically and practically challenging to crisis management personnel. According to Verweij (2007) professional use of force implies moral competence due to its rarity without controversies and the need to use force in a legitimate way. In certain risky situations lethal use of force is appropriate for peacekeepers. In the framework of action competence, ethical dimension gathers other dimensions together and ethical assessment can be seen as part of an individual's search for personal virtues (see Toiskallio 2009). The question of ethics has become extremely important in complex peace processes (ibid). The core competences defined earlier in this section are based on all four dimensions of action competences.

5.4 Conclusions

In chapters 3 and 4, complexity was identified as a challenge to crisis management actors. Multiculturalism in crisis management extends from a multitude of cultural or religious groups in the region to crisis management actors representing different organizations and personnel with diverse backgrounds. The study of the crisis management personnel has mostly been limited to peacekeepers. Questions about cooperation with local inhabitants have been rarely studied (see Howard 2008; Pouligny 2006; Norgaard 2004); however, in keeping with the studies referred to in this chapter, it appears to be essential for successful peace-building.

Awareness about local realities, collaboration skills, and abilities for ethical assessment and complexity management can be seen as core competences in crisis management in general (Figure 3). Besides, combat skills belong among the core competences in military crisis management. Norgaard and Holsting's (2006) division between contact and combat skills is useful for analyzing the competences required in military crisis management. Contact skills require collaboration skills and local awareness. The core competences in crisis management and specific professional challenges may be seen as learning challenges for crisis management personnel and they are linked to the main RQ as well as RQs 1 and 3. Crisis management organizations also need capabilities related to the core competences are also required from crisis management organizations.

Cooperation abilities are essential when responding to RQ3. How a group of people interpret another's intentions influences the interaction and communication between these groups. Professional, cultural, and organizational backgrounds affect how personnel perceive other actors, and the stereotypes regarding "others" may prevail. Social categorization and stereotypical bias may impact the perception of other persons employed in crisis management staff. Perceptions are individual, but they may be affected by group and cultural norms. The perceptions that personnel have regarding other professional groups in collaboration is discussed in chapter 8, in the empirical part of this research.

With regard to RQ 2, identity issues are relevant at the individual level. Personnel's identity development should respect professional identities. One possible way to reduce stereotypical views could be a common and broader category for identification, which would affect

personnel's identities. In crisis management, this would mean an emerging personnel category that includes both civilian and military crisis management personnel working for common goals. However, this way of reducing stereotypes may fail, if people in various duties resist it; therefore these people should have the opportunity to retain their former professional identities. This kind of identification links RQ2 to RQ3, because common identification facilitates cooperation between different actors.

Table 7. Crisis management experiences and their potential impact on the personnel's self-concepts and identities

Experience	Impact on the personnel's identities or self-concepts
Danger	Traumas at worst
New cultures	One's own place in the world
Meaning of the work	Personal satisfaction
Work comrades	Social identification
Problem solving	Positive/negative impact on identity/self-concept
Organizational culture & social categorization	Formation of social identity

Table 7 shows the impact that some potential experiences can have on crisis management on the personnel's self-concepts and identities. Danger may cause traumas, envisaging new cultures may make one think about his own place in the world, meaningful work signifies personal satisfaction, and new work comrades a source for identification. Ability in problem solving may have a positive impact on one's identity or self-concept. Organizational cultures and social categorization patterns have an impact on social identity formation. These are examples of potential influence of crisis management duties on the personnel, as introduced in this chapter.

6. Learning

The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and RQs 1, 2, and 3 which are as follows:

Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

RQ 2. How do field experiences affect the personnel's identities and self-concepts?

RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

In many contemporary theories of learning, social and individual levels are intertwined. This chapter introduces perspectives on learning, as well as results from the research related to crisis management and learning processes. As concluded in chapters 4 and 5, complexity management and multicultural contexts represent learning challenges in crisis management. Chapter 5 introduced the core competences in crisis management, which are collaboration skills, local awareness, complexity management and ethical assessment and professional skills; combat skills are also emphasized in military crisis management. They are important objects of learning when educational practices in crisis management are analyzed and developed.

6.1 Contemporary perspectives on learning

At the individual level, learning can be defined as “any process that in living organisms leads to permanent capacity change and which is not solely due to biological maturation or ageing” (Illeris 2009b). Learning involves human processes including social interaction and psychological processing (Illeris 2011, 12). Because learning is experiential which means that it is based on our experiences, research on learning extends to all academic bases on human beings (Jarvis 2010). The concept of learning depends on how a human being and knowledge are interpreted (Mäkinen 2006, 53).

Regarding knowledge and learning, Etienne Wenger (1998, 4) made the four following assumptions: (1) the social character of our existence is relevant to learning; (2) knowledge is a matter of competence; (3) knowing is a matter of participating; and (4) meaning – including our ability to experience the world and our engagement with it as meaningful – is what learning is to produce. The social practices of social communities and constructing identities related to these communities are included in participation. Deeper forms of participation shape not only what we do, but also who we are and how we interpret what we do. Therefore a social theory of learning integrates the components that are necessary to characterize social participation as a process of learning and knowledge. Community, identity, practice and meaning are connected with learning (Ibid., 4–5).

Two phenomena which connected with life-long learning – meta-learning and significant learning experiences – are inter-twined but analytically different (Silvennoinen 2004). According to the meta-cognitive approach, actors can learn to manage their own learning by defining their learning objectives and observing their own progress towards these objectives (Uusikylä & Atjonen 2005, 146). Meta-cognition concerns upper level cognitive skills (Heiskanen & Salo 2008, 77). Meta-understanding means a person's capacity to assess his or her understanding the things he or she has heard or read. Self-regulation refers to the ability to regulate one's own motivation and thinking in ways that enable one to challenge one's own thinking (ibid.). Meta-learning refers to unintentional learning and affects one's views regarding his or her potential and conditions for action. These views are implicit. Significant learning experiences have an impact on one's life and they change or strengthen one's identity. A change of profession may be such an experience although some significant learning experiences may take longer and be progressive in nature. (Silvennoinen 2004, 62–63.) In meaningful learning, an individual connects new information with the concepts that exist in his or her former cognitive structures, and as a phenomenon, knowledge creation is related to meaningful learning (Novak 2002, 73 & 115).

Learning can take place in formal, non-formal, and informal situations. Formal learning situations mostly refer to educational institutions and the non-formal ones refer to the educational arrangements of a non-formal character. Informal learning situations take place in everyday life (Jarvis 2010). Lifelong learning challenges individuals to deal with their identities in a continuous way (Eteläpelto 2007). At work, learning takes place in the sphere overlapping one's work identity and workplace practices (see Illeris 2011). Therefore, work identity is also needed for dealing with issues leading to learning at work. Identity connects one's personality to wider contexts within a learning process.

Individuals develop their skills at work but the nature of learning at work has not been well studied or conceptualized. Learning and the actual doing at work are intertwined and this type of learning cannot be classified in terms of formal education (Collin 2005). Learning at work different from learning in a class room, both contextually and distinction of learning and work-related learning usually occurs at places of work (Varila & Rekola 2003; Rauramo 2008, 162).

6.2 Levels of individual learning in relation to explicit and tacit knowledge

Qualitative differences between hierarchical levels of learning have been described in the learning literature. Knud Illeris (2009a) divides individual learning into four levels. Mechanical or cumulative learning means adding new information on a former knowledge structures. Assimilative learning is the addition new parts to former knowledge structures. Accommodative learning is a result of modifying former knowledge structures. Finally, transformative or expansive learning requires deeper changes in a person's personality and how he or she categorizes knowledge. (Illeris 2009a, 12–14.) These hierarchical levels have similarities with several other theories of learning, such as Gregory Bateson's categorization on the levels of learning, Yrjö Engeström's (1987) theory of expansive learning and Jack Mezirow's (2009) theory of transformative learning.

The first two of Illeris's (2009a) categories can be described as conventional learning, and the two latter ones as innovative types of learning; having said that, Illeris himself only used the four-level categorization introduced above. Illeris's (2009a) categorization is broad and learning categories in many other contemporary theories can be divided in accordance with his typology. However, Mezirow's (2009) view regarding transformative learning slightly differs from Illeris's. According to Mezirow (2009), transformative learning takes different forms in communicative and instrumental learning processes. Instrumental learning means controlling or manipulating an environment, while communicative learning is interactive in its nature. Transformative learning usually involves critical self-reflection and is an outcome of resolving a disorienting dilemma requiring reflection. (Ibid.) In contrast to Illeris's more cognitively-based analysis, Mezirow (2009) emphasized that most transformative learning occurs outside of awareness.

Yrjö Engeström's (1987) theory on expansive learning focused on collective types of learning. One of the basic issues in activity theory is the relationship between activeness, which describes animal and human forms of life, and the idea of activity, which is an object-oriented and cultural formation that has its own structure. Within activity theory an atomized view on actions is criticized. A key principle of the approach is historicity. In many ways, activity theory is an alternative interpretation of learning processes compared with the views that make a strong distinction between the individual and collective. However, this type of definition, makes analysis of learning challenging. Although learning is regarded as being socially constructed, the subject of human learning must have mental capacity. If this argumentation is accepted with regard to human learning, the learning unit should be seen as an individual; this is in contrast to Engeström's (1987) views.

In expansive learning, an organization analyzes its working methods, builds up a new model for action and starts to use it. Expansive learning means the ability to learn something that has not been foreseen (Engeström 2004, 59). A cycle of expansive learning starts from questioning, involves contradictions, and new qualitative stages emerge as solutions to the preceding stage (Engeström & Sannino 2010; Engeström 1987, 91). In the cycle of expansive transition, the need state is seen as a primary contradiction, after which double-bind and its analysis and first transformation take place. As a result of the process, object and motive construction and modeling of instruments occur; this is followed by the application and generalization and the second phase of transforming take place. Eventually, all the second kind of activity and consolidation and reflection take place. Learning is a necessary pre-condition for personal development, and development is also an ingredient of learning. Joint cooperative activities can cause a historically new form of activity to emerge. (Ibid.)

Expansive learning in Engeström's (1987) theory is similar to Illeris's (2009a; 2011) description of transformative learning, although the latter is based on individuals. On the other hand, Engeström's (1987) views on contradictions inspiring learning are quite similar to Mezirow's (2009) interpretations about the relevance of disorienting dilemmas that trigger reflection processes. Unfortunately, while the expansive learning theory has focused on understanding the expansion, the conditions for expansive learning have not been studied (Ludvigsen 2007).

Some distinctions between various categories of learning may be made by classifying the categories of information one deals with. Explicit knowledge is clearly defined. Tacit knowledge is not explicit and is instead based on learning and experience. It consists of well argued beliefs and their tacit dimension, which cannot completely be described in explicit terms, although it affects behavior (Virtainlahti 2009, 38). Tacit knowledge is learnt through socialization and may become explicit through externalization. However, spiral internalization of explicit knowledge and its combination with new information lead back to a new kind of tacit knowledge. (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 62–72.) Knowledge creation is a social process (Nonaka & Toyama 2007, 29). In order to assess professional knowledge and practices, it is essential to be aware of these different levels of knowledge and the interaction between them.

In working life, knowledge based on experience means tacit knowledge. Its distribution is possible in similar kinds of situations as it is learnt, namely in authentic environments. (Paloniemi 2008.) Learning can be regarded as an experiential human process that leads to a completely changed person (Jarvis 2009). From this perspective, learning is holistic – it is embodied, social, and potentially transformative. In the present study, however, less transformative processes of learning are not identified as non-learning. Regarding crisis management, learning often signifies learning at work; therefore, the results related to it may also be applied to crisis management. Informal learning may take place in crisis management duties and take all the forms of learning processes introduced in Figure 4.

Learning new types of knowledge or skills requires the learning processes described above. In order to differentiate between learning strategies, Illeris's approach is both precise and practical as an analytical tool for research on individuals. Figure 4 combines Illeris's (2009a) typology of learning within an individual with the learning of either tacit or explicit knowledge (see Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995).




Figure 4. Levels of individual learning in relation to explicit and tacit knowledge

Individual competences are learnt at different levels of learning. An individual may need several strategies to learn different competences. It is worth analyzing what kinds of competences are needed in crisis management and how they are learned. In military crisis management, use of weapons partly requires cumulative or assimilative learning. Cultural and communicative strategies are learnt in a more complex way, which requires reflectivity that is accommodative or potentially transformative. Because transformative and accommodative learning modify individual ways of thinking, they probably make tacit knowledge explicit if the changes in cognitive structures become conscious to an individual. If transformative learning is regarded as taking place often "outside of awareness" as Mezirow (2009) presumes, transformation may even concern the part of knowledge cycle from explicit to implicit. This part of the cycle is essential to Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) theory.

Assimilative and mechanical learning concerns explicit knowledge; due to their less challenging nature, these concepts are the two lowest in Figure 4. The typology can be utilized when developing education and training for crisis management personnel and the opportunities for the personnel to learn. In crisis management, it is essential to describe how well the employees could "learn the unforeseen" such as transformative learning. Like activity systems, crisis management organizations are multilevel systems. Personnel's duties challenge the idea of life-long learning and put stress on the need to combine organizational and individual levels of learning.

6.3 Organizational learning and change in crisis management

Organizational learning requires learning individuals, but individual learning does not necessarily lead to organizational learning (Senge 1994, 140). However, organizational learning, however, has been criticized because of category mistakes in conceptualizations. The critics assume that learning is only possible by individuals. (Argyris 2003, 7.) If learning is regarded as a human process, as Knud Illeris (2011) presumes only individual processes in organizational learning can be described as learning. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, however, learning is also affected by social processes. At the organizational level, learning actually means change and development.

Organizational learning and change perspectives can be applied to crisis management organizations. A learning organization must combine adaptive learning with generative learning, which means being able to create (Senge 1994). Transformative learning, which was introduced earlier in this chapter, may be regarded as part of organizational change. Both individual and organizational perspectives are important for developing learning organizations (*ibid.*). As Chris Argyris (2003, 157) has noted, organizations can only learn through individuals who act as agents for them. An organizational learning system either facilitates or inhibits individuals' learning (*ibid.*). Organizations can promote continuous learning, and efforts to enhance it extend from capturing suggestions for change and improvement to team learning, and leadership for learning as well as broader organizational structures that enable learning (Watkins & Cseh 2009, 13–14). An individual's ability to learn from his or her failures concerns both individual and organizational learning because inability to deal with failures may cause even larger problems (Argyris 1998). In

crisis management this view is slightly contradictory because training and education of the personnel aims to avoid failures in order to minimize security risks.

This conceptual critique may be enlarged to any conceptualization of learning regarding extending over the individual level. In this sense, the criticism is justified, but seeing different qualities in organizational learning and change enables conceptual progress. Within organizational learning, it is necessary to have an interactive spiral between tacit and explicit knowledge in order to enable knowledge creation in a way that is partly similar knowledge creation at the individual level (see Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).

Nonaka and Toyama (2007) emphasize that organizational learning is an outcome of personal tacit knowledge that is transformed into explicit organizational knowledge. Within an organizational setting knowledge creation derives from a process that transforms individual tacit knowledge into organizational explicit knowledge. Such a transformation does not take place without conscious efforts to gather tacit knowledge. Therefore, various methods of information gathering within an organization are important.

Organizational learning and change have been mostly overlooked with regard to peacekeeping operations. First-level organizational learning regarding peace operations means that an operation is able to learn, while second-level learning refers to the ability of the organizational planners and leaders to learn from the operational experiences between missions (Howard 2008, 14). Second-level learning is mostly individual in nature, although the community in a peace-building operation participates in it. The community level that Wenger (1998) has emphasized is central for organizational learning in crisis management, which Howard (2008) considered to be a tool for progress in post-conflict operations. These communities are essential for organizational learning, both in the field within an operation as well as in the institutions dealing with operational knowledge.

First-level learning directly affects the outcomes of peace operations. It consists of gathering field data, coordinating international efforts to integrate the post-war environment, exercising leadership in ways fostering the parties involved, and resolving crises arising in a peacekeeping mission. First-level organizational learning is a factor that partially induces success or failure in peacekeeping. It only takes place during operations, while second-level learning occurs between operations. (Howard 2008, 327–328.) First-level learning is a condition for second-level learning and organizational development.

Although a lot of first-level learning has taken place in peacekeeping operations, many failures have been made in second-level learning. At the institutional level it is crucial to work for reforms that enable first-level learning in single operations. (Ibid. 330–346.) Howard's framework is within the UN but the two-level idea of organizational learning may also be applied to other organizations arranging crisis management and peacekeeping. Different organizations assess their own success in field operations in various ways. UN and NATO have permanent criteria for assessing their work, the EU and OSCE do not have such long-standing traditions for assessing their own results and working methods. (Häikiö 2009.)

Making first-level learning into second-level learning or organizational development requires feedback to promote futures operations. In this process, various kinds of feedback

mediate the knowledge and information that is necessary for institutional learning. For institutional learning, it is necessary to make a distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge because gathering tacit knowledge may be far more challenging than collecting more explicit knowledge or information. Tacit knowledge management requires awareness of competences and people having them within an organization and acknowledgement of this knowledge (Virtainlahti 2009, 74). A central question is whether those people who deal with the operational knowledge are aware of different types of knowledge, how to gather it, and how to use it to enhance overall comprehension with respect to development of crisis management. Another essential question is whether crisis management organizations receive adequate information and whether they should obtain feedback from local inhabitants as well.

Individual learning in crisis management requires different learning strategies depending on the competences that should be learnt. Organizational learning in crisis management relies on the personnel's individual learning capacity, as well as on the arrangements for gathering information, which extend the organization's ability to promote its strategic objectives. Organizational learning is also an outcome of learning new competences, which are collective in nature. Dealing with the adoption of tacit knowledge is a challenging part of organizational learning. Competence, knowledge and learning management should be connected with the objectives of an organization (Virtainlahti 2009, 68).

Development in information technology has not been sufficiently utilized in crisis management and peace-building (Ghani & Lockhart 2008). If information technology is more widely adopted in crisis management and peace-building processes, duties in crisis management will become more knowledge-intensive. It is difficult to handle a growing amount of information because its relevance and correctness should be checked. This is a challenge in many knowledge-based duties. When peace-building is regarded as a multi-level process, as it is by Ghani and Lockhart (2008), the challenges of learning become more complicated for all personnel. Information processing is part of learning processes in crisis management. Because learning in this field extends from an individual to an institutional level, information technology should be developed for both of these purposes.

6.4 Crisis management operation as a learning environment and challenges to education and training

A crisis management mission is a learning environment for personnel, but crisis management operations have not generally been evaluated as such. Work, the work community, and the type of production in relation to the individual are central elements of workplace learning (Illeris 2011). Single crisis management tasks, the core competences in crisis management, and the community in the duties can be described as elements for an individual working and learning in crisis management. Competence development in itself requires reflection (ibid. 61). Education and training of peacekeeping troops is mostly focused on the special skills required during a peacekeeping mission.

Section 5.1 described the central features of crisis management organizations. Chapter 5 defined collaboration skills, local awareness, ability for ethical assessment and complexity

management were defined as core competences in civilian and military crisis management. Besides, soldiers obviously need combat skills in military crisis management. In a post-conflict situation crisis management personnel must be able to cooperate with the operation's multinational forces and with expatriate staff of various international organizations, as well as with local authorities and local people trying to orientate to live in peace. Because the expertise is considered as part of co-evolution (e.g., Hakkarainen et al. 2004, 150) and interaction also enables learning at work (Illeris 2011, 34–35), it is necessary to develop crisis management skills by taking into account the contextual and social factors that affect an individual professional's actions.

Control-based combat skills are mostly learnt through professional military training programs and drills. In the armed forces, a lot of time is traditionally devoted to this type of training. Smaller units are trained to receive assignments, which are carried out through standard procedures. The aim is to learn standardized combat skills and methods. Classic combat skills are repeated in training in order to maintain them. This kind of instruction aims to enable soldiers to respond to any conceivable situation without hesitation and to apply predefined methods that are appropriate from a security perspective. Combat skills competence is learned using the concept of discipline. (Norgaard & Holsting 2006, 112–114.) Peacekeepers exercise situational and context-dependent decision-making and external control is replaced with internal control (Norgaard 2004, 214). Discipline alone is not sufficient for activities in complex international operations. Developing trust-oriented competences is a long learning process that is based on social skills. Contact skills are not learnt through discipline. They are strengthened through deeper understanding of other cultures, but training can help a soldier to strengthen these competencies to a certain degree. (Norgaard & Holsting 2006.) Cultural competences rely on learning about one's own culture, expressions of the acquired cultural skills, gaining cultural knowledge, understanding meaning of locations and symbols, awareness about regional history, and communicating with the local population on a regular basis (Ådahl 2009, 108). Only first-hand experience of reality can make a soldier to understand the situational complexity and encounter his or her limitations in making development-oriented solutions. (Norgaard & Holsting 2006, 115–121.)

Training and education of crisis management personnel can serve as a basis for learning cross-cultural awareness. The personnel in international crisis management learn mostly at work from their colleagues by handling tacit knowledge. Communication with local inhabitants is also a potential learning situation. Misunderstanding of the local culture may lead to misinterpretations and irrational behavior and local inhabitants may also misinterpret the behavior of crisis management personnel.¹⁸ On the other hand, tacit knowledge of personnel may be accurate or incorrect, or a combination thereof. An individual interprets intercultural information through a framework that is affected by his or her cultural background (Talib 2008). Tacit knowledge can be shared in cooperative learning methods including working in pairs and networks (Virtainlahti 2009, 118–119). In crisis management, this type of “peer education and learning” enables adequate mission-related information to be learned. Personnel's skill may evolve during the mission through reflection, training, and guidance .

¹⁸ As an example of culturally insensitive behavior by soldiers, US troops in Afghanistan dropped flag-figured footballs to Afghan children from an airplane (Linjakumpu 2009, 199). Some of the footballs had the flag of Saudi-Arabia, which contains the first verse of the Koran, a confession of faith. Accordingly, Americans were accused of cultural insensitivity in Afghanistan. (Ibid.) A friendly gesture may be interpreted negatively if the outcome does not fit in its cultural environment.

There are two parallel and interconnected tendencies in peacekeeping operations: a transition from a centralized and bureaucratic type of management to risk management, which allows an individual soldier to control himself or herself; and a transition from a territorially defined discourse of security to a value-oriented discourse of security, which makes the construction of a civil-military "trust capital" and political cooperation into military security issues. These two tendencies mark a transition to a humanitarian security mechanism and the construction of a new global governmentality that connects humanitarian, political, military and local civilian actors in an extensive network of strategic power relations. (Norgaard 2004, 217.)

Military crisis management requires the ethical dimension of action competence because of the potential consequences of the crisis management personnel's actions endangering their own troops and decisions to use armed force (Mikkonen 2008). Therefore, learning crisis management duties also requires ethical comprehension and is different from learning separate skills. The framework of combat and contact skills (see Norgaard & Holsting 2006), which are necessary for military personnel serving in peace operations can be reflected to the action competence framework. Although combat skills can be considered as being more easily learnt through training and education in comparison to the contact skills, the physical, psychological, social and ethical dimensions of action competence are relevant to the development of both combat and contact skills.¹⁹ In a way, the ethical dimension is especially crucial when practicing combat skills and taking into account one's own troops and the civilians' situation. Ethical questions in crisis management are an example of a field that requires continuous training, and they can be considered as part of life-learning processes. The ability to conduct intercultural communication is an outcome of different abilities, including an individual's understanding of global unity: therefore, it also has an ethical dimension (see Heinonen 2002, 86–87).

Education and training prior to a crisis management mission aims to develop personnel's competences to work. Necessary competences in civilian and military crisis management are related to peace-building tasks. Combat skills are important for military crisis management staff. Collaboration and contact skills should be handled in the education and training of the personnel, and a multilevel approach to learning could serve as the basis for this education. Social skills can be learned and do not depend on sociability which is part of a human being's personality (Keltikangas-Järvinen 2010). Learning social skills concerns a complex and multi-cultural environment while these skills are embedded in the context of a peace operation. Education can enhance the ability of peacekeepers to deal with the conflict and its background as well as with different aspects on the operation (Johansson 2001, 61). Regarding social skills, the definition of their nature as a result of learning affects the idea of crisis management education. Communication and cultural skills required in crisis management can be taught²⁰.

In the education and training of crisis management personnel, a distinction can be made between special skills needed in the field and abilities for transformative learning. Special skills

¹⁹ According to Franke (2003), the relationship between warrior and peacekeeper identities may be seen as a double bind due to the potential controversy between them. Although there are cultural differences in the conceptualization of these identities, it is important that a peacekeeper is able to use arms as well as communicate with local people.

²⁰ Peacekeepers may have prejudices that impede peace-building and even worsen the situation in a conflict area (Boniecki & Britt 2003). Unmotivated peacekeepers may be less likely to accept stressful conditions to help troubled factions, and may be unable to construe the operation in meaningful terms (Britt 2003, 76). Training and education for crisis management duties is important, both from motivational perspectives and in order to decrease prejudice that may emerge in the duties.

may be both function- and operation-specific, requiring either repetitive or transformative forms of learning. Transformative learning styles are crucial for adopting core competences in crisis management, namely collaboration skills and local awareness. However, the question of how to develop transformative learning abilities in crisis management or in any kind of work place remains open. Traditional education promotes a narrow field of learning, namely assimilative learning (Illeris 2009c, 91). There is no evidence that education and training for crisis management would be an exception to this phenomenon. A greater understanding of the variety of competences needed in crisis management as well as of their learning would facilitate developing education and training of this field.

Learning of central skills, such as combat skills, can be described as cumulative learning. Adopting cultural knowledge may require different forms of learning, which may be applied to reality in more complicated manners, enabling higher levels of learning. However, collaboration skills and local awareness can be learnt through transformative learning because one must modify the perceived information and be able to modify his or her behavior coherently with security and cultural information. In Finland, education and training are arranged for all personnel recruited to a mission. In military crisis management, some personnel are recruited from the military personnel including professional officers and part from the reserves. Recruitment for civilian crisis management is based on the professional needs of civilian operations.

In today's education of military personnel the importance of self-education, self-improvement, and informal learning should be emphasized (Talerud 2007, 80). Because cultural stress may be associated with physical stress, soldiers need to be aware of the cultural environment. Cultural training and education should play a major part in preparing troops to work in a culture that is non-familiar to them. (McMaster 2009, 21.) Besides cultural education, it is also necessary to arrange education and training on human rights and gender issues (see Valenius 2007; Schulze 2010).

Differences in education and training of personnel for civilian and military crisis management can be derived from the different competences required in these tasks, although views on required competences may vary. Soldiers who have the option of use force must have education and training before they can assume this responsibility. From an ethical point of view, military personnel must understand the principles of a just war, the role-specific obligations of military personnel, and the universal ethical virtues and values of special importance for military personnel (Cook 2009, 117). Within the framework of action competence, education and training should support critical thinking and the ethical assessment of one's activities (Toiskallio 2009). There is minimal evidence regarding the outcome and meaning of ethics education in the military (Lucas 2009, 10). Therefore, it is challenging to develop ethics education for military personnel who have or are going to have crisis management duties.

Training and education of peacekeepers have a history dating back more than 50 years. In 2001, the center for education and training of Finnish peacekeepers was named as the International Centre of the Defence Forces (FINCENT) in 2001. Training arranged by the center has taken into account cooperation with civilian actors. Apart from the military training, the students chosen to serve as peacekeepers receive education and training regarding

the situation of the conflict region, the other actors of the region and their roles, as well as issues related to religion, culture, and gender equality. (Koskela 2007.) FINCENT and the Crisis Management Centre (CMC, which focuses on training civilian crisis management personnel) Finland cooperate in education and training²¹.

A study on the education and training of peacekeepers found several deficiencies²² (Lahdenperä & Harinen 2000). A study of police officers who had worked in a civilian mission in Kosovo found that they had learned professionally from their experiences. Learning had occurred due to difficult situations, multicultural collaboration and strengthening in self confidence (Raatikainen 2004). With regard to learning, there is a need to develop the didactics for the education and training in crisis management.

6.5 Conclusions: Skills and learning processes needed in crisis management

The main focus of this chapter has been to answer to the main RQ and RQs 1, 2 and 3. The focus of learning in crisis management is on core competences. Different strategies for learning necessary competences should be promoted. As part of learning, personnel's identities may change, which provides a partial answer to RQ2. Meta-cognitive skills are required in order to observe learning strategies. If the human security approach is a priority, the selected core competences are important. The learning processes introduced in this chapter can be categorized with respect to the former competence analysis.

Most special skills could be adopted through mechanical or assimilative learning. General learning abilities are important for cross-cultural communication and solving new kinds of problems. However, there is no knowledge about how peacekeepers and civilian crisis management personnel apply different learning strategies before and during missions. Levels of learning could be a framework for assessing learning environments as well as the ability to learn new skills and knowledge. Problem solving requires higher levels of learning, but learning combat skills mostly requires mechanical, reproductive or assimilative learning. Education and training for crisis management operations are generally based on learning specific skills and knowledge necessary for specific duties. Therefore, it is necessary to rethink the educational concept for crisis management.

²¹ Basic education and training of Finnish peacekeepers take about 2–4 weeks. (Suomalainen sotilas 2009, 231.) FINCENT and Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland deepened co-operation by establishing a Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management in 2008. The centre develops civil-military relations and arranges training. (Koskela 2008, 9.) The training and education of Finnish civilian crisis management personnel mostly takes place at the Crisis Management Centre (Crisis Management Centre 2008a).

²² A lack of education and training on landmines and unexploded ammunition was expressed by 27 percent of the respondents. Over half of the respondents assessed the focus on negotiation skills insufficient. Two thirds of the reservists understood the orders regulating crisis management. Over 70 percent of the respondents felt that they knew enough about the cultural and religious differences within the region. 87 percent of the respondents expressed the ability to understand the rules of engagement completely. Education regarding patrolling was found sufficient by 61 percent of the respondents. (Lahdenperä & Harinen 2000.)

Table 8. Learning patterns in relation to knowledge and competences in crisis management

Actor	Type of learning	Strengthening knowledge and competences
Organizations	Organizational learning and development	Cooperational competence
		Multiculturalism
		Ensuring security by different means
		Feedback systems
Personnel	Life-long learning	Contact skills
		Continuous processes
	Learning at work	Different skills and competences
		Tacit/explicit knowledge
	Transformative learning	Challenging problem solving
		(Complexity management)
		Ethical assessment
		Tacit knowledge
		Cooperation
	Accommodative learning	Tacit knowledge
		Reflective skills
		(Complexity management)
		Ethical assessment
		Explicit knowledge
	Assimilative and mechanical learning	Situational awareness
		Combat skills
Explicit knowledge		

Table 8 helps answer both the main RQ and RQ 1. Organizational learning is required to strengthen the core competences at the institutional level. As Norgaard and Holsting (2006) have evaluated, learning different competences in crisis management takes place in different ways. At the organizational level, the learning objective is to strengthen the core competences. Feedback from the personnel is a prerequisite for organizational learning in crisis management.

At the individual level, learning objectives in strengthening the core competences may be divided into different categories. Adapting contact and cooperative skills can be regarded as a challenge for life-long learning. Learning at work is part of life-long learning. It may consist of learning core competences in crisis management. Problem-solving may require new kinds of realizations that represent transformative learning. Learning tacit knowledge in cooperation is part of learning in crisis management duties and it may require either accommodative or transformative learning. Adopting both explicit and tacit knowledge may occur through reflective processes. For military crisis management, learning combat skills related to handling weapons and the like is a process of mechanical or reproductive learning. Situational awareness mostly requires reproductive learning and, partially, some other types of learning. Taking responsibility for one's actions related to one's capacity to understand the consequences of those actions. In crisis management, realities may change rapidly which underscores the need to apply the ideas learned during the preceding education and training – as well as the ability to apply the existing knowledge to the on-going situation. Learning crisis management also concerns the learning processes at work in the missions, not just the courses that occur prior to the missions.

As mentioned above, learning takes place within an individual, although it is also a social process. In order to enhance organizational learning and development, it is necessary to analyze both first- and second-level organizational learning in peace operations. This means that crisis management employees should be able to gather information about the operations in order to enable first-level learning. Between operations, this information and the outcomes of earlier peace operations should be critically analyzed in order to carry out second-level organizational learning which is necessary for the development of future operations and peace-building. There appears to be a need to understand tacit knowledge from the operations. Making tacit knowledge explicit at the organizational level facilitates organizational learning.

The theoretical framework of the first and second levels of organizational learning has implications for personnel. With regard to the main RQ, personnel's learning abilities are relevant for the outcome of the mission. Regarding the main RQ and RQ1, the complexity of contemporary armed conflicts and crisis management underlines the importance of learning abilities of the personnel. Howard's view knits together individual and institutional learning and helps understand how both dimensions affect the development of crisis management. Institutional learning in crisis management requires individual learning on behalf of the personnel.

RQ2, which is related to the crisis management personnel's identities is important from the perspectives of learning and organizational development. Identities affect learning processes that include interpretation of information and work communities in crisis management. As mentioned at the end of chapter 5, common identity combining different dimensions of crisis management might reduce stereotypical views on other professional groups in crisis management. This, in turn, could facilitate learning processes related to comprehensive crisis management.

7. Futures challenges for crisis management personnel in the light of the Delphi panel process

The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ and RQs 1 and 3 which are as follows:

Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

This chapter introduces the results of the Delphi panel process. The empirical part of this research will be interpreted primarily in order to answer to RQ 3 and partly to the main RQ and RQ 1. The Delphi panel process is aimed to understand futures development in armed conflict and crisis management and their relation to the competences required in crisis management.

7.1 Consistency of the Delphi Panel

The Delphi expert panel in crisis management consisted of 15 experts. However, a total of 42 individuals expressed their views in the first interview phase of the Delphi panel process. Twenty-seven crisis management personnel interviewees were asked the same future-related questions as the expert panelists as part of the first round of the panel process. Interviews were used as the method for gathering data for the first round of the futures panel was interviewing. The reasoning for this two-level panel was that the crisis management personnel could reveal some weak or emerging signals regarding the practical processes in crisis management²³. The answers of the crisis management personnel interviewees were interpreted as accomplishing data providing information especially about personnel and educational questions. They had “practical expertise” in crisis management, which should not be under-estimated when assessing prospects in crisis management and peace-building. Their perspectives were considered to have provided further information that was valuable in the process of estimating respected features of the crisis management personnel in the future. Their role was particularly valuable in revealing the personnel’s needs for feedback and debriefing systems when returning home. Debriefing is used here in a more general context than in psychological interventions focusing on catastrophes and immediate psychological interventions facilitating the psychological recovery of the patients (see Saari 2008). Arguments about debriefing were included in the second round of the panel process. Information from the first round was utilized when constructing the second round of the process.

²³ At the beginning of the planning of this study, the Delphi panel process was limited to crisis management experts. Consequently, the final practical outcome of the composition in the panel may be regarded as a compromise of combining practical and more theoretical and broader experience in crisis management.

The decision to restrict the panel attendance was made after the first round of the Delphi panel process. Although such a solution is exceptional, it is justified by the study's data gathering process. "Double interviewing" of the crisis management personnel about both their experiences and future assessments provided an opportunity to discuss developmental challenges of crisis management with people who had profound experience from field work. On the other hand, expertise regarding many of the details in the second round questionnaire was not a prerequisite for working in civilian or military crisis management personnel. Consequently, it was unlikely that the participation of crisis management personnel would reinforce the validity of the second round in the panel process. Only the expert panelists' answers were counted when structured parts of the interviews were analyzed for the construction of the second round of the panel process. The final results of the study consist of the results of the second phase.

Many of the 15 expert panelists had several types of knowledge about crisis management and some were selected because of their varied expertise in their career background and other kind of orientation. Five of the experts had worked at various educational, training, or research institutions. Four had spent at least part of their careers as professional officers, while several had practical experience in civilian or military crisis management or in similar kinds of duties. Two of the panelists worked in NGOs focused on conflict management. Many experts had served in public service and seven had worked at some ministry related to the research theme (namely the Ministry of Defence, Ministry for Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Interior). Six of the panelists were women. (See Appendix 4).

Comprehensive crisis management is a wide-ranging theme. When trying to attain a comprehensive view on crisis management, it was preferable that panelists would represent broad expertise. When choosing the panelists, gender was taken into account in order to obtain detailed information about the theme. Expertise related to crisis management has traditionally been seen more as part of a masculine sphere than a feminine one. All of the panelists were Finnish, which means that the interview questions focused on the Finnish context in crisis management policy. The panel assessed futures trends in terms of conflict types, requirements for crisis management personnel and their education and training. Assessment of future conflicts served as background information for the development of crisis management and the requirements for the crisis management personnel.

7.2 First round of the Delphi panel process

The first round of the Delphi process took place between February and June 2008 and consisted of structured interviews. The interview questions are introduced in Appendix 6. The average interviews lasted for less than an hour on average.

The themes of the interviews were:

- Future crises and conflicts
- The development of crisis management organizations
- Finnish participation in military crisis management in coming twenty years
- Finnish participation in civilian crisis management in coming twenty years
- Special capability requests for Finland regarding international crisis situations

- Future cooperation of civilian and military crisis management in the future
- Future cooperation with local inhabitants in conflict areas
- Ideas for better cooperation of either civilian or military actors in crisis management
- Skills required from crisis management personnel
- Challenges of educating of crisis management personnel
- Learning opportunities during crisis management missions and feedback system for the personnel
- Combined education and training of the military and civilian crisis management personnel

The interview questionnaires were sent to most of the panelists before the interview took place. This was a practical move in order to ensure that panelists would have time to familiarize themselves with the research themes and questions. The time perspective for futures estimations was presumed to be twenty years from the time of the interviewing. The time-frame was mentioned during the interviews and in the questionnaire-frame was used throughout the Delphi process.

The questions were mostly formulated to identify the prospects that the interviewees would find probable – not just the ones they hoped for. However, regarding the 20-year futures perspectives in crisis management, it could be challenging for any interviewee to completely isolate the probable alternatives from the preferable ones. The interviews were structured such a way that the futures crises and conflicts were assessed as background information for the estimations of crisis management. In the questions and arguments related to crisis management and personnel needed in conflict regions, the preferable alternatives were looked after in the research procedure. The distinction of the preferable and probable alternatives was made possible during the phases of the Delphi study.

7.3 Second round of the Delphi panel process

This section introduces the final results of the Delphi panel process. The first round was a preliminary phase which led to the arguments of the second round. After analyzing of the first round interviews, the theses for the second round questionnaire were constructed. The aim of this process was not to find a consensus but to define the relevant conditions for future progress in crisis management, peace-building and peace processes in the future. Critical questions regarding this kind of progress were required for the second round of the Delphi process. Therefore, the progress-seeking nature of futures studies therefore had an impact on the definitions of the claims in the questionnaire for the second round. Consequently the claims were not always “average results of the panel” although some were.

The second round of the Delphi process took place in September and October of 2008. This empirical phase was conducted in the form of e-mail questionnaires. (See Appendix 7.) Instead of questions, theses were used as the method to identify the panelists' views.

After each thesis, every panelist had an opportunity to propose his or her opinions. The questionnaires were sent to the 15 panelists one of whom was not able to answer the questionnaire. The questionnaire contained a total of 33 theses, and a numerical scale was

used for the basic assessment of the theses²⁴. The panelists were asked their views about the relevance 19 of the theses²⁵. Both scales ranged from 1 to 5 so that a positive agreement or an assessment of the relevance grew along those scales.

The theses consisted of ideas that could be necessary in the strategies for developing crisis management. The order of the themes in the questionnaire was similar to the questionnaire in the first round. The procedure started from the development of crises and conflicts and ended with the personnel and educational theses for assessing core competences in crisis management. Although there was variation in the assessment of several theses, some theses gathered consensus from the panel. The high-level consensus thesis received average support of between 4.50 and 5.00, while consensus claims received average support between 4.00 and 4.49. This section analyzes not only the numerical results, but also the arguments for and against the claims. The relevance of most theses was assessed as being lower than the respondents' agreement with the argumentation they contained. Due to the small sample size and the specific nature of the data, no statistical method has been applied to the analysis of the data. The numerical borders limiting consensus categories were made so narrow that the average answers would indicate high or relatively high consensus among the respondents.

Any potentially significant question in the futures planning may divide the experts' opinions. The theses were analyzed as single items as well as in relation to each other and to their wider contexts. The themes of the questionnaire arose from conflicts to crisis management with crisis management personnel. The results are introduced and analyzed in this thematic order. After the quantitative results, some of the panelists' arguments will be introduced and the summaries of the thematic results will be made after a few theses.

Futures crises and conflicts

The nature of the future conflicts concerns the development of crisis management and peace-building.

Thesis 1

“Conflicts in the future that interfere with the means of crisis management will be most common in Africa and in the Middle East and one or several parties in these conflicts will be non-state actors.”

There was a relatively high consensus on this item (average 4.21/14 answers) and the thesis was considered relevant (average 4.29/14 answers). This prospect of conflicts requiring crisis management was quite consistent with the analysis of new conflicts introduced in the first chapter of this study. The former Soviet Union, the Caucasus and Middle and Southern Asia were mentioned as possible areas requiring crisis management. One panelist mentioned that it would be difficult to predict the future of South America. This means that although

²⁴ The alternatives to assess the theses were:

- (1.) Completely disagree with the claim,
- (2.) Somewhat disagree with the claim,
- (3.) Don't know/Neither agree nor disagree
- (4.) Somewhat agree with the claim, and
- (5.) Completely agree with the claim

²⁵ The alternatives to evaluate the relevance of the theses were: 1. Highly irrelevant, 2. Somewhat irrelevant, 3. Don't know/ Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat relevant, and 5. Highly relevant.

Africa and the Middle East will be major areas for crisis management, the risk area could in fact be global.

Consensus on this item is relevant from several points of view. Conflicts in the future will require crisis management arrangements in order to be solved. The international community should be prepared for the continuation of complex conflicts. On the other hand, understanding this complexity may be part of facilitating peace processes for stable progress in areas that are currently unsettled.

Thesis 2

“Possible changes in the relations between the major powers will not affect the principles of crisis management, including human rights.”

The average of the answers was 3.36 (14 answers), and there was not a consensus regarding the relevance of the item (average of 3.71/14 answers). The panelists expressed doubts that the changes in relations between the great powers would actually have an impact on the principles of crisis management. The consensus on this thesis was not high. Although there have been discussions regarding the changes in great powers in the coming decades, the impact of these changes on crisis management has not been the subject of widespread discussion. The claim was open to various dimensions of changes – both positive and negative.

Theses 1–2

The first two arguments were seen as more significant in numerical terms than the actual support that they received. This could indicate that the themes are relevant for the future of crisis management. Today's trends may influence the experts' views regarding the nature of futures conflicts. Therefore the panel's support for the description, which was quite similar to today's conflicts, may not indicate stability in the nature of the conflicts. However, the conflicts described in the first claim are quite challenging for crisis management and peace building. The relations of the major powers and their impact on crisis management will be relevant for the framework of crisis management. The first thesis is relatively consistent with the research literature on conflicts handled in chapter 3.

Models for crisis management

Thesis 3

“In the future, the cooperation between military and civilian crisis management will come closer, but the development of the division of labor will lead to phase-like tasks of various actors.”

The panel did not agree about this item (average 3.71/14 answers), but felt it had relatively high relevance (4.00/14 answers). While cooperation is getting closer, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the civilian and military actors in crisis management may need to work at the same time – not necessarily at clearly distinctive stages. Methods and instruments are different in civilian and military crisis management. The contribution of the international community in crisis management should vary in accordance with the needs of the people in the crisis area. In many peace processes, military contribution is needed to

ensure security, and civilian crisis management and local ownership should reduce the need for military contributions to the process. International politics may have an impact on the consistence of the crisis management and peace-building means in practice. The importance of the thesis which was expressed by the panelists may reveal that the theme of cooperation between various actors is relevant. However, modeling the forms of collaboration may be difficult.

Thesis 4

“The development of comprehensive crisis management will require better cooperation relations between various actors in crisis management.”

There was a high degree of consensus on this item (4.71/14 answers) and it was considered relevant (average 4.43/14 answers). The panelists expressed various levels at which the development of cooperation would be needed. Joint education was mentioned as a way of deepening cooperation, and attitude change was a factor that motivated the need to deepen cooperation in order to create comprehensive crisis management.

Theses 3–4

Theses 3 and 4 emphasized the meaning of cooperation between civilian and military actors. The panel avoided overly narrow interpretations of the phases of military and civilian actors in crisis management. Various crisis management actors will require cooperation skills in the future and this question will need to be comprehended profoundly when developing comprehensive crisis management functions, planning, education, and training. Better cooperation is consistent with the idea of comprehensive crisis management introduced in chapter 4. Thesis 3 relies on the idea of modeling crisis management; the panel was not in favor of this idea, although it found this theme relevant.

Thesis 5

“In civilian crisis management, the success of Finland will be based on specialization.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.43/14 answers). The thesis was criticized because the specialization may not yet be possible and may not have sufficient resources. Finland is only one actor and it must collaborate with other countries. On the other hand, specialization was considered as a future option and the tasks so demanding that they would require further education and training. Leading roles in civilian crisis management may require specialization. Such specialization could be based on deeper development work of civilian crisis management which would require education, a professional recruitment system, and further research.

Thesis 6

“In military crisis management, the success of Finland will be based on specialization.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.71/14 answers) although the panel was more in favor of military specialization than in civilian crisis management specialization. Arguments in favor of specialization in military crisis management emphasized the scarce resources of a small country like Finland. Specialization could be geographical, which would mean focusing on military crisis management in only a limited number of regions. A leading

role in some tasks might require specialization. In technology, specialization in the fields that were not otherwise available for an operation could facilitate the work of military units in military crisis management. Specialization could facilitate attendance choices in various operations at the national level. However, specialization should not prevent attendance in less specialized tasks in peace operations.

Theses 5–6

Although there was no clear consensus on the specialization required in civilian or military crisis management, the question about specialization will probably remain open for discussion in the future. Potential specialization should not hinder decision making regarding crisis management operations that require broader skills than the specialized ones. However, if some “top skills” in crisis management are targeted, it will be necessary to have some kind of specialization strategy. The panel’s more pessimistic view on specialization in civilian crisis management may be connected with shorter traditions in this field. The panel did not in favor the modeling of crisis management, as was seen in the third thesis based on a phase-type approach.

Military crisis management

Thesis 7

“In military crisis management, when the expenses per unit are rising, the number of troops sent abroad will remain as it is today or decrease slightly.”

The panel did not agree on this thesis (average 3.57/14 answers) and there was not much support for the relevance of this statement either (average 3.36/14 answers). Several comments saw the increase of peacekeepers as being dependent on the (political) will to distribute more resources in military crisis management. There is currently variation in the costs of military crisis management operations. Some answers revealed a degree of skepticism regarding whether the expenses in military crisis management increase more than other costs today or in the future. In more demanding crisis management tasks, more professional personnel from the Finnish armed forces should be recruited into the operations; therefore growing numbers should be taken into account in the plans concerning personnel of the armed forces. One answer linked this question was linked to the wider defence policy questions related to the priorities of the use of the Finnish armed forces.

Thesis 8

”In military crisis management, great international pressure and obligations due to it are prerequisites for the increased number of troops sent abroad.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.71/14 answers). The thesis was criticized because national decisions are always necessary in order to send troops abroad for peace operations and Finland has long-standing interest in crisis management. On the other hand, international political pressure was seen as a major factor in the process and related to Finnish forms of cooperation, with NATO as an example. In international relations, Finnish participation in crisis management is related to the crises and also some other objectives that are considered relevant. One panelist even mentioned that international pressure has a

limited effect in Finland. Other factors are also related to the decisions, for example success in crisis management and economic resources have an impact on the decisions.

Thesis 9

“Finland must support the UN peacekeeping by arranging applied education or training for peacekeepers representing various countries.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.79/14 answers). The idea received support from the panel, but it was criticized from a few points of view. Finland could collaborate when arranging courses. Finland could not specialize only in arranging courses for others because experience is necessary for arranging proper education and training. However, education and training for peacekeepers and police will be required. Aid in “educating educators” was seen as a functional solution because every country has a responsibility to arrange training for its own troops.

Theses 7–9

Factors affecting Finnish participation in international military crisis management will consist of several kinds of processes. Expenses, future conflicts, processes in international relations and domestic politics will probably have wide-ranging impacts on the decisions. If arranging more education and training to support foreign troops in UN peacekeeping operations Finland must also remain capable of acting in peacekeeping. Pure specialization in educating others would probably not be an option.

Civilian crisis management

Thesis 10

“The increase of the Finnish civilian crisis management will depend on the results of the action.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 2.79/14 answers), and the item was not assessed as relevant (average 3.21/14 answers). There was variation in the answers regarding this statement. Although no thoughts were expressed against the principle of measuring the results, the measurement of the results may be fairly difficult in civilian crisis management. Projects in reconstruction may occur for long periods which makes the evaluation process even more complicated. Political pressure plays a major role in the decision process. The need for crisis management should be an essential factor when making decisions about participation. The relevance of the thesis was considered to be higher than the thesis itself. One panelist felt that the evaluation of crisis management projects would become significant in the future. Because the assessment of the outcome in various missions is challenging, progress in the evaluation processes may also be needed in the future.

Thesis 11

“The guidelines of the civilian crisis management arranged by Finland will depend on the policy of the EU.”

This thesis received relatively high support (average 4.00/14 answers), although it was not assessed as relevant (average 3.57/14 answers). The meaning of the EU was seen as a key

question due to the EU membership of Finland and the active role of the EU in civilian crisis management. Two panelists mentioned the meaning of the UN and OSCE in Finnish civilian crisis management with one emphasizing a stronger practical impact of the UN. The EU does not limit Finland's choices in civilian crisis management, which allows Finland to focus on its own way. One panelist assessed the claim as being relatively important because Finland has to influence the EU policy in civilian crisis management.

Thesis 12

“The development of civilian crisis management will require growing cooperation with development policy actors.”

There was a consensus on this item (4.36/14 answers). The context of development policy and civilian crisis management is often the same. Therefore, strengthening cooperation would be necessary. Civilian crisis management is needed in building governance, and development cooperation may be an exit strategy from crisis management.

Theses 10–12

In the near future, at least, the Finnish development of civilian crisis management seems to be related to the EU's development. Futures crises will and should have an impact on the development of crisis management. Although it is difficult to measure the results and impacts of civilian crisis management, there may be an increasing tendency to develop such measurement. One future trend may be growing collaboration of civilian crisis management and development policy. For some reason, the panel found it easier to reach consensus on the theses regarding civilian crisis management than on those regarding military crisis management. When assessing these themes afterwards, the significance of the UN should not be underestimated although at the timing of the panel process, the EU was one of the major themes with regard to civilian crisis management.

Special requests for Finland regarding crisis management and peace-building and the possibility for specialization of Finland in this field

Thesis 13

“Special requests for Finland in peace negotiation aid will depend on the success of single negotiators in peace negotiations.”

The panel did not agree on this thesis (average 3.93/14 answers). However, the statement did have some support because negotiations are linked to single individuals whose credibility is crucial in a peace process. Two panelists recommended education for peace negotiations²⁶. Two panelists noted Finland's status as a non-allied or non-colonialist country as a partial explanation for a favorable position for a background in peace processes. The need for good negotiators is broader than the number of negotiators available.

Thesis 14

“Special requests for Finland in crisis management and peace-building will require specialization from Finland, and this kind of specialization is indicated on various international occasions.”

²⁶ Several panelists mentioned President Ahtisaari. The questionnaire was sent to the panelists before the news of President Ahtisaari's receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2008.

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.79/14 answers) and it was not considered relevant (average 3.43/14 answers). Specialization was not seen as a necessary condition for special requests in crisis management and peace-building. However, two panelists described Finland's position as a credible country as a background feature for requests. Specialization may be difficult because the field of crisis management is changing. However, the idea of specialization received support as a process in which expertise would nationally strengthen. One panelist mentioned that Finland had already specialized in crisis management and peace-building.

Thesis 15

“There will not be any special requests for Finland in crisis management and peace-building.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 2.5/14 answers). According to two panelists, Finland will probably not receive more special requests than other countries. This would not exclude some special requests from being made.

Theses 13–15

In peace processes, strong individuals like president Ahtisaari are important figures. However, it would be challenging to develop structures that would facilitate the growth of “peace-makers”. Specialization in peace-building may be difficult and overly restricted specialization is not reasonable either. Strengthening existing resources may be a form of specialization. Overly narrow specialization could hinder participation, if crisis management contexts change. Therefore, it is preferable for the systems to be flexible in applying in futures changes as well. The views of the panel do not support special requests on peace negotiations or crisis management to Finland or that the national specialization would support these efforts.

Future development of cooperation of military and civilian crisis management

Thesis 16

“Information sharing and a clear division of labor will be key issues in the development cooperation of military and civilian crisis management.”

There was a high consensus on this item (4.57/14 answers) and it was also considered relevant (average 4.43/14 answers). Cooperation is based on functional information sharing and division of labor, and strategic planning is a crucial part of the process. A clear division of labor should prevent duplicate use of resources and make it possible to carry out all the necessary parts of crisis management.

Thesis 17

“Modeling cooperation in, for example, 3–7 structurally different cooperation models of international actors could facilitate planning and education in crisis management.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.57/14 answers) and it was not seen as relevant (average 3.57/14 answers). Military and civilian crisis management require separate planning processes. It is necessary to take special characteristics of each conflict and conflict

environment into account. Modeling facilitates the description of features necessary in cooperation. However, there were doubts about how modeling would function in practice.

Thesis 18

“Local inhabitants must be taken with to participate in rebuilding projects when the projects are planned.”

There was a high consensus on this thesis (average 4.86/14 answers). The local people know the history and the culture of their area – the conflict area – which means they have special expertise. Reconstruction and sustainable peace require local ownership; this issue is especially important with regard to institution building which takes local environment and conditions into account. Cooperation with local inhabitants is a challenge for the international community learning about crisis management. The panel’s strong support for this thesis may be signal an emerging trend in crisis management and peace-building. Most peace-building processes and policies have been planned and implemented by external actors, although the local involvement has been emphasized in principle. A key question in practice is how to develop local involvement as a constitutive part of a peace process. A post-conflict area may involve a wide range of opinions, which means that the representation of local communities is not a neutral question.

Thesis 19

“Internet-based information sharing must be utilized in the civilian and military organizations’ cooperation with local inhabitants in crisis regions.”

There was no consensus on this thesis (average 3.86/14 answers). On the other hand, the idea of information sharing did receive support. The Internet is efficient in those areas where it can be utilized. However, there were doubts about how to get an Internet-based system to function in conflict areas. Regarding confidential information, there may be also limits for information sharing.

Theses 16–19

Getting local inhabitants involved in the planning of international operations is a significant challenge, not only for Finnish authorities but for the international community and agencies more broadly. The usefulness of the Internet may depend on the local circumstances: if the local inhabitants have an appropriate technological level, the Internet may be a practical tool in information sharing. As seen earlier regarding theses 3, 5 and 6, the panel was not in favor of modeling crisis management.

Crisis management personnel

Thesis 20

“The proportion of duties requiring expertise and special professional skills will increase in civilian and military crisis management in the future.”

The idea received support (average 4.29/14 answers) and the panel considered it quite relevant (average 4.15/14 answers). One panelist found the situation to be quite similar

to the current situation in such a way that special professional skills are required for the reconstruction of a country which is a long-term process. It is necessary to evaluate expertise and special skills when the target is an increase of influence in crisis management. Special skills of foreign personnel are motivated by the idea that local people can learn from them. One panelist was of the opinion that this kind of tendency would take place at least in the civilian side of crisis management.

On the other hand, not all personnel in crisis management will need to be specialists. The claim was criticized with the idea that the proportion of the specialists may not increase, apart from the growth in the volume of crisis management. In some situations new technical solution may also reduce the need for experts. One panelist emphasized the relevance of this claim with the planning process. The growth of expertise tasks should be taken into account in the planning processes of crisis management.

Thesis 21

“In civilian crisis management, interaction and negotiation skills must be taken into account in the recruitment phase of the personnel.”

There was high consensus on this thesis (4.86/14 answers) which was also considered highly relevant (average 4.57/14 answers). In a new cultural environment, interaction skills are especially important, and this should be taken into account in the education and recruitment of personnel. Failures in this field have often been linked to weak interaction skills. The relevance of the argument was justified by the fact that the success of crisis management depends on the personnel’s skills in collaborating with local people and the others attending the process. This should be taken into account when recruiting crisis management personnel as well as when educating them. However, one panelist acknowledged that these types of skills are generally required in working life.

Thesis 22

“In military crisis management, interaction and negotiation skills must be taken into account in the recruitment phase of the personnel.”

The panel agreed about this item (4.29/14 answers) and the statement was assessed as crucial (average 4.07/14 answers). Interaction and negotiation skills were considered necessary if a soldier collaborates with local people and other crisis management personnel. These skills are more necessary in leading positions but elevated interaction and negotiation skills are an advantage in every position, as described by one panelist. Although the majority of the panel felt this thesis was relevant, one panelist noted that the level of other skills necessary in military crisis management cannot be lowered because of the relevance of communicative abilities.

Theses 21–22

Personnel’s interaction and negotiation skills were acknowledged in both civilian and military crisis management. Interaction and negotiation skills were considered necessary for future crisis management personnel, and even more so for the personnel in the civilian crisis management than in the military crisis management. This distinction was motivated by the difference of the tasks: the military does not necessarily need to collaborate with the

local people, but communication with local people is evident in every aspect of civilian crisis management. No panelist considered that interaction and negotiation skills would be more necessary in military than in civilian crisis management. One panelist concluded that a similar kind of education in communication skills for civilian and military personnel would facilitate cooperation.

Although communication skills are valuable in various tasks in today's working life, their particular importance in futures crisis management was clear, according to the panel. The communicative nature of peace processes in practice has not been subject to broad discussion, which means that this topic is important for the future development of crisis management. The personnel should have these skills as well as the professional expertise that they need in their duties. As mentioned in chapter 4, communicative capacity can be seen as part of core crisis management competence.

Thesis 23

“In civilian crisis management, it is necessary to develop a new recruitment system that will ensure that multi-skilled personnel will be attracted towards various duties.”

There was no consensus on this statement (average 3.93/14 answers). The idea of a new recruitment system was supported by one because international standards in recruitment and personnel policy would be needed. However the opportunities to develop the existing system were emphasized by some of the panelists. Recruitment from private sector was regarded too low. Young people should be recruited in a more systematic way because it takes time to get enough experience to work in more demanding crisis management tasks. Some problems may exist if people cannot get free from their tasks in Finland although the Finnish legislation supports these arrangements.

Thesis 24

“In military crisis management, it is necessary to develop a new recruitment system that will ensure that multi-skilled personnel will be attracted towards various duties.”

There was no consensus on this claim (average 3.21/14 answers). The need to reform the system was seen as topical because it has been difficult to recruit peacekeepers from among the ranks of professional soldiers. According to one panelist, the existing recruitment system is good but it is necessary to strengthen the will to participate in crisis management.

Theses 23–24

The support for a new recruitment system was lower in military crisis management than in civilian crisis management. Instead of creating new systems, there were diverse ideas about developing recruitment.

Thesis 25

“In order to recruit professional military personnel recruited into international duties in crisis management, service abroad should be a factor in promotion to the highest ranks of officers.”

This thesis gained support among the panel (average $4.07/14$ answers). The statement was supported with the idea that experience from crisis management develops an officer's skills and abilities in his or her duties. As one panelist mentioned, an argument is not the same as a demand. Another panelist felt that this thesis already existed by another panelist. The panelists did not comment on the public discussion regarding the difficulties with recruiting professional officers in demanding crisis management duties.

Challenges in the education of crisis management personnel

Thesis 26

“In the education for civilian crisis management, it is necessary to develop common standards for international organizations and the states of the region in order to utilize the resources in an efficient manner and to avoid double education.”

The panel supported this idea (average $4.36/14$ answers). The challenge of developing these standards is remarkable. Although the idea received support, the implementation was found to be demanding because of the differences of various crises. Various types of education are needed in courses for different missions. The standards would facilitate international cooperation and make the use of resources more efficient. National applications in course arrangements are still required.

Thesis 27

“It is most important in the education for civilian crisis management, that the person attending the training learns the crisis management duties and the nature of the operation as well as the basics of the local cultures of the region and the history and background of the conflict.”

The panel supported this thesis (average $4.43/14$ answers) and also regarded it as relevant (average $4.36/14$ answers). Cultural and historical education applied to the conflict area facilitates the communication with local people and generates success for a mission. Understanding the cultural background is indispensable in civilian crisis management. One panelist emphasized the idea that general education could be complemented with courses focused on cultural issues. Before a crisis management mission, it would be reasonable to make an anthropological report about the conflict area.

Thesis 28

“In military crisis management education, it is most important that the person attending the training learns the crisis management duties, the necessary military skills and the nature of the operation as well as the basics about the local cultures of the region and the history and the background of the conflict.”

The panel supported this idea (average $4.21/14$ answers) and considered it to be crucial (average $4.07/14$ answers). All peacekeepers must know the basic facts about the region. Those peacekeepers who collaborate with local inhabitants need special education in the culture of the area. On average peacekeepers are younger than civilian crisis management personnel, and should have high situational awareness in military operations; and therefore cultural education may be even more essential for peacekeepers. The relevance of the

claim was motivated by the idea that weak situational understanding may lead to failures. Although the claim was found relevant, the panel also emphasized the flexibility, adaptation, and learning skills of peacekeepers.

Theses 27–28

Awareness of the cultural and historical background of the conflict was found to be relevant for the education of both civilian and military crisis management, although the topic was more highly valued in the former. Military crisis management may involve some routine tasks in which contacts to local inhabitants are not common; therefore cultural awareness is not as important as it is in most or all tasks in civilian crisis management. With regard to both military and civilian fields, the similar kinds of theses were assessed significant. On the other hand, the level of cultural and historical awareness should be heightened without narrowing the expertise and skills of the crisis management actors in the field.

Feedback arrangements

Thesis 29

“Every person who has had service abroad in civilian crisis management should be given an opportunity to provide and receive personal feedback and a so-called debriefing conversation.”

There was consensus on this item (average 4.43/14 answers) and the panel acknowledged the idea’s importance (average 4.48/13 answers). Debriefing opportunities were considered reasonable both because of the personnel’s needs and the advantage of the organization that arranges the mission. The “institutional memory” can develop through the process which also supports learning.

Without an opportunity for discussion, an individual may remain fixed with the crisis management operation for an unnecessarily long period of time. Even the opportunity to handle possibly traumatizing experiences should be arranged for personnel who have worked abroad in crisis management duties. The personnel’s knowledge about crisis management should not be wasted. There is a need to develop debriefing and “lessons learned” activities at the national level. Feedback information should be utilized in some form in order to further develop crisis management.

Thesis 30

“Every person who has had service abroad in military crisis management should be given an opportunity to provide and receive personal feedback and a so-called debriefing conversation.”

There was also consensus on this item (average 4.36/14 answers), and the argument was considered crucial (average 4.14/14 answers). A debriefing opportunity for was considered particularly relevant if a traumatizing event had taken place during the operation. With regard to civilian crisis management, the personnel’s knowledge should not be wasted in military crisis management either. In larger operations it may be difficult to implement efficient arrangements for feedback. The relevance of the claim has probably been assessed

in regard to the need to avoid post-traumatic disorders and conditions similar to them. The idea was seen significant because today's feedback systems have not evolved optimally.

Thesis 31

“The feedback from crisis management personnel should be gathered in a systematic way and to develop crisis management further.”

There was a high degree of consensus on this item (average 4.64/14 answers) and the relevance of this claim was considered to be high (average 4.50/14 answers). Successful and failed methods in crisis management should both be studied in order to develop material for further development of crisis management. Data gathering should be systematic and always in use. The information may be useful when developing national capacities and even when collecting information for national decisions in crisis management. Without this kind of data analysis, useful information would be lost. The thesis is relevant because of the development of crisis management. Such information may also be useful in some other societal development tasks. Feedback gathering should be part of the feedback system.

Theses 29–31

Feedback gathering and debriefing systems for crisis management personnel received wide support, both for civilian and military personnel. Debriefing systems will be a future challenge especially, if Finland participates in riskier civilian or military operations. Institutional and individual learning are both challenging elements in crisis management. Institutions must collect data related to former or on-going operations in a manner that respects the privacy of the personnel. On the other hand, it is motivating for the personnel to talk about their experiences and provide ideas regarding how to develop the systems to function in better ways. Functional feedback and debriefing systems require constant development work that enables further evolution of learning organizations and more interactive working methods.

Joint education and training in military and civilian crisis management

Thesis 32

“Military and civilian crisis management education should be arranged in joint modules that cover one functional theme or details relevant to the situation of one region.”

There was variation in the assessment of this thesis (average 3.79/14 answers) and it was not considered significant (average 3.64/14 answers). Although joint education and training were seen as a positive phenomenon, there is a need to also have separate education and training. According to one panelist, separate education will probably remain more important than joint education. Joint training should be arranged on a practical basis facilitating field work in a real environment. Joint education should model the cooperation methods in the crisis area. Mutual understanding and shared situation analysis would increase within this process. Modules could handle special themes as well, such as human security, resolution 1325, and region awareness. Joint courses should lead to functional use of resources. The distinction between civilian and military actors is a model for a recovering society. The functions of civilian and military actors' work are different, which is also relevant in educational contexts.

Thesis 33

“It is practical to arrange education and training for military and civilian crisis management nationally in different organizations that cooperate in joint education and training.”

There was no broad consensus on this idea (average 3.64/14 answers) and it was not considered relevant either (average 3.21/14 answers). Some of the panelists support the statement, but others considered this organizational question only as a practical one. The reason behind separate organizations was motivated by diversified needs for education and training in military and civilian crisis management. One panelist, who assessed this claim as significant, underlined the necessity of functional education in crisis management.

Theses 32–33

Although the numerical assessment of claim 32 varied, there were similar opinions regarding the need for some joint education and training. In the future, although the distinction between civilian and military crisis management actors will be clear, functional cooperation will be needed in education and training in order to strengthen comprehensive crisis management. It is likely that many courses will be arranged separately.

Synergy in understanding the work of various institutions in a conflict area seems to be a condition for functional action of both the civilian actors and the military. The panel's opinions on the organizational arrangements of civilian and military crisis management education did not reach consensus. The institutional questions related to the arrangements of the joint courses should be solved with respect to the specific needs of military operations and civilian peace-building.

7.4 Summary and conclusions from the Delphi Panel process

Plenty of theses created consensus in the Delphi Panel process. However, some of the theses that did not create consensus were of importance. The results are introduced in the categories of high consensus and consensus theses followed by the important non-consensus theses. The results are then introduced in thematic order. Finally, the results are assessed in their contextual framework. The second round of the Delphi panel did not raise questions that would have made the third round in the Delphi process adequate.

7.4.1 Consensus theses

High consensus theses represent those with an average between 4.50 and 5.00, while consensus theses are those with an average between 4.00 and 4.49

High consensus theses (average 4.50–5.00)

Cooperation relations in crisis management (thesis 4) will be a key question in the future progress of crisis management. Consensus on this statement may strengthen the idea that

it is necessary for planning to be flexible and have the capacity for complex operations. Information sharing and a clear division of labor between various agencies (thesis 16) will be important at the operational level within a comprehensive approach. The meaning of this statement should not be neglected at any level of operations or projects in crisis management. Taking the local people's needs and opinions into account (thesis 18) even when a crisis management and peace-building operation is in the planning stage, could help avoid errors of cultural and historical misunderstanding within a mission. The international community is only starting to comprehend the meaning of real cultural awareness and local ownership in peace operations.

In civilian crisis management, interaction and negotiation skills will be of high importance (thesis 21). Communicative personnel in international agencies will also be able to ensure local ownership and functional information sharing. Communicative skills are also essential for civil-military cooperation. Developing feedback gathering and debriefing systems for crisis management personnel will be crucial in the future (thesis 31). This kind of policy means that a human security perspective is extended to personnel who may risk their own safety for the sake of a peace process. The respect for the personnel's needs and views may have a positive impact on the crisis management organizations and agencies themselves if they are able to learn more and if the personnel feel that their views are taken more seriously, for example, in the planning processes.

Consensus theses (average 4.00–4.49)

The crises requiring crisis management will probably be similar to the complicated conflicts seen since the 1990s. Thesis 1, which concerns the nature and the geographical range of futures conflicts, received broad support. The nature of the future crises is challenging to the development work of crisis management. The missions should be planned by taking into account both the local environment and the crisis management conceptual work within the global context. The claim regarding the impact of the EU on Finnish civilian crisis management also received wide support (thesis 11). The role of the EU will probably be important for Finnish participation in civilian crisis management in the near future. In accordance with thesis 12, the cooperation with development policy will probably be in progress in civilian crisis management. In the long run it will be more difficult to foresee which organizations arrange international civilian crisis management or similar kinds of activities.

Crisis management personnel will be probably require greater expertise in the future (thesis 20). Specialization will probably take place at this level. In military crisis management interaction and negotiation skills will be necessary (thesis 22). As mentioned earlier, communicative skills of the personnel are important for civil-military cooperation and ensuring local ownership. When deciding about the promotions to the highest ranks in the military, the service in military crisis management should be taken into account (thesis 25). In civilian crisis management education, common international standards will be needed for reasonable use of resources (thesis 26). In education and training for civilian (thesis 27) and military (thesis 28) crisis management awareness about cultural and historical features of the crisis region as well as the background of the conflict are indispensable features. Both civilian (thesis 29) and military (thesis 30) personnel should have opportunities to provide feedback

as well as to have debriefing discussions after the completion of their crisis management duties.

7.4.2 Non-consensus arguments of importance

Despite not achieving consensus among the panel, some of the theses may still be relevant. Non-consensus may also reveal some crucial problems. In most theses, the average assessment was higher on the scale of agreement than on the scale of relevance. Higher relevance than agreement was assessed on theses 1, 2, 3, 10, and 29. None of the arguments were strongly disagreed or found strongly unimportant by the panel, no average answers to any argument were between 1 and 2.

Theses 1-3 handled the environment and background factors of crisis management. When a thesis was found to have a higher level of importance than agreement, there may be some potential for change that would raise the importance of the thesis in relation to the amount of agreement with it. The nature of the future crises as well as the dynamics affecting crisis management may be relevant although it may be difficult for a panel member to estimate exactly how these changes will look in the future. With regard to thesis 10 the relevance may be in the potential of the future assessment of the results of the civilian crisis management.

One of the themes that emerged during the first round interviews was specialization. There were opinions both for and against specialization in various fields of crisis management and peace building. The arguments regarding the development of military crisis management achieved less unanimity than the theses about civilian crisis management.

For a small country like Finland questions related to specialization are not easy. On the other hand, scarce resources should be used in a reasonable manner. A small country cannot participate in everything. But too overly narrow participation may be limiting, if the environment and needs in crisis management change. Because of the extent of crises and conflicts, the need for assistance in peace processes appears to be broad in the near future. Because of special characteristics of various conflicts and crises, the needs may also be diverse.

Modeling and measuring were two other themes included in the second-round questionnaire. Measuring the impact of crisis management is extremely challenging. However, learning from the past and on-going processes may facilitate more effective and better crisis management in the future, even from the perspective of human security.

In the future, specialization and modeling may be essential themes in the progress of crisis management. In the current situation, in which new forms of crisis management are emerging, it may be difficult to foresee how specialization would occur because current crises face a constant lack of various resources. In modeling, there is always a risk of not taking into account special features of a crisis. Because the panel favored taking the opinions of local inhabitants into account, not finding consensus on modeling and specialization could be interpreted in a context of respect for local cultural and situational features. The role of the Internet and information technology in information sharing in conflict or post-

conflict areas should not be neglected either, although the panel did not find consensus on the theme.

7.4.3 Results in a thematic order

Futures crises and conflicts

The panel favored of the idea that futures conflicts requiring crisis management will be similar to those that have taken place recently. They will mostly take place in Africa or in the Middle East and will involve non-state actors. The panel considered this topic to be relevant. The panel did not clearly assess the meaning of potential changes in the relations of great powers. The continuations of armed conflicts with the involved non-state actors have been assumed to be a futures scenario, as mentioned in chapter 3.

Models for crisis management and futures development in military and civilian crisis management

The panel supported the idea of comprehensive crisis management and considered it to be a significant idea. Because the comprehensiveness of crisis management is widely acknowledged by various institutions including the EU, this result is not surprising. There was no consensus of the phase-like progressing cooperation in civilian and military crisis management. On the other hand, the panel did consider the idea to be relevant by the panel. The potential phases of crisis management should be analyzed by experts both in civilian and military crisis management, in order to find out whether such kind of modeling is achievable for futures development work.

Specialization in military or civilian crisis management did not receive support from the panel. However, international development in crisis management may at least add some impetus to this idea. The higher expenses in crisis management will not necessarily require the number of Finnish troops in military crisis management to be reduced. Of course, this will depend on the political will of the decision makers. On the other hand, there was no consensus that an increase in peacekeeping troops would require strong international pressure. Even the idea of arranging training for those countries whose troops need it, did not reach consensus. These types of ideas somehow resembled weak signals not reaching consensus.

Regarding civilian crisis management, the panel did not favor the idea that the increase of Finnish civilian crisis management would depend on the results of these activities. The panel acknowledged the EU's influence on the guidelines of the civilian crisis management, as well as the need for growing cooperation between civilian crisis management and development policy actors.

Special requests for Finland regarding crisis management and peace-building and the possibility for specialization of Finland in this field

The panel was not in favor of Finland receiving various special requests in crisis management, peace-building or negotiations on these topics. The panel did not predict specialization due to these requests. Although President Ahtisaari's efforts and results in peace negotiations are widely known, too much attention should not be put on a single person's results. The estimation of the panel does not rely on any unique position of Finland in crisis management.

Development of cooperation in military and civilian crisis management in the future

Information sharing and clear division of labor were recommended as forms of cooperation between civilian and military crisis management. The panel did not recommend modeling of the forms of cooperation. However, the panel did support cooperation with local inhabitants, even in the planning processes. Internet-based information sharing for local inhabitants was not recommended because of the limits of its usefulness in conflict or post-conflict areas. Nevertheless, development of information technology may make these kinds of arrangements more utilizable in the future.

These estimations by the panel have some similarities with the discourse on development cooperation. Development aid has been criticized because of its potential negative consequences in the societies it has been brought in (Koponen 2009). Every intervention from outside particular society – even from a war-torn one – has unintended consequences. Taking local opinions into account as much as possible may facilitate the creation of local ownership and social structures which enable peace-building.

Crisis management personnel and feedback arrangements

According to the panel, duties requiring expertise and special professional skills in crisis management will increase proportionally in both military and civilian crisis management according to the panel. The panel also emphasized the relevance of interaction and communication skills. However, the panel felt that new recruitment systems for military or civilian crisis management were not necessary in order to ensure multi-skilled personnel. The panel felt that, in military crisis management, service abroad should be one argument to reach the highest ranks of officers. Every person who has served in military or civilian crisis management should have the opportunity to provide and receive feedback and have a debriefing. The feedback from personnel should also be gathered in a systematic manner and be utilized.

Education of crisis management personnel and potential for joint education and training in military and civilian crisis management

The panel welcomed international standards for education in civilian crisis management. The panel recommended that, apart from education for one's duties, crisis management personnel need to learn the basics of local cultures and history in the mission areas – as well as basic military skills in military crisis management. The panel did not consider joint education of the military and civilian personnel as a necessity and it did not reach a

consensus about the administrative arrangements for the education and training in civilian and military crisis management.

7.5 Critical details from the Delphi results

Larger global trends also affect crisis management. In the coming decades, globalization will probably be a significant trend (Mannermaa 2008; Shapiro 2008). This century is an era when the global economy will expand by utilizing telecommunications and information processing which will have large-scale impacts on all countries and territories although territorial unevenness will remain as a dividing factor on progress (Castells 1998, 374). Information societies will be changing to ubiquitous societies in which information flows and networking are available through easily controllable and self-monitoring technologies. New technologies and complex risk societies will emerge. Working life will develop in less bordered directions, signifying 24/7 practices, and every individual will have several identities, which will change over his or her life span. Climate change will play major part in co-existing with globalization. (Mannermaa 2008.) Less expensive types of ubiquitous technology may develop and have cultural impacts. How will these trends affect conflicts and crisis management? It is impossible to assess exactly how technological changes will affect cultural development, either globally or locally. More ubiquitous technology will probably progress and expand its influence, which will also affect conflict development and crisis management as well. If armed conflicts occur, human factors will probably remain important in crisis management, regardless of technological changes.

Technological changes and globalization may enable easier contacts between representatives of various cultures. However, this type of “facilitation” does not guarantee that such development will occur. Due to globalization, strong local identities exist, although the development of “identity multiplication” may take place, as Mannermaa (2008) has assumed. At best, this will mean a less conflict-prone future. If new communication technologies are more widely available in crisis areas, interaction between local people and crisis management personnel may take new forms. In such circumstances, contact and communication skills become extremely important. New technological frameworks will not determine the contents of communications, but cultural misinterpretations may be even more fatal, if communication takes place through some form of technology. In contrast to the Delphi panel results, I believe that Internet-based information sharing will play an essential role in communication in post-conflict zones. However, as Auli Keskinen (1999, 126) has explained, the development of administrative information technology as a continuous multilevel process, and the adaptation of the Internet in information-sharing will probably also be a similar kind of multi-level process in crisis management.

From a consensus perspective in the Delphi panel process, the more tangible arguments related to crisis management personnel and their education received support more easily than the arguments about the structural development of crisis management. It is probably the case that today’s problems were more easily acknowledged, which made it easier to reach consensus for claims of a more concrete type. This idea is consistent with the criticism of potential systematic errors in Delphi results that Osmo Kuusi (2003, 223–224) has posed and which were introduced in section 2.4.3. Because crisis management is a broad field,

having experts with diverse background knowledge implied that their orientation and opinions could possibly vary. Due to the diversity, the credibility of the consensus results is higher than when a panel has similar kinds of experts.

Technological development may make the work of military crisis management personnel safer if they are better equipped. On the other hand, new threats may emerge if armed groups apply new technologies for violence. The questions related to riskier military crisis management operations were not profoundly handled during the second round of the panel process. Instead, the focus was on the cooperation processes, rather than on the details related to militarily demanding operations. However, the military side of crisis management was not excluded. In the future, the communicative nature of crisis management and peace-building will be essential regardless of how challenging the single operations will be militarily.

The two main approaches of future research are transition and modeling (Aaltonen & Keskinen 2003, 79). The aim of this study was not exact modeling but finding relevant trends for the futures crisis management. Human dimensions in crisis management will be important when developing better forms of crisis management in order to provide human security. Emphasizing human security should be part of peace processes. Hopefully, the efforts of the international community will be broad and determined to develop a safer world for everyone. Such development would signify that the need for crisis management and peace building would decrease in the long run. However, the panelists in the Delphi process did not foresee such development taking place in the near future.

The complexity of the futures crises and conflicts has been discussed. It is reasonable for the international community to construct capacities to handle complicated processes. In addition, it is important to prevent armed conflicts. Is this idea an illusion or an option provided by better negotiation skills in peace processes, more skilful peace building personnel and both realistic and culture-aware planning in crisis management?

7.6 Summary of the Delphi panel process

The Delphi panel process focused on futures conflict development, crisis management, and the competences required for it. The features of conflicts resemble the new conflicts introduced in chapter 3. This result has an impact on answering the main RQ and RQs 1 and 3, because the complexity challenges both the crisis management organizations and the individuals working for them.

Table 9. Main results of the Delphi panel on crisis management

Future phenomenon	Challenges for organizations	Competences required
New conflicts	Common goals	Reflectivity
		Contact skills
Multitude of actors	Lack of cooperation	Cooperation abilities
Various risks	Flexibility	Contact and combat skills
		Professional skills
Multiculturalism	Local ownership	Cultural competences

Regarding the main RQ and RQ1, it is important to bear in mind that the personnel should have interaction and negotiation skills. In the context of new conflicts, cooperation will be relevant between civilian and military actors in crisis management as well as in contacts with development cooperation personnel. For long-term results, cooperation with local residents is central: both collaboration skills and local awareness are required from crisis management personnel and processes enabling local residents to have active roles in peace-building. In the Delphi panel process, cooperation skills of the personnel as well as cooperation between various organizations and agencies and other actors were indicated as being of high importance. Apart from communication skills, the professional skills of crisis management personnel are emphasized. Local ownership in a post-conflict environment requires understanding of multiculturalism on behalf of crisis management personnel, and therefore cultural competences are important. Cooperation abilities in Table 9 are necessary when responding to all the challenges mentioned in the table. The competences described in Table 9 are consistent with those introduced in section 5.3 with one exception: the results of Delphi panel did not mention the ability to make ethical assessment.

Due to the complexity of the cooperation between various actors, learning processes in crisis management and peace-building should be emphasized. Armed conflicts and crisis management change, which means that learning abilities should be developed constantly. Such development requires flexibility from crisis management organizations and the needs of the personnel should also be acknowledged. In potentially more demanding tasks, it will be necessary to develop practices that take the needs of the personnel to express themselves into account, as well as their experience, which could help develop crisis management. Feedback and debriefing conversations are part of this process.

The results related to feedback are consistent with Howard's (2008) typology of first- and second-level learning when developing crisis management practices. Better feedback systems enable higher levels of organizational learning. The challenge of feedback practices should be taken seriously at the institutional level of various international agencies and organizations. Well-structured feedback arrangements enhance learning, and also enable advances in leadership and management practices. Individuals taking responsibility for leadership in crisis management must understand the linkage between organizational and individual learning. The riskier the operations become, the more important it will be to enhance return and demobilization arrangements. It may be more complicated for an individual to return home than he or she could predict beforehand.

New technological innovations could be adopted into various processes in crisis management. For example, learning during a mission could be reinforced by programs available on the Internet. Technology may facilitate the development of various feedback systems, which should not completely replace face-to-face communication about feedback. Modified technology may make it possible to reach various objectives in crisis management and peace-building.

The panel did not recommend specialization or modeling in crisis management. It was easier for the panel to reach consensus on the substantial competences in crisis management. In the future, crisis management personnel need to be multi-skilled. In addition to the necessary professional skills required in one's duties, adequate communication skills will also be crucial. Multi-skilled personnel should be recruited into crisis management and the training and education of the personnel must support the evolution of communication skills and cultural awareness of the personnel.

8. Meanings of crisis management work described by the personnel

The aim of this chapter is to respond to the main RQ as well to RQs 1, 2, and 3, which are as follows:

Main RQ. What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

RQ 1. What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

RQ 2. How do field experiences affect personnel's identities and self-concepts?

RQ 3. How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

This chapter introduces and analyzes the results of the interviews of the crisis management personnel. The structure of the questionnaire was almost similar in the three professional groups interviewed for the research (see appendix 5). In the actual interviews, the questions varied because there were diverse and spontaneous issues expressed by the interviewees. In total, 27 persons were interviewed for the study. The list of the interview numbers of both crisis management and the Delphi panel expert interviewees is presented in appendix 6. All of the interviewees had work experience in Kosovo, either in military or civilian crisis management. As described in chapter 2, the interviewees were comprised of:

- Nine professional officers from the permanent staff at the Finnish Defence Forces who had experience in peacekeeping (all of these professional officers were men)
- Ten peacekeepers recruited from the reserves (five women and five men from various professional backgrounds)
- Eight people who have worked in one or several civilian crisis management operations (five women and three men).

The details of the interview process were introduced in chapter 2²⁷. The interviews were focused on the experiences of the personnel as well as on their interpretations of the events that took place and what all of this had meant to them. These interviewees were also asked to participate in the futures panel process, which was introduced in chapter 7²⁸. Most of the interviews took place at the offices of the interviewees with a few exceptions. The focused interviews generally lasted less than an hour.

Interviews of the crisis management personnel were transcribed in detail²⁹. Results from the interviews are partially reported in accordance with the professional groups. Reporting

²⁷ Voluntary candidates for the interviews were found in co-operation with the Finnish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior and the Finnish Association for Peacekeepers (Rauhanturvaajaliitto). The sample is not an average of everyone who has worked in Kosovo. Among professional officers it would have been difficult to find female interviewees. Because the gender of the interviewees may have some impact on responses, it was preferable to get both men and women interviewed for the study. Consequently, both male and female reservists and civilian crisis management employees were asked to be interviewed.

²⁸ When there was limited time for the interviews, the interviewees were given the opportunity to respond to the futures panel questionnaire literally.

²⁹ The interviews were transcribed by a research assistant. Because of a technical problem, one interview could not be transcribed. However, exact notes of the interview were made, which enabled quite precise interpretations of this interview.

with or without this professional group differentiation depends on the relevance of grouping with regard to the reported results. For example, many development ideas are reported in accordance with the professional groups because work practices in civilian and military crisis management differ from each other. Typical or particularly interesting examples of views expressed in the interviews can be found in the footnotes, which also contain references from the text to the interview numbers. Interview numbers are found in appendix 4, which documents the interviewees' professional status (whether the interviewee is a civilian crisis management employee, professional officer or reservist) and gender. The referred parts of the interviews provide a more viable picture of the interviewees' thinking than would have been solely by describing their views. The footnotes are directly cut from the interview scripts.

8.1 Facts about the crisis management personnel interviewed for the study

At the time of the interviews, 20 of the interviewees had recently completed their crisis management duties and seven were still working in the mission. Those interviewees who were still continuing their duties in Kosovo at the time of the interview represented the reservists and the civilian crisis management personnel. Only one interviewee had finished her mission more than a year before the interview was made. Professional officers in military crisis management had 6–12-month contracts in Kosovo. In civilian crisis management the contracts had been at least five months in duration. In both civilian and military crisis management, some interviewees had changed their duties during the mission. The estimated average length (or the real outcome) of the service in Kosovo was 16 months³⁰ on average. The variation between the groups was salient: the average length of service among the professional officers was nine months, among the reservists it was 11 months and among the civilian crisis management personnel it was 29 months.

Most of the interviewees (74 percent) had not had crisis management experience prior to Kosovo. Of those who did have previous crisis management experience, three had served in one mission and four in two or more missions. The service in Kosovo was the first crisis management mission abroad for seven professional officers, eight reservists and five employees civilian crisis management. Prior crisis management experience is recommended in several duties, especially in more challenging circumstances, and these factors impact the recruitment of the personnel.

On average, the civilian crisis management employees were older than the personnel in the military crisis management. The average age of the civilian crisis management interviewees was 51 years, compared to 33 years for reservists and 38 years for professional officers. The average age of the entire sample of interviewees was 40 years. The youngest interviewees were born in the 1980s and the oldest ones in the 1940s. This result is understandable given that civilian crisis management duties often demand more work experience than tasks in the military crisis management. In general, peacekeeping duties are more physically demanding than work in civilian crisis management, which means that the recruitment of

³⁰ Those having returned from the mission reported the length of their stay at the mission. Those still working in Kosovo provided the date at the end of their stay or estimated its length.

younger peacekeeping personnel is favored. There is also a maximum age limit for reservists in military crisis management among Finnish troops. In general, the physical challenges in military crisis management are more demanding than in civilian crisis management. The average age for female interviewees was 37 years, compared to 42 the male interviewees.

None of the female peacekeepers had any children. Only one female interviewee, a civilian crisis management employee, had children under the age of 18 years. Put another way, 90 percent of the female interviewees did not have children under the age 18 years, clearly higher percentage in comparison to 23 percent of the male interviewees. When grown-up children were taken into account, eight of the female interviewees were childless (80 percent), compared to three male interviewees (18 percent). Altogether 11 interviewees (41 percent) were childless. Four (15 percent) of the interviewees had one or more children over the age of 18 years.

On average the female interviewees were younger than their male counterparts. Due to the age difference, the female interviewees may have children later in their lives. The age difference is probably not the only explanation for the larger number of childless individuals among female interviewees. The family situation probably has more effects on women's preferences. It seems that women with children are probably less inclined to work abroad in crisis management duties than men in a similar kind of situation. Because of the qualitative nature of this data, it is impossible to prove the likelihood of this tendency.

None of the professional officers interviewed for the study were single. Half of the reservists and most of the civilian crisis management employees were either married or co-habiting. Over 60 percent of the peacekeepers studied by Monica Röberg (1999, 10) were married or co-habiting. It is not possible to conclude whether the family structures of the interviewees in this sample are exceptional compared to crisis management personnel on average.

A clear majority of the interviewees (20 interviewees, 74 percent) had a university-level education (M.A., etc.), and the rest had a graduated from a high school. The educational level of the interviewees was relatively high, given that 41 percent of Finnish employees have a university-level education (Lehto & Sutela 2008). The level of education was at least partly related to the independence of one's duties in crisis management. The work positions of the personnel interviewed for the study were not standardized or of a similar level. As mentioned earlier, this data does not represent average numbers of crisis management personnel's features. With regard to family duties, however, these statistics described above are consistent with the traditional role of women which is more closely linked to their families than men's.

8.2 Preference for crisis management duties in the past and in the future

About a quarter of the interviewees had worked in crisis management prior to their mission in Kosovo. Half of the interviewees working for civilian crisis management had previous experience in crisis management or development aid duties. One reservist and two professional officers had been deployed to military crisis management before Kosovo.

The reasons for leaving to Kosovo to work in a crisis management mission were divided into personal issues and more generally motivated issues. Seven professional officers mentioned the wish to develop professionally was a motivational factor for attending the mission. On the other hand, only one reservist and one civilian crisis management employee identified professional reasons as a motive for being deployed to crisis management. Approximately half of the interviewees described a more general desire for new experiences as a reason to leave, and around the same number highlighted international issues or security or multiculturalism as motives. A minority of interviewees mentioned reasons within categories of financial reasons, learning better language skills, and helping other people. Serving in crisis management duties had been a long-standing dream for some of the interviewees. The interviewees mentioned both personal and altruistic motivations.

Most interviewees had several reasons for working in crisis management duties, often combining altruistic and career-oriented motives. Some of the interviewees had past experiences with peacekeeping or international projects that had influenced their decisions to go to Kosovo. One of the interviewees in civilian crisis management described her previous duties in international agencies and described the work in Kosovo as part of a continuum in her international career. Duties in military crisis management can be assessed as a natural part of the career of professional officers, although this is not an obligatory part of a military career.

Earlier studies have found manifold motivational factors for working in military crisis management. Peacekeeping tasks had been a longstanding dream for many peacekeepers, and their motives for leaving could be complex (Röberg 1999, 5). According to Limnell and Moberg (2008, 8), one of the major motives for young professional officers seeking for service abroad has been to gain a new type of work experience; this finding resembles the results of the present study.

The interviewees were asked whether they would like to serve in crisis management later in their lives. None of the interviewees expressed certainty that they would never go to a new mission. However, the interviewees did have doubts about whether a new mission would be "suitable" in their life span, either for family or professional reasons. A positive attitude towards a potential future mission may be interpreted as an outcome of a positive experience during the present or a past mission. The respondents identified the following reasons why they would like to participate in a future crisis management mission: experience, good timing (professionally or for the family situation), camaraderie (mostly mentioned by the reservists), the meaning of the crisis management (mostly mentioned by the civilian crisis management employees), professional development, the work itself (one interviewee even mentioned this as a vocation), the nature of new tasks, and the nature of the operation (for example, not willing to participate in a risky operation). The most important reasons for not leaving were: family situation, and feeling that the existing crisis management experience was sufficient.

Two civilian crisis management interviewees had plans to return to Kosovo soon³¹ and two reservists admitted that they had already made applications for new service in military crisis management. Professionally, the question seemed complicated for professional officers

³¹ At the time of the interviews, the EU was sending a large delegation of civilian crisis management personnel to Kosovo.

because, in higher ranks, the number of duties preferable from the perspectives of Finnish officers in international crisis management operations is limited. Positive experiences from Kosovo influenced the answers in several ways. For example, camaraderie was mentioned as a reason for working again in crisis management duties. One civilian crisis management employee was interested in applying for new crisis management duties because of the challenges of the work, namely that they require new kinds of problem solving for which routine solutions are not enough. This kind of motivation is related to a will to learn new processes or new problem-solving methods.

Many interviewees mentioned that their family situation affects whether they are inclined of applying for crisis management duties. The age of the interviewees' children may influence the timing of the duties as well. Two female peacekeepers mentioned that it would be possible to work as a peacekeeper while they still did not have children. None of the male interviewees mentioned that having children would be deal-breaker. Culturally, the family situation seems to have different meanings for men and women thinking about the possibility of working in crisis management. The finding that family situation would explain why several interviewees would not attend future service in crisis management abroad was in accordance with Linnéll and Moberg's (2008, 8) finding that family reasons would be the most important reason for not leaving for service abroad. Two other reasons why young professional officers would not leave abroad were unclear contract stipulations regarding service abroad, and a lack of interest (ibid. 8).

8.3 Identity and professional meaning of crisis management work

Professional roles and meaning of the crisis management duties

Several respondents found it difficult to identify whether their thoughts about their personal professional roles had changed or not. For professional officers, a crisis management mission is part of the occupational continuum although the situational factors abroad differ from those in Finland. For civilian crisis management personnel, the occupational role in crisis management may resemble their work in Finland. For most reservists, the peacekeeper role clearly differs from their civilian duties in Finland. The work in crisis management could also be seen as an enlargement of occupational roles. Demanding duties requiring the ability to communicate in English, to work in a multi-cultural team, or to react quickly were mostly seen as a satisfying a part of the work in Kosovo. Individuals found this process meaningful if it strengthened their confidence. Work abroad in crisis management consists of so many different factors compared to work in Finland; this helps the individuals recall the events and inner processes that occur because of these duties.

Many of the crisis management employees felt that crisis management experience had strengthened their beliefs in their own capacities. Interviewees may not find it easy to answer to the question of how the crisis management operation would have affected their self-concept or identity. The mission work typically had had a positive impact on their self-concept and self-esteem. Individuals had learnt to work in new, more complicated situations, which made them more confident. An international working environment, new situations and

the need to work in English consisted parts of these experiences. For professional officers, Kosovo could be as an example of a new working environment or a sphere of activities that were considered professionally crucial. In civilian crisis management, new professional challenges can lead to a reanalysis of the professional field because the work is reconstructed in a new environment that requires new kinds of solutions. A new environment provides the opportunity to think about how things are in Finland. Crisis management duties could be described rewarding. For the reservists, there was variation regarding whether the duties were similar to their work in Finland.

Self-confidence, self-concept, and learning in professional groups

Twenty of the interviewees (six representing civilian crisis management personnel, nine reservists, and five professional officers) expressed some change in their self-concept or identities – mostly in terms of their self-concepts. This group comprised the majority of the interviewees. The other interviewees had not noticed any change or they ambivalent regarding this question. One of the interviewees could not assess whether such a change had taken place.

Several interviewees mentioned that working in crisis management provides opportunities to learn new things. Some felt that their self-concept had become clearer; understanding oneself can be seen as a necessary condition to understanding others working in the same team and the process led to larger cultural awareness³². In a way the process could be described as one of a *self-realization*, which is where a person identifies something that already exists as part of himself or herself. One reservist described how she saw more clearly her own ability to work in difficult circumstances and her courage in these situations.

Work in crisis management offers individuals the opportunity to reflect of certain features and compare them to other individuals in new circumstances. Therefore, work may change a person to some extent, although he or she will interpret these reflections as clarification of his or her self-concepts. Although not the interviewees described how they had found themselves after these reflections, the reflection processes were somehow similar.

All of the interviewed professional officers had found the missions to be professionally positive experiences, although this is not say that they would have experienced only positive things. Many of them felt that their beliefs in their own capacities had been strengthened. One civilian crisis management employee sought further professional education after returning because the learning experiences from Kosovo had been motivating, while a reservist considering applying for further education. The changes that took place while working abroad in crisis management duties may help produce courage or motivation to study more. The positive expression was typical of both the civilian crisis management interviewees and reservists, although the idea was not expressed by all of them. As one civilian crisis management employee said: “It gives you confidence when you find out that you manage the situations.”

³² "...different people are managed in different ways or they need different ways to collaborate with. And I cannot understand how to treat other people if I cannot understand myself." (Interview 20.)

New duties could even help develop the courage to do such things as express opinions. This kind of process could contribute to self-realization. Strengthening of features that an individual had earlier found in himself may be associated with new skills or abilities in a positive way, which may explain why so many interviewees reported crisis management duties as positive experiences. New, positive experiences from crisis management could *strengthen one's self-confidence*. Good results at work and discovering one's abilities to learn new things and processes could be part of a process strengthening self-confidence. A new environment provides better chances to realize certain skills or to interpret their meaningfulness. Success in a previously unknown environment is rewarding.

One reservist interviewee mentioned that it was important to gain work experience from abroad but not necessarily as a peacekeeper. It was even considered possible that not staying home and learning more at work would have a negative impact on one's career. On the other hand, one interviewee said that in his field in the Finnish public sector, the meaning of work experience from international tasks had increased over the preceding five years.

Identification with peacekeepers or civilian crisis management personnel

Reservists identified most strongly with peacekeepers; males mostly identified with their own comrades, while females were more likely to identify with peacekeepers in general. Professional officers had no strong identification with the peacekeeping community. If identification took place, it mostly involved comrades in Kosovo, not peacekeepers in general. The degree of identification varied among civilian crisis management personnel with half having civilian crisis management personnel as a clear reference group. The professional groups were divided into groups of "no identification" and "some or more identification" with crisis management personnel. Absolutely no identification was expressed by one interviewee among the reservists and two interviewees among the civilian crisis management personnel, but, on the contrary, there was only one professional officer identifying clearly with his work comrades. Some interviewees were ambivalent in regard to the identification. Those expressing no identification with crisis management personnel tended not to express change in their self-concept either, although there were exceptions to this tendency as well.

Professional officers found working in Kosovo to be professionally meaningful, but the experience did not usually lead to strong identification with peacekeepers. However, one officer with clear identification and friendship bonds with his former group members in KFOR denied that he would have any identification with peacekeepers in general. From an institutional perspective, the difference between working in the armed forces in Finland and in KFOR is not large in comparison to most occupational changes of the reservists and the civilian crisis management personnel. Professionalism may be one way of dealing with the questions related to working abroad³³.

As mentioned in chapter 5, Limnell (2004) and Heinänen (2008) noted that Finnish professional officers appear to identify themselves with their profession, which may reduce their need to identify with peacekeeping community. Because of their strong professional identity, professional officers may be less likely to identify themselves with a specific professional grouping in crisis management, namely with peacekeepers. In military crisis

³³ As one professional officer explained, the working community in Kosovo was one of many in which he had worked during his career. Interviewee: "...that work, it is one work community among the others." (Interview 42.)

management, officers' titles as officers do not change either. Although reservist peacekeepers have their military titles, they are not soldiers in their daily life and duties in Finland.

It does not seem difficult for Finnish professional officers to integrate their peacekeeper identities with their soldiers' identities because being a peacekeeper is part of their military career. As noted in chapter 5, Franke (2003) noted soldiers' warrior identity may be controversial with peacekeeping tasks. Franke's solution was to integrate warrior and peacekeeper identities in such a way they would both comprise positive parts of the soldiers' identities. Even after the peacekeeping service, the role of former duties may vary according to the professional status: peacekeeping is a professional issue for an officer working in the armed forces but a reservist may see it as a "hobby".³⁴ Finnish peacekeepers may not assess soldiership as much in terms of being a warrior as Franke (2003) has presumed.

Identification with peacekeepers could be significant for an individual. As one female reservist explained, it could be easy to find something to talk about with anyone who has peacekeeping experience. Identification was noticeable when an interviewee used a family metaphor regarding peacekeepers: "It is such a big family." Identification with work comrades and peacekeepers in general could both be meaningful and the atmosphere could be found pleasant. Röberg (1999) described the "strength" of the peacekeeping community later during a peacekeeper's life span. . This type of phenomenon may signify that the peacekeeping experience is especially meaningful for some peacekeepers.

Working as a peacekeeper was even seen as a special experience that radically differed from everyday life in Finland: therefore, the contacts with other peacekeepers could become important. The difference between the reservists and professional officers in terms of their identification with peacekeepers may be explained by the choices they had made. For a reservist, applying to a military crisis management service is not seen as part of a career – it may be a choice in a stronger sense than leaving abroad for crisis management duties is for a professional officer, although it is possible to work as a professional officer without working in international missions. The professional background or education is not emphasized when reservists work as peacekeepers, which may strengthen their tendency to identify with the peacekeeping community.

With regard to military crisis management interviewees' social identities, the results suggest that professional officers tie their peacekeeper identity to their professional identity, while reservist peacekeepers have a stronger tendency to peacekeeper identification. Civilian crisis management personnel tend to identify themselves to their work community or crisis management personnel in general. Chapter 5 suggested that reservist and professional officer peacekeepers' group-based and collective social identities would be on a similar basis in crisis management, but this does not appear to be the case. With regard to person-based identities, a peacekeeper's role was closer to a professional officer's identity than the roles of reservists and civilian crisis management personnel to their former or modifying person-based social identities. On average, the traditions in military organizations are stronger than in civilian ones, which may have an impact on identity issues as mentioned in section 5.3. However, not all the reservists identified themselves with peacekeepers. One female reservist said that

³⁴ One professional officer described the meaning of reservist activities in the professional context saying that he did not need such activities in his free time because they were part of his work. Interviewee: "I do it daily as my job. I do not need it when I have some free time." (Interview 41.)

although peacekeeping was part of her past it was not so meaningful as in her life at the time of the interview. One male reservist had no identification with peacekeepers at all.

As described earlier, one civilian crisis management interviewee mentioned that identification with personnel had had an impact on her identity. She had discussed the idea of establishing an association for civilian crisis management personnel with her colleagues as an option, given that there is an association for peacekeepers. The civilian crisis management personnel have various professional, task-related and organizational backgrounds. These differences may direct the identification of the civilian crisis management personnel.

Because many interviewees reported the meaning of the peacekeepers or civilian crisis management personnel, these groups may have some impact on individuals' identities, although the interviewees did report this kind of issue when asked about the impact of crisis management on their own identities. An anxiety-buffer mechanism of social identity (see Castano et al. 2003) may partly explain why professional officers' identification to peacekeepers was not as strong as reservist peacekeepers' identification. For reservists, peacekeeper identity might be more utilizable in possible anxiety reduction than for professional officers, who probably have their professional identification on the basis.

Because of clearer professional identity related to military duties and crisis management, it may not be necessary for professional officers to identify themselves with a peacekeeping community: this is contrast to the reservists. The professional identities of civilian crisis management personnel and reservists were perhaps not as prone to "function" in crisis management surroundings. This may explain why identification with peacekeeping or civilian crisis management communities was stronger among the reservists and civilian crisis management personnel than among professional officers.

Meaning of life

Younger interviewees with no earlier crisis management experience tended to have thought about the meaning of the life during the crisis management mission in Kosovo. However, previous crisis management or development work experience did not hinder stronger feelings related to the recent history of Kosovo and local inhabitants' experiences. The recent war taken place in the Balkans in Europe raised some personal thoughts as well but this contemplation did not necessarily lead to a change, instead it tended to strengthen one's basic values.

Some interviewees mentioned experiences that had made them think about the meaning of life. When responding to this question, two interviewees talked about seeing children go barefoot in Kosovo. Such an experience revealed in a tangible way how difficult the realities were for local people in Kosovo. One interviewee mentioned that he did not think about the meaning of life while he was in Kosovo, but that he would not think about it very much at home either. It is hard to see that thinking about the meaning of life, which is connected with the question of every individual's limited life span, would have had any direct effect on one's identity processing activation. The interviewees did not express that this kind of thinking would have led to identity changes.

However, the question was open for further associations. One of the interviewees considered that work in crisis management was more meaningful than any duty she could perform in Finland. Another interviewee admitted that he had thought about the meaning of life in his duties, as well as at home. Thoughts about the meaning of life can lead to an assessment of the current situation and the future of the crisis area, not necessarily to thinking about the individual himself or herself. Côté and Levine (2002, 180-181) presumed that the ability to think about the meaning of one's life is related to the development of an "integrated" ego identity. The interviews in this study do not allow such strong interpretations of the personalities of the interviewees. Although thinking about the meaning of life signified reflective processes, no clear connections were found between these reflections and other parts of the interviews.

Identity development

Working in a crisis management mission seems to affect an individual's self-confidence if it provides positive learning experiences from work. Identification with crisis management personnel is less common among professional soldiers. There is more variation among the reservists and civilian crisis management personnel regarding their identification with either their mission comrades or peacekeepers or civilian crisis management personnel in general.

Few interviewees mentioned the work having had any impact on their identity. One interviewee, who had worked in civilian crisis management, mentioned the influence that crisis management had had on her identity due to some identification with the personnel she had worked with. Many interviewees denied any change in their identity or self-concept. Although many of the interviewees considered the experiences important for their self-concept, they did not describe them in terms of their identity³⁵. One professional officer did not believe that the duty had had any effect on his identity, but he did acknowledge that he had paid attention to the differences of various nationalities in crisis management and especially to Finnish or Nordic working habits³⁶.

The changes mentioned by crisis management personnel, on the other hand, did vary. One reservist felt that working in a European operation had made him feel more European. One civilian crisis management employee mentioned that her personal feeling of "world citizenship" had grown. As mentioned earlier, however, many interviewees expressed some self-realization. The identity the interviews referred to was linked to group memberships, which meant that the meaning of crisis management duties for the individual dimension (rather than the group dimension) of identity and self-concept should be emphasized. For many individuals, learning through new challenges has been part of self-realization. According to the answers to the identity-related questions, crisis management duties did not seem to strengthen or change social identities.

³⁵ In the interview, the interviewer described identity as a concept that is related to self-concept, but relevant in relation to various groups as a family or an occupational group etc.

³⁶ Interviewee: "As a Finn, it is nothing new to me. In my previous job, I've attended international training and similar kinds of things."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "Nordic people in general – and Finns – do things in reasonable and logical ways." (Interview 30.)

Crisis management duties implying personal change

Although not all the interviewees felt as though they would have been influenced by working in Kosovo, some did express stronger feelings. The differences between being at home and abroad had raised thoughts about the meanings of these issues. As one female civilian crisis management employee said, the difference was hidden in that change that took place at home because the things had changed in Finland while she was in Kosovo: "...it was such a time journey."

One professional officer described the peacekeeping world in somewhat similar terms describing peacekeeping as "a shadow world" and saying that the changes taking place at home may be challenging to realize³⁷. From this perspective, work in civilian or military crisis management resembles some other kind of work abroad that requires adaptation. There are also differences compared to other types of work. Crisis management duties may be risky because of the history and potentially the actuality of an armed conflict. In a crisis area it may be more difficult to follow the situation at home or in one's home country than it would be working in another country that is more similar to Finland. At the very least, the opportunities to travel home from a crisis management mission are more restricted, although special arrangements for Finnish peacekeepers do allow regular journeys home and vocational stays there during a mission. The Finnish policy that allows peacekeepers to travel home for vacations is meant to promote their social relations in Finland.

The changes in one-self while being abroad and the changes at home take place simultaneously although one cannot be aware of all the changes that occur at home. One cannot return to the same place or situation that he or she left before leaving on a mission. At the individual level, some personal changes take place when a person is abroad for a year, for example. This situation may be surprising as the two above interviewees expressed. Education and training of crisis management employees should include coping with this phenomenon.

Interpretation of the results from identity-related questions

In a professional sense, crisis management has diverse meanings for employees serving in it. For professional officers, working abroad in an international mission seems to be more like a part of a career than it is for reservists or civilian crisis management employees. On the other hand, civilian crisis management employees may aim for atypical careers which may be international.

Individuals may find it difficult to estimate the impact that a mission has on them. However, many of the interviewees said their missions strengthened their self-confidence and some kind of self-realization. Something within the interviewees themselves had become clearer and these experiences were linked to success in new and demanding work situations. Either

³⁷ Interviewee: "... that peacekeeping world is like a shadow world, so that in a way it is not a real world..."

Interviewer: "Yes"

Interviewee: "...like a terminal phase for a human being."

Interviewer: "Okay."

Interviewee: "And it works for a year, for a year. There are changes taking place inside, certainly, and when you return here, in a way you stop. And when you return here, in a way you've halted your time.."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "And it is a shock for many people. ..." (Interview 38).

during or after new situations and experiences, crisis management personnel reflect on their personal features. This kind of self-realization may have a stronger long-term impact on self-confidence. Talking about one's life may reinforce the feeling of coherence (Alasuutari 2007, 163). Therefore, the interview situation may even strengthen interviewees' interpretations of their past experiences.

Because the success in new challenges appeared to be linked to learning, crisis management organizations should provide learning opportunities and guarantee that individual learning also leads to learning at the institutional levels. However, personnel who are unwilling to attend interviews may have more negative experiences, which means it would be exaggerated to claim that crisis management duties have only positive effects on one's self-concept.

The above-mentioned experiences have similarities with the significant experiences that Silvennoinen (2004) considered relevant for identity development and life-long learning. Work in crisis management duties may be a significant experience, promoting learning processes that have special importance with regard to lifelong learning. The same theme is discussed in section 7.4 in relation to various types of experiences.

Many of the interviewees described their thinking processes in Kosovo. Poverty and injustice often raise questions that are difficult to answer even in relation to one's own role on the globe. However, these interviews felt it would be impossible to conclude that individuals who have processed these issues would have been more prone to identity changes than other interviewees.

The interviewees' interpretations of their crisis management experiences were in favor of the personal meanings of the experiences, but not so much in favor of the social dimension of the identities. Generally speaking, conscious, major changes in social identities did not occur. However, some of the interviewees did acknowledge what their work comrades meant to them, or even emphasized the meaning of the peacekeeper or the civilian crisis management community. Positive experiences and outcomes appeared to have a positive impact on self-concept. Self-realization was a positive experience that several crisis management employees acknowledged.

Regarding RQ2 which pertains to the identities and self concepts of the crisis management personnel, it is obvious that many employees in crisis management who find positive experiences feel some kind of self-realization that connects the growth in self-confidence with learning. In identification, work in crisis management appears to be more substantial for the reservists in military crisis management and civilian crisis management personnel than for the professional officers in military crisis management. Because some kind of informal learning is typical to learning in crisis management, this phenomenon should be studied in detail in order to better develop crisis management practices and education related to learning.

8.4 Positive and negative experiences from crisis management

8.4.1 Positive experiences

The interviewees' responses often combined answers regarding interesting and rewarding experiences. This section also covers answers to the question about easy experiences. Although an international working environment was a central theme in most of the interviews, the three professional groups emphasized slightly different perspectives. Professional officers mostly described their positive experiences in terms of "international environment" or similar terms, while the reservists mostly mentioned "work with local people". Typical expressions of the civilian crisis management personnel included "collaboration with local people" or expressions focusing on the "international community". However, most interviewees mentioned several kinds of positive experiences.

Work with local inhabitants could be seen as the most interesting part of the work. Contacts with new cultural spheres, the local way of life and the problems of the Balkans were also seen as interesting, and some interviewees found meeting representatives of local cultural groups to be an interesting part of the work³⁸. Collaboration and challenges in an international environment was also found as the most interesting part of the work and it was described in positive terms concluding with a feeling that an individual had succeeded and learned at work³⁹. One professional officer said that a "real" environment was an interesting challenge. Four professional officers identified the multinational sphere of activities and its special features to be the most interesting part of the work. The local culture was also considered interesting and rewarding apart from the work in international troops. As a whole, the work, tasks and colleagues were described the most interesting and rewarding part of the experience in Kosovo. The peacekeeping community was perceived in a positive way related to a positive atmosphere.

The diversity of the tasks was also described as interesting. The professional challenges of the work in Kosovo could be considered as the most interesting and rewarding part of the stay in Kosovo. One female reservist found the diverse operational tasks to be the most interesting part of her duties in Kosovo and felt that the experiences had led to a broadening of her world view. Seeing the results of a project could be the most interesting part of the work⁴⁰, as one professional officer mentioned, this is unlike the work in Finland where an individual mostly only sees the plans, not the tangible results. Another professional officer considered concrete tasks to be the most interesting part of the work. For military professionals, Kosovo provided real opportunities to practice various skills which are also of professional importance in other circumstances.

³⁸ Interviewee: "Most interesting... In our duties, you work, work with different parties. Your main task is to meet, to listen... it's observing them."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "It has been absolutely most rewarding, getting to know the local culture." (Interview 31.)

³⁹ "Perhaps it is – perhaps it is meeting foreign and different people and getting to know different ways of thinking – and adapting your own thoughts and working habits so that collaboration functions. And of course managing with your duties so you don't need to be ashamed of what you have done. *Managing with your duties and collaboration.*" (Interview 08). Similar kinds of thoughts were expressed in interview 38.

⁴⁰ "You saw how the project progressed. So if you were building a sports field, or repairing a school, you could see it. And then it occurred quickly, and it functioned. It took an end in time, as it was planned..." (Interview 18.)

One civilian crisis management employee felt that influencing and not needing to work in routine manners were an interesting part of the work. The opportunity to work all the time was considered to be an interesting part of the work. One interviewee who was involved with the planning processes in civilian crisis management found the whole process interesting, felt it was rewarding to see the results of the process, and interpreted the process as a challenge that provided opportunities to learn new things. One civilian crisis management employee believed that creating new systems was the most interesting aspect of the work: this work was done with representatives from another culture who sometimes had different opinions on the processes with good arguments which also made the international work interesting. The development and monitoring work made one civilian crisis management employee's own skills and expertise more tangible to her.

The change in working environments enables various comparisons. The interviewees varied in terms of what work-related issues they considered interesting. Although the duties in civilian and military crisis management vary, most of the employees seemed to perceive the challenges in a culturally new environment in a positive manner. The interviewees did not seem to find these challenges overly demanding.

Conversations with work comrades were often the most rewarding part of the work – and new friendship bonds were described as a similar kind of rewarding experience. One reservist found discussions with the interpreters to be the most rewarding experiences; although they came from the local culture, they felt to be work comrades in a deeper sense. Good team work was found to be the most rewarding part of the work by one reservist and a good work community by a professional officer. Human relations at work were found as the most rewarding part of the work by one professional officer. Learning about diverse work cultures was also rewarding⁴¹.

The duties were assessed to be the most rewarding part of the stay in Kosovo, as one professional officer described, while a civilian crisis management employee felt that getting some results at work was the most rewarding aspect. Another answer, given by a civilian crisis management employee, was the feedback from local people. The declaration of independence in Kosovo was mentioned as a rewarding experience because it signified that some development had occurred.

According to many interviewees in military crisis management, the daily routines at the camp were clear and easy because routines and every-day life at the peacekeepers' camp were easy-going. The routines and the rhythm of a work day were easy although the work days were quite long. The work itself could be described as the easiest experience. The work community was considered both easy and nice – and demanding, although the practical arrangements for peacekeepers made life easy⁴². Two interviewees said that getting along

⁴¹ "... But first and foremost it was rewarding to get to work with people coming from other cultures. Because in a way working cultures differ from each other in different countries and especially when there differences in military education and training in different countries... And it was especially interesting to observe how it appeared and what kind of working culture emerges due to it." (Interview 35.)

⁴² Interviewee: "It is somehow a bipartite thing this question about your work comrades. On the other hand the easiest and nicest thing has been the work community. And there are problems as well - but so great and the community where *it is easy to go...*"

Interviewer: "So in a way it is controversial?"

Interviewee: "Yes, in a way it is. The work community carries easy going in some things. It has been easiest to take responsibility of one's own economy because the local workers take care of the laundry. There is always food on the table, so when you go to

with the work comrades was the easiest part of staying in Kosovo. Apart from the hard work, the support of the work community made the tasks easier. Even one civilian crisis management employee found routines in every-day life simple in Kosovo, although her routines were not connected with the camp life of the peacekeepers. Different kinds of people along with the similarities despite having different backgrounds were found to be a pleasant and easy experience, as one civilian crisis management employee found it easiest or nicest to communicate with local people. The tasks in Kosovo were found to be clear. Another “easy” factor was having enough time to work: there were not as many other responsibilities to handle as when living at home.

8.4.2 Negative experiences

This section discusses questions about difficult, stressful, and frustrating experiences. Many interviewees found their contacts with their family to be complicated. Eight interviewees mentioned this theme but, during the interviews, many interviewees focused only on their work issues and did not pay attention to their private lives. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude how difficult a problem the distance from home actually was. The difficulty of being away from one’s family could be connected with a feeling of a lack of freedom in special and restricting circumstances.

Obedying rules was also perceived as being somewhat difficult. One reservist said he found it difficult to adapt to the military leadership culture which had negative side-effects because negative phenomena were hidden from superiors. This comment can be interpreted as a difference from an organizational culture, which may divide peacekeepers into the groups of reservists and professional soldiers although it is difficult to assess whether this mentioned feature in leadership is common. One reservist mentioned that he found it difficult to maintain his motivation if the things were arranged incorrectly or in the wrong order: he was referring specifically to the procedures organized by a representative of the personnel of armed forces not accustomed to the working methods of civilian society. Contradictions between the reservists and the professional military personnel may be relatively wide in military crisis management, although the question has not been broadly studied. One reservist said that he found it most difficult to learn the practical procedures of the armed forces, even though they were not overly difficult.

Too much work was identified as a difficult and stressful challenge. Haste was the most difficult part of the work, as one civilian crisis management employee assessed. On the other hand, one peacekeeper said that, after having learned the duties, the tasks were too simple, which made it difficult for her to be motivated. One professional officer described problems and difficulties from a perspective of adaptation and problem-solving: negative features or reactions of the members of the team are accepted because you realize that you cannot escape from the situation. The bureaucracy and some difficult colleagues were the most difficult parts of the work, as one civilian crisis management employee described. Another civilian crisis management employee mentioned that it was most stressful or frustrating when she

the boarding house it is absolutely easier when you compare it to your life at home.” (Interview 07.)

could not perceive any development occurring in Kosovo⁴³. Difficulties making a colleague to understand your work objectives could make working complicated.

Work by communicating in a foreign language could be energy-consuming, as one professional officer explained. Knowing and understanding local contact persons could be seen as a difficult part of the work, although communicating with local inhabitants was considered interesting. With regard to cultural differences, one professional officer said that understanding local thinking was a challenge and more demanding than understanding foreign colleagues⁴⁴. It was difficult to learn to work in culturally appropriate manners that were not as efficient as one civilian crisis management employee was used to. Adapting to the working culture was a problematic part of the work for another civilian crisis management employee. For a reservist, it was stressful to combine civilian and military cultures in his duties. Another reservist found it stressful that the armed forces leadership was non-professional and that the abuse of alcohol was a problem for some colleagues. A professional officer found it stressful that the official organization was unable to create a community spirit. Five interviewees found it most stressful to be away from home⁴⁵. Although the interviewees did not describe any especially stressful situations from this perspective, the situation within families with children was especially demanding. Practical questions related to the work conditions could cause problems. One peacekeeper found his duties stressful when two of his colleagues fell ill at the time when the independence process induced some unrest in the operational area. One reservist who did not have a substitute for her duties had found the situation stressful.

The EU bureaucracy was the most stressful elements within civilian crisis management, and bureaucracy in general was considered the most stressful part of the work. Even the bureaucracy of the Finnish armed forces was found to be stressful. The unrealistic “dead-lines” were a stressful part of the work, as one civilian crisis management employee explained, and a professional officer felt stressed by similarly occasional haste due to tasks requiring quick reactions.

Most of the frustration was related to the tasks and some limits regarding implementing them in a rational way. Although many of the interviewees focused on their duties when responding to the question about frustration, distance from home was also a cause of frustration. Some kind of frustration or difficulty was expressed in the context of the change of environment when returning to peacekeeping duties⁴⁶. As reported earlier, the change in

⁴³ Interviewee: “...the progress, it does not take place there in Kosovo, it just doesn't occur. It, it just goes nowhere. Would it be...”

Interviewer: “Yes.”

Interviewee: “something dependent on the UN, dependent on the local people – it is difficult to say. But it is most stressful and frustrating to see that today you've got this result and tomorrow it has not gone anywhere.” (Interview 26.)

⁴⁴ Interviewee: “So, it is most difficult to understand some others' perspectives when the field is so heterogeneous..”

Interviewer: “Yes.”

Interviewee: “So, when talking about some other soldiers who come from other countries, it is still easy.”

Interviewer: “Yes.”

Interviewee: “But when you add the ethnic differences on that and their...”

Interviewer: “And local ethnicities, yes.”

Interviewee: “So local people, and understanding their views and motives.” (Interview 30.)

⁴⁵ “So it is the same thing to all the people with families. Although I came here once a month, so despite it...separation from your family was absolutely the most difficult single factor.” (Interview 08). Similar kinds of thoughts were expressed in interviews 17, 19, 21 and 28.

⁴⁶ Interviewee: “...so when you've been on vacation here in Finland and when you've returned back, you turn your brain into a Kosovo mode and it takes a few days, a few days, before you get your wheels turning. So, sometimes it comes to your mind

time and place may be a demanding part of crisis management tasks that have similarities to working abroad in a more conventional way. However, the multiple meanings of these changes have not been properly studied.

Many interviewees found it frustrating that some processes took a lot of time. Frustration could be one part of the work when trying to implement new kinds of plans and methods, and lots of communication was needed in the process. The failures of the UNMIK to implement its mandate caused frustration for one civilian crisis management employee. One interviewee wondered whether the whole process would end up to having any results.⁴⁷ Peace-building processes are time-consuming and the results may be seen only after the work period of an employee is already over.

The bureaucracy and inefficiency at work could be frustrating and time-consuming which may make the work more complicated than it would necessarily be. Two peacekeepers mentioned that foreign aid made local people passive which frustrated them. People accustomed to effective work patterns were often frustrated by time-consuming activities and not keeping promises on behalf of the collaborative partners in the region. Potential frustration could be connected with the specific duties. One interviewee was frustrated when the information gathering had not influenced the decisions made by the superiors. One reservist said that her superior's poor leadership skills had caused problems.

Potential problems related to the Finnish troops' limited mandate to use force also caused frustration, as one peacekeeper mentioned. Information sharing on behalf of the Finnish troops should have been more effective. Impractical transitional arrangements including insufficient guidance can also cause frustration.

A lack of variation in the duties could cause frustration, as one female reservist mentioned. One interviewee mentioned that he attended various free time-activities arranged for the Finnish troops, which at least prevented him from coming frustrated. However, the meaning of frustration should not be overestimated. As one professional officer mentioned, the work itself was so interesting that he could not become frustrated. Another professional officer said that he felt some frustration as you would at any other place because sometimes you just get frustrated at work but most often he did not have time to get frustrated because the work was so demanding and the days were so long. There was no time to get frustrated, as one professional officer said. There is probably variation in the amount of frustration in crisis management duties depending on the tasks, situational factors, and persons involved.

Two female peacekeepers mentioned difficult or frustrating gender-specific phenomena related to the atmosphere of the peacekeeper community. They felt that special attention was paid to female peacekeepers which made them feel uncomfortable.^{48 49} On the other

that it could go easier, the whole thing. But...."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "Is it frustration or not? Perhaps a mild version of that.." (Interview 31.)

⁴⁷ "...sometimes you think about how it there have been so many years from the war and there are so many organizations working over there, so what have been the results?. We just thought about whether the whole packet functions well." (Interview 17.)

⁴⁸ Interviewee: "Mhmm, yes, we females were observed like under a loop. It was sometimes even oppressive. So we are still in different positions over there."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "So if we could change it, it would be better to be there." (Interview 27.)

⁴⁹ "Or honestly said, it was like being on the lookout for especially women because we were there as a minority." (Interview 29.)

hand, one female reservist who felt uncomfortable with the special attention from her male colleagues also said that her previous peacekeeping experience was an advantage because it was easier for her to adapt to the peacekeeper community than it was for her female colleagues without former peacekeeping duties. One female reservist said that she would have liked to change her duties during the mission but that a less competent male peacekeeper was recruited instead, which she interpreted as discrimination due to her gender. Because three out of five female peacekeepers expressed some dissatisfaction concerning how they were treated due to their gender, it appears quite probable that gender issues often affect the work satisfaction and related issues for female peacekeepers.

8.4.3 Dangers and worries

Most of the interviewees had not felt any danger, or dangers that were only of modest or moderate nature. Most often the interviewees mentioned that traffic caused some risk and one even mentioned the local dogs. Therefore, threats faced by military and civilian personnel cannot mostly be described in military terms.

While out patrolling on the day of the independence declaration, one interviewee met a person with a weapon who arranged “happy shooting” with no intention to hurt anyone: however, the situation became slightly threatening when it was necessary to confiscate the weapon. Another peacekeeper had observed some armed unrest at the time of the independence declaration. One reservist felt that patrolling in a village was the most threatening experience.

Many of the interviewees had felt no danger in their duties in Kosovo. However, it was meaningful to take necessary measures to maintain security in military means as peacekeepers, even though the situations were not risky. One civilian crisis management employee mentioned that a grenade attack in a neighboring area could have occurred at the time that colleagues were nearby. One professional officer said that he occasionally worried about the potential risks of political unrest for Finnish troops in the neighboring area. The impression from the interviews was that nobody had felt really worried about the situation in Kosovo, although some of them had been in risky situations. Compared to some other crisis management operations, like the one in Afghanistan, the difference is clear. Therefore, the circumstances in riskier operations and missions are probably more demanding in general which may also affect other perceptions of crisis management personnel.

One peacekeeper said that his concerns mostly occurred when he was personally at home for a holiday and aware of the risks of violence during the time of the independence declaration. After returning to Kosovo, however, he was not worried about his personal security. This estimation may be interpreted in at least two ways. Either the threats were regarded as more controllable when present, or it was impossible for one to worry about threats when it was necessary to concentrate on work.

The family situation or the alcohol use of a work comrade could be reasons to worry about colleagues. A few interviewees also said that the mental health or well-being problems of colleagues could be a concern. . Several interviewees said that they had not worried about

their work comrades. The poverty of the local people in the neighboring areas also raised some concerns. For example, the future of the local people was a concern for one professional officer. The low risk level in Kosovo probably also affected the personnel's perceptions related to the comrades. The stress factors related to one's colleagues will be higher, if the operation is riskier.

8.4.4 Multiple meanings

As mentioned, the work community in peacekeeping could be found both pleasant and demanding. Some interviewees mentioned features of the tasks that contained both positive and negative aspects. Insecurity in the duties was found to be both easy and difficult and challenging – one interviewee described it as a drug.⁵⁰ Work challenges may enable learning. The crisis management environment was found to be interesting although it was exhausting to communicate in a foreign language. Communication with local people was rewarding and interesting – but also difficult.

One professional officer said that hasty and unforeseen situations requiring problem-solving caused both positive and negative feelings, even stress, which facilitated the actual problem-solving. A reservist expressed a similar kind of contradiction: she was over-worked – but the support she received from the work community made the work easier. Even daily routines were found to be both easy and stressful – and frustrating.

There seems to be learning potential in duties or situations consisting of double or multiple meanings. Demanding situations may become rewarding ones if an individual is able to handle it. Learning may be a “side-effect” of handling complicated situations – and may even to strengthen self-confidence, as mentioned in section 8.3. Informal learning may occur at work, even if the individual does not explicitly consider it to be learning.

Multiple meanings of duties or various phenomena clearly raised thoughts among crisis management personnel. Double and multiple meanings may be recalled more easily than more ordinary situations because more complicated situations and processes may be thought about again later. The challenge of such situations did not become overwhelming because it remained controllable.

Contradictory elements in learning situations at work have been described in nursing duties (Nurminen 2008). Such occasions may be controversial, insecure, and unique with factors that are difficult to predict. In such circumstances, intuition is crucial for understanding the relevant information in order to make decisions or to act. Because intuition and tacit knowledge are subjective, it is possible to transfer information and knowledge about such situations, not the experience. (Ibid.) Therefore, controversial learning situations may be fruitful for learning in various fields of working life and duties.

In some sense, these multiple meanings may be regarded as contradictions, which Engeström (1987) has described as part of an expansive learning process. When envisaging contradictory elements at work, some creativity is needed for problem-solving. A relevant

⁵⁰ Interviewee: “In these duties, *it is tolerating uncertainty*. It is a routine, it becomes a routine, but it is like a drug. It is like you said, both most difficult and easiest – it is both.” (Interview 3.)

question is whether this type of learning in crisis management could be facilitated in some way – or whether training is impossible for not unforeseen phenomena. The description of contradictory phenomena could potentially facilitate learning and adaptation. Would these types of multiple meanings have importance in learning in riskier environments? While there are certainly contradictions serving potential for learning, even in riskier situations, growing security risks are a stress factor.

8.4.5 Interpretations of crisis management experiences and learning: Mostly positive but partially contradictory perceptions

Individual perceptions regarding the atmosphere of the peacekeeping community or team work varied considerably. Both positive and negative perceptions were found, although positive experiences received more attention in research interviews. Of course, an individual's perceptions could contain both positive and negative elements related to the atmosphere. Cross-cultural contacts were mostly found rewarding. New situations and circumstances enabled learning that could not take place in similar kinds of ways at home. The experiences expressed by the interviewees were mostly positive, although many had felt frustration from time to time. New experiences had provided opportunities for learning. Experiences consisting of diverse meanings seemed to be recalled well by the personnel. Multiple meanings are likely to activate reflection, even afterwards. These situations may offer learning opportunities that should be taken into consideration when developing education and training of crisis management personnel.

As mentioned in section 8.3, crisis management duties may be significant experiences (see Silvennoinen (2004)) in the individuals' life spans and may be relevant in their life-long learning processes. Several interviewees had earlier mentioned that their self-conceptions had strengthened during the duties and at least partly as a result of learning at work. Work in crisis management may be a good time for informal learning to occur. This learning occurs in implicit ways, often without being directly considered as learning. According to Collin (2005), learning at work should not be assessed in similar terms as learning through education. When assessing identity issues, regardless of the changes that have taken place in identities or identification, learning was connected with ultimately positive and potentially challenging learning experiences.

Learning at work also consists of informal learning which is difficult for an individual to assess. It is especially crucial for learning tacit knowledge, but probably not so much for learning explicit knowledge. It is challenging for both individuals and institutions to assess tacit knowledge and the results of informal learning. However, the results of these types of learning that may exist in the minds of the employees could be gathered in order to enable organizational learning although this task is not easy.

Approximately 70 percent of all Finnish employees find independence to be a factor that strengthens their well-being at work. Interesting work also enhances well-being at work, and this effect is slightly higher among women than among men. Work colleagues are another meaningful factor for well-being at work. (Lehto & Sutela 2008, 191–193.) These themes can also be found in the interviews with the crisis management personnel. Compared to

work conditions in general, similar things also seem to be positive or negative in crisis management duties.

Haste may cause stress, which means that it is taken into consideration in the context of the well-being of the personnel. Higher demands of efficiency are linked to the personnel's feelings of insufficiency (Järnefelt 2002a, 27). Overly demanding or overly easy tasks have a negative impact on an individual's well-being at work (Mamia 2009, 39). There is a need to balance demands and stress factors of the work in peace operations; therefore, general research results on work and well-being should be taken into consideration when developing crisis management. Leaders and managers should regularly assess the amount of work and its coherence with resources, and they should estimate time-tables realistically, as well as to provide opportunities to delegate duties and allocate time for the employee's personal development (Järnefelt 2002b, 101–102).

The interviewees seemed to have plenty of activities and their work days were usually not dull. Although the interviewees in this study may represent more positive approaches to crisis management duties than the personnel in general, it is interesting that boredom did not seem to be a wide problem among the interviewees as was found in a Danish study (see Norgaard & Holsting 2006). The frustration identified in another Finnish study (Ahtiainen et al. 2007) did not seem to be a wide or profound problem either among the interviewees, although they did express some frustration. The dangers envisaged by the interviewees were restricted and not serious. This is an essential difference between KFOR and riskier operations. However, even in less risky operations potential threats are taken into consideration and there are differences in risk perceptions and adaptation to new situations. Serious difficulties or mental problems were not mentioned either: this is in accordance with the results of Kousa (2008) who claimed that serious mental problems among Finnish peacekeepers were rare.

Crisis management personnel face new situations that are perceived in different ways. New situations require capacity for adaptation, learning, and applying one's existing skills. A similar kind of situation may be perceived in various ways by different individuals. With regard to the main RQ and RQs 1 and 2, these results strengthen the view that crisis management missions are special learning environments that are likely to provide problem-solving opportunities.

8.5 Cooperation

8.5.1 Cooperation with local inhabitants

Best experiences with local inhabitants

Contacts with local inhabitants were part of the duties of the civilian crisis management personnel interviewed for this research although the types of contacts with local people varied in accordance with the interviewees' duties. One interviewee's assessment was that local people were friendly and their perceptions of expatriate employees seemed to be positive.

Cooperation with local people was part of the tasks of one interviewee as a leader of a unit, and the method of the project was to get the local people involved so that they would learn how to deal with the administrative matters. Although this kind of method was the only way to get the local people to adapt the idea of project, it initially took more time than if the interviewee had done it herself. Although the communication was challenging, finding the communication channel was the easiest part of the process. The cooperation worked best when the interviewee was able to understand the realities of the local people's lives and did not have unrealistic views about the life there: this required some experience in the region. Understanding the local way of thinking made the cooperation easier.

The success of cooperation could be two-fold. Locally it was culturally acceptable to answer "yes", even if this was not an honest answer; this made interaction somewhat problematic. Because of the differences in communication styles it may be difficult to find problems "under the surface." It is a matter of finding out when a positive answer really is a positive answer.

Most of the interviewed peacekeepers had contacts with locals. However, some of the interviewed peacekeepers worked in duties that required little or no personal communication with local inhabitants. Generally, the communication and cooperation with local inhabitants went well. Local people's perceptions of KFOR were mostly positive and friendly. It was easiest to discuss the projects that had proceeded well. As one interviewee said, pretty much everything went well at the level of conversation. Reconstruction projects largely proceeded smoothly, although some practical problems did occur.

One reservist who had a lot of contacts with local civilians mentioned that work with local inhabitants had gone well because the local people had considered KFOR to be a cooperation partner. According to this reservist, communication and the support functions of KFOR had been the most successful parts of the cooperation with local people. Local employees of KFOR were seen as important contacts for peacekeepers and the local employees played a crucial role in the field work as interpreters. One female peacekeeper who had worked with local employees of KFOR mentioned that cooperation with them had been successful. Village leaders were often important contacts. Trust-building was the most successful part of the work of the peacekeepers.⁵¹ Good experiences that led to trust between the local inhabitants and the expatriate personnel were often considered to be a positive part of the work with local people. However, not all the peacekeepers do had contacts with the local inhabitants.

Difficulties with local inhabitants

As a superior to local employees one civilian crisis management employee had found it difficult to communicate about contradictory opinions. This leads the phenomenon already mentioned in the section on best experiences with local inhabitants. Positive expressions of local people may hide negative thoughts which are not openly expressed because of cultural codes of convenience that expatriate personnel may find difficult to interpret.

⁵¹ Interviewee: "Our work was to gain the trust on behalf of the local people – it has worked well. It has been easiest to get personal contacts which has been our main duty. Personally, like my colleagues have said, I've found that it has been easy to get contacts [among the local people]." (Interview 31.)

Despite succeeding in communication, one interview in a leading position found it challenging to communicate in the correct manner with some local employees. It was challenging to achieve the right balance. In such a balance local employees in the project carried the responsibilities required for the task, which gave them some power as well. In one project, the only problems emerged in contacts with governmental authorities. Corruption was seen as a significant problem among local authorities. The work of the international community should have led to wider learning processes on behalf of the local population. Although collaboration was almost always harmonious, difficulties did emerge, and were probably related to confusions about various roles and functions of different actors in Kosovo ⁵².

Not all of the civilians had positive perceptions of KFOR which had a negative impact on the cooperation. This was especially the case among the Serbs whose attitudes towards the Ahtisaari plan were negative: however, ethnic background could not be seen as a hindrance for cooperation. Local inhabitants sometimes wanted KFOR peacekeepers to act as judges in local disputes between ethnic groups. Clearly, such work would not have been part of the peacekeepers mandate, so they had to refuse such requests. However, it is understandable that the functions of various organizations or agencies were not clear from the local people's perspectives.

Problems that were often brought forward by peacekeepers were inter-ethnic in nature, although these problems could not usually be assessed as serious. However, the role of ethnicity had not disappeared. One interviewee felt that it was easier for the Albanians to talk about their past experiences to peacekeepers than it was for Serbs. Local people expressed dissatisfaction about the distribution of the aid in their region. The independence process of Kosovo influenced some local people among the Serbs in such ways that they doubted the impartiality of KFOR at that time, although the problems did not become more difficult.

It was difficult to communicate regarding the processes that had not proceeded in an appropriate manner because the local people did not talk about the exact situation instead discussing issues related to the matter. A problem that emerged in reconstruction was that KFOR could not fully trust in the promises of their local counterparts in work processes. The inefficiency of local actors was found to be problematic in cooperation. Cultural differences regarding work efficiency were evident and it was necessary to supervise the reconstruction processes carefully.

According to one interviewee, the reputation of Finnish KFOR troops was good in Kosovo. Although Finnish perceptions of this issue may not be objective, it is a positive sign that Finnish peacekeepers feel that they are assessed in a positive way by the local inhabitants. Practical problems could emerge too. Sometimes the troops had communication problems if interpreters were not present, and all parties had to communicate in languages other than their mother tongues; cultural differences could further complicate interaction. Good communication would facilitate cooperation and the lack of it could hamper collaboration. ⁵³

⁵² Interviewee: "So, I found that because there were EU-funded projects and American projects, partially one on the other, there were too many cooks over there." (Interview 28.)

⁵³ Interviewee: "And the cultural differences are, perhaps, so large, that the way to act is so different so that sometimes.."
Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "It caused problems."

Interviewer: "Or it was difficult to interpret what the other person meant, or?"

Gender and cooperation with local inhabitants

The interviews sought assessments of gender issues related to cooperation with local inhabitants with a few questions focusing both on the interviewees' personal experiences from the impact of their own gender on their work and, more generally, their assessment of the meaning of gender in crisis management duties. Male interviewees had a more positive picture of the influence that their female counterparts had on their duties. A positive interpretation was generally due to the fact that their cooperation partners were mostly men. Women's experiences were more divided with regard to their gender's influence on their duties. Being a woman could have a positive, negative or even neutral influence, and one interviewee described both negative and positive aspects. The negative experiences were expressed by civilian crisis management employees. In military crisis management, the male reservists assessed the significance of their gender in more positive terms than professional officers who assessed the significance of their gender more typically as neutral with regard to their duties. Several factors could cause these differences: differences among individuals and duties, as well as an outcome of the phenomenon that local people would treat expatriate men and women differently.

Among civilian crisis management personnel who were the superiors of local employees, one female employee had had problems with local male employees who had difficulties to accept a female superior. The same individual had perceived attitudes among local women that favor male opinions over female ones. On the other hand, being a woman could be seen as an advantage in civilian crisis management. According to one interviewee, a female negotiator was more easily remembered on international occasions, and being a middle-aged woman was a respectable status in the eyes of local people. In general, being a female employee in civilian crisis management could be an advantage because of the perception that women might work in a "softer" manner. Two female civilian crisis management interviewees assessed that gender was not meaningful in the management of their duties; it was neither an advantage nor a disadvantage. Another female civilian crisis management employee felt that being a female employee had both positive and negative impacts, although she assessed the negative ones as being more significant. When thinking about the gender in civilian crisis management, one male employee in civilian crisis management considered that being a male in his duties was not problematic.

Three female peacekeepers felt that their gender had a neutral impact and two female peacekeepers found the influence to be positive. One female peacekeeper in duties requiring special expertise had not found any problems in contacts with local people. Another female peacekeeper thought that female peacekeepers' work and presence could support local women. A female peacekeeper was of the opinion that being a female in peacekeeping tasks had been both an advantage and disadvantage in her duties, but that local women had expressed more trust in her than in her male colleagues. However, some local men had refused to talk to her, instead talking to her male colleagues. This interviewee assumed that women in the field work were more trustworthy. In a family, a man might refuse to talk about his problems to anyone but a woman could talk about them to a woman. For

Interviewee: "And then that if a Finn does something in this way then the other one does not understand why he does it so."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "And such, such small things grew larger and larger." (Interview 36.)

children, interaction with female peacekeepers seemed to be easier than with male ones. Overall, this interviewee found the influence of being a woman to be positive.

Recruiting women to work for international projects or agencies could serve as a positive role model for local women, as one female interviewee said. The recruitment of female personnel for international civilian crisis management tasks may also be problematic, and structural issues hindering women from working in civilian crisis management should be eliminated. Unfortunately, the UN had failed to recruit women for various tasks in Kosovo, and one interviewee even doubted whether the UN had worked hard to recruit women. On the other hand, gender segregation at work can influence the local recruitment situation: it may be difficult to recruit male employees to some duties because of the lack of male candidates.

A reservist mentioned that 90–95 percent of the local people he collaborated with were men, which meant that cooperation was easy for him as a man. Another peacekeeper, a professional officer working in another unit, assessed that 90 percent of the local contacts took place with males. One male peacekeeper felt that the local male-dominant cultural reality made it easier to be a male peacekeeper. Because the local Muslim tradition in Kosovo does not rely on extremism, the gender of the employees was not considered as a major issue in Kosovo. One professional officer felt that gender was not relevant in his duties in relation to the communication with local people. Most professional officers felt that gender was not an irrelevant factor in their duties. When having a conversation with village leaders who were men it was perceived that the interaction was easier for male peacekeepers. When asked about the meaning of the information from local women, one male reservist considered this question to be significant because local women within a family most often kept “invisible”. Women’s invisibility in contacts with local and more traditional communities was a theme that was repeated in the interviews.

Although there were female peacekeepers among the Finnish troops, four interviewees said that they had no female colleague working in the same unit. One male reservist assumed that being a female peacekeeper would probably not make a difference in communication with local women – but that it would be difficult for him to assess this question. One peacekeeper assumed that it would be difficult for him to assess whether the local communities would accept female peacekeepers in communicative tasks with local people. He mentioned one situation in which his unit could not communicate with a local family because the male members of the family were not present. The meaning of gender varied because gender was significant in communication with more traditional societies but not in cooperation with higher levels of administration.

One professional officer assumed that, although it was easier for male soldiers to collaborate with their local counterparts, cooperation with local women would be easier for female peacekeepers. Interaction with women in a traditional society would require the presence of women peacekeepers, and Swedish troops had female peacekeepers in duties requiring communication with local women. Female peacekeepers’ communication with local women would also have required the presence of female interpreters.

One male peacekeeper felt that male peacekeepers would provide a stronger feeling of security for local people than female ones. Although his perception was positive about

working as a male peacekeeper, the significance of female peacekeepers' contribution would be acknowledged as well so that it would be functional to have female peacekeepers involved. One male peacekeeper said that female employees' contribution would be more meaningful in civilian tasks in Kosovo – in comparison to the tasks of KFOR. As a conclusion, the relevance of gender was seen in a limited number of duties or situations in military crisis management in Kosovo. Having both female and male peacekeepers would be good when creating contacts. Because contacts with civilians are more essential in civilian crisis management, the role of gender may be more important in that field.

8.5.2 Cooperation between civilian and military actors in crisis management

Experiences from the cooperation on the civilian side

All of the interviewees reported cooperation between various civilian agencies or NGOs was reported. Cooperation between civilian actors usually functioned well. Good cooperation was an advantage for all the civilian actors and cooperation in successful projects was rewarding. In the cooperation between different civilian actors and agencies, there was a need for information sharing and exchange. Because various civilian agencies have worked in Kosovo, information sharing and coordination should be a natural part of the cooperation among various actors.

Rivalry among civilian organizations may be a problem for the cooperation of civilian actors in crisis management and state-building and coordination in the work of various actors is difficult. The lack of coordination even gave one civilian crisis management employee the impression that it was necessary to arrange meetings to distribute information about a wide range of projects going on and to avoid duplicate work in the same task. Changes in the arrangements and duties of various civilian agencies did not occur easily. The change of leadership from the UN to the EU was considered to be a difficult process, as three interviewees assessed

Reasonable coordination seems to be an essential factor in the collaboration of civilian actors. Organizational rivalry may be minimized if the projects and their collaboration are well coordinated. The organizational structures and duties of various actors should be clear. Although this idea is well established in principle, practical collaboration and coordination should be developed. When analyzing experiences from civilian crisis management, information about the personnel's experiences should be gathered in order to get practical guidelines to develop collaboration. However, organizational rivalry is a difficult issue that cannot be answered only by education and organizational learning. Clear common goals of the collaboration should facilitate and hopefully even prevent rivalry.

Experiences from the cooperation on the military side

There are differences in military cultures and working manners between different countries. However, one interviewee especially paid attention to the idea that cultural differences did not cause harm to the cooperation. Cultural differences affected how individuals

communicated but not the outcome. There were cultural differences in daily routines and their timing. National interests could be a burden in the cooperation of KFOR.

The working language of KFOR is English and there is variation in terms of how well peacekeepers are able to communicate in that language. Several peacekeepers said that the lack of appropriate English language skills among military crisis management personnel was a substantial problem. On some occasions, the lack of sufficient language skills was found to be only a minor problem. Insufficient language skills could cause problems in reports and documents, even those written by a native English speaker. The peaceful situation in Kosovo meant that the lack of the language skills did not cause problems. If the situation had been riskier, the probability of significant misunderstandings could have been higher.

Twelve peacekeepers (eight reservists and four professional officers) mentioned insufficient English language skills among other countries' troops in KFOR. This suggests that the problem probably caused some kinds of problems for the operation. More specifically, the lack of language skills was linked to colleagues from countries other than Finland and no one was really concerned about the English language skills of Finnish peacekeepers. The lack of language skill seemed to be a larger problem, at the lower operational level of the military hierarchy, but occasionally professional officers faced problems when their higher-ranking colleagues did not have sufficient language skills for their duties. One interviewee said that language problems and different organizational backgrounds had made the organizational practices less efficient because some misunderstandings had taken place and the national decision-making could be time-consuming in some cases which influenced the outcome.

Compared to the practices of many other countries, the Finnish rotation system in which about half the troops are changed in every six months was considered positively. KFOR's military duties in Kosovo require various abilities and skills. Not all of the NATO-standards were fulfilled by all the countries in KFOR. Although there are standards regarding how NATO-documents should be written not all the countries were able to meet the standards although despite being members of NATO.

Within Finnish troops some problems were found between reservists and professional soldiers. One reservist mentioned that although some reservists were more competent at certain tasks, military protocol dictated that the professional soldiers should make decisions in these tasks. The peacekeeping work community is different because it is not possible to avoid meeting more unpleasant colleagues in one's free time unlike in normal work communities. In pressure situations, these phenomena may be harmful to the work communities of the peacekeepers.

If a person is unwilling to work, it can be very difficult to get him or her away from his or her duties. Such cases were exceptional, however, and the peacekeepers mostly worked well. One interviewee mentioned that some individual colleagues who were unwilling to work sufficiently caused problems. However, these cases were mostly related to problems that could exist in any work community.

By international standards, the professional skills of the military personnel were not always at the level required for the specific tasks: this caused some problems, especially in leadership

duties. If an individual had insufficient skills, the individual's hardworking nature could compensate. On the other hand, if an officer was not at the professional level required for certain tasks, it was often difficult to arrange the organizational settings because of the sensitive nature of the problem.

Because communication is crucial in crisis management, personnel's sufficient level of the English language skills should be ensured in every operation. Although employees' language skills should have been assessed, several of the not all the peacekeepers had appropriate language skills. Insufficient language skills may be a difficult issue to overcome because all the countries should recruit personnel that have sufficient skills in the area. However, at least in riskier operations, poor language skills can lead to misunderstandings, which could potentially endanger some functions. Therefore, this type of problems should be handled in a manner that lead to sufficient competence in the communication language of the operation.

Cooperation between civilian and military actors

For some actors in civilian crisis management, it was necessary to cooperate with military crisis management actors. Half of the interviewees representing civilian crisis management personnel had regular contacts with KFOR. Half of the civilian crisis management interviewees did not collaborate with KFOR at work. When the state-building process proceeds, the role of KFOR will probably diminish in Kosovo, which means that the links between many civilian and military actors are not necessary. No special problems were found although there were differences in military cultures of various countries. One interviewee who had cooperated with KFOR in reconstruction said that all had functioned well. One interviewee mentioned that KFOR had difficulty adapting to the changing circumstances and the change towards the growing role of the civilian actors was somehow problematic partly because of the differences of organizational cultures – although no single soldier had caused problems as an individual⁵⁴. Finnish troops seemed to work well together and have plenty of practical projects going on. Because the troops were organized nationally, they often had national agendas. This was a negative phenomenon that affected the cooperation and out-come.

Most peacekeepers had some form of cooperation with civilian crisis management actors in Kosovo. Five peacekeepers including one professional officer did not collaborate with international civilian organizations or NGOs in their duties. Mostly UNMIK and OSCE were the collaboration partners. The EU and UNHCR or the UN in general were also mentioned as cooperation partners. The peacekeepers worked in various duties and the positive and negative sides of the cooperation varied as well. The overall-outcome of the cooperation was mostly positive. The cooperation regarding functions linked to KFOR and civilian crisis management generally proceeded well. The nature of cooperation was interactive. Information sharing and exchange were the most important parts of the cooperation between the civilian agencies and military actors. Practical information sharing was reported as having functioned well. With regard to the close duties of KFOR and civilian agencies, information was required in order to guarantee that the actors would know what they needed to do and

⁵⁴ Interviewee: "Because it is such a typical situation that first they go in tanks and..."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "then there will be an institution on its own and then the civilians come a bit later, and it becomes problematic to find *the models for collaboration*." (Interview 20.)

who had responsibility for the duties that could be considered as belonging to several actors. When meetings take place only rarely, it is difficult to get more profound information. The information meetings between KFOR and civilian agencies seemed to be more utilizable for the civilian agencies. Some cooperation related to the joint aid efforts of civilian agencies and KFOR. One interviewee mentioned that collaborative training for UNMIK and KFOR had succeeded well. KFOR and civilian actors arranged joint projects. Because the UNMIK was a fragmented agency, it was more difficult to collaborate with it. One professional officer felt that some problems had been found when the “border-line” between UNMIK and KFOR functions was negotiated in common meetings and some “jealousy” was expressed by UNMIK. The bureaucratic features of UNMIK caused some problems for the cooperation. There had been variation in terms of how well the cooperation between civilian agencies and military actors had functioned.

Insufficient language skills among the civilian crisis management personnel were also a problem for the cooperation, according to one interviewee. The lack of English language skills is not only a problem among peacekeepers, although it was mentioned more often regarding military cooperation and it probably caused more harm there. The language question was probably more problematic on the military than on the civilian side. There were problems related to different working cultures. Someone who was accustomed to exact timing of negotiations might find it difficult to understand that some other participants from differing background had other perceptions of how exactly the meetings should start. Cultural differences could also influence how the personnel perceived local problems, such as violence against women. Changes of the personnel in different organizations could cause problems for cooperation.

Reconstruction and security: potential contradictions for KFOR

Norgaard (2004) has pointed out that current challenges for peacekeepers are: (a) creating security and stability in the mission area and (b) reconstructing the civil and political infrastructure. Therefore it is important to understand whether carrying out these two kinds of activities might be contradictory from peacekeepers’ perspectives. The interviewees who had served as peacekeepers were asked a question related to the possible contradiction of ensuring security and reconstruction. According to the interviews, there were no major contradictions between security and reconstruction goals in the activities of KFOR reported by the interviewed peacekeepers. A clear majority of peacekeepers did not see contradictions between their reconstruction and security-oriented tasks in Kosovo. From a human security perspective, this result is interesting. For local people, the presence of the peacekeepers is mostly a positive phenomenon in Kosovo – at least according to the perception of the interviewed Finnish peacekeepers.

KFOR functions in accordance with its mandate. According to one interviewee, the option to use force was one tool for security, just as reconstruction was another. The local population may find it difficult to understand why KFOR supports reconstruction in one area, but not in another. Both major ethnic groups expressed that they were dissatisfied about the reconstruction resources allocated by KFOR and felt that the distribution was not impartial: there was some dissatisfaction about who received aid and who did not. As a potential contradiction, one interviewee described a situation in which local Serbs were

interviewed for security reasons, but the local Albanians were not interviewed, which led the local Albanians to perceive this activity of KFOR as a partial one.

Insufficient planning may cause problems for reconstruction. Unfortunately the projects did not always lead to well-functioning results; for example one construction project was not utilized but this was not regarded as a real contradiction between security and reconstruction goals. One interviewee mentioned that some contradictions between security and reconstruction goals occurred due to the lack of respect, although this did not cause risks for KFOR. Reconstruction and other non-military activities had raised reflections about the relevance of various duties of KFOR. Peacekeepers may think about the priorities of the mission.

8.5.3 Findings from the cooperation activities

The frequency of contacts with local population varies in accordance with personnel's duties. In civilian crisis management, it is clearly necessary to interact with local people regularly, although the communication may be targeted to a limited number of people. In military crisis management, there are tasks in which peacekeepers do not necessarily have any contact with the inhabitants. Three peacekeepers did not have work contacts with local inhabitants. A peacekeeper's duties may change during the service. Consequently, it would be unwise not to take into account an individual peacekeeper's chances of having contacts to local people in the preceding education and training, although it would not be necessary to have direct contacts with local inhabitants according to the plans. Cultural awareness and practical communication skills are valuable in interaction with local inhabitants in a conflict-affected area. Misunderstandings may emerge and the expatriate employees on both civilian and military side of crisis management should be able to deal with them. The personnel need to understand if a misunderstanding has taken place.

Gender issues in the field work may be difficult to assess. One of the roles of female expatriates personnel may be to facilitate interaction with local women, especially in traditional societies. Because these issues are not necessarily evaluated in various contacts with local inhabitants, it may be difficult for the personnel to estimate the significance of gender in the contact they do have with them. For crisis management personnel, questions related to gender and cultural sensitivity may be complicated. On the other hand, local or regional traditions should be respected, while the international community should work for progress and to improve the position of local women. Reacting to a single situation may be a dilemma for personnel because cultural differences and all individuals' rights to progress in peace-building should both be respected. From the perspective of human security, this should mean both the protection of people and their empowerment in reconstruction and peace-building (Palm 2008, 37).

Understanding gender dimensions in conflicts is significant for those working in operations (From-Emmesberger 2008, 54). The gender issues may be interpreted in diverse ways by local inhabitants as well as by expatriate crisis management personnel. Because there are various interpretations of a single situation, it is necessary that personnel's background

information on gender issues in a particular conflict is sufficient. Awareness and knowledge about gender issues in various cultural contexts is very important in crisis management.

Among the personnel, there were numerous interpretations of the meaning of the gender in crisis management. However, gender awareness would facilitate resolving problems and enhance local involvement in peace-building. Information about the experiences of crisis management personnel regarding gender issues makes it possible to understand how to strengthen women's opportunities to participate in peace-building at various levels of peace processes.

Because the interpretations of the meaning of gender vary among the personnel, it is easier to understand how the meanings of the same issue vary among local inhabitants in crisis areas. Different interpretations may make the implementation of resolution 1325 more difficult as would be the situation if the interpretations were more unified. Without understanding the variety of interpretations, the implementation may be even more demanding. Regarding RQ 3 on crisis management practices, organizations and education, it is obvious that cultural and communicative education is of importance for the crisis management personnel.

Most of the interviewees considered the cooperation between and within various organizations to have been successful. However, some dissatisfaction in internal and inter-organizational cooperation was found as well. In this research, it is impossible to obtain information about the background of the dissatisfaction in relation to the other actors mentioned by the interviewees or their interpretations of the same processes with the ones of the interviewees. Therefore, the analysis relies on the narratives of the interviewees. Information sharing and exchange were often mentioned as major parts of cooperation of different actors.

Insufficient English language skills were a broad problem that complicated all inter-organizational cooperation and even collaboration within and between the military and civilian organizations and agencies. This problem was identified in both civilian and military organizations and by both civilian and military employees. However, the problem was more acute among peacekeepers according to the interviews. If the situation in Kosovo had been riskier, the lack of English language skills among the soldiers might have caused more problems for KFOR. In riskier operations, poor language skills in the communication language of the operation may lead to serious problems and endanger some functions: therefore, it would be necessary for personnel to have sufficient language skills for their duties. English language skills were necessary and they are part of contact and communication skills in crisis management.

All of the civilian crisis management employees reported having worked in collaboration with representatives of other civilian agencies, and half had had regular cooperation with KFOR. Therefore the role of communication skills is extremely important in civilian crisis management. The need to communicate among peacekeepers varied more widely. Although they all had to be able to communicate in English in their KFOR duties, it was not always necessary to be able to communicate with representatives of agencies other than KFOR.

It is essential to develop proper communication in order to carry out both civilian and military crisis management functions, and any major lack of language skills among the personnel may lead to misunderstandings that impede the progress of the operation. Crisis management organizations on both the civilian and military sides should more seriously consider the extent to which cultural differences, even within organizations, affect their functions and efficiency.

In crisis management environments with higher security risks, the questions regarding fluent English language skills are more fundamental than in Kosovo where the security situation has recently been relatively stable. Howard's (2008) typology of first- and second-level learning could be utilized when analyzing these results. The findings of organizational rivalry and the lack of English language skills should be taken into account when developing crisis management organizations, arrangements and courses for crisis management personnel.

Organizational rivalry decreases, if the division of tasks between various organizations and agencies is clear. The ability to connect various duties with the broader objectives of a mission might also reduce organizational rivalry, if the result is broader comprehension of the need for various activities and the respect for them. The staff's overall comprehension of complex missions should be taken into account when developing training and education of the personnel. Decreasing prejudice between representatives of various organizations could also help reduce organizational rivalry. A common identity consisting of a common social category for different crisis management actors might decrease prejudice and facilitate inter-organizational cooperation.

The peacekeepers felt that security and reconstruction tasks coexisted positively. The recent developments in Kosovo had been quite peaceful, which probably made it easier for the interviewees to assess security and reconstruction as complementary phenomena. In a more hostile environment, the complementary roles of these phenomena might not have been as likely to exist. This question should be evaluated in a broader manner because the various tasks of the military crisis management troops may be confusing to the local inhabitants. For example, the roles of the military and the humanitarian agencies should not be confused.

The ability to communicate about these issues with local inhabitants and with representatives of different organizations is clearly necessary. Communication and contact skills are relevant in all dimensions of interaction, both between various organizations as well as with local people. In complicated missions, understanding of the mission's common goals is important. This comprehension may make collaboration easier if it is linked to the understanding of the roles of the various actors.

Regarding RQ3 on crisis management practices, organizations, and education, the results of this part of the interviews do not reveal any particular problems in the cooperation of various agencies, although some dissatisfaction was found in terms of the cooperation between and within different organizations. However, the reported lack of English language skills of many employees representing other countries may be a severe problem in practice.

8.6 Education and training for crisis management duties

After gaining some field experience, the personnel may be better able to assess the education and training arranged before the mission. The interviewees had numerous ideas about how to develop the education and training. The results are reported consistently with the professional groups of the interviewees. There was a clear difference between the civilian and military crisis management interviewees in regard to participation in pre-education and training. All of the personnel serving in military crisis management attended at least one training or orientation course before travelling to their duties in Kosovo. However, a majority of the civilian crisis management interviewees (five interviewees) had not attended any mission-specific course in regard to Kosovo although one of them had attended education prior to the previous mission.

The interviewees were asked about the education and training connected with their duties in Kosovo. Training during the mission was not included in the number of courses asked here. The interviewees described their experiences from the courses and evaluated the meaning of the courses, but these evaluations were not meant to be feedback related to particular courses. In this context, training means both practical training of the specific skills needed in the duties in Kosovo as well as more educational parts of the training courses. This section reports the results in professional groups. Most of the training courses for the military personnel were arranged by the Finnish National Defence Forces. Civilian crisis management personnel had mostly attended the courses arranged by the agency in which they began to work. Many of these employees started to work in Kosovo before CMC Finland had started its civilian crisis management courses.

Most of the military personnel had attended courses arranged for peacekeepers starting work in Kosovo.

Those courses are usually named in Finnish “rotation training” (*rotaatiokoulutus* in Finnish). Most peacekeepers who had attended these courses were satisfied with them, although some had ideas to develop course practices. The reservists mostly attended the rotation education courses and some professional officers had experience from a wider range of courses before starting the duties in Kosovo.

The ideas of life-long learning and personal studies during and before the missions were mentioned by some of the interviewees. All the interviewees, not only those who had experience with training courses, were asked about development ideas for future education and training both before and during crisis management operations, although the exact questions varied slightly depending on the issues that the interviewees recalled or emphasized.

Civilian crisis management personnel

Two civilian crisis management interviewees had attended one course and one interviewee had attended two courses before the duties in Kosovo. As mentioned above, most of the civilian crisis management interviewees had not attended any courses prior to starting work in Kosovo. The numbers did not include courses prior to some other peace-building or

similar kinds of missions abroad. One interviewee who worked for a large international organization was satisfied with a course arranged prior to travelling to Kosovo. Another interviewee had participated in a course arranged by the CMC Finland and found it utilizable at work in Kosovo. An interviewee considered that it would be important to clearly inform the course participants about the objectives of the mission.

Life-long learning or mission-specific learning opportunities were not handled in the courses. A mission abroad could be regarded as challenge that required a lot of studying prior to traveling to start the work, although another kind of learning began after the duties had started with many new contacts⁵⁵. One interviewee who had not had any opportunity to participate in a training course before the mission mentioned that it would be crucial to at least arrange orientation courses that would inform new personnel about the culture, history, and current situation of the region. Another interviewee also emphasized learning about these subjects. One interviewee felt that the education and training for civilian crisis management duties should be based on the current situation data because the situations in crisis or post-conflict areas may evolve rapidly.

Mission-related objectives should be emphasized during the courses. This finding is consistent with Adler and Britt's (2003) idea that peacekeepers should understand the meaning of the mission. Training courses should be constructed in a standardized manner for employees from different countries. All the EU member countries should arrange courses for civilian crisis management employees or representatives of these countries should have opportunities to participate in international courses organized by some other EU member country and mission-related courses could be at least partly arranged in the places covered by the mission. One interviewee suggested that courses prior to the missions could function as a forum to select the participants. Because course arrangements are expensive, this kind of selection cannot be directly applied but the idea of checking personnel's appropriateness for the duties may be possible in some phase of pre-education.

During missions, civilian crisis management employees may need opportunities to meetings in to gain further education or training related to the current situation of the region: however, it may be difficult for people to find time for this kind of training.

Professional officers

Two of the professional officers had attended one course prior to starting to work in Kosovo and two had attended two courses before starting to work in Kosovo, one had attended three courses and three officers had participated in four training courses. These numbers do not include training courses before some other missions.

The officers were generally satisfied with all the courses. Generally, there did not seem to be any dissatisfaction of having attended too many courses. Instead, some more education and training would have been useful. One interviewee had learned about his future duties in Kosovo only few months before they started. This meant he was not able to attend all the

⁵⁵ "So that every time you go to a new country, you need to create, of course, to read through the history of that country, read the statistics describing the country, understand what the local administration has been like, understand where we come from and who are the actors and how the map functions. *And most study to get through is to know those 100 people in your sector who you should get to know and have contacts with so that you can talk like this...*" (Interview 3.)

appropriate courses that would have supported his work. For example, a course arranged within Nordic cooperation arrangements would have been useful. Changes in the recruitment of personnel can have negative consequences that affect individual opportunities to attend various courses which would be necessary for the crisis management duties.

Some professional officers had not attended courses appropriate to their staff tasks. For the demanding and most internationally oriented staff tasks, it would be relevant to arrange enough courses that would be suitable for the particular tasks. In general, rotation courses were found to be good. Practical questions were well handled during the rotation course. Because of the more detailed military education, rotation courses were not so utilizable for professional officers especially if they do not serve in the national troops. On the other hand, the rotation course arrangements created community and team spirit. The life-long learning or other mission-specific learning opportunities were generally not emphasized during the courses. The use of manuals and informative material related to them was handled in the training.

Three interviewees mentioned that they had found to working and collaborating with their immediate predecessors for a week in Kosovo to be extremely fruitful. This kind of arrangement was practical for gaining in-depth knowledge of the new duties. An interviewee who had had guidance some time before the duties began, found this arrangement to be helpful for learning. Two interviewees mentioned that prior to starting their duties, that they had studied issues related to the history and culture of Kosovo on their own. This kind of study should be facilitated in the education and training of crisis management personnel.

One interviewee said that he had prepared material for his successor but that he did not know anyone else who would have done the same. This kind of social innovation appears to be a good idea. Because this innovation was meant for enable learning, because there was general satisfaction with guidance and dissatisfaction with insufficient guidance, the idea of informal learning in crisis management duties gains support.

Given that professional officers have expressed that work in an international mission is a learning opportunity while they are busy during the mission, some structures to promote their learning opportunities could be developed. National and international training of KFOR sometimes occurred simultaneously which limited participation in either kind of training. One interviewee mentioned that he had sent informative material in an electronic form to his successor well before the new recruit was to arrive in Kosovo. Specified courses should be arranged for the troops serving in special duties that require particular professional skills. However, one officer admitted that it would be difficult to arrange diversified courses for all the tasks because the background skills vary.

Culturally and historically specific aspects cannot be exaggerated in the education and training of the peacekeepers. More material (such as books, DVDs, web-sites) on cultural issues could be produced and some web-sites and the like could be recommended to the personnel starting to work in crisis management. Guidance practices of the peacekeepers should be developed further and management of exceptional or emergency situations could be the subject of further trained both before and during the missions. Guidance is needed some time before the work in a mission starts because such an arrangement facilitates individual reflection and learning.

Reservists

There were six reservists who had attended one training course before the KFOR mission and four reservists had attended two such courses. Training courses before some other peacekeeping missions abroad were not included in these numbers. Most of the peacekeepers were satisfied with the training prior to the mission and during it, if applicable. However, there were some parts of the training which could be developed further. One interviewee had had an obligation to cut short the rotation course before it ended due to the change of forthcoming duties in Kosovo and had found this situation unsatisfactory.

During the rotation education, it was necessary to collaborate with future colleagues, which was good for the management of future duties. Peacekeepers said that education provided practical information that was useful for their duties. In a “task-related training course” it was obligatory to work in English, which was good practice for the duties that required communication in English. The presentation about Islam during the task-related course was overly focused on extremism or other forms of Islam that do not exist in Kosovo, which meant it was inadequate for the on-going situation there.

The basic tasks and skills required of a peacekeeper soldier were handled well during the rotation course. In the rotation course, the training of handling weapons was clear and easy to keep in mind. The rotation education contained good practical training for soldiers’ duties but could have included more specialization for the exact duties in Kosovo.

According to one interviewee, the rotation training course did not include a presentation describing the war in Kosovo in 1999, although this would have been very helpful for understanding the on-going situation in the region. There was an expressed desire for more culturally-based information. Some criticism was expressed: stereotypical views related to Kosovar inhabitants were presented in culturally-oriented education and issues related to the work in a foreign culture and different culture should have been handled, taking into account individual perceptions and feelings related to these kinds of phenomena.

Some parts of the courses were too tense, which meant it was difficult to really learn all the details of the presentations. Course feedback regarding these kinds of problems could help the development of courses that are as clear as possible from participants’ points of view. According to one interviewee, it was possible to understand certain realities only after having come to work in Kosovo. It was possible to attend various courses or activities in Kosovo although the lack of time sometimes hindered participation. For example, local languages could be studied in Kosovo. A wide range of courses were arranged including languages, first-aid courses and courses encouraging personnel to work as support persons. Some of the lessons arranged in Kosovo overlapped with the rotation education course.

The life-long learning or mission-specific learning opportunities were mostly not emphasized during the courses. Insufficient guidance when starting work was considered problematic. On the other hand, good guidance was found to be a key function for learning new professional tasks. During the training courses, more information about the cultural realities of contemporary Kosovo would have been beneficial for peacekeepers. Training for emergency situations before and during the mission could have been more in-depth.

Because reservists may have learned professional skills that would give them an advantage in peacekeeping duties, it would be useful to identify these skills during the training courses. Exchange of the duties could be practical, especially for the personnel who were not serving in operative tasks, in order to understand the overall operation.

The rotation course could have been longer in duration, although this is also a matter of resources. Apart from developing courses before the missions, training and life-long learning opportunities during the missions could be developed as well. Occasions or meetings encouraging self-reflection of the personnel should be arranged in order to strengthen the mental health of peacekeepers and facilitate learning processes. Although there are plenty of training and educational activities for Finns working in KFOR, a more systematic and supportive approach to the personnel's learning potential could provide an advantage from a pedagogic point of view.

Findings from crisis management education and training

In this sample, only a minority of the civilian crisis management personnel had attended any of the training courses prior to their missions. From an educational perspective, the fact that over half of the personnel had not received any training immediately before the mission could have been problematic. On average, professional officers had participated in the largest number of courses, and the reservist peacekeepers had taken at least one training course before starting work.

One of the positive aspects was the learning opportunities arranged by KFOR or the Finnish troops in Kosovo. These activities could even help prevent boredom during the mission. According to the interviewees a lack of time limited the actual opportunities for studying rather than a lack of courses or other activities. However, a more systematic approach to facilitate learning processes during the duties in crisis management could help life-long learning come true in crisis management missions. Individual learning in crisis management work is part of an individual's life span.

In education and training courses before the missions, guidance for studies on one's own during the mission had not taken place. Independent learning practices during the missions were not prompted. Consequently, promotion of informal learning was not enhanced in the education and training of crisis management personnel.

Particularly with regard to interactive and communication skills in a multi-cultural environment, new educational methods could be applied. In the context of deep leadership and interaction, coaching is evolving as a method to enhance an individual's interactive skills (Nissinen et al. 2008). This kind of idea could also be applied to crisis management circumstances. Some kind of coaching or counseling during the missions could take place. If the need to advance the interactive and communication skills of crisis management personnel is acknowledged, it will be important to enhance appropriate educational and training methods before and during the missions to develop these kinds of skills. Some of the education could consist of counseling or coaching at work.

However, some of the interviewees spoke of their own studies related to the mission in Kosovo. Without any special prompting to study on their own, they had studied various issues that would enhance their understanding of the reality of Kosovo. More systematic prompting for this type of activity might also facilitate understanding the complexity of learning because, at least in its informal forms, learning is not measurable. Self-educational potential has been described as one's ability to reflect critically, learn, study, and influence (Hämäläinen and Nivala 2008, 205). Advancing self-educational potential of crisis management personnel could be one objective of their education and training.

Up to 80 percent of the activities in the National Defence Forces, are based on common knowledge and tacit knowledge. However, the educational practices of the NDF have been based on immediate teaching. (Halonen 2008, 102–103.) This is not optimal to the learning of tacit knowledge and probably the situation regarding crisis management is probably similar. Therefore, educational arrangements that strengthen life-long learning opportunities in crisis management are needed.

For professional officers, the situations in which they have to start to work in demanding duties without the opportunity to attend adequate courses may cause stress and frustration. Especially in demanding duties, the opportunities to study prior to the mission are important for the management of the duties. Those professional officers who have had thorough course and guidance arrangements were satisfied, while those without such opportunities appeared dissatisfied. The same kind of tendency was seen among the reservists working in special tasks that required guidance.

Regarding RQ3 on crisis management practices, organizations, and education, it is clear that cultural issues should be handled more profoundly during the courses, as should issues related to the adaptation in new cultural environment. Because of the relevance of cultural awareness in crisis management, the pedagogic challenge of teaching cultural differences and background of a conflict should be taken seriously. In relation to RQ1 on the learning challenges that new conflicts pose to crisis management personnel, the interviews revealed that individual learning processes during the missions were mostly neglected in the education and training of the personnel. The education and training are more or less based on the idea of “school-type” of learning taking place during the courses and partly at work.

The challenges mentioned by the interviewees could be taken into consideration when planning study programs of crisis management personnel. Adaptation to various changes during and after the mission may be difficult for an individual. Because only three civilian crisis management employees had attended any training courses before travelling to Kosovo, my conclusion is that at the time of their recruitment there was a lack of adequate training in civilian crisis management.

8.7 Feedback and support to the return to Finland

Because many of the interviewees had not yet returned from the mission but continued to work in their duties in Kosovo, the procedure of the interviews varied slightly because of this difference. This section covers both the interviewees' personal experiences from their return

and their ideas about how to improve return arrangements for the further development of crisis management are reported in this section. In part of the interviews, the conversation proceeded to the crisis management personnel's return and demobilization arrangements in general and/or –to the questions related to mental health and support for mental health. This part of the interviewing process became more detailed as it went on.

Feedback to personnel and ideas to develop feedback

The work certificate systems in various civilian agencies functioning in the field of civilian crisis management vary in accordance with organizational practices in these questions. Two of the civilian crisis management interviewees had some opportunity for feedback, one should have had the opportunity in principle but had not had it in practice and the rest did not report the opportunity for personal feedback. In international agencies, the recruitment often depends on factors other than an individual's personal skills. This very nature of international agencies may impede the development of efficient feedback systems. If a project is arranged by a private enterprise, there is probably no regular system for arranging feedback to the personnel. According to these results, inadequate feedback arrangements in civilian crisis management may cause problems. Inadequate or insufficient feedback may inhibit both individual and organizational learning. The large number of actors in this field may make it difficult to tackle this problem.

Although CMC Finland has taken responsibility for feedback arrangements of the Finnish crisis management personnel, national arrangements cannot completely compensate for arrangements modified to individual organizations. Therefore, at least the international organizations and enterprises working for them, as well as single states, should have opportunities to receive feedback arrangements that are somehow standardized. It may be difficult to get the enterprises involved, if they do not have a model how to develop these arrangements.

There is a need to arrange feedback in ways that enable subordinate employees to provide honest feedback to their superiors. Developing feedback systems is important because to the recruitment of personnel whose personal characteristics make them unsuitable for civilian crisis management. Language and social skills are required in civilian crisis management focusing on various cultures, especially in higher positions of an agency. In some organizational settings when the project is not arranged by a large agency it may be difficult or impossible to develop a feedback-system that ensures feedback to an employee. Therefore, national feedback arrangements can complement the institutional feedback systems. Feedback information should be reliable in order for it to be valuable: unfortunately, this is not the case if all the employees receive positive feedback regardless of the actual outcome of their work. Due to the variety of the agencies and their practices, it is impossible to make clear conclusions about their feedback systems. Some kind of standardization of the feedback would improve the position of the employees: the need to establish a standardized feedback system was more acute in civilian crisis management, according to the interviews.

Peacekeepers working for Finnish troops in KFOR can receive work certificates after their service. Most of them received evaluations from their superiors. Development discussions carried out by one interviewee were interactive in nature, which meant that the personnel

in the subordinate positions could comment on the assessment. When working in the international staff, the personnel typically received feedback from the national side and from KFOR. One interviewee had received feedback three times although no development discussions were arranged. The feedback from KFOR or NATO was assessed as being over-positive. Communication with the Finnish superior in Kosovo aided assessment of the various cultures. The Finnish feedback system was found to be more credible than the NATO-based evaluation system.

Employee feedback should be provided in a positive manner, such as prompting learning processes, but some of the interviewees felt that the feedback was given too much like a “judgment”. Swedish feedback arrangements were assessed positively because of the positive atmosphere in which the feedback was given: and even negative feedback was given in a constructive way. Compared to the national system with its annual development discussions, the similar systems in the international service duties are not as well developed, according to one professional officer. Personal goals for the work period in peacekeeping could be set and the feedback system could be linked to these goals.

In general, the reservists working in crisis management receive evaluations from their superiors. Three of the interviewees were uncertain about feedback arrangements that would take place at the end of their duties in Kosovo. Self-evaluation and evaluation by superiors were compared in a fruitful manner. According to one reservist, the Swedish feedback system was more rewarding than the Finnish. Feedback was dependent on the superior’s ability to communicate: both giving and receiving feedback. On the other hand, feedback conversations also succeeded well. A normal kind of work certificate that potentially express the positive features of the employee was preferable as a form of feedback on the military side.

Personnel’s feedback to the crisis management organizations or regarding the missions and ideas for its development

One civilian crisis management interviewee had personally been active in providing feedback to the civilian crisis management organization she had worked for. Three interviewees mentioned that they had not had a chance to provide feedback about their duties. One civilian crisis management employee mentioned that she had not been asked to write any feedback regarding the mission, although this kind of information could be useful for the development of crisis management practices, while negative feedback may reduce the opportunities to get recruited into a new mission. Nationally and at the EU level, a system to gather feedback about the crisis management would be useful because information from the personnel would help develop better crisis management practices. Mission-related feedback could help the development of international agencies. The development ideas of civilian crisis management personnel were consistent with Howard’s (2008) ideas of gathering field information in order to develop institutional practices in crisis management.

Four professional officers mentioned the opportunity to provide feedback. One interviewee was unsure how well feedback from the Finnish KFOR troops in Kosovo would be analyzed and utilized later. Riskier operations might receive more attention from the defence administration. One interviewee mentioned that he had even provided feedback regarding the

position of the peacekeepers working out of the rotation schedules. Two officers mentioned that they had written a report about their duties and this kind of reporting functioned as feedback to the Finnish National Defence Forces. This kind of reporting was voluntary and was not gathered by KFOR. The Finnish National Defence Forces have existing feedback systems and a crucial development question is how this material is analyzed and utilized in order to develop the organization and its practices.

Three reservist peacekeepers felt that they had had opportunities to provide feedback, while two other interviewees that they had not had any such opportunity. Some kind of feedback could be provided informally because the atmosphere of the unit was good. One interviewee wondered whether peacekeepers were unwilling to give feedback – especially negative feedback – to the organization because they were afraid of not having further opportunities to serve as peacekeepers. Feedback could be made in a form of a report.

Support to the return to Finland and other dimensions of mental support and ideas for their development

Several interviewees emphasized return arrangements even though it was not originally a theme of the interviews. However, given that many interviewees wanted to offer their opinions about return issues, the theme was included in most of the interviews. One civilian crisis management employee suggested that an obligatory conversation after an employee's return would be a good practice and it would facilitate adaptation to the circumstances back at home. Regarding civilian crisis management duties in Kosovo, special psychological support practices did not seem to be necessary. At least, the need for psychological support after the mission was not mentioned, although the idea of feedback conversations might be considered as a good one.

Regarding professional officers, returning home could be perceived as an easy process. A service period of half a year might make return and adaptation at home easier. On the other hand, one officer spoke of the difficulties related to his return home.⁵⁶ His difficulties were related to the contrast between unlimited, long workdays in Kosovo and everyday life with the family and limited work days, as well as the distance to his former work environment in Kosovo. In some regards, the return had not been difficult, but, an opportunity for a discussion might have been fruitful and facilitated the return.⁵⁷ In the first peacekeeping duty, some stronger emotions rose during the transition period and previous peacekeeping experiences could facilitate learning about how to handle transitions and one's emotions. Several interviews discussed feedback and debriefings arrangements. There was support for developing more advanced return arrangements in order to guarantee the peacekeepers' well-

⁵⁶ Interviewee: "So I must say that it is a real shock to return in that way. It is like talking to an empty room, you talk today like... It is like you said earlier that you still have one foot in Kosovo, so I would say... that my body is here completely but I'm obliged to think what is happening there...sometimes, not all the time. Therefore I personally believe that we ought to take some model from Sweden."

Interviewer: "Yes."

Interviewee: "They have a system in which when they return from an international operation, the operation continues one week in their homeland." (Interview 21.)

⁵⁷ Interviewee: "Although I do not feel that I would have had *any problems to set myself to live at home and so forth*, but somehow it has emerged that it would be good to get to talk about these things to someone."

Interviewer: "Yes, yes."

Interviewee: "...as well.. *Although it has just been living over there*, it would be nice to talk with someone who knows what it's all about." (Interview 25.)

being. It is recommended that every peacekeeper could have an opportunity for a personal conversation with an expert of this field after their return.

According to one male reservist who did not mention personal problems, there it would be reasonable to arrange possibilities to attend some return conversation or meeting. Furthermore, because it was easier to go to Kosovo than to return home, return meetings or conversations could help in adaptation back home. Another reservist mentioned that the system of Sweden, which signifies that peacekeepers' work continues in Sweden after the return and includes personal discussion opportunities, enables personal processing of the mission and would have aided her adaptation at home. Each individual's perception of the return might include an understanding of a difference between that individual and the others because the one coming from a mission continued like in the situation a year before and the ones having lived in Finland had "really" lived in Finland. Several interviewees said that some odd or sad feelings might arise after the return or transition.

Two individuals (a priest and one deployed support person) worked for issues related to mental health of approximately 400 Finnish peacekeepers in Kosovo and there was also a network of voluntary support persons. One reservist interviewee wondered whether these arrangements were sufficient for mental support of the Finnish troops. An appointment to check the peacekeeper's situation after returning to Finland could be beneficial to the individual and could also help develop the feedback systems. There was support for developing more advanced return arrangements to guarantee the peacekeepers' well-being. One interviewee mentioned that he would personally not like to have any feedback or return conversation, but that such a conversation could be necessary for peacekeepers who had been in dangerous situations in their duties. Return conversations could be voluntary. Questionnaires related to the return and personal well-being could be sent to the peacekeepers twice after their home return, which would be a sign of caring about the well-being of peacekeepers.

Findings from feedback and return arrangements

The theme of adaptation when returning home arose spontaneously in some of the interviews. Some interviewees said that the return had been difficult, although not all who mentioned this as a relevant topic had experienced difficulties. Especially in riskier missions, the personnel may require permanent and clearer arrangements regarding receiving mental support. The role of priests has been to support peacekeepers mentally and spiritually (Helin 2008). Some enlargement of mental support is needed in military crisis management, and the agencies that take responsibility for civilian crisis management also develop this type of service and support.

However, it should be acknowledged that even "well-being" individuals may also require the opportunity to have a conversation to better adapt to everyday realities in Finland. This type of opportunity should be provided regardless, how stressful the service abroad has been to an individual. A need for a return conversation should not be regarded as a negative or stigmatizing sign. Three interviewees mentioned either during or after the interview that the interview had functioned as a form of return discussion or a debriefing. In riskier operations, the need for debriefing and feedback conversations will probably be substantially higher

than for Kosovo. Higher risks cause more stressful events at work. These occasions should be handled in some form during the mission and as a whole when the individual returns back home.

Return conversations are currently being developed, both on the military and civilian sides (latter/CMC Finland). It is challenging to try and connect procedures that strengthen mental health and adaptation with learning processes, both at the individual and institutional levels. In the training and in the material distributed to the personnel, potential problems arising after the return should be handled seriously. Many of the potential problems after the return are social in nature and are related to different experiences of the person returning and those staying home.

Feedback arrangements are carried out by the Finnish National Defence Forces regarding military crisis management and by CMC-Finland regarding civilian crisis management although the CMC-arrangements had not yet started when the civilian crisis management personnel interviewed for this research returned home. However, these new arrangements can have a more positive impact for an individual and his or her learning than they have had until today. There is a question mark over how well the gathered information is utilized at the institutional level in order to develop the operational practices. The interviewees in the civilian crisis management had faced various feedback practices. General guidelines especially for feedback practices in the institutions of civilian crisis management are important.

From a fruitful theoretical perspective, applying Howard (2008), a linkage between first- and second-level learning is important for the development of peace operations: well-functioning feedback arrangements would be important. Feedback standards and development processes could aid organizational learning in peace operations and crisis management. On the other hand, well-modified personal feedback and some kind of learning-goal- setting could strengthen personnel's opportunities to learn and develop themselves. However, learning and giving feedback should not be simplified. It may be difficult to assess which practices would be the best ones because the assessment takes a long time and the practices may need to be modified quickly.

For institutions, insufficient utilization of personnel's feedback is waste of resources. For individuals, feedback facilitates learning and personal development. Feedback to both individuals and institutions should be used in a comparable manner. As mentioned at the end of sections 8.3 and 8.4, informal learning takes place at work in various missions. Part of informal learning involves handling tacit knowledge. Individuals may even better understand their learning processes if they have opportunities to provide feedback and simultaneously think about their learning processes. Informal learning might even lead to the formation of explicit knowledge through reflective processes facilitated by appropriate feedback arrangements.

When managing knowledge, it is relevant to establish working methods that enable knowledge and skills transfer from one individual to another, and its modification as part of the common knowledge and know-how of the organization (Moisio & Salimäki 2005). The temporary nature of crisis management tasks means that information transfers are extremely important. Feedback gathering can comprise a major part of knowledge and information

transfers in crisis management missions. Feedback arrangements should be taken into account when developing leadership and management practices as well.

It is also necessary to develop feedback arrangement during civilian and military crisis management missions. An environment that supports the autonomy of its personnel enhances its learning opportunities, and positive feedback usually improves an employee's work motivation (Salmela-Aro & Nurmi 2005). Because crisis management missions are temporary in nature, too little attention has been paid to establishing the circumstances that support motivation and well-being in ways that are common in ordinary working places. Feedback is part of good leadership and it supports developing competences and working methods (see Nissinen et al. 2008; Virtainlahti 2009, 154). The ability of superiors to provide positive feedback and to provide any feedback in a positive manner should receive attention when planning the education and training processes of the superiors in crisis management. Coaching and evaluation of the results should support learning processes especially regarding interactive skills within an organization. Because of the temporary nature of the crisis management organizations, feedback processes should be well planned and evaluated in accordance with other efforts to develop well-functioning leadership and learning processes.

The criteria for a successful outcome in a certain task are often unclear, which means that feedback from others may be crucial (Salmela-Aro & Nurmi 2005, 137). Such situations may take place often in crisis management duties, in which the actor may find it difficult to make quick decisions or assess activities that require certain skills. The need for feedback may sometimes be even higher in crisis management than in more ordinary-kind of work.

Courses for crisis management personnel should be planned so that they seriously consider the personnel's challenges to adapt to the changes required for crisis management duties. The return home seems to be a more challenging change than going to work abroad in crisis management. Support for the reflection of the changes may facilitate the personnel's actual abilities to work "with" these issues.

Previous studies have also recognized difficulties connected to returning home (see Roberg 1999, 45). Many spouses of peacekeepers were surprised that the peacekeeping did not end when the peacekeeper returned home (ibid., 46). Peacekeeping is such a strong experience that former peacekeepers keep talking about it when meeting each other (ibid.). Police officers who served in Kosovo found it was frustrating to come home from more challenging duties because their work communities were usually not interested in their experiences and personal development during the duties in Kosovo (Raatikainen 2004, 76). Therefore, an individual can experience difficulties both at home and at work after the return.

Regarding RQ1 on learning in crisis management and RQ3 on crisis management practices, organizations, and education, it is clear that the learning cycle between individual and institutional learning has not been the framework for developing feedback practices in crisis management. Gathering information from crisis management personnel should lead to institutional learning. Practices to develop institutional learning should be developed in both civilian and military crisis management. This kind of information gathering could also lead to the development of collaboration among various actors.

8.8 Summary of the qualitative interviews

The results of the qualitative interviews provide information about the personnel's experiences and the requirements for crisis management personnel. Interviewees mostly perceived the challenges in crisis management in a balanced manner. In addition, the interviews were affected by the interviewer and the selective nature of the memory of any interviewee.

The results of this chapter can be interpreted in terms of learning. Table 10 categorizes learning processes and challenges as well as potential institutional deficiencies in terms of learning in crisis management. The table helps answer the main RQ and RQs 1, 2, and 3. Some of the interviewees expressed both positive and negative perceptions. Learning processes in crisis management can be derived from the interview material. They are divided into several categories in Table 10 consistently with Illeris (2009a) and Senge (1994). Adaptation to changes is classified as a learning process, because several interviewees identified return difficulties as a challenge. Adaptation requires several kinds of learning processes in terms of Illeris's (2009a) categories: mechanical, assimilative, accommodative, and transformative learning. Of these, accommodative and transformative learning describe individual learning as having an impact on cognitive structures (Illeris 2009a). Transformative learning was combined with a positive experience of self-realization which strengthened confidence.

Table 10. Learning processes, challenges for individuals, and institutional deficiencies

Learning processes	Learning challenges	Institutional deficiencies
Transformative learning	Self-realization	Insufficient learning strategies
Accommodative learning	Self-realization	
	Learning unexpected combinations	Lack of acknowledgement
Assimilative learning	Receiving functional feedback	Insufficient feedback systems
Mechanical learning	Instructions	
	Teaching	
Adaptation into changes	Returning home	Lack of debriefing strategies
Organizational learning	Functional feedback	Insufficient feedback systems
	Learning at work	Lack of life-long learning vision
	Tacit knowledge	Arrangements for orientation
	Informal learning	

To respond to the main RQ and RQ1, it is important to realize that learning processes in crisis management take different forms. As Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) explained, making tacit knowledge explicit is part of a spiral process between tacit and explicit knowledge. Handling tacit knowledge is a prerequisite for organizational learning. Informal learning signifies learning outside school-like environments: it is a form of adapting both tacit and explicit knowledge and it can also make a major part of learning at work. Training and education are often necessary for supporting informal learning processes and are required in order to adapt easily definable skills in crisis management. According to the results, the interviewees had not received support for informal learning or learning at work when they had attended education and training for their crisis management duties. Didactical applications regarding different competences and levels of learning are needed when developing education and training of the personnel.

I believe that self-realization is an outcome of positive and creative problem-solving that often occurs in transformative and accommodative learning processes. The interviewees expressed this type of learning when describing their experiences of applying their knowledge in new situations. To answer RQ 3, the results of the interviews reflect several institutional deficiencies: namely, lack of life-long learning vision, lack of acknowledgement of tacit knowledge, insufficient feedback systems, and lack of debriefing strategies. These deficiencies should be improved by developing crisis management organizations in terms of learning. Without comprehension of tacit knowledge, educational practices may also suffer from inadequate learning vision, which could lead to neglecting informal learning at work. Training for crisis management duties is based on mainstream ideas of required competences, but not as much on the idea of how the personnel would best learn these competences. These questions should be reconsidered when developing educational practices for crisis management.

Positive experiences of crisis management personnel are often connected to some kind of self-realization. To answer the main RQ and RQ1 which focused on learning, it is necessary to understand that positive learning outcomes can be promoted in crisis management, even though it may be difficult. Positive experiences were often combined with success in new situations that could be described as learning, even though the interviewees did not always describe these experiences in this way. These kinds of situations are also emotionally rewarding and they can be described as informal learning. This kind of learning partly means adopting tacit knowledge. It is difficult to assess learning and its utilization at work because learning is combined with other work activities (see Collin 2005). Therefore, it is difficult for individuals to perceive whether they have achieved “a new level” in their understanding of a phenomenon at work. Being aware of one’s own learning processes may be impossible. Because informal learning consists of constructing and learning tacit knowledge, further research on this theme is important. Crisis management organizations need to understand the role of tacit knowledge and informal learning in order to develop learning organizations and knowledge management in them.

The challenge for the evolution of crisis management organizations is to enable individual learning that would lead to institutional learning or change. As concluded in chapter 6, learning as a human phenomenon occurs within an individual, although it is affected by social processes (see also Illeris 2011). Institutional learning may occur at the level of working teams which represent communities of practice in Wenger’s (1998) terms. The development of feedback systems is essential for both individual and institutional learning. It is a way of making tacit knowledge explicit at the organizational level and part of knowledge creation (see Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Understanding the interdependence of tacit and explicit knowledge at the organizational level may facilitate developing crisis management organizations and practices.

Instead of separate agencies, a crisis management organization can be seen as consisting of all the institutions and actors relevant for the operation. Today, the feedback systems of the various agencies differ from each other and employees of private enterprises do not necessarily receive any feedback at all. The interviewees had plenty of ideas about how to develop practices both in civilian and military crisis management: these ideas covered training, feedback and return arrangements. Gathering ideas about how to develop crisis

management in the future appeared to be fruitful. As mentioned in section 8.6, one professional officer had gathered material for his successor in order to facilitate learning for the duties. Guidance also facilitated learning. These results offer us some understanding of the important role that tacit knowledge has in crisis management.

Crisis management duties require a lot of time, and they are temporary and demanding. Many challenges are caused by the distance to the families and friends. Regarding military crisis management in Kosovo it was a necessity for the personnel to leave their families at home. Some other duties that require work abroad also require to living separately from one's family. Paradoxically when the family stays home, there may be more time for staying at work and working even longer days.

Regarding RQ3, the experiences of the personnel described in chapter 8 underline the personnel's professional abilities and their communication skills. Cross-cultural issues are significant both in interaction within an international mission as well as in contacts with local employees, representatives of regional governance, and other local inhabitants. A certain kind of flexibility is required from the personnel working in such circumstances. To promote the human security, the expatriate personnel need to communicate with local people as well as to learn new issues – and to enable institutional learning. Interaction with the local population often occurs with the help of interpreters. Cultural differences and the complexity of the operation may make communication more difficult, which means that personal abilities that can be learnt through education and training are essential.

The interviewees interpreted gender issues in diverse ways. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the range of views the personnel had regarding their cooperation with local inhabitants in a crisis area. Cultural and gender education may somehow standardize personnel's knowledge of these particular issues. However, the local inhabitants' opinions on these issues in a conflict area may be controversial. It would be recommendable to have guidelines about how to act in a situation that is a dilemma if local opinions are divided. Cultural realities and recommendations for empowering all the population are compared. Guidance in gender issues during the operation may facilitate dealing with them (see Anttila 2011). Strategic planning in the recruitment may help get both women and men to work in crisis management duties for which the influence of the gender is essential.

Personnel's feedback opportunities facilitate individual and institutional learning as well as guarantee the personnel's well-being. Changes when starting work in an international mission, as well as when returning home, may be surprising for an individual. Returning home requires adaptation that may be more complicated than people presume beforehand. The theme of the difficulties when returning home was tangible in several interviews because of the interviewees' own experience or because of observing some others' challenging return processes. Several interviewees emphasized the meaning of the return which suggests it is an important theme. Acknowledgement of this difficulty should lead to practical policies that facilitate the return of personnel. Opportunities for return conversations could be part of this process. After more complex and riskier missions than in Kosovo, the return may be even more demanding for an individual.

Regarding RQ2 on the crisis management personnel's experiences and their influence on the identities and self-concepts, the positive sphere of the experiences is a major finding in the results. Also, it is noticeable that most of the interviewees mostly did not report any identity changes. Successful experiences were often linked to a positive self-concept and some kind of self-realization. Although those individuals who had negative experiences may have refused to be interviewed, the relatively stable crisis management environment could mainly explain this result. Although no major identity changes took place, the interviews suggest it is worth reporting that identification with the work community was most modest among the professional officers, while the reservists identified with their work communities, including the peacekeeping community, most strongly when the professional groups were compared. Identification with the crisis management communities could have an impact on the personnel's identities although they did not mention this aspect when asked about identity changes. Multidimensional experiences seem to enable learning and work in crisis management may be a good time for learning within an individual's life span and life-long learning processes.

9. Learning in crisis management: conclusions from the results

9.1 Evaluation of the methods and the significance of the research

Validity is based on the idea that empirical research actually measures what is expected to measure. In qualitative data, criteria of validity rely on honesty, the depth, richness and scope the obtained data, the participants, objectivity and the extent of triangulation. Validity is regarded in degree rather than as an absolute state. (Cohen et al.2007, 133.) The validity and reliability of the empirical parts of this research rely on the criteria in use in qualitative research. There is also some supplementary criteria regarding the Delphi panel process. Some theorists believe that reliability does not cover qualitative research and that terms like credibility, neutrality, consistency, and trustworthiness should be used instead (ibid. 148). Triangulation is a means to increase the validity and reliability of a research and therefore, methodological triangulation has been applied to this research. Validity responds to the question of whether a method explains or describes the phenomena it was meant to explain or describe. The question of the validity of the results is more complicated than the question of credibility. In the interviews, the interviewees were able to check whether they had understood the questions correctly. Consequently I presume that the interviews interpreted for this research actually measure the things they were meant to measure. In the Delphi panel process, the interpretation of the first-round results affects on the arguments or questions in use during the second round. In the Argument Delphi panel process, the researcher was allowed to provoke the experts to obtain information that potentially reveals weak or strengthening signals: therefore, the validity of the whole process is more difficult to assess.

There are two systematic errors in futures thinking; namely overestimating change and underestimating inertia. On the other hand, reports provoke reactions which affect development. In fact, a good prediction is one that leads to action and change – not the one coming true. (Godet 2001, 22–24.) Therefore, it is difficult to assess the validity of futures studies and this dilemma also extends to my research. A study may itself impact the future and lead changes which otherwise would not have occurred. Therefore, revealing weak or emerging signals can be part of the reliability of any research process in futures studies, although it is difficult to indicate the truth-value of these signals. The relevance of the arguments concerning futures development which Kuusi (1999, 77) has defined as criteria for significance of a Delphi study may be seen only afterwards. There are some systematic errors in Delphi panel processes. The more distant the envisioned future, the greater the variation among expert assessment. Experts tend to be more pessimistic in a longer perspective in compared to short-term estimations. Research questionnaires and posed questions may have an impact on the results. The more desirable the idea being assessed, the closer its emergence is estimated. A closer crisis is seen as being more meaningful than a longer-term crisis. Simplicity and certainty are overestimated in compared to complexity and uncertainty. (Kuusi 2003, 223–224.) When analyzing the results of any Delphi research, these aspects should be taken into account.

In interviews, the best way to achieve greater validity is to minimize bias as much as possible: one way to control the reliability is to make the interview questions crystal clear (Cohen et al. 2007, 150–151). The ontological and epistemological assumptions affect how focused interviews are estimated as a research method and how the validity of results is measured (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2006, 19). Interviews are always results of social interaction which influences the outcome (Alasuutari 2001, 142–143). Understanding the interactive nature of an interview process helps to make the analysis as objective as possible.

The methodological concept of reliability is used to describe how well methods measure or represent the phenomena they are meant to measure. As in qualitative interviews in general, the interviews in this research were unique narratives. The interviewees gave their interpretations of the events and it is impossible to know how other individuals present at the same events would have interpreted them. Personal perspectives on crisis management were expressed. When assessing the reliability of the results, it is essential to remember that the consistencies of the group of interviewees as well as the Delphi panel have an impact on the results. As mentioned at the end of chapter 8, the interviewees may be more optimistic than those who would not like to be interviewed about their crisis management experiences. Regarding the Delphi panel process, a panel consistency either solely based on the civilian or the military side might have provided results other than those presented in this research.

The interviewer's personality and status as a civilian doctoral student at the National Defence University might have had an impact on the interviews. Issues related to feedback and debriefing systems may have been more easily expressed to a civilian than to an officer, for example. On the other hand, some more militarily-oriented problems might have been more easily told to an officer. The information from the crisis management personnel's interviews as well as from the Delphi panel process was interpreted with respect to the actual answers. Therefore, I believe that the credibility of both materials was high.

The unique nature of the interview process means it would be impossible to repeat exactly as it occurred in this research. The same kind of uniqueness also applied to the Delphi panel process. Despite the uniqueness of the interview and the panel processes, I believe that the results from this material have provided new knowledge, although it is mostly consistent with some of the studies introduced in earlier chapters.

The futures panel process revealed current questions for the near future of crisis management and peace-building. Results regarding feedback systems and return arrangements were consistent when utilizing two methods. Applying two methods made it possible to find processes that are relevant and close to individuals working in crisis areas. The results were complementary and consistent with the essential role of communication and contact skills. These findings are not contradictory with the challenges that have been traditionally linked to peace-building and peacekeeping activities; instead, they should be taken seriously account when developing crisis management. Core competences in military and civilian crisis management will remain highly significant. It is relevant that working conditions and training of crisis management personnel are developed in accordance with new challenges. This kind of development may enhance human security, both of the personnel and of local inhabitants. A comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach has enabled the analysis of

the core competences required for crisis management. On the other hand, it has made the theoretical framework of the research fairly broad.

9.2 Results of two empirical parts concisely

The main RQ of this research focuses on what kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management. Four of this report's research questions were introduced in chapter 2 and handled in the conclusions of the theoretical and empirical chapters. At the beginning of this chapter, the results of the two empirical chapters of this research will be compared with each other and with the theories introduced in chapters from 3–6. At the end of the chapter, a summary of the results will be introduced by answering the four RQs. The research focus of two kinds of empirical entities was partially different, which means that the comparison of these results cannot be regarded as a broad methodological triangulation but as a partial one. Two empirical parts can be interpreted separately. It is hoped that the results may be applied to “futures making”. However, any future assessment of primarily intellectual activity or endeavor is inherently difficult.

The futures panel on crisis management presumed that conflicts that would be interfered with by means of crisis management would resemble the new conflicts defined in chapter 3. Future crisis management will be demanding due to the complexity of conflicts. When conflicts and crisis management become more complex, learning becomes complicated as well. For challenges related to complicated information flows, methods to promote transformative learning and comprehension of large amounts of information should be emphasized.

The futures panel emphasized collaboration of various crisis management organizations and agencies. The panel supported the idea of cooperation between local people and crisis management actors, as well as between civilian crisis management and development cooperation. Cooperation and coordination are necessary between organizations that potentially consist of a multitude of actors. The teams in which the personnel are deployed require collaborative competences. Compared with official reports on crisis management (for example, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009), the emphasis on cooperation is not surprising. However, an essential question is how to enhance cooperability in practice. Is this a challenge for developing networks and network-based working methods in and between organizations?

The crisis management personnel interviewed for this study mentioned some unofficial aspects not favoring cooperation. Rivalry between the organizations may cause problems, while different organizational traditions may impact what kinds of practices are considered good. Many interviewees found communication difficult because some personnel from other countries could not communicate in English. Crisis management organizations must be aware of potential communication problems within organizations and between them as well as between crisis management personnel and local inhabitants. When enhancing organizational learning, it is also important to understand communication questions related to work of all the personnel. These themes are also undoubtedly worthy of further research.

An individual may work in complicated and culturally diverse environments where skilful communication is a necessity. Local awareness and comprehension of cultural differences facilitate communication. Multi-level requirements of peace-building must be taken into consideration when developing crisis management. Both now and in the future, it will not be sufficient to construct administration only for the requirements of central governance. Peace-building occurs at various levels that have specific challenges. Crisis management personnel are obliged to interpret diverse demands coming from local population and various actors involved in peace-building.

Question marks remain regarding specialization in crisis management and the potential need to model various types of conflicts. These ideas did not receive support from the futures panel. However, they may be worth further investigation in some advanced forms. Modeling should not be regarded as a “technical” tool because there are and will be differences between conflicts.

Comprehensiveness in crisis management could advance in terms of organizational learning and unifying common tasks and objectives at the operational level. At best, cooperability provides a foundation for common identities and facilitates division of labor. Organizational learning is essential for the future of crisis management. Sufficient feedback arrangements that enable organizational learning are required. Coordination between organizations in crisis management is necessary and even organizational learning could be coordinated. These aspects should have an impact on leadership and management of these organizations and agencies. Organizational learning is collaborative learning among various civilian and military agencies and organizations participating in crisis management.

In regard to Figure 2 in section 5.1, various levels of organizational life should be taken into consideration as well. In terms of cooperation between various organizations, crisis management personnel interviewees mostly described collaboration between teams or departments. Within their own organization, they mostly described cooperation within their own teams. The organizational level was more distant. In the futures panel, various levels were handled in different theses of the questionnaire. In order to develop crisis management organizations, distinctions must be made between various organizational levels.

Local ownership is a prerequisite for durable human security. According to the futures panel, local inhabitants should influence the planning of crisis management and peace-building. As much as possible, they should have an impact on peace-building in order to strengthen local ownership. According to the interview results, contacts with local people can be both challenging and interesting. Interaction may be especially challenging if hostilities continuously take place, as in the current situation in Afghanistan. In such circumstances, it is especially demanding to strengthen trust within society. Enhancing human security requires crisis management personnel to have communication and contact skills because they enable strengthening local involvement which is a condition for successful peace-building.

Training before the missions may facilitate contacts with local people. Expatriate crisis management personnel need encouragement to identify local inhabitants' views and even opinion differences among them. The gender issues may be dilemmas for expatriates working in crisis management duties. The interviews revealed a multitude of opinions on gender

issues. In addition, there may also be various interpretations of this theme among local inhabitants. The empowerment of the whole population may challenge working methods. Leadership, guidelines for gender issues, and education of the personnel need to support both cultural and gender awareness.

Generally speaking, crisis management personnel did not recognize identity changes taking place as a result of their work. The work community in military crisis management appeared to be more important for the reservists than for the professional officers in military crisis management. Most of the interviewees had been busy in the operation. The experiences of the crisis management personnel can be compared to some extent with the futures panelists' views on the qualifications of the personnel. The experiences of the crisis management personnel were mostly positive, and positive learning experiences appeared to take place because of the self-realization at work. Some of the controversies they recalled could be seen as part of learning processes. There had been various obstacles for the cooperation, including different interpretations on behalf of actors working for different organizations. To improve the cooperation, it is essential to emphasize the common goals of different organizations and agencies in a joint operation. As concluded in chapter 5, strengthening a common identity could facilitate collaboration as well. It can take place by respecting the existing roles and identities of various actors.

Debriefing and return arrangements after the mission were emphasized by many interviewees who had worked in Kosovo. The futures panel found the feedback arrangements to be essential for developing crisis management. Return arrangements should also be taken seriously into the consideration during the training. In addition, special information booklets on this issue might be useful. The significance of potential debriefing arrangements meant that challenges relating to the return home as well as the need to develop feedback systems were emphasized in the interviews and panel process: these messages may be interpreted as "strengthening signals". There is no reason to neglect these messages in regard to the evolution of crisis management systems in the future. In more complicated operations, these types of challenges may even be more demanding than in Kosovo.

The qualifications of the personnel described by the Delphi panelists focused on communicative and professional skills. These skills may also be promoted in education and training as well. Cooperation at various levels and towards different directions will be a challenge in crisis management and also has an impact on the personnel and the skills required in crisis management. Illeris (2011) assessed reflectivity as a key element to competence development and it belongs among the core competences in crisis management.

Communicative skills are especially important in civilian crisis management. In military crisis management, the individual's duties have a stronger impact on the level of the communicative skills required of that individual. However, the potential need for communication skills should be taken into consideration in all duties as this is a crucial issue for developing education and training for crisis management duties. Professional skills in crisis management appear to include creativity, which means the capacity to learn new things and new ways to react in unexpected situations. Therefore, applying acquired knowledge or skills in new circumstances comprises a significant part of learning. The ability to make ethical assessments is needed, although the panel did not emphasize this point.

Crisis management personnel envisage moral dilemmas, which creates the need for the personnel to have abilities related to ethical assessment.

In Kosovo, individual learning often took the forms of informal learning. Learning in crisis management tasks does not usually resemble learning in educational institutions. It is often informal and signifies learning at work. The crisis management personnel' experiences introduced in this research may open the doors for new kinds of learning processes, education and training. At least partly, the informal nature of individual learning of tacit knowledge in crisis management should become more explicit and conscious in order to facilitate organizational or institutional learning. Understanding processes in the evolution of tacit knowledge in this field is also important. Learning about the core competences may require different learning strategies. Therefore, in the education and training of the personnel, different types of learning processes need to be understood and encouraged. It is necessary to apply long-term educational strategies involving learning at work and understanding of multi-type learning of the core competences.

The futures panelists' views were in favor of standards in education and training for civilian crisis management. According to the panel, crisis management duties, information about the operation, local cultures, and the historical background of the conflict should play an essential role in the education for crisis management duties. Regarding military crisis management, the education and training of basic military skills are also important. According to several interviewees who had experience in crisis management, lifelong learning ideas were not promoted during their education and training before the mission. Because such personnel apply their skills and knowledge through the operation, education and training should encourage individual efforts to learn in a persevering way.

The following introduces some brief answers to the research questions. Conclusions will be made from the results of the two empirical chapters of this research as well as from the literature reviewed previously.

The main RQ:

What kind of learning should be promoted in crisis management?

Crisis management organizations require learning individuals in order to change. Core competences include skills and abilities that crisis management personnel should learn before and during the mission. Core competences in civilian crisis management differ from those in military crisis management. Apart from core competences, personnel also require competences for their specific duties.

There has been a lack of capacity to transform individual learning processes into institutional and organizational learning and change in crisis management (see Howard 2008). Organizational learning require adequate organizational arrangements and support from the leadership of crisis management operations.

Regarding human security, the abilities of the crisis management personnel in communication and cooperation are crucial and will remain as such in the future. Increased complexity in conflicts and peace-building may take place and make the work in crisis management even

more challenging. Cultural awareness and communication competences will help take local populations into peace processes and provide human security. Reflectivity can be seen as part of adopting the ability to make ethical assessment and personal competences. Besides, in military crisis management, combat skills are important.

For individuals, learning is often informal in its nature, which means that more detailed knowledge is required about both individual and institutional learning in crisis management. The idea of prompting individuals' learning at work should be included in the training and education of the crisis management personnel. Different competences required for crisis management are learned in many ways, which means that several kinds of learning strategies should be enabled to promote core competences. Crisis management organizations should improve feedback mechanisms that strengthen both institutional and individual learning because both of them are significant for the evolvement of crisis management. From an institutional point of view, organizational learning processes are emphasized and their promotion should be a key target when developing crisis management and peace-building processes.

RQ1: What kind of learning challenges will new conflicts pose to crisis management organizations and personnel?

New conflicts are complex: therefore, it is necessary for crisis management personnel to understand their background. Personnel should understand the cultural environment in which they work, as well as the local population's empowerment as part of providing human security. Crisis management is multicultural and the comprehension of the shared objectives of the mission also facilitates working. The individual level learning of the personnel and information sharing within the operation enable organizational learning. This core idea needs to be made explicit for all parties. In order to develop education and training for crisis management personnel, the didactical applications will be needed as well.

For the personnel, crisis management work provides many opportunities for learning, although the duties may be demanding. At best, self-realization of the personnel takes place and positive experiences strengthen self-confidence. The experience seemed to have more personal than social meanings for the interviewees. Changes of time and space can be difficult to deal with. Return home may be difficult and arrangements for facilitating the adaptation after the return require improvement.

2. (RQ): How do field experiences affect the personnel's identities and self-concepts?

Positive experiences of managing new situations were often linked to self-realization and positive self-concepts although the interviewees did not express as many changes in their identities. At the personal level, positive experiences appear to be combined with informal learning. Identification with the peacekeeping community was common among the reservists, but not among the professional officers. Several civilian crisis management interviewees also identified themselves with civilian crisis management personnel. However, it is impossible to conclude how long-lasting this type of identification is and the degree to which it affects one's identity in the long run.

3 (RQ): How can crisis management practices, organizations, and education be developed when the human security approach is taken into account?

According to the results, practices strengthening local ownership need improvement. Cooperation between various agencies and between local residents and expatriate actors in peace-building is a priority for well-functioning peace-building and crisis management. Cooperation skills are needed in order to guarantee human security prerequisites for which are respect for local views and participation. Various aspects of collaboration should also be taken into account in the education and training of the personnel. A clear division of labor and definition of tasks given to single agencies facilitate cooperation. The need for cooperation skills does not make other professional skills less important than before. In the education and training of the personnel, there is a need to pay attention to general learning abilities and personnel's further learning at crisis management work. Educators and instructors need to understand the competences required in crisis management and how they are learned during the courses and after them. Individuals need support for their identity work as well.

Feedback arrangements are central for the progress of crisis management. Personnel's activities potentially enable organizational learning in crisis management. Crisis management organizations should be more aware of the core competences in crisis management and how they can be learnt both individually and institutionally. Results from learning studies, and especially studies focusing on learning at work and organizational learning, could be applied to this context. Because common identity for crisis management and peace-building personnel might facilitate cooperation, common education, training, and guidance might reinforce common identity construction. Likewise, emphasizing common goals of civilian and military actors strengthens both cooperability and potentially common identity construction.

Futures conflicts will probably remain complex. Stronger local involvement facilitates peace processes. Contact skills and cultural awareness will be crucial for crisis management personnel in the future. Personnel should be able to cooperate with a range of partners. Life-long learning at work should be taken into account more seriously during the training and missions so that different learning processes would be facilitated. Informal learning should be acknowledged when training and education for crisis management duties are developed. Cooperation in training of civilian and military employees is needed although the roles of civilian and military personnel in crisis management should remain clear.

9.3 How to improve learning, feedback systems, and training

Understanding the growing importance of the communicative tasks in crisis management and peacebuilding is a key issue in developing these practices. It is necessary to strengthen learning of communication skills before and during crisis management operations. Competence development overall also requires reflectivity. In order to enable the institutional (second-level) learning it is important that the first-level learning results are well handled and reported and that the conclusions from them implemented. Learning individuals are

important for evolving crisis management, because they may gather operational knowledge and provide feedback. This enables organizational or institutional learning and change. On the other hand, it is essential that the institutions enable individual learning by giving feedback. A crisis management operation needs to advance as a learning organization although it may consist of several actors.




Figure 5. Learning and change in crisis management

Different institutions collaborate for the joint objectives. Individuals working in crisis management often cooperate within an organization and between agencies, as well as with local inhabitants. As concluded in chapter 6, learning takes place within an individual although it is affected by social processes. Therefore, organizational learning means change enabled by the learning of individuals leading to reassessment and potentially new activities within an organization. For organizational learning and change, communication about the results or outcomes is crucial. Gathering diverse data about the results is important for organizational learning in crisis management and peace-building. The outcome should be assessed by taking into account local people's estimations as well as the mission's personnel's views. Different learning strategies for different situations, knowledge and skills could be promoted.

Well-functioning feedback systems are also a condition for learning organizations. Organizations and agencies in crisis management should develop their feedback systems in order to enable organizational change. A peace-building or crisis management operation generally consists of a range of agencies or organizations. In order to create a "learning and changing operation" in crisis management, these organizations should be able to share information and even critical findings about the results of an operation.

Gathering feedback during the missions is not sufficient to develop crisis management and peace-building. Information should also be analyzed and utilized. Both the futures panel and the interviews of crisis management personnel were in favor of developing feedback systems. Howard's (2008) framework of operational (first-level learning; mostly individual) and institutional (second-level learning) learning levels makes it easier to understand that

adequate feedback systems are important in developing crisis management and peace-building. Learning within different organizations in a crisis management operation should be gathered and shared in such a way that the whole operation would utilize it. Regarding feedback systems and learning options, it is important to acknowledge the need to develop leadership strategies in crisis management as well. A multitude of actors are present in a crisis management and peace-building process. A multi-cultural environment always complicates leadership processes (see Nissinen et al. 2008, 41). Because of the multi-cultural and temporary nature of crisis management, reforms within international agencies and organizations should take place with goal-oriented efforts to achieve progress in feedback practices. There is a challenge to get a peace operation as a whole to function as a learning organization.

Information technology may be utilized more intensively in the future: to strengthen the learning in crisis management both at individual and institutional levels. If this type of progress includes growing and up-dated knowledge about crisis management missions, it will facilitate learning how to develop on-going and forth-coming operations. Information that is processed more quickly may reduce uncertainty. Institutional learning that relies on information technological development requires individual learning.

The more complex the conflicts and both crisis management and peace-building become, the more demanding the communication will be. Communication skills are a prerequisite for situation awareness. Contacts between different actors will be an essential part of crisis management work in the future. Therefore, communication skills should not be underestimated even in situations with riskier military crisis management tasks. Communication skills may be regarded as a condition for fulfilling first-level learning because they are a necessity for developing second-level learning when applying Howard's (2008) typology. On the other hand, second-level learning enables first-level learning options in later peace-building missions. At best, different forms of learning are taken into account at a systemic level and when developing leadership practices.

Learning in riskier operations is more demanding. It can be more difficult to find rewarding experiences, if existing threats make trust-building between local people and crisis management personnel more challenging. Consequently, at the individual level, positive experiences from successful events may be rarer in riskier operations. On the other hand, success in peace-building in such circumstances may be even more rewarding than in less risky ones.

Challenges for organizational learning and change are broad in today's crisis management, both in civilian and military terms. However, the need for learning in military studies and strategic thinking is not new. The ideas described above have similarities with John Boyd's (1927-1997) strategic thinking based on flexibility and learning (see Osinga 2007). The principle of human security makes the ideas related to learning in crisis management even more topical and complex than they used to be in operational planning.

When developing training practices, responses to the challenges of crisis management in the future should evolve. Naturally, professional skills required for single tasks are naturally important. In addition, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, cultural awareness,

communication and cooperation skills, reflective skills, and the ability to adaptation to a new culture and to the return home should all be taken seriously. Reflective skills should enable learning new skills during the duties and facilitate the various learning and adaptation processes required during and after the mission.

Training before the missions should enhance the adoption of new learning strategies applied to the mission. Opportunities for learning during missions should be emphasized in the education, training and work practices of both civilian and military crisis management personnel. Crisis management missions are learning environments and learning at work is an essential part of the learning of crisis management personnel. Promoting learning at work requires engagement, goal direction and resources, which means that its development takes time (Illeris 2011, 161).

Tacit knowledge sharing and informal learning processes need to be fully understood when developing training and learning practices, and crisis management in general. Education and training should favor practices that facilitate a learning cycle from individual to organizational learning and back to individual learning. In particular, small actors in crisis management have difficulties arranging organizational and individual learning practices. Course practices should be developed to promote special and general skills necessary for crisis management. Partially courses for military and civilian personnel can be united although the differing duties of civilian and military officials should not be confused. Joint courses could handle specific themes (like gender) or mission-related issues (such as geography, culture, and objectives of the mission). Human security could be a theme that requires comprehensive efforts from both civilian and military personnel: education and training related to this theme should also be connected with the cultural, historical and social issues of a conflict area.

9.4 Combining individual and institutional levels

This research combines the individual and institutional levels in crisis management. Cooperation in the missions makes it possible achieve the goal of human security. It is essential that the international community understands how people working for different organizations promote peace-building and sustainable peace. The individual, institutional and international levels are intertwined.

At the individual level, crisis management duties seem to be a meaningful period for the personnel. At best, employees self-concepts become clearer, their *self-realization* increases and their positive evaluations about themselves strengthen after success in demanding work experiences. It is recommended that work in crisis management consists of meaningful experiences as often as possible even in the future. The personnel envisage complex situations when working to improve conditions in a crisis area.

The personnel interviewed for this study did not usually acknowledge identity changes during the mission, although they had experienced some change in their self-concept. Compared to other groups, professional officers were less prone to any identification with their mission communities, which appeared to be due to their strong professional identity.

With regard to identity construction, a common crisis management personnel identity might benefit cooperation in crisis management and decrease stereotypical barriers between different personnel groups. However, the processing of common identity cannot be forced, although it may be supported by arranging common training and favoring the common mission instead of separate organizations or agencies involved in it.

Because crisis management duties may be more challenging in the future, it is necessary to facilitate the personnel's adaptation to the demanding circumstances. This is not only a question of professional skills but abilities for reflection which could be strengthened in education. Leaders of the missions should understand the needs of the personnel in their duties. Working abroad in a culturally different environment and in special circumstances is a challenge, and the difference is especially tangible when personnel are isolated from their families. Personnel in both civilian and military crisis management should be prepared for this difference. Prior to a mission, it may be difficult to understand changes in time and space as well as their meaning in personal human relations. Because coming back home may be much more demanding than going to work abroad in crisis management duties, special arrangements for the employees' return should be developed. Training courses and services provided for the personnel should be equipped with information about these issues. The challenge of the return back home should be handled as well. Many interviewees expressed that the return home was challenging although not all the interviewees having returned home shared this view. Broader opportunities for return conversations or even obligatory conversations should be arranged. In the Finnish Defence Forces and CMC Finland, the processes of developing return arrangements are advancing.

The framework of competences makes it possible to understand the realities of crisis management personnel and to take the individual needs into account. More knowledge about the well-being of crisis management personnel is needed. Adler and Britt's (2003) views which emphasize coping with stressors, understanding the meaning of the mission, and adequate education and training seem to be relevant in developing good working conditions for the personnel who are considering working in complicated crisis areas in the future.

The substance of peace-building should not be forgotten. Civilian means are the grounds for reconstructing and rebuilding civil societies. Military means of peace operations are required to ensure peaceful development. Comprehensive crisis management requires both parts to be united in one mission in a functional manner. Although I have concluded from the results that contact and cooperation skills will be important in future crisis management and peace-building, the functions of military and civilian crisis management should not be confused. Peacekeepers will work in military duties and civilian crisis will work management personnel in the civilian duties. On the other hand, competences required for these tasks vary in accordance with an individual's duties. In civilian crisis management, interactive and communicative skills will be particularly important, as well as besides specific professional skills.

9.5 Prospects for further research

Crisis management is based on the efforts of several countries. The combination of countries involved varies from one operation to another. Although the interviewees in this research were Finnish, some of the results reported earlier are significant for the international community as a whole. The analysis of conflict development and progress in crisis management and peace-building is the basis for understanding the core competences required in crisis management. A comprehensive approach to crisis management is worthy of further research. It should facilitate the development of crisis management practices to ensure human security. Howard's (2008) typology is a good theoretical tool at the institutional level for understanding and developing learning processes in crisis management. Forms of informal learning in crisis management require further research and it could be fruitful to compare these results with studies on learning at work. Conceptually and methodologically, it could be interesting to compare the tacit knowledge emphasized in the learning literature and weak signals described in futures.

Multi-level analysis of peace-building is required. Diverse organizational levels and their relations to potential communication problems should be analyzed in a more detailed manner. Because organizations generally provide a positive picture of themselves it may be difficult to handle these questions openly. However, it is necessary to understand communication and other cooperation problems in order to solve them. One of the main challenges is to enable early local involvement strengthening peaceful development. Stronger local involvement may change the overall picture of international peace operations. Development work and research in the field peace-building and local ownership should also evolve.

In military theory, effectiveness has been traditionally regarded as an outcome of military force: in contemporary complex peace operations, however, this evaluation is not sufficient (Egnell 2009). The complexity of conflict resolution and crisis management challenge both military studies and peace and conflict studies. For military studies, a major question is the integration of the civilian components to collaborative context with the military. Joint efforts of both conceptual research and applied studies are needed in order to better understand conditions for peace-building and crisis management.

Crisis management will also play an essential role in achieving peaceful development of societies in the future. Success in peace-building is a key question for peaceful development. In military studies, more research in crisis management is required to better understand its essence and how to develop it. While it is sufficient to limit the scope of research to military studies only, multidisciplinary perspectives and studies in crisis management will be particularly essential in the future. Different perspectives may provide us a broader picture of the phenomena that must be understood in peace-building. In addition, efforts for sustainable peace processes need to be supported by strong political commitment and research activities. Acceptance of this may reveal that achieving peace is challenging and complicated on several levels. With humble and communicative orientation, the international community can contribute to a more peaceful world than that of today.

References

- Aaltonen, Mika & Keskinen, Auli (2003). Conclusion: organisational complexity. In Auli Keskinen, Mika Aaltonen & Eve Mitleton-Kelly: *Organisational complexity*. Foreword by Stuart Kauffman. Pp. 77–81. Helsinki: Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics.
- Aaltonen, Mika & Wilenius, Markku (2002). *Osaamisen ennakointi – pidemmälle tulevaisuuteen, syvemmälle osaamiseen*. Helsinki: Edita Prima.
- Abrams, Dominic & Hogg, Michael A. (2005). Collective identity: Group Membership and Self-conception. In Marilyn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds.). *Self and social identity*. Pp. 147–181. Noida: Blackwell Publishing.
- Abugre, Charles (2009). Reviewing the implementation on UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820 – What will it take? *Development dialogue*. 2009 (no. 53). Pp.136–174.
- Adler, Amy B. & Britt, Thomas W. (2003). The psychology of the peacekeeper: Common themes and future directions. In Thomas W. Britt & Amy B. Adler (Eds.). *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper. Lessons from the Field*. Pp. 313–318. Westport: Praeger.
- Adler, Nancy J. (1997). *International dimensions of organizational behavior*. Cincinnati: International Thomson Publishing.
- Ahtisaari, Martti (2000). *Tehtävä Belgradissa*. Juva: WSOY.
- Ahtisaari, Martti (2009). What makes for successful conflict resolution? *Development Dialogue*. 53: 41–49.
- Aksu, Esref (2003). *The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change*. Manchester: Manchester university press.
- Alasuutari, Pertti (1995). *Laadullinen tutkimus*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Alasuutari, Pertti (2001). *Johdatus yhteiskuntatutkimukseen*. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
- Alasuutari, Pertti (2007). *Yhteiskuntateoria ja inhimillinen todellisuus*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. (Originally in English: *Social theory and human reality*. London: Sage 2004.)
- Allardt, Erik (1976). *Hyvinvoinnin ulottuvuuksia*. Porvoo: WSOY.
- Allardt, Erik (2004). Vertailevan sosiologian tutkimusryhmä. In Risto Alapuro & Ilkka Arminen (Eds.) *Vertailevan tutkimuksen ulottuvuuksia*. Pp.25–40. Vantaa: WSOY.
- Amnesty International (2011). *Amnesty International Report 2011. The state of the world's human rights*. London: Amnesty International.

- Anderson, Mary B. (1999). *Do no harm: how aid can support peace or war*. Boulder, CO & London: Lynnie Rienner Publishers.
- Anttila, Ulla (2009). Pohjoismaat ja uusi turvallisuusyhteistyö. *Maanpuolustus* 2 (88).
- Anttila, Ulla (2010). Kohti kokonaisvaltaista kriisinhallintaa – tarvitaanko uusia kompetensseja? *Tiede&Ase*.
- Anttila, Ulla (2011). Kriisinhallintahenkilöstö, sukupuolen merkitys ja muutoksen polut. *Naistutkimus* 2/2011.
- Anttila, Ulla, Kylä-Harakka, Juha, Leskinen, Jukka, Mikkonen, Riku, & Toiskallio, Jarmo (2007). Officership 2025 and changes in military crisis management from the action competence perspective. A military-pedagogical and–psychological view. In Marko Laaksonen (Ed.) *The future of military leadership and management*. Pp. 84–117. Helsinki: Edita Prima.
- Argyris, Chris (1998). Teaching smart people how to learn. In *Harvard Business Review on Knowledge Management*. Pp. 81–108. Harvard: Harvard Business Review.
- Argyris, Chris (2003). *On organizational learning*. 2nd edition. Malden: Blackwell publishing.
- Arnkil, Robert (2009). Siltoja yli kinkkisen virran: hyvien käytäntöjen leviäminen työyhteisössä. In Karin Filander & Marjatta Vanhalakka-Ruoho (Eds.) *Yhteisöllisyys liikkeessä*. Pp. 325–352. Jyväskylä: Kansanvalistusseura.
- Aro, Miia & Petman, Jarna (1999). Voimankäytön oikeuttaminen ja sotilaallisten järjestelmien muutokset Euroopassa ja Suomessa. Helsinki: Hakapaino, University of Helsinki Press.
- Ayoob, Mohammed (2000). State making, state failure and revolution in military affairs: war at the end of the 20th century. In Gwyn Prins & Hylke Tromp (Eds.). *The future of war*. Pp. 147–166. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Bannon, Ian & Collier, Paul (2003). Natural resources and conflict: What we can do. In Ian Bannon & Paul Collier (Eds.) *Natural resources and violent conflict. Options and actions*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Beardsley, Brent (2009). Lessons learnt or not learnt from the Rwandan genocide. In Amanda F. Grzyb (Ed.) *The world and Darfur*. Pp. 41–60. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Beck, Ulrich (1999). *Mitä globalisaatio on? Virhekäsityksiä ja poliittisia vastauksia*. Tampere: Vastapaino (Originally in German: *Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus – Antworten auf Globalisierung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997)

Bekoe, Dorina A. (2008). *Implementing peace agreements. Lessons from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia*. USA: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bell, Wendell (1997a). *Foundations of future studies – Human science for a new era*. Vol 1. *History, purposes and knowledge*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Bell, Wendell (1997b). *Foundations of future studies – Human science for a new era*. Vol 2. *Values, objectivity and the good society*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Bell, Wendell (2009). Moral discourse, objectivity and the future. *Futura* 28 (1): 43–58.

Bellamy, Alex J. (2004). The “next stage” in peace operations theory? *International Peacekeeping* 11(1): 17–38.

Bellamy, Alex J. (2009). *Responsibility to protect. The global efforts to end mass atrocities*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bellamy, Alex J. (2011). *Global politics and the responsibility to protect. From words to deeds*. London: Routledge

Berdal, Mats (2008). The Security Council and peacekeeping. In Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh & Dominik Zaum (Eds.) *The United Nations Security Council and war. The evolution of thought and practice since 1945*. Pp. 175–204. Oxford: Oxford university press.

Berger, Peter L (2002). Introduction. In Peter L. Berger & Samuel P. Huntington (Eds.) *Many globalizations. Cultural diversity in the contemporary world*. Pp. 1–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blitz, Brad K. (2006). War and change. In Brad K. Blitz. (Eds.) *War and change in the Balkans. nationalism, conflict and cooperation*. Pp. 1–12. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boniecki, Kurt A. & Britt, Tomas W. (2003). Prejudice and the peacekeeper. In Thomas W. Britt & Amy B. Adler (Eds.). *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper. Lessons from the Field*. Pp. 53–70. Westport: Praeger.

Bottici, Chiara & Challand, Benoît (2010). *The myth of the clash of the civilizations*. London: Routledge.

Boucher, David (2009). *The limits of ethics in international relations. Natural law, natural rights, and human rights in transition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brahimi, Lakhdar (2006). United Nations peace operations in the 21st century: a few personal thoughts. In Hanna Ojanen (Ed.) *Peacekeeping – peacebuilding. Preparing for the future*. Pp. 13–20. Helsinki: Finnish Institute for Foreign Affairs.

- Brewer, Marilynn B. (2001). The many faces of social identity: implications for political psychology. *Political Psychology* 22 (1): 115–125.
- Brewer, Marilynn B. & Gaertner, Samuel L. (2005). Toward reduction of prejudice: Intergroup contact and social categorization. In Marilynn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds.). *Self and social identity*. Pp. 298–318. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Britt, Thomas W. (2003). Can participation in peacekeeping missions be beneficial? The importance of meaning as a function of attitudes and identity. In Thomas W. Britt & Amy B. Adler (Eds.). *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper. Lessons from the Field*. Pp. 71–88. Westport: Praeger.
- Brown, Oli (2008). *Migration and climate change*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Brown, Rupert (2000). *Group processes. Dynamics within and between groups*. Second edition. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Brown, Rupert & Capozza, Dora (2006). Motivational, emotional, and cultural influences in social identity processes. In Rupert Brown & Dora Capozza (Eds.). *Social identities. Motivational, emotional and cultural influences* Pp. 3–29. Cornwall: Psychology Press.
- Buerstedde, David (2005). Violence in Kosovo calls for a fresh look at the mission's priorities. *OSCE yearbook 2004*. Pp. 135–145. Germany: Nomos.
- Bull, Carolyn (2008). *No entry without strategy: Building the rule of law under UN transitional administration*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Burr, Vivien (2003). *Social constructionism*. 2nd edition. London: Routledge.
- Byman, Daniel (2011). Terrorism after the revolutions. How secular uprisings could help (or hurt) Jihadists? *Foreign Affairs* 90 (3): 48–54.
- Carey, Sabine C., Gibney, Mark, & Poe, Steven C. (2010). *The politics of human rights. The quest for dignity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carpenter, R. Charli. (2006). "Innocent women and children". *Gender, norms and the protection civilians*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Carreiras, Helena.(2006). *Gender and the Military: Women in Armed forces in Western Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Castano, Emanuele, Yzerbyt, Vincent Y., Paladino, Maria Paola, & Carnaghi, Andrea (2006). Extending the self in space and time: Social identification and existential concerns. In Rupert Brown & Dora Capozza (Eds.). *Social identities. Motivational, emotional and cultural influences* Pp. 73–90. Cornwall: Psychology Press.

Castells, Manuel (1998). *End of millennium. The information age: Economy, society and culture. Vol 3.* Great Britain: Blackwell.

Castells, Manuel (2009). *Communication power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Charron, Nicholas (2010). *Déjà vu all over again: A post-Cold war empirical analysis of Samuel Huntington's Clash of civilizations' theory.* *Cooperation and conflict*, 45 (1): 107–127.

Cheeseman, Graeme (2004). *Defending the "other": military force(s) and the cosmopolitan project.* In Michael Evans, Russell Parkin & Alan Ryan (Eds.). *Future armies, future challenges. Land warfare in the information age.* Pp. 216–236. Singapore: Allen & Unwin.

Chirot, Daniel (2001). *Introduction.* In Daniel Chirot & Martin E. Seligman (Eds.) *Ethnopolitical warfare. Causes, consequences, and possible solutions.* Pp. 3–26. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Chomsky, Noam (2006). *Failed states. The abuse of power and the assault on democracy.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Clausewitz, Carl von (1968). *On war.* London: Penguin Books.

Clemens, Walter C. (2006). *Understanding and coping with ethnic conflict and development issues in post-soviet Eurasia.* In Neil. E. Harrison (Ed.). *Complexity in world politics. Concepts and methods of a new paradigm.* Pp. 73–93 Albany: State university of New York.

CMC (2008c). *CMC Finland Yearbook 2008 on civilian crisis management studies.* Kuopio: CMC Finland.

Coghlan, David & Rashford, Nicholas S. (2006). *Organizational change and strategy.* London, Routledge.

Cohen, Louis, Manion, Lawrence, & Morrison, Keith (2007). *Research methods in education. Sixth edition.* London: Routledge.

Collier, Paul (2007). *The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Collier, Paul, & Sambanis, Nicholas (2005). *Preface.* In Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis (Eds.) *Understanding civil war. Evidence and analysis. Vol 2. Europe, Central Asia, and other regions.* Washington D.C: The World Bank.

Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke & Sambanis, Nicholas (2005). *The Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war onset and the case study project research design.* In Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis (Eds.) *Understanding civil war. Evidence and analysis. Vol 2. Europe, Central Asia, and other regions.* Pp. 1–33. Washington D. C: The World Bank.

Collin, Kaija (2005). Experience and shared practice. Design engineers' learning at work. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 261.

Conflict and fragility (2009). Preventing violence, war and state collapse. The future of conflict early warning and response. Paris: OECD.

de Coning, Cedric (2008). Civil-military coordination and complex peacebuilding systems. In Christopher Ankersen (Ed.) Civil-military cooperation in post-conflict operations. Emerging theory and practice. Pp. 52–74. London: Routledge.

Cook, Martin (2009). Teaching military ethics in the United States air force: Challenges posed by service culture. In Don Carrick, James Connelly & Paul Robinson (Eds.) Ethics education for irregular warfare. Pp. 107–118. Farnham: Ashgate.

Coté, James E. & Levine, Charles G. (2002) Identity formation, agency, and culture. A social psychological synthesis. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Coticchia, Fabrizio & Ferrari, Federica (2009). Security – old issues, new frames: securitization and human security. In Giampiero Giacomo & R. Graig Nation (Eds.) Security in the West. Evolution of the concept. Pp. 239–270. Milan: Vita e epsiero.

Crisis Management Center (2008b). Annual Report. Kuopio: Crisis Management Center.

Crisp, Richard J. & Hewstone, Miles (2006) Multiple social categorization. Context, process, and social consequences. In Richard J. Crisp & Miles Hewstone (Eds.) Multiple social categorization. Processes, models and applications. Pp. 3–22. Hove: Psychology Press.

Cronberg, Tarja (2003). Tulevaisuuden sodat – maan päällä ja taivaassa. In Anssi Männistö (Ed.) Miksi soditaan? Pp. 48–56. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Dalby, Simon (2009). Security and environmental change. Cambridge: Polity.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja (2007). Soldiers and statebuilding: The approach of the Danish armed forces to reconstruction support. Copenhagen: DIIS Report 2007:2. (<http://diis.dk/>)

Defence Command (2004). Teknologian kehitys. Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2020 (STAE 2020). Part 1. Helsinki: Edita.

Deng, Francis (2000). Out of Africa: the fate of the state and the international system. In Gwyn Prins & Hylke Tromp (Eds.). The future of war. Pp. 133–145. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Dixon, Jeffrey (2009). What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research findings. *International Studies Review* 11 (4): 707–735.

- Dobbins, James F. (2008). *After the Taliban. Nation-building in Afghanistan*. Washington D.C.: Potomac books.
- Dove, Fiona (2009). The responsibility to protect. *Development Dialogue*. 2009 (53): 77–81.
- Dovidio, John F., Gaertner, Samuel L, Hodson, Gordon, Riek, Blake M., Johnson, Kelly M. & Houlette, Missy (2006). Recategorization and crossed categorization. The implications of group salience and representations for reducing bias. In Richard J. Crisp & Miles Hewstone (Eds.) *Multiple social categorization. Processes, models and applications*. Pp. 65-89. Hove: Psychology Press.
- Doyle, Michael W. & Sambanis, Nicholas (2006). *Making war & building peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Duyvesteyn, Isabelle & Fumerton, Mario (2010). Insurgency and terrorism: is there a difference? In Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter & Christopher Coker (Eds.) *The character of war in the 21st century*. Pp. 27–41. London: Routledge.
- Eckert, Roland (2008). Violent events and collective identity. In Michal Finklestein & Kim Dent-Brown (Eds.) *Psychosocial stress in immigrants and in members of minority groups as a factor of terrorist behavior*. Pp. 16–22. Amsterdam: IOS press.
- Eerola, Annele & Miles, Ian (2011). Methods and tools contributing to FTA: A knowledge-based perspective. *Futures* 43 (2011) 265–278.
- Egnell, Robert (2009). *Complex peace operations and civil-military relations. Winning the peace*. London: Routledge.
- Ellström, Per-Erik & Kock, Henrik (2009). Competence development in the workplace: concepts, strategies and effects. In Knud Illeris (Ed.) *International perspectives on competence development*. Pp. 34–54. London: Routledge.
- Engeström, Yrjö (1987). *Learning by expanding*. Helsinki: Orienta-konsultit.
- Engeström, Yrjö (2004). *Ekspansiivinen oppiminen ja yhteiskehittely työssä*. Keuruu: Otava.
- Engeström, Yrjö & Sannino, Annalisa (2010). Studies of expansive learning: Foundations, findings and future challenges. *Educational Research Review* 5 1–24.
- Eronen, Oskari (2008). PRT models in Afghanistan: Approaches to civil-military integration. In *CMC Finland Yearbook 2008 on civilian crisis management studies*. Pp. 104–139. Kuopio: CMC Finland.
- Eskola, Jari & Suoranta, Juha (2000). *Johdatus laadulliseen tutkimukseen*. Tampere: Vastapaino.

- Eteläpelto, Anneli (2005). Tutkimus ammatti-identiteetin tukijana ja oppimisyhteisöjen rakentajana. *Aikuiskasvatus* 25 (2):150–154.
- Eteläpelto, Anneli (2007). Työidentiteetti ja subjektiiviset rakenteiden ja toimijuuden ristiaallokossa. In Anneli Eteläpelto, Kaija Collin & Jaana Saarinen (Eds.) *Työ, identiteetti ja oppiminen*. Pp. 90–142. Porvoo: WSOY.
- Eteläpelto, Anneli ja Vähäsantanen, Katja (2006). Ammatillinen identiteetti persoonallisena ja sosiaalisena konstruktiona. Teoksessa Anneli Eteläpelto ja Jussi Onnismäe (Toim.) *Ammatillisuus ja ammatillinen kasvu*. Vantaa: Kansanvalistusseura.
- European Union (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world. European security strategy*. Brussels: European Union.
- Evans, Michael (2004). Clausewitz's chameleon: military theory and practice in the early 21st century. In Michael Evans, Russell Parkin & Alan Ryan (Eds.). *Future armies, future challenges. Land warfare in the information age*. Pp. 26–45. Singapore: Allen&Unwin.
- Ewan, Pauline (2007). Deepening the human security debate: Beyond the politics of conceptual clarification. *Politics*, 27(3): 182–189.
- Fagan, Andrew (2010). *The atlas of human rights*. UK: Earthscan.
- Flournoy, Michèle A. (2006). Nation-building: Lessons learned and unlearned. In Francis Fukuyama (Eds.). *Nation-building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Pp. 86–104. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Foreign Policy (2011). Failed states. *The 2011 index*. *Foreign Policy* 2011, 4, 48–50.
- Forsberg, Tuomas (2010). Minkälaisista kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimusta tarvitaan? In Vilho Harle (Ed.) *Näkökulmia kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimukseen*. 3rd edition. Pp. 23–31. Tampere: University of Tampere, Department of political science and international relations.
- Fox, Jonathan & Sandler, Shmuel (2004). *Bringing religion into international relations*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan
- Franke, Volker (2003). The social identity of peacekeeping. In Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (Eds.) *The psychology of the peacekeeper. Lessons from the field*. Pp. 31–51. Westport: Praeger.
- Franke, Volker C. & Warnecke, Andrea (2009) *Building peace: An inventory of UN peace missions since the end of the Cold War*. *International peacekeeping*. Vol 16(3), pp 407–436.
- From-Emmesberger, Sofie (2008). Gender and crisis management. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). *Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocks for Finnish crisis management*. Pp. 54–60. Tuusula: Finnish Defence forces international centre.

Fukuyama, Francis (2006a). Guidelines for future nation-builders. In Francis Fukuyama (Ed.) *Nation-building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Pp. 231–244. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis (2006b). Nation-building and the failure of institutional memory. In Francis Fukuyama (Ed.) *Nation-building. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Pp. 1–18. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

The future of military leadership and management. (2007). Ed. Marko Laaksonen. Helsinki: Edita prima.

Gergen, Kenneth (2009). *An invitation to social construction*. Second edition. Los Angeles: Sage.

Ghani, Ashraf & Lockhart, Clare (2008). *Fixing failed states. Framework for rebuilding a fractured world*. Oxford: Oxford university press.

Giddens, Anthony (1991). *Modernity and self-identity. Self and society in the late modern age*. Cambridge: Polity press.

Giddens, Anthony (1999). *Runaway world. How globalisation is reshaping our lives*. London: Profile books.

Giddens, Anthony (2009). *The politics of climate change*. Cambridge: Polity press.

Giustozzi, Antonio (2010). Novelty is in the eye of the beholder: understanding the Taliban in Afghanistan. In Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter & Christopher Coker (Eds.) *The character of war in the 21st century*. Pp. 57–71. London: Routledge.

Glenn, Jerome C & Gordon, Theodore J (2007). *2007 state of the future*. Washington (D.C.): World Federation of United Nations Associations & American Council for the United Nations University.

Glenn, Jerome C, Gordon Theodore J. and Florescu, Elizabeth (2010). *2010 state of the future*. Washington D.C.: Millennium project.

Global Humanitarian Forum (2009). *The anatomy of a silent crisis. Human impact report: climate change*. Global Humanitarian Forum: Geneve.

Glover, Jonathan (2001). *Humanity. A moral history of the twentieth century*. London: Pimlico.

Godet, Michel (2001). *Creating futures. Scenario planning as a strategic management tool*. London: Economica.

Goldstein, Joshua (2001). *War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Government of Finland (2004). Finnish security and defence policy 2004. Government report. Helsinki: Edita Prima.
- Government of Finland (2009a). Finnish security and defence policy 2009. Government report. Helsinki: Edita Prima.
- Government of Finland (2009b). Valtioneuvoston selonteko Eduskunnalle Suomen ihmisoikeuspolitiikasta 2009. (In English: Government report to Parliament on Finnish human rights policy 2009.) Helsinki: Edita Prima.
- Gotchev, Atanas (2006). Terrorism and globalization. In Louise Richardson (Ed.) *The roots of terrorism*. Pp. 103–115. New York: Routledge.
- Grasa, Rafael (2003). Prólogo. La construcción de la paz posconflicto armado: Punto de encuentro de la resolución de conflictos, la investigación para la paz y la cooperación para el desarrollo. In Romeva i Rueda, Raül. (2003). *Guerra, posguerra y paz. Pautas para el análisis y la intervención en contextos posbélicos o postacuerdo*. Pp. 11–28. Spain: Icaria.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (2006). Economic factors. In Louise Richardson (Ed.) *The roots of terrorism*. Pp. 85–101. New York: Routledge.
- Haas, Michael (2008). *International human rights. A comprehensive introduction*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Haavisto, Pekka (1999). *Kesä Balkanilla*. Jyväskylä: Wutum.
- Haftendorn, Helga (2008). How well can Europe and the United States cooperate on non-European issues? In Geir Lundestad (Ed.) *Just another major crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000*. Pp. 137–158. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hakkarainen, Kai, Lonka, Kirsti & Lipponen Lasse (2004). *Tutkiva oppiminen. Järki, tunteet ja kulttuuri oppimisen syyttäjinä*. Porvoo: WSOY.
- Halonen, Anna (2005). Kuusi vuotta siviilikriisinhallinnan historiaa. Teoksessa Senja Korhonen & Johanna Sumuvuori (Eds.) *Konflikteista kehitykseen. Johdatus Euroopan unionin siviilikriisinhallintaan*. Pp. 16–29. Suomen Sadankomitealiitto and KATU, Jyväskylä.
- Halonen, Pekka (2008). Oppimiskulttuurin muutos puolustusvoimissa – kohti työssä oppimisen valmiuksia. In Juha Mäkinen (Ed.) *Opettajuus Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulussa ennen, nyt ja tulevaisuudessa? Opettajien tunteja opettajuudestaan, opiskelijoistaan vertaisistaan ja korkeakoulustaan*. Pp. 102–110. Edita Prima: Helsinki.
- Harmon, Christopher C. (2008). *Terrorism today*. Second edition. London: Routledge.
- Haslam, S. Alexander (2004). *Psychology in organizations. The social identity approach*. 2nd edition. London: Sage publications.

Hawkins, Virgil (2008). *Stealth conflicts. How the world's worst violence is ignored.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Hedlund, Erik & Soeters, Joseph (2010). Reflections on Swedish peacekeepers' self-image and dilemmas of peacekeeping. *International peacekeeping* 17(3): 408–414.

Heikkilä, Kirsi (2006). Työssä oppiminen yksilön ja oppimisympäristöjen välisenä vuorovaikutuksena. *Aikuiskasvatus* 26 (2):144–147.

Heinonen, Reijo E. (2000). *Arvomuisti kehitysyhteistyössä. Kulttuurien kohtaamisen lähtökohtia.* Turku: Gillot.

Heinonen, Reijo E. (2002). Values memory, global ethic and civil crisis management. In Jarmo Toiskallio, Wolfgang Rojl, Reijo E. Heinonen & Pekka Halonen, *Cultures, values and future soldiers.* Helsinki: Finnish National Defence College, Department of education.

Heinonen, Reijo E. (2004a). Mikä tulevaisuudessa takaa turvallisuutemme. Kohden kollektiivisen turvallisuuden käsitettä. *Futura* 23 (3): 75–81.

Heinonen, Reijo E. (2004b). When the foundations of our security are shaken. On the birth of neo-terrorism. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Identity, ethics and soldierhip.* ACIE publications 2004. National defence College, Department of education, No. 1. Pp. 47–56.

Heinänen, Jukka (2008). Upseerien arvotutkimus 2007. In Torsti Sirén (Ed) *Upseerina 100-vuotiaassa Suomessa – Millä arvoilla muutoksen maailmassa?* Pp. 7–30. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Heisbourg, Francois (2003). *Hyperterrorisme: La nouvelle guerre.* Paris: Odile Jacob.

Heiskanen, Erika & Salo, Jari (2008). *Eettinen johtaminen. Tie kestävään menestykseen.* Helsinki: Talentum.

Helin, Jukka (2008). Pappina kansainvälisissä tehtävissä. In Hannu Niskanen & Valde Palola (Eds.) *Rauhan asialla.* Pp. 163–180. Helsinki: Minerva.

Helkama, Klaus (2009). *Moraalipsykologia. Hyvän ja pahan tällä puolen.* Helsinki: Edita.

Henk, Dan (2007). Human security and the Military in the 21st Century. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Ethical Education in the Military. What, How and Why in the 21st Century?* Pp. 211–237. ACIE Publications. National Defence University, Department of Education, Series 1, 1. Helsinki:Edita.

Hewstone, Miles & Cairns, Ed (2001). Social psychology and intergroup conflict. In Daniel Chirot & Martin E. Seligman (Eds.). *Ethnopolitical warfare. Causes, consequences, and possible solutions.* Pp. 319–342. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

- Hirsjärvi, Sirkka & Hurme, Helena (2006). Tutkimushaastattelu. Teemahaastattelun teoria ja käytäntö. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.
- Hofstede, Geert (2001). Culture's consequences. Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Hogg, Michael A. (2004). Social categorization and group behavior. In Marilyn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds) *Self and social identity*. Pp. 203–231. Blackwell, Malden.
- Hoikkala, Tommi, Salasuo, Mikko & Ojajärvi, Anni (2009). Tunnetut sotilaat. Varusmiehen kokemus ja terveystaju. Jyväskylä: Nuorisotutkimusverkosto.
- Holbeche, Linda (2006). *Understanding change. Theory, implementation and success*. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Holsti, Kalevi J (1991). *Peace and war: armed conflicts and international order 1648–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holsti, Kalevi J. (1996). *The state, war and the state of war*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Horgan, John (2005). *The psychology of terrorism*. London: Routledge.
- Horowitz, Donald L. (2000). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. 2nd edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Howard, Lise Morjé (2008). *UN peacekeeping in civil wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hudson, Natalie Florea (2010). *Gender, human security and the United Nations. Security language as a political framework for women*. London: Routledge.
- Hugo, Graeme (2008). *Migration, development and environment*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Huhtinen, Aki-Mauri (2006). Sotilasjohtamisen toimintaympäristöt. Teoksessa Aki-Mauri Huhtinen & Jarmo Toiskallio (Eds.) *Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu - kehittyvä sotatieteellinen yliopisto*. Professori Mikko Viitasalon juhlaKirja. Helsinki:Edita.
- Huhtinen, Aki-Mauri & Rantapelkonen, Jari (2007). Informaatioajan sotataidon kritiikki. *Sotilasaikakauslehti*, 82 (5):16–20.
- Hulme, Mike (2009). *Why we disagree about climate change. Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity*. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
- Human security report 2005 (2005). New York: Oxford University Press.

Huntington, Samuel (2003). *Kulttuurien kamppailu ja uusi maailmanjärjestys*. Helsinki: Terra Cognita. (Originally in English: *The Clash of the Civilizations, Remaking of the World Order*. 1996)

Häikiö, Antti (2008). *Nine springs in the Balkans- frog symphony in major and minor keys*. In Nina Suomalainen & Jyrki Karvinen (Eds.) *The Ahtisaari legacy. Resolve and negotiate*. Pp. 143–160. Vantaa: Tammi.

Häikiö, Antti (2010). *Kriisinhallinta vaatii asennetta ja osaamista*. Helsingin sanomat, January 21, 2010.

Hämeen-Anttila, Jaakko (2003). *Islam – sodan ja rauhan uskonto. Tulevaisuuden sodat – maan päällä ja taivaassa*. In Anssi Männistö (Ed.) *Miksi soditaan?* Pp. 110–121. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Hämäläinen, Juha and Nivala, Elina (2008). *Kasvatustiede. Pedagogisen ihmistyön tiede*. Finland: Unipress.

IISS/International institute for strategic studies (2010). *The military balance 2010. The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics*. London: Routledge.

Ikenberry, G. John (2008). *Unilateralism in US foreign policy: What role does America see for Europe?* Geir Lundestad (Ed.) *Just another major crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000*. Pp. 77–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Illeris, Knud (2009a). *A comprehensive understanding of human learning*. In Knud Illeris (Ed.) *Contemporary theories of learning. Learning theorists...in their own words*. Pp. 7–20. London: Routledge.

Illeris, Knud (2009b). *Introduction*. In Knud Illeris (Ed.) *Contemporary theories of learning. Learning theorists...in their own words*. Pp. 1–6. London: Routledge.

Illeris, Knud (2009c). *Competence, learning and education: how can competences be learned, and how can they be developed in formal education?* In Knud Illeris (Ed.) *International perspectives on competence development*. Pp. 83–98. London: Routledge.

Illeris, Knud (2011). *The fundamentals of workplace learning. Understanding how people learn in working life*. London: Routledge.

ILO (2006). *The end of child labour: within reach. Global report under the follow-up to the ILO declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work. International labour conference, 95th session. Report I (B)*. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Inayatullah, Sohail (2010). *Theory and practice in transformation: The disowned futures of integral extension*. *Futures* 42: 103–109.

International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2006). Human rights in the OSCE region: Europe, Central Asia and North America. Report 2006 (Events of 2005). Austria: Druckerei Janetscek.

International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2007). Human rights in the OSCE region: Europe, Central Asia and North America. Report 2007 (Events of 2006). Austria: Druckerei Janetscek.

Jacobsen, Carl G. (2000). Peacemaking as Realpolitik, conflict resolution and oxymoron: the record, the challenge. In Johan Galtung & Carl G. Jacobsen Searching for Peace. The road to transcend. USA: Pluto Press.

Jacoby, Tim (2008). Understanding conflict and violence. Theoretical and interdisciplinary approaches. London: Routledge.

Jarvis, Peter (2010). Adult education and lifelong learning. Theory and practice. 4th edition. London: Routledge.

Jarvis, Peter (2009). Learning to be a person in society: learning to be me. In Knud Illeris (Ed.). Contemporary theories of learning. Learning theorists...in their own words. Pp. 21–34. London: Routledge.

Johansson, Eva (1997). The role of peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish experience in UNPROFOR. *Armed forces & Society*, 23 (3): 451–466.

Johansson, Eva (2001). The UNknown soldier. A portrait of the Swedish peacekeeper at the threshold of the 21st century. Sweden: Karlstad University Studies: 21.

Johansson, Eva (1997). The role of peacekeepers in the 1990s: Swedish experience in UNPROFOR. *Armed Forces & Society*, 23 (3): 451–466.

Jokinen, Arto (2010). Asevelvollisuus tasa-arvokysymyksenä. In Pirjo Jukarainen & Sirkku Terävä (Eds.) Tasa-arvoinen turvallisuus? Sukupuolten yhdenvertaisuus suomalaisessa maanpuolustuksessa ja kriisinhallinnassa. Pp. 127–129. Hämeenlinna: Minerva.

Jortikka-Laitinen, Tiina (2006). Euroopan unionin siviilikriisinhallinta. In Forsberg, Tuomas et al. Yhteisten arvojen puolesta? Suomi ja EU:n kriisinhallinta. Pp. 118–146. Helsinki: Eurooppa-tiedotus.

Judah, Tim (2008). Kosovo. What everyone needs to know. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark (2003). Terror in the mind of God. The global rise of religious violence. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark (2006). Religion as a cause of terrorism. In Louise Richardson (Ed.) The roots of terrorism. Pp. 133–144. New York: Routledge.

- Juergensmeyer, Mark (2008). *Global rebellion. Religious challenges to the secular state, from Christian militias to Al Qaeda*. London: University of California Press.
- Junkkari, Kaija Maria and Junkkari, Lari (2003). *Nykyajan paimentolaiset. Työ ja koti maailmalla*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Järnefelt, Noora (2002a). Kiireen hallinta työn muutoksessa. In Noora Järnefelt & Anna-Maija Lehto *Työhulluja vai hulluja töitä?* Pp. 57–104. Helsinki: Statistics Finland.
- Järnefelt, Noora (2002b). Työkiireen syiden jäljillä. In Noora Järnefelt & Anna-Maija Lehto *Työhulluja vai hulluja töitä?* Pp. 17–53. Helsinki: Statistics Finland.
- Juuti, Pauli (2006). *Organisaatiokäyttäytyminen*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Kagan, Robert (2008). *The return of history and the end of dreams*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Marja-Liisa & Heinlahti, Kaisa (2006). *Mitä on tutkimus? Argumentaatio ja tieteenfilosofia*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Kaldor, Mary (1999/2001). *New and old wars: organized violence in a global era*. UK: Polity Press.
- Kaldor, Mary (2007). *Human security. Reflections on globalization and intervention*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. & Sambanis, Nicholas (2005). Bosnia's civil war. Origins and violence dynamics. In Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis (Eds.) *Understanding civil war. Evidence and analysis. Vol 2. Europe, Central Asia, and other regions*. Pp. 191–229. Washington D. C: The World Bank.
- Kamppinen, Matti (2003). Johdanto. In Matti Kamppinen, Osmo Kuusi & Sari Söderlund (Eds.) *Tulevaisuudentutkimus. Perusteet ja sovellukset*. Pp. 17–18. Tampere: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura.
- Kamppinen, Matti & Malaska, Pentti (2003). Mahdolliset maailmat ja niistä tietäminen. In Matti Kamppinen, Osmo Kuusi ja Sari Söderlund (Eds.) *Tulevaisuudentutkimus. Perusteet ja sovellukset*. Pp. 55–116. Tampere: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura.
- Kamppinen, Matti, Malaska, Pentti & Kuusi, Osmo (2003). Tulevaisuudentutkimuksen peruskäsitteet. In Matti Kamppinen, Osmo Kuusi ja Sari Söderlund (Eds.) *Tulevaisuudentutkimus. Perusteet ja sovellukset*. Pp. 19–53. Tampere: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura.
- Kangas, Seppo (1999). *Rauhanturvaajaseurakunta puolustusvoimien vuosina 1918–1998 tekemän kirkollisen työn konstruktiona*. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of Education.

- Katko, Tapio (2009). Water and development. In Mikko Perkiö (Ed.) Perspectives to global social development. Pp. 197–204. Tampere: Tampere University Press.
- Kauppi, Antti (2004). Työ muuttuu – muuttuuko oppiminen? In Päivi Tynjälä, Jussi Välimaa & Mari Murtonen (Eds.) Korkeakoulutus, oppiminen ja työelämä. Pp. 187–212. Juva: PS-kustannus.
- Kauppinen, Kaisa & Huida, Outi (1994). Naiset, rauhanturvaamistyö ja muutos. Helsinki: Puolustusvoimien koulutuksen kehittämiskeskus.
- Kauppinen, Kaisa & Veikkola, Hanna-Kaisa (1997). Tasa-arvoistuvat työyhteisöt. Helsinki: Työterveyslaitos.
- Keating, Tom & Knight, Andy (2004). Introduction. Recent developments in postconflict studies – peacebuilding and governance. In Keating, Tom & Andy Knight (Eds.). Building sustainable Peace. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,
- Keegan, John (1994). A history of warfare. New York: Vintage Books.
- Keegan, John (2000). A brief history of warfare – past, present, future. In Gwyn Prins & Hylke Tromp (Eds.). The future of war. Pp. 171–180. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Keltikangas-Järvinen, Liisa (2010). Sosiaalisuus ja sosiaaliset taidot. Juva: WSOY.
- Kennedy, Denis & Kotilainen, Noora (2009). Kriisinhallinnan haasteita ja vaaroja ei tiedosteta kunnolla. Helsingin Sanomat. 12th October, 2009.
- Kennedy, Paul (2006). The parliament of man. The past, present, and future of the United Nations. New York: Random House.
- Kerkkänen, Ari (2008). On intelligent approach in crisis management. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocks for Finnish crisis management. Pp. 85–96. Tuusula: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.
- Kerr, Rachel & Mobekk, Eirin (2007). Peace and justice. Seeking accountability after war. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Keskinen, Auli (1999). Towards user empowerment. On development of utilisation of information and communications technology in decision making of administrations. Tampere: Studia Politica Tamperensis, No 6, University of Tampere, Department of Political Science and International Relations.
- Kinnunen, Merja (2004). Paikallinen ja globaali vertailevassa tutkimuksessa. In Risto Alapuro & Ilkka Arminen (Eds.) Vertailevan tutkimuksen ulottuvuuksia. Pp. 67–80. Vantaa: WSOY.

Kiras, David (2008). Irregular warfare. In David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck & C. Dale Walton (Eds.) *Understanding modern warfare*- Pp. 224–291. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.

Kirpal, Simone (2004). Researching work identities in a European context. Introduction. *Career development international*, 9 (3): 199–221.

Kivimäki, Timo (2003a). Introduction. In Timo Kivimäki (Ed.) *Development cooperation as an instrument in the prevention of terrorism*. Research report. Pp. 1–4. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS).

Kivimäki, Timo (2003b). The era of terrorism. the global context of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In Timo Kivimäki (Ed.) *Development cooperation as an instrument in the prevention of terrorism*. Research report. Pp. 5–8. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS).

Kivimäki, Timo & Laakso, Liisa (2003). Causes of terrorism. In Timo Kivimäki (Ed.) *Development cooperation as an instrument in the prevention of terrorism*. Research report. Pp. 85–98. Copenhagen: Nordic institute of Asian studies (NIAS).

Klare, Michael T. (2002). *Resource wars. The new landscape of global conflict*. 2nd edition. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Knight, Andy (2008). Civil-military cooperation and human security. In Christopher Ankensen (Ed.) *Civil-military cooperation in post-conflict operations. Emerging theory and practice*. Pp. 15–30. London: Routledge.

Koivula, Tommi (2005). EU battle group: the big picture. In Mika Kerttunen, Tommi Koivula & Tommy Jeppsson: *EU battlelegroups. Theory and development in the light of Finnish-Swedish co-operation*. Helsinki: National Defence College.

Kokkarinen, Helena (2008). Becoming comprehensive: Finnish and European developments. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). *Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocksfor Finnish crisis management*. Pp. 23–29. Tuusula: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

Koponen, Juhani (2009). Development aid at the heart of development policy. In Mikko Perkiö (Ed.) *Perspectives to global social development*. Pp. 38–46. Tampere: Tampere University Press.

Korhonen, Outi, Gras, Jutta & Creutz, Katja (2006). *International Post-Conflict Situations: New Challenges for Co-Operative Governance*. Helsinki: The Erik Castrén Institute Research Reports (18/2006), Hakapaino.

Korvajärvi, Päivi (2007) . Paikallinen ja ruumiillinen sukupuoli työssä. In Kasvio Antti & Tjäder Johanna (Eds.) *Työ murroksessa*. Pp. 153-167. Otava: Keuruu.

Koskela, Mauri (2008). Preface. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocks for Finnish crisis management. Pp. 5–9. Tuusula: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

Kotilainen, Nora (2011). Humanitarian soldiers, colonialised others and invisible enemies. Visual strategic communication narratives of the Afghan war. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Kristoffersen, Lene (2006). Soldiers or saints? : Norwegian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Afghanistan. Oslo: Institute for Defence Studies.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962/1970) The Structure of scientific revolutions. Second edition, enlarged. Chigago: The University of Chigago Press.

Kuosmanen, Taru (2007). Bringing Justice Closer: Hybrid Courts in Post-Conflict Societies. Helsinki: The Erik Castrén Institute Research Reports 22/2007.

Kupila, Päivi (2007). ”Minäkö asiantuntija” Varhaiskasvatuksen asiantuntijan merkitysperspektiivin ja identiteetin rakentuminen. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.

Kurkinen, Petteri (2001). Siviili-sotilasyhteistyö kriisinhallintaoperaatioissa. Helsinki: National Defence College/Edita.

Kuusela, Pekka (2002). Sosiaalipsykologian maailmahypoteesit. Tieteenalan historia ja sosiaalisen konstruktionismin muodot. Finland: Unipress.

Kuusi, Osmo (1993). Delfoi-tekniikka tulevaisuuden tekemisen välineenä. In Matti Vapaavuori (Ed.) Miten tutkimme tulevaisuutta? Pp. 132–140. Helsinki: Painatuskeskus.

Kuusi, Osmo (1999). Expertise in the future use of generic technologies. Helsinki: Government Institute for Economic Research.

Kuusi, Osmo (2003). Delfoi-menetelmä. In Matti Kamppinen, Osmo Kuusi & Sari Söderlund (Eds.) Tulevaisuudentutkimus. Perusteet ja sovellukset. Pp. 204–225. Tampere: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura.

Laakso Liisa (2003) Siviilikriisinhallinta ja yhdentyvän Euroopan globaalipolitiikka. Teoksessa Maailman tutkimisesta ja muuttamisesta. Juhlakirja Jyrki Käkösen täyttäessä 60 vuotta 23.1.2003. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute. University of Tampere.

Lahdenperä, Jyrki & Harinen, Olli (2000). KFOR-joukkojen suomalaisen pataljoonan (SP/KFOR) reserviläisten näkemys koulutuksellisesta valmiudestaan. Vaasa: Development Center of the Finnish National Defence Forces.

Lahikainen, Anja Riitta (2000). Turvallisuus identiteettikysymyksenä. In Pauli Niemelä & Anja Riitta Lahikainen (Eds.) Inhimillinen turvallisuus. Pp. 61–89. Tallinna: Vastapaino.

Landman, Todd (2009). Social science methods and human rights. In Fons Coomans, Fred Grünfeld & Menno T Kaminga (Eds.) *Methods of human rights research*. Pp. 19–44. Antwerp: Intersentia.

Langille, H. Peter (2008). Preventing genocide and crimes against humanity. In Amanda F. Grzyb (Ed.) *The world and Darfur*. Pp. 280–327. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Laungani, Pittu D. (2007). *Understanding cross-cultural psychology. Eastern and western perspectives*. London: Sage.

Lebow, Richard Ned (2010). *Why nations fight. Past and future motives for war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lehnardt, Chia (2009). Peacekeeping. In Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher (Eds.) *Private security, public order. The outsourcing of public services and its limits*. Pp. 205–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lehto, Anna-Maija & Sutela, Hanna (2008). *Työolojen kolme vuosikymmentä. Työolotutkimusten tuloksia 1977–2008*. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus.

Leitenberg, Milton. 2006. *Deaths in wars and conflicts in the 20th century*. Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional paper 29, third edition.

Lewis, Duncan (2004). Lessons from East Timor. In Michael Evans, Russell Parkin & Alan Ryan (Eds.). *Future armies, future challenges. Land warfare in the information age*. Pp. 264–281. Singapore: Allen&Unwin.

Liesinen, Kalle (2008). Future challenges of the peacemaking processes. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). *Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocks for Finnish crisis management*. Pp. 41–46. Tuusula: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

Limnell, Jarno (2004). Upseerin arvotutkimus. In *Kadettikunta: Maailman ja yhteiskunnan muutos – upseerin arvot ja perinteet*. Pp. 13–43. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Limnell, Jarno (2008). Upseerina 100-vuotiaassa Suomessa. In Torsti Sirén (Ed.) *Upseerina 100-vuotiaassa Suomessa – Millä arvoilla muutoksen maailmassa?* Helsinki: National Defence University.

Limnell, Jarno (2009). *Suomen uhkakuvapolitiikka 2000-luvun alussa*. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of strategic studies.

Limnell, Jarno (2011). *Maailma ja Suomi 9/11 jälkeen*. Helsinki: WSOY.

Limnell, Jarno & Moberg, Michael (2008). *Nuorten upseerien näkemyksiä kansainvälistymisestä ja mahdollisesta Nato-jäsenyydestä*. Helsinki: National Defence University.

- Limnell, Jarno & Salenius-Pasternak, Charly (2010). Kriisinhallintamme kaippaa selviä tavoitteita. Helsingin Sanomat 28.7.2010.
- Lindberg, Sara & Melvin, Neil J. (2007). Major armed conflicts. In SIPRI yearbook 2007. Pp. 55–78. Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Oxford University Press.
- Lindley, Dan (2007). Promoting peace with information. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lindsey, Charlotte (2005) Rape and other forms of sexual violence. In Marie Valiachová & Lea BIASON (Eds.) Women in an insecure world: violence against women – facts, figures and analysis. Pp. 113–129. Geneva: DCAF.
- Linjakumpu, Aini (2009). Islamin globaalit verkostot. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Lintonen, Raimo (2007). The UN and the governance of global security. Ministry of Defence (2007). Predictors regarding actors up to the year 2030. In Pekka Sivonen and Henriikki Heikka (Eds.). Pp. 114–125. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence.
- Linturi, Hannu (2007). Delfoin metamorfooseja. Futura, 2007, 26 (1): 102–113.
- Lonsdale, David (2008). Strategy. In David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck & C. Dale Walton: Understanding modern warfare- P 14–63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lucas, George R., Jr. (2009). Foreword: 'This is not your father's war.' In Don Carrick, James Connelly & Paul Robinson (Eds.) Ethics education for irregular warfare. Pp. 1–11. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Lundelin, Mika (2008). Johdatus sotilaslakimiehen toimintaan kriisinhallintaoperaatioissa. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Mabey, Nick (2008). Delivering climate security. International security responses to a climate changed world. Albingdon. The Royal United Services Institute/Routledge.
- Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). The new Asian hemisphere. The irresistible shift of global power to the East. New York: Public Affairs.
- Malaska, Pentti (1993). Tulevaisuustietoisuus ja tulevaisuuteen tunkeutuminen. In Matti Vapaavuori (Ed.) Miten tutkimme tulevaisuutta? Pp. 6–12. Helsinki: Painatuskeskus.
- Malešević, Sinisa (2010). The sociology of war and violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malik, J. Mohan (2009). India's response to China's rise. In Kevin J. Cooney & Yoichiro Sato (Eds.) The rise of China and international security. America and Asia respond. Pp. 177–212. London: Routledge.

- Malkki, Janne, Marjomaa, Risto, Raitasalo, Jyri, Karasjärvi, Tero & Sipilä, Joonas (2008). *Sodan historia*. Helsinki: Otava.
- Malkki, Leena, Paastela, Jukka, Eloranta, Elina, Lahtinen, Mikko, Renkama, Jukka & Sinkkonen, Teemu (2007). *Terrorismin monet kasvot*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Mamdani, Mahmood (2009). *Saviors and survivors. Darfur, politics, and the war on terror*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Mannermaa, Mika (2004). *Heikoista signaaleista vahva tulevaisuus*. Helsinki: WSOY.
- Mannermaa, Mika (2008). *Jokuveli. Elämä ja vaikuttaminen ubiikkiyhteiskunnassa*. Juva: WSOY.
- Mamia, Tero (2009). Mistä työhyvinvointi syntyy? In Raimo Blom & Ari Hautaniemi (Eds.) *Työelämä muuttuu, joutaako hyvinvointi?* Pp. 20–55. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Martin, Mary & Kaldor, Mary (2010). Introduction. In Mary Martin & Mary Kaldor (Eds.) *The European Union and Human Security. External interventions and missions*. Pp. 1–11. London: Routledge.
- Martin, Mary & Owen, Taylor (2010). The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience. *International affairs* 86: 1, 211–224.
- Martin, Susan Ehrlich & Jurik, Nancy C. (2007). *Doing justice, doing gender. Women in legal and criminal justice occupations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Maslow, Abraham⁵⁸ (1998). *Maslow on management*. New York: John Wiley&Sons.
- May, Larry (2007). *War crimes and just war*. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
- MacFarlane, S. Neil & Khong, Yuen Foong (2006). *Human security and the UN. A critical history*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- MacFarling, Ian (2004). Asymmetric warfare: myth or reality? In Michael Evans, Russell Parkin & Alan Ryan (Eds.). *Future armies, future challenges. Land warfare in the information age*. Pp. 139–157. Singapore: Allen&Unwin.
- McCants, William (2011). Al Qaeda's challenge. The jihadists' war with Islamists democrats. *Foreign affairs* 90 (5): 20–32.
- McCoubrey, Hilaire & Morris, Justin (2000). *Regional peacekeeping in post-cold war era. Great Britain: Klower Law International*.
- McGarty, Craig (2006). Hierarchies and minority groups. The roles of salience, overlap, and background knowledge in selecting meaningful social categorizations from multiple

⁵⁸ with Deborah C. Stephens and Gary Heil.

- alternatives. In Richard J. Crisp & Miles Hewstone (Eds.) *Multiple social categorization. Processes, models and applications*. Pp. 25–47. Hove: Psychology Press.
- McMaster, H. R. (2009). Preserving soldiers' moral character in counter-insurgency operations. In Don Carrick, James Connelly & Paul Robinson (Eds.) *Ethics education for irregular warfare*. Pp. 15–26. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Medcalf, Jennifer (2008). *Going global or going nowhere? NATO's role in contemporary international security*. Oxford: Peter Lang.
- Melasuo, Tuomo (2009). Cultural competence – smooth behaviour or deep understanding? In Susanne Ådahl (Ed.) *Varying cultures in modern crisis management*. Pp. 13–21. Helsinki: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.
- Metsola, Lalli (2008). Turvallisuus ja kehitys kietoutuvat entistä tiiviimmin yhteen. *Helsingin Sanomat*, August 18, 2008.
- Metsämuuronen, Jari (2001). *Laadullisen tutkimuksen perusteet*. Estonia: International Medhelp.
- Mezirow, Jack (2009). An overview on transformative learning. In Knud Illeris (Ed.) *Contemporary theories of learning. Learning theorists...in their own words*. Pp. 90–105. London: Routledge.
- Miall, Hugh (2007). *Emergent conflict and peaceful change*. Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan
- Micewski, Edwin R. (2005). On the philosophical framework for the ethical debate in professional military education. In Edwin R Micewski & Hubert Annen (Eds.) *Military ethics in professional military education – revisited*. Pp. 13–21. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Studies for Military Pedagogy, Military Science and Security Policy.
- Micklethwait, John & Woolridge, Adrian (2009). *God is back. How the global revival of faith is changing the world*. New York: Penguin.
- Mikkonen, Riku (2008). *Sotilaan eettinen toimintakyky ja päätöksenteko. Teoreettinen mallinnus ja empiirinen tutkimus kriisinhallintaympäristössä*. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Ministry of Defence (2007). Predictors regarding actors up to the year 2030. In Pekka Sivonen & Henriikki Heikka (Eds.). Helsinki: Ministry of Defence.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2009). *Suomen kokonaisvaltainen kriisinhallintastrategia*. (In English: *A Comprehensive strategy in crisis management*.) Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Ministry of the Interior (2008c). Finland's national strategy for civilian crisis management. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

Moisio, Elina & Salimäki, Aino (2005). Osaamisen johtaminen ja palkitseminen. In Matti Vartiainen & Juhani Kauhanen (Eds.) Palkitseminen globaalissa Suomessa. Pp. 176–198. Helsinki: WSOY.

Mueller, John (2006). Accounting for the waning of major war. In Raimo Väyrynen (Ed.). The waning of major war. Theories and debates. Pp. 64–79. London: Routledge.

Muggah, Robert & Krause, Keith (2009). Closing the gap between peace operations and post-conflict insecurity: towards a violence reduction agenda. *International peacekeeping*, 16 (1): 136–150.

Murphy, Ray (2007). UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mustonen, Jari (2008). Coordination and cooperation on tactical and operational levels: Studying EU-ESDP crisis management instruments. In CMC Finland Yearbook 2008 on civilian crisis management studies. Pp. 18–41. Kuopio: CMC Finland.

Mäki, Kirsi (2007). Sota. In Johanna Kantola & Johanna Valenius (Eds.) Toinen maailmanpolitiikka. 10 käsitettä feministiseen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimukseen. Pp. 99–118. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Mäkinen, Juha (2006). The learning and knowledge creating school: case of the Finnish National Defence College. Helsinki: the Finnish National Defence College.

Männistö, Anssi (2003). Islam, länsi ja kylmän sodan perintö. Teoksessa Anssi Männistö (Ed.). Miksi soditaan? Pp. 122–134. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Määttä, Jukka (2007). Asepalvelus nuorten naisten ja miesten opinto- ja työuralla. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.

Nahm, Sue J. (2006). From bad to better: Reflections on refugee and IDP militarization in Africa. In: Robert Muggah (Ed.) No refuge: the crisis of refugee militarization in Africa. Pp. 217–250. London: Zed Books.

Naidoo, Kumi (2010). Boiling point "Can citizen action save the world?" *Development Dialogue*, 2010 (54).

Newman, Edward (2006). "New wars" and spoilers. In Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond (Eds.). Challenges to peacebuilding: managing spoilers during conflict resolution. Pp. 134–150. Tokyo: United Nations University.

Newman, Edward & Richmond, Oliver (2006). Introduction . Obstacles to peace processes: understanding spoiling. In Edward Newman & Oliver Richmond (Eds.) *Challenges to peacebuilding: managing spoilers during conflict resolution*. Pp. 1–19. Tokyo: United Nations University.

Niemelä, Pekka (2008). *The politics of responsibility to protect: Problems and prospects*. Helsinki: Publications of the Erik Castrén institute of international law and human rights 25/2008, University of Helsinki.

Nieminen-Mäkynen, Terhi (2008). As a mayor in Kosovo. In Nina Suomalainen & Jyrki Karvinen (Eds.) *The Ahtisaari legacy. Resolve and negotiate*. Pp. 163–190. Vantaa: Tammi.

Nissinen, Vesa (2001). *Military leadership. A Critical constructivist approach to conceptualizing, modelling and measuring military leadership in the Finnish Defence Forces*. National Defence College. Department of management and leadership. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Nissinen, Vesa, Anttalainen, Jarno & Kauppinen, Risto (2008). *Sovella syväjohtamista – huipputuloksiin vuorovaikutusta oppimalla*. Helsinki: Tammi.

Nonaka, Ikujiro & Takeuchi, Hirotaka (1995). *The knowledge-creating company. How Japanese companies create the dynamics of innovation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nonaka, Ikujiro & Toyama, Ryoko (2007). Why do firms differ? The theory of the knowledge-creating firm. In Kazuo Ichijo & Ikujiro Nonaka (Eds.) *Knowledge creation and management. New challenges for managers*. Pp. 13–31. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norgaard, Katrine (2004). *Tillidens teknologi. Den militære ethos og viljen til dannelse*. Copenhagen: Institute of Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences.

Norgaard, Katrine & Holting, Vilhelm S. (2006). *International operations in FOKUS*. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defense College.

Novak, Joseph D. (2002). *Tiedon oppiminen, luominen ja käyttö. Käsitekartat työvälineinä oppilaitoksissa ja yrityksissä*. Keuruu: PS-kustannus. (Originally in English in 1998: *Learning, creating and using knowledge: concept maps as facilitative tools in schools and corporations*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.)

Nurmela, Teemu (2010). *The social battlespace of stabilization operations – action amongst the people*. Helsinki: National Defence University.

Nurminen, Raija (2008). Intuitio ja hiljainen tieto hoitotyössä. In Auli Toom, Jussi Onnismaa & Anneli Kajanto (Eds.) *Hiljainen tieto. Tietämistä, toimimista, taitavuutta*. Pp. 187–200. Jyväskylä: Kansanvalistusseura.

Nuruzzaman, Mohammed (2006). *Paradigms in conflict. The contested claims of human security, critical theory and feminism*. Cooperation and conflict, 41.

Nye, Joseph S. (2003). *Understanding international conflicts. An introduction to theory and history* (4th ed.). New York: Pearson.

Olonisakin, 'Funmi & Ikpe, Eka (2011). Conclusion. In 'Funmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes & Eka Ikpe (Eds.) *Women, peace and security. Translating policy into practice*. London: Routledge.

Olson, Lara & Charron, Andrea (2009). In Hans-Georg Ehrhart & Charles C. Pentland (Eds.) *The Afghanistan challenge. Hard realities and strategic choices*. Pp. 77–102. Montreal: McGill-Queens' University Press.

Osinga, Frans (2007). On Boyd, Bin Laden, and fourth generation warfare as string theory. In John Andreas Olsen (Ed.) *On new wars*. Pp. 168–197. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.

Oyserman, Daphna (2005). Self-concept and identity. In Marilyn B Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds.). *Self and social identity*. Noida: Blackwell Publishing. Pp. 5–24.

Palm, Anne (2008). NGOs vital actors in comprehensive crisis management. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). *Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocks for Finnish crisis management*. Pp. 35–40. Tuusula: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

Paloniemi, Susanna (2008). Hiljaisen tiedon jakaminen työyhteisössä – työssä oppimisen rajapinnalla. In Auli Toom, Jussi Onnismaa & Anneli Kajanto (Eds.) *Hiljainen tieto. Tietämistä, toimimista, taitavuutta*. Pp. 255–274. Jyväskylä: Kansanvalistusseura.

Patomäki, Heikki (2007). *The political economy of global security. War, future crises and changes in global governance*. London: Routledge.

Pavkovic, Aleksandar (2001). Kosovo/Kosova: A land of conflicting myths? In Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov & Bülent Gökau (Eds.) *Kosovo. The politics of delusion*. Pp. 1–10. London: Frank Cass.

Peltoniemi, Rainer (2007). *Suomen puolustusjärjestelmän ydinosamisalueet ja niiden muutoshaasteet mahdollisessa Nato-jäsenyydessä*. Helsinki: National Defence College, Department of Education, series 2, No 17.

Petersen, Friis Arne, Binnendijk, Hans, Barry, Charles & Lehmann Nielsen, Peter (2010). Implementing NATO' comprehensive approach to crisis management to complex operations. In Gülmur Aybet & Rebecca R. Moore (Eds.) *NATO. In search of a vision*. Pp 75-98. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

Piiparinen, Touko (2010). *The transformation of UN conflict management. Producing images of genocide from Rwanda to Darfur and beyond*. London: Routledge.

Pitkänen, Ville-Veikko, Utunen, Heini & Henriksson, Kirsi (2010). Sukupuolinäkökulma suomalaisessa siviilikriisinhallinnan kansallisten valmiuksien kehittämisessä. In Pirjo Jukarainen & Sirkku Terävä (Eds.) *Tasa-arvoinen turvallisuus? Sukupuolten yhdenvertaisuus suomalaisessa maanpuolustuksessa ja kriisinhallinnassa*. Pp. 75–90. Hämeenlinna: Minerva.

Porto, João Gomes, Alden Chris & Parsons, Imogen (2007). *From soldiers to citizens. Demilitarization of conflict and society*. Aldershot: Ashgate

Post, Jeerold M.(2006). The psychological dynamics of terrorism. In Louise Richardson (Ed.) *The roots of terrorism*. Pp. 17–28. New York: Routledge.

Poulligny, Béatrice (2006): *Peace operations seen from below. UN missions and local people*. London: Hurst&Company.

Puusa, Anu (2005). *Organisaatioidentiteetin tarkastelu käsitetutkimuksena*. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.

Pyykönen, Juha (2005). Crisis management: a new form of nation-building? Questions asked and some tentative conclusions. In Tommi Koivula & Tuomas Tammilehto (eds.): *Crisis management: a new form of nation-building?* Helsinki: National Defence College.

Pyykönen, Juha (2008). Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan kuvan muutos. In Jyri Raitasalo & Joonas Sipilä (Eds.) *Sota – teoria ja todellisuus. Näkökulmia sodan muutokseen*. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of Strategic Studies.

Raatikainen, Mika (2004). *Poliisin silmin – missio Kosovo 2000–2001*. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Rainne, Juha (2008). *Legal implications of NATO membership. Focus on Finland and five allied states*. Helsinki: Eric Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights.

Raitasalo, Jyri (2008a). *Kriisinhallinta kriisissä?* Helsinki, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies.

Raitasalo, Jyri (2005). *Constructing war and military power after the Cold War*. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Raitasalo, Jyri (2008b). Sodankäynnin vallankumous – realistinen visio vai virhearvio? In Jyri Raitasalo and Joonas Sipilä (Eds.) *Sota – teoria ja todellisuus. Näkökulmia sodan muutokseen*. s. 43–61. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies.

Raitasalo, Jyri & Sipilä, Joonas (2004). *Sodan määrittelystä. Käsitteet sodasta sodankäynnin taustalla*. Helsinki: National Defence College.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom & Miall, Hugh (2008). *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Second edition Cambridge: Polity.

Rantapelkonen, Jari (2000). *Konfliktin, konfliktinhallinnan ja turvallisuuden käsitteet kylmän sodan jälkeen*. Helsinki: National Defence College, Department of strategic and defence studies.

Rantapelkonen, Jari (2006). *The narrative leadership of war. Presidential phrases in the "War on terror" and their relation to information technology*. Helsinki: National Defence University.

Rapoport, Anatol (1968). Introduction by Anatol Rapoport. In Carl von Clausewitz. *On war*. Pp. 11-80. London: Penguin Books.

Rauramo, Päivi (2008). *Työhyvinvoinnin portaat. Viisi vaikuttavaa askelta*. Helsinki: Edita.

Rekkedal, Nils (2006). *Nykyaikainen sotataito. Sotilaallinen voima muutoksessa*. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Renner, Michael (2002). *Breaking the link between resources and repression*. In *State of the World 2002*. The Worldwatch Institute. New York: W. W. Norton.

Responsibility to Protect. 2001. The Report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

Rescher, Nicholas (1998). *Predicting the future. An introduction to the theory and forecasting*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Richardson, Louise (2006). *The roots of terrorism*. In Louise Richardson (Ed.) *The roots of terrorism*. Pp. 1–16. New York: Routledge.

Rinne, Risto & Salmi, Eeva (1998). *Oppimisen uusi järjestys*. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Romeva i Rueda, Raúl. 2003. *Guerra, posguerra y paz. Pautas para el análisis y la intervención en contextos posbélicos o postacuerdo*. Spain: Icaria.

Ronkainen, Suvi (1999). *Ajan ja paikan merkitsemät. Subjektiviteetti, tieto ja toimijuus*. Tampere: Gaudeamus.

Ross, Michael & Buehler, Roger (2005). *Identity through time: Constructing personal pasts and futures*. In Marilyn B Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds.). *Self and social identity*. Pp. 25–51. Noida: Blackwell publishing.

Rubinstein, Robert A., Keller, Diana M. & Scherger, Michael (2008). *Culture and interoperability in integrated missions*. *International Peace-keeping* 15:540–555.

Ruusuvuori, Johanna & Tiittula, Liisa (2005). *Tutkimushaastattelu ja vuorovaikutus*. In Johanna Ruusuvuori & Liisa Tiittula (Eds.) *Haastattelu. Tutkimus, tilanteet ja vuorovaikutus*. Pp. 22–56. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Ruohomäki, Olli (2008). Broader perspectives: Good international engagement in fragile states. In Oskari Eronen (Ed.). Needs of comprehensiveness. Building blocks for Finnish crisis management. Pp. 13–22. Tuusula: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

Ryan, Alan (2004). Land forces 21st-century coalition operations: implications for the Asia-Pacific. In Michael Evans, Russell Parkin & Alan Ryan (Eds.). Future armies, future challenges. Land warfare in the information age. Pp. 96–126. Singapore: Allen & Unwin.

Ryter, Marc-André (2003). Motives for humanitarian intervention and the international community. Helsinki: National Defence College.

Räty, Arto (2008). As a soldier in Kosovo. In Nina Suomalainen & Jyrki Karvinen (Eds.), The Ahtisaari legacy. Resolve and negotiate. Pp. 119–141. Vantaa: Tammi.

Röberg, Monica (1999). Kotona ja kaukana. Rauhanturvaajan parisuhteen erilainen aikakausi. Kotka: Suomen sinibarettiliitto.

Saari, Salli (2008). Kuin salama kirkkaalta taivaalta. Kriisit ja niivästä selviytyminen. 5th edition. Keuruu: Otava.

Sackman, Harold (1975). Delphi Critique. Lexington: Heath.

Said, Edward W. (1978/2003). Orientalism. New York: Vintage.

Salehyan, Idean (2009). Rebels without borders. Transnational insurgencies in world politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Salmela-Aro, Katariina & Nurmi, Jari-Erik (2005). Mikä meitä motivoi? In Matti Vartiainen & Juhani Kauhanen (Eds.) Palkitseminen globaalissa Suomessa. Pp. 132–148. Helsinki: WSOY.

Salminen Pertti (2003). ”Nordic power projection” and international operations: aspects from the past and new opportunities. In Bo Huldlt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg & Elisabeth Davidson (Eds.) The new Nordic security agenda. Perspectives from Finland and Sweden. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College & Finnish National Defence College.

Salminen, Pertti (2009). Sotilassilmin Natosta. In Terho Suominen & Jyrki Karvinen (Eds.) Suomi ja Nato. Pp. 19–24. Helsinki: Atlantic Council of Finland.

Salonius-Pasternak, Charly (2009). Suomi on paraikaa sotaa käyvä maa. Helsingin sanomat 24.7.2009.

Salonius-Pasternak, Charly (2010). Suomi on sodan osapuoli Afganistanissa. Kosmopolis 40 (1): 7–25.

Salonius-Pasternak, Charly & Visuri Pekka (2006). Suomi rauhanturvaajana 1991–2006. Jyväskylä: Ministry of Defence.

Sambanis, Nicholas (2005). Conclusion. Using case studies to refine and expand the theory of civil war. In Paul Collier & Nicholas Sambanis (Eds.) *Understanding civil war. Evidence and analysis. Vol 2. Europe, Central Asia, and other regions.* Pp. 299–330. Washington D. C: The World Bank.

Sandole, Dennis J. D. (2010). *Peacebuilding. Preventing violent conflict in a complex world.* Polity: Cambridge.

Sato, Yoichiro (2009). Conclusion: China in the eyes of Asia and America. In Kevin J. Cooney & Yoichiro Sato (Eds.) *The rise of China and international security. America and Asia respond.* Pp. 232–241. London: Routledge.

Save the Children (2011). *Devastating impact. Explosive weapons and children.* London: Save the Children Fund.

Savola, Heikki. (2006). Euroopan unionin sotilaallinen kriisinhallinta. In Forsberg, Tuomas et al.(Eds.) *Yhteisten arvojen puolesta? Suomi ja EU:n kriisinhallinta.* Pp. 77–117. Helsinki: Eurooppa-tiedotus.

Schein, Edgar (2004). *Organizational culture and leadership.* San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Schein, Edgar (2009). *The corporate culture survival guide.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Schulze, Kirsten E. (2010). The AMM and the transition from conflict to peace in Aceh, 2005–2006. In Mary Martin & Mary Kaldor (Eds.) *The European Union and human security. External interventions and missions.* Pp. 12–34. London: Routledge.

Sen, Amartya (2006). *Identity and Violence: the illusion of destiny.* New York: W. W Norton & Co.

Senge, Peter M. (1994). *The fifth discipline. The art & practice of the learning organization.* New York: Currency Doubleday.

Seppä, Tarja (2008). Englantilainen koulukunta ja Darfur. Humanitaarisen intervention ja suojeluvastuun problematiikasta. *Kosmopolis* 38 (2): 7–29.

Shapiro, Robert (2008). *Futurecast 2020. A global vision of tomorrow.* London: Profile Books.

Shea, Jamie (2010). NATO at sixty – and beyond. In Gülmur Aybet & Rebecca R. Moore (Eds.) *NATO. In search of a vision.* Pp. 11–34. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

Sheehan, Nadège (2011). *The economics of UN peacekeeping.* Oxon: Routledge.

Sheffer, Gabriel (2006). Diasporas and terrorism. In Louise Richardson (Ed.) *The roots of terrorism.* Pp. 117–129. New York: Routledge.

- Shultz, Richard H. Jr. & Dew, Andrea J. (2006) *Insurgents, terrorists and militias. The warriors of contemporary combat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Silvennoinen, Heikki (2004). *Oppiminen työelämässä*. In Heikki Silvennoinen & Pasi Tulkki (Eds.) *Elinikäinen oppiminen*. Pp. 61–102. Tampere: Gaudeamus.
- Simic, Olivera (2010). Does the presence of women really matter? Towards combating male sexual violence in peacekeeping operations. *International peacekeeping* 17 (2): 188–199.
- Small Arms Survey 2006 (2006). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smedberg, Marco (2001). *Militär ledning. Från Napoleonkrigen till Bosnienkrisen*. Lund: Historiska media.
- Smil, Vaclav (2008). *Global catastrophes and trends. The next fifty years*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Smith, Dan (2005). *Sodan ja rauhan kartasto*. Keuruu: Like (In Finnish. Originally published in English.)
- Smith, Hugh (2004). The military profession in Australia: crossroads and cross-purposes? In Michael Evans, Russell Parkin & Alan Ryan (Eds.). *Future armies, future challenges. Land warfare in the information age*. Pp. 184–215. Singapore: Allen&Unwin.
- Smith, Ron (2009). *Military economics. The interaction of power and money*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smith, Rupert (2006). *The utility of force. The art of war in the modern world*. London: Penguin Books.
- Soeters, Joseph & Bos-Bakx, Miepke (2003). Cross-cultural issues in peacekeeping operations. In Thomas W. Britt & Amy B. Adler (Eds.) *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper. Lessons from the Field*. Pp. 283-298. Westport: Praeger.
- Special inspector general/Iraq reconstruction (2009) *Hard lessons: The Iraq reconstruction experience*. Washington, DC: Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction, U.S. G.P.O.
- Springer, Natalia (2006). *Deactivating war: How societies demobilise after armed conflict*. Rome: NATO Defense College.
- Stohl, Rachel & Grillot, Suzette (2009). *The international arms trade*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Suomalainen sotilas (2009). *Jääkäristä rauhanturvaajaan*. Lauri Haavisto (Editor in chief). Hämeenlinna: Weilin+Göös.

Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*. Pp. 61–76. London: Academic Press.

Talerud, Bo (2007). Ethos in and the Ethics for Today's Armed Forces in the Western Societies: Why bother about military ethics and ethos? – Setting the stage. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Ethical Education in the Military. What, How and Why in the 21st Century?* Pp. 63–84. ACIE Publications. National Defence University, Department of Education, Series 1, N. 1. Edita, Helsinki.

Talib, Mirja-Tytti (2008). Opettajan hiljainen tieto ja erilaisuuden kohtaaminen. In Auli Toom, Jussi Onnismaa & Anneli Kajanto (Eds.) *Hiljainen tieto. Tietämistä, toimimista, taitavuutta*. Pp. 149–162. Jyväskylä: Kansanvalistusseura.

Tallberg, Teemu (2003). *Miesten koulu? Mieskuva varusmieskoulutuksessa käytettävissä opetuselokuvissa*. Helsinki: STAKES.

Tallberg, Teemu (2009). *The gendered social organization of defence. Two ethnographic case studies in the Finnish Defence Forces*. Helsinki: Publications of the Hanken school of economics, nr 193.

Tardy, Thierry (2004) Introduction. In Thierry Tardy (Ed.): *Peace operations after 11 September 2001*. Pp. 1–12. London: Frank Cass.

Tardy, Thierry (2006). *The EU and NATO as peacekeepers: Open cooperation versus implicit competition*.

Thakur, Ramesh (2006). *The United Nations, Peace and Security. From collective security to the responsibility to protect*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Theros, Marika (2010). A human security strategy for Afghanistan. What role for the EU? In Mary Martin & Mary Kaldor (Eds.) *The European Union and human security. External interventions and missions*. Pp. 145–158. London: Routledge.

Thoms, Oskar N.T. and Ron, James (2007). Do human rights violations cause internal conflict? *Human Rights Quarterly* 29(3): 674–705.

Thual, Francois. 1995. *Conflicts identitaires*. Paris: Ellipses.

Tiittula, Liisa & Ruusuvuori, Johanna (2005). Johdanto. In Johanna Ruusuvuori & Liisa Tiittula (Eds.) *Haastattelu. Tutkimus, tilanteet ja vuorovaikutus*. Pp. 9–21. Tampere: Vastapaino.

Todisco, Enrico (2009). From culture to multiculturalism. From the migration of people to the migration of cultures. In Jukka Kultalahti, Ilari Karppi, Olli Kultalahti & Enrico Todisco (Eds.): *Globalisation. Challenges to research and governance*. Helsinki: East-West books.

- Toiskallio, Jarmo (1998). Kohti sotilaan toimintakyvyn teoriaa. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Toimintakyky sotilaspedagogiikassa*. Vaasa: National Defence College.
- Toiskallio, Jarmo (2000a) Introduction: Is there a military pedagogy? In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Mapping military pedagogy in Europe*. Pp. 6–9. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of Education.
- Toiskallio, Jarmo (2000b). Military pedagogy as a practical human science. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Mapping military pedagogy in Europe*. Pp. 45–64. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of Education.
- Toiskallio, Jarmo (2000c). Unohdettu ja uudesti syntynyt. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Näkökulmia sotilaspedagogiseen tutkimukseen*. Pp. 33–44. Helsinki: National Defence University, Department of Education.
- Toiskallio, Jarmo (2004). Action competence approach to the transforming soldiership. In Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Identity, ethics and soldierhip*. ACIE publications 2004. National defence College, Department of education, No. 1. Pp. 107–130.
- Toiskallio, Jarmo (2008). Sotilaspedagogiikan ja kasvatustieteen rajapinnalla. In Arto Kallioniemi, Auli Toom, Martin Ubani, Heljä Linnansaari & Kristiina Kumpulainen (Eds.) *Ihmistä kasvattamassa: koulutus – arvot – uudet avaukset/Cultivating humanity: Education – values – new discoveries*. Professori Hannele Niemen juhlaKirja. Pp. 119–134. Turku: Research in Educational Sciences 40/Finnish Society in Educational Sciences.
- Toiskallio, Jarmo (2009). Toimintakyky sotilaspedagogiikan käsitteenä. In Jarmo Toiskallio and Juha Mäkinen: *Sotilaspedagogiikka: Sotiluuden ja toimintakyvyn teoriaa ja käytäntöä*. Helsinki: National Defence University.
- Toom, Auli (2008). Hiljaista tietoa vai tietämistä? Näkökulmia hiljaisen tiedon käsitteen tarkasteluun. In Auli Toom, Jussi Onnismaa & Anneli Kajanto (Eds.) *Hiljainen tieto. Tietämistä, toimimista, taitavuutta*. Pp. 33–58. Jyväskylä: Kansanvalistusseura.
- Triandis, Harry C. 1997. A cross-cultural perspective on social psychology. In Graig McGarty & S. Alexander Haslam (Eds.). *The message of social psychology*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Tuomi, Jouni & Sarajärvi, Anneli (2004). *Laadullinen tutkimus ja sisällönanalyysi*. Helsinki: Tammi.
- Turner, John C. & Reynolds, Katherine J. (2005). The Social identity perspective in intergroup relations: theories, themes, and controversies. In Marilyn B Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds.). *Self and social identity*. Pp. 259–277. Noida: Blackwell Publishing.
- Tynjälä, Päivi (2000). *Oppiminen tiedon rakentamisena. Konstruktivistisen oppimiskäsitteksen perusteita*. Tammi: Tampere.

UNDP (2005). *Securing development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*. Geneva: United Nations Development Programme.

United States of America (2002). *The national security strategy of the United States of America*.

United States of America (2006). *The national security strategy of the United States of America*.

Uusikylä, Kari & Atjonen, Päivi (2005). *Didaktiikan perusteet*. Helsinki: WSOY.

Valtonen, Vesa (2010). *Turvallisuustoimijoiden yhteistyö operatiivis-taktisesta näkökulmasta*. Helsinki: National Defence University.

Varila, Juha & Rekola, Hilikka (2003). *Mitä on työssä oppiminen. Teoreettisia ja empiirisiä näkökulmia työssä oppimiseen*. Joensuu: University of Joensuu.

Verkuyten, Maykel (2005). *The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity*. Hove: Psychology Press.

Verweij, Désirée (2007). *Military Ethics: A Contradiction in Terms?* In: Jarmo Toiskallio (Ed.) *Ethical Education in the Military. What, How and Why in the 21st Century?* Pp. 43–62. ACIE Publications. National Defence University, Department of Education, Series 1, N:o 1. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

Vesa, Unto (2010). *Rauhan tutkimuksesta ja sen saavuttamisen mahdollisuuksista*. In Vilho Harle (Ed.) *Näkökulmia kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimukseen*. 3rd edition. Pp. 275–308. Tampere: University of Tampere, Department of Political Science and International Relations.

Vesala, Kari Mikko & Rantanen, Teemu (2007). *Laadullinen asennetutkimus: lähtökohtia, periaatteita, mahdollisuuksia*. In Kari Mikko Vesala & Teemu Rantanen (Eds.) *Argumentaatio ja tulkinta. Laadullisen asennetutkimuksen lähestymistapa*. Pp. 11–61. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino.

Virtainlahti, Sanna (2009). *Hiljaisen tietämyksen johtaminen*. Helsinki: Talentum.

Visuri, Pekka (1997). *Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia*. Juva: WSOY.

Visuri, Pekka (2000). *Kosovon sota*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Värrö, Veli-Matti & Ropo, Eero (2010). *Miten olla upseeri ja herrasmies? – pahimman valmistautuminen sotilaspedagogiikan näkökulmasta*. In Juha Mäkinen & Juha Tuominen (Eds.) *Toimintakykyä kehittämässä: Jarmo Toiskallion juhla-kirja. Military pedagogical reflections*. Pp. 124–138. Helsinki: Edita Prima.

- Väyrynen, Raimo (2003). *Ahneus ja sota*. Teoksessa Anssi Männistö (Ed.) *Miksi soditaan?* Pp. 32–47. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Väyrynen, Raimo (2006a). *Conclusion*. In Raimo Väyrynen (Ed.) *The waning of major war. Theories and debates*. Pp. 300–305. London: Routledge.
- Väyrynen, Raimo (2006b). *Introduction*. In Raimo Väyrynen (Ed.) *The waning of major war. Theories and debates*. Pp. 1–30. London: Routledge.
- Väyrynen, Raimo (2010). *Wright klassikkona*. In Quincy Wright's *Sodankäynnistä*. Pp. 15–47. Tallinn: Like.
- Väyrynen, Tarja (2010). *Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimus*. In Vilho Harle (Ed.) *Näkökulmia kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimukseen*. 3rd edition. Pp. 253–274. Tampere: University of Tampere, Department of Political Science and International Relations.
- Wager, Maaret (1994). *Constructions of femininity in academic women*. Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Sciences.
- Watkins, Karen E. & Cseh, Maria (2009). *Competence development in the USA: limiting expectations or unleashing global capacities*. In Knud Illeris (Ed.) *International perspectives on competence development*. Pp. 7–17. London: Routledge.
- Wedin, Lars (2005). *The concept of crisis management*. In Tommi Koivula & Tuomas Tammilehto (Eds.) *Crisis management: a new form of nation-building?* Pp. 11–25. Helsinki: Edita Prima.
- Weiss, Thomas G., Forsythe, David P., Coate, Roger A. & Pease, Kelly-Kate (2010). *The United Nations and changing world politics*. 6th edition. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Wenger, Etienne (1998). *Communities of practice. Learning, meaning, and identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wennmann, Achim (2011). *The political economy of peacemaking. Conflict, development and peacebuilding*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Werther-Pietsch, Ursula and Roithner, Anna-Katharina (2011). *Linking peacebuilding and statebuilding – A new paradigm for UN response to fragile situations*. *Development dialogue* (55): 153–182.
- Wiharta, Sharon. (2007). *Peacekeeping: keeping pace with changes in conflict*. In SIPRI yearbook 2007. Pp. 107–128. Oxford: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Oxford University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas (2004). *Toward a new realism*. In Andreas Wimmer, Richard J Goldstone, Donald L. Horowitz, Ulrike Joras & Conrad Schetter (Eds.) *Facing Ethnic conflicts. Toward a new realism*. Pp. 333–359. US: Roman & Littlefield.

Wirtz, James (2003). Ethics and the return of the strategy. In Edwin R. Micewski (Ed.) Civil-military aspects of military ethics. Pp. 25–39. Austria: Publication series of the National Defence Academy.

Wiuuff Moe, Louise (2010). Addressing state fragility in Africa. A need to challenge the established “wisdom”? Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Worchel, Stephen (2005). Culture’s conflict and conflict management: some suggestions, many questions. *International journal of intercultural relations*, 29: 739–757.

Worchel, Stephen & Coutant, Dawna (2004). Relating group identity to individual identity. In Marilyn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone (Eds) *Self and social identity*. Pp. 182–202. Blackwell, Malden.

Woudenberg, Fred (1991). An evaluation of Delphi. *Technological forecasting and social change* 40.

Wright, Quincy (2010). *Sodankäynnistä. Like: Tallinn.* (“A study of war”, originally published in English in 1942 and 1962. The Finnish language version is an abridged one.)

Ylöstalo, Pekka (2009). Mielekäs ja menestyvä työpaikka. In Raimo Blom & Ari Hautaniemi (Eds.) *Työelämä muuttuu, joutaako hyvinvointi?* Pp. 78–102. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Zenko, Micah & Friedman, Rebecca R. (2011). UN early warning for preventing conflict. *International peacekeeping*, 18 (1): 21–37.

Ådahl, Susanne (2009). Culturally confident crisis management – some hints from an anthropologist. In Susanne Ådahl (Ed.) *Varying cultures in modern crisis management*. Pp. 103–112. Helsinki: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

References (not published)

Ahtiainen, Minna, Backman, Laura & Pietilä, Nelli (2007). *Suomalaisen rauhanturvaajien henkinen hyvinvointi ja selviytymisvoimavarat kriisinhallintatehtävissä ulkomailla*. Laurea University of Applied Sciences. Thesis.

Finskas, Ulla Maija (2010). *Helping civilians through humanitarian organizations –the role of states. A presentation at seminar “The Geneva Conventions Revisited: Reflections on current challenges to International Humanitarian Law” at Finnish Parliament (the main auditorium), January 29th, 2010.*

Gounden, Vasu (2011). *African perspectives on peace mediation. “States as peacemakers. Different approaches to mediation and mediation support” Seminar. organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Crisis management Initiative in Helsinki. June 8th, 2011.*

Häikiö, Antti (2009). *Presentation at a seminar of STETE on Kosovo in the Annex building of Finnish Parliament, Helsinki. December 17th, 2009.*

Kaski, Markus (2007). A presentation on MNE5 in a seminar on MNE5 process arranged by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the House of Estates in Helsinki, June 2007.

Koskela, Mauri (2007). A seminar presentation. A seminar on civil-military cooperation in crisis management organized by CMC Finland. Kuopio, August 29th, 2007.

Kousa, Harri (2008). Suomalaisilla rauhanturvaveteraaneilla vähän traumaperäisiä stressihäiriöitä. A non-published pro gradu study. University of Turku, Department of Psychology.

Kurashina, Yuko (2005). Peacekeeping, participation and identity changes in the Japanese self defence forces: Military service as “dirty work”. University of Maryland, a dissertation.

Kuusi, Osmo (2007). Discussion with Osmo Kuusi on futures studies on the October 25th, 2007.

Liesinen, Kalle (2007). A seminar presentation. A seminar on civil-military cooperation in crisis management organized by CMC Finland. Kuopio, August 29th, 2007.

Ludvigsen, Sten (2007). The hedgehog and the fox. Cuban versus Engeström’s approaches to the analysis of ICT reforms. A presentation at the Third Finnish Conference on Cultural and Activity Research (Fiscar ’07), University of Helsinki, September 27–28th 2007.

Owen, Taylor (2010). Human Security: Prospects for a New Security Paradigm. A presentation at CMC/KATU seminar in Helsinki, October 20th, 2010.

Räty, Arto (2010). Military involvement in contemporary international crisis management. A presentation at seminar “The Geneva Conventions Revisited: Reflections on current challenges to International Humanitarian Law” at Finnish Parliament (the main auditorium), January 29th, 2010.

Talvitie, Tuija (2011). Presentation at a peace mediation and peace-building seminar arranged by Finnish Ministry for Foreign affairs. February 14th, 2011.

Tiilikainen, Teija (2007). A speech at resolution 1325 seminar in Hanasaari, Espoo. June 2007.

Väinölä, Antti-Jussi (2005). Rauhanturvatoiminnassa syntyvän osaamisen käytettävyys reservin sijoitusharkinnassa. National Defence College. (Not published).

References (internet versions)

Crisis Management Centre (2008). <http://www.cmcfinland.fi/pelastus/cmc/home.nsf/en/centre> . Read on of January 30th, 2008.

EULEX(2010). Programme Report 2010. <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/tracking/EULEX%20Programme%20Report%202010%20.pdf>. Read on August 8th, 2011.

Finnish Defence Forces 2008a. Kosovoon kahden pääpuolueen hallitus. <http://www.mil.fi/rauhanturvaaja/uutiset/765.dsp?printable=2&> . Printed on January 14th, 2008.

Finnish Defence Forces (2008b). Internet access: <http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/rauhanturvaaja/operatiot/kosovo.dsp>. Read on February 1st, 2008.

Finnish Defence Forces (2010). Puolustusvoimien tehtävät. Internet access: <http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/portal/puolustusvoimat.fi/> Retrieved on the August 5th, 2010.

Finnish Defence Forces (2011). Suomen kriisinhallintajoukko Kosovossa on lakkautettu. <http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/su+puolustusvoimat.fi/pv.fi+staattinen+sivusto+su/puolustusvoimat/tiedotteet/skjk+tiedote> . Retrieved on January 14th, 2011.

Finnish Defence Forces (2012). Kansainvälinen yhteistyö > Kansainvälinen kriisinhallinta > Kosovo > Suomen osallistuminen. <http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/portal/puolustusvoimat.fi/> . Read on June 12th, 2012.

Finnish Government (2008). A press release of the Finnish Government. Internet access: <http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/en.jsp?oid=220059> Read on February 1st, 2008.

Foreign Policy (2007). Failed States Index 2007. www.foreignpolicy.com Retrieved in November 2007.

Foreign Policy (2009).Failed States Index 2009. www.foreignpolicy.com Retrieved in November 2009.

Heldt, Birger & Wallenstein, Peter (2006). Peacekeeping operations: Global patterns of intervention and success, 1948-2004. 2nd edition. Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications. www.folkebernadotteacademy.se (printed on October 5th, 2007).

Kennedy, Denis (2009). Military-humanitarian integration. The promise and the peril. FIIA Briefing paper 37. 13 August 2009. <http://www.upi-fia.fi/fi/publication/82/> Retrieved on September 10th, 2009.

Millennium Project (2011a). Global challenges facing humanity. http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/Global_Challenges/chall-10.html. Retrieved on May 23rd, 2011.

Millennium Project (2011b). The Millennium Project. Global futures studies & research. <http://www.millennium-project.org/> Retrieved on May 23rd, 2011.

Miller, Thaddeus, Baird, Timothy D., Littlefield, Caithlin M. & Chapin, F. Stuart III (2008). Epistemological pluralism: Reorganizing interdisciplinary research. *Ecology and society* 13 (2): 46 online. <http://ecologyandsociety.org>

Ministry for Foreign affairs (2010). Operaatiot: kansainvälinen kriisinhallinta. <http://www.formin.fi/Public/default.aspx?nodeid=42651&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI> . Retrieved on August 5th, 2010.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2011). Operaatiot: kansainvälinen kriisinhallinta. <http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=14840&GUID={6D545754-3500-4BE4-B069-91FD3E840BAA}>. Retrieved on August 16th, 2011.

Ministry of interior (2008a). Internet access: <http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/home.nsf/pages/A156B6D0DC66E808C22573BF00483663?opendocument>. Read on February 1st, 2008.

Ministry of interior (2008b). Internet access: <http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/home.nsf/pages/A156B6D0DC66E808C22573BF00483663?opendocument>. Read on February 5th, 2008.

NATO (2010a). International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key facts and figures. Internet access: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Rev%20Placemat.pdf>. Retrieved on August 18th, 2010.

NATO (2010b). NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). Internet access: http://www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf . Retrieved on August 18th, 2010.

OSCE (2009). <http://www.osce.org/about/13510.html> . Read on August 24th, 2009.

Salonius-Pasternak, Charly (2011a). Practicing progressive pragmatism. Charting Barack Obama's course for U.S. foreign policy. FIIA Briefing Paper 77. http://www.fia.fi/publication/177/practicing_progressive_pragmatism/ Retrieved on March 21st 2011.

Salonius-Pasternak, Charly (2011b). The impact of Osama Bin Laden's death on ISAF. <http://www.fia.fi/> Retrieved on May 18th 2011.

Skjelsbaek, Inger (2007). Gender aspects of international military interventions: national and international perspectives. PRIO paper. Internet access: http://www.prio.no/files/file49891_gender_aspects_of_international_military_interventions.pdf Retrieved on September 2nd, 2010.

Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2009). Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy. Proposals presented to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009. <http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=40310&GUID={826E755E-D8ED-4428-A942-85DA3C3C2A97}> Retrieved on June 20th, 2011.

UN (2010). Contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Internet access: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/june10_1.pdf. Retrieved on August 9th 2010.

UNDP (1994). Human Development Report. Internet access: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/> Printed in May 2007.

UNEP (2009). From conflict to peacebuilding. The role of natural resources and the environment. http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/conflict_peacebuilding.pdf Retrieved in November 2009.

Valenius, Johanna (2007). Gender mainstreaming in ESDP missions. Chaillot Paper, number 101. <http://www.nato.int/ims/2007/win/opinions/Gender%20mainstreaming%20in%20ESDP%20missions.pdf> .Printed in September 2007.

Files

Millennium Project (2009). 2009 state of the future. 10. Peace and conflict. A file from the 2009 state of the future report.

Abstract

Enhancing human security through crisis management – opportunities and challenges for learning

Since the Cold war, armed conflicts have usually started in so-called fragile states and poor countries, they have occurred inside states, mostly not between them and non-state armed groups have been involved in them. They often lead to conflict cycles, in which warfare and more stable circumstances vary. Because conflict mortality often remains under the international definition (under 1,000 annual deaths), I call these kinds of conflicts as “new conflicts”. The international community has tried to develop the models for crisis management and peacekeeping in order to obtain sustainable peace. Human security is based on a vision according to which every individual’s human rights should be respected. This vision affects how crisis management and peace-building are carried out.

The present research consists of two empirical parts: a Delphi panel process and interviews of crisis management personnel. Fifteen experts on different fields in crisis management attended the panel that was carried out in 2008. According to the panel, the futures conflicts will often resemble “new conflicts”. In addition, interaction and communication abilities are required from crisis management personnel. The panel emphasized interaction and communication abilities particularly with regard to the competences of civilian crisis management personnel, although these abilities are also important for the military crisis management personnel. A clear division of labor between various actors is required in crisis management.

The second empirical part of the research consisted of 27 thematic interviews with civilian and military crisis management personnel who had served in Kosovo. The interviewees were nine professional officers, ten peacekeepers who had been recruited from the reserves, and eight individuals who had worked in civilian crisis management. The interviews occurred between February and June 2008.

The results emphasized the significance of interaction and communication abilities because many interviewees had solved problems with crisis management personnel and local inhabitants.

Learning processes that occurred in crisis management and that were often positive and informal in nature were also highlighted through the interviews. These successful events had a positive impact on an individual’s self-confidence and this process can be described in terms of self-realization. Learning in crisis management is especially significant if the activities are developed in order to enhance human security.

Informal learning should be better taken into account when developing crisis management education and opportunities for learning in crisis management. Feedback systems also require development. The entire crisis management operation should also receive critical feedback if it is necessary in regard to its positive and negative outcomes.

Several individuals who have worked in crisis management require adequate feedback in regard to their work. Spontaneously many interviewees considered that crisis management personnel should have a right to have a debriefing-like return conversation. Even the knowledge that such an opportunity exists could be good news for the personnel, even though the opportunity might not always be utilized. Compared to starting to work, returning to Finland from crisis management duties is more challenging for many individuals

The results of the present study prompt to study crisis management from the perspective of learning. It is also essential to develop feedback systems in crisis management to enhance individual and organizational learning. A crisis management operation is a learning environment. The development of crisis management personnel's communication and interaction skills is essential in order to attain a sustainable peace process, in which the inhabitants of a conflict region are also involved.

Tiivistelmä

Inhimilliseen turvallisuuteen kriisinhallinnan kautta

– oppimisen mahdollisuuksia ja haasteita

Kylmän sodan jälkeen aseelliset konfliktit ovat yleensä alkaneet niin sanotuissa hauraissa valtioissa ja köyhissä maissa, ne ovat olleet valtioiden sisäisiä ja niihin on osallistunut ei-valtiollisia aseellisia ryhmittymiä. Usein ne johtavat konfliktikierteeseen, jossa sota ja vakaammat olot vaihtelevat. Koska kuolleisuus konflikteissa voi jäädä alle kansainvälisen määritelmän (1000 kuollutta vuodessa), kutsun tällaisia konflikteja ”uusiksi konflikteiksi”. Kansainvälinen yhteisö on pyrkinyt kehittämään kriisinhallinnan ja rauhanrakentamisen malleja, jotta pysyvä rauhantila saataisiin aikaiseksi. Inhimillinen turvallisuus perustuu näkemykseen, jossa kunnioitetaan jokaisen yksilön ihmisoikeuksia ja jolla on vaikutusta myös kriisinhallinnan ja rauhanrakentamisen toteuttamiseen.

Tutkimukseen kuuluu kaksi empiiristä osaa: Delfoi-tulevaisuuspaneeliprosessin sekä kriisinhallintahenkilöstön haastattelut. Viisitoista eri alojen kriisinhallinta-asiantuntijaa osallistui paneeliin, joka toteutettiin vuonna 2008. Paneelin tulosten mukaan tulevat konfliktit usein ovat uusien konfliktien kaltaisia. Lisäksi kriisinhallintahenkilöstöltä edellytetään vuorovaikutus- ja kommunikaatiokykyä ja luonnollisesti myös varsinaisia ammatillisia valmiuksia. Tulevaisuuspaneeli korosti vuorovaikutus- ja kommunikaatiotaitoja erityisesti siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstön kompetensseissa, mutta samat taidot painoutuivat sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan henkilöstön kompetensseissakin. Kriisinhallinnassa tarvitaan myös selvää työnjakoa eri toimijoiden kesken.

Kosovossa työskennelleen henkilöstön haastatteluaineisto koostui yhteensä 27 teemahaastattelusta. Haastateltavista 9 oli ammattiupseeria, 10 reservistä rekrytoitua rauhanturvaajaa ja 8 siviilikriisinhallinnassa työskennellyttä henkilöä. Haastattelut toteutettiin helmi- ja kesäkuun välisenä aikana vuonna 2008. Haastattelutuloksissa korostui vuorovaikutus- ja kommunikaatiotaitojen merkitys, sillä monissa käytännön tilanteissa haastateltavat olivat ratkoneet ongelmia yhteistyössä muun kriisinhallintahenkilöstön tai paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa.

Kriisinhallinnassa toteutui oppimisprosesseja, jotka usein olivat luonteeltaan myönteisiä ja informaalisia. Tällaisten onnistumisten vaikutus yksilön minäkuvaan oli myönteinen. Tällaisia prosesseja voidaan kuvata ”itseä koskeviksi oivalluksiksi”. Kriisinhallintatehtävissä oppimisella on erityinen merkitys, jos halutaan kehittää toimintoja inhimillisen turvallisuuden edistämiseksi. Siksi on tärkeää, että kriisinhallintakoulutusta ja kriisinhallintatyössä oppimista kehitetään ottamaan huomioon oppimisen eri tasot ja ulottuvuudet sekä niiden merkitys.

Informaaliset oppimisen muodot olisi otettava paremmin huomioon kriisinhallintakoulutusta ja kriisinhallintatehtävissä oppimista kehitettäessä. Palautejärjestelmää olisi kehitettävä eri tavoin. Koko kriisinhallintaoperaation on saatava tarvittaessa myös kriittistä palautetta onnistumisista ja epäonnistumisista.

Monet kriisinhallinnassa työskennelleet kaipaavat kunnollista palautetta työrupeamastaan. Liian rutiininomaiseksi koettu palaute ei edistä yksilön oppimista. Spontaanisti monet haastatellut pitivät tärkeänä, että kriisinhallinnassa työskennelleillä olisi mahdollisuus debriefing-tyyppiseen kotiinpaluukeskusteluun. Pelkkä tällainen mahdollisuus ilmeisesti voisi olla monelle myönteinen uutinen, vaikka tilaisuutta ei hyödynnettäisikään. Paluu kriisinhallintatehtävistä Suomeen on monelle haasteellisempaa kuin näissä tehtävissä työskentelyn aloittaminen ulkomailla.

Tutkimuksen tulokset kannustavat tutkimaan kriisinhallintaa oppimisen näkökulmasta. On myös olennaista, että kriisinhallinnan palautejärjestelmiä kehitetään mahdollisimman hyvin edistämään sekä yksilöllistä että organisatorista oppimista kriisinhallinnassa. Kriisinhallintaoperaatio on oppimisympäristö. Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön kommunikaatio- ja vuorovaikutustaitojen kehittäminen on olennaista tavoiteltaessa kestäväää rauhanprosessia, jossa konfliktialueen asukkaatkin ovat mukana.

Appendix 1.

List of abbreviations

AU	African Union
CH model	Collier-Hoffler model
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperation
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CMC Finland	Civilian Crisis Management Center Finland
CMCO	Civil-military coordination
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
ESDP	European security and defence policy
EU	European Union
EUBG	European Union Battle Group
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FINCENT	International Centre of the Defence Forces in Finland
G8	Group of Eight
ICC	International Criminal Court
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KTC	Kosovo Transitional Council
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
MPED	Military pedagogy
NATO	North Atlantic Alliance Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NORDCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NRF	NATO Response Force
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PRT	Provincial reconstruction team
PST	Peacebuilding Systems Theory
RMA	Revolution in the military affairs
RQ	Research question
UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA as well)
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
WHO	World Health Organization

Appendix 2.**List of figures**

Figure 1.	Types of explanatory factors behind new conflicts	23
Figure 2.	Levels for analyzing organizational and inter-organizational functions	74
Figure 3.	Individual's core competences in crisis management.....	88
Figure 4.	Levels of individual learning in relation to explicit and tacit knowledge	94
Figure 5.	Learning and change in crisis management	185

Appendix 3.

List of tables

Table 1.	Main focus of the chapters in relation to the research questions	15
Table 2.	Consensus determinants of civil war based on high confidence in a sample of quantitative studies (Dixon 2009, 720)	45
Table 3.	Learning challenges to crisis management organizations and personnel posed by new conflicts and development goals related to them	49
Table 4.	Crisis management, types of aid, and peace-building	57
Table 5.	Roles of selected international institutions in crisis management and peace processes.....	61
Table 6.	Selected findings on Finnish crisis management personnel's positive and negative experiences	85
Table 7.	Crisis management experiences and their potential impact on the personnel's self-concepts and identities.....	90
Table 8.	Learning patterns in relation to knowledge and competences in crisis management	102
Table 9.	Main results of the Delphi panel process on crisis management	127
Table 10.	Learning processes, challenges for individuals, and institutional deficiencies	173

Appendix 4.
Interviewees by number and status

Interview number	Status
01.	DELPHI interviewee, male, military education
02.	DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
03.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, female
04.	DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
05.	DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
06.	Reservist interviewee, male
07.	Reservist interviewee, male
08.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, male
09.	DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
10.	DELPHI interviewee, male, military education
11.	DELPHI interviewee, male, military education
12.	DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
13.	Reservist interviewee, male
14.	DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
15.	DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
16.	Professional officer interviewee, male
17.	Reservist interviewee, male
18.	Professional officer interviewee, male
19.	Professional officer interviewee, male
20.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, female
21.	Professional officer interviewee, male
22.	DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
23.	DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
24.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, female
25.	Professional officer interviewee, male
26.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, female
27.	Reservist interviewee, female
28.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, female
29.	Reservist interviewee, female
30.	Professional officer interviewee, male
31.	Reservist interviewee, male
32.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, male
33.	DELPHI interviewee, male, civilian education
34.	DELPHI interviewee, female, civilian education
35.	Reservist interviewee, female
36.	Reservist interviewee, female
37.	Civilian crisis management interviewee, male
38.	Professional officer interviewee, male
39.	Reservist interviewee, female
40.	DELPHI interviewee, male, military education
41.	Professional officer interviewee, male
42.	Professional officer interviewee, male

Appendix 5.**Interview questions for the crisis management personnel interviews**

Ulla Anttila
Helmikuu 2008

Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön haastattelu**1. Osaryhmä**

- (A) rauhanturvaajat, puolustusvoimien palkattu henkilöstö
(B) rauhanturvaajat, reserviläinen
(C) siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstö

2. Syntymävuosi 19__

3. Sukupuoli (a) nainen
(b) mies

4. Perhesuhteet Puoliso a. on
b. ei ole
____ alle 18-vuotiasta lasta
____ yli 18-vuotiasta lasta

5. Koulutus _____
peruskoulu
opistotaso/ammattikorkeakoulu
ylempi korkeakoulututkinto/tätä ylempi
nykyiset työtehtävät/tehtävät kotimaassa:

6. Työskentely operaatioalueella

Milloin työskentely alkoi? _____

... ja päättyi? _____

Työtehtävät Kosovossa:

7. Mahdollinen aiempi osallistuminen kriisinhallintatehtäviin

Oletteko ollut mukana useassa operaatiossa?

Paikka _____

Aika _____

Operaatio ja tehtävä _____

Paikka _____

Aika _____

Operaatio ja tehtävä _____

8. Miksi hakeuduitte kriisinhallintatehtäviin?

9. Rauhanturvaamisen/kriisinhallinnan merkitys (A,B,C)

Mikä merkitys kriisinhallintatehtävissä työskentelyllä on ollut ammatilliselle kehityksellenne?

Onko kriisinhallintatehtävillä ollut vaikutusta siihen, mitä ajattelette omasta ammatillisesta roolistanne nykyisin?

Mikä merkitys kriisinhallintatehtävissä työskentelyllä on ollut minäkuvan ja identiteettinne kehitykselle?

Ovatko rauhanturvaajat/siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstö edelleen tärkeä viiteryhmä minäkuvan kannalta?

Mietittekö kriisinhallintatehtävissä elämän tarkoitukseen liittyviä kysymyksiä?

10. Tulevaisuus (A, B, C)

Aiotteko lähteä uudelleen kriisinhallintatehtäviin?

Miksi haluatte lähteä/ette halua lähteä kriisinhallintatehtäviin uudelleen?

11. Kriisinhallintatehtävät, vastaukset pyydetään lyhyesti

Mikä oli kriisinhallintatyössä mielenkiintoisinta? _____

- ” - antoisinta? _____

- ” - vaikeinta? _____

- ” - stressaavinta? _____

- ” - helpointa? _____

Koitteko kriisinhallintatehtävissä vaaraa?

Jos koitte, voitko kuvata tilannetta tai tilanteita?

Koitteko tehtävissänne muuta vaaran tunnetta – esimerkiksi huolta työtovereista tai jonkin lähialueen tilanteesta?

Oliko teillä turhautumisen hetkiä?

Jos oli, kuvaisitteko tilannetta tai tilanteita?

12. Yhteistyö paikallisten siviilien kanssa (A, B, C)

Olitteko tekemisissä paikallisten siviilien kanssa?

Kuvaisitteko, kuinka yhteistyö heidän kanssaan sujui?

Mitkä asiat sujuivat parhaiten?

Jos ongelmia oli, millaisia ne olivat?

13. Alueella työskentely ja sukupuoli

Olitteko tilanteissa, joissa sukupuolestanne oli hyötyä tai haittaa tehtävien suorittamisen kannalta?

Jos olitte, voitteko kuvailla tilanteita?

Miten suuri merkitys paikallisväestön kanssa työskennellessä oli työntekijän sukupuolella?

14. Yhteistyö siviilikriisinhallinnan toimijoiden kanssa (A, B)

Teittekö yhteistyötä paikalla toimineen siviiliorganisaation työntekijöiden kanssa – esimerkiksi YK, EU, ETYJ tai kansalaisjärjestöt?

Voitteko kuvailla, kuinka yhteistyö heidän kanssaan sujui?

Mitkä asiat sujuivat parhaiten?

Vaihteliko yhteistyön toimivuus organisaatioittain?

Jos ongelmia oli, millaisia ne olivat?

Jälleenrakennus edellyttää luottamuksellisia välejä siviileihin, mutta turvallisuuden takaamiseksi rauhanturvaajilla on äärimmäisissä tilanteissa oikeus aseellisen voiman käyttöön.

Koittako ristiriitaa operaatiossa jälleenrakennustehtävien ja turvallisuuden takaamisen välillä?

15. Yhteistyö rauhanturvaoperaation sotilaiden kanssa / muiden siviilikriisinhallinnan toimijoiden kanssa ©

Teitkö yhteistyötä paikalla toimineen rauhanturvaoperaation eli KFOR:in sotilaiden kanssa?

Voitteko kuvailla, kuinka yhteistyö heidän kanssaan sujui?

Mitkä asiat sujuivat parhaiten?

Oliko yhteistyössä eroa sotilaiden kansallisuuksista riippuen?

Jos eroja oli, kuvaisitteko niitä?

Ilmenikö ongelmia yhteistyössä muiden siviilikriisinhallinnan toimijoiden kanssa?

Jos ongelmia ilmeni, kuvaisitteko millaisia?

16. Yhteistyö sotilaiden kesken (A, B)

Oliko yhteistyössä sotilaiden kesken ongelmia?

Jos oli, kuvaisitteko ongelmia?

17. Rauhanturvaajien koulutus (A; B)

Vastasiko ennen rauhanturvaoperaatiota saamanne koulutus odotuksianne?

Saitteko riittäviä yleisiä valmiuksia toimia rauhanturvatehtävissä - esimerkiksi liittyen rauhanturvaamiseen yleensä ja sotilaan tehtäviin rauhanturvaoperaatioissa?

Saitteko riittäviä erityisiä valmiuksia toimia kyseisissä rauhanturvatehtävissä – esimerkiksi liittyen alueen kulttuuriin, maantieteeseen ja erityiskysymyksiin?

Entä millaista opastusta saitte, miten voisitte oppia uutta itse komennuksen aikana?

18. Koulutuksen kehittäminen (A, B, C)

Millä tavoin kehittäisit rauhanturvaajien/siviilikriisinhallintahenkilöstön koulutusta ja harjoituksia:

▪ ennen operaatiota/työskentelyä?

▪ operaation/työskentelyn aikana?

Mikä saamastanne koulutuksesta oli erityisen hyvää

a. ennen operaatiota/työskentelyä?

b. operaation/työskentelyn aikana?

Oliko jonkin tyyppinen koulutus tarpeetonta

a. ennen operaatiota?

b. operaation aikana?

Miten kriisinhallintatyöskentelyn jälkeinen palautejärjestelmä toimi? Oliko sellaista lainkaan (henkilöstön oman tai instituution kehityksen mittaamiseksi)? Ts. saitteko antaa palautetta tai annettiinko teille palautetta?

Minkä tyyppistä palautetta olisitte henkilökohtaisesti toivonut mm. oppimisen kehittämiseksi?

Appendix 6.

Interview Questionnaire for the Delphi Panel process (1. round)

Ulla Anttila
Helmikuu 2008

Kriisinhallinnan tulevaisuus

Pohjakysymykset Delfoi-menetelmän 1. kierrokselle

Tulevat kriisit ja konfliktit

1. Millaisiksi arvioitte ne konfliktit ja kriisit, joita kansainvälinen yhteisö pyrkii estämään ja lopettamaan kriisinhallinnan avulla tulevaisuudessa? Arviointijakso on noin 20 vuotta.

Kriisinhallinnan mallit

2. Mihin suuntaan oletatte kriisinhallintaorganisaatioiden kehittyvän seuraavan 20 vuoden aikana? Valitkaa vaihtoehdoista yksi, joka parhaiten kuvaa näkemystäsi.

- a. Pysyvät nykyisellään
- b. Sotilaallisten ja siviiliorganisaatioiden yhteistyö tiivistyy
- c. Sotilaallisten ja siviiliorganisaatioiden työ eriytyy ja yhteistyö vähenee
- d. Tapahtuu sekä tiivistymistä että eriytymistä, mutta eri kysymyksissä

Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?

Sotilaallisella kriisinhallinnalla tarkoitetaan sotilaiden organisoimaa rauhanturvaamista ja kriisinhallintaa, jonka tarkoituksena on konfliktialueen vakauttaminen. Operaatiot ovat yleensä kansainvälisiä ja johtovastuu operaatiosta voi olla esim. YK:lla, Natolla, EU:lla tai jollakin maaryhmittymällä. Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan rinnalla tai siihen liittyen voidaan kriisialueella toteuttaa humanitaarista apua, jälleenrakentamista sekä ohjelmia, jotka liittyvät hyvän hallinnon kehittämiseen.

3. Oletatteko Suomen osallistumisen kansainväliseen sotilaalliseen kriisinhallintaan seuraavan kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana:

- a. Pysyvän nykyisellään
- b. Kasvavan
- c. Vähenevän

Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?

Siviilikriisinhallinnalla tarkoitetaan siviilien organisoimaa kriisinhallintaa. Sitä saatetaan toteuttaa itsenäisesti tai sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan rinnalla. Siviilioperaatiossa pyritään vakauttamaan oloja mm. avustustoiminnan, jälleenrakentamisen ja hyvän hallinnon kehittämisen kautta. Siviilioperaatiossa saatetaan toteuttaa myös aseistariisuntaa.

4. Oletatteko Suomen osallistumisen kansainväliseen siviilikriisinhallintaan seuraavan kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana:

- a. Pysyvän nykyisellään
- b. Kasvavan
- c. Vähenevän

Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?

5. Suomelta tullaan tulevaisuudessa pyytämään erityisesti seuraavanlaista kansainvälistä tukea edellyttäviin kriisitilanteisiin seuraavanlaista kapasiteettia tai osaamista (voitte valita tarpeelliseksi katsomasi määrän vaihtoehtoja):

- a. rauhanneuvotteluapu
- b. demokratiakoulutus
- c. hyvän hallinnon kehittäminen
- d. sotilasjoukkoja, millaisia _____
- e. humanitaarinen apu
- f. en pidä Suomelle kohdistuvia erityispyyntöjä todennäköisinä
- g. muu vaihtoehto _____

Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?

6. Millä tavoin sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyötä pitää tulevaisuudessa kehittää?

- a. parantamalla tiedonkulkua
- b. yhdistämällä siviili- ja sotilasoperaatioita
- c. lisäämällä yhdessä toteutettavia tehtäviä
- d. huolehtimalla selkeästä työnjaosta
- e. yhteistyön mallit pitää ratkaista tapauskohtaisesti, ilman mitään tavoitemallia
- g. vaikuttamalla toimijoiden asenteisiin

Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?

7. Miten parantaisitte yhteistyötä paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa konfliktialueella?

8. Miten parantaisitte yhteistyötä (vastaajasta riippuen näkemys)

- siviilikriisinhallinnan sisällä - ja/tai -
- sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan sisällä?

Kriisinhallintahenkilöstö**9. Kriisinhallintahenkilöstöltä edellytetään tulevaisuudessa seuraavia ominaisuuksia (voitte valita tarpeelliseksi katsomasi määrän vaihtoehtoja):**

- a. erityisosaaminen ja -taidot
- b. kielitaito
- c. kulttuurien tuntemus
- d. kyky oppia uusia asioita
- e. vuorovaikutus- ja neuvottelutaidot
- f. paineensieto
- g. sosiaalisuus
- h. muu, mikä _____

Mitä pidätte edellä mainituista tekijöistä tärkeimpänä?

- a. sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa _____
- b. siviilikriisinhallinnassa _____

Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön koulutus**10. Tulevaisuuden kriisinhallintakoulutuksen suurimpina haasteina pidän (valitkaa enintään kolme vaihtoehtoa):**

- a. erityisosaamisen ja erityistaitojen opettamisen
- b. kielitaidon opetuksen
- c. kulttuurien tuntemuksen opettamisen
- d. varautumisen oppimaan uusia työskentelymenetelmiä
- e. kansainvälisen operaation toimintojen hallinnan opettamisen
- f. muu, mikä _____

Mikä haasteista on tulevaisuudessa merkittävin?

- sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa _____
- siviilikriisinhallinnassa _____

Miten perustelette näkemyksenne?

Millä tavoin oppimismahdollisuuksia ja koulutusta kriisinhallintatyöskentelyn aikana tulisi kehittää?

Millä tavoin kehittäisitte kriisinhallintatyöskentelyn jälkeistä palautejärjestelmää? Palautteella tarkoitetaan sekä henkilöstön antamaa palautetta organisaatiosta että henkilöstön saamaa palautetta omasta toiminnastaan.

11. Pitääkö sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutusta toteuttaa tulevaisuudessa yhdistetysti?

- a. Kyllä
- b. Ei
- c. Vaihtelee tilanteen mukaan.

Jos vastasitte joiltain osin tai kokonaisuudessaan myönteisesti, missä asioissa pidätte yhdistettyä koulutusta perusteltuna?

Appendix 7.

Questionnaire for the second round of the Delphi panel process

Ulla Anttila

MPKK:n tohtoriopiskelija

Kriisinhallinnan tulevaisuus

Väittämät Delfoi-menetelmän 2. kierrokselle, syyskuu 2008

Arvoisa vastaanottaja,

Delfoi-tutkimukseni toisen kerroksen lomake perustuu ensimmäisen kierroksen haastattelujen ja niihin liittyneiden lomakkeiden analyysiin. Tälle lomakkeelle nostetut väittämät eivät ole keskiarvotuloksia vaan osa niistä on tullut esiin haastateltavien kertomissa perusteluissa.

Arvioitavia väittämiä on lomakkeella yhteensä 33. Toivon, että sinulla on aikaa arvioida ne kaikki ja mahdollisuuksien mukaan myös perustella arviosi. Tutkittavien väittämien avulla pyritään kartoittamaan ajanjaksoa n. 20 vuotta eteenpäin nykyhetkestä.

Oheinen lomake on tallennettu Word-muotoon siten, että se olisi mahdollista täyttää mahdollisimman helposti tekstinkäsittelyä hyödyntäen. Toivon sinun voivan vastata 3.10.2008 mennessä. Lomake on mahdollista palauttaa minulle myös paperiversiona kotisoitteeseeni. Tässä tapauksessa toivon sinun kirjoittavan nimesi lomakkeeseen ja toimitan sinulle mielelläni palautuskuoren, kunhan ilmoitat asiasta.

Toivon, sinun ilmoittavan minulle myös puhelinnumerosi, jotta voisin kysyä puhelimitse mahdollisia täydentäviä kommentteja. Jos sinusta tuntuu mielekkäältä, pelkän kirjallisen vastaamisen sijasta voimme käydä lomakkeen läpi myös haastatteluna esim. puhelimitse. Pyydän sinun ilmoittavan toiveesi haastattelutyypisestä lomakkeen läpikäymisestä sähköpostitse.

Kuten Delfoi-paneelin ensimmäisellä kierroksella painotin, vastaukset käsitellään tutkimuksessa niin, ettei paneeliin osallistuvien henkilöiden henkilöllisyys käy ilmi. Lomakkeeseen vastaaminen vie aikaa noin tunnin. Suuret kiitokset vaivannäöstäsi lomakkeeseen vastatessasi!

VASTAUSOHJEET

Väittämiä pyydetään arvioimaan joko yhdellä tai kahdella mittarilla, joiden suurin arvo 5 tarkoittaa myönteisintä suhtautumista.

A. Väittämiin pyydetään vastaamaan käyttäen seuraavaa skaalaa:

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä

3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

B. Väittämien olennaisuutta koskevaan arvioon pyydetään vastaamaan käyttäen seuraavaa skaalaa:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1-5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut-osuudessa toivon sinun voivan painottaa, millä edellytyksin kyseinen näemyksesi tulevaisuuden kehityksestä toteutuu.

VÄITTÄMÄT

Tulevat kriisit ja konfliktit

1. Tulevat konfliktit, joihin puututaan kriisinhallinnan keinoin, ovat yleisimpiä Afrikassa ja laajassa Lähi-idässä ja konfliktin yhtenä tai useampana osapuolena on eivaltioollisia ryhmittymiä.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1-5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1-5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

2. Mahdollinen suurvaltasuhteiden muutos ei vaikuta kriisinhallinnassa noudatettaviin periaatteisiin esimerkiksi ihmisoikeuksiin liittyen.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1-5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä

5. Täysin samaa mieltä__

Perustelut:

Kriisinhallinnan mallit

3. Tulevaisuudessa sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyö tiivistyy, mutta työnjaon kehittyminen johtaa vaihteellisuuteen eri toimijoiden työskentelyssä.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

4. Kokonaisvaltaisen kriisinhallinnan kehittäminen edellyttää kriisinhallinnan eri toimijoiden yhteistyösuhteiden parantamista.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

5. Siviilikriisinhallinnassa Suomen onnistuminen perustuu erikoistumiseen.

Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä

3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

6. Sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa Suomen onnistuminen perustuu erikoistumiseen.

Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä__

Perustelut:

Sotilaallinen kriisinhallinta

7. Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan yksikkökustannusten kasvaessa ulkomaille lähetettävien joukkojen määrä joko pysyy nykyisellään tai vähenee hieman.

B Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

8. Sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa ulkomaille lähetettävien joukkojen määrän kasvu edellyttää suurta kansainvälistä painetta ja siitä johtuvia sitoumuksia.

Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

9. Suomen pitää tukea YK:n rauhanturvaamista järjestämällä soveltuvia koulutuksia eri maiden YK-joukoille.

Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

Siviilikriisinhallinta

10. Suomen siviilikriisinhallinnan kasvu on riippuvaista toiminnan tuloksellisuudesta.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

11. Suomen harjoittaman siviilikriisinhallinnan suuntaviivat ovat riippuvaisia EU:n linjauksista.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä

- 4. Melko olennainen
- 5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

12. Siviilikriisinhallinnan kehittyminen edellyttää kasvavaa yhteistyötä myös kehityspolitiikan toimijoiden kanssa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

- 1. Täysin eri mieltä
- 2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
- 5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

Suomeen kohdistuvat erityispyynnöt kriisinhallinnassa ja rauhanrakentamisessa sekä maamme mahdollinen erikoistuminen näillä aloilla

13. Suomeen kohdistuvat erityispyynnöt rauhanneuvotteluavusta ovat riippuvaisia yksittäisten neuvottelijoiden menestyksestä rauhanneuvotteluissa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

- 1. Täysin eri mieltä
- 2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
- 5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

14. Suomeen kohdistuvat erityispyynnöt kriisinhallinnassa ja rauhanrakentamisessa edellyttävät Suomelta erikoistumista, joka osoitetaan kansainvälisissä yhteyksissä.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

- 1. Täysin eri mieltä
- 2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
- 5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

- 1. Erittäin epäolennainen
- 2. Melko epäolennainen
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Melko olennainen
- 5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

15. Suomeen ei kohdistu erityispyyntöjä kriisinhallinnassa ja rauhanrakentamisessa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

Sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyön kehittäminen tulevaisuudessa

16. Tiedonkulku ja selkeä työnjako ovat avainasiat sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan yhteistyön kehittämisessä.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

17. Yhteistyön mallintaminen esimerkiksi 3–7 rakenteellisesti erilaiseen yhteistyömalliin kansainvälisten toimijoiden kesken helpottaisi kriisinhallinnan suunnittelua ja koulutusta.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä

- 4. Melko olennainen
- 5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

Yhteistyö paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa konfliktialueella

18. Paikalliset asukkaat on saatava mukaan jälleenrakennushankkeisiin jo suunniteluvaiheessa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

- 1. Täysin eri mieltä
- 2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
- 5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

19. Internet-pohjaista tiedonjakoa on hyödynnettävä kansainvälisten siviili- ja sotilasorganisaatioiden yhteistyössä paikallisten asukkaiden kanssa kriisialueella.

Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

- 1. Täysin eri mieltä
- 2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
- 5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

Kriisinhallintahenkilöstö

20. Asiantuntijuutta tai erityisammattitaitoa vaativien tehtävien osuus kasvaa tulevaisuudessa sekä siviili- että sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

- 1. Täysin eri mieltä
- 2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
- 5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

- 1. Erittäin epäolennainen
- 2. Melko epäolennainen
- 3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
- 4. Melko olennainen
- 5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

21. Siviilikriisinhallinnassa vuorovaikutus- ja neuvottelutaidot on otettava huomioon jo kriisinhallintahenkilöstön rekrytointivaiheessa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

22. Sotilaallisessa kriisinhallinnassa vuorovaikutus- ja neuvottelutaidot on otettava huomioon jo kriisinhallintahenkilöstön rekrytointivaiheessa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

erustelut:

23. Siviilikriisinhallintaan on kehitettävä uudenlainen rekrytointijärjestelmä, joka takaa monipuolisen henkilöstön saatavuuden eri tehtäviin.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

24. Sotilaalliseen kriisinhallintaan on kehitettävä uudenlainen rekrytointijärjestelmä, joka takaa monipuolisen henkilöstön saatavuuden eri tehtäviin.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

25. Jotta sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan kansainvälisiin tehtäviin saadaan tulevaisuudessa rekrytoiduksi sotilaallista ammattihenkilöstöä, pitää ylennyksissä ylimpiin upseeri-arvoihin olla yhtenä perusteluna ulkomaanpalvelus.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

Kriisinhallintahenkilöstön koulutuksen haasteet

26. Siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutukseen on kehitettävä yhteiset standardit kansainvälisten organisaatioiden ja alueen valtioiden kesken, jotta voimavarat saadaan käytettyä tehokkaasti ja päällekkäiseltä koulutukselta välttyään.

Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

27. Siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutuksessa tärkeintä koulutettavan henkilön kriisinhallintatehtävien ja operaation luonteeseen tutustumisen lisäksi on alueen paikalliskulttuurien, historian sekä konfliktin taustan perustietojen opetus.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

28. Sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan koulutuksessa on tärkeintä koulutettavan henkilön kriisinhallintehtävien ja sotilaallisten valmiuksien sekä operaation luonteeseen tutustumisen lisäksi on alueen paikalliskulttuurien, historian sekä konfliktin taustan perustietojen opetus.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

29. Jokaiselle siviilikriisinhallinnan tehtävissä ulkomailla työskennelleelle on tarjottava mahdollisuus henkilökohtaisen palautteen antamiseen ja saamiseen sekä ns. debriefing-keskusteluun.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

30. Jokaiselle sotilaallisen kriisinhallinnan tehtävissä ulkomailla työskennelleelle on tarjottava mahdollisuus henkilökohtaisen palautteen antamiseen ja saamiseen sekä ns. debriefing-keskusteluun.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

31. Kriisinhallintahenkilökunnalta saatu palaute on kerättävä talteen systemaattisesti ja hyödynnettävä kriisinhallinnan jatkokehittämisessä.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

Sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutuksen toteuttaminen yhdistetysti

32. Tulevaisuudessa sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutus kannattaa toteuttaa yhdistetysti moduuleina, jotka esimerkiksi kattavat tietyn asiakokonaisuuden tai jonkin alueen tilanteeseen liittyvät asiat.

A Arvio väittämästä (1–5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä

2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

33. Sotilaallisen ja siviilikriisinhallinnan koulutus on tarkoituksenmukaista järjestää kansallisesti eri organisaatioissa, jotka tekevät yhteistyötä yhteiskoulutuksessa.

A. Arvio väittämästä (1-5):

1. Täysin eri mieltä
2. Jokseenkin eri mieltä
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Jokseenkin samaa mieltä
5. Täysin samaa mieltä

Perustelut:

B. Väittämän olennaisuus (1–5):

1. Erittäin epäolennainen
2. Melko epäolennainen
3. En osaa sanoa/kantani on ääripäiden välissä
4. Melko olennainen
5. Erittäin olennainen

Perustelut:

SUURET KIITOKSET VAIVANNÄÖSTÄSI!

Mahdolliset lisäkommentit lomakkeesta tai aihepiiristä:

ISSN 1798-0399
ISBN 978-951-25-2356-6
ISBN 978-951-25-2357-3 (PDF)



National Defence University
Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy
P.O. Box 7
00861 Helsinki
Suomi | Finland

▶ www.mpkk/mil.fi