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CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS?

SUSANNA ESKOLA (ed.)

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU – NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
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THE ELEVENTH SUOMENLINNA SEMINAR

The 28th and 29th of May 2008
Helsinki

FOREWORD

The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University of Finland arranged its eleventh annual 'Suomenlinna Seminar' in Helsinki, on the 28th and 29th of May, 2008. Participants of the seminar included key political and military decision makers and academics in Finland as well as a selected group of international guests, totalling about 60 persons.

Finland applied for membership in the UN in 1955. The first Finnish peace-keeping contingent was deployed in the Middle-East in the following year. From those years on, Finland could put into practice the common Nordic view of it being more important to be in the thick of the problems and trying to help and sort them out than to pontificate from the sidelines. From the perspective of a small nation, the importance to support the UN was also widely recognized. The same rationale was applied from the mid 1990s on, when peace-keeping evolved, mandates were widened and new actors entered the scene. Participation in operations and different international exercises is also instrumental in developing the capabilities of a national defence, as multinationality is widely applied today in tactical, as well as operational formations. A seminar analyzing the future outlooks and challenges of Crisis management is in fact looking into one of the corner stones of Finnish foreign and security policy.

The articles of this book tackle four interconnected and partly overlapping dimensions of crisis management by discussing its justification, evaluation, motivation and future perspectives. Each article elaborates a certain aspect of these themes. Together, they create a critical expedition to the predominant views on crisis management.

We cannot expect any clear-cut, universal or static answers to the topics of the seminar, nor is such an undertaking the purpose of this publication. Rather, due to the importance of crisis management in contemporary world politics and the vagueness of the concept itself, we felt we had an academic responsibility to make a contribution by provoking discussion on the subject, not ignoring its political and controversial nature.

The articles are presented in more detail in Susanna Eskola's introductory text. On behalf of the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies I thank Ms. Eskola for her contribution as the editor of this seminar report.

Helsinki, October 2008

Director of the DSDS
Colonel Erik Erroll

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INTRODUCTION: CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS?

Susanna Eskola

Suomenlinna Seminar 2008

The eleventh annual Suomenlinna seminar, organized by the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of the Finnish National University, had a somewhat provocative title: *Crisis management in crisis?* The chosen title suggests that the tool intended for solving crises might be in crisis itself. The seminar was organised exactly for the purpose of discussing this problem; the aim was to truly ponder on the concept of crisis management.[1] In order to progress, it is sometimes necessary to return to the basic questions once again and to critically examine the answers given to them. Thus, the question asked and discussed in the seminar concerned the very foundation of the phenomenon.

Crisis management and its problems have been discussed, and are being discussed, in several arenas. The 11th Suomenlinna seminar tried to contribute to the discussion not just by considering the practical level of crisis management, but through tackling the themes often neglected; by pondering on the justification and motivation of the operations and by critically examining the essential problems of the evaluation and future of crisis management. The commonly given reasons for the operations, as well as their possible effects, were the questions that the organisers deemed important. Why is crisis management done and why should it be – or should not be – done? What have been the successes and failures of the operations so far, and why? How can we develop the operations? How do the operations carried out affect the contemporary world and the world of tomorrow? What are the future prospects of crisis management?

[1] The 11th Suomenlinna Seminar concentrated on military crisis management, which is why this article also concentrates on that side of the management actions.

Why Does Crisis Management Matter?

One might, of course, ask why these questions are important anyhow. Why did we gather to discuss the nature of crisis management? The answer to this question is threefold:

To begin with, one cannot bypass the practical impact that crisis management has in today's world. The character of crisis management is comprehensive – it includes a variety of actions that cover many important aspects of human life, and the procedures created and decisions made in the operations therefore affect the lives of the managed (and the ones managing them) in multiple ways. Crisis management will always be a combination of many compromises, but it is extremely important to recognise the crucial practical meaning of the focus of each compromise.

Secondly, the role of crisis management is significant also in a more implicit, but even more profound, way; as a construction and constructor of the world order[2]. There seems to be a widely shared understanding that, after the Cold War and 9/11, the old order of things has broken down and that we are now living in a more fragmented, complicated and interconnected world, where old threats have been complemented by a set of new ones that are more transnational in nature. During the Cold War, the commonly held assumption of the world order was based on the norms of respecting sovereignty, the non-use of force and non-intervention, so as to maintain international peace and security[3]. In the contemporary world, the established form of promoting security is somewhat different. States have started to actively prevent the threats also outside the state territory and the concept of security has widened tremendously. According to many researchers, we are living in an era of securitization[4], where distant events (also the kind that did not use to belong to the security sector) are seen as threats, and the way to cope with this situation has become to actively manage, and, if possible, to prevent events considered as threats.

Thus, the use of armed forces can be seen as an important way of promoting a certain set of values and interests, a certain kind of world order. By this I refer to Hedley Bull's idea of the twofold meaning of the use of armed forces in the world system; it is a tool for destruction but also a tool for preservation. The use of armed forces is a threat that has to be re-

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[2] Order in social life can be defined as a formula of action which is intended to promote certain values and interests. Norms are the key factor sustaining the prevailing order. These norms are constructed in social interaction and although they are not necessary binding they nevertheless create the framework for possibilities for actions. See Bull (2002/1977), pp. 4-6.

[3] Ryter (2003), p. 1.

[4] See for instance Buzan, Waever, de Wilde (1998) and Laitinen (2004).

stricted, but it is also a possibility, an effective way for the world society to enforce the rule of law, the balance of power and to promote just change. How, when and why we use military force says a great deal about how we see the world; what is considered to be a threat, and who are considered as enemies, allies or friends. Thus, the normative evolvement of war rises to the fore; the questions of what is considered to be legitimate and desirable use of armed forces and how the "rules of the game" are defined have a wider implication on the predominant order of things. This means that the change in the norms of the use of armed forces changes the norms of the world system, as well.[5]

This mode of thought can also be applied to crisis management, since the concept of war has started to transform after the Cold War. The rise of crisis management has been a part of that change – it is often defined as a way of coping with the altered situation in the post Cold War and 9/11 era. It is a way of responding to the emerging threats and a new basis for developing the armed forces[6]. This aim to cope with the altered situation, the need to create a new form of action, is reflected also in the European Union's Security Strategy in which one can see a shift in the strategic culture:

> "With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The policy implication for the Union is first of all the need to be "More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. *Active policies* are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. *We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention."* [7]

Although crisis management is a part of the changed view on security and the legitimate use of armed forces, this does not mean that crisis management is a totally new phenomenon. In the course of history, nations have always used military force abroad in different ways, and peacekeeping was an important mode of action also in the Cold War era. However, it is important to notice the shift in the mode of the actions performed. Traditional peacekeeping has turned into crisis management where the old principles about the need of consent of the fighting parties and impartiality have started to become less important; the coercive nature and supreme power have become more momentous[8]. It is important to examine the current mode of crisis management profoundly; how we cope, or manage, with the

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[5] Bull (2002/1977), pp. 52-53, 180-181.
[6] Raitasalo (2008), p. 2.
[7] A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, pp. 7, 12 (my italics).
[8] Pyykönen (2008), p. 128.

crises of today has an important effect on what tomorrow's crises will look like.

Consequently, the third reason, which emphasises the need for discussing crisis management, is the open and political nature of its definition – although there has clearly been a shift in the character of the operations performed, no shared understanding of the definition of crisis management exists. Attempts to define a doctrine for when and how it is legitimate to use coercive violence have faced strong opposition[9]. There is a certain amount of fluidness at the core of the concept of crisis management. After all, it includes multiple actors with different agendas and motives, and how one defines an operation carried out abroad depends on one's position. Crisis management is at the interface of law and politics and contains strong moral and philosophical dimensions[10]. Although no comprehensive doctrine is possible, we at least need to achieve a better level of understanding of the basis of the actions taken to avoid making choices – that shape both our present and future – blindfolded.

Some Controversial Aspects of Crisis Management

The themes discussed in the 11th Suomenlinna seminar were selected so as to inspire a lively discussion between the ideational and material worlds. The aim was not just to discuss the practical "lessons learnt" but also to examine the underlying conceptions of crisis management.

One aspect that was deemed important by the organizers was the basis of justification and motivation of the actions. Operations are commonly justified and motivated by their capability to improve the security interests of the managers and the managed, through promoting humanitarian security and preventing conflicts from escalating. In other words, the imperative to act is reasoned both through national and humanitarian arguments. Crisis management is presented as inevitable in the contemporary world – it is argued to be the only way of dealing with the complicated security environment. The extreme nature of a conflict situation is seen to create legitimacy to actions that would normally be disapproved[11]. This was expressed, for example, in the case of Kosovo, when NATO's military intervention was considered illegal but legitimate.[12]

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[9] Ryter (2003), p. 2.
[10] Ryter (2003), p. 1.
[11] See Raitasalo (2005a).
[12] See for instance Independent International Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo Report.

Although the reasoning used is convincing and crisis management has brought aid to a considerable number of people, the argument of the inevitability of the actions can often be questioned. There is a need to discuss the operations also critically – to ask what is actually achieved by a certain operation. Crisis management cannot be viewed as a simple and uncontradictory answer. It is merely an alternative – and by no means unproblematic – way of responding to certain threats. In addition to successful operations, many unanticipated problems have come up. Rwanda, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, to name but a few, have shed light on the variety of problems that crisis management operations may face, and possibly even produce. The failures of crisis management operations and their prolonged durations have caused growing dissatisfaction also among the populations of the countries managing the operations. In Finland, for example, there is an ongoing debate over which missions abroad are suitable for the country. The official motivations given for crisis management follow the Western general line of argument:

> "In parallel with the traditional task of territorial defence, more emphasis is being placed on the defence of basic democratic values, interests and vital functions of societies. This often takes place through crisis management far away from the national borders of the countries concerned."[13]

Nevertheless, in 2007, only 50% of the Finns thought that the Finnish Defence Forces should take part in conflict and threat prevention in various parts of the world. [14]

The rising suspicion among the people is something which should be taken into serious account. Crisis management includes a promise for a better future. Thus, there is something paradoxical about all this: people often seem to think that the action meant for improving security may actually cause new problems, both in the short and long term, or that it may not have a real impact at all; whose security is thus promoted? The organizers of the seminar therefore saw it important to pay special attention to the basis of the motivation and justification of the operations. It is important from time to time to critically scrutinize not just *how* but also *why* crisis management is done.

In addition to the motivation and justification of crisis management, the organizers felt that another theme that needed to be addressed was the evaluation of the operations and the future prospects of crisis management. It goes without saying that without evaluation there cannot be any development. This has also been taken into consideration, since evaluation is

[13] The Finnish Security and Defence Policy Report, 2004 p.41.
[14] The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) 2007.

seen as an essential part of crisis management operations. Still, it is important to discuss the basis of the evaluation methods, as it is not easy to define, not to mention evaluate, success in crisis management. How to separate long term and short term success and how to measure the first one, in particular? How to use coercive force in a way that also enables trust among the managed? These questions, for their part, show that it is not an easy task to evaluate crisis management. Indeed, there are aspects that cannot be formulated neatly into a diagram or statistic. It is important to discuss what it means for the future (of crisis management) if the evaluation of the operations is inadequate – how can we develop our actions and aim for progress without knowing exactly what to evaluate? Without a more profound understanding, it is possible that we develop our actions on grounds of some successful operations, even though we may not precisely know what actually made them successful. Thus, during the 11th Suomenlinna seminar, we discussed the lessons that have been learnt and lessons that should be learnt, and tried to analyse the possible consequences that the current mode of action may have for the future

To sum up, crisis management is an important but controversial form of coping with problems in today's world. Although a comprehensive doctrine of crisis management is hardly possible, we need to achieve a better level of understanding of the basis of the operations carried out, not just on a practical, but also on a conceptual level. This need is well recognised and one solution often referred to is the so called Comprehensive Approach. It aims to enhance the co-operation in crisis management on all levels[15]. The Comprehensive Approach undoubtedly has many advantages – after all, improving co-operation in a world where threats do not respect boundaries (at any level) is necessary – but we still need to widen, or rather deepen, our perspective a bit. This refers to the need to grasp the ambiguous and multifaceted nature of crisis management. Indeed, it is not important only to discuss *how* to work better together, as it is also important to ask *why*-questions – to question the essence and basis of the predominant ways of thinking. The aim of the 11th Suomenlinna seminar was precisely to take this kind of deeper, more critical view of the predominant assumptions of crisis management.

[15] Comprehensive approach refers to *...a range of models and mechanisms aimed at enhancing overall coherence, cooperation and coordination. ...*" The aim is *"...to achieve greater harmonisation and synchronisation among the activities of the various international and local actors, across the analysis, planning, implementation, management and evaluation aspects of the programme cycle."* Friis & Jarmyr (2008).

Searching for Alternatives

The articles of this book tackle four interconnected and partly overlapping dimensions of crisis management: justification, evaluation, motivation and future perspectives of crisis management. Each of the articles elaborates on some aspect of these themes and together they create a critical expedition to the predominant views of crisis management.

Timo Airaksinen first creates a philosophical basis for crisis management by elaborating the logic and ethics of coercion. He discusses the problems and paradoxes, as well as the possibilities that the use of coercive power contains. Andreas Behnke and Dibyesh Anand, in turn, examine the underlying assumptions in Western crisis management. Anand points out the dangers of management speak and the oversimplifying definitions that it may entail, while Behnke discusses the paradoxes of NATO's involvement in Crisis Management in the Balkans in the 1990s and examines the challenges facing (NATO's) crisis management today.

Tim Foxley tackles the current problems and future prospects of the Afghanistan mission. He calls for longer-term understanding and planning, stating that the Western assumptions are often unhelpful and that there is a true need for expertise in the key regions of the world and in the probable problem areas of the future. Kalle Liesinen, in turn, examines the case of decommissioning and reintegration in Aceh as an example of the possible issues that crisis managers have to face in post-conflict operations. He also emphasises the need for a profound evaluation process in order to develop the operations.

Jyri Raitasalo and Alyson Bailes concentrate on national interests in crisis management. Bailes, in her article, examines the motivations given to overseas operations in European countries and how the motivations have changed since the Cold War. She tackles the important question of what it means for the future if the motivations are seen as more or less controversial. Raitasalo emphasises the different strategies of major and minor powers and critically discusses the possible consequences of crisis management from the point of view of small countries, in particular.

Marcus Mohlin discusses the current development, which has seen the increasing presence of private military companies in crisis management and other similar undertakings. He argues that private military companies are involved for a reason quite different from most other actors that operate in areas of conflict and crisis: that of profit. This motive creates certain problems, which makes it extremely important to analyze the role of the companies.

All in all, the articles create a comprehensive view of the problems and prospects of crisis management. The theme common to all of them is the understanding of crisis management as a complex and deeply political issue; there cannot be any technical quick-fix answers in crisis management, because it is a multi-levelled and dimensional phenomenon. Thus, the articles aim at invoking discussion, rather than giving direct answers. They illuminate the questions of the logic behind the predominant chains of argument, as well as the contradictions between and inherent in them. They also elaborate the practical expressions of these problems by discussing the operations in Aceh, Afghanistan and Kosovo. Through this interplay between the practical and the conceptual level, they help to grasp the multileveled network of problems in crisis management, both now and in the future. This multileveled approach is crucial in order to improve our understanding of crisis management. The articles in this book invoke questions that are not always comfortable but are nevertheless necessary.

Questioning the Certainties

Based on the insights provided by the articles, there are at least two themes worth considering in the discussions to come. Firstly, there is a need to pay attention to the unplanned effects of crisis management and, secondly, to create a form of dialogue that is inclusive rather than exclusive. These themes are intrinsically woven together.

The first theme refers to the idea of crisis management as an important factor in creating and re-creating the world order. It is interesting to discuss what long-term implications this mode of action might have for our conceptions of the use of armed forces. The change in the use of armed forces, as stated at the beginning of this article, must not be underestimated – the change in the norms of using armed forces has a tendency to affect the norms of the world system in the long run.

One transition that is potentially significant is the change in the relationship between soldiers and civilians. The improvement of the co-operation between soldiers and civilians in crisis management has rendered the old distinctions between the two groups vague. The new threats are located in the borderland between civilian and military sectors, which puts pressure on the traditional role of soldiers[16]. Being a soldier today includes a much wider and more diverse set of responsibilities than it used to. The roles of the military and civilian personnel are now more similar and they work in closer co-operation than before. Although it can also be argued that this phenomenon is nothing new, this recent trend should not be undervalued.

[16] See for Instance Raitasalo 2005b; Martelius 2006; Nokkala 2006.

The increasing military presence in different kinds of crisis areas has created a situation where the use of military force abroad may become more common and accepted – a normal way of behaving in the world, rather than an exception.

This development might, in the worst case scenario, mean increasing lack of trust and polarisation in the world. The threat is real, in that it is possible that the world will divide even more deeply into the managers and the managed. To carry out a crisis management operation successfully requires strong military power, which is why only powerful states and coalitions can perform these tasks. This works also the other way around; it is hard to imagine a state with strong military power becoming an object of military intervention. Thus, there is the threat that crisis management will widen the gap between the strong and the weak in the world system.[17] As it was explicitly stated in the European Union and Finnish Security Strategies[18]; what has become more important in crisis management is the protection of shared values, not just territory. This, in turn, raises the question of whose values and what kind of values? It is important to critically reflect on the distinction between 'us' and 'them'.

The above mentioned problematic consequences of crisis management are not easy to tackle. Therefore, the second theme that needs to be discussed is how we could improve the character of crisis management in order to avoid the polarisation of the world. As there is no easy answer, the best alternative is to create dialogue that is both inclusive, instead of exclusive, and reflective instead of straightforward.

To create inclusive dialogue we need to widen our basis for discussion so that it includes, not just the multiple actors doing crisis management, but also the managed. So as to avoid making the mistake of using 'our' concepts to measure 'their' problems, the empowerment of the locals in the crisis areas, despite its problematic features, is the best option available. The concept of empowerment is notoriously imprecise and vague. There is no commonly shared view on the exact definition of the concept, but it can be defined as an attitude or approach – as a will to avoid managing the problem from the outside while helping the parties to manage the problem. It should at least mean the aim "to locate the war within the precise social context from which it springs"[19] This refers simply to the need to understand conflicts as social projects and to see conflict and peace as a continuum instead of opposites. There is a need to understand the relations of the pre-war society and the social processes that lead into the escalation of the

[17] Ryter (2003), p. 7.
[18] See pages 3 and 5.
[19] Richards (2005) p.4.

conflict. If the particular context is taken into account, it becomes possible, for example, to influence the group dynamics in the society in a way that makes sustainable peace more possible to achieve. This kind of knowledge is not possible to reach without dialogue with the locals in the conflict zones.[20]

The empowerment also benefits the managers by giving hope for the future; by promoting local ownership we ensure at the same time that we are able to withdraw from the situation sooner or later. No one wants to tie themselves to operations that may last for decades. The paradox of development aid is an illustrative example – it was supposed to make itself redundant, but instead it became institutionalized. In addition, mistakes made in previous development efforts are some of the main reasons for today's (security) problems. So there is a risk that mistakes made in crisis management today will be the root of problems for the future generations. By giving voice to the victims, by empowering the managed, we are more likely to create a true possibility for sustainable solutions to crises.

As stated previously, besides avoiding the exclusion of the managed from the dialogue, one should also avoid dialogue that is too straightforward by nature. On the contrary, the dialogue should include a great deal of self-reflection (from the part of the managers). The need for self-reflection refers to the theme of evaluation which was discussed previously in this article. Based on the ideas presented in this book, one could claim that, in the evaluation process, critical self-observation is needed more than diagrams and calculations. If we do not question our actions and their foundation at least from time to time, no development or true learning is possible. Acting without self-reflection is like knocking on the same door over and over again while knowing that nobody is home. Through self-reflection and dialogue we might be able to come up with another solution to get into the house; maybe there is a window open somewhere?

The 11th Suomenlinna seminar contributed to the search for the open window – to the search for more inclusive and reflective dialogue. The aim of the seminar was to discuss the core of the phenomenon, not just to search answers to the practical problems. To have this open dialogue and self-reflection, we also need to grasp the political and controversial nature of crisis management in order to create a truly comprehensive and more in-depth view. One could say that due to the importance of crisis management in the contemporary world and to the vagueness of the concept, there is an academic responsibility to make a contribution and to provoke this kind of discussion. Even though we cannot expect any clear-cut, universal or static answers to the questions concerning crisis management, the questions

[20] Ibid. pp.9-13.

should be asked, nevertheless. The purpose of this paper was to lead the reader into pondering on the concept of crisis management, its defining features, the underlying assumptions and the problems it may contain. The following articles will lead the reader deeper into these questions.

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2

THINKING ABOUT THE LOGIC AND ETHICS OF COERCION

Timo Airaksinen

Coercive Power between Individual Agents

A basic question of hard power is this: How are rational agents supposed to reason about their threat-strategies, if they want to influence another person's actions to their own benefit? In this part of the paper my basic method is that of analytical philosophy combined with praxiology. I assume first that the agents we discuss here are rational individuals who want to maximize the (positive) outcome of their actions, in the usual way. Later I will relax this condition in order to create a more realistic situation. In such high stress situations as those of coercion and threats, agents may find it difficult to plan their actions according to the canons of rationality. This problem does not belong to philosophy.

I try to show that coercive threats do not work in two-person non-social cases, understood as strategic games. This may sound unintuitive on common-sense empirical grounds and it should be explained why this is so.

Description of coercion:

Agent A threatens agent B by X (beating), when X is a disvalue to both A and B. A wants Y (money) from B. If and only if B does Y, A does not do X. For B, X is a greater loss than Y. Therefore, B does Y, and A is successful. All this is rational. B is able to minimize his loss by accepting the loss of Y and A gets what he wants.

This is not unconditionally so, for the following reason. B has the choice of resisting A. If B refuses to do Y, A cannot get Y. But in this case A is committed to do X, that is to realize his threat. But B can ask: Why would A do so? Now he cannot get Y and X as such is a disvalue for him (however small). Hurting B cannot intrinsically benefit A in any way but means, on the contrary, waste of energy and a risk of harm to the agent himself. Therefore A has no motive to do X, as B must realize. It follows that B can safely refuse Y, even when he is threatened by X. But if B is able to refuse on rational grounds, A cannot present an efficient threat. A knows this all,

as he is a rational and well-informed agent. In such a situation coercion never existed, against the initial stipulation that it did. A just pretended coercion. Coercion never gets off the ground, so to speak. All threats are just stylistic features in a violent and evil context. They manifest evil, nothing else. Only if B is scared or otherwise irrational, A may succeed.

Such reasoning works only if A is a rational utility maximizer. What happens if he is not? Suppose A may be irrational. Then B needs to reason as follows:

If I refuse, I save Y but X may or may not happen because A is irrational and it is impossible to predict what he will do. X may follow Y. Therefore, I must refuse to Y, because my own worst position is the loss of both X and Y, and I can save Y only if I refuse. I may then receive a beating but I save my money anyway. The worst case is that I get the beating (X) and lose my money (Y). This is what I must avoid.

On these grounds rational A refuses to co-operate with B. A thinks he is in a winning position, and this is so regardless whether he gets (harmful) X in the end.

The same reasoning is valid even if A is like a sadist and, as such, enjoys X. In this case X is no longer a loss to him. A will do X independently of what B does. A enjoys X, which makes B's decision deterministic and clear. So, B should refuse to do Y. In this way B can save Y. B will get X anyway. Here A's sadism is a form of irrationality as well, not because A's behavior cannot be predicted – it can be – but because it is based on his rigid emotions. His emotions are not sensitive to utility calculations, and in this sense they are too predictable. A does X however harmful it is to himself. His emotions which reward him of doing X are so overpowering that it does not matter how harmful X as such is to him. Such emotions are truly evil, as they harm both X and Y.

This is evil: it harms us all. Notice that in normal conditions A's emotional tendency to perform X is conditional on the amount of harm X brings about to him. He does not beat B up if he thinks he gets a long prison sentence for it. Yet, if A really wants to do X, he may always deceive himself into believing that he can avoid the related harm. This is what evil people seem to believe. Their emotions make them epistemically irrational in the sense of, denial of truth, self-deception and weakness of will, as I said in the first section of this paper. Moreover, B cannot know what evil thoughts A may entertain in their interaction. B's best choice is always to refuse Y, or not giving A what he wants. A sadistic agent must look irrational to B.

The Success of Institutional Coercion

I show next that threats work only if we can add to their descriptions such social elements as institutions. In other words, effective and efficient threats between rational agents work only if suitable social institutions support them. This is a kind of Hobbesian argument which shows that in the State of Nature social power does not exist. Social power is a social construction. This also supports Hobbes's idea that nothing is evil or wrong in the State of Nature. He thinks that social institutions bring about justice and, consequently, the possibility of evil as a failure of justice. Without institutions all is chaos of force and violence. For instance, the two-person individual case of coercion is not coercion at all. It is mere violence. My argument establishes rational evil in a more direct sense: threats work only in an institutional setting and this constitutes the rational game of coercion – without mitigating its characteristic evil nature. Nevertheless, my argument is still Hobbesian in a broad sense of the term.

The institutional rational rule of coercion is as follows:

Only if A is an institutional agent is his threat position X convincing to B in the sense that the institution guarantees the realization of X just in case of not Y by B. In this case B should agree to Y when B knows about A's background. Coercion emerges as a type of effective interactive strategy

If A is an institutional agent with, say, a reputation to lose (informal case) or a norm to follow (formal case), A will do X only if B refuses to do Y. This perfect state of affairs is due to the fact that A's loss of reputation is more important than the disvalue of X. In the formal case A acts according to the preset pattern he is programmed to follow. The informal agent may be a mobster and the formal agent a police officer. For the first type of an agent a failure means the collapse of identity and status whereas for the second it is mishap which, because it is against the rules, must not happen. The same can be said of a professional coercer, such as police. He cannot start negotiating around his threats. Notice here that even if some or even most of the police threats were both legal and just, as threats they would still represent prima facie evil. A possible world without threats is better than one where threats exist *ceteris paribus*. Threats can be justified but they are still evil. Threats aim at intentional harm to persons and they submit an agent under another's will.

A dilemma emerges: (i) When evil is discussed objectively, as if from an outsider's vantage point, the evil-making characteristics seem to disappear and so the object of study becomes distorted beyond recognition; but (ii) if we internalize the wicked position we become wicked, which we certainly do not want to happen. It is too easy to take the formal coercer's viewpoint

under the pretext of justice. This could be used as an explanation of the fact that even if goodness is accessible through systematic ethics and the social sciences, evil is not. Evil tends to vanish. I shall try to show that if to a certain degree we can make sense of evil, then we must take a detour via aesthetic regions and myths. This is to say that wickedness becomes a personal style and viciousness a myth, either personal or institutional. A good example is one's reputation as an efficient coercer, or why not as a just officer? These are institutional myths which must first be created and then carefully nurtured.[1]

A psychological possibility exists as well, as follows: A is not a sadist. Only if B refuses to do Y, A becomes specially motivated to act and do X, say get angry; and this constitutes the crucial extra motive to X. But we need to ask, why would A become angry. Frustration, perhaps? The problem is that B cannot know about A's psychological constitution in advance. Therefore B's best bet may still be to refuse Y. If B can know about it, anger is a kind of institutionalized social fact. In this case the background institution of A forms B's source of knowledge about A's motives.

As stated above, the crucial decision rule for B is the following one: because he cannot know what A is going to do, B must act so that the worst alternative will be eliminated. Clearly, the worst possibility is such that X and Y are both realized, for example B surrenders and loses his money and still gets beaten. He can avoid this fate by refusing to do Y, or what A wants from him. If B is lucky, no X follows. This is his ideal situation, but he cannot bring it about by means of his own decisions. Now, only if X is an institutional coercive agent, is it rational for B to do Y. If A is indeed an institutional agent he will do X, if needed, and moreover he will not do X when he gets Y. This would ruin his reputation as well, or be against the rules.

This is to say that institutional threats and coercion can be effective and efficient to the degree that they become invisible. Both agents know the rules of the game even before it begins and both are able to anticipate their opponents' actions so that no explicit threat needs to be issued and no resistance is even considered. In a sense, B becomes an institutional victim who may fail to notice this fact. Evil is then fully embedded in an effective and efficient action context which is cemented by the relevant institutions. This is why so much of all the evil is not visible. It is part of a rational, social plan of life and its professional embodiment. Threats become invisible and in a sense accepted.

[1] See Laver (1982).

Ethics of Conflicts

From the praxiological point of view this is to say that threats can indeed be Efficient and Effective, in Professor Wojciech Gasparski's sense.[2] I discuss briefly his third E, which is ethics. I already showed that the efficiency of threats can be evaluated only in a fully social context. In an ideal case threats need not be presented at all, since all agents know them anyway. This is a standard case in a society where hard social power is well organized and established. Effectiveness, or the goal directedness of action, presupposes that the coercer and his subject person share the social reality where they act so that both sides understand what can be done and what cannot. For instance the coercer must know what the victim is afraid of and what he considers a negative value. Because this is so difficult, many threats are based on violence, which is a universally feared disvalue. In this way my approach combines praxiology and the analysis of social action and its institutions.

From the point of view of ethics, the concept of trust is crucial. Is there any place for trust in coercive interaction? We need to draw a distinction between reliability and trustworthiness in this context. To be reliable means that an agent will perform as expected in a regular and predictable manner. Even a car may be reliable in this sense. A coercer, A, is reliable if his threats are convincing to B so that they form a reason for her to obey A. We may also say that for A to be a successful coercer, B must be confident that A will indeed realize his threat, if and only if it is needed.

However, it is hardly possible to say that B finds such an A trustworthy in the proper sense of the term. A's colleagues and supporters may call him such, but not B. The colleagues are not in a conflict situation with A, and this seems to explain the attitudinal asymmetry mentioned here. In a context of conflicts we cannot talk about trust between the relevant agents, except in an ironic sense. When B says something like "I trust A to hurt me, if I do not obey", the sense of irony is obvious. When B says "I believe that A will hurt me", no such irony can be detected.

It is difficult to place ethics to a context of serious conflicts. A and B have no common ground of interests and values so that they could be said to trust each other. On the contrary, they may do anything to deceive each other. Conflict resolution is indeed difficult on such a context where A has already issued a threat against B. This means an open conflict which should be avoided as long as possible.

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[2] Gasparski (2000).

Of course we may say something about ethically acceptable threats. Any threat should be minimal, its effects should be reversible etc., according to the Canons of Just War. But it can hardly be expected that A and B would agree that A's present threat is justified according to these Canons. The agents may agree on the theory of Just War, but they need to agree on the moral interpretation of their present interaction. It seems that A is likely to have much more relaxed view of its ethics than B. Thus they need an external judge to tell them what a decent interpretation of ethics is. This is another problem for a conflict resolution strategy which is at the same time ethically justified and maximally efficient.

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3

DANGERS OF MANAGEMENT SPEAK: POLITICS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ERASURES OF HISTORIES

Dibyesh Anand[1]

Crisis is part and parcel of human life. In a religious discourse, even gods and prophets can be seen as crisis managers – the humanity faces a grave crisis of morality and/or a breakdown of social order and then the god sends 'his' messenger/son to show the true path ahead, to reveal the way out of the crisis. In a more materialist framework, forms of social order such as capitalism and communism progress only through periodic crises. In international relations, war is not a crisis, but a response to a political crisis – organised violence is legitimised as the unavoidable act to resolve a crisis. In the context of the 11th Suomenlinna Seminar's topic, crisis in such wider terms was not discussed. In this article, I nevertheless intend to reflect upon the dangers of management speak that lies under the concept of crisis management (CM). I write in a polemical style deliberately.

Response versus Reflection

When individuals are afflicted by personal crisis with affective dimensions, it normally requires a therapeutic answer and a reflection. On the other hand, the language of CM in world politics is one of response rather than of reflection, of responding to a clearly recognisable crisis coming from outside rather than a critical self-reflexivity. At the core of crisis management lies the ethos of control. *How to manage the Other in order to secure Self in the name of the good of the Other?* Is crisis management then another name for imperialist adventures? Maybe not, but the resonance of imperialist ethos of managing crisis affecting the Other is at the very least worth noting.

[1] The author would like to thank Dr Nitasha Kaul for her ideas and comments and the organisers for the opportunity to present them.

Management Speak

The use of the term crisis management shows the inescapable infiltration of managerialism within our daily language through the New Public Management from 1970s and 1980s – with its focus on privatisation of economics, politics and ethics. In management speak everyone becomes a customer, politicians and administrators proudly represent themselves as efficient managers, and there is a strong need to justify everything in terms of 'offering value for taxpayers' money'. For example in a Public Relations event organised by the British Army the presenters kept repeating how the army is a good value for money.

However, the relationship between public life and management goes back further. For instance, at the very heart of colonialism lies the management of dangerous or pliable colonised Other. Colonial powers used a mix of carrot and stick, self-interest and paternalism, and presented themselves as legitimate response to a crisis of governability with the capacity to provide better management in the future. Colonial violence was like a mask dance. Violence was unleashed on the colonised in the name of progress. Notions of order, humanism, progress and civilisation were based upon violence, dehumanisation, racism, exploitation, and terrorism. For instance, the British invasion of Tibet in 1903–1904 and the massacre of hundreds of Tibetans in a brief battle was blamed on the stupidity of Tibetans who 'failed' to see how progressive the British Empire was. Another example is the way in which the brutality of colonial government in demonising and suppressing Mau Mau rebellion in 1950s Kenya was justified as a response to the terror of the rebels.

Management is not something that was used as a controlling philosophy in the colonised world. It was part and parcel of modernity. Modernity and governmentality went hand in hand – management lies at the core of modernity; management of lives is the most important function of the state and at the same time the rationale and legitimising principle for it. To manage is to control, or try to control the contingent plurality of the real world. Social control through a mix of coercion and consent – law and order and social welfare – constitute the modern state as well as the subjects of the state. No arena of life is to be left outside the purview of management by the state or its allies, the market and civil society.

So, while life remains precarious, the state is expected to manage it. Crisis remains an abnormal situation, a surprise event requiring systematic attempts to manage the threat within a short decision time. The polity is expected to manage crises, including even natural disasters. To take the example of cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar – natural disasters are no longer seen as merely unavoidable, god's punishment or god's test of faith;

the blame is put not on Nature but on human-led government. Natural disasters are thus seen as tests of government's efficacy and responsibility. While the Burmese military leaders presented their efforts as adequate or jostled with the international community over their capability, people suffered. Also the debate around Hurricane Katrina in the USA or Sichuan earthquake in China was dominated by discussions around the management capacities of the state.

Managing International Relations

IR in a certain sense is always crisis management since there is no overarching authority, no general manager, no CEO, no god. Therefore, crisis is normal and to be expected. How to manage crisis where the abnormality of it is replaced by a normality? How to manage without a clearly laid out chain of command? This is what international actors or national actors acting internationally face. How to do crisis management? These are issues that the actors involved need to grapple with.

While crises are central to international relations, CM is something more recent. World politics is replete with crises throughout the world and this in itself is not new. What is new is the need and expectation that states must respond to a crisis far away from home. Crisis management has created a language of expectation. This can be explained through shifts in international relations as well as in the ideas about international relations – the end of the Cold War increased global interconnectedness and an awareness of it. The world faced a rise of humanitarian discourse, global terrorism and global war on terror. This is linked to a specific politics of time and space – we live in an era of *now* and *here* (speeded up time requiring immediate response, interaction and communication). Spatial boundaries get blurred as states are expected to act not only *here* but also *there*. How we decide where to intervene and where not to intervene, where to even recognise crisis and where to ignore it? Darfur? Burma? Tibet? Palestine? Such questions are invariably highly politicised and any answer to these reflects the self-interest of the one answering.

Conceptualising CM

CM is essentially a marriage between a sense of responsibility to the Other and interest of Self. The latter remains crucial imperative but the language of justification is couched in terms of the former. There can be two broad critiques of CM – in terms of practice and ethos.

Practice

If we study the actually practiced CM operations, they reinscribe the West and the Rest divide. CM is related to the questions of how we define the Self, Interest, Responsibility and the Other. The limitations of nation-building or state-building through outside 'help', primarily in the areas of policing, law and order, and military modernisation are evident. Crisis management remains within a militarist framework, often a privatised one (through Security Sector Reforms and Private Security Companies) and makes a mockery of security-development nexus. Empirical studies can reveal who benefits from the business of CM – the state, the private sector, the third sector (aid agencies), many of us! To what extent crisis management makes a positive difference to the lives of those we are supposed to save? I leave this unanswered.

Ethos and problem definition

The language of CM assumes an empiricist notion of problem-policy relations. The problem, the crisis, is deemed to be an objective problem – clarity of definition and identification is assumed. So, Darfur crisis becomes one between state backed Arab militias versus the black African, even though most serious observers will reject this simplistic division. One needs to be aware of the politics of definition and construction of problem. One should ask questions. Who is the representer? Who represents certain acts of violence as terrorism in the so-called war on terror? Whose interests are served by such definitions? Say, who benefits from representing the Iraqi conjured up weapons of mass destruction as dangerous or Iranian nuclear programme as threatening to world peace? Why are certain lenses retained whatever the actual reality of the postcolonial world is? Why are the ancient hatred thesis cavalierly bandied around? All this leads to the erasures of histories, to a dehistoricised understanding of conflict. This means for instance that Kashmir or the enmity between India and Pakistan will be read as an alibi for the putative historical Hindu-Muslim enmity. Adoption of such blinkered views of crisis shifts the blame and responsibility on everyone except the crisis managers themselves. Then, violence is used and legitimised as a reaction. We see this also in the case of Israel and Palestine – violence takes place in the name of security.

The Way Ahead

The way forward is not simply to see all cultures as clashing or mutually unintelligible. We need historical understanding – but one that recognises multiple histories. One needs to be aware of who writes the stories and avoid works that seem to provide insights into coherent cultures (e.g.

Raphael Patai's The Arab Mind or writings of Bernard Lewis on orientalism). All cultures are sites for contestation and no culture is closed. Thus I want to emphasise the importance of doing anthropology. I am personally sceptical of Intercultural dialogue for it assumes culture is fixed and clearly identifiable (and may even talk of the Arab culture or Chinese mindset for example as obvious facts not requiring any explanation). We need more self-reflexivity and awareness of how our intervention, how our crisis management, may misrepresent the crisis and hence not solve the problem, but actually be part of the problem, or make solution more difficult. I prescribe nothing concrete. If you want, let us carry our business as usual but not couch it in terms of humanity or 'soft power'. Preferably one should work hard, acquire knowledge, remain open, take responsibility and reflect. One should go even beyond the managerial language of blue sky thinking, thinking outside the box or creative thinking – best is to have undisciplined imaginations!

4

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AS A CIVILISATORY PROJECT: NATO'S EXPERIENCE IN THE BALKANS

Andreas Behnke

Introduction

NATO's involvement in Crisis Management (CM) in the Balkans in the 1990s is characterised by a number of paradoxes. Firstly, NATO encountered the rapidly developing war in Yugoslavia with a Strategic Concept in place that recognised the relevance of instabilities produced by ethnic and nationalist conflicts for Alliance security, yet did not provide for clear military or diplomatic means to deal with them. In order to overcome this contradiction, the Alliance had to conduct an 'ontological coup d'etat'. Secondly, NATO's ultimate involvement in the war was based on a historically and politically peculiar and therefore contingent situation, into which NATO stumbled almost haphazardly. Yet the 'lessons from Bosnia' would serve to define a general Alliance approach to CM, as Bosnia was understood to be an example or instance of a larger pattern of new security issues and challenges for NATO.

Thirdly, a political process of fragmentation and state-building was cast predominately in moral or ethical terms, focusing above all on the *level* of violence in the conflict, while remaining utterly mute about its political *purpose*. Fourthly, and related to the third point, despite its 'humanitarian' intervention, or rather because it was a predominantly 'humanitarian' intervention, NATO in effect supported the political cause behind the violence. Fifth and finally, NATO's approach to the Bosnia crisis was deeply indebted to a Western onto-theology of space and identity that could not conceive of the 'fluid' and dispersed nature of political and ethnic identities in Bosnia as anything else but an aberration from the normality of the modern nation-state. It's commitment to 'ontopology', to a notion of geopolitical order in which homogenous identities exist within fixed and mutually exclusive spaces imposed a solution upon Bosnia that ran counter to the fluid situation on the ground and could only be produced by condoning a significant level of ethnic cleansing.

In a sense, then, NATO is correct in identifying 'Bosnia' as the paradigm for things to come in terms of CM. The conflict between 'solid' military

and political strategies within CM and the increasingly 'liquid' nature of security, identity, and alliances in the 21st century define the Crisis of Crisis Management for the Alliance.

Security as a Civilisational Challenge

NATO's initial inaction in Yugoslavia demonstrates the inherent contradiction of post-Cold War security order NATO constructs in the 1991 *Strategic Concept*. On one hand, the alliance had identified a number of threats or risks beyond its borders, which might affect the security of its member states, albeit in a different fashion than the threat of a military attack by Soviet forces. The ambiguous status of these new threats is revealed in the vague metaphor of "spill-over" through which their effect "on the security of the Alliance" is defined[1]. Yet NATO's capacity to act is at the same time still confined to the defence of its territory against a military invasion. Accordingly, while the Alliance's strategic gaze has been de-linked from the security political order of the Cold War, its ability to act is still defined by the parameters of that very context and order.

The tension between sight and cite in NATO's discourse, between the strategic gaze that reaches beyond NATO's area and the citation of its Cold War strategy and mission is further exacerbated by the Alliance's association with civilisational values and a civilisatory mission. The Alliance's response to the existential crisis of the end of the Cold War had been characterised by a 'culturisation' of security, a re-assertion of NATO as the institutional expression of a common Western civilisation, and a definition of security-as-cultural identity[2].

The claim to 'project' Western values into its periphery, and to produce a Europe free and whole, was challenged by the events in Yugoslavia, where these values were now violated almost as a matter of course. While the events in the Balkans never produced a threat against the territory of any NATO member state, NATO's credibility to be the institution to defend 'Western values' was soon at stake. Its re-presentation of a civilisational rather than instrumental defence institution now created a moral obligation to act. To be able to live up to its value-discourse, and to remain effective in a security structure in which 'threats' (to credibility, to agency, to relevance) were no longer functioning the way they did during the Cold War, NATO either had to go out-of-area, or out of business. Given the generally established limitations imposed upon NATO's agency by the original Washington Treaty, in which out-of-area affairs were solely a matter of Ar-

[1] NATO (1991a) p.10.
[2] Behnke (2007); Williams and Neumann (2000).

ticle 4 consultation, this re-definition of its military agency was to be accomplished in a 'coup de force', in a self-proclaimed re-constitution of NATO as a global rather than territorial actor.

Initial Responses

In the initial phases of the conflict, it was far from self-evident that NATO would play a decisive role in the ending of the 'war' in Bosnia. The Alliance's initial discursive framing of the crisis in Yugoslavia in general, and the one in Bosnia in particular, was anything but one of active engagement. In its first statement on "The Situation in Yugoslavia", NATO's Heads of State and Government proclaimed that they "are deeply concerned by the current crisis in Yugoslavia and the grave danger it poses to stability in the region". The crisis itself was defined by the "use of force" in attempts to change existing borders, "external or internal", and "to achieve political goals".[3] This concern about the illegal use of force, however, does not produce Yugoslavia as a security related problem for which NATO asserts its agency. The role to bring an end to the crisis and to re-establish peace and stability in Europe is assigned to the European Community (EC), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the United Nations, with the Alliance limiting itself to an expression of "support and appreciation"[4]. At this point, Yugoslavia is a geographical entity without a constitutive role within, or relationship to, NATO's re-presentation of the West. The threats that emanated from it at this time were defined as regionally confined, thus releasing NATO from its responsibility to act in defence of its member states' territory.

The deterioration of the situation in Bosnia, and the apparent inability of the EC and the CSCE to curb the escalating violence, however, soon put pressure on NATO to reconsider its detached stance. In particular, NATO's traditional defensive limitation to the territory of its member states became defined as increasingly obsolete. The honour to have coined the relevant catch phrase that came to dominate the discussion of NATO's future goes to Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee of the RAND Corporation. In one of the most influential contributions to the discussion in which they review "Europe's new strategic challenges" along two "arcs of crisis", they write

> "While almost everyone from the Atlantic to the Urals shudders at the prospect of NATO crumbling and the United States withdrawing from Europe, the simple fact is that if NATO does not address the primary security chal-

[3] NATO (1991b) §§1-3.
[4] NATO (1991b) §4; cf. NATO (1992a) §8.

> lenges facing Europe today, it will become increasingly irrelevant. *NATO must go out of area or it will go out of business.*"[5]

The *Strategic Concept* of 1991 had re-asserted the limitation of NATO's authority to use force only against armed attacks against the territory of its member states. "Other risks" within a "global context" were only covered under the consultation mechanism of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and thus could not trigger the collective action provision of Article 5.[6] Yugoslavia, and above all Bosnia, however, became discursive spaces that defined the challenge to the Alliance's ability to retain its security-political agency after the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the East-West line of conflict. The criticism of NATO's inactivity became particularly powerful as it was linked to standards of Western culture and civilisation, which demand intervention not on geo-strategic, but moral grounds[7]. The Alliance was thus confronted with what Susan Woodward calls the "dilemma of strategic versus moral significance"[8]. Posing no strategic threat to the territory of its member states prevented NATO from using its military assets to help end the war, while at the same time the humanitarian crisis, reported widely in the press and on television, led people to appeal to NATO as an institution that stood for the defence of those Western values that were now repeatedly violated in Bosnia.

NATO's *Coup de Force*

To resolve this aporia between epistemic universalism and military territorialism, NATO conducted what critics in hindsight denounced as a coup:

> "the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in an act of institutional self-preservation, has conducted a silent political coup on the parliaments and citizens of its member states. […] [The] alliance in the 1990's decided to go out of area to avoid going out of business. NATO has justified nondefensive operations and even waged a war against Serbia."[9]

NATO's *coup de force* to go out of area and as a result back into business began at the Oslo Meeting in June 1992. While not directly relating the statement to the crisis in Yugoslavia, NATO now articulates its

> "capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful set-

[5] Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee (1993), pp. 29, 31.
[6] NATO (1991a) §13.
[7] Crosette (1992); Thatcher (1992); Whitney (1992).
[8] Woodward (1995), p. 289.
[9] Merry (2004).

> tlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with out own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise."[10]

Six moths later, NATO re-iterates and expands it coup, now proclaiming its willingness to conduct peace-keeping operations

> "under the authority of the UN Security Council […] We are ready to respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions"[11].

By linking itself to the CSCE and then, politically more significantly, to the UN Security Council (UNSC), NATO at the same time de-links itself from it previous 'territorial trap'. Supplementing its mission portfolio with peace-keeping and enforcement actions on behalf of the UNSC permits the Alliance to use its military capabilities outside the area designated by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty and to deploy them in a forward rather than merely defensive mode. The conflict in Yugoslavia is accordingly framed as the first case of this new cooperation between NATO and the UNSC.

Concurrent with these self-assertions of out-of-area agency comes a modified rendering of the conflict itself, now more closely tied to the identity of the West and the normative commitments of the Alliance. This is accomplished by *including* the "former Yugoslavia" as a part of the "Euro-Atlantic region" in order to be able to *exclude* it, albeit now in an internal and constitutive move. The "violence and destruction which continue […] in the territory of the former Yugoslavia", the "unbridled nationalism and attempts to resolve disputes by violence" are now rendered as "frustrations" for "our efforts to achieve a peaceful and cooperative order in Europe".[12] Even more significantly, this space is now also inhabited by a concrete other. "Main responsibility" for the "continuing resort to force and resulting loss of life, as well as the suffering and extensive destruction in the territory of the former Yugoslavia" rests with "the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) including the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]"[13].
The previous legalistic and formalised rendition of Yugoslavia as a regionally confined problem concerning the illegal use of force, accidental to the

[10] NATO (1992b) §11.
[11] NATO (1992d) §§ 4, 5.
This declaration comes in fact after NATO started monitoring the UN-imposed arms embargo against Yugoslavia with its naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.
[12] NATO (1992b) §4.
[13] NATO (1992c) §5.

purpose and identity of NATO, has now given way to a rendition in which the crisis in Yugoslavia plays a politically constitutive role in NATO's discourse. As of the 1992 Oslo meeting, NATO produces a more fully developed narrative that includes Bosnia as an integral part in its construction of in\security in Europe. As part of the Euro-Atlantic region, it falls under the strategic gaze and becomes subject to the political agency of NATO; as a site of force, violence and destruction, it becomes the ontological other within this relationship. The "resurgence of democracy" in Europe faces its opposite in the "re-emergence of war". Instead of being allowed to celebrate its success, Europe is confronted with "nightmare images from [its] past".[14] Finally, NATO's agency on behalf of security and stability is mirrored by the designation of the Yugoslav authorities as responsible for the contamination of this space. Responsibility for good and evil are distributed according to NATO's sovereign gaze. Contrary to Woodward's assertion that NATO at this point still tried to avoid "being dragged into the conflict"[15], ontologically as well as epistemically, the Alliance at this point produces the very map that will be instantiated in its further practice towards Bosnia. Moreover, NATO's actions in Bosnia now become proof of the continued relevance of the Alliance. In this way, the 'appellation' of public and publicised opinion is recognised by NATO, albeit in a fashion that rejects the charges against it. In the words of its Secretary General,

> "NATO has offered its support to the United Nations and it has done everything the UN has asked, and has done so efficiently. […] These missions are thus a demonstration of NATO's vitality rather than of its irrelevance. In fact, in many respects, NATO's involvement justifies our claim that a streamlined defence organisation can deliver when necessary. Thus I am not prepared to accept the blame where we do not have the responsibility."[16]

And, reasserting NATO's unique position as the institutional expression of Western civilisation, of "democracy and market economy" and "transatlantic solidarity and recognition of shared fundamental interests", NATO is "thus the basic model" of the way security can be produced[17]. And this basic model can no longer be limited to the defence of the territory of NATO member states. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is now coded in terms of its potential for spill-over. "Violent nationalism in Yugoslavia may not threaten NATO territory; but left to fester it can only expand insecurity and instability across Europe", thus undermining and potentially undoing the "positive achievements of the last few years"[18]. Moreover, the post-Oslo

[14] NATO (1993d).
[15] Woodward (1995), p. 289.
[16] NATO (1993c).
[17] NATO (1993a).
[18] NATO (1993a).

narrative further dramatises the responsibility of the designated perpetrators:

> "Primary responsibility for the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina lies with the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs. They have sought territorial gains by force and engaged in systematic gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the barbarous practice of "ethnic cleansing". There is the systematic detention and rape of Muslim women and girls. Relief convoys are being harassed and delayed. All such acts must cease."[19]

By establishing the ability of NATO to act 'out-of-area' in Bosnia and by identifying the (Bosnian) Serbs as the culprits in this conflict, NATO's discourse now produces the conditions for military action. Since 1992, the Alliance had monitored a UN arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea, and a no-fly zone over Bosnia. As of April 1993, Operation *Deny Flight* turned the monitoring of the no-fly zone into an enforcement operation.[20] As of August 1993, NATO prepared for "stronger measures against those responsible" for attacks against Safe Areas, "including air strikes"[21]. On 28 February 1994, in the Alliance's first military engagement ever, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes over Bosnia[22]. In response to Serb violations of UNSC resolutions, NATO conducted isolated attacks against Serb targets as of August 1994. As outlined above, in August 1995 the Alliance commenced its first sustained air campaign, *Deliberate Force*. Final attacks were conducted in October 1995.[23] NATO's military actions was embedded within a discourse that produces at this point three central statements: the model character of Bosnia for NATO's future 'peace-keeping missions', the solidity of boundaries and borders, and the identification of violence as a moral rather than a political problem.

Bosnia as the Future of NATO

The third aspect of NATO's discursive rendition of the conflict in Bosnia concerns NATO's self-designated agency in the post-Cold War era and the exemplary role its actions in Bosnia play in this context. 'Bosnia', in other words, now becomes emblematic for the challenges that define the new agency for NATO.

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[19] NATO (1992e) §2.
[20] The maritime monitoring operation was turned into an enforcement operation already in November 1992. NATO conducted this mission in cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU).
[21] NATO (1998) pp. 115-116.
[22] NATO (1998) p. 116.
[23] NATO (2002).

A crucial element in this regard is the rendering of "The Former Yugoslavia" as an exemplary case for NATO's new mission. The typicality of this particular instance for the future of NATO's military organisation needs to be established for the coup de force to constitute a new and generally accepted security political order. Within this order "crisis management" and "peace-keeping" define the new missions for NATO "out of area". Offering "political-military tools" and "integrated structure" and a "political/military consultation mechanism", the Alliance is "the only organization that possesses the right package" and "provides the bedrock of 'hard' security" as well as "the means to turn political declarations into coherent action". Bringing all this to bear, the "Yugoslav crisis demonstrates not NATO's irrelevance but its vitality and its potential".[24]

Underlying these new missions is a re-definition of the referent object of security from the inside to the outside. Territorial defence is being overtaken by the projection of stability into unstable parts of Europe. Military force is now to be employed outside the territory of its member states, in order to prevent the expansion of insecurity and instability across Europe. As this new mission requires the continued cooperation of Europe and North America, as "transatlantic solidarity and recognition of shared fundamental interests between Europe and America remain the precondition for managing security today", NATO becomes "the basic model of the way in which the industrial democracies must operate to uphold stability in a world of multidimensional risks and limited national means"[25].

Within this world, "Yugoslavia is only the most violent manifestation of a global slide into disorder. […] [And] in this interdependent world it is an illusion to believe that one can live in security surrounded by chaos"[26]. Underlying this purportedly empirical observation is however the virtually metaphysical commitment to security-as-identity and a related coding of difference as danger. What NATO has accomplished for its own member states, i.e., to help them transcend their history and create an institution of political union, now has to be achieved beyond its borders to defeat the re-emergence of such history[27]. But Bosnia is not only the site of such conflict, fracturing and disintegration. It also defines the 'cancer' that threatens to contaminate the unity and identity of the West and of NATO. The rendition of Bosnia as a cancer therefore introduces a fertile ambiguity into NATO's discourse, for it articulates the paradoxical nature of the problem. At the same time as it is supposed to be a demonstration of NATO's unity

[24] NATO (1993d).
[25] NATO (1993a).
[26] NATO (1993e).
[27] NATO (1994c).

and integration, it threatens to undermine these central assets of the Alliance. Misconceptions and misunderstandings about the significance of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia prevented NATO from assuming a united stance in the beginning of the crisis.

> "And so we went our separate ways, each side according to its own national perspectives shaped by historical experience. […] For three years Europeans and Americans talked past one another. […] The gap was only bridged this summer when all Allies concluded that, before withdrawing and leaving the Balkan region to its fate, it was necessary to try robust action."[28]

NATO's agency is thus constituted by a double necessity: to save Bosnia, and in the process to save itself. One purpose simply becomes the flipside of the other.

What holds NATO together are "long-term, strongly-held values. We protected those values in the Cold War. We are now at the forefront in ensuring that they remain the cornerstone of the new and undivided Europe of today". Moreover, what commits NATO is the fact that these values are not the values of NATO alone, but of the international community.[29] NATO's action in Bosnia, therefore, responded to "a challenge not only for our Alliance but also for the entire international community"[30], serving notice "that the international community cannot continually be defied and all rules of civilised conduct abandoned with impunity. NATO's intervention restored the credibility of the international community"[31]. And in a final twist, Bosnia stands not only for the spatial de-limitation of security, but also for its functional 'globalisation':

> "The concept of collective defence, limited to a certain countries in Western Europe and North America, is today no longer sufficient. […] The security imperatives of a European continent that evolves towards unity transcend the needs of a collective security of only a few countries; the Europe of the post-Cold War era requires a different approach, a truly comprehensive (*globale*) concept of security that, while building on the solid basis of military stability, allows the creation (*eclosion*) of political, economic, cultural and human (*humaines*) relations, which will in time strengthen our common destiny and which will be the only guarantees for a peaceful future."[32]

The discursive rendition of Bosnia therefore constitutes the exemplar and the basis for the re-definition of the structure of in\security within which

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[28] NATO (1995b).
[29] NATO (1995c).
[30] NATO (1994d).
[31] NATO (1995c).
[32] NATO (1995a); my translation.

NATO will operate. It remains to deconstruct this discourse on Bosnia and to tease out its inherent contradiction.

Deconstructing 'Bosnia'

NATO's discursive rendition of 'Bosnia' establishes a particular temporal and spatial framing that enables the Alliance to re-produce its metaphysics of security as (cultural) identity. As I will discuss in the following section, in order to maintain the distinction between the West and Bosnia as sites of peace, unity and morality on one hand, and conflict, fragmentation and immorality, on the other hand, time and space are structured in order to absolve Western institutions and states from any involvement in the violence and conflict in Yugoslavia in general, and Bosnia in particular. [33]

But this narrative contains contaminating elements that, if allowed to play themselves out, undermine and deconstruct this discursive formation. Like any author, NATO faces the problem that its texts cannot be protected against traces of excluded scripts, grafts of alternative interpretations, supplements enabled by its own elements.

At the heart of the narrative is the presentation of Bosnia as a fixed and established spatial entity that defines the geographical perimeter of the conflict. Secondly, the temporal delineation takes only the immediate context of the conflict in Bosnia into consideration. Excluded from consideration is consequently the wider historical and geographical context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. NATO even speaks about the danger of a "spillover of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina to neighbouring territories"[34]. Accordingly, the Alliance's goal is the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as "a single Union within its internationally recognised borders"[35]. The historically situated constitution of Bosnia is therefore obscured, and the violence that *accompanied* this constitutive moment is rendered as an attack on a pre-existing, politically and epistemically unproblematic, entity.

This discursive rendering of violence is focused predominantly upon the Serbs, while eclipsing the role of other actors in this conflict. In addition, the Serb violence is portrayed as virtually meaningless, as disruptive, mor-

[33] I do not mean to claim that there is a proper and correct way to tell the story of the Yugoslav crisis. Any narrative employs particular temporal and spatial structures, and none can claim any epistemological privilege as to its truthfulness. What I am concerned with here are the effects of one rendition as compared to another.
[34] NATO (1993b).
[35] NATO (1994b) §18; cf. (1994a) §4.

ally reprehensive, and without apparent political purpose.[36] Serb actions are therefore producing fragmentation and instability against NATO's attempts to maintain and preserve integrity and stability. Voided of any political context, Serb actions are presented solely in terms of their moral implications – and as such roundly condemned.[37] By focusing almost exclusively on the mode of violence rather than its rationale, NATO's discourse can ostensibly maintain the distinction between identity and difference, integrity and fragmentation, and inside and outside that defines the logic of its construction of in\security. By moralising the Serb violence, it is produced as the antithesis of Bosnian integrity. "Nationalism, ethnic strife and violent conflict" are thereby made accidental rather than integral to the situation in Bosnia. The origins and the responsibility for these problems can be assigned to a particular group, thus rendering the overall situation basically conflict-free. The Serbs wilfully import violence into this situation. NATO's intervention is therefore concerned with the (re-)establishment of a given spatial structure, rather than contributing to the conclusion of a violent process of national disintegration.

But NATO's discourse cannot maintain this argument once the traces of a suppressed discourse are exposed and played off against the dominant narrative. And once this alternative reading is done, what becomes clear is the inadvertent recognition that nationalism, ethnic strife, and violent conflict are part and parcel of the overall process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, involving all parties, including the West.

The first traces of the alternative and marginalised narrative can be found in the 'ethnicised' rendering of Bosnia's inhabitants. There are no Bosnian citizens as such, that would define and embody a distinctive and homogeneous identity. Instead, NATO talks about "Bosniacs", "Bosnian Croats", and "Bosnian Serbs"[38]. The spatial entity NATO sets out to preserve and maintain does not correspond to an identical citizenry that fills out this space. Instead, we have fractured and contradictory identities, a fact which, interestingly enough, NATO never explains. Hence the spatial unity and integrity upon which NATO bases its narrative becomes early on undermined by the fragmented and multiple identities of its inhabitants. Moreover, the designation of these people links them to spatial entities outside of

[36]There is one exception to this pattern. In an early statement in December 1992, 'the present leadership of Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs' are identified as seeking 'territorial gains by force'. This purpose is however included in a list of morally deplorable actions such as 'gross violations of human rights' and the 'barbarous practice of "ethnic cleansing". Cf. NATO (1992e: §2).

[37] The point here is not to formulate an apology for the Serb atrocities committed in this period. The point is rather that even a moral(ising) narrative has political implications.

[38] NATO (1994a) §4; (1994b).

Bosnia proper: to Serbia and to Croatia. Otherness is therefore part and parcel of the Bosnian identity, the outside part of the inside.

This peculiar ethnicisation and concomitant fragmentation of the identity of the Bosnian people repeats a similar move in Western discourses in the earlier stages of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. As Susan Woodward has shown, Western interpretations of the emerging conflict between Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia quickly referred to the nationalist discourses that were offered as justification for the secessionist movement in the two former republics.

> "Once Western powers began an explicit attempt at mediation in May 1991, they sped up this process [of disintegration] by accepting the nationalists' definition of the conflict, undermining or ignoring the forces working against radical nationalists and acting in ways that fulfilled the expectations and reinforced the suspicions of nationalist extremists – exactly the opposite of their stated goals of intervention."[39]

As Woodward herself points out, however, this position was hardly the outcome of deliberate policy plans. Western policy towards Yugoslavia was characterised by piecemeal responses, ambiguity and mixed messages from individual Western governments, rather than a concerted effort to bring the crisis to a peaceful solution.[40] Yet the resultant political trajectory pointed increasingly towards 'recognition' of the ethnic or nationalist agenda within the conflict, to the detriment of alternative solutions that would have focused on constitutional and economic reforms of Yugoslavia as a whole. Both the European Community and the USA over time settled for this particular framing of the crisis.

The Western stance, while purportedly aiming at mediating between the parties in Yugoslavia did in fact take sides in favour of the nationalists and against any attempts to salvage Yugoslavia as a whole. Thus, as it delegitimised the attempts by the Yugoslav army to fulfil its constitutional obligation to maintain the integrity of the Federal Republic as an unjustifiable use of force[41], it prepared the grounds for the ensuing violence, including the ethnic cleansing that become one of the defining characteristics of the conflict in Bosnia. As Woodward observes,

> "The Serbian leaders had said many times that, if the state broke up, they would insist on redrawing borders to incorporate Serbs currently living outside Serbia. The army had already come to the defence, not only of the

[39] Woodward (1995), p. 147.
[40] Woodward (1995), p.161.
[41] Woodward (1995), p. 178.

> Yugoslav border, but also of civil order and of minorities during violent clashes between Croats and Serbs in Croatia."[42]

Given the multi-ethnic conditions in Yugoslavia, the ethnicisation of the conflict would inevitably lead to violence. The West's 'recognition' of the ethnic nature of this conflict in effect amounts to an imposition of a particular metaphysics of identity and place that found no correspondence in the ethnic and national situation on the ground in Yugoslavia. In the absence of clearly delineated national communities living in distinctive areas and territories, the *ontopological* grammar of interpretation that the West brings to the situation amounts to an act of violence, an intervention that contributed to the creation of the conditions of possibility for the subsequent violent reordering of Yugoslavia and Bosnia. In a brief sketch Jacques Derrida outlines the metaphysics underlying both Western interpretations of political order and the conditions for peace in Yugoslavia, as well as the ethnonationalist programmes in the Balkans themselves.

> "By *ontopology* we mean an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present being [*on*] to its *situation*, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the *topos* of territory, native soil, city, body in general."[43]

Identities, in other words, belong to particular places, to the exclusion of other identities. Relying upon, and reproducing, a "primitive conceptual phantasm of community, the nation-state, sovereignty, borders, native soil and blood"[44], the ontopological readings of Yugoslavia that dominated in the West can only see a solution to the crisis in the creation of purportedly homogenous nation-states out of the republics of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic itself was increasingly perceived to be an 'artificial state', "unable to supplant parochial loyalties and cultural identities"[45]. As an ethnically and nationally heterogeneous state, Yugoslavia could not last, as only ethnic and national identity and community could guarantee the security and persistence of a state. And while Slovenia as the first republic to secede might have presented itself as a fitting case, already Croatia and then certainly Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated the problematic nature of this frame of reference. In Croatia, a large Serb minority incited the desire of the Serb government to extent Serbia's borders so as to include them. In Bosnia, Serb and Croat aspirations to fulfil the ontopological order previously sanctioned by the West conducted some of the worst atrocities in Europe since the Second World War.

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[42] Woodward (1995), p. 165.
[43] Derrida (1994), p. 82.
[44] Derrida (1994), p. 82.
[45] Woodward (1995), p. 205.

This argument is not meant to condone or even explain the atrocious mode of warfare Serb forces, and to a lesser extent other forces, engaged in. What it does maintain is that beyond the *mode* of violence, which NATO's texts so adamantly condemn, the *political* rationale for this violence is in fact condoned by the West. After the possibility of maintaining a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vanished from the discourse, the conflict parties, Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs fought over the realisation of their respective ontopologies, over the creation of their respective homogenous 'nation-state'. The implications of such a strategy are contemplated by an US strategic expert; albeit removed from the immediate reality of the violence in Bosnia, he is nonetheless comfortable to pronounce the requirements for establishing lasting stability and peace in the region. Enacting the ontopological order in Bosnia, a republic in which Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had coexisted longer than Yugoslavia had existed, requires

> "[D]rawing new borders and transferring populations. Croatians, Muslims and Serbians would have to concede territory and move people. […] Furthermore, a new Muslim state must be created by concentrating Muslims now scattered across the region into central Bosnia. Remaining Bosnian territory should be given to Croatia and Serbia. Perhaps one million people – approximately 600,000 Muslims, 300,000 Serbs and 100,000 Croats – will have to move. Many others have already relocated."[46]

What John Mearsheimer's argument here demonstrates is that under the multi-ethnic conditions of Bosnia, ontopological readings and strategy breed violence. Except for the murder and rape that accompanied the Serb campaign, what Mearsheimer outlines here is the script of 'ethnic cleansing'.

It should be easy to recognise that ontopology is inherently related to NATO's metaphysical assumptions about security as identity. Safety, security, and stability are only conceivable within a homogenous community of shared identity. Fragmentation, multiplicity and diversity are necessarily harbingers of conflict and violence. These axioms operate on the level of the nation-state as well as on the level of the West as a civilisational space.

But what NATO's narrative on Bosnia reveals upon a close reading is the very violence that the notion of security as identity produces. The reference to the ethnic groups that inhabit Bosnia is a trace of the ontopological reading imposed on Yugoslavia since 1991, in which the ethnicised identities vie for their respective territory and state. Given the ontopological reading, there cannot be any proper Bosnian identity, as the available ones are first and foremost defined by their ethnic differences. Moreover, the designations now clearly link these identities with the warring enemies, no longer

[46] Mearsheimer (1993).

with constituent people of a multi-ethnic Bosnia. The conflict has changed the identity of Bosnia, turning it from a country "that was Serbian as well as Croatian as well as Muslim" into a country that is "neither Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Muslim. Rather, some parts are Serbian, others Croatian, and third ones Muslim"[47].

Secondly, NATO's insistence on the inviolability of the borders of Bosnia only helps to emphasise their contingent and precarious nature. The very assertion of their inviolability carries the trace of the violence threatening them; the fact that NATO sees the need to call for their recognition reflects the absence of that recognition within the context of the war.

Thirdly, the fact that this tension between self-determination and sanctity of borders is never properly addressed in NATO's discourse reflects the deep roots ontopological axioms have in Western discourse. After all, this tension can only be resolved in the ideal case in which a state is homogenous[48]. Yugoslavia and Bosnia are therefore *a priori* exceptional cases, and the conflict there is in this sense a violent process of normalisation in which the perverse multi-faceted identities in Yugoslavia become straightened out and ethno-nationalist identities become "in-stated"[49]. And the Western conceptual and political complicity in this process explains why NATO's texts condemn the genocidal *form* this process takes, but never its political purpose.[50]

Outlook: NATO Crisis Management between Solid and Liquid Security

NATO's crisis management in Bosnia is also an attempt to manage the crisis of NATO itself after the end of the Cold War. The purpose of its CM in Bosnia is to re-affirm, or re-produce, a fixed and stable Western identity, which sets the standard of civilisation for ultimately the rest of the world. This 'model character' of the West is not only defined by its substantial commitment to certain values and norms, but also, perhaps above all, by its solidity and persistence in times of crisis. NATO's answer to the existential crisis of the end of the Cold War, when it lost its 'constitutive other', the

[47] Jergović (1995).
[48] Hayden (1992), p. 670.
[49] Luke (2001).
[50] The differential treatment NATO bestows upon the Serbs as opposed to the Croats in light of their respective ethnic cleansing campaign might at least partially be explained by the effective instrumentalisation of an 'Orientalist' discourse by Slovenian and Croatian authorities, through which they were able to differentiate themselves as 'European' identities from the Serbians and their 'Balkans' identity. Cf. Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992) and Hansen (1996).

Soviet Union, was to re-assert the continued 'trans-national' identity of the West and by re-articulating the relationship between security and cultural identity within the official discourse. The solidity of the West would thus translate into the solidarity of the Alliance itself, preventing the 're-nationalisation' of member-states' security and defence policies. Only then could NATO provide the 'bedrock of hard security' for a region such as the Balkans.

By reading Bosnia in a synecdochical fashion, by assuming it to be the paradigm of things to come in terms of crisis management, NATO in a sense projects the problems of this case into the future. Put simply, none of the assumptions about solid identity, alliance, or security are adequate or relevant anymore, and therefore, NATO's (always haphazardly developed) approach to CM (in terms of its assumption about identity and security) is today deeply flawed.

There is, firstly, the notion of a solid identity of the West that can provide a cultural or civilisatory impetus to CM. But as a number of scholars have pointed out, the West itself can no longer claim the civilisational or cultural pre-eminence that NATO's discourse still insinuates. Its universalist aspirations were effectively supported by the competition of an equally universalist ideology in the East. Yet it seems that in today's globalised world, universalism itself is disputed and that we are seeing a proliferation of local and regional identities, many of which have turned to/against the West as a 'constitutive other'[51]. Moreover, such identities are now liquid rather than solid, dispersing via migration, information, and commodification through the networks of a globalised system. The West is as much recipient as it is 'sender' of cultural items and norms, and it is increasingly difficult to define it in an unambiguous fashion. With that, the notion of a civilisational commitment to crisis management is no longer sustainable.

The problematic nature of Western cultural identity is also reflected in the fate of NATO itself[52]. Arguably, NATO, and the West it represents was 'liquefied' on 26 September 2001, when US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz declared at a press conference at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in reference to a potential collective action by NATO in response to the attacks of 9/11, "if we need collective action, we'll ask for it. We don't anticipate that at the moment". With that, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) would not be a collective Western assertion of its civilisational identity against its new 'constitutive other'. Rather, it made GWOT a predominantly American endeavour, with the frontline drawn by Bush's "ei-

[51] Laidi (1998).
[52] cf. van Ham (2008), pp. 16–17.

ther with or against us" rather then by the collective voice of the Western community.

With that, NATO began its transition into a 'coalition of the able and willing' as foreseen and desired by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. The mission now defined the coalition, a principle detrimentally opposed to the intervention in Bosnia where the Alliance and its civilisatory purpose had defined the mission. NATO is turned from a coherent cultural entity to a portfolio of military capabilities, available for US strategic planning. To the extent that 'culture' still matters, it is reduced to a 'general shared outlook of the world', a 'club of democracies' in overall support of American goals in the world. The latter, a generally pro-American orientation has therefore supplanted a shared sense of identity and destiny. Although US has always been dominant within NATO, its interests were considered to be largely identical to European interests, the interpretation of the threat to the West more or less identitical. Bosnia in this sense is the last time in which a reluctant US is willing to subject itself to the logic of NATO, rather than the other way around. Today, even NATO's defenders concede that the 'interpretation of threats' has become a problem[53]. Some European interpretations differ significantly from US interpretations, with Iraq defining the implosive moment here. Within such a liquid alliance, the market rules rather than sovereignty, the demands of crises regulate the supply of military capabilities, and the decisions about friends and enemies are only temporal, contingent and valid 'until further notice'.

The threats that NATO faces today are no longer clear, present, and solid as the one posed by the Soviet Union. The complexities of the conflict with Islamic Fundamentalism as a social, political, and cultural challenge, as a simultaneously pre-modern and modern challenge belie the simplicity of the notion of a War on Terror. The flexibility and fluidity of terrorist networks, their unpredictable presence and absence within our own societies, the global linkages established through archaic ideologies and post-modern technologies, the disappearance of a battlefield in this 'war' and the emergence of a fluid 'battle-space' that transcends national boundaries and that includes today cyber-space[54] produce a 'crisis' that cannot be managed by 'solid hardware' alone.

As in Bosnia, and perhaps even more so, NATO encounters in Afghanistan a fluid crisis, with insurgents melting into their surroundings, and across national borders. Changing tribal loyalties and political power balances further define a situation within which NATO's strategic approach of distinctive zones and delineated CM is ultimately ineffective. Yet while in Bosnia,

[53] Kaiser (2008), p. 12.
[54] Weimann (2006).

NATO was able to impose its solid solution of ontopological order, this seems to be impossible in Afghanistan. Unable to conceive of, and provide, 'liquid security', NATO's efforts in Afghanistan are doomed to be futile.

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5

THE ACEH CASE – AN EXAMPLE OF DECOMMISSIONING AND REINTEGRATION

Kalle Liesinen

The Finnish NGO Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) got involved in the Aceh conflict mediation in the spring of 2004. The contacts intensified in late 2004 and the first round of talks was held in January 2005. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was signed in mid-August 2005, concluding the process of talks, which the Chairman of the Board of CMI, President Martti Ahtisaari, facilitated. I was invited to lead the decommissioning of the weapons of the Free Aceh Movement in August 2005. The preparatory phase of 30 days included the creation of the needed organisation and local negotiations so as to implement the agreed disarmament. The decommissioning was successfully finalised and the decommissioning component of the Aceh Monitoring Mission dismissed within 107 days. In this article, I will evaluate the peace process in Aceh based on my experiences in the field. I will start by discussing the negotiation process.

It is important to notice that the CMI-led process was not the first negotiation process between the two parties, the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement. During the years 1999–2003, peace was negotiated under the aegis of the Henri Dunant Centre. The importance of that process and its collapse should not be underestimated.

The general aim of the CMI-led negotiations was to establish a process which would lead to a peaceful settlement of the Aceh conflict within the framework of autonomy for the region. Various issues were discussed in the negotiations, and the parties committed themselves to seek permanent and comprehensive solution with dignity for all.[1]

The negotiation process lasted seven months altogether and included five rounds of talks. All the meetings were held in Helsinki. The first round of talks took place in January and the last in July in 2005. There were six main topics of negotiation on the agenda.

[1] Martti Ahtisaari, CMI, 2005.

1) *The issue of self-government and its content.* In order to create solid ground for the talks, these issues had to be dealt with.
2) *Provisions for political participation.* Provincial and local elections had to be agreed on.
3) *Economic arrangements.* Agreeing on practical and concrete economic conditions during any peace negotiation is crucial, and economic arrangements were naturally one of the most pivotal topics of discussion. The economic agenda on the table varied from an auditing system of provincial revenues to taxation issues and a centre-province allocation of finances.
4) *Amnesty.* To whom should it be granted?
5) *Security arrangements*. The discussions included issues such as reducing the presence of national military and police forces, as well as defining their roles in Aceh and in the decommissioning of GAM armaments.
6) *Modalities for outside monitoring*.

In order to create a real chance for a successful outcome, one of the key elements was the principle that "nothing is agreed before everything is agreed"[2]. This meant that neither party could claim any victories during the process and use media to communicate to their constituencies how successful they had been in the negotiations. All the agreements were included in the MoU and published only in the end. The aim was to be able to negotiate in peace.

Disarmament and Negotiations – the Aceh Case

It is fair to say that during the negotiations the issue of decommissioning was not considered as a key for finding a solution between the parties. Naturally, the issue was on the table for security reasons, but also for political reasons, to a certain extent. Finding an acceptable solution and identifying a meaningful quantity of arms to be handed over was dealt with relatively smoothly. It was also a conscious choice from the part of the mediator not to go into details in designing the actual decommissioning process.

From a tactical point of view, the key for having this positive and constructive spirit on the decommissioning was the fact that it was often discussed in conjunction with the wider question of reintegration (or "facilitation of integration", as it was called during the first rounds of the talks). Ever since the beginning of the talks, the representatives of the Government of Indonesia were ready and willing to discuss the different activities through which they

[2] Mediator Martti Ahtisaari has later, on several occasions, emphasized this principle as one of the success factors.

would be prepared to support the GAM fighters. As it was a general approach during the peace talks to ask the parties themselves to propose concrete actions, this was also the case with the issue of disarmament. The number of arms to be handed over and the figures and activities of reintegration were negotiated simultaneously.

The terms defining any disarmament process may vary depending on the actor concerned. During the recent years, the combination of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) has become a common procedure and mindset. With this in mind, the use of the word "decommissioning" in the Aceh peace treaty may come as a surprise.

"Decommissioning" is a general term for the formal process of removing something from its operational status. Some specific instances include: industrial decommissioning, ship decommissioning, nuclear decommissioning, decommissioning of small arms & light weapons (SALW) and weapon systems, as well as decommissioning of soldiers, i.e. demobilization. Recently, the term has been used in the name of *The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning* (IICD)[3], which was established to oversee the decommissioning of the weapons of paramilitary organisations in Ireland in 2000. The Aceh peace broker, President Martti Ahtisaari, played a key role also in that process.

A DDR program typically moves from demobilization and disarmament – the act of releasing or disbanding an armed unit and the collection and control of weapons and weapon systems – to reintegration, facilitating the return of ex-combatants to civilian life through benefit packages and strategies that help them to become socially and economically embedded in their communities. The term demobilisation was also included in the Aceh peace accord, which stated that the GAM would undertake the effort of demobilising all of its 3,000 military troops.

Reintegration was a crucial part of the MoU, binding the Government of Indonesia and the authorities in Aceh to assist people who had participated in GAM activities and to facilitate their reintegration into civil society. These measures were to include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians.

The disarmament in the MoU ordered the GAM to undertake the decommissioning of all arms, ammunition and explosives with the assistance of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The GAM committed to hand over 840

[3] Martin Melaugh: Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), 2 July 1999
[http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicd020799.htm].

arms starting from 15th September 2005. The surrender of weapons was executed in four stages and concluded by 31st December 2005. As a response, the Government of Indonesia was put under an obligation to withdraw all elements of non-organic military and non-organic police forces from Aceh in four stages, in parallel with the GAM decommissioning. The withdrawal had to take place immediately after each stage of decommissioning and was verified by the AMM. The withdrawal was concluded by 31st December 2005. [4]

This design tied the decommissioning directly to the security sector reform (SSR), which determined the potential shape and size of the future military, police, and other security structures in Aceh. In addition, the reintegration of not only combatants but also other effected groups included all the needed elements in the process. The main criteria for monitoring and evaluating the decommissioning DDR program were obvious, as the implementation of the MoU was fixed with weapon numbers, unit strengths and a tight timeframe. The weakness was that there were no clear criteria for evaluating how the achieved results would affect the overall objectives of the whole program; wider stabilization and the reconstruction process. This wider perspective strongly included the parties and, in practise, meant local ownership, leaving the international community in the position of a monitor and donor.

In the Aceh peace negotiations, the DDR process played only a minor role, as it can be said that the military situation was not the key element in any possible settlement. Thus, the basic parameters for a wider DDR program were not detailed in the peace accord. Only the timings and the most important quantitative figures were strictly determined in order to set the pace for the whole process. This is not to say that the issue as such was not important, but the general approach laid emphasis on the idea that it was crucial to underscore a genuine commitment to the process from both parties. The aim was to make sure that the parties were committed to achieving sustainable solutions.

The peace brokers organised two journeys to Sumatra to verify the figures of the troops and the GAM armament. The first trip was made at the end of June 2005, only 45 days before the signing of the MoU, and the second only two weeks before the signing. During the first round, Major General Jaakko Oksanen, later AMM Deputy Head of Mission, collected information from the Indonesian Army units in Aceh to compare it with the number of weapons to be decommissioned. Summing up all the information showed that the Military of Indonesia (TNI) believed that the GAM could have 1400 weap-

[4] The Memorandum of Understanding between former Acehnese rebel movement GAM and the Government of Indonesia on 15 August 2005 [http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf].

ons at the most. This was good enough, as no military unit is expected to underestimate the opponent on purpose. [5]

The second trip to Aceh concentrated on verifying the effectiveness of the GAM's command chain in Aceh. The journeys convinced the CMI and President Ahtisaari that peace was achievable and that the goals set were reasonable.

Local Preparations and Negotiations

This very late dealing with the decommissioning matters left little negotiating time to agree on how the DDR process would be accomplished in real terms. As the negotiations did not provide detailed sense of how the DDR was to be realized, a lot was to be agreed upon locally between the parties and the implementing body. For this reason, Aceh is not a good example of how the DDR process is usually implemented. In Aceh, the role of the decommissioning was sidelined in the main negotiating table and the matters were to be settled during the implementation phase.

The implementing body and the parties involved had to prepare and organise the DDR within a very limited timeframe. The first stumbling block was actually the European Union as the supervising body. The original idea in Brussels was to use a private company to do the disarmament work. The idea collapsed, as no companies were available as fast as needed, and the decommissioning component therefore had to be formed. Some fragments of the original idea still survived even in the final version of the AMM mandate given by the EU. It tasked the AMM only to *monitor* the demobilization of the GAM and to decommission its armaments – a mandate that turned out to be disarmament in the spirit of MoU. [6]

The strict timetable and unfamiliarity with the DDR process explained a lot of the insecurity in the EU. The AMM was an extraordinary EU mission – an entirely new opening and the EU's first civilian crisis management mission to Asia. The decommissioning component made the mission EU's first own DDR project, even though the reintegration only included the monitoring task. Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration had been part of the multidimensional approach to post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction promoted by the United Nations, but at that stage it did not belong to the established mode of action in the EU. The Union later ac-

[5] Major General Jaakko Oksanen, CMI, 2005.
[6] COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2005/643/CFSP on the establishing of the EU-led Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia)
[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:234:0013:0016:EN:PDF].

cepted the UN terminology and recognised the long history of disarmament and the actors specialised in it. This happened in the EU through the "Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration" that was approved by the European Commission on 14th December 2006 and by the Council of the European Union on 11th December 2006 – a year after the Aceh decommissioning.

Parallel to the discussions in Brussels, the Free Aceh Movement emphasised that the international community was vital to them, as they did not want to surrender to the Indonesian army. The GAM needed dignity, respect and safe methods for collecting the weapons. The first concept of operations was based on the wishes of the GAM and the best practices of previous DDR operations. The planners understood how important it was to show respect to former fighters when they felt that they were loosing their fight. Any humiliation could have meant new violence in the future.

Arms were to be handed over only to an international body. The decommissioning teams were constantly moving from one location to another, collecting weapons and registering fighters for reintegration without much publicity. The GAM was supposed to organise demobilisation events of their own in the presence of international monitors. The Government of Indonesia, however, demanded full transparency, presence of Police and Army at all weapons collection sites, as well as army control over the decommissioning.

The negotiations over the DDR details were carried out during the first thirty days after signing the Helsinki agreement on 15th of August 2005. The Chief of Decommissioning pressed hard to achieve as normal a DDR process as possible. It was assumed that former combatants would emerge out of hiding at the same time as the GAM handed over their weapons, in a series of arranged events. The decommissioning component co-operated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help to support the reintegration of former combatants and to organise the short term reintegration.

Only a few days before the first decommissioning event, the GAM chose to collect the weapons by themselves and transport them to the weapon collection sites. The GAM chose the places so that they were safeguarded by their supporters and surrounded by crowds of ordinary villagers. Obviously, this was due to security concerns among the GAM, which emerged as the Head of AMM, Mr. Pieter Feith, allowed the Indonesian Army and Police to be present at all the collection events.

Practical Implementation of the Decommissioning[7]

The decommissioning took place from September to December in four phases. During each phase, a quarter of the final goal of 840 weapons was decommissioned, which was followed by the relocation of TNI and Police forces during the last ten days of each month. The tight timetable ensured momentum, and the monthly steps were so small that the parties could not hamper the process with fictitious reasons without losing their face.

The decommissioning got extensive media coverage. The GAM representative, Mr. Irwandi Yusuf, orchestrated all the weapon collection events. The GOI high representative, Major General Pambang Darmono, ensured the full co-operation of government authorities. The comprehensive media attention supported the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. The disarmament events attracted substantial attention from the local population. Thus, the process of four stages effectively built up the confidence between the parties.

The documentation of relatively short-term projects is often neglected. In the Aceh case, all four mobile decommissioning teams (MDT) and the Decommissioning Office compiled their final reports to one comprehensive document, which covered all that was done during the period of their operation as part of the AMM (August to December 2005). The input was compiled into the Final Decommissioning Report 2005 and was given to the AMM Headquarters (HQ) for further distribution. All the decommissioning forms documenting the receipt, details and destruction of weapons throughout the four stages were also fully compiled. A complete set of documents was given to the President of Indonesia and to Teungu Zaharia Saman of the GAM on 27th December 2005 and to relevant EU authorities at the AMM HQ on 29th December 2005.

The overall functioning of the Decommission Component can be divided into three main periods:

Pre-IMP[8]-time	3rd August - 14th August 2005
IMP-time	15th August - 14th September 2005
AMM[9]-time	15th September - 31st December 2005

[7] The Final report on Decommissioning in Aceh, AMM, 29th Dec 2005 [http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Council%20Joint%20Action.pdf].
[8] Initial Monitoring Presence.
[9] Aceh Monitoring Mission.

The pre-IMP time consisted of the familiarization and planning of the decommissioning. It also included preparations to demonstrate presence in Aceh on 15th August 2005, when the MoU was signed.

The practical preparations for the decommissioning were made during the IMP-time. The major components in the planning and preparations included:

- Conceptualizing the Concept of Operations for AMM's decommissioning operations.
- Working out the technical methods and procedures of decommissioning.
- Working out the processes and documentations.
- Deriving the structure and organisation of the mobile decommissioning teams (MDTs), and staffing up the various appointments with the EU and ASEAN monitors, as well as contracted local staff
- Procuring and preparing all the necessary equipment, tools and vehicles of the MDTs.
- Preparing to receive and train the MDTs.

The majority of the personnel arrived for training in Medan, Indonesia on 9th September 2005. The Mobile Decommissioning Teams were formed and equipped in Banda-Aceh and sent out to field duties on 13th September 2005. This made it possible to arrange the first decommissioning event in Banda Aceh on 15th September – the very same day that the Aceh Monitoring Mission was officially launched.

The overall concept was to organise four mobile decommissioning teams to cover the entire area of Aceh. All the teams had their own areas of responsibility, but being mobile, they could be moved into any other MDT's area of responsibility to reinforce or support their decommissioning operations. This, in time, became the main method, as the GAM concentrated on certain areas at each phase of the disarmament. The Decommissioning Office liaised with the GAM at the Committee of Security Arrangements (COSA) and organised other meetings to arrange for the time and locations of the decommissioning, and then plan and disseminate orders to the MDTs to execute the decommissioning tasks.

Each MDT was self-sufficient in vehicles and equipment. A MDT could be internally divided into three functional groups: the Headquarters Group took care of all the planning, command, coordination, documentation and medical support, the Liaison Group was in charge of all liaison with the GAM, TNI, police, local authorities, as well as other agencies in order to establish the weapons collection sites (WCS), while the Technical/Explosive Ord-

nance Disposal (EOD) Group was in charge of the destruction of all weapons and ammunition.

The Tech/EOD group destroyed weapons with a 1.7kW rotary cutting machine powered by generators (5-7kW), destroyed weapons accessories with sledge hammers and bolt-cutters, and destroyed ammunition with explosives provided by the Indonesian army. This light method could be used, as the total number of arms was limited and did not include heavy armament. All weapons and ammunition were thoroughly documented before and after destruction for transparency, and all weapons remains were returned to the Military of Indonesia.

The weapon collection sites were locations where the GAM brought their weapons and ammunition and handed them over to the MDTs. The MDTs organized each site and co-operated with the police to secure the site and to put in crowd control measures like tapes and access points. Each collection site had weapons checking, registration, collecting, destruction and remains areas as well as other areas, like the Visitor and VIP viewing area and the press / media area.

At the beginning, one of the critical aspects was to cater for Government dignitaries and their entourage arriving at the weapon collection site without affecting the neutral appearance of the event. On occasions, this gave unintentional appearance of ownership of the site to the TNI and caused a loss of control by the AMM. However, the teams were able to settle the problem in such a manner that it did not harm the process, which is something that could easily have happened.

The GAM remained secretive and provided the exact location of the first weapon collection sites only on the morning of the decommissioning. The first decommissioning saw the surprise use of a large sports field in the middle of Banda-Aceh in front of the main garrison. Civilian onlookers gathered in crowds of over a thousand people, and the GAM's appearance was accompanied by some excitement and cheers from the crowd. Instead of individual GAM fighters handing in their weapons, the weapons were consolidated and packed in light-coloured rice/flour sacks, and delivered in bulk by a few GAM representatives using vehicles. At a later stage, the GAM was also willing to reveal the weapon collection sites a few days beforehand, and interacted with the AMM to finalise some of the sites. The decommissioning generally ran smoothly and unhampered either by the crowd, GAM or GOI.

The main worry of the decommissioning leadership was the absence of common safety regulations in the routines of the GAM field fighters. Some of the old explosive devices brought in were literally terrifying. The security concerns were deepened by some senior government VIPs and some GAM

members who wished to walk through the danger area and discuss various matters in front of the public. Sometimes even the AMM District office monitors caused disorder by wondering around the working space. As luck would have it, however, no accidents occurred, also because of the high professionalism of the personnel. The general public was also invariably well behaved and compliant with the team requirements. Nevertheless, the experience proved the value of military ordnance training in decommissioning and highlighted the need for strict discipline.

To compensate for the shortcoming of formal demobilisation, the Decommissioning Component introduced the "Last Weapon Ceremony". The Ceremony was conducted on the morning of 21st December 2005 in Banda Aceh to signify the end of the decommissioning of GAM weapons and the successful completion of the decommissioning. Guests from the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement were invited to witness this symbolic event of cutting the last six GAM weapons. A symbolic "Last Weapon Plaque" was created from the remains of the last weapon to be decommissioned and was jointly presented by Head of Mission, Pieter Feith, and the senior GAM representative, Irwandi Yussuf, to the Government of Indonesia, symbolizing the end of conflict and the beginning of lasting peace in Aceh.

The decommission work in Aceh was done by 44 decomissioners from 12 different countries. The demobilisation and monitoring of the reintegration were also part of the Aceh Monitoring Mission mandate. Their completion required, however, more time than the disarmament. For the first time, human rights monitors took part in a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission as members of the Decommissioning component. Security issues were the core of the AMM mandate, as the wider reintegration was only to be monitored.

The Decommissioning component of the AMM left the area by the end of 2005. The initial mandate for Aceh Monitoring Mission expired in March 2006. With the decommissioning and TNI redeployment completed by the end of December, and the GAM announcing that they had abandoned the military organisation, a great deal had already been achieved during the first mandate period. Nevertheless, regular monitoring of the situation in the field still kept the mission busy.

Lessons learned from the Technical Implementation

While the weapons were handed over by the GAM on time, the ex-combatants did not emerge out of hiding. This also meant that the GAM fighters did not register themselves when handing in the weapons at the

weapon collection sites. Normally, it was other fighters who gave out the weapons, not their original owners. The GAM representatives stated openly that the demobilization would be dealt with later, and that the reintegration was to be negotiated separately. The new approach limited the DDR-process to mere disarmament.

The outcome was a great disappointment to the decommissioners and to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which expected to receive the AMM list of former combatants, to provide clothing, a health check and some funds. The same procedure had worked well with the first released prisoners. The planned process would have followed the best practice models from other countries, where the demobilization and disarmament were directly linked to the provision of reinsertion and reintegration benefits. With the absence of a list of demobilised fighters, the planned IOM combatant program stalled, and the funds had to be returned to Brussels.

The partial DDR process predicted future difficulties. The core of the decommissioning survived, however, and the disarmament set the pace for security arrangements. Other questions were also waiting to be settled: The agreed standards left space for spoilers and sceptics during the fragile moments preceding the consolidation of peace. As the peace agreement committed guerrillas to give up 840 weapons and dismiss 3,000 combatants, the numbers aroused curiosity. The AMM had to explain repeatedly that not all GAM fighters had been armed and that a great deal of the armament had been lost in the previous military operations and during the tsunami catastrophe. Although the parties were officially unanimous over the figures, the people of Aceh remained doubtful.

Not only was the real number of weapons under discussion, the number of fighters was also challenged. This was originally started by the GAM, as there was a real problem in making the difference between fighters and supporters. Many of the GAM supporters had played different roles over the decades. Rather than consisting of a small band of guerrillas hiding in the hills, the combatants had moved in and out of towns and villages over the years. In the deep jungle, the fighting body would sometimes resemble a group of villagers rather than a military unit. The number of people who could claim to be retired fighters, civilian members, and other remarkable people was estimated to be more than 20,000. By allowing the international support to flow only to fighters in arms, not to the other participants, the GAM leaders would have risked invoking serious internal disorder.

The number of 3,000 fighters was settled in the peace agreement. Discussion over how to deal with the larger pool of those who had been involved in the GAM became increasingly sensitive. There were concerns in the Government that the recognition of the larger number would leave those supporting

the peace process vulnerable to hard-line nationalists who would say the increased number proved that the GAM had been lying during the negotiations, and that if they had had larger numbers of personnel, they also had to have more guns than what had been agreed in the MoU.

Discussions over the reality of larger GAM numbers were politically loaded from the start, which did not help in solving the matter. The Indonesian government demanded the list of names from the GAM as a precondition to any reintegration aid. The AMM accepted the demand, in part because it appeared to fit the international norms on how the DDR process is usually conducted, and in part because it advanced the building of trust. The IOM also agreed because the demand fit the expectations of accountability. The idea was unacceptable to the GAM, as the core fighters were still afraid of being subject to punishment or revenge if they gave out the names.[10] The question remained open and hampered efforts to assist the larger group of the former GAM, who still presented a potential security risk if they could not see the benefits of the peace process.

The GAM had no intention of providing a list, or even of approving any similar method. The main concern was over security – any list of names would inevitably find its way to the Government intelligence services. There was also a desire from the part of the GAM leadership to keep control of the reintegration funds in order to help their own structures, when transitioning from an armed rebel movement to a political and social body. The list also represented a negotiating point and a way to bargain for other concessions.

The MoU had set a quantitative target of 840 arms to be handed over by the GAM. It was therefore important to produce a definition of what kind of weapons were acceptable by the AMM to be included in the 840. Based on this definition and the principle of counting only firearms that were of adequate functionality, effectiveness and lethality, the decommissioners classified every weapon handed in by the GAM as either accepted or disqualified. A weapon was basically disqualified based on non-functionality due to poor condition, broken or missing parts, or based on ineffectiveness as a lethal firearm due to poor construction, poor material or other technical deficiencies which limit its effectiveness to shoot factory-made explosive propellant lethal ammunition.

The issue of accepting custom-made 40mm grenade launchers that met the functionality, effectiveness and lethality criteria of the AMM turned out to

[10] The previous peace processes come to a sudden end. The official announcement of government of Indonesia was made at the same time as the second biggest military operation in Indonesian history commenced in full power and decimated the trustful guerrilla movement on 2002. The survivors were understandably suspicious and timid.

be a problem. The Indonesian Government faced internal dispute about the accepted numbers in the MoU. As the GAM fighters seemed to increase in numbers, more weapons should also have been decommissioned. The custom-made weapons became the central point of the government's attitude in decommissioning, with the AMM accepting weapons, but the GOI disputing them.

At the end of the third decommissioning phase, the GAM indicated that the number of 840 acceptable weapons might not be reached. With high level discussions and plenty of effort, the final goal was, however, reached on 19th December 2005. At the end of the decommissioning, the Government of Indonesia asked the GAM to verify in a written statement that they had handed in all their weapons. After the exchange of letters and a positive response from the GAM, the GOI stated that even though there still were issues, they accepted the outcome. As the authorised international body, the AMM accepted the disputed weapons and declared that the GAM had fulfilled its commitment to disarm 840 weapons by the end of the year 2005. The years after decommissioning have showed that the numbers in the MoU were correct. After the process, only about one hundred weapons have been confiscated in Aceh – mainly from criminals and anti-GAM organisations. Considering the population of 4 million, the figure is low.

Reflections on the DDR Guidelines

At the same time as the first Aceh meeting was organised in Helsinki in January 2005, an expert group of academics and practitioners met at the International Peace Academy in New York. The well known rationale was that the DDR was seldom implemented in a comprehensive way which would have included all the necessary dimensions to secure a stable peace process. The meeting was the opening for the working process of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR). The purpose was to link the DDR to the earliest possible stage of the peace support operation mandate. The work was to be done in close consultations with the ongoing processes within the UN-system (IDDRS[11]) and the World Bank (evaluation of MDRP[12]).

The CMI was well aware that the SIDDR approached the DDR from a very broad perspective. However, the work was not finalised until March 2006, when the final report was presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Research on the topic was published even later, during the summer of 2006, having time to affect the EU concept of the DDR. Thus, the Aceh

[11] Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.
[12] Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program.

peace negotiations were over and the main part of the DDR completed before the academic studies were in use. Of course, one of the best known publications in the field, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment – Principles and Guidelines", published by the UNDP's Lessons Learned Unit[13], contributed to the approach adopted by the peace process and the monitoring mission.

Although the theory is still taking shape, all the elements of the DDR were included in the Aceh peace accord in a way that was acceptable to both parties. The EU process later provided the mandate and the practical arrangement of the AMM, where the original idea to outsource disarmament affected the final outcome. The chain of events lead to the outcome that the DDR was partly executed by the Decommissioning element and partly by the other parts of the AMM organisation. The Decommissioning component was an integrated but separable part of the AMM. It specifically monitored and facilitated the disarmament of the members of the GAM in separate phases. The task was to carry out the decommissioning and destruction of small arms & light weapons. It was only responsible for the decommissioning and destruction of all weapons, ammunitions and explosives handed in by the Free Aceh Movement, GAM. The importance of reintegration was acknowledged, and a special Deputy Head of Mission for amnesty, reintegration & human rights, Ms. Renate Tardioli, was appointed.

From the point of view of successful implementation and its monitoring, it was pivotal to have solid expertise to follow the disarmament in Aceh. Two thirds of the DDR experts in Aceh had military background, including experience from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) small arms projects in former Soviet Union and Caucasus, decommissioning in Northern Ireland and EOD work in Lebanon, Iraq and Sri Lanka. The field handbook used in the decommissioning component was the rather up-to-date "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration" manual published by GTZ[14], Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Swedish National Defence College and Forsvarets skolesenter (Norway) in 2004. It turned out that the field manual gave only a broad outline, as the circumstances in different missions vary so much that a universal manual can not go into details without distorting the reality.

It was not surprising that the early efforts to fund ex-combatant's reintegration into society were unsuccessful even though the actual situation in the

[13] www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R.pdf.

[14] Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations, see [http://www.gtz.de/en/index.htm].

field was calmer than what had been predicted. Former combatants gradually felt confident enough to return to the villages, and despite some continued tensions at the local level, the number of reprisals or other similar incidents was low. The number of military type incidents, verified by the AMM, most of which were minor, declined from a monthly high of 107 in October 2005 to 20 in February 2006. This reflected the continued positive high-level commitment to peace from both parties, and the control that the senior leaders retained over the local commanders. In this situation, the reintegration assistance was also channelled to recipients stipulated in the MoU. The process was led firmly by the government and reduced the scope for international agencies to provide advice on reintegration issues. This, however, nearly tripled the total number of violent incidents among the civilian population, as the distribution of aid and reintegration recourses was heavily criticized by frustrated citizens.

The most vulnerable component of the DDR was the demobilisation. The decommissioning leadership was very disappointed that the military command chain was not formally cut. This left enduring suspicion that the GAM fighters would still be loyal to the military oaths which would hinder their return into normal civilian life. The decommissioning component of the AMM had the original idea of developing mechanisms for a symbolic transformation from military to civilian life, such as the recognition of military service, giving out medals or holding ceremonies, depending on the political and judicial context. The Aceh case proves that, in certain cases, it may be important to require that the participants formally renounce in writing their association with a group or cause. Statements made at an organisational level may satisfy organisations, but convincing the people takes more than that.

The DDR process cannot be implemented if the population is not protected, or if there are no disarming parties or international personnel. It is therefore essential that security can be provided wither by national civilian or military security forces or international forces, until new national security structures are in place.

The former fighters may be a source of problems for many reasons. The remaining command structure of guerrillas (or combatants, or freedom fighters, depending on one's viewpoint) is a key element in major organised violence. This is why formal demobilisation is the best alternative. It is best to see that veterans form open veteran aid associations rather than have any secret command chains left.

The DDR process should always include the development of arms control incentives for post-demobilization operations, as the initial disarmament often leaves many weapons behind. For this purpose, the decommissioning

component stored a set of equipment and devices for later use in the AMM. Some of the decommissioning personnel joined the AMM as monitors, when the organisation was dismissed at the end of the year 2005. The mechanism was not needed, as the local administration was totally capable of dealing with the few arms that were found after the decommissioning. Of course, there still may be arms hiding somewhere, as the 2004 tsunami may have killed people with information and buried the hideouts with wreck and layers of soil.

From the point of view of security, the overall situation in Aceh is stable. The number of confiscated weapons has remained low, and the normal Indonesian practise in weapon control works also in Aceh. Although there has been an increase of criminality, no arms are usually involved. Governor Irwandi Yussuf (GAM) is satisfied with the decision reached under the AMM auspices to increase the strength of the Aceh police by 2,000 over and above the MoU agreed maximum of 9,100 personnel[15]. Since the AMM left the area, some incidents have happened involving excessive use of force by the police. The police forces are undergoing human rights training.

The Indonesian army has started recruiting local Acehnese men, receiving 5000 applications for 175 positions. However, no former GAM combatants have so far joined TNI. The Aceh military district (KODAM) commander, Major General Supiadin, has expressed his satisfaction over the security situation, assessing that the main future threat to stability may come from internal tensions within the GAM, a poorly managed reintegration program and unemployment, which may lead to criminality. The economic recuperation remains a challenge.

The experience gained from international operations calls for the adoption of a common framework for post-conflict programming, which links decommissioning and demobilization to reintegration measures and then to longer-run development strategies. The planning of a successful DDR program requires an understanding of the situation in the field – the country context – as well as the goals, political will, and resources that the international donors are willing to provide. Effective DDR planning also relies on the analyses of possible beneficiaries, power dynamics, local society, and the nature of the conflict or peace process.

The planners should also identify potential spoilers and the impact they might have on the DDR program. When possible, a spoiler strategy should be included in the peace dialogue, and outstanding security concerns should be recognized and addressed in the DDR strategy.

[15] CMI follow-up visit December 2007.

Reintegration is the key to sustainable peace. While disarmament and demobilization are time-bound, reintegration is an ongoing process. Reintegration should address the economic and social needs of ex-combatants, focusing on providing economic skills and opportunities that promote reconciliation within the communities. It is utmost important to organise a formal demobilization process, to cut command chains and strike off any oaths obligating combatants to obey former leaders. These command chains, if left intact, can continue to operate as criminal or terrorist networks. This may have been the weak point in the Aceh decommissioning – there still is distrust due to the lack of formal demobilization.

The conditions in the country, the mixture of peoples and sometimes also the need for training and education may demand the establishment of war veteran camps that could be used some months after the demobilisation. This may, however, not be the primary option, considering the need to bring families together and begin a normal life. Veteran organisations concentrating on humanitarian activity and peer group activities can provide a good start.

Close attention must be paid to how the community perceives the former combatants. Difficulties can arise, if former combatants, at times guilty of intimidation and human rights abuses, are 'rewarded' with benefits while the impoverished communities receive nothing. Programs should be designed to provide incentives to both former combatants and the communities that receive them. This proved to be successful in Aceh.

The AMM took the peace process forward by overseeing and organising real events in the field. The decommissioning events, in particular, began to generate positive momentum. The Aceh Monitoring Mission concentrated on the fundamental idea of avoiding the complex array of issues that were more Indonesian by nature than linked directly to the Aceh conflict. This is said to have led to inefficiency, mainly in areas like human rights and reintegration work, but it also ensured that the AMM concentrated on the core strengths. This pragmatic, operational approach did not accord with all the expectations of a human security approach. In Aceh, one must, however, remember the limitations of the given mandate and understand that the mission operated inside a sovereign democratic state which held a commitment to peace and was totally capable of putting the commitment into practice.

The DDR programs too often displace women who have worked in the civilian sector or in some non-armed semi-military tasks during wartime. Furthermore, women as victims of warfare are often forgotten. In Aceh, the international community acted very carefully with issues relating to women due to cultural reasons. This may not have been the best possible method. Women should be included in peace programs – also in the DDR process –

from the very beginning. Women may have been victimised and therefore need special attention. On the other hand, their role in stabilizing the situation and advancing the reintegration is essential. The most affording proof of success in Aceh was the rapid increase of new marriages and the following baby-boom. It began, however, only after both men and women became convinced of a better future.

The components of the DDR processes do not necessarily follow one after another in a fixed order, nor do these components necessarily happen at the same time throughout a country or region. All the elements should still be assessed and planned as part of the overall process. A DDR process calls for several actors, as no organisation is specialised in all the necessary aspects, and there is a need to have a comprehensive approach. The implementation of DDR actions must be considered in the context of local circumstances and needs. In peace negotiations, a general understanding of the established practice could be helpful, but forcing separate and different cases into the same frame may not be advisable.

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6

AFGHANISTAN: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS

Tim Foxley

Nearly seven years after military intervention successfully and quickly removed the Taliban regime, the international community is still, in many ways, managing a crisis in Afghanistan. Difficulties are ever pressing – a stronger and more confident insurgency, refugees, food shortages, corruption, warlords, a weak government, human rights violations, a massive drugs industry and a broadly ineffective police and judicial system. It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves of the conclusions of a range of academic and government institutions over the last six months:

- Senlis Council: "Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink." [1]
- Atlantic Council: "Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan."[2]
- Afghanistan Study Group: "The mission to stabilise Afghanistan is faltering."[3]
- CSIS: "The US and NATO/ISAF are not winning in Afghanistan."[4]
- Manley Report (Canadian): "...serious failures of strategic direction, and persistent fragmentation in the efforts of ISAF and NATO..."[5]
- ICG: "Afghanistan is not lost but the signs are not good."[6]
- ECFR: "Failure in Afghanistan is now a realistic prospect..."[7]

Clearly, the initial optimism in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban was not justified, but it is important to counterbalance this by noting that if we fall into the easy trap of looking at the short term – 6 months, 12 months, a couple of years – then we will almost certainly come up with a very different, and a much more negative, outlook to that which we would have

[1] *Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink*, The Senlis Council, 2007
[2] *Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action*, The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2008
[3] *Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies,* Afghanistan Study Group Report, Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008.
[4] *Open Letter on Afghanistan to the House Committee on Armed Services,* Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008.
[5] *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, 2008.
[6] *Afghanistan: the Need for International Resolve*, International Crisis Group, 2008
[7] *Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008.

if we took a longer term perspective. By this we are talking about decades. It maybe that two or three decades at least is a more realistic time-frame in which to judge progress for this scale of crisis management.

Current Progress Gives Some Grounds for Encouragement...

This is of course a very negative stance regarding Afghanistan's situation at the moment. It is important, for a sense of perspective, to highlight the major gains that have been made – Afghanistan has an approved constitution, an elected President and Parliament and a national army. Refugees are voting with their feet and returning in large numbers, reconstruction and development is ongoing, particularly as regards road networks and power infrastructure.

In terms of investment in the country's future, boys and girls are going to school in greater numbers than at any point in Afghanistan's history. So if you really want a time-frame for Afghanistan's "success", the problems of definition notwithstanding, it is perhaps in 20, 30 or 40 years time, when these children are able to take their places in running their own country as civil servants, engineers, doctors, lawyers and teachers.

But until then, and above all, this country needs to hold together.

...But Problems Can Appear Insurmountable

The Afghan and international community's efforts have been hampered by a failure of co-ordination, lack of strategic planning and, in many cases, the lack of political resolve. These failings have been painfully spotlighted by the Taliban's activities. Efforts to construct viable Afghan institutions appear weak and fragmented – particularly of the police and the judicial system. For all the millions of dollars spent, the performance of the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept seems generally to be regarded as inadequate at the very best.

Crisis management in the case of Afghanistan has been difficult because of:

- The sheer scale of the problem
- The international community's poor understanding of Afghanistan, leading to naïve expectations (particularly of time-frame and the scale of task)
- Competing and conflicting political and military agendas of the international community

Scale of the problem

Afghanistan was never going to be an easy location for crisis management – and some form of crisis management – mostly with no, or very little success – has been going on for four decades. The scale of the problem seems to have become more imposing with the passage of every decade. There are many factors making work in Afghanistan somewhere between difficult and impossible: historical, religious, geographic, ethnic, cultural, tribal.

It is impossible to generalise and make assumptions about the Afghan population – there might be as many as 52 distinct ethnic groups and 18 separate languages. You can argue how much of the scale of the problem is the fault of the international community – the legacy of the British Empire and the "Great Game", but also the Soviet occupation. But the subsequent civil war, followed by the Taliban regime and a continuation of a form of civil war literally reduced to rubble any semblance of state organisation, administration or infrastructure. And the absence of governance permitted the rise of a myriad of unpleasant warlords and mini fiefdoms. The notorious ethnic Tajik warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum had, at his peak, his own currency and his own airline.

Poor Understanding of Afghanistan

Many of the international community's difficulties with Afghanistan, post-2001, have been with understanding the complexities of the country with which they were dealing. Obviously many NGOs, aid agencies, charities and experts had been working with, and involved in, the country since long before this time – the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan recently celebrated 25 years of engagement in the country. So there was very much a body of expertise associated with Afghanistan. But, inevitably, it was international governments of the time, drawn to Afghanistan with specific and very immediate agendas, that inevitably ended up calling the shots – making key and far reaching policy decisions but without any significant depth of understanding about the country's likely medium- and long-term needs.

The key thing is that in many of the countries and international organisations that became quickly involved in Afghanistan in 2001, knowledge of the country ranged between virtually non-existent to patchy at best. With limited knowledge of the country comes a serious risk of poor decisions. With the sheer complexities of Afghanistan – its history, culture, tribal systems and diverse ethnic groups and political experience and needs, this becomes even more likely. Prejudices and pre-conceptions can and do dominate in the absence of hard analysis and verifiable information – I believe that in part the preference for ISAF to remain in Kabul in 2002 rather than

expand across the country to remove the power vacuums was a perception that the Afghan population would rise up in Jihad in exactly the way they reacted to the Soviets.

Within the government departments of the international community what crisis management and analytical experience there was, was based around the Balkans, Africa and other peace-keeping operations. Knowledge of central and southern Asia was somewhat limited. So the situation in late 2001, with only a few exceptions, was likely to have been a lot of analysts desperately trying to develop their understanding and provide coherent advice in an unrealistically short time-frame which was ultimately going to see international troops deployed into Afghanistan.

Having governments and their advisers, in fast moving and highly pressurised decision-making environments, basing their decisions in respect of Afghanistan on experiences and understanding on places like the Balkans or Africa is by no means ideal. Although there were clearly some superficial similarities with places like the Balkans (tribes, religion, ethnic groups, warlords) – these merely encouraged simplistic assumptions:

- a quick military campaign that removes the Taliban from Kabul equals victory
- the rest of the country's redevelopment will come naturally
- a Western model of democratic and centralised government is the correct model for this country

With events moving at the quickest pace at the end of 2001 and early 2002, I suggest that this was when local and regional expertise amongst the international governments was at its weakest. From an analytical perspective, you simply cannot grow the sort of knowledge and understanding – personalities, allegiances, tribes (particularly the Pushtun tribal system) – that in hindsight was very necessary. Then, the Taliban were a shadowy organisation about which little was known even by acknowledged experts. Their composition, motives and intentions are still being hotly debated even now.

As already mentioned, academic and regional expertise was available (from the UN and long-term NGOs) and was sometimes consulted, but even then views and opinions about the best way to handle Afghanistan differed widely. Even where available expertise was used it tended to be distorted into fitting the priorities and requirements of political agendas amongst the international community.

The bottom line is that if you do not understand the situation and you “don't know what you don't know” you risk creating some very naïve expectations about what is *and, crucially, what is not* achievable. With the very quick

fall of the Taliban government, everybody expected Afghanistan to be "fixed" in a short space of time.

Competing and Conflicting Agendas of the International Community

A crisis can be very good at exposing the differing agendas of the international community. The starting point for subsequent difficulties was the multitude of different international military, government and NGO organisations all trying to bring assistance at the same time and in very different fashions, with much duplication of effort, confusion of purpose and lack of an overall strategy.

Each individual nation is answerable to its own population in terms of money spent and casualties suffered. Each nation has difference tolerances and assessment of risk. Nations will also want to ensure that the money they contribute to Afghanistan's redevelopment conforms with their own view of the world. It was the US who almost single-handedly brought about the fall of the Taliban, but was far too keen to declare victory and to move on as soon as possible to Iraq. In addition, for much of the time of their involvement in Afghanistan, their forces were employed on very specific anti-terrorist/al-Qaida duties.

Many of the troop contributing nations were and now remain happy to focus on the nation-building, peace-keeping and reconstruction aspects at the expense of the arguably more immediate need to tackle a resurgent Taliban. In the opinion of this author, NATO and ISAF is significantly handicapped by the proliferation of national caveats throughout its activities. Not only do they impede its ability to project across the country to areas where assistance is most needed, but it creates a negative impression within the Afghan population. Arguably (in the absence of hard evidence) it is also providing encouragement to the Taliban and perhaps even highlighting "weak links in the chain" for them to target.

So what now?

My conclusion is in two parts – lessons identified (I have followed the semi-official UK Ministry of Defence practise of avoidance of the term "lessons learnt"!) and prospects for Afghanistan over the next few years.

Crisis Management Lessons Identified

Although it should be far too obvious to be said, but better provision amongst the international community's governments is needed for analyti-

cal expertise in key regions of the world and likely future problem areas – which can be difficult to predict sometimes! But it also involves developing wider links to expertise that normally lies outside of government circles and policy makers.

Even in fast-moving crisis management situations, longer-term understanding and planning is crucial and Western assumptions, concepts and planning 'templates' are not only frequently unhelpful but can often be downright dangerous. Short-term solutions can and will cut across longer-term strategy, such as funding and arming Afghan warlords and militias who will remain empowered long after they have served the immediate purpose for which they were employed. If you fix one problem (for example, eradicating poppy) you can create two or three new problems (unemployment, resentment towards the international community, recruitment for the insurgency...)

What you do is not necessarily as important as what you are perceived to be doing. Managing expectations and avoidance of unrealistic promises are two sides of the same coin and time spent consulting and involving the Afghans themselves is seldom wasted.

Prospects

Although it is possible (and of course necessary) to point to significant progress across Afghanistan's social, political, security and infrastructure fields, it is important to remember that this progress is extremely fragile, lacking in depth and in many ways flawed through problems of internal corruption and lack of human and physical capacity. In the best set of circumstances, Afghanistan's prospects over the next thirty years will be hesitant and faltering at best and a bullet or bomb at a crucial moment could undo much that has already been achieved. The country will be vulnerable to a wide range of negative factors, of which a resurgent Taliban is but one. There are many international, regional and local players and power-brokers for whom Afghanistan's progress towards a loosely "Western" and democratic centralised state system is (or may become) contrary to their interests. Some of these elements are playing pragmatic and long-term games – it may currently be in their interests to play along with the Western model, given the weight of international community engagement at present.

The year 2008 will be another very difficult one, although perhaps not as apocalyptic as some people suggest. The progress of the insurgency will still dominate the government and media agendas of the international community. Some analysis will say the Taliban are being beaten, others will claim they are threatening to take Kandahar and even Kabul. There

will be much misleading and misinformed use of statistics to prove both sides of the story. The reality will, of course, be much less clear, but I am certain that the Taliban will have neither "won" nor "lost" in the space of the next twelve months.

Therefore I remain pessimistic – there are some significant hurdles to be cleared in the next three or four years, with a US and two Afghan elections to be held. All three can have far-reaching impacts on both the international community's resilience to stay the course and the Afghan population's perception of progress. In the run up to the 10th anniversary of 9/11 in September 2011, I am also concerned that there will be an enormous – and wholly artificial – media and public pressure to declare some kind of victory and pressurise governments into making commitments to troop withdrawals. This pressure will come not just from the international community but also from parts of the Afghan government and population, who are becomingly increasingly frustrated at being unable to run their own country.

And again, Western perspectives can be unhelpful – while we in the international community might be able to present troop withdrawals as a sign of optimism and a return to normality, three or four years ago, I was reminded from by one of the very few Afghan representatives at a conference that from an Afghan perspective, a troop withdrawal is more likely to be interpreted as abandonment, not victory...

My concern is that if we prematurely succumb to artificial and politically-motivated pressures to withdraw, Afghanistan will not be sufficiently mature to be able to stand on its own feet. I believe that significant troop withdrawals in 2011 would be premature.

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7

MOTIVES FOR OVERSEAS MISSIONS: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY

Alyson JK Bailes

A Little History

For a number of states especially in the Western part of Europe, military action overseas has been a familiar and continuous experience ever since the fifteenth century. To put the current surge of such activity in perspective, it would be interesting to plot a graph of overseas actions over the centuries – by whom they were undertaken, where, for what purposes and on what scale. Many interesting historical echoes would surely arise, showing that it is after all not so novel or unexpected to find British troops in Afghanistan, Portuguese in the East Indies, Spanish in Colombia or French and Germans in Lebanon. Nor, indeed, is the controversial modern idea of military deployments to deal with non-state, transnational challenges a particularly new one: one has only to think about past actions against piracy or the sometimes forceful application of naval quarantine against plague.

In the present context, however, there is only room to look back as far as the Cold War period for comparative purposes. Particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, the totality of European actions overseas was very substantial, but the motives were relatively clear and easy to distinguish compared with today's. They may be brought under a three-fold heading:

> A. *National motivation*: perhaps the largest deployments in terms of troop numbers were linked with the final phase of the European colonial empires, taking the form of direct protection and reinforcement of territories before their independence, emergency deployments to deal with 'wars of independence', and post-independence assistance which often included the training and re-structuring of local forces;
>
> B. *Strategic motivation*: at the time this was clearly linked with the extra-European dimensions of the East-West bloc confrontation, and it involved 'wars of choice' inasmuch as the permanent defence commitments of NATO only applied to the Euro-Atlantic area. Thus, a limited number of West Europeans joined US-led coalitions in Ko-

rea and Viet Nam, and a few roles were played by the smaller Warsaw Pact members acting essentially as Soviet proxies, in warlike conditions in Angola or as monitors in the South East Asian peace settlements;

C. *Altruistic motivation*: the widest range of Europeans were to be found acting under the aegis of the United Nations in traditional peacekeeping missions, which were presented as a contribution to global order and humanitarian goals and which in fact – distinguishing them from category A above – commonly involved nations acting in locations with which they had no historical ties.

For purposes of contrast with current conditions, it is worth underlining that the only formal institutional framework for European actions at this time was indeed the UN. Aside from NATO's geographical limitations and the lack of EC/EU military competence, the other regional organizations that undertake peace missions today (like the African Union) were either non-existent or non-operational, and the NATO analogues known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) were too short-lived to develop operational traditions even within their own territories.[1]

A Modern Typology of Motives

For analyzing developments since the end of the Cold War, the tripartite division of motives suggested above still appears to hold good, but the proportions have shifted and new complications have entered the picture. Albeit with an increased danger of over-simplification, the new typology may be laid out as follows:

a. *(Direct) national motivations*: post-colonial connections do still influence European choices of what missions to launch and who will join them, but it is now relatively less usual for the former imperial power to go it alone (like France in Côte d'Ivoire or the UK in Sierra Leone). More often, the most interested state tries rapidly to multilateralize the intervention (like France in Rwanda with Opération Turquoise) or manages to set it up as an institutional intervention from the start, preferably with a commander from a non-imperial nation (cf. the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) action in Bunia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the one now planned in Chad).

[1] An arguable exception is the Five Power Defence Arrangement in SE Asia which provided a framework for British involvement in handling the Malaysian insurgency.

b. *Strategic motivations* can no longer be tied to the former East-West dynamic but take at least three newer forms:

i) Actions in response to 'new threats' from non-state/transnational actors, which may be addressed with military means when the targets can be geographically localized, as in the US-led coalition actions against Afghanistan and Iraq;

ii) Missions undertaken through non-UN institutions: above all (in the European case) through NATO and the EU which both adopted new policies allowing worldwide military intervention at the start of the 21st century,[2] but also in support of the growing number of non-European regional groupings that have been entering the operational field. These operations are classed here rather than under an 'altruistic' heading because even when they have purely humanitarian targets, they always serve some self-seeking purposes (e.g. of self-profiling and competence building), both for the organization itself and its members. They can, of course, also be undertaken for reasons closer to the institutional community's strategic self-interest as in the case of EU plans for evacuating European citizens, or actions to limit damage and spillover from conflicts near the European heartland (West Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East);

iii) Missions undertaken at least partly, and allegedly, for economic motives: the obvious example being the oil dimension of a series of Western interventions in Arab regions from the 1992 Gulf War onwards.

c. *Altruistic motivations*: UN missions have grown overall, in numbers, scale and variety, since 1990 and still attract contributions from just about every European state. However, particularly since the mid-1990s, the tendency has been for West Europeans – and indeed, OECD countries generally – to switch the bulk of their resources away from such missions towards the new institutional frameworks and/or ad hoc coalitions. As shown in Fig. 7.1 below, the somewhat surprising result is that 'hard core' UN peacekeeping nations like the Nordic states and Canada now come well down the list of largest numerical contributors, and the UK comes only 42nd despite the large size – in gross numbers and as a proportion of its

[2] The EU did so in the Helsinki European Council decision of December 1999 creating ESDP, which did not mention geographical limits, and NATO by policy decisions taken in mid-2002 in preparation for the Prague Summit.

total force establishment – of its current overseas deployments. (The two figures given for each country are: first, its ranking among the largest UN troop contributors[3]; second, the number of personnel on mission at the given time.)

Country	Rank	Personnel		Country	Rank	Personnel
Italy	9	2870		Canada	54	169
France	**13**	**1924**		Hungary	59	118
Spain	19	1251		**Sweden**	**63**	**103**
Poland	**24**	**977**		**Norway**	**68**	**83**
Turkey	26	757		**Denmark**	**70**	**71**
Germany	**30**	**621**		Ireland	75	**52**
Austria	36	425		Netherlands	76	51
Belgium	39	375		Bulgaria	77	51
Portugal	41	348		**Finland**	**78**	**51**
UK	**42**	**348**		Czech Rep.	81	40
USA	**43**	**297**		Slovenia	87	29
Slovakia	44	294		Estonia	110	2
Romania	46	265		Cyprus	112	2
Greece	52	239		Luxembourg	113	2

Fig. 7.1: NATO and EU member states[4] contributing forces to UN missions in March 2008[5] (listed by rank)

Propensity to contribute

Given this range of potential frameworks for deploying national forces overseas, different regions respond differently – South Asia, for instance, providing vastly more resources for the UN overall than does Europe or, say, the Far East – and different nations within a region have a differentiated 'propensity' to contribute.[6] National choices depend, in the first place, on preferences as between institutionalized and non-institutionalized (coalition or purely national) missions; preferences between different institutional frameworks;[7] the importance attached to a watertight international-

[3] The top ten UN peacekeeping contributors up to end-2006 were: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa, contributing altogether 60% of all military and police personnel on mission at that time.
[4] not listed: Latvia, Lithuania, Malta.
[5] Source [http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2008/mar08_2.pdf].
[6] For a new survey of regional peacekeeping performance which focuses on several of the same issues as discussed here see Daniel, Taft, and Wiharta. (eds.) (2008).
[7] It is true that institutional profiles are not always clearly distinguished, above all in places where several institutions share tasks and the functional division of labour is

legal mandate; preferences for acting in some regions (closer to home, farther from home) rather than others; and further, more or less values-related attitudes. Secondly there are variations in the *type* of operation a state is willing to join, determined partly but not only by the actual capacities of its forces: operations with a greater or lesser degree of risk and likelihood of the use of force; operations where the national contingent has to be self-supporting against those where contributions can be 'blistered on' to those of larger nations and air or sea lift is readily available from outside; operations where a larger or smaller proportion of national costs can be reclaimed, etc. etc.

A limited illustration of how the combination of these factors affects individual nations' contributor profiles is given in Fig. 7.2 below, which compares five militarily active European states with the USA. It will be seen that there are subtle differences in the amount of effort put into EU and UN missions respectively, and a political dividing line between those willing and not willing to contribute to the third available NATO mission (after ISAF and KFOR) which is a military training mission in Iraq. There are clearer differences in the placement of each country's largest contributions – considered by institution, by region, and by type of mandate. Additionally, although the figures available in this table are not good enough for precise calculations, it can be seen that the proportion of each state's total forces (and of its ready combat forces) deployed abroad varies considerably. It is highest in the USA, rises to around 10% for the UK, can be as high as 5% at times for Sweden (and other Nordic nations) but remains well below that level for France and Spain as well as Germany.

This said, the overall increase in peace missions world-wide[8] and the constantly growing functional range of those missions – imposing demands on a wider range of national assets than just the military – has created added pressures and problems of choice for every single European country, including those outside the EU and NATO. Some of the particular difficulties that arise as a result will be briefly listed at the end of this text.

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variable: for instance a police component can be provided either by the UN, OSCE, EU or some other regional grouping. In such cases nations may choose to contribute more on the basis of preferred functional packages than on the basis of institutional 'flags' attached to those packages.

[8] According to SIPRI figures (Appendix 3a of SIPRI yearbook 2007, OUP 2007), there were a total of 60 peace missions in 2006 with a total of 167,566 personnel – a historic high. While the number of missions has been inflated mainly by additional institutions starting to mount them (e.g. the EU had 11 missions in that year), the UN remains by far the largest employer of manpower and has doubled the total of personnel engaged in its missions between 2000 and 2006.

	Total missions	By Institution		Largest contributions		Force total (active)[9]
		Inst.	*Missions*	*Inst.*	*Personnel*	
UK	**36**	**UN**	**14**	**ISAF**	**7800**	**212 000**
		EU	7	Iraq	4500	
		NATO	3	KFOR	135	
		Other	11			
USA	**26**	**UN**	**12**	**Iraq**	**160 000**	**1, 42 m.**
		NATO	3	ISAF	15 000	
		Other	11	KFOR	1436	
France	**37**	**UN**	**18**	**KFOR**	**2269**	**179 000**
		EU	10	UNIFIL	1587	
		NATO	2	ISAF	1515	
		Other	8	EUFOR ALTHEA	131	
Germany	**31**	**UN**	**12**	**ISAF**	**3210**	**198 000**
		EU	8	KFOR	2374	
		NATO	2	UNIFIL	905	
		Other	9	EUFOR ALTHEA	127	
Sweden	**33**	**UN**	**15**	**ISAF**	**345**	**18 000**
		EU	8	KFOR	331	
		NATO	2			
		Other	8			
Spain	**25**	**UN**	**10**	**UNIFIL**	**1121**	**106 000**
		EU	7	ISAF	740	
		NATO	2	KFOR	637	
		Other	6	EUFOR ALTHEA	362	

Fig.7.2: International Peace Missions 2008: Some Contributor Profiles of NATO/EU States[10]

European Motives in More Detail

First, however, each of the categories of potential motivation applying to European contributors in the last tabulation above will be explored here in greater detail. It must be admitted in advance that separating out national,

[9] Very rough estimates.
[10] All data on contributions taken from the SIPRI peace missions data base, [http://conflict.sipri.org/SIPRI_Internet/index.php4].

strategic and 'altruistic' motives becomes increasingly difficult and artificial the closer one looks into individual national policies, particularly those of states that do not have overseas imperial traditions. Indeed, it may be that some states never fully clarify (and for practical political purposes, do not need to)[11] the real motivations underlying any given choice to join or leave a mission. It is also possible that some motives are 'lighter' and more transient than any explored under the present categorization, having to do with personal or short-term party-political considerations.

National motivations

Considerations of post-colonial responsibility, strengthened by cultural and ethnic ties (i.e. the present of immigrant minorities) as well as history or formal security assurances, still seem to count for a lot in the choices of countries who owned such empires. Apart from Britain and France, it is worth noting the conflicting considerations that led Portugal finally to take a role in the East Timor peacekeeping mission and that have prompted several rounds of painful debate in Belgium over African interventions. A mirror-image reasoning applies to the choices of those countries who agree to provide commanders for actions with a clear neo-colonial flavour precisely because they themselves were not colonialists and can give the action a 'cleaner' look (as Sweden for the ESDP mission in the DRC and Ireland in Chad). Beyond this and not necessarily in order of priority, other types of motives linked directly to national interests are:

- the interest in obtaining good training for and testing of national forces, including the expected gains in interoperability, and possibly the chance to try out, to advertise for sale, or to gain a stronger case for acquiring relevant types of new equipment;
- the 'quid pro quo' reasoning whereby a contribution provided in order to please a coalition-leading country, or the responsible institution, is expected to make that country or institution more sympathetic and likely to intervene on the given country's behalf should it fall into national difficulties. This reasoning has been quite patent in the choices of several small-to-medium states in Europe who cannot realistically expect to defend their territories with their own forces, and it becomes more compelling in proportion as it becomes harder to have faith in the automatic execution of NATO collective defence commitments (so that, as it were, extra 'protection money' has to be paid for favoured treatment);

[11] One reason for a certain lack of rigour in this regard is that in the majority of EU and NATO states, such operational decisions still do not need to be formally approved (and/or granted ad hoc financing) by parliament.

- territorial security concerns when the crisis in question is close to national and regional borders and may result in migration flows, overflow of fighting/terrorist activity, disruption of important trade supplies, mistreatment of related national minorities and so forth. All these motives have been strong ones for a range of European 'front line states' (and for the second tier of Germany, Austria, Italy) throughout the series of actions in the Western Balkans. However, there can be also cases where a state very close to the action is better left out of the intervening group so as to avoid provocation and complications, notably over minorities;
- especially within, and on the borders of, the 'new Europe' there have been several cases of pairs and groups of countries setting up joint peacekeeping units – and seizing opportunities to use them – as a way of underlining their own local reconciliation, abandonment of old enmities and territorial claims. Several of the new EU Battle Groups reflect such a rationale but they were preceded by voluntary groupings in the 1990s (e.g. Poland/Lithuania, Hungary/Italy/ Slovenia…).

Strategic motivations

The first type of present-day strategic motivation listed above, the response to *'new threats'* (including cases linked with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), has never yet sparked a collective military action *led by* Europeans and is rather unlikely to do so.[12] In recent years European choices have been, rather, about joining or not joining US-led interventions of this kind, and the motives for going along can take many forms apart from simply agreeing with the need for the action. Even in the case of states sharing much of the US strategic reasoning such as the UK, a strong motive has clearly been to get 'on the inside' of US plans so as to have some possibility of guiding and moderating them, and/or of achieving a trade-off in some other policy field (as the UK hoped to secure a better US policy on the Israel/ Palestinians dispute at the time of the first Iraq attack.) Here again, especially for smaller nations, the hope of gaining a pay-off in terms of direct national favour from the strategic leader can come into play.

[12] While ESDP guidelines and the collective doctrine of NATO do not exclude common actions in response (e.g.) to terrorist threats, discussions within the EU since 2001 - and following the declaration of the Union's political anti-terrorist 'solidarity' commitment in 2004 - have revealed the wide range of national views and experiences of terrorism and a general reluctance to handle it as a military adversary. The EU's December 2004 strategy on WMD includes possible military action only as a last resort and the whole of the EU's negotiating effort on Iran has been clearly designed to avoid reaching that point. The outcome of the Iraq venture is of course a powerful argument in the same direction!

A further variant is the belief that one's own military-technical contributions are particularly relevant or actually essential for the speedy success of the mission, for limiting collateral damage or tackling the humanitarian needs or whatever (a kind of micro-altruism within a strategically motivated venture). Finally, when the pressure to 'stand up and be counted' as a participant becomes explicitly political as it has in most recent US initiatives and when non-participation, *per contra,* will be read as a protest gesture, states' choices become also a matter of political profiling at home and abroad and can easily be linked with attitudes towards other parts of the coalition leader's policy that may have little relation to the logic of the present action. The power of political motives has been clearly seen, for instance, in the role that terrorism and Iraq played in the Spanish national elections of 2004 and the speed of the new government's withdrawal from Iraq thereafter.

Motives linked to new *institutional frameworks* for military intervention are several and complex, inasmuch as the individual state may be thinking not just of its own position vis-à-vis the proposed action, but of the action's importance for the strategic interests and development of the institution as an collectivity and the impact of each choice on its own place in that community. The most straightforward possible reasoning is linked to the *utility* of the given institution taking on the task: NATO may be seen as the only good choice because of its professional military capacities and 'toughness', or the EU because of its ability to coordinate multi-functional inputs including police and humanitarian contingents, aid and other economic resources. For conflicts near home as in the Balkans and potentially in the Western part of the former Soviet Union, NATO and the EU also have a unique potential (contrasted with the UN or even Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) to continue the process after crisis termination by supporting the general transformation of the affected state(s) to the point where they can be considered for joining the permanently peaceful circle of these institutions' own membership.

A second type of motive, however, springs from a rather opposite concern to remedy the institutions' perceived *weakness or limitations*: it has been a common argument among European analysts since the late 90s that NATO 'can only survive' by proving its active utility as an operator outside the Atlantic area,[13] while a school led by France has always seen ESDP actions as a way to strengthen the EU's strategic credibility and lead it gradually in the direction of a full common defence community. Such arguments are taken particularly seriously by smaller states who see their own survival

[13] See for instance the paper by Christoph Bertram, *NATO's only future: the West abroad.*
[http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=233&parent_type=PXXX.].

linked to the efficiency of either or both institutions, with the somewhat paradoxical result that the NATO members who most need NATO to stay serious about its European obligations are forced to acclaim every new move it makes to shift its energies outwards.

Countries preoccupied with their own influence within the institutions may seek to leverage their operational contributions for a general improvement of status, or (especially in the EU) perhaps for recognition and trade-offs in other policy fields where it is less easy for them to gain credit. Non-member states working as partners of the EU or NATO respectively (such as Norway in the first case and Sweden and Finland in the second) are clearly motivated to join in institutional operations as a 'back door' route to influence and a way of picking up specific inside knowledge, improving interoperability etc. It has even been suggested that Denmark has to try particularly hard in NATO-led and coalition missions overseas to compensate at home and abroad for its self-inflicted opt-out from ESDP. Be that as it may, a final motivation evinced by some European contributors is a 'double institutional' one: a wish to see NATO and/or the EU directly support other respectable regional institutions, with the hope of making the latter more competent to succeed in their own crisis management work in overseas regions of concern (*vide* NATO and EU support for the original African Union mission in Darfur).

The *strategic economic* motivation has surely been overrated in popular conspiracy theories claiming that every foreign initiative in the Middle East, and even in countries like Sudan, is 'all about oil'. While oil-linked considerations have been powerful in US thinking, on general strategy as well as specific actions, throughout modern times it seems unlikely that any group of Europeans would consider 'saving oil' a sufficient reason – on its own – to use military force overseas, for reasons similar to those discussed on terrorism above (footnote 7).

However, it should not be forgotten that in the early 1990s the Western European Union, at that time the only purely European forum for defence concertation, coordinated two multilateral naval actions related to the commercial use of shipping routes: to keep the Gulf clear and de-mined for oil transports and to enforce a weapons embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), respectively. More recently, possibilities of using joint naval forces to deal with seaborne illegal migration in the Mediterranean and the idea of a joint 'border force' to handle illegal passage of people as well as goods have been quite seriously canvassed in the EU, while NATO decided at the 2006 Riga Summit to study operational options for contributing to energy security. It is not too difficult to imagine that further developments related to climate change, energy competition, or both in combination (e.g. after the melting of Arctic ice) could create scenarios

where there would be a critical mass of European support for using military assets, if only – for example – to rescue victims of some nearby natural catastrophe and maintain them in camps to forestall migration.

Altruistic motivations

Finally, the *altruistic motivation* for European contributions should if anything be even stronger today than in the past. The advance of globalization and a more multipolar world power system have made Europeans more dependent than ever before on global order, restraint, lawfulness and a sense of mutual responsibility in security behaviour, as well as on the functioning of long-range economic relationships and communications. Today's more complex understanding of armed conflict dynamics stresses the way that violence even in remote and primitive locations can fuel transnational menaces including terrorism and proliferation but also the uncontrolled spread of disease, drugs or human trafficking. In these senses, altruistic intervention could be seen as less purely altruistic and more (at least indirectly) rewarding in the majority of cases today: but there has also been a development of more abstract and philosophical thinking about the pre-eminence of 'human security' considerations and the universal 'responsibility to protect', both ideas being largely inspired by European liberal values.

As to why individual European states should want to get involved, the simplest cases are those where they are responding to widespread popular concern and a demand for humanitarian action. Some may argue that they can and should bring aid in particularly difficult locations because they have 'clean hands' and can be accepted where larger powers' forces or neighbours with mixed motives would not be. A more complex reasoning applies in states that have increased their exposure in 'harder' or more self-interested interventions and who want to show that they are still capable of doing something for the good of mankind. That idea is extended to institutional level when European states support the occasional humanitarian action by NATO (aid in the Kashmir earthquake), or when EU members readily agreed to add disarmament and humanitarian tasks to the list of generic ESDP missions.[14]

Finally, can some seemingly altruistic actions be accompanied by a deterrent function, as a demonstration of vigilance and strength? It might be argued that certain genuinely humanitarian tasks such as providing aid after hurricanes in the Caribbean have been signaling at the same time to Cuba or other possible regional mischief-makers that the West could also inter-

[14] This change goes back to proposals by the Barnier Committee in the European Convention that preceded the drafting of the would-be EU Constitution, and it has been preserved in the Lisbon Treaty now awaiting ratification.

vene in a more strategically protective mode: or that the large West European contingents in the enlarged UNIFIL in Lebanon are sending some kind of message to Syria and Iran.

In Conclusion: the Price to be Paid

Whatever European nations' motives for post-Cold War overseas activism may be and whatever their chosen pattern of contributions, hardly any of them have escaped repercussions ranging from specific technical demands and resource squeezes to debates that call the whole basis of national defence in question. Only some of the more obvious issues can be named here; the task of elaborating them – and discussing solutions – must be for another place.

Generally speaking, taking part in long-range operations (especially where there is need for multinational interoperability) has pushed towards numerical reductions and capability enhancements in national forces, including extended and more specialized training and a shift towards equipment types that are multi-use and multi-climate.

While conscripts can be excellent peacekeepers, the cost of maintaining an extensive conscript system has often proved difficult to reconcile with the expenses of such restructuring and of individual operations, and constitutional requirements to send only volunteers abroad have caused further headaches. Practical considerations as well as NATO and EU institutional policies have driven medium and small states towards considering specialization, which automatically implies greater reliance on partners with different specialities and is thus something of a policy conundrum for non-allies.

There has been great pressure for standardization not just of kit but of operational methods ranging down from readiness standards and response times to detailed rules of engagement, communication protocols and language use. In complex missions, similar issues in the field of civil-military relations, relations with NGOs and standards for security assistance and training are also coming to the fore. Neither NATO nor the EU has yet been ready to address very openly the discrepancies that still exist in countries' basic approaches to the use of force and to certain legal requirements, but these are at the core of some major current problems (notably in Afghanistan) and the logic points to a gradual levelling down, or levelling up depending how you look at it, of attitudes in those respects as well.

However, neither NATO nor the EU (nor any other multilateral grouping in the world) is yet anywhere near having a single joint force that exists under

common command, or could directly be brought under it without a series of ad hoc national decisions and cessions of authority. Despite facing tasks that are increasingly multinational and that increasingly respond to global or transnational phenomena, decision making at the point of choice of mission (and of role within the mission) remains strictly and stubbornly national.

This mismatch is itself the source of many conundrums for politicians and planners alike. It is not just that national populations may grow war-weary, risk-averse and obsessed with body-bags; nor even that there is resistance to excessive thinning-out of troops who ought to be protecting the home territory. There are also serious grounds for the nation to worry that its defence priorities, plans and actions are becoming in some sense 'denationalized',[15] that its decision makers are being exploited and bullied by more powerful national and international actors and that the men and women in its forces, fighting in places with no historical or logical connection to the homeland, are becoming hardly different from mercenaries. These same men and women, meanwhile, are asked to switch their dedication and their readiness to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives from the altar of the homeland – not to any single new altar, but to a whole succession of different institutions whose flags they may serve under, with a constantly changing pattern of comrades in arms and a different, often somewhat vague and tangled rationale for every single action.

To put it more simply, the trouble is that the whole range of relatively convincing motivations and justifications reviewed in the present piece are ones that make sense to elite politicians and other parts of the expert security establishment. With the seemingly never-ending expansion of such missions, it is high time to ask how they can be made to make sense to everybody: and if they cannot, what that bodes for the future.

[15] An interesting and provocative multi-author book on precisely this theme of 'The Denationalization of Defence' was edited by Ø. Østerud and J.H. Matlary in 2007; it treats the outsourcing of defence tasks to private sector operators as the other side of the coin.

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8

(WHY ON EARTH) SHOULD SMALL STATES DO EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS?

Jyri Raitasalo

Introduction

This article probes from a critical perspective the emerging trend of small states actively using their militaries in expeditionary operations within the globalising international system. The aim of this article is not to prove that this emerging military activism and the use of armed force within a widening geographical area is somehow wrong or unjustified. Rather, this article raises some questions that are related to the increasingly active military doctrines and policies of small Western states in the beginning of the 21st century. It is suggested that these questions should be analysed in a more profound and public manner than is currently the case. A changing military agenda among small Western states should not only be analysed from a traditional strategic perspective – i.e. from a great-power perspective that conceptualises the use of armed force as one normal instrument of statecraft. I propose that in addition to this great-power perspective, one should also see the emerging globalising international system from the perspective of small states with more circumscribed strategic interests and limited resources.

The National Interest Redefined

Within the subject of Strategic Studies, The concept of National Interest has traditionally been equated with the survival of the state and/or the maximisation or optimisation of its power position vis-à-vis other states.[1] This Cold War era strategic focus on The National Interest was rather unproblematic and became taken for granted. States were key players in the international agenda and their survival was constantly threatened by the anarchic logic of the bi-polar international system. In retrospect, it is rather easy to comprehend, how and why theoretical literature on national interest was rather sparse and undeveloped as practical knowledge of the dangerous Cold War system seemed to dictate a particular view of states, The Na-

[1] See e.g. Morgenthau (1967) and Waltz (1979). See also Cox (1986).

tional Interest and the use of military force in the international system. During the decades of pressures of the bi-polar threat-penetrated international system, it was all about *defending the national interest*[2] – and the essence of this national interest could be taken by assumption, without more detailed empirical studies of different states in different geographical regions and with distinctly different strategic resources.

The Cold War era conceptualisations of The National Interest – and more broadly international politics in general – were framed mostly from a great-power perspective. What on earlier times had been an international system of several significant great powers (a multipolar system) had turned into a battleground of two great powers without precedent – the two superpowers. If the tradition of political realism or strategic studies have emphasised the importance of great powers in explaining real-world events, the Cold War era was no exception – on the contrary. After all, it was a time of high concentration of power never before seen between two adversaries almost alike. So, it was not very surprising that IR-scholars, practitioners of strategy and statesmen viewed international security with great-power lenses during the entire Cold War era.[3]

The rather essentialist view of The National Interest that was attached to the mainstream theoretical construct of the Cold War days – namely political realism in a wide variety of flavours – started to become challenged on two different levels during the 1980s and early 1990s. The more profound challenge came from the (meta)theoretical level – when the questions on the philosophy of science entered the arena of political scientists, IR-scholars and even strategists. The linguistic turn and the constructivist "middle ground"[4] were manifestations of the increasing willingness to go behind the traditional taken-for-granted wisdom inherited from the 19th century statesmen-diplomats, whose diplomatic maxims were codified into the theoretical body of political realism.[5]

The other – more substance-related – challenge to the atheoretical and universalistic concept of The National Interest was associated with the winding down of the Cold War confrontation and the lowering probability of a superpower nuclear showdown. As the old rules of the international system became challenged by political practice in the early 1990s (e.g. the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and subsequently of the Soviet Union), states throughout the world were faced with a critical question: if the Cold War interna-

[2] See e.g. Finnemore (1996).
[3] More about the great-power perspective in political realism, see e.g. Bisley (2008), p. 210-226. See also Little (2007), p. 82-84, 196-200.
[4] Adler (1997).
[5] For more about the 'genealogy' of realism, see e.g. Guzzini (1998).

tional system is over, what constitutes the security and defence logic(s) of the post-Cold War international system?

In tandem the two above-mentioned challenges to the traditional realism-induced understanding of The National Interest meant that researchers and political practitioners started to reconceptualise their views of what national interests are all about. For some twenty years the *question of defining – not only defending – the national interest* has been on the agenda of statesmen, professionals of security policy and scholars. More and more the idea of conceptualising national interests as politically (or socially) constructed has been accepted – although probably most analysts would agree that the conditions in which states (and possibly other agents as well) define their interests is not totally in their own control. States thus define their security objectives within the globalising international system, but not under the conditions of their own choosing.[6]

The socially constructed nature of national interests means that they cannot be equated only with the survival of the state and the need to use military force in order to increase the power position of the state in question. It is possible that a particular state defines its national interests so that, for example, increased international social or economic justice means the fulfilment of those interests. Furthermore, the socially constructed character of national interests indicates that within the timeframe of years and decades, practically any matter can become 'the essence' of national interest for a particular state. Thus, new issues may – and do – become associated with particularistic expressions of national interests and new methods may be used in order to promote these interests.

The above-mentioned logic connects the shift of many small states' defence policy from the traditionally static and defence-oriented expressions towards more active and offence-related policies that we have witnessed during the last two decades. This shift started with the demise of the old massive military threat and the parallel emergence of the military crisis management tradition. Its later expressions have included counter-terrorist operations and warfare against terrorism in remote locations – barely understandable with the Cold War logic of defending The National Interests against easily recognisable threats.

[6] More about social construction through the processes of reproduction and transformation, see. e.g. Archer (1995); Archer (1998); Bhaskar (1979).

Military Crisis Management – Why?

The development of Military Crisis Management tradition – mostly within the developed West – has been connected to a process of getting a grip on the post-Cold War security logic of the international system and redefining security threats countered by states as the 'old' security threats have been conceptualised to diminish radically. Military Crisis management and the associated increasing military activity out of national/alliance area is thus a cause and an effect of widening the concept of security. Changing perceptions of security threats have directed Western military activity towards faraway locations – today the area of operations is practically global. At the same time, with more active use of military force, Western states have by their own doing created an emerging and so far an intensifying tradition of militarily responding to such events that still in the 1980s were not understood to require military response. Several small states – such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden or Netherlands – have been actively involved in this process of redefining security threats and countering these 'new' threats also with military tools.

If the end of the Cold War is to blame on the emergence of a Western tradition of military crisis management on the macro level, it can be reduced into several more micro-level causes or influences that have supported and strengthened the emergence and consolidation of the active use of Western militaries in crisis management missions. In the following, I briefly touch upon several of these micro-level influences, namely 1) the widening of the concept of security, 2) the changing perception of security threats, and 3) the loss of solid foundations for the long-term development, maintenance and use of armed forces, associated with the demise of the Cold War era security logic. These three influences have given states incentives to reformulate their strategic and military doctrines – at least in the developed West.

The three above-mentioned security trends have coincided with the shifting conceptualisations of effective military power, which have surfaced during and particularly after the 1991 Gulf War. This war against Saddam Hussein's massive conventional army – and more importantly the interpretations of the lessons of this war – have set the pace of Western understandings of effective and credible military power in the post-Cold War era. High-tech military forces have become the new imperative in the development and transformation of Cold War era armed forces into usable, credible and efficient fighting forces that can fulfil the missions that today's security exigencies demand. The post-Gulf operations or wars in Bosnia, Iraq (Desert Fox 1998) and Kosovo, as well as the preliminary successes made in the wars in Afghanistan (2001–) and Iraq (2003–) have supported the view

of high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs changing the ground-rules of contemporary warfare.[7]

The widening conception of security that has come about in the post-Cold War era has had two-fold implications for the execution of national security policies. First, conceptualisations of security have been creeping from the politico-military sphere into new sectors of economy, societal issues, the environment and so on. Second, new referent objects of security have become injected on the side of states. The concepts of human security and even global security have been frequently used in the international security parlance in the 21st century. Together these two processes of widening – or even dispersing – the conception of security have with the demise of the Cold War era military threat made military operations out-of-area for humanitarian purposes possible. Thus the seeds for military crisis management were planted already in the Cold War era military practises of peacekeeping and great-power interventions on the one hand and the post-Cold War era reinterpreted threat-assessment within a widening security framework on the other hand.

The changing understanding of security threats rely on the end of the Cold War and the need to come to terms with the emerging 'new' security logic that is expected to come about to guide us from the still ongoing post-Cold War era into something more lasting and more definitive in terms of rules of international security. Looking at how security threats are conceptualised in the West in 2008, one can quite convincingly argue that the post-Cold War era is not over – we are still in the process of trying to get a firmer grip on the foundations of states' security policies. We are still faced with a struggle over the meaning of security and the relevant security threats that should guide states' security policies.

Representative of the idea of redefining security and related threats are two documents that NATO produced at the turn of the decade between 1988 and 1990. In 1988 it was still stated that:

> "The Soviet Union's military presence in Europe, at a far in excess of its needs for self defence, directly challenges our security as well as our hopes for change in the political situation in Europe."[8]

It only took a couple of years for the "old" threat to start its demise, as NATO's London declaration from 1990 reveals:

> "Europe has entered a new, promising era. … The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards free society. … The Atlantic Commu-

[7] E.g. Raitasalo (2005).
[8] NATO (1988).

> nity must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship."[9]

A similar notion of redefining security through the lenses of NATO's missions can be located in the years following the end of the Cold War. In 1991, the then new Strategic Concept of NATO noted that:

> "The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence."[10]

Few years later – in 1996 – the new role of NATO vis-à-vis the new security threats was presented in an almost totally different manner:

> "The new NATO has become an integral part of the emerging, broadly based, cooperative European security structure….We have… reconfigured our forces to make them better able to carry out the new missions of crisis management, while preserving the capability for collective defence."[11]

What these brief quotations revel so clearly is that the concept of security and related understandings of security threats had already during the few years following the end of the Cold War undergone a drastic change. Similarly, Western responses to new security threats were reconstructed in a manner that deviated from the confrontational state-centric superpower security framework of the Cold War era.

The ambiguities, contradictions and struggles in estimations of relevant security threats within the West mean that *nature of a guiding logic for long-term development of Western armed forces is rather fluid*.[12] We no longer have solid foundations – like the Soviet threat – to base our defence policies upon. Rather, the 'right' way to develop and maintain armed forces is very much debated today. Combining the lessons of the Gulf war – encoded in the American military vision of the Revolution in Military Affairs – with the rupture in conceptualisations of the nature of military threats that accompanied the end of the Cold War, Military Crisis Management has offered some guidelines for states on how to go about developing their armed forces in uncertain times. In the security sphere this uncertainty has mostly been about the 'nature' of future military conflicts and the 'right' way to prepare for them militarily.

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[9] NATO – The London Declaration (1990).
[10] NATO's Strategic Concept (1991), paragraph 34.
[11] NATO Press Communiqué (1996).
[12] The role of terrorism as a security threats is a case in point. Whether it is a military threat (or a threat to be countered militarily) or not is still debated. Similarly the humanitarian reasons for using military force within the international system offensively is struggled within the western security community. On security communities, see e.g. Adler & Barnett (1998).

On the 'demand' side of military crisis management, the rise of *new wars*[13] and the *large-scale humanitarian catastrophes and atrocities* connected to them – with the multiplying CNN-effect of contemporary 24/7-media – have made it necessary for the developed West to do something in order to reduce the effects of these wars and to prevent such ordeals from happening in the future. Naturally, as Western states have reacted to these humanitarian catastrophes immediately after the end of the Cold War, there have not been any ready-made solutions or operating principles of how to respond to such events. Therefore, *the Western tradition of military crisis management has been a process of learning-by-doing* as the lessons of one operation have guided the execution of the next. Humanitarian mission in Iraq (1991), Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and East-Timor – to name a few – have thus forced the West to develop and continuously ameliorate a military response to new wars. This trial-and-error method of the emerging Western military crisis management policy has naturally been possible due to the dramatic demise of traditional military concerns on national and alliance levels.

The Problem of Global Terrorism

After being almost overwhelmed with the steady increase in the demand side of military crisis management operations from the mid-1990s onwards, the West was at the turn of the century engaged in multiple ongoing crisis management operations with tens of thousands of troops deployed inside and outside of Europe. New approaches, doctrines and troops were needed, as witnessed by the rapid development of the European Union's military crisis management capabilities and the restructuring of NATO's tasks and its military focus. After the terrorist strikes in the eastern coast of the United States in September 2001, the Global War on Terror has very much dominated the Western discussions on military operations. I would argue that the militarised response of the George W. Bush administration on terrorism was not only possible due to some domestic factors (the neoconservative outlook of some key personnel in the administration), but also due to the increased international (and particularly Western) legitimacy of military interventions that was caused by the strengthening military crisis management tradition from the beginning of the 1990s. *I argue that by 2001 offensive military operations out of national or alliance area were much more legitimate internationally than they were at any time during the Cold War. Military interventions for doing good were becoming a norm during the late 1990s (The Responsibility to Protect[14]), diminishing the*

[13] Kaldor (1999).
[14] See e.g. The Responsibility to Protect – Research, Bibliography, Background (2001).

strength of the centuries old norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty.

The Global War on Terror itself – mainly expressed through the operations (wars) in Afghanistan and Iraq – has caused some adverse effects on the Western military crisis management tradition that had matured for a decade before war was declared on jihadist terrorists and states that harbour them. Today the main problem is the increased difficulty in separating a war-on-terror operation from a military crisis management operation. And as the amount of international debate and struggle over the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the Iraq War (2002–2003) demonstrated, Global War on Terror is anything but uncontroversial or completely legitimate – even within the Western security community.

NATO's ISAF-operation in Afghanistan can serve as a good example of the problems and difficulties that one faces when trying to classify the operation: is it a military crisis management operation[15] – which is more legitimate – or part of the global war on terror or an example of coalition warfare – the legitimacy of which would be more questionable. For some – if not most – small European states, the legitimacy question is not idle. Taking part in coalition warfare in Afghanistan or Iraq is still a tough decision to make for many small states in Europe. Any potential decision is made even harder by the problem of unclear boundaries between the military crisis management operation and coalition warfare operation in Afghanistan – executed partly by the same troops or troop-contributing states.

It is noteworthy that whatever the successes or failures of the Global War on Terror so far have been, it has continued to weaken the established norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty as offensive military operations have had rather large coalitions of participating nations in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, looking at the situation in the year 2008, it seems that both the developing Western military crisis management tradition and the ongoing Global War on Terror have facilitated future offensive military operations – even without the approval and mandate of the United Nations Security Council, the only authoritative international body that can legally sanction the use of military force within the international system. It is worth analysing, whether it is in the interests of small states that the legitimacy of offensive military operations without UN Security Council backing is increasing. This is particularly so within those small states that are geographically situated in the vicinity of a great power, which is more likely to have the needed capabilities to launch an offensive military operation outside its own borders. Before making some preliminary conclusions

[15] Including such elements as providing security and stability, reconstruction and disarmament.

from a small-state perspective, I will briefly probe the state of the Western military crisis management tradition through some voiced concerns over the problems that currently ongoing operations are facing.

Western Military Crisis Management in Crisis?

One can hardly avoid noticing the increasing trend of Western states committing economic, social and military resources for crisis management operations in the post-Cold War era. With this increased resource allocation and heightening expenditures on military crisis management, it is worth analysing what is being achieved. Lacking the possibilities of doing a thorough analysis in this article, I raise several problems that can be associated with the strengthening military crisis management tradition in the West. I do this in order to shed light on the small-state perspective that will follow.

Maybe the most important and most obvious problem related to the logic of military crisis management is the fact that the needed capabilities differ considerably from those that Western states have inherited from the Cold War era. Out-of-area high-tech capabilities are needed in today's military operations rather than more static – and less high-tech – but more numerous capabilities of territorial defence. At least this is so, if you look at what developed Western states are at the moment doing, when they create or modify forces for crisis management operations.[16] This shift in logic has meant that many – actually most – Western states have started to transform their armed forces in order to lose some of the Cold War era 'military overweight' and to procure advanced military systems. The problem that is related to this process of profoundly transforming the armed forces touches upon the question of *expenditures*.

The rapidly deployable high-tech out-of-area capabilities are so expensive, that probably no European state can independently maintain a level of credible military capability to be used in a traditional military confrontation. While this might not be so big a problem for militarily allied countries – the member-states of NATO – the trend that is intertwined with the transformation of Western armed forces is increased military interdependence. With increasing debates among NATO members about the appropriate role of the alliance – expeditionary operations (military crisis management and operations against terrorism) vs. the defence of alliance territory – a member-state with only very limited repertoire of high-tech capabilities is totally dependent on large-scale military cooperation even for the very basic

[16] See e.g. Headline Goal 2010 (2004); A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy (2003).

defence-related tasks (e.g. surveillance of air-space or air patrolling, not to mention the defence of territory – even against 'minor' attacks). And if on the longer run the Western tradition of military crisis management proves to be only a passing military fad, the states that have invested heavily on the requirements of crisis management may have transformed themselves into oblivion with the massive reductions of manpower, military system and overall capabilities. Looking at the future of the international system's security situation with the time-frame of 10–20 years, it is practically impossible to know the state of great-power relations and the militarization of relationships between states. As 9/11 has revealed, strategic surprise can occur – and if it does, it can have unexpected consequences.

The second problem related to military crisis management – as it has developed within the West so far in the post-Cold War era – has to do *with differing interests and resources of participant states* in any crisis management operation. As great powers have traditionally viewed military tools as a normal part of their statecraft toolbox, the development of military crisis management tradition and the related expeditionary military operations seem rather easy to accept. One could argue that the 'emergence' of the military crisis management tradition in the early 1990s was mainly caused by the *pre-existing expeditionary warfare capabilities and culture of Western great powers* – first and foremost the U.S., but to a smaller degree also the United Kingdom and France.

Whereas great powers have for decades and even centuries developed intervention forces for pursuing political objectives, small states cannot rely on a similar strategic culture or national tradition of conceptualising their military objectives. Offensive expeditionary military operations have probably with few exceptions been the preserve of great powers. The resources at their disposal and the associated expressions of national interest have throughout several centuries sedimented into an outlook of using military force outside one's own territory. Military crisis management operations fit rather easily into this kind of strategic outlook, while the defence-oriented and more static policies of resource-poor small states have had to overcome decades and centuries old traditions of using their militaries in 'operations' only when absolutely necessary (defending against external threat) and only for purposes of defending the status quo. *Military crisis management is thus a watershed event for small-states' military culture or defence policy*. This is probably why there have been heated debates within NATO and even the EU on troop contributions and the lack of deployable capabilities in operations that member-states have decided to undertake.

NATO's ISAF-operation in Afghanistan is a case in point. Western states led by the U.S. are continuously struggling to get more troops to the operation as security situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating. Not only

the number of troops is still deemed too low – which is some 50,000 in the summer on 2008 – but also advanced military capabilities (e.g. helicopters) are not pouring in at a pace that would satisfy top military leadership of the operation or the security political elites in the capitals of the NATO member-states and those of NATO's partners.[17] Why are the member-states not committing needed troops to an operation that they collectively have decided to undertake and in which they naturally wish to succeed? One answer could lie in the difference between resources and interests of great powers on the one hand and medium as well as small states on the other. The direct link between national security and committing troops to a war in a faraway location with questionable chances of success is rather difficult to forge, particularly in states that have only very limited military resources and which are still influenced by the Cold War era military culture of territoriality and defence in conceptualisations of military operations. This is so today – even despite the fact that understandings of national security have started to be re-evaluated in the chaotic world of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras.

The downsizing of NATO Response Force (NRF) is a similar indication of the difficulties of gathering ready-to-use military forces and capabilities for expeditionary operations. What was previously (only for a few years though) a high-readiness expeditionary force of some 25,000 soldiers has now been reduced in size to less than 10,000 soldiers – because of difficulties in gathering the rotating force-packages by the member-states. Again the question arises: why are there problems in gathering high-readiness military forces (mostly for crisis management missions) by member-states of NATO when these states have collectively decided to construct such a high-readiness force concept? I would argue that at least in part this can be explained by the low level of (national) interests in many of the participating states to commit resources and put soldiers at risk for the kind of missions that have been visioned to be carried out with these kinds of troops.

In addition, I would like to raise the question of *usability*[18] *of rapid reaction military crisis management forces* for the kind of effects that are sought after in places like Afghanistan, Iraq or Chad. Most (visible) efforts of transforming NATO and creating military crisis management forces within the framework of the EU are connected to rapid reaction capabili-

[17] The delays of the European Union's military crisis management operation in Chad and the Republic of Central Africa is a similar example: sufficient troop contributions were so difficult to come by that the beginning of the operation was delayed by several months.

[18] For me the question of usability of troops is not only a question of whether we can use these troops or not. It should be conceptualised more broadly, I argue, so that one should include in the analysis alternative troops that could be available for the same amount of resources.

ties. These are the most expensive type of forces that exist – particularly so when they are procured with high-tech systems and strategic lift capabilities that are on alert constantly for possible missions. But if one looks at the history of employing NATO or EU rapid reaction military crisis management forces – NRF or EUBG[19] – one can see very few successes. With only a 'history' of several years one could make the argument that rapid reaction forces produce very little 'bang for a buck'.

If one looks at the ongoing military crisis management operations of today – many of which are hard to classify as purely military crisis management operations due to the ongoing war on terror – one can notice the need for a time-frame of years and decades, not days and months. So, while rapid reaction forces are certainly needed at particular instances, one can ask whether the intensive focus on these forces when transforming the armed forces is a correct strategy. It seems almost evident that the sustainability of troops and the traditional *boots-on-the-ground* approach should not be overridden when conceptualising the military crisis management forces for the future. This approach would favour the capability to sustain large troop formations (several battalions – brigade) of lower readiness and lower level of technology for years and even more than a decade rather than focus on quickly getting the troops on the operation and almost as rapidly getting them out. It is of course a more delicate question to assess all the reasons behind creating and maintaining rapid reaction forces than I am able to provide here[20], but this problem within the military crisis management framework should at least be acknowledged and thoroughly analysed.

Finally, the trend towards *token forces* should be acknowledged and analysed within the developing military crisis management tradition. As many of today's military crisis management capabilities are based on high-tech systems and need to be interoperable with the United States that is transforming its military within the framework of the Revolution in Military Affairs, many troop contributing states can or wish to send only a handful of troops and few pieces of military equipment to the operations. In many cases the troops sent represent a *symbolic force*, probably with no influence on the operation they are contributing to. In the worst case some of the small national contributions sent to a crisis management operation may actually have negative effects, as increased coordination and bureaucracy is needed to facilitate the smooth running of the operation where dozens of different national contingents bring very little capabilities to the operation. For example, in the Iraq-operation (a war on terror operation combined with a military crisis management operation) in the spring of 2008 there

[19] European Union Battle Groups.
[20] E.g. the NRF is not intended to serve only the crisis management function, but serves also as a catalyst for larger military transformation within the alliance.

were some 20 troop-contributing nations with less than 100 soldiers each in the operation.[21] Similarly as is the case with the development of rapid deployment capabilities, there are multiple reasons for states to send symbolic forces into military crisis management operations. These include such issues as the show of solidarity, political legitimation of an operation, consolidation of military credibility and securing of possible future security guarantees from other members of the military alliance. Despite these several additional reasons for military 'tokenism', the role of the Western military crisis management tradition in bringing about this dispersion of troops in multinational crisis management operations should not be overlooked.

Conclusion: The Need for a Small-State Perspective

The need for and some examples of a small-state perspective within the framework of military crisis management have so far been presented mostly in passing. Now it is time to ask, why do we need a small-state or a minor-power perspective on crisis management and what such a perspective would imply for the analysis of the issue.

I argue that the struggles within NATO concerning the chronic troop shortages of the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan are at the very core of these two perspectives. These struggles highlight and pinpoint the differences between great power views and minor power views on the rationality to participate in the military operation thousands of kilometres away from national territory. The main troop contributor and the only global military superpower in the world – the United States – has been pressing hard its allies and (PfP-)partners in order to get them to send more men and military capabilities to deal with the worsening security situation that the state and citizens of Afghanistan are faced with. In the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,

> *"But we must not – we cannot – become a two-tiered Alliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not.* Such a development, with all its implications for collective security, would effectively *destroy the Alliance.* ...
>
> In NATO, *some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations*, thus forcing other allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying. …

[21] These states were: Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, Denmark, Mongolia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Estonia, Macedonia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, Latvia, Singapore, Tonga, New Zealand, Philippines.

> In the years ahead, the credibility of NATO, and indeed the viability of the Euro-Atlantic security project itself, will depend on how we perform now [in Afghanistan]."[22]

The threat that Secretary Gates mentions has to do with the alliance becoming a two-tiered ensemble of states. On the one hand, this would mean that only part of the member-states would be capable or willing to fight the wars that have collectively been decided to be worth the fight – like the case of Afghanistan. On the other hand this could mean the waning of NATO as a Western military organisation and ultimately its dismantlement. As there is still demand for the NATO-membership in the eastern parts of Europe and even beyond, and as no member-state of the alliance has withdrawn its participation from the alliance (with the partial exception of France, which is after 40 or so years now returning to the alliance as a 'full member'), the question needs to be asked: why does U.S. Secretary of Defense need to struggle with strong diplomatic language in order to get other member-states to participate in an operation that has been described as the number one priority of NATO? My answer to this question would in a simplified form be: because of the differing understandings on the use of military force between great and minor powers.

For the great powers, military force has traditionally (for centuries) been an instrument to be used when pursuing the national interest. The very definition of great powers always involves the military sphere and such a level of military capability that it clearly overshadows both quantitatively and qualitatively most other states in the international system. Instrumental view on military force, offensive military posture, the propensity to use military force to pursue state interests, the use of the military for the policy of prestige and the overwhelming amount of military capability are distinctive properties of great powers. When one looks at small states or minor powers, one normally cannot recognise a pattern of the use of military force to achieve political goals, nor can one locate significant 'mass' of military capability. In a similar fashion, one normally cannot find an offensive military posture. Instead, one would typically seek to find a defensive military doctrine that would be based on the notion of upholding the status quo.

Taking this view on the problems of NATO's ISAF-operation – or the very *problematique* of what kind of military crisis management operations would suit both great and small powers – one can make the following preliminary conclusions. First, great powers are more capable of using military

[22] Gates (2008) (my italics). About the problems of having 'wrong' kind of troops available to the alliance, see also the speech by the secretary-general Robertson in 2003, where he noted that "… although we have 1,200,000 regular soldiers under arms in Europe and Canada, the vast majority are at present *useless* for the kind of missions we are mounting." Robertson (2003) (my italics).

force to solve political problems and to fulfil politically defined goals. Second, great powers are more willing to use military force. Thirdly, small states' military resources are very limited to be used in expeditionary military operations *à la* military crisis management operations. Investment in rapid reaction high-tech expeditionary military crisis management capabilities is bound to lead to increased dependence on others on matters of military significance. The resources of small states are going to facilitate only very small-scale development of these highly expensive and multilaterally developed capabilities *by definition* (small states have very limited resources). Fourthly, the increasing participation in military operations and even warfare within the limits of a globalising international system is 'producing' as a side-effect the weakening of the norms of non-intervention and state-sovereignty. With uncertain future prospects of the international system, this trend might not on a long run be in the interests of small states – particularly so in the case if militarized great-power confrontation returned to the international security agenda.

This article, and the related presentation at the 11th Suomenlinna Seminar, have been intended to critically assess the Western logic of military crisis management in the post-Cold War era. Despite the critical tone of this article, it should be noted that I am not proposing that Western states totally halt their military crisis management operations. Neither am I proposing that small states should stop participating in international military crisis management operations. Rather, what I have attempted to do, is to increase reflexivity on a critical security political matter that many times seems to live a life of its own and which is hard to criticise as the moral purposes of military crisis management – the lessening of human suffering – are so noble. Any criticism found in this paper is intended to provide clues for better strategic level planning and execution of military crisis management operations, as the results so far have been more modest than many had hoped for.

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9

PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES – ASSETS OR LIABILITIES IN FUTURE CRISIS MANAGEMENT?

Marcus Mohlin

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on a new actor that is becoming more and more common in crisis management and similar undertakings. This actor is involved for a reason quite different from most other actors operating in areas of conflict and crisis: that of profit. This motive creates certain problems, which makes it a matter of some urgency for us to know more about such companies and their effects.

Over the past couple of years there has been significant debate about so-called private security companies, i.e. for-profit companies providing different types of security services such as personal protection details to heads of governments or other important personnel. They also provide security for non-governmental organisations and international organisations as well as defend refugee camps and escort convoys through dangerous areas. One of the most widely recognized private security companies today is the American. company Blackwater. One task of theirs, which attracted considerable attention, was the protection of US Ambassador Paul Bremer, when he was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Instead of being protected by US Department of State agents from the Worldwide Personal Protection Services (WPPS), as is usually the case for American State Department personnel, he was protected by a private for-profit company.[1] Usually associated with the privatisation of violence and the weakening of the state, these types of companies dominate current debate about contractors operating in different forms of contingencies.

However, there are other types of companies, which also provide services in areas of conflict that may affect states in different ways. For instance, most governments that want to deploy military forces overseas have to lease ships to be able to do so. Roll-on-roll-off ships and the like are not normal assets for a navy. They usually have some smaller amphibious landing ships, but they are seldom of the size to ship large forces over long distances. Instead countries wishing to move heavy equipment and large

[1] Mohlin and Käihkö (2008).

amounts of stores to remote areas turn to the private market to lease ships in order to conduct strategic sea-lift operations.

The same goes for strategic air-lift; large aircraft are too expensive for smaller nations to operate themselves. Instead they lease air-lift from companies such as the Volga-Dnepr Group based in Russia and England. The Volga-Dnepr Group claims to be "[…] one of the world's largest transporters of outsize and heavyweight air cargo", and "[…] provide air cargo solutions for customers to and from virtually any point of the globe."[2] Their aircraft, An-124s and IL-76s are among the largest available in the world. The only aircraft comparable in size would be the C-17 Galaxy of which the United States has 138. The only other country operating C-17s is the United Kingdom whose Royal Air Force has four such aircraft. Most other nations have the considerably smaller C-130 Hercules and hence need to outsource strategic air-lift to civilian companies because such assets are rare and expensive.

Medical services can also be leased, with packages available ranging from entire hospitals to medics, nurses and medical equipment and supplies. One such company is Medical Support Solutions specialising in "[…] the provision of Medical and Emergency Risk Management and Remote Site Medical Services."[3]

A fifth type of service available is the leasing of people with specialised skills. However, the people on lease here are ex-military officers, non-commissioned officers or ex-police officers with several years of active duty behind them. Most come with unique experience and expensive training, often received in elite units and higher echelon headquarters or in some other specialised units. One interesting example is the way the United States outsourced its contribution of civilian police to the UN operation in Kosovo. Instead of providing government or state employees, the US turned to DynCorp, a large private military company, to do the recruiting and administration of police officers for service with UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).[4]

Logistics and the building and running of entire camps is also a service that is now available as a turn-key solution for any government or NGO that wants to set up a shop somewhere in the world. Instead of moving equipment and personnel to distant locations, such a service can be contracted to a company who will then build the required refugee camp or, if needed,

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[2] http://www.volga-dnepr.com/.
[3] http://www.medsupportsolutions.com/.
[4] United States Institute of Peace: Special Report [http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr71.pdf].

entire military camps, complete with guards, weapon ranges, mess halls, warehouses and accommodation.

Another service available on the open, international market is the conduct of full scale combat operations. Admittedly, it is more an *ad hoc* service that is only accessible via personal connections and relationships, rather than one advertised by companies. These are the classical mercenaries – and they do still exist. One recent example was when Simon Mann, formerly of Britain's Special Air Service, tried to stage a military coup in Equatorial Guinea a few years ago.[5] Seldom advertised nowadays as a service available from any company, in the mid 1990's it was considered a commodity and countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea outsourced combat functions to companies such as Executive Outcomes[6] and Sandline[7].

Over the past five years the situation in Iraq has attracted large numbers of for-profit companies, ranging from the heavily debated private security contractors to more benign providers of logistics and interpreters. It is estimated today that there are some 180 000 civilians employed by approximately 200 different companies as support to the rebuilding of Iraq.

All these companies may seem to be only remotely related to each other, but they do in fact share some common characteristics. First of all, they are not only prepared to offer their services in the most dangerous of places, that of crisis and conflict, this is an area they specialise in. Secondly, they employ former soldiers to staff most positions. In fact, most companies recruit such people for two major reasons: they are the only people qualified to do serious work under the circumstances and they have the networks to draw further personnel from. In essence, military expertise has become a commodity for sale. Now, with that in mind one question that has to be addressed is whether these companies are nothing but mere mercenaries.

Operating in a Legal Vacuum

One problem, however, is that the most common definition of what constitutes a mercenary is not only contested, but also very vague. The Geneva conventions contain the most widely cited definition. Despite the fact that USA and some other countries have not signed the additional protocol, *GC*

[5] BBC News, Profile of Simon Mann [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3916465.stm].
[6] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/executive_outcomes.htm.
[7] http://www.sandline.com/.

1977 (APGC77), this definition of a mercenary is the most commonly accepted:

> "Art 47. Mercenaries
> 1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
> 2. A mercenary is any person who:
> (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
> (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
> (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
> (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
> (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
> (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces." [8]

When taking a closer look at the text we can see that it actually raises more questions than it answers. For instance, what does it mean by someone being "[…] recruited […] in order to fight in an armed conflict"? Is a security operative from a private company exempt from the rule? He can hardly be described as *fighting* in an armed conflict, and he may not be taking "[…] a direct part in the hostilities", but his actions will most definitely affect the outcome and dynamics of any conflict. The picture is further complicated because all the requirements have to be fulfilled for the definition to be valid, and because the text talks about individuals rather than companies. The conclusion must, therefore, be that the current text is not applicable to modern day companies.

This leads us to further conclude, that the status of individuals working for a private, for-profit company providing security services in a country plagued by crisis or conflict is, to say the least, debatable, if not uncertain. Another conclusion must be that companies are not regulated at all in International Humanitarian Law. However, it must be stressed that there is a lot of ongoing research into this specific problem concerning armed security.[9] For this reason it is not only interesting, but also quite important, to investigate the role of for-profit companies in crisis management and also their connections with contracting countries.

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[8] http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm.

[9] See, for instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross [http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/privatisation-war?opendocument&link =home] and the Swiss Initiative [http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc].

The Industry Summarized

To sum things up briefly: companies provide a vast array of different services and packages of services. One major service is the construction and maintenance of camps of all sorts, big and small. For instance, camps are built for both refugees and the military. Companies are also prepared to provide those camps with all the necessary logistic solutions, from the shipping of all sorts of consumer goods, to heavy equipment, to storage and the maintenance of large warehouses. Large equipment such as bulldozers or even tanks can be moved using leased aircraft and ship. Many states, especially smaller ones, without national strategic airlift/sealift capability have to rely on private companies for the deployment of military forces overseas. The guarding of camps and personnel can, as mentioned earlier, also be provided by private companies. Security will often be provided in the form of static defence of critical infrastructure and security arrangements for important personnel. Sometimes companies provide governmental organisations with training so that they will be able to take care of their own security. This training is sometimes aimed at military units or individuals and sometimes devoted to the larger re-organisation of a country's armed forces as a whole.

The latter activity is closely related to what is now commonly referred to as security sector reform (SSR). Another new type of activity that resembles SSR is what American company Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) has labeled "governmental institutional capacity". This is perceived as something slightly broader than SSR and encompasses the restructuring of not only agencies dealing with security but organisations involved in aviation and border control etc. A rather new and interesting service includes not only the gathering of intelligence, but also the analysis of such information. What may be more surprising is that companies nowadays also conduct certain law enforcement activities such as policing operations and border control. Finally, companies are, in all probability, prepared to provide covert intelligence gathering such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). A more speculative but nonetheless important point is that companies may also be prepared to conduct offensive military operations, such as direct participation in combat, if deemed viable and politically acceptable by the contracting agency or government.

Now all of this may seem quite straightforward, but it has attracted a lot of attention, not only in academia, but also among journalists and non-governmental organisations. The reason is very often that they, as alluded to earlier, have been perceived as mercenaries. The industry itself, for natural reasons, shies away from that label and has come up with its own defini-

tions. The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA)[10], a Washington DC based lobby organization, sees three primary clusters of companies: logistics and support companies (LSC), private security companies (PSC) and security sector reform companies (SSRC).[11] They all differ slightly from each other depending primarily on what type of services they provide, but also on the clients they serve. SSRCs, in particular, mainly provide services to governments and international organisations, whereas the other two types also co-operate with other multinational companies.

In my opinion this is a case of trying to depict the industry in the most favorable way possible. Choosing which label to attach to which company in terms of who they sell their services to is as natural as choosing how to market any product: the name or label conveys a certain image. In this case the message is that the companies are trustworthy and the services provided not especially controversial. This may be true in some cases, but, on the other hand, they could also be highly controversial and even contentious.

Therefore, any company providing services for a government may be considered to be a private military company (PMC), rather than any of the other labels. The government sponsored training of a foreign country's armed forces may very well be considered as providing military assistance as a service. This is something typically done using national military assets rather than private for-profit companies. That is why all companies may be considered PMC's depending on the quality of the service and the links to and relationship with the contracting agency or state.

Problems and Pitfalls

The debate about private for-profit companies operating in crises or conflict ridden areas abounds with worst case scenarios and hypothetical problems. One major issue is what has theoretically been labeled 'privatisation of security' meaning that when the provision of security services is outsourced to actors other than state controlled agencies, the state is diminished and loses control of its own security.[12] In my opinion the research on this specific topic lacks a fundamental understanding of the dynamics in which the use of private security companies takes place. Very seldom does a security company enter a stable country, thus participating in the privatisation of something or other. On the contrary, states where they are employed have already undergone a serious degree of fragmentation and secu-

[10] http://ipoaonline.org/php/.
[11] Doug Brooks definition of Peace and Stability Industry [http://www.hoosier84.com/mspconceptualization.html], February 2005 version. Doug Brooks is the founder and current president of IPOA.
[12] See, for instance, Schreier and Caparini (2005); Eugene B. Smith (2002).

rity has already been taken over by local warlords and sometimes by criminal gangs. Most companies operate in what we nowadays refer to as weak or failed states and are there to stabilize or secure a situation. There is a causality here that is not fully researched and this needs to be studied further in order to fully understand the effects of private for-profit companies.

Adopting a more empirical procedure, rather than the theoretical and deductive methods so often encountered, we can however discern other effects of these new types of actors. One problem is linked to the dynamics of the conflict and another seems to be related to dependence: for-profit companies appear to alter the conflict when they appear on the battlefield or in an area of crisis, and at the same time these companies seem to create some sort of dependence between the employer, or principal, and the company.

The former can be illustrated by two cases from Iraq, of which the incident in Fallujah should be familiar to all. Four operatives from the American PSC, Blackwater, were killed and mutilated in Fallujah in early 2004. The area was under the control of US Marine Corps Colonel Toolan of the 1st Regiment, 1st Marine Division, who had initially planned a relatively low key hearts and minds style of operation.[13] But, because of the attack on U.S. citizens Colonel Toolan was forced to go in to the city with massive military force, completely contrary to his initial intent. The result was a devastated town where the entire population became locally displaced persons – and very hostile to the American presence.

A similar event, also involving Blackwater operatives, was the much debated shooting at Nisoor square in Baghdad in September 2007. The incident is still under investigation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and their findings are not yet official, but what we do know is that the shooting started when an escort carried out by private security operatives approached the square. What exactly happened is unclear, but it appears that the escort was blocked by a civilian vehicle and that the security contractors understood themselves to be either under threat of attack, or under immediate attack. They responded first by trying to divert the blocking cars by driving the other way into the roundabout, but in doing this they seem to have met other civilian cars – and this is when the shooting started. Seventeen civilian bystanders were allegedly killed in just a few minutes. The result was disastrous for the entire US military operation in Iraq because people had already had difficulty discerning between civilian contractors and the US military. Thus, the efforts of the US military to try and get

[13] Frontline, Interview of Marine Col. John Toolan [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/toolan.html#1].

closer to the local populace were made more difficult because of the actions of a security contractor.[14]

A third example of the effects of a for-profit company is the training conducted by MPRI in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They received a contract to train the Bosnian Army as early as 1996 and have been involved ever since. The goal from the beginning was to create a Bosnian Army powerful enough to resist any attack from the Bosnian-Serbs and in the longer term to create a federation army from what was originally two armies: the Bosnian-Croat HVO and Bosnian-Muslim units. What is interesting is that the training went as far as restructuring the entire military, from a Yugoslav and Warsaw-Pact type force into an army with Western doctrine. This is a major undertaking and actually meant destroying something in order to rebuild it from scratch. It has taken a very long time, but the Bosnians now operate with the Americans in Iraq and provide a 37 man Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit.[15] Quite successful one might argue, but it has also created a Bosnian Army dependency on MPRI that may not have been anticipated at the outset. When doing some interviews I asked a senior Bosnian officer what they intended to do with this new army they had been given by the US and MPRI. His reply was that they didn't know, "[…] because MPRI hasn't written our strategy yet."[16]

Future Trends

The industry is now well established and shows signs of maturing. The Klondike years of Iraq are now behind us and it is no longer possible to make the same amount of money as during the early years after the US-led invasion. Profit margins are decreasing and companies are merging and becoming larger. What is also happening is that companies are looking for new markets and trying to provide new services. They are now competing with traditional NGO's and IO's to do security sector reform (SSR), demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) and even humanitarian aid. They also market different sorts of crisis management solutions such as actual rescue and recovery efforts as well as the planning and training of crisis teams.

Therefore, we will most likely see even more for-profit companies operating in areas of crisis and we will see them offering yet more services to customers operating in areas of conflict and crises. Companies will probably also provide comprehensive packages of services to countries fre-

[14] Singer (2007) [http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx].
[15] Interview by Marcus Mohlin in Sarajevo, February 2008. Anonymous respondent A.
[16] Interview by Marcus Mohlin in Sarajevo, February 2008. Anonymous respondent B.

quently stricken by large catastrophes, such as natural disasters, famine, sudden streams of refugees and the like.

Recommendations

Taking all these factors into account, any future crisis managers, civilian or military, have to realize that for-profit companies operating in an area of crisis or conflict are here to stay; they must now be considered part of the overall picture. Therefore, crisis managers, military commanders or humanitarian aid organisations must at an early stage identify which for-profit companies are present in the area of interest, what they are doing there, and for whom they are doing it.

For-profit military, security or logistics providers must be included in all contingency plans. It may even be wise to consider them as stakeholders in the conflict, thereby realizing that they could have different motives for their presence in the area than those of traditional actors.

Consequently, it is important for all crisis managers to try and have a dialogue with all private for-profit companies and, if possible, establish a forum where they can meet and exchange information on the situation and planned activities. This will reduce any negative side-effects of their presence and change the relationship between the military, or humanitarian organization, and the for-profit company; instead of being treated as a liability, companies can be viewed as an asset in the overall operation to provide security or humanitarian aid to people in need.

Conclusion

Private for-profit companies are not dealt with in terms of international humanitarian law, thus their status is not yet entirely clear. This means that they operate inside a sort of legal vacuum that has to be dealt with. The industry also operates on a worldwide basis and will be present in any future conflict recognized by the international community, thus making their legal status a concern not only for states hosting such companies, but also for those actors operating in the area. Unilateral national solutions will almost certainly be insufficient and a collective approach is probably the only way to remedy this problem.

The activities of such companies could, for instance, not only hamper but also seriously undermine counter-insurgency operations. It is therefore necessary to engage such companies in dialogue and treat them as stakeholders in the conflict.

It is also well worth recognising that what may seem to be a for-profit company could also be an extension of a foreign government, a sort of proxy tool. This is especially important because, as the contractor debate is so focused on the armed security contractors, other companies are being seen as benign, when – on the contrary – they may be equally problematic. Private security companies are thus not the only actor of interest out there.

Finally, it is an industry that is maturing; the companies themselves are taking part in the debate and actually propagating an increased regulatory framework. But the question still remains; where do we draw the line between companies and states?

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XI Suomenlinna Seminar

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN CRISIS?

Helsinki, 28th-29th May, 2008
Organized by the National Defence University of Finland,
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

SEMINAR PROGRAMME

The seminar sessions will take place in the building of the Finnish National Defence Courses, Maneesikatu 6, Helsinki.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 28TH, 2008

09:30-10:00	Coffee and registration
10:00-10:15	Opening of the seminar: Director of the DSDS, LtCol Mika Kerttunen
10:15-12:00	**SESSION ONE: THE ISSUE OF JUSTIFICATION OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT EFFORTS** **Chair: Tommi Koivula** *"Just war" -philosophy, humanitarian responsibilities, international norms and regimes, national and institutional interests*. Speaker 1: Prof Timo Airaksinen (Univ. of Helsinki), 'Responsibility and the Ethics of Coercion' Speaker 2: Dr. Dibyesh Anand (Univ. of Westminster), 'Dangers of Management Speak: Politics of Crisis Management and Erasures of Histories' Speaker 3: Dr. Andreas Behnke (Univ. of Reading), 'Crisis Management as a Civilisatory Project: NATO's Experience in the Balkans'
12:00-13:15	Lunch

13:15-14:45	**SESSION TWO: EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS ACHIEVED** **Chair: Hanna Ojanen** *Discussion on case studies, highlighting Aceh and Afghanistan.* Speaker 4: Director Kalle Liesinen (Crisis Management Initiative, Helsinki), 'Need for Evaluation: DDR in Aceh as an Example' Speaker 5: Mr. Tim Foxley (SIPRI), 'Afganistan: Progress, Problems and Prospects'
14:45-15:15	Coffee
15:15-16:00	*Crisis Management: The Finnish Agenda*. Speaker: Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee, Parliament of Finland, MP Pertti Salolainen.
16:15	Transportation available from Maneesikatu to Market Square or Hotel Grand Marina

Evening program:

17:15-18:00	A cruise in the Helsinki archipelago (departure from Market Square)
18:00-21:00	Dinner in the restaurant Walhalla (Suomenlinna), transport to mainland Helsinki.

THURSDAY, MAY 29TH

9:30-10:15	Coffee
10:15-11:45	**SESSION THREE: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY** **Chair: Antti Sillanpää** *How to measure the way CM capabilities and CM operations actually contribute to national and alliance security? The challenges posed by lacking resources.* Speaker 6: Prof Alyson Bailes (Univ. of Reykjavik), 'Motives for Overseas Missions: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly'

	Speaker 7: Major, Dr. Jyri Raitasalo (DSDS), '(Why on Earth) Should Small States Do Expeditionary Operations?'
11:45-13:00	Lunch
13:00-14:15	**SESSION FOUR: THE FUTURE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT** **Chair: Pertti Puurtinen** *The measures for success, the capabilities to be devoted, learning from the mistakes done. The relationship between civil and military CM. The political, skill-based, and financial prerequisites for success.* Speaker 8: Director Tomas Ries (Swedish Institute for International Affairs), 'Imperial Military Missions in a Globalising Security Environment' Speaker 9: Cdr Marcus Mohlin (Swedish National Defence College), 'Private Military Companies - Assets or Liabilities in Future Crisis Management?'
14:15-14:30	Coffee
14:30-15:30	Concluding Panel. Chair: prof. Pekka Sivonen, DSDS.
15:30-15:40	Final Remarks: Director of DSDS, LtCol Mika Kerttunen

ABBREVIATIONS USED

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMM HQ	Aceh Monitoring Mission Head Quarters
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CM	Crisis Management
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
COSA	Committee of Security Arrangements
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSIS	Center for Strategic & International Studies
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSDS	Department of Strategic and Defence Studies (Finnish National Defence University)
EC	European Community
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EOD	Technical/Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUBG	European Union Battle Group
EUFOR ALTHEA	EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GAM	Free Aceh Movement

GoI	Governement of Indonesia
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
IICD	The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMP	Initial Monitoring Presence
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPOA	International Peace Operations Association
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KODAM	Aceh Military District
LSC	Logistics and Support Companies
MDRP	The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDT	Mobile Decommissioning Team
MoU	The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement

MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PMC	Private Military Company
PSC	Private Security Companies
SALW	Small Arms & Light Weapons
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SIDDR	Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSRC	Security Sector Reform Companies
TNI	Military of Indonesia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
WCS	Weapon Collection Sites
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WPPS	Worldwide Personal Protection Services

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Timo Airaksinen

Dr Airaksinen is currently a Professor of Philosophy (Chair in Ethics, Social Philosophy and Philosophy of Law) at the University of Helsinki and Docent of Philosophy at the University of Turku and at the University of Lapland. He holds a M.A. in Philosophy and Psychology and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Turku. He has previously worked as a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University (1994–1996) and as a consultant and lecturer to many professional associations and societies. He holds several positions of trust and academic administrative positions. Professor Airaksinen has written extensively on Ethics, Political Philosophy and Thomas Hobbes. He has published books on the Philosophy of Literature and several high school text books. He is presently working on Bishop Berkeley and the 18th century Philosophy of Science.

Dibyesh Anand

Dr Anand has been a Reader in International Relations at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster since July 2007. In 2008 he was appointed as the Beatrice M. Bain Affiliated Scholar at the University of California Berkeley and as Author and Leader of a module 'Culture and International Relations' for Freie Universitat Berlin's International Relations Online Programme. Previously he has worked as a Researcher and Lecturer at the University of Bath and at the University of Delhi. He has also served as an Invited Lecturer at many universities including Harvard University. Dr Anand has published three books and several articles, research studies and book reviews. He holds a BA (Hons) in History and Political Science as subsidiary from the St Stephen's College, University of Delhi, and a M.A. in International Law and Politics from the University of Hull and a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Bristol.

Alyson JK Bailes

Dr Bailes is currently Visiting Professor at the University of Iceland in Reykjavik, teaching on general security topics and on Nordic and European security, and also carries out personal projects in the field of security analysis. From July 2002–August 2007 she was Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the first woman ever to hold that post. Professor Bailes' former career was spent largely in the British

Diplomatic Service which she joined in 1969 after graduating from the University of Oxford. She served in many posts abroad and in UK. Before her attachment with SIPRI she was from 1997 to June 2000 the Political Director of the Brussels-based European defence institution, Western European Union. From November 2000 to June 2002 she was British Ambassador in Helsinki, Finland, but resigned from the British service to take up her post at SIPRI. She remains a member of the Boards of several think-tanks, academic organizations and periodicals.

Andreas Behnke

Dr Andreas Behnke is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading. He has also taught and researched International Relations as a Faculty Fellow at American University, the School of International Service, as a Lecturer at Towson University, as a Researcher and Teaching Fellow at Stockholm University and as a Visiting Research Scholar in London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr Behnke has written extensively on several topics in particular on his main research interests Critical Security Studies, security and globalisation, Critical Geopolitics and Critical International Relations Theory. He holds degrees in Politics and International Relations from the Stockholm University (Ph.D) and (M.Sc) and Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz (M.A.).

Susanna Eskola

Susanna Eskola worked as a Trainee at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University during the summer 2008. She is currently a Trainee at the European Commission and is working on her master's thesis at the University of Helsinki on crisis management as part of the Western strategic cultures. Her main research interests include Strategic and Security Studies, especially security and defence policy, transformation in the concepts of war and security and the security-development -nexus. She holds a BA. in Political Science from the University of Helsinki.

Tim Foxley

Mr Foxley holds a BA (Hons) Degree in History and Politics, with a specialisation in Military History. He is on a leave of absence from the UK Ministry of Defence where he has been a Political/Military analyst since 1992. Since 2001 he has been studying Afghanistan as a Ministry of Defence Senior Research Analyst, undertaking several visits. He has

produced assessments and briefings to a range of UK, NATO and ISAF government and military officials. In 2006 he was attached for four months to ISAF IX in Kabul as a Senior Analyst. For his sabbatical period he is working at SIPRI, continuing his studies of Afghanistan political and military issues. He runs an Afghanistan blog on the SIPRI website (http://blogs.sipri.org/Afghanistan) where he welcomes any contributions to the debate. He is currently working on a study of the effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

Kalle Liesinen

Mr. Kalle Liesinen (col.ret) works as the Executive Director of Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). He was invited to lead the decommissioning in Aceh in August 2005. Decommissioning was successfully finalised and decommissioning component of Aceh Monitoring Mission dismissed within 107 days. Mr. Liesinen was later called in as the Deputy Head of the Mission. He follows up the situation in Aceh in his current position at CMI, chaired by President Martti Ahtisaari, the mediator of Aceh peace agreement. Mr. Liesinen has also worked in many other international missions during his civilian and military career including the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and with the UN in Lebanon, Iran and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He has also published articles and columns and given lectures private diplomacy, conflict resolution and crisis management.

Marcus Mohlin

CDR (Commander) Marcus Mohlin is a former submarine officer. After having served on submarines for nearly ten years he transferred to the Navy Counter Special Forces Unit (BASSÄK) where he eventually rose to become the Commanding Officer. CDR Mohlin has served twice on overseas missions, first with the UN in Angola and then with NATO/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. CDR Mohlin has studied Political Science and History of Sciences at Uppsala University and is now a Doctoral Candidate at the Finnish National Defence University. He is writing his dissertation on Private Military Companies as Strategic tools. CDR Mohlin is a Fellow of the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences and a member of IISS.

Jyri Raitasalo

Major. Dr. Jyri Raitasalo is working as a Lecturer of Strategy at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies (DSDS) of the Finnish

National Defence University. Previously he has worked as a Research Officer at the DSDS, Researcher at the University of Helsinki, and at several regimental posts at the Helsinki Air Defence Regiment. He graduated from military academy in 1995, received his doctorate on International Relations from the University of Helsinki in 2006 and passed the General Staff Officer Course in 2007. His research interests cover strategic theory and IR theory, particularly focusing on the Western processes of reconstructing the meaning of war and military power as well as the transformation of Western armed forces after the demise of Cold War.

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Strategian laitos
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
PL 266
00171 HELSINKI

Department of Strategic and Defence Studies
National Defence University
P.O.Box 266
FI-00171 HELSINKI
FINLAND

Tel: +358 9 181 26320
Fax: +358 9 181 26324
E-mail: strategian.laitos@mil.fi
Internet: http://www.mpkk.fi/