THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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SUMMARY

Ever since Siad Barre’s regime was toppled in the beginning of the 1990’s Somalia has been without an effective central government. As a result Somalia has remained in an anarchic condition of state collapse for nearly two decades. This anarchy has often been put forward as a potential breeding ground for terrorism. As a response to this threat the United States has undertaken several policies, initiatives, and operations in the Horn of Africa generally and in Somalia specifically.

In this descriptive study a twofold analysis has been undertaken. First, conditions in present day Somalia as well as Somali history have been analyzed to evaluate the potential Somalia holds as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area. Second, US strategies and actions have been analyzed to evaluate the adequacy of the US response to the threat Somalia poses in terms of terrorism.

Material for the analyses have been derived from anthropological, political, and security studies dealing with Somalia. This material has been augmented by a wide range of news coverage, western and non-western. Certain different US policy documents from different levels have been chosen to represent US strategies for the Global War on Terrorism.

Because Somali social institutions, such as the clan system, hold great weight in Somali society, Somalia is a difficult area of operations for terrorist networks. In addition the changing nature of Somali alliances and the tangled webs of conflict that characterize present day Somalia aggravate the difficulties that foreign terrorist networks would encounter in Somalia, would they choose to try to utilize it in any great extent.
The US has taken potential terrorism threats in Africa and specifically Somalia very seriously. US actions in Somalia have mainly focused on apprehending or neutralizing terror suspects. Such policies, coupled with backing the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia may have actually turned out increasing Somalia’s terror potential.

KEY WORDS
Somalia, Terrorism, Global War on Terror, GWOT, Africa, Horn of Africa, Terrorismi, Terrorismin vastainen sota, Afrikka, Afrikan Sarvi
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Glossary

AIAI  Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya (al-Itihaad al-Islaami)
AFIS  Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia
(AFIT)  (Italian Trusteeship Administration)
AFRICOM  US African Command
ALS  Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia
AOR  area of responsibility
ASWJ  Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
EUCOM  US European Command
CENTCOM  US Central Command
CJTF-HOA  The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
CTF-150  Commander Task Force – 150
DoD  United States Department of Defense
GCC  geographic combatant command
GWOT  Global War on Terror
HDM  Hisbia Digil Mirifle
ICU  The Islamic Courts Union
JFCOM  US Joint Forces Command
JP1  Joint Publication 1 – Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-07.2  Joint Publication 3-07.2 - Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism
MOD  Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante, three Daarood sub-clans
NDS  The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
NGO  Non-governmental organization
NMS  The National Military Strategy of the United States of America
NMSP-WOT  The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
NORTHCOM  US Northern Command
NSCT  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
NSS  National Security Service (of Somalia)
NSS  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
NUF  National United Front
PACOM  US Pacific Command
PMC  Private military company
QRD  Quadrennial Defense Review Report
SDA  Somali Democratic Alliance
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>US Southern Command</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Somali National Congress</td>
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<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
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<td>SNL</td>
<td>Somali National League</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>US Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>SRSP</td>
<td>Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>US Strategic Command</td>
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<td>SYC</td>
<td>Somali Youth Club</td>
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<td>SYL</td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Territorial Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)</td>
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<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government (of Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>US Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Court Union, also Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<td>USP</td>
<td>United Somali Party</td>
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<td>USRDF</td>
<td>US Rapid Deployment Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSLF</td>
<td>Western Somali Liberation Front</td>
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THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

“Why is Africa important to the United States? …Because it’s there.”¹

- James Woods, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs

1. Introduction

On September 11th 2001 three hijacked aircraft, American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, and American Airlines Flight 77, crashed into their targets. United Airlines Flight 93 was unable to strike its target as the hijackers crashed the plane to the ground, when the passengers were about to overcome the them. Not counting the terrorists, 2973 people died in the September 11th attacks. Strategically thinking, the unthinkable had happened. “A small group of terrorists operating out of an undeveloped country in Central Asia…” had inflicted “…more damage on the U.S. in a few hours than the entire Japanese Imperial Navy did at Pearl Harbour…” ²

The US response to the devastating 9/11-attacks was swift. A Global War on Terror (GWOT) was declared, and military operations commenced in several different theaters, most notably Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Being a failed state, Somalia was sighted as a potential terrorist safe haven, and intelligence- and other operations were stepped up or initiated. At the time of writing, several counterterrorism operations were underway.

However, Somalia’s potential as a terrorist base or safe haven is not necessarily that great. In fact, Somalia is a rather challenging environment for terrorist networks. Below I shall analyze

Somali history, social mechanisms and Somali Islamism to evaluate Somalia’s terrorist potential.

I will analyze several different US policy documents to gain a comprehensive picture of the policies behind US counter-terrorism strategies. These strategies will then be contrasted with the actions the United States has undertaken in Somalia. This analysis will make it possible to try to answer the main research problem, is the US response adequate to the threat Somalia poses in terms of radical Islamic terror?

Why is it necessary to study Somalia and the GWOT? In addition to being a contemporary subjects of strategic importance, Somalia and the GWOT are both subjects which the understanding of offers a Finnish audience additional benefits. First, the GWOT and US policies justified by terrorism have caused a lot of bad blood between the US and its European partners. Europeans, and Finns among them, frequently find it hard to understand the American worldview when it comes to combating terrorism. Hopefully studying to the strategies behind the GWOT will alleviate this problem. Second, African social institutions, such as clans and African variations of Islam, remain an enigma to many western soldiers taking part in operations on the continent. With this in mind, it is easy to see that any exercise in understanding said institutions may prove useful, especially since Africa is often mentioned as a potential deployment area for the EU Battlegroups. In addition, recent developments have reminded Finns that we live in a globalized world in which terrorism can touch any country³.

1.1 Previous Research and Sources

To date, only two theses concerning Somalia have been published in the last 20 years in the National Defense University⁴. Internationally there does however exist actual research on the role of Somalia in the GWOT. What has been published consists mainly of pamphlets⁵ and articles in international journals⁶, although there are some published volumes. Articles dealing

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with failed or collapsed states in general are legion\(^7\). General background information on Africa is also in abundance\(^8\). In addition, a lot of material has been published concerning the UNSOM-operations, the US intervention (Operation Restore Hope), and the “Black Hawk Down”-incident\(^9\).

In summary, material on Somalia is seemingly endless. This is especially the case when it comes to the clan system, state failure and collapse, civil war, and “warlordism”. It is without doubt that one can conclude, even after a superficial reference study, that the primus inter pares of Somalia scholars is Professor Ioan M. Lewis. He is widely considered the foremost authority on Somalia, specifically the clan system and Somali society. His first works on Somalia date back five decades, and altogether include a detailed history, anthropological research and contemporary analysis.

Works focusing on the very subject of the GWOT and terrorism in Somalia do also exist. Bjørn Møller has produced a work titled *The Horn of Africa and the US “War on Terror” with a Special Focus on Somalia*, and reached very similar results. An excellent account on al-Qaeda’s endeavours, and problems, in Somalia can be found in a West Point study titled *Al-Qaeda’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*\(^10\).

International news coverage concerning Somalia is extensive. Networks such as the BBC and CNN and newspapers such as the International Herald Tribune or the New York Times cover Somalia and the Greater Horn region in detail. Western news networks though, pose two problems. First, they address the subject in very general terms, and catchphrases, such as failed states, terrorism, “clanism”, and so forth are used without much consideration to their deeper meanings. Second, they are mostly western in origin and in outlook. Controversial issues, such as the nature of the GWOT are mainly treated from a rather western viewpoint. Also, the colonial past is bound to have an impact on the way in which East Africa is portrayed.

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\(^10\) Møller, Bjørn: *The Horn of Africa and the US “War on Terror” with a Special Focus on Somalia*. Conference paper by Bjørn Møller, July 31” 2007. Preliminary version quoted with permission from the author (Møller 2007); Combating Terrorism Center CTC: *Al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*. Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point., 2007, 29-45 et passim (CTC 2007).
Thus, African or non-western news services provide a useful alternative reference. These are mostly online news services, or online versions of traditional newspapers, such as AllAfrica\textsuperscript{11}, Shabelle Media Network\textsuperscript{12}, Somaliland Times\textsuperscript{13} or news services provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Somaliawatch\textsuperscript{14}. Also the Middle-Eastern media service \textit{par excellence}, Al Jazeera\textsuperscript{15} must not be forgotten. African and non-western media services suffer from similar shortcomings as their western counterparts: Selective reporting, politically opinionated writing, influence by different political interest groups, and so forth. In addition African media sources may also be physically threatened by those whom they report on, which clearly places strains on neutral and truthful journalism. None the less, used with caution they are useful sources which often cover events or background issues overlooked by western media.

1.2 Notes on language and terminology

I have chosen to write this study in English. For this there are two reasons. First, most of the subject material is in English. As the United States is a central element in this study English is a practical choice. Second, writing in English increases the possibility of utilizing elements of this study in the future, and gaining a wider audience. Writing in English does, however hold one downside. As mentioned above English language material on the subject is readily available, Finnish language material is not. A Finnish summary is provided at the end of this paper.

Certain terms concerning African studies, and especially the study of terrorism are often used rather liberally in different sources. Because of this, below I will offer the definitions used here. Many of the definitions, especially those concerning Islam are not precise, because different fields of study define some terms differently. Below I have attempted to adopt the definitions and connotations which are most commonly used.

\textit{Failed state or collapsed state}

“Failed state” and “Collapsed State” are both terms which are frequently used rather lightly in contemporary media. Robert D. Kaplan, in his often quoted, but not always agreed with,
depiction of the future “The Coming Anarchy” predicts that “…the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms…”\textsuperscript{16}. Kaplan’s bleak description fits perfectly to what is generally understood to be meant with the term “failed state”. According to Russett, Starr, and Kinsella failed states are “…states that are internationally recognized, but whose governments (if they exist) cannot provide their citizens with even the minimum level of security and well-being expected of sovereign states”\textsuperscript{17}. Jackson and Sorensen claim failed states to be the result of “…more or less complete breakdown of domestic order…”\textsuperscript{18}. The two definitions sighted above are rather broad and all-encompassing, but useful as such, and will be adhered to in this paper, as they accurately describe the situation in many parts of Somalia.

\textit{Clan}

The Somali clans system is presented later in detail. Here it suffices to say that in the text the term “clan” is used liberally to describe any faction or group which the identity of is based on the clan system. This regardless of whether the assembly being discussed is in actuality a clan-family, a tribe, a lineage, a clan or sub-clan. The term however does not apply to such political groups as Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya (AIAI), Islamic Courts Union\textsuperscript{19} or the Somali National Movement (SNM). Groups such as these or parts of them may mostly draw their support from a specific clan, but will be referred to by their specific names.

\textit{The Greater Horn Region or Greater Horn}

Here “the Greater Horn Region is understood to mean a region encompassing seven states; Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. Thus the Greater Horn forms a region half the size of the United States.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Horn of Africa or Horn}

Here “Horn of Africa” will be used to refer to the peninsula which extends northeastern Africa hundreds of kilometers into the Arabian Sea, forming the Gulf of Aden between itself and the south coast of Yemen. Here Horn of Africa refers only to the geographical area, not the land area of any given state. If used to refer to states, “Horn of Africa” is understood here to mean only Somalia.

\textsuperscript{19} Several different spellings appear. This one is the most common in western medias. In English either The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) or The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).
\textsuperscript{20} Prendergast – Thomas-Jensen 2007, 59.
Somalia

“Somalia” refers to the Somali Republic and Somali Democratic Republic i.e. the state of Somalia. When used in such historical or modern context that no state of Somalia can be said to exist, “Somalia” is used to refer to the general land area of Somalia.

Somali and Somalian

Below, “Somali” is used to refer to ethnic background, and identity as a member of the Somali people. “Somalian” specifically refers to official nationality as pertaining to the Somali state. Thus a Somali might not be Somalian and vice versa.

Terrorism

The US Code of January 19th 2004 divides terrorism into domestic and international: “...the term “international terrorism” means activities that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum...”. According to the US Code domestic terrorism deviates from international terrorism only in the fact that it “occur[s] primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”  

Terrorism is of course an extremely controversial issue, for which the United Nations has, as of fall 2007, been unable to find a definition for.

Islam and Islamic

Here Islamic is used to refer to anything pertaining to Islam. Islamic is thus used as a adjective for anything related to the religion of Islam, and is not to be confused with “Islamist”.

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**Islamism and political Islam.**

An Islamist movement is one in which political institutions, legislation, and government are derived from Islam. Islamists understand Islam to be not only a religion, but also a political identity. Islamabad is a general term for all forms of political Islam, irregardless of what Islamic sect any form of political Islam represents.23

**Jihadism, Salafism, and Wahhabism**

Jihadism is here used to refer to any ideology or movement which teaches the use of physical violence as a means to attain political, usually Islamist, aims. Salafism and Islamism are both Islamic movements, albeit, with different ideological viewpoints. Wahhabism, derived from the teachings of 18th century Islamic teacher Muhammad ibn Abdalwahhab, stresses the purification of Islam from foreign influences. Salafism on the other hand, at least in its original form, preaches the need to modernize, purify, and revitalize Islam. Or rather, Islam should make use of, and learn western technological and scientific advances, and thus eventually surpass the west. To date, Wahhabism and Salafism have, to some extent, merged and incorporated elements of each other. Both schools of thought are heterogeneous collections of different factions and vary regionally.24

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24 Ibid.
2. Research paradigm and theoretical background

2.1 Research questions and research paradigm

This thesis I aim to study two countries; the United States on the other hand, and Somalia on the other. Certain narrow elements of both countries are evaluated and findings concerning one are used as a tool to evaluate findings concerning the other. The aim of this research is to evaluate the threat Somalia poses to US national security and US interests in the region via terrorism. Once this is done, assess the US response to said threat and evaluate the adequacy of this response. To put it shortly, this research is essentially meant to be about Somalia and US anti-terror policies and action toward, in, and against Somalia. Somalia is in effect used as a backdrop for studying the War on Terror.

This research does not aim to be a country profile of Somalia or a regional overview. However, a very specific objective is to gain cultural understanding of Somali culture and insight into the social mechanisms at work inside Somali society. The very history of recent US military operations, mainly the UNOSOMs, bare solemn testimony to the importance of cultural awareness.

Terrorism is not in itself a subject of this study. Several studies have been written on terrorism theory, and it remains a highly debated and controversial subject. Many such studies have been published which are more or less objective, and possessing of a broad world view. Unfortunately, for each good study published, a politicized study has be published as well. These studies are opinionated strongly in one direction or the other, and can hardly be seen as useful material for a student of the military sciences. This is of course not surprising as terrorism is a multi-faceted phenomenon which has even eluded definition. One man’s freedom fighter is indeed the other man’s terrorist.
As is depicted in diagram 1, Somalia is a subject of study in its own right, as well as a “looking glass” through which the GWOT can be, viewed, analyzed, and evaluated. The GWOT is looked at through, and compared with, Somalia. In addition it is evaluated internally by comparing theory and practice, policies and actions. Naturally it is clear that any one of the sectors in diagram 1 could easily fill several shelves worth of studies. Thus this study is by necessity an overview.

Despite its title this thesis is not a military history of US anti-terror operations in Somalia. This would be simultaneously well nigh impossible and impractical. Since the brunt of US operations has been covert in nature, few sources exist, and the ones that do are highly unreliable. This is not to claim that sources do not exist - they do - just that they are mostly highly unreliable.
2.2 Research questions

The main research question is:

*Is the US response adequate to the threat Somalia poses in terms of radical Islamic terror?*

This main question is broken down into secondary-questions, and these in turn are divided into tertiary questions in the following manner:

1. *Does Somalia hold potential as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area? What is the extent of this threat?*

   1.1 *What general trends can be detected in the history of Somalia concerning the social mechanics pertaining to armed groups and political Islam?*

   1.2 *What is the role and potential of radical Islam in Somali society?*

2. *What is the general strategy for the Global War on Terror, and how does Somalia fit into its paradigm?*

   2.1 *What general actions has the US taken in Somalia and the Greater Horn region in terms of the war on terror?*
2.3 Theoretical approach

Of all the theoretical schools of thought prevailing in modern strategic studies and the study of International Relations (IR), Political Realism seems, in spite of its many shortcomings, best suited to dealing with problems pertaining to the study of terrorism and anti-terrorism. Of course, realism is hardly the only discipline suited for the task. Liberalism, constructivism, neoliberalism, international political economy, thoughts of the English school, as well as other theoretical approaches also hold great potential as tools in studying terrorism and anti-terrorism. However, for the time being, realism would seem to be most useful and thus I have adopted it as the approach to use.

The reasons for making this choice are rather simple. First, realism readily offers an explanation for the actions states take, especially those involving the use of military power outside their own borders. Thus, if we accept that the Global War on Terrorism is not just about the war on terrorism, but also about power politics, realism readily offers valid explanations. Second, many non-state actors in Somalia, clans, sub-clans, autonomous regions, clan-based militias, and the like seem to behave as if they were states within a state. Therefore, realism also helps explain their actions. In addition, the main goal of many such groups is security. If one were to view said groups as organizations seeking to provide security within themselves, as well as from outside aggression, the analogy to states seems justified. Below I shall briefly discuss the fundamentals of realism that are paramount for this study. I will also attempt to justify the use of a rather state centered theory to explain the actions of numerous non-state actors within a country that can hardly be seen as a functioning member of the international system.

2.3.1 Political Realism

Often described in such terms as “...one of the dominant forces guiding international relations theory...” realism is without doubt one of, if not the most influential theory in the study of International Relations.  

In his classic work Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau outlines the basic principles of Political Realism. These can be summarized into six basic principles. First, politics is

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governed by a set of rules that are brought forth by human nature itself, and thus have remained unchanged throughout time. Second, Political Realism identifies as its main concept the concept of “interest defined in terms of power”. That is to say that the essence of politics is power. This distinguishes politics from other spheres of action, such as economics, which is understood “in terms of interest defined as wealth”. Third, interest defined in terms of power is universally valid, while at the same time not being unchanged and immune to prevailing circumstances. In other words the content and use of power are subordinate to political and cultural environments. Fourth, Political Realism is “aware of the moral significance of political action”, while at the same time though it holds that the state has no right to subordinate its actions to moral considerations because of its citizens who rely on it to look after their security. Fifth, realism strictly separates moral aspirations of states and the moral laws by which the universe operates. Sixth, the demands of other spheres of life can not be allowed to dictate political actions. As such economic or legal objectives cannot be allowed to form the basis for political action; they should be decided upon through interest defined in terms of power. These six principles can be seen to form the foundation of the realist view of international relations.27

Thus, the fundamental element in classical Political Realism is power. Power however, is mostly not just an end in itself, but a means to achieve a very fundamental goal. This goal is security. Security can only be achieved by gaining sufficient power to counter the political dictates of other actors. This is true for all levels of political action, from individuals to entire states. Thomas Hobbes, in his famous “Leviathan” vividly describes this state of matters: “...during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.”28 Individuals however, have been freed from this need to constantly seek more power by the formation of the state. This is because the state upholds law and order within, thus transforming an all-out war of everyone against everyone into peaceful society.29

States on the other hand are not so lucky. No supreme authority exists above states, and they are thus forced to deal with each other in a world of international anarchy. In short, a “state of warre” still exists between them. Thus states are forced to constantly seek more power to ensure national security i.e. state survival. This mechanism of power however, turns the

29 Jackson – Sorensen 2003, 68-77.
international system into a zero-sum game, a situation in which one side’s gain is automatically the other side’s loss. If one state were to gain a great amount of power, its neighbors would perceive this as a threat to their security, and be forced to seek more power themselves. In such a system, for states, national security is always their first and foremost concern. Because of this, states can never truly trust each other. All international agreements and accords are normally respected, but can be discarded instantly if they come into conflict with national security.\(^\text{30}\)

This mutual distrust and the zero-sum nature of the international system bring forth a logical and political problem, referred to as the security dilemma. Shortly put the security dilemma arises when all states seek the key to security, i.e. power. As some states acquire more and more power (undoubtedly feeling more and more secure) they simultaneously begin to be perceived as threats by other states. These states then begin to respond in turn, and a vicious circle of armament competition ensues. As a result, whatever steps a state takes to increase its security may, in the end, make it less secure. This is the very essence of the security dilemma. It is noteworthy that what matters is how states perceive each other and how secure or insecure they feel, not how secure or insecure they de facto are. This subjectivity also goes for calculations of power and evaluations concerning military power: what seems sufficient for the defense of one state may be perceived as threatening attack preparations by that state’s neighbors.\(^\text{31}\)

The key to breaking out of the security dilemma is cooperation. Cooperation between states is, especially in volatile complex regional issues, extremely difficult. This is, because one state “cheating” may undermine the security of other states. Because all states fear betrayal and state survival is their prime concern, they tread carefully when it comes to cooperation. This is often the case, even when cooperation would hold greater benefits than going it alone. This problem is also an old IR classic, known commonly as the prisoners’ dilemma. The prisoners’ dilemma is a widespread concept which has been used to explain the Cold War arms race, as well as other phenomenon.\(^\text{32}\)

The prisoners’ dilemma is a game-theoretical concept that manages to capture the main problem of the security dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma describes two felons (A and B) who are caught and held by the police in separate interrogation facilities, unable to communicate.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.


\(^{32}\) Ibid; Russett – Starr – Kinsella 2004, 248-249.
The district attorney offers both the prisoners the same options: testify against his partner in crime or remain silent. The district attorney informs the prisoners that if one of the prisoners testifies, but the other does not, the one who testified will go free, and the one who did not will be convicted to ten years in prison. If both testify against each other, both will be convicted more leniently, to seven years in prison. If both remain silent, the court will, due to lack of evidence, be unable to convict either on major transgressions, and thus both will receive only one year in prison. If both prisoners could trust the other not to betray him, both could remain silent and receive only the minimum punishment. However, since the prisoners cannot trust each other, just as states or competing political groups cannot, the only logical choice is to testify against the other. Let us consider prisoner A’s options: If B does not testify, A’s best option is to testify since then he will receive no punishment as opposed to one year if he would not testify. If B does testify, testifying against him remains A’s best choice, since he will receive seven years instead on ten. Seven years in more than one, but considerably less than the ten he will receive if he trusts B and that trust is betrayed. As we can see A’s best option is to testify against B, no matter what. Naturally B will follow the same logic, and both prisoners will receive seven years in stead of the one year they could have gotten away with, had they cooperated.33 In essence “A prisoners’ dilemma is a situation where the behavior that is rational for the entire group is irrational from the perspective of each individual in the group.”34

Barry Posen argues that in situations of state collapse the problem inherent in the security dilemma is aggravated by two factors, namely the similarity of offensive and defensive preparations and the perceived greater effectiveness of offensive action. Groups emerging from state collapse, who find themselves suddenly responsible for their own security, are usually forced to arm themselves for fear of violent actions by other groups. Usually to such groups, only low-tech weapons are readily available. As a result these groups are mainly able to form militia-based infantry armies, which while understood to suit defensive operations better than offensive ones, can also be used for attacking enemy territory. If these groups are able to commandeer heavier weapons, like armor or artillery, the same problem persists; armor for example may be excellent offensive weaponry, but it is also very effective in defense. This is also true generally for military potential, it can be used for defensive as well as offensive warfare. Thus states or other groups cannot completely judge their neighbors intentions, and are forced to assume and prepare for the worst, because the worst is possible.

It is also important to note that in circumstances put forth by state collapse, the strength of any group’s group identity is an important factor whilst calculating offensive capability.\(^{35}\) I

As mentioned, superiority of offensive action over defensive action may also deepen the security dilemma. In a situation of state collapse, two factors in particular may be seen to affect the superiority of the offensive over the defensive. The first factor is technology. As technology and military hardware are more or less a constant and Somalia is void of nuclear weapons, technology need not be examined further. The second factor is political and ethnic geography. Political and ethnic geography may form incentives for aggressive action: Some groups will be completely encircled by others. Other groups may be tempted to initiate an attack to rescue pockets of friendly populace within enemy territory, and so forth. Sadly, but not surprisingly, the behavior of international organizations, including the relief organizations and the UN, may also make offensive action a tempting option.\(^{36}\)

In Posen’s words: “…the military capability of groups will often be dependent on their cohesion, rather than their meager military assets. This cohesion is a threat in its own right because it can provide the emotional power for infantry armies to take the offensive.” Strong group identity and group cohesion are paramount in forging infantry militias into effective and efficient fighting forces and thus a necessary defensive precaution. In addition, strengthening group cohesion may be vital for group survival or formation, especially if the group is a new one. Because of this, neighboring groups will, in addition to arming physically, also begin to arm psychologically. This psychological arms race will include a host of political rhetoric as well as propaganda operations. Unfortunately this ideological armament follows the general mechanism of the security dilemma: what seems to one to be a necessary defensive precaution might to another seem to be a prelude to attack.\(^{37}\)

2.3.2 Political Realism applied to internal Somali conflict

When the Somali state collapsed in the late 1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s, a state of anarchy began. This anarchy was not far from Hobbes's bleak description of the original state of nature. This anarchy was the result of the collapse of the Barre regime, i.e. the sudden absence of a central authority. As a result of this collapse, the state could no longer provide security for its citizens. Thus the responsibility for security was taken up by a host of various

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid, 31-34.
groups of various sizes and dispositions, most importantly clans and sub-clans. This was of course a rather natural development, as security is, more or less, the primary function of the clan\textsuperscript{38}.

As clans and other groups are the primary providers of security within Somali society, and as a state of anarchy more or less exists between them, it seems a logical choice to apply the theories of Political Realism to explain their actions. According to Barry R Posen state collapse leaves behind a number of groups of different levels of cohesion. Posen argues, that these groups are forced to pay attention to security, and tend to act in ways outlined by the security dilemma.\textsuperscript{39} One can then assume, that mechanisms outlined by the prisoners’ dilemma also apply, especially in issues such as the formation and armament of clan militias, offensive warfare, seizing land, infrastructure, or wealth via offensive warfare, participating in international peace accords, accepting military assistance from a foreign backer (say, Ethiopia or Eritrea) and so forth.

According to Posen, these groups, suddenly responsible for their own security, must first assess their strategic position in relation to other groups, and then act accordingly. They must ask themselves several questions about their present security situation: which neighboring groups constitute a potential threat and if they do, how will the passage of time affect the balance of power? Is it better to act sooner, or to wait for a better opportunity? As mentioned above, distinguishing between offensive and defensive military capability can be tricky. Thus, groups will revert to history as a tool to assess the degree of the threat posed by other groups. However, using historical archetypes as reference will result in a worst-case analysis. This is so because any historical analysis will most likely be at least partially based on orally recorded history, be emotionally charged, and be intentionally warped for political reasons by the leaders of different groups. Somalia's present situation certainly presents modern Somali leaders with more than enough raw material.\textsuperscript{40}

Though Posen’s technique of applying theories developed for explaining the actions of states to non-state actors is not without problems, it seems valid enough to be adopted here as a theoretical backdrop. Somalia’s recent history certainly offers more than enough examples of how the mechanisms of the security dilemma worked to aggravate the conflict.

\textsuperscript{38} Stevenson 1995, 2-10.
\textsuperscript{39} Posen 1993, 27-28.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 27-38.
2.3.3 Political Realism applied to the Global War on Terror

Realism, a theory well suited to explaining the actions and goals of superpowers, is a more adequate tool than adequate when analyzing the United States and its Global War on Terror. National interest and national security are for the United States, as they are for every country, top priorities. It is with this in mind that we must examine the actions of the United States in Somalia. That is to say that it must be assumed that the war on terror is not solely about fighting terrorism, but an equally important goal is power. Here it is purposeful to adopt the view that the US anti-terror involvement in Africa, is also about national interest, for example the availability of oil to the US, just as the US anti-terror involvement in the Middle-East can be seen to be partially about oil.41

Naturally Morgenthau’s six principles are applicable to studying the United States’ war on terror. Accordingly the Global War on Terror must be seen to be about “interest defined as power”. Albeit the nature of this power and its projections may vary greatly from time to time. Following Morgenthau, it must be assumed that the GWOT is led and fought without letting moral considerations or the demands of other spheres of action limit the United States’ freedom of action.

2.3.4 Somali Identity

While evaluating how well Political Realism can be applied to the Global War on Terrorism, it is important to assess how Somali identity is built. This is because identity is a critical factor when evaluating the actions of different non-state actors, their motives, possible future courses of action and the plausibility of any solution to the conflict. Understanding the inner workings of Somali identification is also crucial in any operative activity on the ground.

A lot has been written on identities, identification theories, nationalisms, and group identities. Benedict Anderson’s often quoted work Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism is indeed one work worth mentioning. However, Anderson’s theories about the imagined and deliberate nature of national group identities seems rather irrelevant to the problem at hand. Thomas Eriksen in his article Ethnic identity, national

identity and intergroup conflict: The significance of personal experiences makes several important observations about the nature of ethnic conflicts and identity. First, Eriksen makes the case against tagging conflicts to be “ethnic” in nature: In other words, the concept "ethnic conflict" is misleading, whether it is used to classify phenomena or to explain hostilities... All the conflicts considered here are conflicts over resources perceived as scarce – territory, political power, economic gain, employment, recognition; rights in a wide sense. What they have in common is their successful appeal to collective identities perceived locally as imperative and primordial, identities associated with a deep moral commitment, whether ethnic (based on notions of kinship and descent), regional (based on place) or religious (based on beliefs and forms of worship). For these reasons, the term "identity politics" is preferable as a generic term for all such political movements, whether nonviolent or violent.

Second, Eriksen reminds his readers of the labile nature of identity: “...identification is relational, situational and flexible, and that each person carries a number of potential identities, only a few of which become socially significant, making a difference in everyday life. Even fewer gain political importance, forming the basis of power struggles and group competition. This is not, however, to say that collective identities can be created out of thin air. They have to be connected, in credible ways, to people’s personal experiences. These experiences in turn are flexible – not only historians, but everybody else as well selects and interprets events to make a particular kind of sense of the past – but not indefinitely so.”

Eriksen’s arguments seem to fit perfectly to the Somali conflict, taking into account the changing nature of Somali identities, especially clan identities (see below).

For the reasons stated above it is worth taking a look at what Somalis identify with and why. Several publications have in the past promoted (intentionally or not intentionally) that the single major building block of Somali identity is the clan. While the clan is indeed extremely important it is hardly the sole basis of identity for Somalis. A sense of being distinctly Somali, being “adopted” into another clan, or being a member of a certain village or militia can be just as important. In fact, these separate layers of identity can exist simultaneously, overlap, and

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44 Eriksen 2001, 56.
vary in importance in accordance with the situation at hand, in accordance with Eriksen’s views.\(^{45}\)

Since it is my aim here to apply state-centric realist theories to states as well as non-state actors, it is useful to seek a definition for the state. Barry Buzan offers a useful definition of the state as a unit in the international system. According to Buzan there can be no analogy between states and individuals in terms of actions because people and states are on different levels of coherence. Buzan claims that states are made up of three distinctive components. First, the state must have a physical base made up of its land-area and its population. Second, the state must have an institutional expression, i.e. an executive government. Third, most importantly the idea of said state must be shared by a significant portion of the populace. In addition to owning these components, to qualify as a proper state, a unit in the international system must be of an adequate size, and must claim complete sovereignty. In understanding Buzan’s model, it is useful to see the term “nation” as referring to the idea of the state mentioned above (as Buzan partially proposes).\(^{46}\)

It can be argued that Buzan’s state model would be easily applicable to non-state actors in the Somali paradigm. This is because surely effective security providing groups, such as clans, share the same general requirements as states. A clan or tribe must have an adequate population base just as a state, albeit it need not be a large as that of a state. Unlike states though, nomadic Somali clans need not necessarily have a strict land area, but rather rights to grazing land and so forth. Even though a clan would not have an executive government, it would surely need to have some institutional expression, be it a council of elders, a religious leader, or some other governing structure. As of states, the most important attribute of clans is that the idea of the clan is shared by its members. Even though clans, sub-clans and diya paying groups (see below) do not claim sovereignty in its western sense, they do retain a degree of independence and the right to make and break alliances and agreements.

Buzan puts forth four models of links between nation and state. The first model is the nation-state in which the nation as a nationalistic idea precedes the state. A common example of the above circumstances is the formation of Hungary and Germany. The second model is the state-nation in which the state was paramount in creation of the nation. Former colonies, namely the United States, are classic examples. The third model is the part nation-state. In it

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the population of the nation forms a majority in several states. North- and South-Korea as well as North- and South-Vietnam are examples. In the fourth model, the multinational state, the state encompasses several nations. Yugoslavia, Britain, and Austria-Hungary can be said to fall into this category. These four models are of course ideal models, and no state in the real world fits into any category as such.47

Richard Caplan defines nation-building along similar ideas about nation and state, albeit with different terminology: “Nation-building, then, has three distinct but related meanings: the creation of a common consciousness or common identity among a people; the establishment or the strengthening of governmental and administrative structures within a state or territory; and the post-war rehabilitation of states and territories.” 48

Caplan’s nation building definitions seem to refer, in Buzan’s terms, first to establishing the idea of the state, second to state-building, i.e. establishing governance and defining physical base and third to rehabilitation of both. It seems that nations can survive and exist without states but states fail to do so without nations. It is of course clear that the state can not long survive without the nation. For example, the idea of a Kurdish state has been harbored by the Kurdish people for a lengthy period of time, but a “Kurdistan” has not materialized. Yet few would go so far as to claim that a Kurdish national identity (or however one would wish to define the idea of the state) does not exist. On the other hand any state without a national identity seems likely to be plunged into the purgatory that is civil war. The exception is naturally a strong dictatorship (possibly in the form of foreign occupation), which may be able to survive for long periods of time without majority approval. With this in mind, it is not surprising that Somalia fell into a state of chaos when Barre’s regime collapsed.49

49 Buzan 1991, 64.
3. Somalia – a failed state and the threat of terrorism

3.1 Somalia, Somali society, Identity and the Clan System

Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew in their study *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias. The Warriors of Contemporary Combat* conclude that any intelligence officer wishing to understand Somali society must learn to appreciate four distinct factors that have more or less molded Somali society into what it is today. These four factors are geography, clan lineage, social contract, and Islam.\(^{50}\) Below we shall briefly discuss each of these four factors. It is of course evident, that each of these would in itself be broad enough to comprise several independent studies.

3.1.1 Geography, Climate, and Population

Although large amounts of oil have not been found in Somalia as of yet, Somalia has in a way fallen victim to the “resource curse” none the less. This is because Somalia is situated in a strategically important area, in the vicinity of the straight which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This straight is part of a maritime-strategically significant area which encompasses the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Suez channel, and the Gulf of Aquaba. This area includes several countries, mainly Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Many of the countries in the area have significant oil and/or gas reserves. Thus, it is easy to deduce why the area is viewed as strategically important: It forms an important transportation route; nearly 11% of the world’s seaborne oil is transported through it.\(^{51}\) In addition to this, Somalia’s maritime position has long been of interest to great powers, not least because the fastest sea route between Europe and Asia runs right along its shores.


Somalia itself is an arid and unforgiving land, characterized by the small amount of arable land. Somalia has a land area of 637,540 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of Finland. Most of this land area is made up of plateaus, plains, and highlands, most of which are unsuitable for agriculture. The small amount of land which is suitable for agriculture is situated in the southwest of the country, where Somalia's two major rivers, the Jubba and the Shabeelle, run northeast to southwest.\(^{53}\)

The climate in Somalia is harsh and rigid. For the nomadic Somalis the year is made up of four seasons. Two of them, the \textit{gu} (April through June) and the \textit{day} (October and November), are rainy, and two, \textit{hagaa} (July through September) and \textit{iilaal} (December-March) are dry. Gu is the most prosperous time of the year for nomads, since it is then that the desert blossoms, creating new pasture. Thus Gu is a time of festivities and political activity.\(^{54}\)

For the nomadic population the timing and amount of rainfall are extremely important. If rainfall is lacking, it is possible even in peacetimes that famine may occur, not to mention in times of major conflict. Not surprisingly, resources are scarce. Thus it is easy to see how Somali's unforgiving and unpredictable climate and geography fostered and aggravated conflict between the nomadic clans. Indeed, it has been argued that Somalia's harsh conditions, characterized by a near desert climate, droughts, and few resources, are the major causes of clan conflict. Partly because of this, violence has been institutionalized in Somali society. It may be even argued that the lack of resources is the main reason behind the Somalia- Ethiopia conflict as well as other protracted conflicts in the greater Horn region\(^{55}\).

Somalia has an estimated population of a little over nine million. A small portion, approximately 15\%, are estimated to be other than ethnic Somalis, including 30 000 Arabs. These figures are of course raw estimates as the ongoing war makes exact censuses impossible, and has driven large amounts of people from their homes. Large numbers of ethnic Somali live outside Somalia’s borders, especially in the neighboring countries. All in all the Somali diaspora is estimated to constitute somewhere between one to three million Somalis. Some members of the diaspora have been suspected of funding terrorist organizations, possibly in Somalia. Diagram 2 shows the estimated percentage of ethnic


\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) Ibid; Juntunen 2007, 124-125.

![Diagram 2: Relative size of Somali Populations in Neighboring Countries](image)

3.1.2 The Somali Clan System

Whilst investigating Somalia’s potential as a terrorist safe haven or base of operations, it is hardly possible to overestimate the significance of clan affiliation or tribalism. Throughout Somali history, the clan system has paid a significant role, and can be seen as one of the sources of Somalia’s present strife.\footnote{Ofcansky, Thomas: Somalia: Recent History. In Murison, Kathrine (Ed.): Africa South of the Sahara. 31st edition. Europa Publications, London 2002, 905-917 (Ofcansky 2002).}

Somalia is, generally speaking, ethnically extremely homogenous. Normally one could assume that this would have a stabilizing effect on any country. Indeed, one has but to take a look at the history of the Balkans to witness the negative effects ethnic diversity can have when coupled with regime change. In Somalia, the positive effects of ethnic unity are countered by deep divisions along clan or sub-clan lines. These clan divisions, inherent is
Somali culture run so deep, that: “...the very fact of sharing a common cultural framework [is that] which made Somalis conscious of what made them distinct from other Somalis”.\(^{58}\)

There exists no academic consensus on the structure of the Somali clan system. Generally speaking the system is based on a number of clan families. These clan families are each divided into several smaller clans, and they again are divided into sub-clans. Clan families are not united and bitter divisions exist within them. This is also true for clans and sub-clans. Nevertheless, the clan can be seen as the most important term of identity of for Somalis. So important, that it is perhaps the only tangible political entity the average Somali knows in Somalia.\(^{59}\)

The clan system dates back several centuries and originally arose from the need to protect the land, livestock, property and so forth of each individual, extended family and tribe. In Somali culture property rights do not arise from legal ownership but simply from possession, and theft is hardly a moral offence\(^{60}\). This naturally led to the need for a security system, and hence the extended families loosely bonded to form clans. These bonds however are not very binding in the traditional sense: Jonathan Stevenson in Losing Mogadishu fittingly remarks on clan bond by quoting an old Somali proverb: “Me and my clan against the world; me and my brother against the clan; me against my brother.”\(^{61}\)

Security was, and still is, more or less the primary function of the clan. This loose security system, which for centuries kept conflict at a skirmish level, was destroyed, or rather, perverted by the Siad Barre regime and the aftermath of its downfall. After rising to power General Barre exclusively favored his own clan (or sub-clan), the Marehan and some other groups within his Daarood clan-family. Traditionally clans would cooperate, or help their sub-clan brethren in times of dire need. Once the crisis was over the hierarchically superior group would withdraw and tension would recede. Several clans did unite during the late 80’s and early 90’s tooust the Barre regime. Tradition would have dictated a return to equilibrium, but that was not to be. Remembering Siad Barre’s Marehan favoring policies and the power the Marehan had held during the Barre years, each clan scrabbled for the position the Marehan had enjoyed. In essence when nomadic tribal traditions were coupled with a corrupt and

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\(^{60}\) Lewis 1961, 119-126, 162-170.

\(^{61}\) Stevenson 1995, 3-4.
nepotistic central government, urbanization, modern weapons, and fabricated differences the result was a deadly quagmire.\textsuperscript{62}

Researchers disagree on which clan factions in Somalia are to be classified as clan-families, clans and sub-clans accordingly. According to Lyons and Samatar the main clan families are Saar, Irir and Darod. The Saar consisting of the Rahanwein and Digil clans, the Irir of the Dir, Isaaq and Hawiye, and the Darod of the Dolbahante, Mijerteen, Warsangali, Ogden, and Marehan\textsuperscript{63}. Ken Menkhaus on the other hand states the clan families to be Daarood, Dir, Isaaq, Rahanweyn (of which the Digil clan is a part of), and Hawiye\textsuperscript{64}. Anna Simons proposes yet another classification, claiming to the clan families be Rahanwein, Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Digil, and Dir\textsuperscript{65}. Yet another classification has bee put forth by Said S. Samatar in the Library of Congress’s Country Studies. In this classification the clan families are split into two groups, the ones that trace their lineage back to the mythical founding father of Somalis, Samaale or Samaal, and the ones that do not. The mostly nomadic clan-families that do trace their lineage back to Samaal are collectively called the Samaal clans and include the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye. The ones that do not, include the agricultural Digil and Rahanwayn.\textsuperscript{66} This classification, albeit with slight modifications, is the most common. See diagram 3.

Such is the interpretation of Mary-Jane Fox, which shall be adopted here. Her understanding of the major clan-families is similar that of Lyons and Samatar and Country Studies (Said S. Samatar), with slight spelling deviations: The two major Sab (or Saab) clan-families are the sedentary-pastoral Digil and Rahanwiin located in the south of Somalia and the four major Samaale clan-families are the pastoral Dir, Isaaq, Hawie, and Daarood located in the rest of the country. The two Sab clan-families are agriculturalist and for them land is important for identity, and they are inclined to be more hierarchical that the Samaale. For the Samaale land ownership in itself is not that important\textsuperscript{67}, and they seem to be less concerned about hierarchy,

\textsuperscript{62} Stevenson 1995, 2-7.
\textsuperscript{64} Menkhaus 2004, 24.
\textsuperscript{65} Nugent 2004, 561.
even to the extent of being called “egalitarian”\textsuperscript{68}. Not surprisingly, all the versions sighted above are basically the same as put forth by Lewis, yet again with variations in spelling\textsuperscript{70}.

It has been suggested that the Somali clan system may be Arabic, in origin. During the 11\textsuperscript{th} through 13\textsuperscript{th} centuries certain Arabian Shahyk patriarchs, namely Shaykyh Daarood Jabarti and Shaykh Isahaaq migrated to Somalia. Shaykh Daarood Jabarti launched what is today Somalia’s larges clan-family, the Daarood by marrying Doombira Dir, the daughter of a local patriarch. Shaykh Isahaaq founded another of the major clan-families, the Isaaq. Before the arrival of the Arabs, Somali society may have been matrilineal. Thus the clan system in its present form was possibly imported or influenced from the Arabian peninsula.\textsuperscript{71}

Diagram 3: Somali Clans According to Chopra – Eknes – Nordbø\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{soomali-clans.png}
\end{center}

\textit{Clans, sub-clans, lineages}

\textsuperscript{68} Fox 2000, 59. Here Hawie shall be spelled Hawiye, since it is a more common form. Sub-clan names may vary.

\textsuperscript{69} Fox 2000, 58-59.


\textsuperscript{71} Samatar S. 1992.

3.1.3 Social Contract

The endemic violence proceeding from the harsh environment and clan segmentation was not allowed to spiral out of control in traditional Somali society. Several mechanisms were devised and implemented to keep the violence in check. The most important of these were the Somali equivalent of a social contract (heer) governed by elders, blood-money (diya\textsuperscript{73}), vendetta killings (godob), limited armed conflict, and poetry.\textsuperscript{74}

Traditionally Somali society was governed by a type of social contract between and within clans and sub-clans known as the heer. Heer was based on a type of common law, qanoon, which in turn was based on Islamic law. The implementation of heer was enforced by clan elders and religious leaders. Those who did not adhere to the heer-based rulings of clan elders became outlaws of sorts.\textsuperscript{75}

Diya-paying is a system of dispute settlement in which a transgression performed against one diya-group by another may be compensated for by payment, traditionally in camels. Almost anything can be compensated for by payment, even murder. The diya-system allows diya-groups to settle conflicts between them without killing and thus stop the violence. The knowledge of the necessity of payment also acts as a deterrent for violence.\textsuperscript{76}

A diya-group is, according to Lewis, “a corporate group of a few small lineages reckoning descent from four to eight generations to the common founder, and having a membership of from a few hundred to a few thousand men.”\textsuperscript{77} Diya-groups do not necessarily, especially in southern Somalia, always follow lineage. It is possible for village membership to be considered as important as lineage ties. Indeed, an entire village may function as a diya-group.\textsuperscript{78} This group is the fundamental building-block of Somali political organization, a well defined social group as well as a political and legal entity. The diya-group co-operates to a great degree on several issues, especially security. Indeed, in Lewis's words: “…with the difficulty under present conditions of adequately policing much of the country, the security of

\textsuperscript{73} Arabic for blood-compensation.
\textsuperscript{76} Shultz – Dew 2006, 64-65.
\textsuperscript{77} Lewis, Ioan: A Pastoral Democracy (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1999), 6, quoted in Shultz – Dew 2006, 63-64.
\textsuperscript{78} Besteman 2003, 289-291.
the individual pastoralist's person and property depends ultimately on his membership of a diya-paying group."  

Godob, the practice of vendetta killings, is another form of conflict management in traditional Somali society. Godob is hardly as useful and as effective as diya, but a conflict management tool none the less. The practice of Godob is simple; the killing of a member of one clan is avenged by that clan by killing the killer or a member of his clan. Vengeance is not necessarily carried out immediately, but the victims’ clan may wait several generations before retribution is perpetrated. Godob thus gives feud longevity and an unpredictable character.  

Limited armed conflict refers to a mechanism in which two clans, sub-clans, or families, fighting over resources such as land would be left to fight among themselves without other groups interfering. It is worth noticing that other groups would maintain their distance on as long as their own interests were not at stake. As is evident though, this system hardly functioned in the situation created by Somalia’s state collapse.

### 3.1.4 Islam in Somalia

Somalis are predominantly Sunni Muslims. Nearly 99% of Somalians are Muslim. So, not surprisingly, Islam occupies a very central place in Somali culture, and may be considered a cornerstone of Somali society. The role of Islam is, however distinctively Somali in nature. This is evident from three traits of Somali Islam. First, traditionally in Somali culture, the religious sphere and the political sphere have been kept separate from each other. In practice though, this has not always been a clear-cut division. Because of their religious role teachers of Islam (wadads or sheikhs) are expected to remain neutral in times of rivalry and conflict, although in practice this tradition is not always adhered to. Secondly, since its arrival Islam was and still is more or less assimilated into the clan system. Heer subordinates Islamic or sharia forms of retribution to diya-paying and other traditional collective forms of punishment. In essence personal responsibility for one’s actions as taught by traditional Islam

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80 Shultz – Dew 2006, 64.
81 Ibid.
83 Fox 2000, 59-60.
has been replaced by the traditional Somali concept of the collective guilt and accountability of the diya-paying group.\(^{86}\)

Thirdly, Islam in Somalia has been considerably influenced by Sufism, as several Sufi sects have appeared in Somalia over the course of its history. Interestingly enough Wahhabism has also influenced Somali Islam from time to time.\(^{87}\) Sufism has traditionally blended partially with the clan system. Genealogical ancestors and founders of Sufi orders are in many places worshipped as saints.\(^{88}\) In modern day Somalia the oldest and most widespread religious organizations are Sufi brotherhoods. The most influential of these brotherhoods are the Quadiriya, Salihiya, and Ahmadiya sects, also found worldwide.\(^{89}\)

Islamic- or *Sharia*-law has not fit perfectly within the nomadic Somali society. In it Sharia tends to be restricted to governing relationships between clans and a few personal status questions. Sharia rulings outside this sphere are not always adhered to by the nomadic Somali. Attempts to strictly impose sharia-law (sometimes including banning the traditional Somali narcotic khat) have met with resistance. In other word, Somali sharia, like Somali Islam in general, is by definition distinctively Somali in nature.\(^{90}\)

### 3.2 The History of Somalia

What follows is a look into the history of Somalia. Why then such a lengthy look at history? The conclusions that can be drawn from observing Somalia’s historical experience form the basis for understanding Somalia’s present state and the condition which prevail today. In its history are rooted the trends which determine the caliber of the threat Somalia poses in the GWOT.

#### 3.2.1 The Rise and Fall of Colonialism in Somalia

Somalis, known to Medieval Arabs as the Berberi, are members of a group of peoples called the Eastern Cushites. It was a splinter of a sub group of the Eastern Cushites, called Samaale

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\(^{86}\) Stevenson 1995, passim.


that moved to and spread over the entire Horn of Africa by 100 A.D. Somalis quickly came under Arab influence, a trend that would continue into modern times. In spite of the fact that through the ages sultans and sheiks claimed to rule what is nowadays Somalia, a centralized authority or Somali state as such did not exist on any level prior to colonial times. Somalia as first observed by the British was a collection of port towns possibly ruled by Arab sultans, of semi autonomous clans and sub-clans, of costal areas partially controlled by Egypt, and of Somali clans freely trading in the region whilst possibly paying taxes to a local sultan or imam.\footnote{Samatar S. 1992; Fox 2000, 61,75-76.}

All through the first half of the nineteenth century the British gradually grew more and more active in Somalia. Aden across the narrow gulf from Somalia was an important waypoint on the navigational route to India. The British coaling station and garrison at Adel, which was established in 1839, depended mainly on Somalia for its food supplies. After 1800, due to expanding British colonial interests in India, British activity in Somalia constantly grew. The British established treaties concerning trade, safe passage, and the restriction of slavery with different clans in different areas, and along with other traders engaged in active trade with the Somalis, at prosperous ports such as Berbera and Seylac (Zeila). This trade, along with British influence in the area continued to grow steadily. The lucrative Anglo-Somalian trade was however largely restricted to the northern parts of Somalia. Southerners were for the most part denied the perks that flourishing trade brought with it.\footnote{Wessling, H: \textit{The European Colonial Empires 1815-1919}. Pearson Education Limited, Harlow 2004, 179 (Wessling 2002); Fox 2000, 80;Fox 2000, 75-83, 85-92.}

The establishment of British colonial rule in northern Somalia was gradual. No single turning point can be named. However, Egyptian activity in the country brought about British power, after a fashion: Egypt had established garrisons in several locations around Somalia from 1875 onward. After Egypt ceded Sudan to Britain, these garrisons were evacuated in 1884. When the Egyptians headed northward, they left behind a power vacuum that was then filled by the British Empire. Finally in February of 1885 the Somali coast from Ghubbet Kharab to Ras Galwein was established as a British protectorate. The British protectorate of Somaliland was then officially established in 1887.\footnote{Fox 2000, 83, 102.}

British rule in northern Somalia was not upheld by a strong military or police presence. The ratio of British security personnel to Somali population was approximately that of one to a thousand. In addition to small disturbances, there was no serious threat to British rule. To this
however there was one notable exception, the twenty-year long resistance put up by Muhammad Abdullah Hassan (called the “Mad Mullah” by the British) and his followers. Hassan, a member of the puritanical Salihiyah religious order, and his dervish-movement put up a resistance that lasted from 1899 to 1920. The Dervish resistance ravaged Somalia and led to the death of nearly one third of the population.94

After the British established colonial rule in northern Somalia, the recently unified Italians were quick to follow suite. Italy was initially to gain control of southern Somalia through a deal brokered by the British. By the time the British protectorate of Somaliland was established, the Sultan of Zanzibar, Sayyid Khalifa-bin-Said, controlled Somali ports from Mogadishu to Kismayo. After Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1889, these ports passed to the British East Africa Company. The Italians had agreed with the British, that said port would be transferred to Italian control immediately after the British gained them from the Sultan of Zanzibar. This transaction then took place in 1892.95

With the exception of the very first years, Italian colonial rule in southern Somalia was by nature very different than the British one in the north. Italian rule was far from the subtle indirect control the British had resorted to, but rather a harsh oppression upheld by direct control. Italian controlled Somalia was a plantation economy, the labor for which was provided by an extensive slave system the Italians conveniently failed to banish. The Italians also established a hierarchical administrative system headed by the Governor of Italian Somaliland and extending all the way down to local native chiefs. The difference between Italian and British styles of colonial rule stemmed from the fact that the two colonial powers had very different goals in Somalia. The British were content to uphold a protectorate to use as a coaling station and to provide supplies for their Aden garrison. The Italians on the other hand were intent on outright colonization. In addition, for both powers, control over Somalia was also about denying it to the French.96

France also established a protectorate in the Horn region, in modern day Djibouti. In 1862 France acquired the port of Obock, which lies north of the modern capital. Two decades later, in 1888 French Somaliland was established and in 1892 Djibouti became its capital. The motive for France’s desire to establish herself in the Horn region were numerous. Like the

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95 Fox 2000, 106-107.
96 Ibid; Ofcansky 2002, 905.
British, the French required a coaling station for ships headed east. Additionally the French desired to cut Britain’s Cairo to Cape Town zone of influence.  

In addition to Britain, Italy and France, the colonial game in the Horn was, uniquely in colonial history, also played by an African participant. This African player was the Emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik (Menelik II). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Ethiopia was, from time to time, an object of colonialism. Ethiopia also worked actively to build a colonial empire of its own. In September 1895 Menelik declared war on Italy, and soundly defeated them in the Battle of Adowa on March 1st 1896. Italy petitioned for peace, and on October 26th 1896 the Treaty of Addis Abeba was signed. In it Italy formally recognized Ethiopian sovereignty and independence.

Menelik however did not stop there. By 1897 Menelik had managed to extend Ethiopian power into Somali inhabited territories. This Menelik accomplished by gaining control of the independent Muslim Emirate of Harer and of the Ogaden region. Later Siad Barre would fight a lengthy war with Ethiopia over the control of this region.

After the turn of the century, barring Muhammad Abdullah Hassan’s activities, began a time of colonial consolidation. The Italian government attempted to lure colonists from the homeland by way of economically lucrative land offers, but to no avail. Somalia remained an economic burden. The fascist regime did launch several extensive development projects. British Somaliland remained a rather insignificant colony. Its main purpose remained the same throughout colonial years, to provide supplies for Aden. Thus, in spite of a more liberal style of rule and less oppressive administration, the British controlled north fell behind the Italian ruled south in terms of economic infrastructure.

Italy continued to push its sphere of influence farther west toward the Ogaden region controlled by Menelik’s Ethiopia. This process continued after the turn of the century, and peaked in 1935 when Mussolini’s Italy began its attack to subdue Ethiopia. Eventually Italian forces were successful, and Italy annexed Ethiopia in 1936.

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100 Metz 1992.
103 Fox 2000, 115, 117.
however, did not stop there. After the outbreak of World War two Italian forces also conquered British Somaliland.\textsuperscript{106}

Thus by 1940 Mussolini had almost accomplished what later rulers in Somalia would strive for, unification of all Somali-inhabited lands under one administrative unit. It appears that this was a time of relative well-being for many Somalis. Some even managed to accumulate formidable economic resources during the Italian occupation, due partially to the Italians introducing a common currency to the area. This state of matter was to be short lived. The British struck back in March 1941, and drove fascist forces out of northern Somalia. Further British campaigns led to the eviction of the Italians from Somalia and the restoration of the Ethiopian throne. British Somaliland, southern Somalia and the formerly Ethiopian controlled Ogaden region were then placed under British military administration. The establishing of British military administration once again placed British, Italian, and Ethiopian Somaliland under the control of one single government. The British did not however establish a unified administration for Somali-inhabited areas and no Somali state was established. In 1948 the Ogaden region was returned to the Ethiopian government.\textsuperscript{107}

After the eviction of the Italians from Somalia, two major trends can be found in Somali history. The first of these trends were the problems that would surface in Somalia several times during the nineteenth century: general violence and disorder made deadlier in part by weapons left in Somalia by departing armies. The second trend was a vast surge in Somali political activity\textsuperscript{108}.

As the Italian army withdrew, it often did so with great speed, and thus often left behind great numbers of weapons and ammunition. This made the disorder that followed the Italian departure very destructive in some areas. Some sources indicate that clan clashes perpetrated by well armed clan militias were beginning to show signs of escalation.\textsuperscript{109} Although modern weaponry may not have been the \textit{primus motor} behind this escalation, it certainly must have


\textsuperscript{107} Samatar S. 1992.

\textsuperscript{108} Fox 2000, 133.

\textsuperscript{109} Ministry of Information: "\textit{The First to be Freed}”. \textit{Record of British Military Administration in Eritrea and Somalia, 1941-1943}. His Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 1944, 11 (Ministry of Information). Quoted in Fox 2000, 134; Fox 2000, 132-134.
increased the body count. Indeed still today, small arms proliferation is a serious problem in Somalia.\textsuperscript{110}

As mentioned above, the period was also a time of widespread Somali political activation. As a reaction, at least partly, to the possibility that Somalia would yet again be divided, Somalia’s first political party, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), was formed in May 1943. Later the SYC renamed itself the Somali Youth League (SYL). The SYL would later play a prominent part in Somali politics.\textsuperscript{111}

The original forming of the SYC is a classic case “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. The British military administration could not cope without the Italian civil servants experienced in Somalia, and many were employed. In 1943 the Italians in Somalia were allowed to form political organizations. Several were formed, many of which fervently demanded the return Italian Somaliland to Italian control. As such ideologies were hostile both to British control and Somali independence; the British colonial officials and the Somalia independence movements began to view each other as allies. British officials encouraged the Somalis to organize politically, and thus the SYC was formed.\textsuperscript{112}

The SYC grew briskly, and is reported to have had 25 000 members one year before it changed its name to SYL in 1947. In addition to numerical growth, the SYL also expanded geographically, and soon had offices in British Somaliland (former) Italian Somaliland, and Ogaden, and Somali inhabited parts of Kenya. The SYC/SYL was by nature a nationalist organization. Its main goals were: to unify all Somali-inhabited areas, promote education, language, and Somali interests and to oppose Italian rule. Interestingly the SYL leadership shunned clan affiliations and refused to reveal their ethnic identities.\textsuperscript{113}

The SYC/SYL was not the only political party to arise in the post World War Two era. Several other factions sprung up, some roughly along clan-lines. In contrast to the SYL’s nationalistic overtones a second political organization allegedly cooperated with Italian factions and its scrimmage with the SYL was economically backed by the Italians. This faction was the Hisbia Digil Mirifle (HDM), originally known as the Patriotic Benefit Union. True to its name the HDM represented the efforts of the Digil and Mirifle clans. In the north,

\textsuperscript{110} United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: “Background Paper: Can Small Arms and Light Weapons Be Controlled?”. Fact Sheet, published June 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2001 on the State Department’s web site. Retrieved July 15\textsuperscript{th} 2007 from \textless http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/3768.htm \textgreater .

\textsuperscript{111} Fox 2000, 134-136.

\textsuperscript{112} Samatar S. 1992.

\textsuperscript{113} Fox 2000, 134-135; Samatar S. 1992.
i.e. British Somaliland the main political organizations were the Isaaq supported Somali National League (SNL), and the United Somali Party (USP) which in turn was supported by the Dir and the Daarood. As the reasons behind this rise in political awareness and organization Fox lists war-time reports concerning the freeing of oppressed people and anti-colonial struggles, the lifting of a ban on open political debate, the embarrassing defeat and exposed fallibility of the Somalis’ Italian colonial masters and a traditional rejection of institutionalized authority.  

In 1945 the Potsdam Conference, not surprisingly, it was decreed that Italy would not be given back the African territories it had acquired during the war. The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers Commission, consisting of the foreign ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, was to decide upon Somalia’s future. The council convened in Paris in April and May of 1946. The British proposed a trusteeship that would contain the whole of Somalia. Other members of the council, especially Molotov, were opposed to this, accusing Britain of imperial schemes.

In January 1948 the commission sent its representatives to Mogadishu to determine and evaluate the political wishes of the local populace. During the hearing demonstrations turned into violent riots. However, the commissions hearing was held according to plan. The commission heard three different local propositions. First, the SYL’s proposition that all Somalis be united under a 10-year international trusteeship. Second, the HDM’s proposal which was very similar to the SYL’s. Third a proposition by Italian and Somali factions that Somalia be placed back under Italian rule.

The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers was unable to reach a decision because of diplomatic conflicts. For various reasons Britain was the only power championing a plan close to the SYL’s proposition. Because Britain was not willing to have a falling out with its allies on behalf of Somali unity, its proposition was withdrawn. Ultimately the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers, unable to reach consensus, referred the matter to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. In 1950 the UN General Assembly ratified a British trusteeship of British Somaliland, and an Italian trusteeship of Italian Somaliland. And so the SYL’s nationalistic aspiration and opposition to Italian rule were shattered in the UN.

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114 Samatar S. 1992; Fox 2000, 135.
117 UN Document 1951.VLA.1.
118 Samatar S. 1992; Fox 2000, 140.
As the northern and southern parts of Somalia were now once again split between two different administrations, their development during the trusteeship period differed greatly. In the south, many Somalis resented being under Italian rule. In fact it has been suggested that resentment of Italian rule may have been the key factor behind the political and national awakenings in Somalia. Whatever the case, Italo-Somali relations were strained, especially for the first three years of the trusteeship from 1950 to 1953. During the trusteeship period, Islamic Sufi-groups, or tariqas, did not hasten to get involved in politics, except to oppose any educational measures that were seen to pose a risk of Christianization.119

The UN established the Italian Trusteeship Administration (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia, AFIS) to prepare former Italian Somaliland for independence. According to the trusteeship agreement the AFIS was to improve the economic and educational infrastructures, among others. The AFIS was not very successful in the former, although exports trebled between 1954 and 1960. The AFIS made greater progress in the latter goal though, but never the less the lack of a written form of the Somali language was a problem.120

On the political front the AFIS managed considerable success. In 1950 the Territorial Council (TC), a parliament of sorts with an advisory role, was established. General elections (no female suffrage) were held in the Italian trusteeship in 1956. The SYL became the largest party. Abdullaahi Iise, a SYL representative, became the first prime minister. Although the TC had power over domestic matters, the AFIS retained a right of veto to its decisions. In general the period from 1956 to independence was politically stable, although SYL interparty squabbling did occur.121

In British Somaliland the British administration was not very successful promoting in education or economic development. The latter was partially due to neglect during protectorate years. Political turmoil was raised by the return of parts of the Ogaden and Haud region to the Ethiopians by the British in 1954. To oppose the move, a new party emerged, the National United Front (NUF). Its cause however, was a lost one.122

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120 Samatar S. 1992
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
The British trusteeship officials did not allocate political power in Somali hands nearly as early as did their Italian counterparts. In 1957, in wake of political protests, a Legislative Council was established. The council originally consisted of six members representing the major clan-families. General elections in the south were held in 1960, in which the SNL and the USP proved victorious.\textsuperscript{123}

Due to popular demand the leaders of the north and south continued to press for independence and unification. British Somaliland received its independence on June 26, 1960, and united with the Italian trust territory on its independence day, July 1, 1960. Thus establishing the independent Somali Republic.\textsuperscript{124}

\textbf{3.2.2 Nation State, State of the Nation}

The first government of the newly independent Somali Republic was a coalition government of the SYL, SNL, and the USP. Prime Minister Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke’s government formed a precedent for years to come, as it was balanced out between northerners and southerners as well as the main clans, including his own Daarood. In spite of this, unification of north and south changed the political map to a great extent. For example prior to unification the Isaaq SNL had been the dominant power in the north and the Dir and Daarood USP pushed into opposition. Unification however, bestowed upon the USP a chance to increase its political influence by allying with the SYL.\textsuperscript{125}

In addition to reshuffling the political landscape, unification brought with it several problems pertaining to the differences in the administrative systems the British and the Italians had left behind in the north and the south respectively. These problems included different conditions of service and rates of pay. The latter condition was severe. In addition to the above, several other problems appeared with the differing legal systems as well as considerable fluctuations in tariffs and customs dues, and the lack of a common written tongue, just to mention a few.\textsuperscript{126}

The question of the Somali written tongue was also a question of interest to Islamic scholars. Several versions had been proposed, the adoption of Arabic being the one supported by

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{125} Ofcanky 2000, 905; Lewis 1988 A, 168.  
\textsuperscript{126} Lewis 1988 A, 170.
religious leaders. In spite of the language question, however it can not be said that any Islamist faction would have been present in the parliament, the National Assembly. Political Islam had not yet arrived on Somali soil.

Clan affiliations had played a major role in all political systems in Somalia in the past, and the independent republic was no exception. In spite of widespread pan-Somali nationalism, the clan remained the most important factor in the political arena. No other socio-political frame of reference simply carried as much weight as the clan. Thus, reluctantly, nationalist politicians had to make use of clan bonds to champion their causes. In addition to clan-lineages other fault lines did exist within Somali society. Examples of such are the north-south division and the pan-Somali question. These different fault lines were often contradictory. For example the north-south divide split the Daarood.

In June 1961 Somalia's first national election was held, which was a referendum on the constitution. The constitution was approved with flying colors in the south, in fact the number of votes for the constitution was greater than the entire population of the region, but it was supported by less than half of the northern voters. This was an expression of the doubts and resentments northerners had about the union. These in turn were sired by the negative effects the union had had on the north: A decline in status from a de facto nation-fledgling to province, and the unemployment caused by national level officials moving to Mogadishu from Hargeisa.

In May 1962 SNL dissidents split from the government, and later formed a new party, the Somali National Congress (SNC), which was predominantly a northern movement, but also comprised a southern Hawiye-backed SYL element. Although the formation of the SNC provided Somalia with three national parties as opposed to parties representing just one clan or area, it would seem that this ultimately was a step toward clan based politics. As a result of internal splits within the Daarood SYL, which were evident in the presidential elections of June 1967, the Dir-Isaaq-Hawiye-coalition which was the SNC lost its point and basically became an anti-Daarood party.

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127 Marchal 2004, 117.
All in all the first decade of independence was characterized, more or less, by a spirit of parliamentary democracy. In the March 1964 elections for the national assembly, opposition parties participated to an extent to verify this. The trend however was moving toward an authoritarian style rule, even before the rise of Siad Barre. The 1964 elections, as well as the 1967 presidential elections and its aftermath were marred by a split within the SYL-Daarood as mentioned above. As the 1969 general elections approached tribalism and clan based politics were on the rise. Political clan- and faction-based political parties were being jump-started before the election to rally clan support. As a result over sixty parties, represented by over a 1000 candidates, took part in the elections, but only five remained, after the elections were over. This was because there was a virtual stampede of parliament members to leave the opposition to join the government to claim their share of the spoils of office. At the end of the day, as the dust settled, only one member of parliament was in opposition! Somalia had become a de facto one-party state.\footnote{Marchal 2004, 117; Ofcansky 2002, 905-906; Lewis 1988 A,201-204.}

As the first decade of independence neared its end, government was more and more characterized, by corruption, nepotism, bad governance, and the increasingly authoritarian styles of the Prime Minister and the President. All in all the entire democratic period was politically as well as socially a tumultuous one containing everything from rigged elections to attempted military coup.\footnote{Lewis 1988 A, 202-207; Fox 2002, 143-144; Ofcansky, 2002, 906; Marchal 2004, 117.}

### 3.2.3 The Siad Barre Regime

The 1969 elections left behind an atmosphere of disappointment. Many factions were frustrated by the fact that, despite investments in campaigns, they did not achieve the political foothold they were vying for. The government of Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal became increasingly unpopular, and accusations of corruption were common. The days of the Igal government were numbered when on October 15\textsuperscript{th} 1969 President Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke was shot by one of his guards. When the SYL decided on a number of actions that would get Igal’s government re-appointed, the military decided to intervene.\footnote{Lewis 1988 A, 206-207.}

On October 21\textsuperscript{st} the army staged a coup, and placed the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) in power. The SRC was comprised of police- and army officers, and was headed by Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre, who soon became the head of state. The opening years
of the Barre Regime were marked by positive developments in the fields of education, namely literacy, and public welfare. Barre attempted, and partially succeeded, in uprooting corruption and distancing Somalis from clan loyalties.\textsuperscript{135}

One year into office Barre introduced a policy of “scientific socialism”. Important sectors of the economy were brought under government control, and in 1975 land was nationalized. From the beginning the system of land leases the Barre Regime set up was a victim of corruption. In addition to the economic sphere, also the military and political spheres were subject to socialist, namely Soviet, influence. In 1976 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was formed, which operated as a political control mechanism.\textsuperscript{136}

The military became increasingly dependent on Soviet equipment and assistance. Soviet military assistance to Somalia was not restricted to the years of the Barre regime as the government of Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shirmarke had signed a military aid agreement with the Soviet Union back in 1963. Other sectors of the security apparatus were also styled along soviet lines, as the National Security Service (NSS) was headed by a KGB-trained commander.\textsuperscript{137}

The NSS embodied the authoritarian aspect of the Barre Regime with its arbitrary powers of arrest and surveillance. Ironically in the light of Barre’s anti-tribalism campaign the NSS and other internal security organs were dominated by his Marehan\textsuperscript{138} clan. With time Barre’s rule became increasingly oppressive.\textsuperscript{139}

Siad Barre’s tampering with the clan system did not however end in denouncing tribalism. Barre, throughout his rule, played a vicious divida et impera -game on the clans. His system of pitting clan against clan was carefully devised to maximize his regime’s power. Neither did his favoritism end in the security apparatus. Increasingly throughout his rule Barre lavished government posts on the three Daarood clans that formed the cornerstone of his rule: his native Marehan, his mother’s Ogaden and his son-in-law’s Dolbahante (MOD).\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{135} Ofcansky 2002, 906; Fox 2000, 144-146.
\textsuperscript{136} Ofcansky 2002, 906.
\textsuperscript{137} Lewis 1988 A, 209-212.
\textsuperscript{138} Barre in fact was a member of the Red Dini, which was a sub-clan of the Marehan, which in turn belonged to the Daarood clan-family. See Menkhaus 2004, 24.
\textsuperscript{139} Lewis 1988 A, 209-212; Fox 2002, 145.
\textsuperscript{140} Besteman 2003, 292.
It is noteworthy to point out, that although General Barre attacked tribalism vehemently, the other, nearly as ancient institution, Islam went virtually un-harassed. Indeed, in 1972 Barre proclaimed that: “As far as socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message like Islam but a mere system for regulating the relations between man and his utilization of the means of production in this world.”. Although religion was not a prime target, Barre was no promoter of Islam either. In 1972 it was decided that the Latin alphabet would be utilized to form written Somalia, not Arabic. In 1975 a secular Family Code was adopted, which in turn was strongly opposed by religious circles. The Barre regime however, did not look kindly upon criticism from religious scholars, and a campaign was initiated aimed against “religiously backward-oriented people”.141

The rise and spread of political Islam, or Islamism coincided with the Barre regime. In February 1974 Somalia joined the Arab League, which increased the number of Somalis being trained in religious schools in the Middle-East. This in turn aided the spread of Islamic ideas. This trend was strengthened by the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, as well as close trade relations with the UAE and Wahhabist Saudi Arabia. Several Islamist organizations were founded in Somalia just before or during the Barre regime. Very little is known about these groups, and very little verified information exists on their activities or importance, although they do not seem to have had much of an impact, not at least before the beginning of the Somali Civil war.142

Islamist organizations of the period included at least Wahdat Shabab al Islami143 (Islamic Youth Unity) and Jama’at Ahlal Islah144 (Society of Islamic people). Wahdat Shabab al Islami was founded in 1969 in Hargeysa. It suffered from prosecution by the Barre regime and supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the early nineties. Jama’at Ahlal Islah was founded by an Egyptian trained Islamic cleric who was openly critical of the Barre regime, and the organization was thus disbanded. Jama’at Ahlal Islah, however later re-emerged as Jama’at Islah145 (reform group).146 As stated there is very little information on these groups, and very little in known about them. In general, whatever their impact may have been, Islamism did to appear as an alternative to the Barre regime. Islamism simply could not

142 Marchal 2004, 116-121.
143 Translitteration from Arabic, Waxda in Somali.
144 Translitteration from Arabic, Ahli in Somali.
145 Translitteration from Arabic, Jamaca Islaax in Somali
mobilize enough widespread support. The reasons for this are linked, among other things, to the clan-system.\footnote{Marchal 2004, 120-121.}

Barre’s struggle for Somali nationalism peaked with his 1977 attempt to militarily wrestle control of the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden from Ethiopia. The situation that came to be as Barre’s troops entered Ethiopia in July 1977 was rather peculiar: Ethiopia and Somalia were both client states, of sorts, of the Soviet Union, as the Soviet backed Colonel Mengistu who had taken power in February 1977. Initially Somalia was not officially invading the Ogaden, but only supporting the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), an Ogadeni armed movement. Somalia officially entered the war in February 1978. Despite of initial success, Somali forces were forced to withdraw by the Ethiopians who received considerable military assistance from Cuba and the USSR. The latter had stepped up to take patronage of Ethiopia as the USA withdrew, and in the process abandoned Barre.\footnote{Fox 2000, 145; Lewis 1988 A, 235-238; Ofcansky 2002, 906.}

The Ogaden war had serious repercussions for the Barre regime. Generally speaking, for the Barre regime, three problems arose out of the war: A large refugee problem from the Ogaden, the loss of a generous superpower patron, and widespread criticism at home. As Ethiopia reconquered the Ogaden, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to Somalia, causing a nearly 20% increase in population, a host of problems, and an influx of western aid.\footnote{Lewis 1988 A, 235-257.}

Politically more serious than the refugee problem was Barre’s break with the USSR. As the Soviets sided with Colonel Mengistu, Barre was left without his most powerful ally. In the middle of the Ogaden war this was a serious blow to Barre, since the USSR had been his main supplier of weapons and other military hardware. Thus Barre was left with only the support of a few states. The break with the Soviets, announced publicly on November 13th 1977, was received well by the Somali public. This was because the Russians had never been very popular in Somalia, as Somalis widely associated the Russians “…with the more oppressive aspects of Siyads regime.” Denouncing the Soviets thus actually boosted the popularity of Barre’s government. Owing to Cold War mechanism however, the loss of Russian aid was a short lived predicament: The US soon stepped in to take the place of Somalia’s superpower patron. Symbolic of this, in March 1982 Barre paid his first official visit to the US.\footnote{Ibid, 235-257.}
As it was a severe blow to Somali nationalism, the Ogaden defeat was widely criticized, and that criticism was voiced more and more openly. Discontent was widespread. In April 1978 a military coup was staged in southern Somalia by a number of colonels from the Majerteyn clan. The coup was unsuccessful, but unrest continued. The Majerteyn-elements in the Mudugh area associated with the unsuccessful coup formed an armed resistance group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by the end of 1981. The SSDF began its military operations with Ethiopian support. Simultaneously with the rise of the SSDF there appeared another resistance group, the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM was mainly a front for the elements of the Isaaq clan based in Togdher region. Like the SSDF the SNM perpetrated a series of military operations against forces loyal to Barre. Barre retaliated with dictatorial brutality; on the other hand.  

After the Ogaden war Barre’s rule became even more authoritarian and oppressive. He began more and more to favor his own clan, the Marehan. The old MOD tripartite alliance was discarded. Barre was, what Lewis calls a “practical Machiavelli”, and he acted accordingly. He armed other clans to fight those in opposition to his rule, thus preventing them from forming a coherent alliance. His tactics of political survival could only be described as *divida et impera*. Barre utilized the same methods within his government. He was hell bent on remaining in power. 

Internal struggles increased after Barre’s May 1986 car accident, which he barely survived. Barre was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia until June. Barre’s absence and apparent incomplete recovery caused certain Marehan elements to become increasingly concerned with their own political survival. Different elements within the Marehan began competing for power and making preparations in case of Barre’s withdrawal.

### 3.2.4 Civil War and Intervention

Toward the end of the 1980’s, insurgency in Somalia advanced to the level of civil war. Managing the insurgency became the main concern of the Barre regime. Armed insurgencies were dealt with ruthlessly by the armed forces and security services. Such hard line tactics were not successful in putting down the insurgency, but rather encouraged armed resistance, and indirectly gave rise to several resistance groups.

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151 Ibid, 251-255.
153 Ibid, 254-255.
In addition to the SSDF and the SNM, numerous other, mainly clan based, factions arose to resist the Barre regime and compete for power: the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), the Somali National Front (SNF), and several others. The USC drew its support mainly from the Hawiye clans of central Somalia. The SPM, launched in 1989, on the other hand was distinctively Ogadeni and the SDA hailed from the Gadabursi (a clan of the Dir clan-family). The SNF seems to have been an alliance formed between different Daarood elements, including Barre supporters.

These different groups wielded various amounts of power in Somalia. In fact, since alliances were shifting in nature, the relative power of these groups was in a state of constant change. Alliances were made and broken in rapid succession. Alliances and deals were also formed over clan lines, as one sub-clan would seek support or protection against another sub-clan. Table 1 sums the clan affiliations of some the different factions.

Table 1: Clan Affiliations of the Different Factions and Armed Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
<td>Majerteyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
<td>Isaaq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
<td>Hawiye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
<td>Ogadeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>Gadabursi (Dir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
<td>Daarood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These factions competed and fought with each other as well as Barre supporters. As their only political or ideological goal seems to have been power, they were rarely able to cooperate. One significant exception to this rule was made however in August 1990 when the SNM, SPM, and the USC agreed to act in unison to oust Barre. A series of events, however led to Barre’s downfall sooner than many had expected.

155 See chart (fig. 2) in Chopra – EKnes – Nordbø, 26.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
As fighting broke out between two Hawiye subclans within the USC fold, the Abgal and the Habr Gedir. Barre tried to utilize the chaos brought forth by the infighting to destroy the USC, but ended up setting off a popular uprising against his government. Anti-Barre militias flooded Mogadishu as the USC and the SPM brought in more troops. With the newfound strength of increased numbers, they were able to force Barre and his followers out of Mogadishu. Barre’s 22-year reign had come to an end.\(^{159}\)

After President Siad Barre’s fall from power in January 1991, Somalia was plunged deeper into chaos and civil war. Several, mostly clan-based, political factions fought for power. An abundance of small arms left behind by years of superpower patronage helped fan the flames. As Somalia had suffered from drought a few years earlier, famine was rampant. This famine was deeply aggravated by the civil war, and 300,000 lives were lost. In addition, 1.5 million people were in great danger of perishing. One million people were displaced.\(^{160}\)

The fiercest fighting took place in Mogadishu, between the two Hawiye factions: the Habr Gedir of General Mohamed Farah Aidid and the Abgal Ali Mahdi Mohamed, both USC factions which had fought each other before. This protracted violence was a result of the inability of the two Hawiye factions to share power: Whilst Aidid was still occupied chasing Barre outside Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi set up an government and had himself proclaimed Interim President\(^{161}\)

After an impressive round of diplomacy by United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James Jonah and others, both factions in Mogadishu agreed to accept the deployment of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, as well as 20 unarmed military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. As a prelude to what was to come, the observers were fired upon soon after they arrived. Thus UNOSOM started off as a simple observer mission, grew to become the largest peace-support mission in UN history, only to be brought down as quickly as it was begun.\(^{162}\)

\(^{159}\) Ibid, 27.
\(^{161}\) Ibid.
\(^{162}\) Stevenson 1995, 9
On April 24th 1992 resolution 751 was adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC). In it the UNSC established United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The “commanders intent” for UNOSOM was that a small contingent of unarmed United Nations military observers would monitor the cease fire in Mogadishu, and the intended security element would provide security for UN personnel and supplies as well as escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to the rest of the country. I.e. the international community resorted to military means as civilian ones simply could not safely stand alone. On September 14th 1992, the first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu.163

Humanitarian supplies however, were not reaching those in need. Supply convoys were often looted, sometimes by the same Somali gunmen that were paid to protect them.164 As a response to continuing famine the UNSC authorized the use of force to ensure the flow of humanitarian relief. This move preceded the deployment of a large military force consisting mainly of US forces165. The operation was known to the UN as Unified Task Force (UNITAF), but US officials dubbed it Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF forces were deployed from December 9th 1992 onward.166 By the beginning of 1993 supplies were once again being delivered. Later on UNITAF was “painted blue” and responsibility was transferred over to a new UN mission, UNOSOM II.167

As Somalia remained extremely unstable and violent, UNOSOM II was beginning to have problems. Aidid and the UN had been suspicious of each other from the beginning, and soon after being established, UNOSOM II, partially due to influence of US officials, de facto declared war on Aidid. Soon the inevitable happened: In June 1993 UNOSOM II-forces clashed with Aidid’s militia. The UN body count was 24 Pakistani soldiers killed. Several battles ensured. UNOSOM attacks on Aidid’s forces were spearheaded by the US Rapid Deployment Force (USRDF). UNOSOM was no longer an outside arbiter of, but a party to, civil war. After the Battle of Mogadishu (in which 18 US servicemen were killed) Washington changed its policy. The US decided to withdraw its forces by March 1994. Most

163 UN: UNOSOM I Background.
164 Stevenson 1995, 7-8.
165 In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. (UN: UNOSOM I Background).
166 UN: UNOSOM I Background
167 Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI) / UN - the Peace and Security Section / DPI / UN - Department of Peacekeeping Operations / UN: UNOSOM II Background. Published on the UN website, available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2backgr2.html>. (UN: UNOSOM II Background)
European countries followed suit. A severely weakened UNOSOM was withdrawn in March 1995, a month ahead of schedule.

### 3.2.5 The Rise of Islamism?

After UNOSOM’s retreat, chaos prevailed in Somalia proper. Different USC factions in Mogadishu continued to fight each other, as well as other factions. The northern part of the country however experienced what was the rise of a semblance of government. In the Isaaq dominated northwest the republic of Somaliland was formed, while the mostly Majerteen northeast saw the rise of Puntland.  

Somaliland had declared independence from Somalia on May 18th 1991. Though not recognized by the UN as an independent state, Somaliland began to build up all the trappings of statehood and managed to restore a semblance of normalcy to everyday life. After a short period of renewed infighting, order was reestablished in 1997. Somaliland remains unrecognized internationally, but has been moderately successful in building a functioning state structure.

The north-eastern region of Somalia, roughly one-third of Somalia’s geographical area, followed a “similar yet different” path as Somaliland had. The north-eastern region, dominated by the Majerteyn sub-clan of the Daarood, was cleansed from Barre supporters by the Majerteyn SSDF in the early years of the 1990’s. The SSDF was successful in consolidating its power in the region, and driving out the AIAI, which had become troublesome. After initial problems, in 1998 the SSDF and its allies formed the Puntland state of Somalia. Puntland did not however, follow Somaliland in declaring independence, but has remained an autonomous region of Somalia.

Since the fall of Barre’s government, over a dozen peace initiatives or peace conferences have been held, most complete failures. In 2000 the Djibouti government sponsored the so-called Arta process, named after the Djiboutian town of Arta where the conference was held. Though rife with problems, the process managed the formation of the Transitional National

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Government (TNG). Although recognized by the UN, the TNG soon disintegrated into just another faction. Its mandate expired in August 2003. Yet another peace initiative had failed. Interestingly enough, several Islamist factions, including court representatives jockeyed for power and a position in government in a manner resembling that of secular factions. Behaving like just another Somali faction cost the Islamists considerable credibility.\textsuperscript{172}

The TNG was followed by yet another attempt to form a central government. This time talks were held from 2002 to 2004 by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The peace talks resulted in the proclamation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG was made up of a 275 member parliament and a cabinet consisting of over 80 members. Abdullahi Yusuf became Somalia’s “President” and Ali Mohamed Ghedi became the TFG’s Prime Minister. The TFG, effectively a loose power sharing coalition dominated by the Daarood, was vehemently anti-Islamist and pro-Ethiopian. Its plans to bring foreign (including Ethiopian) peacekeepers to Mogadishu made it increasingly unpopular among the Hawiye and the Islamists. This despite the fact that Ali Mohamed Ghedi was Hawiye in origin.\textsuperscript{173}

Tensions between the TFG, different warlord and their factions and the different Islamic factions began to rise. By the end of 2006 a large group of Somali warlords had formed the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). The ARPCT seemingly received large amounts of US financial backing. This however was not enough to keep the warlords in power: By June/July 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU, see chapter 3.3.3) had expelled ARPCT forces from Mogadishu. The ICU soon went on to capture large amounts of the southern half of Somalia. ICU rule was moderately popular, as it provided a modicum of law and order an contrast to the anarchy which had characterized Somalia since the collapse of Barre’s regime.\textsuperscript{174}

The ICU’s rise to power made Ethiopia nervous. This was due to several reasons. ICU official had already displayed pan-Somali tendencies, possibly harbouring intentions to incorporate


Ethiopia’s Somali territories into a greater Somalia. Some top ICU figures were closely associated with Ethiopia’s old rival, the AIAI. The ICU effectively made the prospects of the pro-Ethiopian TFG ever gaining control of Somalia look grim indeed. All in all an ICU controlled, possibly Islamist Somalia was, from the Ethiopian perspective, a legitimate geopolitical threat.  

To counter this threat, Ethiopia sent military forces into Somalia at the end of 2006. Ethiopian military might quickly routed the ICU militia, and the Islamist were forced to retreat. The lightly armed ICU militia did not stand a chance against the massive firepower of Ethiopian regular forces backed by air strikes and artillery fire. ICU forces however were not destroyed, only forced to change their tactics. Numerous different groups have moved from direct resistance to fighting an unconventional insurgency against the Ethiopians and TFG forces. Civilian casualties, an unavoidable consequence of fighting large battles in densely populated Mogadishu, have been numerous.

All in all chaos and war have once again drowned Somalia in their deadly embrace. Battles between rival groups are constant. Pirates pray on maritime traffic along Somalia’s shores. An Islamic insurgency continues to fight government forces and Ethiopian troops. Somalia’s neighbors continue to play out their rivalries by supporting their proxies in Somalia. Somalia suffers yet another humanitarian catastrophe, as large amounts of people have been forced to leave their homes because of the fighting. This catastrophe has been aggravated by the fact that some international humanitarian NGOs have been force to evacuate their personnel and cease all operations. The present situation in Somalia looks bleak indeed.

175 Ibid.
3.3 Islamic movements in Somalia

The potential terrorist threat in present day Somalia comes exclusively from Islamic movements. Thus the history and nature of these movements is worth studying. As discussed above, the history of political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic movements in Somalia is rather brief. The Islamic movement was transported to Somalia from Arabic countries via students mainly during the Barre regime. Small factions and Islamic study groups grew active during the 80’s. Such groups were typically made up of young educated men, possibly educated in the Arab countries. These groups were originally part of or closely linked with the Muslim Brotherhood, but soon formed their own movements.

Islamic movements in present day Somalia can be roughly classified according to functions and long term objectives into jihad-movements, political Islamic movements, and Islamist services. Jihad-movements have resorted to violence to promote the “House of Islam” (Islamic lands) and Islamic community against infidels. Political Islamic movements are movements which prioritize political movement, not armed struggle. Some rather extravagant claims have been made about Somali’s al-Qaida connections, but most seem to be based on rather unreliable information. In fact, Al-Qaida’s Somali endeavors ran into several problems in the early 1990’s. It is reasonable to assume that some of the same problems persist today.

3.3.1 Jihad-movements

Jihad-movements, Jihadi Islamism or jihadism are rather small in Somalia, and do not constitute a mass movement in themselves. Of the Islamic movements in Somalia, the one which is most infamous in terms of the GWOT is naturally al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI). Soon after the 9/11 attacks AIAI appeared on a US list of organizations linked to terrorism. However AIAI, in its original form, no longer seems to exists. Its present importance and magnitude, even its very existence is subject to debate.

The history of the AIAI begins with an Islamic movement al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, which aimed at purification of Islam. It was originally just a religious organization without political

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178 Menkhaus 2005, 32-33.
180 Roughly this classification used in ICG 2005 and Menkhaus 2005.
182 ICG 2005, 3-4.
ambitions as such. Many of its leading figures were later to become leaders of AIAI. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya gradually became affiliated with a similar organization from northern Somalia named Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islamiyya. During the first half of the 1980’s the two organizations loosely merged to form the AIAI. AIAI grew very popular with students, offering an ideology to replace Barre’s scientific socialism. AIAI followers also clashed with Sufis from time to time. As the decade drew towards its end AIAI became more and more popular, and even openly criticized the Barre regime.\(^{183}\)

When the Somali civil war broke out AIAI originally refused take part in the armed struggle like other factions, even though it was prodded to do so by a number of Somali mujaheddin from Aghanistan. However, as the USC captured Mogadishu, the Daarood members of AIAI, along with the other Daarood were pushed out. A militant faction of Daarood AIAI members fought Aidid’s USC, but was soundly defeated, and the AIAI was scattered. The battles with the USC, although they ended in defeat, convinced a large number of AIAI of the necessity of armed struggle to further their goals.\(^{184}\)

During the first decade civil war the AIAI aspired several times to permanently gain control of certain areas, but failed.\(^{185}\) These areas included the port town of Bosaaso, the port town of Laas Qorayon on the Red Sea coast, Buulo Haawa, and the town of Luuq. Luuq was AIAI’s most important possession, but in 1996 it was driven out by Ethiopian forces.\(^{186}\) While controlling Luuq the AIAI had problems establishing an universalist Islamist identity that would transcend clan: Most of the AIAI leadership was from the locally dominant Marehan. Islamic rule attracted Islamists from other clans to move to Luuq. This resulted in the local secular Marehan leadership portraying the AIAI as a foreign influence. Thus the AIAI was forced to insist that it was Marehan, while at the same time preaching the predominance of religion over clan affiliations. The more it emphasized its Marehan nature, the more it alienated members of clans from the jihadist cause. On the other hand, the more it claimed that Islam was its members’ only clan, the more it furthered itself from the locally powerful Marehan.\(^{187}\)

AIAI learned from its mistakes, and altered its tactics. It gave up trying to directly control territory, thus denying its enemies a target to direct firepower against. AIAI began to operate

\(^{183}\) ICG 2005, 3-4.
\(^{184}\) Menkhaus 2005, 4-5.
\(^{185}\) Menkhaus, 2002, 109-123.
\(^{186}\) ICG 2005, 5-9.
\(^{187}\) Menkhaus 2002, 58.
in different clan frameworks, offering social and educational services. AIAI aimed to infiltrate the business sector as well as local administrative bodies. AIAI also managed to infiltrate some of the different sharia-court being established throughout the country.\textsuperscript{188} Reports claimed that the AIAI was \textit{de facto} disbanded. Whether or not this is the state of matters, it remains that some AIAI “alumni” have continued the jihadist struggle, albeit with new terror tactics. Tactics which somewhat resemble those employed by al-Qaida affiliated movements in the Middle-East.\textsuperscript{189}

Unlike some US officials would have it understood\textsuperscript{190}, AIAI is not just another name for the Islamic Courts Union, ICU, which gained control of most of southern Somalia by fall 2006. However, connections do exist and they function..\textsuperscript{191} For example recent reports of foreign fighter testify to this.\textsuperscript{192} Thus it is probable that if the ICU had remained in power, AIAI’s remnants operational capabilities would have increased. Despite the Ethiopian intervention, this may yet happen. Especially if Somali Islamists fighting the Ethiopian occupation are widely perceived as fighting for Somalia against a foreign invader instead of an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{193}

### 3.3.2 Political Islam

Political Islamic movements in Somalia can be seen to be composed of different factions, traditionalists and Salafist reformists, “nonviolent” Salafists and other groups.\textsuperscript{194} Below a few of relative importance will be briefly discussed. It must be noted that what is now of these groups is rather unreliable. Analysts disagree on the true nature of many of these groups, their organizations and demarcation lines between each other and between themselves and the AIAI.

By far the largest group is that of Sufi traditionalists, many of which operate trough the remnants of the Sufi brotherhoods. These Brotherhoods have lost much of their influence through the course of the civil war. Some of the traditionalists had organized themselves into an organization by the name of Majma’ ‘Ulimadda Islaamka Ee Soomaaliya, Majma for short.

\textsuperscript{188} Menkahus, 2002, 109-123.
\textsuperscript{189} ICG 2005, 11-12.
\textsuperscript{192} McGregor 2007 C, 6-9.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Menkhaus 2005, 32-38.
In 1991 Aidid approached Majma’ and proposed cooperation against jihadists. Those that accepted Aidid’s call broke away from Majma’ to form a traditionalist umbrella organization called Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ).  

Majma’s aim is uphold the Islamic values it hold dear, preferably through a Somali government that will adhere to the Shafi’i madhhab tradition of Sharia-law. Majma’ has concentrated on providing basic services, like religious education. Majma’ id not engaged in politics, but vehemently support establishing the authority of Sharia-law, and thus support the Sharia-courts. It seems that Majma’ is what it claims to be; a group of Islamic scholars supporting Sharia-law.

ASWJ is an organization of Somali Sufi leaders that opposes the rise of reformist Islamist groups, protecting Somali Islamic practices from foreign, i.e. Wahhabist, influences. It has lost most of its power since the early 90’s. Even its founding father of sorts, Aidid, abandoned it rather soon after its formation. ASWJ’s grates strength however, remains to be cultural nationalism, as it seeks to portray Wahhabism, Salafist reformists, and the AIAI as non-Somali.

Progressive reformists are an important political Islamic group in modern Somalia. Of these probably the most prominent is the non-Salafist Harakat al-Islah. Al-Islah’s ideological roots lay with the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Islah aims to reform Islam to meet modern challenges. More specifically, it advocates the formation of a Islamic state not in contradiction with democratic values. Its members are mostly educated urban professionals and students, and it is centered in Mogadishu. Formed in the late 1970’s it began operating openly only after Siad Barre’s downfall. Presently al-Islah’s activities, like those of several other Islamic movements, focus on education.

Al-Islah has bee keen to stress that it is not fundamentalist, not anti-western, not anti-democratic, and that it most certainly is not the political wing of the AIAI. The credibility of these claims have been widely called into question. Al-Islah, however does practice a democracy of sort within its own ranks, and it has performed friendly gestures toward the US, while not refraining from criticizing the US’s GWOT-actions in Somalia. Its relationship with the AIAI is definitely not friendly; the two movements are ideologically incompatible and

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195 Menkhaus 2005, 32-38; ICG 2005, 16
196 ICG, 16-17.
their methods differ greatly. Al-Islah is (at least potentially) a moderating factor within the Somali Islamic scene.\textsuperscript{199}

In addition to the militant AIAI, other Salafist movements exist in Somalia. Groups such as Al Tabliq and Majuma Ulema are highly conservative, but have denounced the use of violence to forward their salafist goals. However, the actual distance between such groups as Al Tabliq and Somali Jihadists is hard to discern.\textsuperscript{200}

### 3.3.3 Sharia-courts

When the Barre regime collapsed, along with it collapsed the judicial structures of the Somali Republic. In the chaos that followed Barre’s demise, the need for some kind of legal and security structures was evident. This need was answered by the formation of the Sharia-courts. The early courts drew their power from the two factors that continued to hold sway in Somalia: the clan system and Islam. Each court was appointed by a clan (or sub-clan) and had jurisdiction only over its members. Islamic sharia-law was turned to, partially because of the lack of any alternative. The rise of the courts was slow, but by the end of 1996 several courts had been established and new ones were being founded. The courts benefited the general public by supplying a degree of security and rule-of-law while simultaneously providing Somali businessmen with a secure environment for trade. In return the local businessmen helped finance the court and its militia. It must be noted however that court militias were not and are not solely composed of devout Muslim mujaheddin. While being partially better disciplined than traditional clan militias they are mostly composed of normal militiamen who will work for any employer that pays them enough.\textsuperscript{201}

As the court system grew, the court began to cooperate coordinate their actions. The Shari’\’a Implementation Council was formed in Mogadishu in 2000, but not much came of the initiative and it was soon forgotten. In 2004, the formation of a larger sharia-court organization was attempted a second time, and thus the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of Somalia (SCICS) (here also referred to as the Islamic Courts Union, ICU) was formed. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was appointed as its chairman. With the formation of the Council, the Sharia-court system began to expand and gain popular support. Popularity among the general

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid, 34.  
\textsuperscript{201} Menkhaus 2005, 36-37; ICG 2005, 19-20.
public was a direct result of the security the courts provided. There is some confusion related to the actual links between the SCICS and the ICU.  

The Courts are not a uniform group with a uniform ideological record. Rather, they are a very heterogeneous collection of factions with differing agendas and differing ideologies, including AIAI elements. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is a moderate ASWJ affiliate, but his deputies Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Adan Hashi Ayro are (former) high ranking AIAI. The ICU is of course not void of clan connections, and can bee seen to be dominated by the Hawiye, especially in the Mogadishu region. However, it would be going too far to call it a *distinctively* Hawiye faction.

As mentioned, several factions have started an insurgency against Ethiopian forces after the invasion, several of them Islamic in background. The most prominent, and infamous, of these groups is the former “elite” militia of the ICU. This militia, known as “Shabaab” (Youth), is now an Islamist extremist militia fighting Ethiopian and TFG forces. Its ultimate goal is the formation of an Islamist Somalia. Despite US claims of al-Qaida connections, Shabaab seems to be a distinctively Somali organization, albeit with the un-Somali characteristic of seeking to offer an alternative to clan -based militias. This may not be solely propaganda, for while many former ICU militiamen have returned into the fold of their clans’ militias, Shabaab combatants remain dedicated to their Islamist goals. Known for its ruthless methods, Shabaab continues to fight an insurgency against Ethiopian and TFG forces, possibly with Eritrean backing. Shabaab’s present strength is estimated at several hundred. Other insurgent factions include the “Tawhid wa’l-Jihad Brigades in Somalia” (Unity and Struggle) and “The Young Mujahideen Movement in Somalia”. One of the most powerful resistance groups could possibly turn out to be the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS). The ALS, formed by ICU remnants and other opposition elements with Eritrean backing may be able to at least temporarily, unify many different opposition factions against a common enemy, the Ethiopian occupation forces.

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4. The United States War on Terror in Somalia

Ever since the terror attacks of September 11th, the United States has been perpetrating a series of policies, operations, programs and initiatives to protect the United States’ citizens, national security, and global interests from terrorist attacks. These actions have raised a lot of controversy abroad and at home; indeed, no consensus has been reached in what the phenomenon should be called. Some government officials have even forbid their subordinates from using certain terms to describe it. It has been dubbed “a global struggle against violent extremism”, “The Long War”, “the global war on terror” and “ongoing military operations throughout the world” as well as other similar expressions. Here we shall call it the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the expression President Bush (jr.) used in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks.

Irregardless of name it is without doubt that the GWOT will be a prolonged, large scale, multifaceted, and casualty ridden struggle. Without a clear symmetrical opponent to strike at with massive firepower, the United States faces an opponent which is probably more elusive and more capable of adapting than any foe it has faced in the past. Naturally, to defeat such a foe as international terrorists, a versatile strategy, encompassing a multitude of means and assets is required. Thus, the GWOT is to be fought simultaneously on many different fronts, political and military as well as economic.

Below I shall briefly discuss the policies behind the GWOT and contrast them with the actions the US has taken in the Horn of Africa. As stated above, for research purposes the US strategy for the GWOT will be derived from The National Security Strategy of the United

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209 White - Scott Tyson 2006.
211 Maze 2007
States of America (2006, NSS 2006)\(^{212}\), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004, NMS 2004)\(^{213}\), the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism\(^{214}\) (NMSP-WOT), the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism\(^{215}\) (NSCT), and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QRD2006)\(^{216}\). Although said documents do not solely focus on terrorism, it never the less, remains pivotal. These documents are somewhat different in nature and purpose. They partially overlap whilst simultaneously discussing similar themes from rather different points of view.

These documents have been chosen because they represent different sectors of the US government, and represent both civilian and military viewpoints. The NSS2006 is a product of the executive branch, while the NMS2004 is issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSCT was released by President Bush and his administration while the NMSP-WOT was released, with DoD consent, by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Marine General Peter Pace. The QRD2006 is a product of the DoD. The relations of these documents will be discussed below. Other potential documents include the The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (NDS2005)\(^{217}\), Joint Publication 1 – Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP12007)\(^{218}\), Joint Publication 3-07.2 - Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism (JP 3-07.2)\(^{219}\), The 9/11 Commission Report, and several other documents. Due to the limited nature of this paper, analysis must be restricted to those policy documents mentioned above.

Several documents concerning recent or ongoing military operations, as well as intelligence reports, and security assessments and similar documents are classified and unavailable. Thus, when it comes to operational specifics, I have relied mostly on international news services and “educated guesses”. Therefore what follows can not be an accurate operational


description. It must be noted however, that military details are more or less irrelevant for the questions at hand; what matters most is the *nature* of the US involvement in Somalia.

### 4.1 The Global War on Terror: Policy

The NSS2006, the NDS2005, the NMS2004, the NSCT2006, the NMSP-WOT, and the QRD2006 hail from different levels of government, and are documents of different policy levels. While they may all be coined as the “strategic”, there exists a hierarchy between them. The NSS is of course the first and foremost of these documents, from it are derived all others. The following diagram depicts this hierarchy:

**Diagram 4: Hierarchy of National Strategies of the United States**

220 Adopted from: Lagerstam, Kaarel- Puistola, Juha-Antero – Sirén, Torsti: *Yhdysvaltalainen sotilasstrategia täänään*. Publications 2, no. 21,Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University, Helsinki 2003, 1; NMSP-WOT, 9.
As depicted in Diagram 4, the NSS lays down the basic guidelines for the NMS and the QRD, the QRD also influences the NMS and through it, Joint Publications. One discrepancy must be noted here: The NMS available while writing was the NMS2004, which is not based on the NSS2006 and the newest QRD, but rather the previous NSS and QRD. The same goes for the NDS2005. While this is not a major problem, it must be kept in mind.

Each of these documents provides, directly or indirectly, “official” insight into the nature and causes of, and solutions to, the threat posed by terrorism. While not all of the documents go into specifics, they none the less give insight into the policies behind the GWOT. Each document will be analyzed below in light of three factors:

1. How each document defines, classifies, or describes terrorists / terrorism and the GWOT.
2. What each document list as factors causing or not causing terrorism.
3. What each document sees as solutions to the terrorist threat, short- or long-term

The purpose of this analysis is to reveal major trends in the policy working behind the GWOT.

### 4.1.1 The Nature of Terrorism

The third chapter of the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS2006) is titled “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks against Us and Our Friends”\(^{221}\). The Chapter presents an overview of past events, failures and, successes pertaining to the GWOT. The most important successes in the past listed are the ousting of al-Qaida from Afghanistan, the ongoing struggle against terrorists in Iraq, the dismantling al-Qaida’s command structure (i.e. killing or capturing central characters), the rise of an international consensus to condemn terrorism as a means, and other positive developments. Listed failures (or challenges as the NSS puts it) are the transformation of terrorist organizations into a more elusive form, numerous destructive terrorist attacks around the globe, the use of the ongoing battle in Iraq as a propaganda tool by terrorist elements, and continued support from certain nations to terrorist elements. The NSS goes on to define the War on Terror (WOT) as an armed struggle and an ideological battle, as well as list the genesis of terrorism. The NSS is specific of the fact that the WOT is “a battle of ideas, it is

\(^{221}\) NSS2006, 8.
not a battle of religions.” The NSS is careful not to equate Islam with terrorism. Indeed, Islam is referred to as “the proud religion of Islam.” 222

The QRD2006 defines terrorist organizations, or “global non-state terrorist networks” as it calls them, as “distributed multi-national and multi-ethnic networks”. According to the QRD2006 such terrorist networks are attacking the populations of the US and its allies in the GWOT to undermine their resolve to carry on the fight. Their ultimate goal is seen to be the establishment of a theocratic totalitarian order, spanning the entire Muslim world. The QRD2006 list a number of means terrorist networks use to perpetrate their acts of violence. According to the QRD2006 terrorist networks utilize the hallmarks of globalization, free movement of information, ideas, goods, services, capital, people, and technology, to carry out their attacks. Modern communications technology, cell phones, e-mail, twenty four hour news feeds, and the internet are readily used. One major objective for terrorist networks is to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 223

The QRD2006 sees the GWOT as a long war which is different from all earlier conflicts. This difference arises from three factors: the nature of the adversary the US faces the nature of the theater of war, and the means by which such a war can be won. The enemy differs from earlier wars because it is not a nation state, but dispersed non-state networks. War is not fought clearly is some country or along a border, but rather operations are executed globally and within the borders of nations the US is not necessarily at war with. The QRD 2006 also clearly states that the GWOT “…cannot be won by military force alone…” 224

The NMS2004, being a wholeheartedly military document, does not try to define terrorism as such. Rather, it lists “Adversaries… from states to non-state organizations to individuals” that the US military faces. As far as terrorism is concerned the NMS2004 elaborates that some states sponsor terrorists by providing them sanctuary, financial resources, and other capabilities. Non-state actors and individuals also pose a threat. According to the NMS2004 these adversaries may be resistant or immune to traditional deterrence and capable of countering US power projection capabilities. These adversaries specifically target civilians, economic centers and, symbolic locations. The aim of these actions is to strike at the political will and resolve of the United States. 225

222 Ibid, 8-9.
224 Ibid, 9.
225 NMS2004, 4-5.
The NSCT2006 closely echoes the tones and themes of the NSS2006. The NSCT2006, describes terrorist networks as having changed and evolved since the 9/11 attacks as a result of counterterrorism efforts. According to the NSCT2006 the main adversary of the US in the GWOT is a “…transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals…” This movement is backed by a number of state and non-state supporters and is animated by a twisted and violent interpretation of Islam.226

The NSCT2006 stresses that the international terrorist movement is not a clear hierarchical organization, but rather collection of separate entities, which share the same general ideological framework. The NSCT2006 calls this ideology an ideology of ”oppression, violence, and hate”. The aim of these violent extremists is to banish western powers from the Muslim world and set up totalitarian theocratic regimes based on a violent interpretation of Islam. The most radical elements within this movement, i.e. al-Qaida, aim even higher: to establish a pan-Islamic empire of global proportions. The goals are to be attained by exploiting controversies between the Muslim and non-Muslim world as well as within the Muslim world itself. This terrorist enemy does not discriminate when selecting targets and will strike at civilians without hesitation, and is constantly seeking weapons of mass destruction. The NSCT2006 also recognizes the existence of secular, limited terrorist networks not affiliated with radical Islam.227

The NSCT2006 also describes the War on Terror and the United States’ strategy for it. The NSCT2006 describes the GWOT as a twofold battle, similarly to the NSS2006. The War on Terror is depicted to be an armed struggle as well as ideological battle, or rather” …a battle of arms and a battle of ideas… a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology”. The War itself can also be divided into to distinct sections or phases. In the short run the war will be fought utilizing “hard” anti-terrorism means, i.e. neutralizing terrorist operatives and their force multipliers. In the long run the battle will hinge on winning the ideological aspect of the war.228

The NMSP-WOT sees the main terrorist threat in similar terms as the NSCT2006: “…extremist organizations, networks, and individuals… and their state and non-state supporters…”. The most important threat is the al-Qaida Associated Movement (AQAM). The AQAM consists of al-Qaida and other groups linked to it. Al-Qaida is no longer a

226 NSCT2006, 5-6.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid, 7.
hierarchical organization but rather an global “extremist movement”, characterized by a highly adaptable cellular structure. This cellular structure is also characteristic of other terrorist networks, and is a great challenge to counter-terrorism efforts. The NMSP-WOT identifies nine basic components that are critical “elements of operation and survival” for terrorist networks. These are Leadership, Safe Havens, Finance, Communications, Movement, Intelligence, Weapons, Personnel, and Ideology. It is attacking these components that the NMSP-WOT sees as the way to undermine the terrorist networks center of gravity, i.e. remove the threat they pose. It is however recognized, that these components are not uniform and may vary a great deal.\textsuperscript{229}

The plan describes the GWOT in rather paradoxical term. It recognizes that the GWOT is being fought to protect the qualities of free and open societies. However, it simultaneously recognizes that it is these same qualities that enable terrorists capitalize on such traits of free societies as freedom of movement, communications, and financial systems, among others. Thus the plan concludes that because of this the US and its allies are vulnerable to attacks aimed at breaking the cohesion of the anti-terrorism coalition.\textsuperscript{230}

4.1.2 The Causes

Of all the policy documents sighted above, in terms of identifying the roots and causes of terrorism, the NSS\textsuperscript{2006} offers the most explanations. Interestingly enough, the NSS\textsuperscript{2006} is equally adamant concerning what does not as well as concerning what does give rise to terrorism. The NSS separately elaborates four factors which it stresses do not give rise to terrorism.\textsuperscript{231}

First, poverty does not inevitably breed terrorism. As proof of this, the NSS offers the fact that many of the 9/11 attackers were and Osama bin Laden is from rather well-to-do backgrounds. Second, terrorism is not solely a reaction to US actions in Iraq. That the 9/11-attacks were carried out well before the US attacked Saddam Hussein’s regime underlines this. In addition countries which have not been involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom have never the less been targets of terrorist attacks. Third, terrorism is not solely a result of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because planning for the 9/11-attacks “…began in the 1990s, during an active period in the peace process”. Fourth, nor is terrorism solely a reaction to

\textsuperscript{229} NMSP-WOT, 14.  
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid, 13.  
\textsuperscript{231} NSS\textsuperscript{2006}, 9-11.
counter-terrorism efforts: “...al-Qaida... targeted the United States long before the United States targeted al-Qaida”.  

After establishing what factors do not spawn terrorism, the NSS goes on to describe four factors that do. As the first explanation for the rise of terrorism the NSS2006 offers political alienation. Populations who are estranged from their governments and who lack opportunities and influence in their countries form abundant recruitment bases for terrorist networks. Second, past grievances which are perceived to rise from the actions of others are used as emotional rallying calls by terrorists. Here the NSS2006 would seem to be referring to some voices that have blamed several problems in the Muslim world on western colonialism, oil endeavors, and US actions during the Cold War.  

Third, terrorist recruitment is made easier if the target population is misinformed or uninformed about world issues and the information that it does have is distorted by propaganda and conspiracy theories. Fourth, ultimately the success of terrorist networks hinges on the appeal of their ideology. This ideology is purposefully bolstered by cloaking it an Islamic veil.  

The root causes NSCT2006 gives for terrorism are nearly word to word identical to those presented in the NSS2006. The QRD2006, the NMS2004 and the NMSP-WOT do not, as such, provide any theoretical insight into the causes of terrorism. They do however identify key elements, or resources that terrorist networks need to operate and to survive, the most important of which is ideology (see “conditions” above).  

It must be assumed that the NSS2006 (and NSS2002), as the superior policy document, dictates the assumptions on which the lower strategies and plans are based on. Interestingly enough, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002, NSS 2002) differs from the NSS2006 on this matter. It does not list the causes of terrorism as does the NSS 2006, but rather it hints at “legitimate grievances”, and goes on to describe the GWOT in what are almost theological terms.  

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234 NSS2006, 10.
235 NSCT2006, 9-10; QRD2006; NMS2004; NMSP-WOT, passim.
4.1.2 The Solution

All of the documents outline the means of winning the GWOT. They do this to a varying degree, and from different viewpoints: the NSS2006 may be seen to represent a grand strategic level, whilst the NSCT2006 / QRD2006 and the NMS2004 / the NMSP-WOT, roughly represent civilian and military viewpoints, respectively. The NSS2006 outlines a dual pronged strategy: Immediate actions are aimed at killing or capturing terrorist operatives and disrupting or neutralizing their force multipliers. In the long run the GWOT is to be won by prevailing over the terrorists on an ideological battlefield, especially in the Muslim world.\(^{237}\)

This ideological battle is to be won by countering each of the causes the NSS2006 lists (see above). The strategy declares that the solution to terrorism is simple: democracy. This is so, because democracy, claims the NSS2006, provides a solution to each of the problems that give rise to terrorism. Democracy provides the population with ways to influence their country and their own future. Democracy promotes the rule of law, peaceful resolution of disputes and a culture of compromise. All factors that will alleviate felt grievances. One of democracy’s carrying principles, freedom of speech as well as similar principles, will “vaccinate” populations against terrorist propaganda. Democracy will undermine terrorist ideology and targeting of civilians.\(^{238}\)

The NSS2006 recognizes that democracy will not however automatically destroy terrorism. It admits that groups exist within democratic societies which are unwilling or unable to embrace the benefits of democracy. These groups may form a recruitment base for terrorist networks within democratic societies. The solution to this problem is making democracy deeper and more inclusive. The ascension of oppressive regimes into democracy, however, is a long process. Because of this the NSS2006 also promotes four short-term solutions to terrorism. First, using a number of methods, attacks must be prevented before they occur. Terrorist diehards must be captured or killed. Terrorist networks must be disabled. Second, terrorist networks and rogue states supporting them, must be prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. This is undoubtedly an allusion to Iran and possibly North Korea. Third, terrorists must be prevented from using rogue states as sanctuaries. The NSS2006 specifically mentions Syria and Iran. Fourth, the US must stop the terrorists from gaining control of a

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\(^{237}\) NSS2006, 10-11.

\(^{238}\) Ibid.
strategic country in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, or “ungoverned areas”, and from using them as a base of operations.\(^{239}\)

The means to counter terrorism presented in the NSCT2006 are basically an elaboration on those presented in the NSS2006. The NSCT2006 briefly describes four similar short-term solutions as listed in the NSS2006. The plan, to a degree, focuses on these short-term solutions, although it does also dwell on long-term strategy.\(^{240}\)

Terrorist attacks will be prevented by attacking terrorist networks’ key assets. These include, leadership, foot soldiers (“terrorist NCOs” after a fashion), weaponry, financial resources, communication assets, and propaganda tools. In addition aviation-, maritime-, and border security will be upgraded to prevent terrorists from entering the US and hinder their movement internationally. Security protecting critical infrastructure elements will be enhanced.\(^{241}\)

Terrorist will be denied access to WMD/E\(^{242}\) –capabilities via a strategy composed of six simultaneous objectives. First, the United States will actively strive to form an accurate picture of the terrorist networks’ plans, objectives and capabilities concerning WMDs. Second, terrorists will be prevented from gaining WMD/E -related materials, and know-how by perpetrating a comprehensive international counter- and, non-proliferation strategy. Third, a deterrence strategy will be employed to thwart WMD/E -attacks. The NSCT2006 declares clearly that traditional forms of deterrence will not be adequate. It states that “Traditional threats may not work... We require a range of deterrence strategies that are tailored to the situation and the adversary”\(^{243}\). However, it none the less describes deterrence in what sound like traditional Cold War jargon: “…terrorists… would face the prospect of an overwhelming response\(^{244}\) to any use of such weapons”. This deterrence will also include efforts to limit the effectiveness WMD/E –attacks in advance. Fourth, the United States will strike at the terrorist networks’ efforts to move WMD/E –materials. Fifth, the response to a WMD/E attacks will

\(^{239}\) Ibid.
\(^{240}\) NSCT2006 11-17.
\(^{241}\) Ibid.
\(^{242}\) Weapons of Mass Destruction or Effect (WMD/E). WMD/E refers to any terrorist capability which will cause massive destruction and have “devastating impacts”. This includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber, information ,and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other effects. MNSP-WOT, 37.
\(^{243}\) NSCT2006, 14.
\(^{244}\) Italics added. The deterrence depicted by the NSCT2006 sounds a lot like Cold War deterrence strategies, especially John Foster Dulles’s Massive retaliation. See Visuri 1997, 53-55.
be anticipatory in nature. Sixth, the United States will strive to anticipate, or after an attack, identify the source of the WMD/E—materials deployed by the terrorists.\textsuperscript{245}

State sponsorship of terrorist networks is especially troublesome, since some states that do sponsor terrorists most likely have the capacity to produce WMD/E. Terrorist will be cut off from the rogue states supporting and harboring them. This will be accomplished in two ways. First, the United States will work to end state sponsorship of terrorism. This will be carried out by maintaining sanctions against these states, by isolating them internationally. The NSCT2006 directly mentions five states that sponsor terrorism: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba. Second, the United States will work to prevent the shipment of support, material or otherwise, from states to terrorist networks.\textsuperscript{246}

The strategy also aims to expel terrorist from areas, including what the NSCT2006 calls “ungoverned or under-governed areas” a clear allusion to failed states, which the terrorists are utilizing as bases of operation and sanctuary. Physical safe havens will be obliterated by helping ally states to gain complete control over their area. This possibly is a reference to countries like Yemen and Pakistan, which both have uncontrolled “tribal areas”, which possibly harbor Islamic terrorists.\textsuperscript{247} Failed states will be addressed by working to prevent conflict and respond to state failure by “…building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction, and stabilization.”\textsuperscript{248} In addition to physical sanctuaries, terrorist networks also utilize abstract non-physical, legal, or virtual safe havens. The United States will continue to help allied states in upgrading their legal framework to meet the challenges posed by international terrorism. In addition, terrorist financial operations will be attacked, and terrorist use of the internet will be answered to by promoting truthful information across the web.\textsuperscript{249}

The NSCT 2006 also addresses the long term strategies outlined in the NSS2006. It does this according to a slightly different terminology. The long term strategy to win the war is to create a “global environment” in which it is impossible for terrorist networks to survive. To succeed in the long term, the United States must work to uphold international standards and obligations concerning anti-terrorism. Anti-terror alliances and cooperation networks must be

\textsuperscript{245} NSCT2006, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid, 15-16.
\textsuperscript{247} BBC: \textit{Yemen fears return of insurgency}. Published on the BBC website on February 5\textsuperscript{th} 2007. Retrieved February 7\textsuperscript{th} 2008 from \texttt{<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6331149.stm>};
BBC: \textit{Venturing into the Taleban’s backyard}. Published on the BBC website on October 11\textsuperscript{th} 2007. Retrieved February 7\textsuperscript{th} 2008 from \texttt{<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7039661.stm>}.\textsuperscript{248} NSCT2006, 16. Italics added.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid, 16-17.
strengthened. This includes organizations such as the International Maritime Organization as well as “alliances” such as the “coalition of willing and able states and organizations”. The United States must reform its governmental structure to better face terrorism, educate government officials in counter-terrorism and foster a “Culture of Preparedness” to aid in protecting the Homeland.\textsuperscript{250}

The long-term goal of the GWOT, according to the QRD2006 is to defeat the terrorists ideologically. This however requires that several major changes take place. An environment hostile to terrorism must be created on a global scale. Legitimate governments must be able to exert their authority over all their territories. Representative societies must arise around the globe to promote freedom (i.e. democracy), because freedom is the best ideological vaccine against terrorism. Terrorism must be ultimately beaten on ideological grounds.\textsuperscript{251}

The review stresses the fact that a combination of methods, military and non-military, will be required for the United States to triumph over terrorist networks. The path to victory is not littered with major battles and operations, but rather with numerous quiet successes accumulated over a long period of time, and achieved by means of intra-agency cooperation. Cooperation must also exist over national borders. International cooperation must be carried out within the NATO framework, as well as with countries which are not NATO members.\textsuperscript{252}

According to the QRD2006 is essential for the United States to keep to the offensive. Pressure must be kept on international terrorist networks by continually attacking them all around the globe. This requires several simultaneous, international operations of a long duration. These operations must often be perpetrated through local forces, as this will help in the ideological battle. The QRD2006 lists several requirements that must be met, and also several capabilities which US forces must attain. While viewing Somalia as an area of operations the most important of these seems to be the call for knowledge of local conditions. The review declares that the battle must be brought to the enemy via “approaches that are tailored to local conditions and differentiated worldwide”. US forces must develop “Language and cultural awareness to facilitate the expansion of partner capacity”.\textsuperscript{253}

The NMS2004 outlines three military objectives to support the strategic objectives of the National Defense Strategy. To shield the United States from “external attacks and aggression”,

\textsuperscript{250} Ibid, 7, 19-21
\textsuperscript{251} QRD2006, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid, 21-24. Italics added.
to “prevent conflict and surprise attack”, and to “prevail against adversaries”. The Homeland is to be protected by concentrating on defeating terrorism directly where it spawns, although anti-terrorism efforts within the US proper are not to be neglected. That is to say that the defense of the United States begins well abroad. Strategic approaches to the United States will be protected. This includes space approaches. The Military Strategy also promotes the importance of attacking the conditions which allow terrorist networks to survive and operate. The key to this is international cooperation to deny terrorists their state sponsors and prevent them from utilizing failed states as bases.\textsuperscript{254}

Conflicts and surprise attacks will be prevented by maintaining a comprehensive overseas presence. This presence will be utilized to demonstrate US resolve, support allies, deter aggression, and to strike pre-emptively when necessary. It the need arises US force will defeat adversaries, with or without help from its allies. These efforts will include major combat operations, smaller operations, as well as post-conflict- and stability operations.\textsuperscript{255}

The NMSP-WOT mostly follows the general structure and terminology of the US military’s Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)\textsuperscript{256} format. Thus the strategic approach it proposes is described in terms of ends, ways, and means. The plan sees the role of the military as helping other government sectors in striking at the enemy’s \textit{centre of gravity}\textsuperscript{257}, its ideology. In step with this, “ends” are four termination objectives derived from national strategic objectives. The national objectives the NMSP-WOT describes are: the elimination of terrorism as a threat, the construction of a global environment that is inhospitable to terrorism, and the strengthening of the security abilities of partner nations in a number of ways. The termination objectives themselves are classified, but they are to be achieved by reaching six military strategic objectives. These six objectives are the “ways” of the military strategy for the GWOT. Below each one shall be discussed briefly.\textsuperscript{258}

Terrorists shall be denied the basic resources they require to operate and survive. This is to be achieved by utilizing the networked nature of terrorist organizations and the global links between them. In this way it will be possible to perpetrate attacks so as to cause effect throughout the linked networks. This will require assistance from partner nations.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{254} NMS2004, 9-11.  \\
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid, 11-14.  \\
\textsuperscript{256} Finnish readers will find it roughly similar to the FINGOP.  \\
\textsuperscript{257} Italics added. ”Voimanlähde” in Finnish.  \\
\textsuperscript{258} NMSP-WOT, 20, 22-23. 
\end{flushright}
Partner nations shall be empowered to counter terrorism. Success in the GWOT requires that anti-terrorism efforts are of a global, continuous nature. Because of this the United States must continue to foster regional partnerships to fight terrorism.

WMD/E–proliferation shall be countered in all its forms. In addition to preventing the mass destruction, this will prevent the rise of credibility terrorism would have in the eyes of potential supporters, should a WMD/E–attack succeed. This will be achieved by a number of ways, including non-proliferation (NP), counter-proliferation (CP), and consequence management (CM).

Terrorists and their organizations will be defeated. Military operations will be executed to locate enemy functions. Once this is done senior leadership and operatives will be captured or killed. Sanctuaries and bases will be attacked, terrorist cells neutralized, and training and recruitment operations shut down. This will be achieved in close cooperation with partner nations.

Support for terrorists, by state or non-state actors, will be countered. State sponsors may provide terrorist networks with critical resources, the least of which is not legal cover and backing. Non-state supporter may provide terrorist networks with similar benefits as state supporter, including financial. Such support may be veiled as charity initiatives. The military element of countering support consists of intelligence operations, attacks against terrorists and their supporters, as well as efforts to intercept the flow of resources from supporters to terrorist networks. *Military action may include actions to topple or remove a regime which directly supports terrorists.*

The military will support the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. This is a critical objective since ideology is the terrorist enemy’s center of gravity. Military functions to this effect will include providing security and support to the opponents of terrorist networks, and efforts to disrupt the ability of terrorist networks to convey their ideological messages. Operations and efforts will aim to isolate terrorist elements, which will turn global problem into local problems, which can then be then dealt with locally. Providing security is paramount, since security is required for success in other ideological and humanitarian operations. It is often best provided by training local and indigenous security forces. Thus it follows that contacts to the militaries of partner nations are vital. Humanitarian and information operations will support the ideological battle.
A critical element in the ideological battle is how operations are conducted. Botched or poorly conducted military operations may end up bolstering the terrorist’s ideological front. Potential ideological damage can be minimized by pursuing goals by means other than direct U.S. military actions. This basically means allowing indigenous forces to take the lead while US forces remain in a supporting role. When US forces do directly intervene, planning must be careful to minimize negative ideological effects, while at the same time showing that US forces cannot be defeated and will not hesitate to use force when necessary. Success in these goals requires knowledge of local culture and religious issues as well as knowledge of the tactics utilized by the local enemy.

The NMSP-WOT does not go into detail concerning the means by which these objectives will be completed. It simply lists that the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Combat Support Agencies, and Department of Defense (DoD) are the military means of fighting the GWOT. In an end note the NMSP-WOT goes on to once again stress the importance of cultural awareness: “We must be aware of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad”.

4.2 The Global War on Terror: Operations in the Horn of Africa

The United States’ effort in the Greater Horn of Africa region is not just a single operation. Not even to the extent most efforts in Iraq fall under Operation Iraqi freedom (OIF). Rather, US effort in the Horn consists of several different initiatives and operations.

4.2.1 Forces

US forces around the globe perpetrating operations, GWOT-related and otherwise, are divided into nine combatant commands. Five of these have a geographical area of responsibility (AOR). The are the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the US European Command (EUCOM), the US Central Command (CENTCOM), and the US Pacific Command (PACOM). Together the AORs of these five geographic combatant commands (GCCs) circumvent the globe, and encompass all countries, including the continental United States. The other four combatant commands, have no geographical AOR, but have functional responsibilities. The combatant commands are the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the US Special Operations Command

259 All of the above up to note 302 are from NMSP-WOT, 23-27. Italics added.
(SOCOM), the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).  

The combatant commands deter and repel attacks aimed at the United States, perform mission assigned to them, charge subordinate commands with missions and coordinate their actions, plan and execute operations, and uphold security. In addition GCCs are responsible for protecting of US citizens, providing liaison officers and military representatives to a number of agencies and a point of contact within their AOR, assessing and coordinating security matters with diplomatic missions, commanding US forces within their AOR, and exercising force protection among others tasks. While performing these tasks the GCCs report directly to the secretary of defense.

The GCC responsible for the greater horn region generally and Somalia specifically is CENTCOM. Of the African nations, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Egypt, and Sudan fall under CENTCOM jurisdiction. The rest of continental Africa belongs to EUCOM. Madagascar and several smaller islands fall under PACOM jurisdiction. Thus Africa has been effectively been split between three different GCCs. This state of matters has created fault lines and seams between GCC boundaries which may possibly be capitalized on by terrorist networks to avoid detection. This however, is soon about to change radically.

On February 6th 2007 President Bush announced the formation of a new GCC: US African Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM’s AOR will encompass the whole of Africa, with the exception of Egypt, which will remain within CENTCOM’s AOR. The purpose behind the formation of AFRICOM is to provide a unity of command to all US military efforts in Africa. AFRICOM is to use this achieved unity to focus mainly on “humanitarian assistance, disaster

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relief and crisis response missions”. AFRICOM is set to be operational by the end of 2008. Until then operation in the horn of Africa will remain under CENTCOM. 263

Many of the details about AFRICOM, such as personnel issues, funding, and sites for possible bases, are still being worked out. As it is being constructed, AFRICOM’s role has already raised several questions. Will AFRICOM, once it is operational, really focus on humanitarian operations? What will be the amount of its actual military involvement in Africa? What will be AFRICOM’s role in counter-terrorism efforts and the GWOT? These and similar questions are being raised as AFRICOM’s launching nears. Some African states have already taken a negative stance toward the AFRICOM–to–be, and have declared that they will not host US troops or bases. 264 However it is set up AFRICOM will most likely bring efficiency to US effort in Africa.

The main US military component operating in the Horn of Africa is The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Its strength personnel wise at any given time is approximately 1,800. This figure includes personnel from all military branches, civilians, and personnel from allied nations. CJTF-HOA is backed up by two other commands Commander Task Force – 150 (CTF-150), and a Joint Special Operations Task Force. CTF-150 is a naval force consisting of nine ships from seven countries. 265


4.2.2 Operations

CJTF-HOA’s AOR includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and the Seychelles. Comoros, Mauritius, and, Madagascar are coined “areas of interest”. Established in October 2002, CJTF-HOA originally operated from the US and from abroad USS MOUNT WHITNEY, until relocating to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti in May 2003.\(^{266}\)

Since its initiation, CJTF-HOA has officially been mainly involved in development, support and humanitarian operations: Building schools, wells, clinics and hospitals, providing medical services and offering temporary veterinary clinic services. In addition to this CJTF-HOA has trained and assisted African security- and military forces. The aim of said training support is to “assist partner governments in building indigenous capacity to deny terrorists access to their territory”. Humanitarian actions mentioned above are to support this goal. Ultimately humanitarian operations are meant to “help discredit extremist propaganda and bolster local desires and capabilities to defeat terrorists”. I.e. win the “war of ideas”. Commander Task Force – 150 carries out maritime security operations in the Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, parts of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. The objectives of these operations is to combat piracy and strike at terrorist networks’ transport capabilities between critical areas.\(^{267}\)

CJTF-HOA does, officially, operate in Somalia. All the humanitarian missions preformed by CJTF-HOA have been carried out within the Horn region, but outside Somali borders. CJTF-HOA leadership has been very specific in proclaiming that their troops have not entered Somalia. In a news conference held September 21\(^{st}\) then commander of CJTF-HOA, Maj. Gen. Timothy Ghormley stated that: “We don't work in Somalia… We are -- we are not going into Somalia. We are not in Mogadishu… I know that there's quite a bit of interest on it, on what's going on in Somalia. But, no, sir, I am not pushing to get into Somalia.”.\(^{268}\)

If CJTF-HOA has not and does not operate in Somalia, what operations is the US then undertaking there? Since the only US operations in Somalia presently seem to be covert

\(^{266}\) CJTF-HOA website.


operations, information is scarce. Basically the only information available is what can be gleaned from news reports and educated guesses performed by analysts. Vary little of what is presented below has been verified, so caution must be exercised. For clarity concerning sources, different claims are noted separately. However, as already stated above, what matters is not the exact operations and tactics, but rather, the nature of the US involvement in Somalia.

Apparently, as terrorism awareness was on the rise in Washington in the aftermath of the 9/11 –attacks, Somalia was perceived as a potential safe haven for terrorists. The wildest opinions even suggested that Osama bin Laden might flee to Somalia. This of course was in step with earlier American claims that bin Laden had visited Somalia several times before. US reconnaissance in Somalia was activated. This included military as well as civilian (CIA) operations. Allegations of connections between al Qaida and Somali Islamic groups and certain warlords were soon to follow. The US began to be active toward warlords perceived to be potential allies in the fight against islamist terrorist networks. The US began backing some of the warlords in an effort to counter rising islamist power in Somalia. Claims were made that US Marines from CJTF-HOA were performing anti terror functions within Somalia, but these claims were refuted by CJTF-HOA leadership. Some reports claimed that the US was perpetrating or at least making preparations to execute covert anti-terror operations in Somalia through proxy private military companies (PMC).


Whatever the extent of US operations in Somalia after 9/11, it remains that the US was active when it came to anti-terrorism. Actions seem to have consisted of recruiting local militias and warlords to survey and capture terror suspects. This state of matter changed dramatically once the UIC captured Mogadishu and large parts of Somalia proper. Seemingly the US, despite claims to the contrary, heavily backed the TFG and Ethiopian forces while simultaneously perpetrating man-hunts to apprehend or kill al-Qaida affiliates. The most dramatic operations were several aerial bombardments in January 2007 aimed at terror suspect. Claims have been made that several US soldiers and marines would have been taken captive by the Islamic militias and exchanged for UIC leadership taken captive. Such claims have been denied by US officials.277

It is thus apparent that the US has carried out several operations in Somalia of an anti-terrorist-nature. That is to say that in its present counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia the US has reverted to rather “hard” methods; assassinating or apprehending suspects and using military means to thwart terrorists’ efforts to operate, possibly through proxy forces. It seems that the hunt for al-Qaida operatives in Somalia is being executed with little regard for minimizing collateral damages or the US’s public image in Muslim Somalia, as air destructive air strikes were renewed in March 2008.278


5. Conclusions

Is Somalia a threat to US security and GWOT-objectives? Does Somalia really hold potential as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area? To answer these questions, above I have analyzed Somalia and its relevant attributes.

5.1 Somalia

As Menkhaus has aptly pointed out, Somalia seems at first glance to be a very promising target for terrorist operations. Its long unguarded borders and coastline, its close ties with, and close proximity to, the Arab world, and its lack of central government all make it sound like a virtual terrorist’s godsend. Menkhaus argues though that Somalia is everything but the perfect terrorist safe haven. Close analysis reveals that conditions of state collapse are far from ideal conditions for terrorist networks. Menkhaus’s conclusions are easy to agree with.

Historical and anthropological study of the Somali people reveals some clues into how Somalia should be perceived in terms of the GWOT. When viewing the history of, and social constructions in, modern Somalia, one can see that several trends and phenomenon which are visible to the present-day observer date far back into history. Some, such as the undeniable significance of the clan system, may even date back to the primordial genesis of the Somali people. For the sake of our present discussion, four points of significance can be pointed out.

First, regional divisions, particularly a North-South division, run across Somalia. Somalia is not a homogenous country, even if the Somali share a cultural background that is surprisingly homogenous in an African context. Great differences exist between and within Somalia’s different regions. For example, as shown above, historical developments have been very different in northern and southern Somalia throughout their history. It is clearly no coincidence that to date northern Somalia has developed into the relatively stable and somewhat peaceful Somaliland, while southern Somalia has yet again been enflamed into chaos and civil war. The Majerteen Puntland is exception in itself.

Somalia’s diversity will severely hinder the efforts of terrorist networks. For example, successful transportation operations from Yemen to northern Kenya will have to traverse multiple areas controlled by different factions, factions possessing of a varying amount of incentives for cooperation. In addition terrorist networks wishing to find safe haven in

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Somalia are thus forced to work with several different regional authorities, increasing the possibility of betrayal.

Any counterterrorism strategy that wishes to be successful in the long run is also going to have to address these regional differences. They will have to be taken into account while planning operations in Somalia, “hard” counterterrorism operations as well “soft” humanitarian operations. All in all, any conditions prevailing in any given part of the Somali nation can not be assumed to be valid elsewhere. Adding to this confusion, these conditions are likely to change, sometimes rapidly.

Second, clan affiliations are overwhelmingly important. As is obvious from the above, clan is a controversial, complex, labile, variable, and nearly omnipresent phenomenon in modern Somalia. It may have somewhat dwindled in public visibility during the Barre years. However, the clan system was the institution people looked to in the chaos created by the collapse of central government. Indeed, a closer look at the Barre years reveals that the clan system remained a fundamental building block of Somali society, only its role and function were slightly different in flavor.

While one must resist the temptation to oversimplify the role of clan in modern Somalia, its importance is certainly hard to overestimate. Clan undercuts everything. The clan system certainly complicates matters for terrorist networks wishing to operate from, through, or within Somalia. Even an Islamist Jihad fails to dispel the significance of the clan. A good example of this is the problems the AIAI encountered while administrating the town of Luuq (see above). There is no reason why that the ICU, or al-Qaida for that matter, would have, in the long run, fared any better.

Somali history has time and again shown that clan and intra-clan alliances and rivalries can change very rapidly according to the situation at hand. Islamist allies of today could tomorrow just as easily fight terrorist networks in hopes of claiming monetary rewards so lavishly handed out by the US. Terrorist networks operating in Somalia would most likely get caught up in struggles between and within clans and clan based factions. This would force terrorist networks to confront the “Luuq-dilemma” the AIAI faced in the 1990’s. Eventually the terrorist networks would become just another faction and a party to the civil war. Just as happened to the ill-fated UNOSOMs. The same trap however not only awaits Islamic terrorists, but also western anti-terrorism efforts. To some extent the US has already fallen into this trap.
Third, the power of Islam in Somalia is strong, and Arabic connections are robust. Somalia has throughout its history been, and to date remains culturally strongly connected to the Arabic world. Even though the predominant form of Islam in Somalia is Sufism, not Wahhabism as in Saudi Arabia, Arabic influences are considerable. Ideas and ideologies, even Islamist ones, are easily transported to the Horn of Africa from Arabia and the Gulf states. This is evident from the original arrival of Islam to Somalia, or on a more modern note, the arrival of political Islam during the Barre years. Connections between Somalia and the Arabic world can thus be assumed to help terrorist networks spread its ideology, form contacts and recruit personnel.

Fourth, the Somali diaspora holds a great deal of indirect and consequential potential. Large amounts of Somali dwell outside Somalia’s borders. Somalia’s history is rife with examples of how these expatriates have influenced Somali politics. Clearly the most important group has been the large Somali population in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. Were it not for the threat Ethiopia sees in the Ogaden Somali, it most probably would not have intervened in Somalia in the way it has. It is reasonable to assume that this trend will continue, and the Somali populations in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti will continue to be a factor in regional politics. In addition to the considerably large populations living in neighboring countries, the parts of the diaspora living in the Arab and Gulf states as well as the west, will remain a factor in the complex equation that is Somali politics. It is possible, if however unlikely, that diaspora members in the west may be recruited by terrorist networks. As many already possess the nationality of their host country, and are second or third generation refugees, they may remain under the security services “radar”.

To assess Somalia’s terrorist potential, it is necessary to establish what is the role and potential of radical Islam in Somali society. As demonstrated above, radical or political Islam, Islamism is a very multi-faceted phenomenon in Somalia. A heterogeneous multitude of different Islamic groups operate in present day Somalia, of which radical Islamists likely to cooperate enthusiastically with al-Qaida are a small minority. Many of these majority groups are Sufi in orientation, and genuinely seek to advance their goals with peaceful means. At least this was the case before the ill fated Ethiopian invasion in the end of 2006.

It is possible that the Ethiopian invasion already has or will radicalize formerly moderate Islamist factions, and thus provide al-Qaida and other terrorist networks with potential recruits and supporters. It is clear from Somali history that a radical Islamic cause is, in the
long run, unable to unify Somalis and mobilize large scale support. A common enemy however is a different matter entirely. Whether it was British colonial rule during Muhammad Abdullah Hassan’s revolt, Ethiopians during the Ogaden war, or the Barre regime during the beginning of the civil war, a common enemy has been much more successful in uniting the clans. The same thing may eventually happen with the present Ethiopian invasion.

What seems to have happened is that Islamist movements have been able to “hijack” Somali nationalism, which has, paradoxically in clan centered Somalia, a much more powerful allure than political Islam. Radical Islamists, such as Shabaab, have been able to portray themselves as fighting for the Somali nation, albeit an Islamist version of it. In addition they have been able to depict the TFG as an Ethiopian puppet.

Another, possibility sighted by several researchers, Bjørn Møller among them, is that a strong connection could be forged between an Islamist faction and a specific clan or clan-family. This is easy to agree with. A similar connection as existed and to some degree still exists between the Taleban and the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. This is possible if Islamist interest of fighting Ethiopians and the TFG are identified with Hawiye interests of resisting the Daarood dominated TFG’s power. Such a connection seems already to exist to some extent. If this state of matters develops further Islamist factions might be able to equate their survival with Hawiye survival, and thus solicit considerable support from the Hawiye, which are powerful in the Mogadishu area. This might potentially lead to increasing, at least momentary, support for foreign terrorist networks. This in turn could potentially hinder peace initiatives, humanitarian efforts, and US counterterrorism efforts. It is one thing to take up a small Islamic faction, but another thing entirely to take on a powerful clan-family on its home ground. The Black Hawk Down-tragedy remains a painful remainder of this.

So does Somalia hold potential as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area? All in all it seems that Somalia’s immediate potential as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area in not very great. This is due to cultural factors and the circumstances of state collapse, such vicious and tangled webs of clan conflict. However, while Somalia does not hold immediate “terrorist potential”, it is possible that in the future it could claim a more central role in the field of international terrorism.
5.2 The Global War on Terror in the Horn of Africa

Ever since the 9/11 attacks, The United States has been fighting its Global War on Terror to promote US interests and security. The United States’ general strategy and policies for this war has here been derived from several different policy documents of different levels. Discussed in chapter 4.1, an analysis of said policy documents is attempted by looking at all of the documents in turn through three questions concerning the definition and causes of as well as a solution to terrorism. Analysis is also performed on how these documents describe the GWOT.

The documents define terrorism in very broad terms. Very few specific definitions are given, and one might even say that the definitions given for terrorism and terrorist networks are “conveniently” vague. Terrorist networks are described as being international, elusive, capable of adapting, and skilful in exploiting the vulnerabilities of open western societies. All in all terrorist networks are seen as unconventional yet potentially dangerous foes.

Most of the documents do not deal with the causes behind terrorism. As stated above the NSS2006 also lists four factors which are not the sole causes of terrorism: poverty, the war in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and US counterterrorism efforts. Poverty certainly is present in Somalia, as well as is awareness about the conflicts in Iraq and Palestine. As stated above US and Ethiopian counter-terrorism efforts may actually have aggravated the terrorism situation in Somalia, at least in the long run.

The four factors the NSS2006 describes to cause terrorism are certainly at work in Somalia. Large segments of the population are certainly politically alienated, as there is no state system, and traditional clan administrations have left the members of small, weak, and unarmed clans at a considerable disadvantage. Grievances can be found in Somalia. Crimes committed during the Barre years as well as those perpetrated during the civil war, are well remembered. This also goes for the United States. Many remember the UNITAF and the UNOSOMs in negative tones. Misinformation is also abundant in Somalia as all the different factions have spread their versions of the truth through different medias, including the internet and radio networks.

The most important cause behind terrorism, according to the NSS2006, is terrorist ideology. On this point Somalia in not so clearly defined as with concerning the earlier three causes. As mentioned above, to the Somali radical Islamism is something foreign and non-Somali. The
ideological allure of radical political Islam is not that great. However, even if the population generally does not ascribe to the terrorists’ ideology, small groups of individuals do. All in all, in terms of the NSS2006, Somalia is not the optimum area of operations for terrorist networks, but it certainly does hold potential.

The strategy for countering the threat posed by terrorism, as presented in the aforementioned documents, is definitely a dual strategy. Dual, for it is composed of short-term as well as long-term objectives. In the short term the strategies stressed “hard” methods such as capturing and killing terrorists, disrupting their networks, and denying them access to weapons of mass destruction. In the long term the strategies stressed “soft”, possibly non-military methods, and defeating terrorist networks ideologically, the ultimate goal being the spread of democracy.

However, while US anti-terrorism strategies stress the importance of softer humanitarian actions and the ideological battle, the actual actions the US has undertaken in Somalia are mostly of the harder military variety. It seems that US actions are in contradiction with overall US strategies. US counter-terrorism strategies call for winning the ideological battle, humanitarian efforts (such as CJTF-HOA has been undertaking elsewhere in the Horn), and the advancement of democracy. US operations in Somalia have however focused on apprehending and neutralizing a few terrorism suspects, regardless of the costs. “Collateral damages” caused by US counter-terrorism operations, such as the air-strikes in January 2007, have seriously hindered US efforts in the grand ideological battle being fought for the hearts and mind of moderate Muslims in Somalia and elsewhere. Ideologically, being seen as a strong backer of the Daarood-dominated and Ethiopian backed TFG has been just as devastating as civilian casualties. It would seem that short term gain has been pursued at grave cost to long term success.

Taking the above into account is the US response then adequate to the threat Somalia poses in terms of radical Islamic terror? The US’s activity in Somalia clearly demonstrates that the US takes the “Somali threat” very seriously. Clearly a great amount of resources, military and otherwise, have been poured into the Horn of Africa and surrounding areas. The contribution of even such a numerically relatively small force as CJTF-HOA is significant in a situation in which the US is engaged in several other larger operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The ending of the division of Africa between three different combatant commands and the establishment of AFRICOM underline this point. The US clearly recognizes Africa’s growing geopolitical importance.
Thus it is clear that Africa generally and Somalia specifically are viewed as important. In such terms the US response to the “Somali threat” is clearly adequate. However, the problem lies in not the amount of resources allocated to the GWOT in Somalia, but rather in the nature of the US engagement there. Focusing mostly on short term “hard” operations has clearly damaged the US’s long term interests in Somalia. While it is not certain that the insurgency in Somalia will develop into an quagmire resembling Iraq, what is certain is that since the September 11th attacks Somalia has moved farther from and not closer to peace. This is partially a result of US counterterrorism policies in Somalia.

5.3 Critique and the Need for Further Study

The above conclusions have been reached by studying a very broad range of subjects and topics. Thus as the overall subject has been fairly broad, each individual topic has not been delved as deeply as would be preferable. Indeed, the topics touched upon in chapters three and four are broad enough to fill several studies on their own.

Certainly understanding the military ramifications of Somali cultural institutions requires additional study. It of course goes without saying that building this kind of cultural awareness is highly necessary in today’s western militaries. Militaries, which are engaged in increasingly challenging operations in which demarcation lines between combatants and non-combatants or war and peace, are extremely blurred.
6. Finnish Summary

Terrorisminvastainen sota Afrikassa sarvessa


Tässä tutkimuksessa tutkittiin terrorisminvastaisa sotaa Somaliassa kaksijakoisella analyysillä. Ensiksi analysoitiin Somalian nykytilannetta ja historiaa, jotta saataisiin käsitys Somalia muodostamasta uhasta terrorisminvastaisessa sodassa. Toiseksi tutkittiin Yhdysvaltain terrorisminvastaisia strategioita ja operaatioita, jotta voitaisiin vastata itse päätutkimusongelmaan: Vastaavatko Yhdysvaltain vastatoimet siihen uhkaan, jonka islamilainen terrorismi Somaliassa muodostaa?


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### 7.3 News Coverage

#### 7.3.1 Printed News Coverage


February 15th from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051601625.html>.


7.4 Official US documents


7.5 Other sources


8. Appendixes

| Appendix A | Map of the Greater Horn Region (political/geographical) |
| Appendix B | Clan affiliations, Clan and sub-clan “family tree” |
| Appendix C | Map of Somali inhabited areas |
| Appendix D | The national guidance, national strategic framework, and military strategic framework for the GWOT |
Map of the Greater Horn Region (political/geographical)\(^1\)

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Clan affiliations, Clan and sub-clan “family tree”

Chart 2: Somali clans according to Menkhaus

Map of Somali inhabited areas

Somalia’s Clan Families and Major Subclans

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The national guidance, national strategic framework, and military strategic framework for the GWOT¹

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¹ NMSP-WOT, 9, 19, 22.
National Strategy for the GWOT

**National Strategic Aims:**
- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and
- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

---

**Ways**

- Protect the Homeland
- Attack Terrorists
- Support Mainstream Muslims

- Continue to lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist networks the resources they need to operate and survive.

- Expand foreign partnerships and partnership capacity.
- Prevent terrorist use of WMD.
- Institutionalize the GWOT domestically and internationally.

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Means

Instruments of National Power

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Military Strategic Framework for the GWOT

**National Strategic Aims:**
- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and
- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

---

**Ways**

- Protect the Homeland
- Attack Terrorists
- Support Mainstream Muslims

- Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.
- Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.
- Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt.
- Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
- Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.
- Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.

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**Means**

Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies