

Exploring the Potential of Civilian-based Defence in the Context of Switzerland

Master's Thesis in
Peace, Mediation and Conflict Research
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Abstract

Aim: The aim of the study was to investigate the potential of civilian-based defence in the context of Switzerland.

Method: A mix of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used for the study. An online questionnaire aiming to measure the population's perception of non-violence effectiveness in defending a country and its readiness to participate in non-violent civil resistance was shared. Semi-structured interviews with relevant actors were conducted.

Results: The quantitative analysis showed that a large part of the population would be ready to participate in non-violent civil resistance in case of invasion. It also showed a significant difference in the perception of violence effectiveness as a strategy. Qualitative interviews highlighted the limits and assumptions of the current defence system supporting the argument of exploring civilian-based defence in Switzerland.

Conclusions: While no blueprint exists for the development of civilian-based defence, Switzerland's situation offers favourable circumstances to explore the potential of civilian-based defence as a defence system. Furthermore, the civilian-based defence could compensate for the current defence system's weaknesses.

Key Words: Civilian-based defence, non-violent resistance, Switzerland, defence system.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Aim of the Study	3
1.2. Theoretical Framework	4
1.3. Litterature Review	9
2. Method	13
2.1 Sample	13
2.2 Instrument	13
2.2.1 Online Questionnaire	13
2.2.2 Semi-structured Interview	14
2.3 Procedure	16
2.4 Ethical Considerations	16
3. Results	17
3.1 Results of the Quantitative Survey	17
3.1.1 Choice of Action in the Case of a Foreign Armed Occupation of a Town or Village	17
3.1.2 Assumed Effectiveness of Armed Struggle versus Non-violent Struggle as a Method of Combating an Armed Occupation Carried out by a Superior Foreign Power	17
3.1.3 Choice of Actions to Join or Initiate against a Foreign Occupier in their City	17
3.1.4 Readiness to Take Part in Actions if Living under a Repressive Foreign Occupation where People are Killed, Arrested, and Intimidated for Independent Activities	20
3.1.5 Participation in Violent and Non-violent Actions	21
3.2 Results of the Semi-structured Interviews	22
3.2.1 Security Situation of Switzerland	22
3.2.2 Deterrence and Defence	23
3.2.3 Non-violent Resistance	24
4. Discussion	26
4.1 Security Situation	26
4.2 Deterrence and Defence	28
4.3 Non-violence and Civilian-based Defence	32
5. Conclusion	35
References	38
Appendix	43

1. Introduction

During the Cold War, Switzerland's defence policy consisted of a total defence approach composed of three pillars, military defence, guerilla warfare and civil resistance (Bühlmann, 2011; Grosjean & Bachmann, 1969). The first pillar was a traditional military defence expecting the Swiss armed forces to defend the Swiss territory against an invasion with military weapons. At the time, Switzerland prepared to defend against an invasion by the Soviet Union which represented the only threat. If invaders defeated the Swiss armed forces, guerilla warfare and civil resistance which formed the second and third pillars of the military doctrine would be activated. During the occupation, armed attacks would be conducted against the occupier to prevent its settlement. Besides, the civilian population would deny the occupier any legitimacy and cooperation by refusing to comply with its rule and cooperate with the armed resistance (Grosjean & Bachmann, 1969). The end of the Cold War and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era in international relations and consequently in defence policy. That claim held especially true for Switzerland against which no credible conventional military threat persisted after the Cold War (Armée Suisse, 1999). In the following decades, political interest in defence policy shrunk because the safer someone feels, the less they care about defence (Petrauskaite, 2021), the budget allocated to defence decreased, and the traditional conscription system was even challenged in a referendum. Following the Cold War, Switzerland shifted its conception of defence from deterring and waging interstate conflicts towards defence against asymmetrical threats mainly conceived as violent extremist groups conducting targeted attacks against civilians and critical infrastructure (Federal Council, 2001). For Switzerland, it meant basically merging two of the three core duties of the military, defending the territory and supporting civil authorities when their means do not suffice. Consequently, the Swiss armed forces reorganized its forces and equipment to strengthen its troops' mobility and readiness to combat in urban settings and to support in case of emergencies such as floods, droughts, nuclear power plant malfunction, etc (Federal Council, 2001). Besides, Switzerland also decreased the size of its military in human power while maintaining a conscription system requiring all male citizens over 18 to do their military service. The Swiss direct democracy allows for the population to intervene in policy development and the Swiss population was consulted through voting about defence policy matters several times in the past decades. Indeed, since the year 2000, eight referendums and initiatives related to the Swiss armed forces and defence policy reached the minimum amount of signature required to get the population to vote.

Five votes (1,2,4,6,7) concerned the missions and structure of the military including two relating to the acquisition of new combat aircraft. The results were generally tight except for the larger

restructuring of the Swiss Armed Forces which entailed a reduction of the contingent and the reinforcement of the mission to support civil authorities in case of emergency. The other votes (3,5,8) addressed directly and indirectly the existence of the army itself and produced clear results against the abolition or drastic reduction of the Swiss armed forces.

Table 1

Votes Related to the Swiss Armed Forces Since 2000. Source: Chancellerie fédérale (2023)

Date	Name	Results	Brief content summary
1. 27.09.2020	Federal Decree of 20.12.2019 on the procurement of new combat aircraft	Accepted (50.1%)	The Federal Council is tasked to renew the means of airspace protection by purchasing new combat aircraft
2. 18.05.2014	Federal Act of 27.09.2013 on the procurement fund for the Gripen combat aircraft (Gripen Fund Act)	Rejected (53,4%)	A fund is created to purchase the Gripen combat aircraft
3. 22.09.2013	Popular initiative of 05.01.2012 'Yes to the abolition of compulsory military service'.	Rejected (73.2%)	No one can be required to perform military service. Switzerland has voluntary civil service
4. 18.05.2003	Federal Law on the Army and Military Administration (Army Law, LAAM), Amendment	Accepted (76.0%)	Reduction of the military contingent from 360'000 to 140'000. Increase role of the military in civil authority support. Important technical organization changes.
5. 02.12.2012	Popular initiative 'for a credible security policy and a Switzerland without an army'.	Rejected (78.1%)	Forbid Switzerland to maintain a military force except for participation to international peacekeeping missions
6. 10.06.2001	Amendment of 06.10.2000 to the Federal Law on the Army and Military Administration (LAAM) (Cooperation in training)	Accepted (51.1%)	Allowing the Swiss Armed Forces to provide training abroad and to participate in international military exercises.
7. 10.06.2001	Amendment of 06.10.2000 to the Federal Law on the Army	Accepted (51.0%)	The Swiss Armed Forces are allowed to participate in UN and OSCE peacekeeping missions. The Federal

	and Military Administration (LAAM) (Armaments)		Council makes the decision in consultation with the relevant commissions.	
8.	26.11.2000	Popular initiative "Saving on the army and general defence - for more peace and jobs for the future" (Initiative in favour of a redistribution of spending)	Rejected (62.4%)	The budget allocated to the defence is reduced by half in the following ten years. A third of the savings is allocated to strengthening Switzerland's international peace politics.

The Centre for Strategic Studies from the ETH Zurich has conducted perception surveys about the Swiss armed forces for over 25 years. Their study shows that the Swiss population overwhelmingly considers the Swiss armed forces necessary or absolutely necessary (Tresch et al. 2023). However, the study shows less consensus on the desirability of the Swiss army with the population being split into two groups. The first group holds a positive view considering that the army plays a central positive role whereas the second considers the Swiss armed forces as a necessary evil. In 2023, these two groups combined represent 87% of the Swiss population. (Tresch et al. 2023). The perception survey also shows that the Swiss population does not perceive the amount of money dedicated to the Swiss armed forces the same way. Over the past ten years, between 45% and 49% of the population consider that the confederation allocates the right amount of money and between 30% and 43 % of the population estimate that too much money is allocated to the Swiss armed forces (Tresch et al. 2023).

The clear results of the referendums, initiatives and surveys regarding the existence of the Swiss Armed Forces indicate that the Swiss population largely support its existence, but the same results highlight the absence of a large consensus about how the Swiss armed forces should be organized and about their mission. The Swiss population wants to have a defence system, but the current system appears to not fully satisfy large parts of the population. However, it is worth mentioning that the debate is generally framed as an opposition between two positions, one pro-military and a second one supporting complete disarmament impersonated by the Group for a Switzerland without an Army (GSSA) which launched the popular initiatives to abolish the Swiss armed forces.

1.1 Aim of the Study

This research was developed in the above-mentioned context and explores the perception of non-violent civil resistance institutionalized as defence policy, also called civilian-based defence, in

the context of Switzerland which can be perceived as a third option besides military defence and the absence of a defence system. It contributes to stimulating the debate around defence policy in Switzerland by exploring a different framework and concept of defence. The aim of exploring the possibility of implementing civilian-based defence is to ensure that governments consider all defence policies especially non-violent ones that present the highest potential for reducing the level of violence in the future. Assessing the perception of non-violent resistance is one of the first steps to open a constructive debate around civilian-based resistance.

To explore the perception of civilian-based defence, this research is structured in six parts. The introduction provides some background information and the issue discussed. The second part presents the theoretical framework of this research. It introduces the concept of civilian-based defence by exploring academic works that have discussed the concept and its limits. The part describes the methodology used to explore the question. It details the questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews as well as the procedure for collecting data. The following part presents the results of the data collection. The fifth part provides the space for discussion around the results based on the theoretical framework presented earlier in the study. The sixth and final part concludes the research.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

In international relations, conflicts are assumed inevitable. Consequently, states carry the responsibility to provide an effective system to defend their political society against aggression. This system aims to deter aggression and if deterrence fails, it must then effectively neutralize and end the aggressor's attack without destroying the object of defence, meaning the political society that the state represents. Deterrence which seeks to convince an aggressor that conducting an attack would cause unacceptable consequences and that gains would be denied (Schnyder, 1967) is one of the components of the broader concept of dissuasion which also entails influencing through advice, rational argument, moral appeal and persuasion (Davis, 2014). Most people and governments believe that military means represent the best and only way to deter and defend. Indeed, only 26 countries have no army as a defence system and among them, seven rely on the military means of a foreign power (Barbey, 2015). However, activists, scholars and even high-ranking military officers have challenged that assumption and developed theories arguing that effective defence systems can rely on non-violent means. The theories follow two traditions of nonviolence; the principled tradition, perfectly exemplified by Gandhi and the philosophy of Satyagraha, and the pragmatic tradition which focuses on the effectiveness of the strategy rather than the moral argument (Summy, 2009). As defined by Sharp & Jenkins (1990), the concept of civilian-based defence, also called

civilian defence or social defence in Europe, characterizes a defence policy relying on civilians implementing the defence strategy using civilian means of struggle. Hence, civilian-based defence applies the principles and techniques of nonviolent struggle to national defence.

In 1973, Gene Sharp published the seminal three-volume “The Politics of Non-Violent Action”. This work became, and remains until today, the reference on methods and dynamics of nonviolent actions. He presented the rationale for non-violent struggles and described 198 methods of nonviolent actions which he separates into three main categories; nonviolent protests and persuasion, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Obviously, more methods exist, especially in the digital age but the scope of this research limits the possibility to explore such avenues. Sharp applied the non-violence rationale to imagine and argue for a national defence system that he calls civilian-based defence. This study uses Sharp’s work as framework and presents the rationale in the following paragraphs.

Sharp (1973) describes two views of the nature of political power which is defined as “the totality of all influences and pressures, including sanctions (or punishments), available for use in efforts to determine and implement policies for a political society” (Sharp 1990, p.22-23). The first view considers that the people depend on their government’s goodwill. Contrarily, the other view sees a government as constantly depending on the people’s goodwill and support. In the former view, political power is intrinsic to a government, in the latter political power rises from the cooperation of the people. Nonviolent methods, including civilian-based defence, assume the second view to hold true.

“If rulers are to wield political power, they must be recognized as possessing authority, be able to direct the behaviour of other people, draw on large resources, both human and material, direct bureaucracies in the administration of their policies, and command organizations of repression or combat. The availability of each of these sources is dependent on the cooperation and obedience of the population and of the many groups and institutions of the society to be ruled. That means that these components are not automatically at the disposal of the would-be rulers.” (Gene Sharp, 1990, p.23)

Hence, six sources of power were identified: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources and sanctions. These resources result from the cooperation of the governed and interact among themselves. Consequently, cooperation or noncooperation affects the level of political power that a government can wield. The degree of availability of these resources varies constantly, impacting the rulers’ power level, but rarely are they all fully available or completely absent. If the people perceive the rulers as illegitimate and decide to withdraw their cooperation, it becomes a threat to the rulers which are dependent on the availability of assistance. The population and institutions that once effectively and reliably accomplished their tasks and thus provided sources of power may start to perform inefficiently or even refuse to cooperate. In this

situation, the rulers will rely on segments of the population that remain supportive and support the regime in carrying out the sanctions to reestablish obedience and submission. However, even when threatened by punishment, a choice remains. One can choose to obey to avoid the sanction, or one can disobey and risk receiving the punishment. If one does not fear the punishment because they sufficiently believe in the cause they are defending, they are likely to continue the struggle regardless of the individual danger. The same holds true for military forces, soldiers do not flee because of the possibility of physical injury or death. Even in the case of repression to impose obedience, rulers need a certain level of cooperation from part of the population, typically the police, the army or paramilitary forces. These forces might also stop cooperating in some circumstances, either because they sympathize with the resistance's cause or because they refuse to commit violence against nonviolent people.

According to the conception of power explained in the previous paragraph, a large-scale withdrawal of consent materialized through noncooperation and disobedience and maintained even in the face of repression could be institutionalized as a defence system. Civilian-based defence is built on the same understanding of world politics as other security studies. A potential foreign invader would attack to achieve objectives and success depends on their achievements. According to Sharp (1990), most cases of foreign invasion and occupation are conducted for such purposes as establishing a puppet or subservient government, annexing territory with its population intact, economic exploitation, gaining certain raw materials, extending an ideology or religion to a new population, removing or preempting a perceived military threat, and transporting military equipment and troops to attack a third country." Civilian-based defence must therefore deny the invader these objectives. The deterrent effect of civilian-based defence depends on the attacker's perception of a society's ability to deny the objectives and impose costs and the actual capacity to do so. However, whereas military deterrence threatens to impose costs through massive physical destruction and deaths, civilian-based defence undermines the attacker domestically, by creating internal dissent and unrest; internationally, by imposing economic and political costs; and in the attacked country, by denying objectives and inducing disaffection among the attacker's troops. Traditional deterrence literature outlines the need to effectively build the capacity to deny objectives (Schnyder, 1960) to deter potential opponents and Sharp follows that recommendation by arguing that training of the population is a key element. Furthermore, communication capabilities and extensive use of them play a crucial part and aim to inform all possible attackers of the powerful defence capacity. As mentioned above, deterrence complements dissuasion and thus building a positive international image and relations remain essential to prevent invasions. Nevertheless, military and civilian deterrents can never guarantee to deter and a defence policy must be able to

actually defend a society. Just as for military defence, general plans of defence will be translated into various strategies developed into separate campaigns that complement each other to reach specific purposes in particular situations. As mentioned above, Sharp (1973) introduced 198 methods of nonviolent action focusing on imposing political, social, economic and psychological costs. These methods should be articulated to focus on three main precepts: maintaining legitimacy and capacity for self-governance, selecting strategies to deny the attacker's goals and resisting the aggressor's violence. However, no blueprint strategy exists for civilian-based defence and seeking to develop a defence strategy makes sense only in a country which has accepted and supports civilian-based defence which is not the context of this study.

In his book, Sharp (1990) dedicated a chapter to transarmament which he defines as the transformation of the defence weapon system from military weapons to non-violent psychological, social, economic and political weapons. In this chapter, he highlights the preconditions to adopt civilian-based defence and the steps to transform the defence system. Just as for military defence, the willingness to defend a society represents the first condition for the adoption of civilian-based defence. The members of a society engage in defence because they love their society and its independence and want to preserve their way of life. Regardless of the country's imperfection and the inevitable argument among the population, people defend their system because it remains a better perspective than the rule of a foreign power. The second precondition for people to engage in civilian-based defence resides in the belief that the policy effectively protects the country. To sum up, adopting a military or a civilian-based defence depends on the same conditions, the willingness to defend and the belief in the chosen system. According to Sharp (1990), transarmament does not require a fundamental change in human nature and international politics, such as global demilitarization or the removal of causes of wars, because non-violent civil resistance relies on removing sources of power regardless of the existence of military weapons and sources of conflicts. In the same chapter, Sharp (1990) highlights conditions for the process of transarmament. The belief in civilian-based defence's capacity to effectively protect a society was outlined as a condition to adopt civilian-based defence, but that conviction must be built in a population, particularly for an innovative policy that lacks historical examples. Consequently, Sharp recommends a non-partisan and incremental process. The process ought to seek to build consensus across the whole political spectrum to avoid alienation from certain parts of society. Indeed, civilian-based defence relies on mass participation and a variety of institutions and organizations in all sectors of society. The existing defence establishment is a key component that should not be alienated in the process of transarmament and therefore an incremental approach should be favoured. The incremental approach serves multiple purposes. First, transarmament should not be

perceived as a downgrading of defence by reduction of military capacities, but as the development of an effective defence system and an incremental approach offers the possibility to test non-violent means for specific contingencies complementarily to military defence. Second, slow change provides space and time for planning and training which are essential to develop an effective defence system. Indeed, transarmament requires time to develop new, adequate and comprehensive capabilities. Finally, adopting non-violent resistance for specific defence tasks builds the politicians', the defence establishment's, and the population's confidence in the policy which is a necessary condition for extending the scope of civilian-based defence and reducing military means in the long term. Apart from incrementally implementing civilian-based defence, Sharp (1990) also outlined the need to parallelly decentralize power to increase a society's resilience.

During the development and incremental implementation of civilian-based defence, various elements must be investigated to provide the public with adequate and thorough information to decide upon the adoption of civilian-based defence or not. As stated above, public support is essential for civilian-based defence to be implemented and its adoption therefore must follow an inclusive democratic process. The public must be provided comparative analyses of, among others, military and civilian-based defences' capabilities to meet security needs for the present and the future and their advantages and disadvantages. In the assessment of the viability and relevance of civilian-based defence, the country's security situation and the perception of deterrence and defence options, including civilian-based defence, form the two decisive factors. Consequently, this research aims to explore these factors, particularly the perception of non-violent resistance because research tends to focus on the perception of current defence policy.

Sharp (1990) presents five main advantages that civilian-based defence possesses over military defence. First, he mentions the self-reliance in defence for states, because they only rely on their population with no dependency on foreign military weapons providers. Second, he highlights the potential to reduce international dangers because civilian-based defence does not physically threaten any foreign country. Third, in the long term and if civilian-based defence becomes adopted by more countries, the incidence of international aggression is likely to decrease. Fourth, it may reduce nuclear proliferation by providing an alternative to conventional military and therefore, reduce the risk of annihilating nuclear wars. Fifth and last, internal usurpations by military forces become less likely with a civilian-based defence.

1.3 Literature Review

The idea of using non-violent civil resistance as a national defence system first emerged after World War I (Miniotaitė, 2004). It remained marginal and primarily a critique of the military until the presentation “The Alternative to the Nuclear Deterrent: Non-violent Resistance” (1958) given by Stephen King Hall, a British military officer and politician. He detailed his idea in the book “Defence in the Nuclear Age” (1958) which argued that Britain should prepare for nonviolent resistance instead of relying on its nuclear weapons and conventional military forces. Academics delved into the topic and proposed scholarly and rigorous works such as Johan Galtung in “Defence Without a Military System (1959). In September 1964, eminent figures convened in Oxford for the first international research conference on civilian defence (Miniotaitė, 2004) which compiled papers resulted in the book “The Strategy of Civilian Defense” (Roberts, 1967). The spontaneous civilian resistance that eventually did not succeed in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969 showcased an inspiring example for scholars in the field (Sharp, 1990). In the 60s, scholars published books and articles on civilian defence (i.e. Erbert, 1969; Galtung 1967; Gleditsch, 1965; Sharp, 1965, 1969). The following decades saw several publications around civilian-based defence with Gene Sharp spearheading the research and publishing several books such as “National Security Through Civilian-based Defence” (1985), “Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence”(1986) and, “Civilian-based Defence: a Post-Military Weapons System” (1990) in collaboration with Bruce Jenkins. The end of the Cold War and particularly the successful use of non-violent resistance to gain independence in Lithuania which later defined it as a state defence strategy stimulated the reflexion around civilian defence systems (Miniotaitė, 2004). However, after the impetus given by the end of the Cold War, national defence through non-violent civilian resistance lost the academic interest and few research have been produced since except for Brian Martin who wrote “Whatever happened to social defence?” (2014) and “Social Defence” (2019). However, civilian resistance has interested some militaries during the Cold War and until today especially in the Baltic and Nordic states. Countries such as Sweden and Switzerland, included components of civil resistance in their total defence doctrine already during the Cold War (Miniotaitė, 2004). Since the Cold War, the Baltics, particularly Lithuania (Binnendijk, 2021, Maszkiewicz, 2015) and the Nordic including Sweden and Finland have integrated non-violent civilian resistance components in their respective doctrines (Fiala, 2019; Wither, 2020). After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, scholars investigated the potential of civilian-based defence in Ukraine (Bartkowski, 2015; Bernath, 2016; Maszkiewicz, 2015), notably because Russia included social movements and civilian-led demonstrations in its military doctrine in 2014 (Bartkowski, 2015). The countries that include or have included non-violent resistance in their defence systems

have always considered it as a complementary to conventional military means rather than a substitute.

Although no country has adopted non-violent civilian resistance as sole defence policy. There are examples of countries which questioned and abandoned having a military force as defence system among which Costa Rica represents the most prevalent example. On December 1, 1948 the transitional junta governing Costa Rica dissolved the military and prohibited the maintenance of a permanent military (Andersen, 1998). The decision came after the leaders concluded that the country did not need the military to ensure the country's external sovereignty and a fear of new coup being staged by the military to restore the previous government (Buscone, 2017). Only 10 days after the promulgation of the abolition, an 800 men force invaded the country from Nicaragua to restore the former government (Høivik and Aas, 1981) but failed due to lack of support from the Costa Rican population and the activation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance with the Organization of the American States which Costa Rica signed after abolishing the army and which ensures that each signing party assists a country under attack (Buscone, 2017). In 1955, a new group of Costa Rican rebels based in Nicaragua and formed tried to invade and overthrow the Costa Rican government which mobilized the police and volunteers and called on the Organization of the American State for support (Buscone, 2017; Høivik and Aas, 1981). The military part of the conflict ended after few weeks. While the level of success of the demilitarization of Costa Rica is questioned to the increasing militarization of its police and the authoritarian turn in political discourse in the past decade (Hochmuller & Muller, 2023), Costa Rica maintained the prohibition of a standing military and has successfully defended against external invasion during the past 75 years. Even if Switzerland and Costa Rica's contexts differ in multiple ways, the Costa Rican case provides interesting insights on the possibility to defend without a military. It shows that not only a country is not bound to having a military for its survival, as examples have been studied (Barbey, 2015), but also that a country can effectively defend against external aggression without a conventional military. While this study does not argue for the investigation of demilitarization in Switzerland, the Costa Rican examples support the questioning of the paradigm of military defence as sole effective defence system which provides argument for the consideration of civilian-based defence as a potential defence system.

In the academic community, scholars debated, critiqued and identified limits to the concept of civilian-based defence. This first challenge to civilian-based defence lies in the conception of a nation. Civilian-based defence does not aim to protect the territorial integrity of a nation. However, scholars highlight that national territory is perceived as an integral part of a nation and that the population expects the defence system to protect it (Boserup & Mack, 1974; De Roose, 1990). They

explain that the national territory is the equivalent of private property but at the state level. As long as a society relies on a police to enforce, if needed through force, the defence of private property, then the population will likely expect the state to protect its own territory by force. According to them, a nation needs first to distance its identity from its territory to implement civilian-based defence. Based on that argument, De Roove (1990) developed a military response to civilian-based defence which emphasizes targeted small-scale military operations aiming to create dissent and fear among the attacked population. However, he acknowledges that the effectiveness of this strategy depends on the unity of the attacked society. Binnendijk (2021) highlights two strategic limits to the defence mechanism upon which relies civilian-based defence. First, he argues that the expectation of the invaders' defection due to fraternization by the local population is based on research on internal struggle. According to him, foreign invaders would be less receptive to fraternization due to greater social distance between the population and the invader. Furthermore, he argues that because the successful defence is a public good, meaning that even those who did not participate in it benefit from its outcome, the best strategy for individuals, especially during the early stage of the invasion, would consist of letting other resist. In light of the above-mentioned need for mass participation to increase civilian-based defence effectiveness, a significant number of people choosing to seek the benefit without participating in it would indeed undermine the defence policy. Other scholars have questioned the feasibility of developing civilian-based defence through an institutional process (Martins 2019; Randle, 2021). According to them, governments might refrain from training civil resistance because it could eventually turn against them. Indeed, providing a population with more tools to wage political struggle diminishes the freedom of action of a government. Moreover, in the Weberian conception, the state is defined by the actor having the monopoly over legitimate violence. A national defence system without violence challenges that definition and the state would therefore become the entity having popular support within a community. Such a redefinition forces the state to constantly seek support and build consensus within its population (Johansen & Brian, 2019). Randle (2021) further argues that a main barrier resides in the psychology of government, namely that exploring civil resistance is perceived as acknowledging the possibility that the current army could be defeated.

The elements mentioned above do not compose an exhaustive list of possible limits to civilian-based defence and this research does not aim to develop such a list. It is widely acknowledged that civilian-based defence needs more research and development and that as mentioned earlier each country should conduct context-specific research just as for military defence. This research falls into that scope and aims to explore the perception and viability of

non-violent resistance in the Swiss context. The following part will present the method this research relied on to explore that question.

2. Method

2.1 Sample

A questionnaire was filled in by 185 participants, 72 females and 111 males, living in Switzerland. Two respondents filled in “other” for sex. The mean age was 36.6 years (*SD* 14.6) for females and 36.8 years (*SD* 14.8) for males. The age difference was not significant. The age range was between 20 and 79 years.

Qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews conducted with four parliamentarian members of the Defence and Security Commission (one woman and three men) and three male Swiss strategic studies researchers.

2.2 Instrument

2.2.1 Online Questionnaire

A questionnaire, later translated in French and German was constructed for measuring the respondent’s perception of and willingness to participate in violent and nonviolent resistance actions.

The first question asked the respondents which action they would choose in case of foreign armed occupation of their city. The respondents chose among the following answers: I would commit armed resistance; I would resist by participating in actions of civil resistance such as demonstrations, protests, marches, boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience; I would go abroad; I would cooperate with the occupier; I would do nothing; I prefer not to answer.

The second question asked which method of combatting an armed occupation carried out by a superior foreign power was considered the most effective between armed and nonviolent struggle.

Response alternatives for the questions measuring the willingness to participate in resistance action were on a five-points scale (-2 = I completely disagree; -1= I somewhat disagree; 0= undecided; 1= I somewhat agree; 2= I completely agree). Question 3 investigated 13 actions in the case of occupation of one’s city. Question four specified that the occupier was repressive and investigated nine actions in this context.

3.1 Armed attacks against occupier soldiers and local collaborators

3.2 Armed attacks or undermining premises of occupier or local collaborators

3.3 Intentional elimination (murder) of occupation leaders or local collaborators

3.4 Boycott of invaders' political institutions and organizations

- 3.5 Boycott of social and cultural activities organized by the occupiers
- 3.6 Refusal to pay taxes to occupation administration
- 3.7 Cover anti-occupation nonviolent activists
- 3.8 Cover anti-occupation armed resistance
- 3.9 Strike
- 3.10 Damage factory property or equipment produced for military purposes
- 3.11 Spread anti-occupation information, leaflets, graffiti
- 3.12 Organization of local committees of resistance that would plan action of nonviolent resistance
- 3.13 Work in the underground anti-occupation edition
- 4.1 Armed struggle
- 4.2 Strike
- 4.3 Hunger strike/starvation
- 4.4 Deliberate inefficiency at work if that is important for occupiers
- 4.5 Distribution of leaflets and graffiti
- 4.6 Wearing national clothing and demonstrations flag that are banned by the occupier
- 4.7 Blocking roads to create traffic jams at strategic locations
- 4.8 Participation in the ostracism of invaders and their collaborators
- 4.9 Documenting the violations of human rights and information transfer

2.2.2 Semi-structured Interview

An interview scheme was constructed and later translated in French. Follow-up questions were asked during the interviews.

Table 2*Semi-structured Interview Scheme*

Theme	Questions
Switzerland's security situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the current external security threats to Switzerland? • What are the current internal security threats? Does Switzerland prepare against coups? • Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country. What does this mean in regard to national security? • Why is it armed neutrality? • Peacebuilding is in the Federal Constitution (art.54), how does this materialise in security policies? • What does NATO represent for Switzerland's security?
Swiss armed forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the perception of the Swiss armed forces abroad? Does it represent a deterring force? A credible defence force? • What are the Swiss Armed Forces defending? (Territory, institutions, people, values...), (During WWII, the federal council planned to abandon half of the territory to preserve the institutions= réduit national. During the Cold War, it was considered possible for the Swiss government to flee abroad and encourage civil resistance and guerrilla warfare until the Swiss military and its allies expel the occupying force) • Swiss military is made of its citizens. How do we know if they would be ready to actually fight in a war? Would they be ready to kill? • How important is the economic role of the Swiss military? And the symbolic one?
Alternative Defence Policy, Civilian-based Defence, Civil Resistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • During the Cold War, Switzerland adopted a total defence policy (military defence, civil resistance and guerrilla warfare). Researchers argue that violence in a predominantly non-violent civil resistance movement is counterproductive because it legitimizes the opponent's repression and violence, affecting third-party support and preventing the alienation of the opponent's supporters. Besides, Chenoweth (2011) showed that nonviolent movements are more effective than violent ones. Would the state, and the military be ready to abandon guerrilla warfare and only implement nonviolent civil resistance? Why? • Other countries are including civil resistance in their defence policies (Sweden, Lithuania), but maintain or reinstate a violent component (guerrilla warfare), why is that? Are traditional institutions unable to challenge the paradigm of violence? Are they defending their own existence? • Why has civil resistance been included in defence policy (Cold War) but not trained as is the military? • Civilian-based defence (CBD= the institutionalization of non-violent civil resistance as a defence policy, including preparation and training) relies on defending a way of life, values. What are the values that the Swiss population would unite to defend? • CBD requires an adaptation of the law (legality of civil disobedience) which would give more power to the people. To what extent is the state willing to empower its citizens risking them to challenge it? • CBD is more effective when the organization is decentralised (more resilient). The political structure of Switzerland makes it ideal (federalism). Furthermore, a country is more resilient and independent if it decentrally produces its

	<p>own resources. Why is Switzerland not developing that aspect more? (Production of food and energy)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the long run, Switzerland could become the first country to fully implement and solely rely on CBD and become a leader in transarmament and the reduction of weapons. This would reinforce Switzerland's position as a peace promoter. To what extent is the security sector considering that option and the long-term?
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2.3 Procedure

A French and a German electronic version of the questionnaire were created on Google Drive. Snowball sampling was used to obtain responses. The link to the questionnaires was spread among a small pool of respondents, who participated and furthered the link to their broader circles of contacts. The links were also shared on social media. The data collection was active from 15 December 2022 until 27 March 2023.

On 2 February 2023, an email was sent to all seven French speaker members of the Swiss Defence and Security Commission to ask them for an interview. Four of them responded positively and interviews were scheduled. The other three were contacted again a month later and either never responded or declined the invitation. Four researchers from the Swiss military academy (MILAC) and the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) were invited for an interview by email. Three of them responded positively. One researcher demanded to receive the questions before the interview.

The seven interviews were conducted between 3 March 2023 and 9 June 2023. The interviews lasted between [00:43:27] and [01:08:22]. Five interviews were conducted online via Zoom and two were conducted in person. Four interviews were conducted in French and three in English. All the interviews were transcribed and translated into English when necessary.

2.4 Ethical Considerations

The study is consistent with the principles concerning human research ethics of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013), as well as follows the guidelines for the responsible conduct of research of the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2012).

3. Results

3.1 Results of the Quantitative Survey

3.1.1 Choice of Action in the Case of a Foreign Armed Occupation of a Town or Village

The most common choice of action in the case of a foreign armed occupation of their town or village was resisting by participating in actions of civil resistance such as demonstrations, protests, marches, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience (37.8%). Committing armed resistance was the second preferred option (31.9%). The least common choice was to cooperate with the occupier (1.1%). The rest of the population preferred action was going abroad (14.6%) and doing nothing (13.0%). Some people preferred not to answer (1.6%).

The preferences differed by gender. Actions of civil resistance such as demonstrations, protests, marches, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience was more common among female (54.2%) than male (26.1%) respondents. Committing armed resistance was a more common choice for men (45.9%) than women (11.1%).

3.1.2 Assumed Effectiveness of Armed Struggle versus Non-violent Struggle as a Method of Combating an Armed Occupation Carried out by a Superior Foreign Power

The respondents considered armed struggle (60.0%) more effective than non-violent struggle (40.0%) to combat an armed occupation carried out by a superior foreign power.

Of females, 54.2% and of males 30.6% considered non-violent struggle to combat an armed occupation most effective, whereas 45.8% of females and 69.4% of males considered armed struggle to be more effective.

3.1.3 Choice of Actions to Join or Initiate against a Foreign Occupier in their City

Table 3

Frequencies of Responses for the 13 Items. Column 1. shows the cumulative percentage of respondent who chose somewhat agree and completely agree; Column 2. shows the cumulative percentage of respondent who chose somewhat disagree and completely disagree;

	1. Would participate or initiate the action (%)	2. Would not participate nor initiation the action (%)	3. Undecided (%)
Armed attacks against occupier soldiers and local collaborators	37.3	45.4	17.3
Armed attacks or undermining premises of occupier or local collaborators	64.9	24.3	35.1
Intentional elimination (murder) of occupation leaders or local collaborators	29.2	55.1	15.7
Boycott of invaders' political institutions and organizations	82.2	9.2	8.6
Boycott of social and cultural activities organized by the occupiers	77.3	11.9	10.8
Refusal to pay taxes to occupation administration	73.0	13.0	14.1
Cover anti-occupation nonviolent activists	69.7	13.5	16.8
Cover anti-occupation armed resistance	61.1	11.9	27.0
Strike	57.3	20.5	22.2
Damage factory property or equipment produced for military purposes	56.2	23.8	20.0
Spread anti-occupation information, leaflets, graffiti	65.7	14.6	21.1
Organization of local committees of resistance that would plan action of nonviolent resistance	56.8	17.8	25.4
Work in the underground anti-occupation edition	48.1	21.6	30.3

Because the data were at interval level, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried out with sex as independent variable and the 13 items measuring preferred choice of actions against a foreign occupier as dependent variables. The multivariate analysis was significant (see Table 2).

The univariate analyses showed significant differences between females and males on the following items: armed attacks against occupier soldiers and local collaborators, armed attacks or undermining premises of occupier or local collaborators, intentional elimination (murder) of occupation leaders or local collaborators, strikes, and damage factory property or equipment produced for military purposes (see Table 1.). A tendency was also found for cover anti-occupation nonviolent activists.

Table 4

Results of a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with Sex as Independent Variable and 13 Items Measuring Choice of Actions against a Foreign Occupier as Dependent Variables (N = 183)

	<i>F</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i> ≤	η_p^2	Means	
					Females	Males
Effect of Sex						
Multivariate analysis	5.55	13, 169	.001	.299		
Univariate analyses						
Armed attacks against occupier soldiers and local collaborators	54.39	1, 181	.001	.231	-1.11	0.42
Armed attacks or undermining premises of occupier or local collaborators	21.51	“	.001	.106	0.04	1.01
Intentional elimination (murder) of occupation leaders or local collaborators	41.49	“	.001	.186	-1.32	0.00
Boycott of invaders' political institutions and organizations	.25	“	<i>ns</i>	.001	1.36	1.28
Boycott of social and cultural activities organized by the occupiers	.63	“	<i>ns</i>	.003	1.31	1.16
Refusal to pay taxes to occupation administration	.11	“	<i>ns</i>	.001	1.01	1.07
Cover anti-occupation nonviolent activists	3.18	“	<i>ns</i>	.017	1.13	.80
Cover anti-occupation armed resistance	2.39	“	.076	.013	.65	.92
Strike	5.37	“	.022	.029	.85	.38
Damage factory property or equipment produced for military purposes	7.50	“	.007	.040	.22	.77
Spread anti-occupation information, leaflets, graffiti	.09	“	<i>ns</i>	.001	.74	.79
Organization of local committees of resistance that would plan action of nonviolent resistance	.00	“	<i>ns</i>	.000	.57	.56
Work in the underground anti-occupation edition	.68	“	<i>ns</i>	.004	.46	.30

3.1.4 Readiness to Take Part in Actions if Living under a Repressive Foreign Occupation where People are Killed, Arrested, and Intimidated for Independent Activities

Table 5

Frequencies of Responses for the Nine items. Column 1. shows the cumulative percentage of respondents who chose somewhat agree and completely agree; Column 2. shows the cumulative percentage of respondents who chose somewhat disagree and completely disagree

	1. Would take part in the action (%)	2. Would not take part in the action (%)	3. Undecided (%)
Armed struggle	47.0	40.0	13.0
Strike	55.7	25.4	18.9
Hunger strike/starvation	13.0	63.2	23.8
Deliberate inefficiency at work if that is important for occupiers	82.7	6.5	10.8
Distribution of leaflets and graffiti	51.9	21.1	27.0
Wearing national clothing and demonstrations flag that are banned by the occupier	38.4	31.9	29.7
Blocking roads to create traffic jams at strategic locations	59.5	19.5	21.1
Participation in the ostracism of invaders and their collaborators	65.9	13.0	21.1
Documenting the violations of human rights and information transfer	68.6	11.4	20.0

Because the data were at interval level, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried out with sex as independent variable and the nine items measuring readiness to take part in actions as dependent variables. The multivariate analysis was significant (see Table 4).

The univariate analyses showed significant differences between females and males on the following items: armed struggle, hunger strike/starvation, distribution of leaflets and graffiti, and wearing national clothing and demonstration flag that are banned by the occupier (see Table 4). A tendency was also found for documenting the violations of human rights and information transfer.

Table 5

Results of a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with Sex as Independent Variable and 9 Items Measuring Choice of Actions against a Foreign Occupier as Dependent Variables (N = 183)

	<i>F</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i> ≤	η_p^2	Means	
					Females	Males
Effect of Sex						
Multivariate analysis	6.91	9,173	.001	.264		
Univariate analyses						
Armed struggle	36.08	1, 181	.001	.166	-.65	.68
Strike	1.98	“	<i>ns</i>	.011	.64	.34
Hunger strike/starvation	7.89	“	.006	.042	-.61	-1.12
Deliberate inefficiency at work if that is important for occupiers	1.39	“	<i>ns</i>	.008	1.33	1.16
Distribution of leaflets and graffiti	9.36	“	.003	.049	.85	.27
Wearing national clothing and demonstrations flag that are banned by the occupier	4.10	“	.044	.022	.31	-.07
Blocking roads to create traffic jams at strategic locations	.15	“	<i>ns</i>	.001	.53	.60
Participation in the ostracism of invaders and their collaborators	2.29	“	<i>ns</i>	.012	.68	.95
Documenting the violations of human rights and information transfer	3.19	“	.076	.017	1.17	.86

3.1.5 Participation in Violent and Non-violent Actions

For the items of question 3, more people were ready to participate in at least one nonviolent action (93%) than in at least one violent action (74.6%). The percentage of respondents who were ready to participate in at least one violent action targeting persons was 44.9%.

For the items of question 4, more people were ready to participate in at least one nonviolent action (91.4%) than in at least one violent action (47%). When combining both items from questions 3 and 4, more people were ready to participate in at least one nonviolent action (96.2%) than in at least one violent action (77.3%).

3.2 Results of the Semi-structured Interviews

The semi-structured interviews sought to gather experts' opinions on the security situation of Switzerland, deterrence and defence, and finally non-violent resistance.

3.2.1 Security Situation of Switzerland

The security threats that interviewees mentioned throughout the interviews can be divided into three main categories; civil threats, transnational and criminal threats, and military threats. The interviewees differed in their perception of the main threats and the likelihood of them happening.

All the interviewees mentioned civil threats including the consequences of climate change, pandemics, the arrival of refugees, mis and disinformation, incidents in nuclear power plants and technology.

We have reports on Switzerland's security policy that set the framework every four years. Most of the threats that weigh on Switzerland are in the civilian sphere, whether it's the issue of climate change and its consequences, a pandemic like the one we experienced during Covid, or, and this is something we kind of face for the first time, there was the question of the risk of electricity shortage, which, if it leads to a blackout, would undoubtedly pose significant problems. (Interviewee 1)

I think one of the threats that certainly exists is in the cyberspace. I think there are some threats simply because it's easy to carry out attacks. You don't need to cross any other national borders, whatever. There are no national borders in the cyberspace. I think this is certainly one of the threats. (Interviewee 5)

All but one interviewee mentioned transnational and criminal threats with violent extremism being the most common one. However, the conception of violent extremism differed among interviewees and entailed far-left, far-right and religious extremism.

Then, in the context of radicalised Shia terrorism, a terrorist group with a couple of Stingers, they could basically create havoc which could potentially have an intensity that it would reach the level of armed combat and the police would be totally overloaded. (Interviewee 7)

There are domestic threats, with groups on both the far right and the far left becoming more radical. And we're seeing this in Zurich in particular, with this new group that's really starting to take up a lot of space. And I think it is also taking up quite a lot of space in the

work of the intelligence services of the confederation and the cantons, particularly the canton of Zurich. (Interviewee 3)

Four out of seven interviewees mentioned existing military threats for Switzerland but all except one considered them unlikely.

The main external threat, although low, but that has to be on the radar of the armed forces is interstate war. A war between European nations or Switzerland and another European power would start. That's the highest danger, but it's not the highest priority at the moment, I think. (Interviewee 6)

So it's quite clear [the Russians] are a threat, but mostly for the post-soviet base. The probability that you would have Russian tanks or operational capabilities knocking at the Swiss borders went down since the 24th. [...] I think if you say, is it really credible that the military threat will be carried out? I'm even on record and to that I say, well, no. (interviewee 7)

3.2.2 Deterrence and Defence

Various elements of deterrence and defence were discussed during the interviews among them neutrality, the Swiss armed forces, and NATO.

All interviewees but one highlighted the legal obligations resulting from the neutral status of Switzerland and defending the Swiss territory to prevent anyone from using it for military purposes was the most mentioned. Interviewees also pointed out the obligation to not support any of the parties and the prohibition to join international military alliances. These elements were often nuanced by highlighting that neutrality remains above all a political tool that contributes to Switzerland's safety and evolves through time.

Of course, you have the legal level of neutrality, but then you also have the political level. This is where it really gets interesting because there you have a little bit of leeway where you can decide what is actually possible within the framework of our understanding, which is something that evolves. (Interviewee 5)

It's an excellent question because there is the law of neutrality, then the policy of neutrality and obviously, it depends on which side of the political spectrum you are. [...] So for me, neutrality is a means of defending the country's interests, but it's not an end in itself. It is a means of foreign policy to defend our country and its population. (Interviewee 3)

The Swiss armed forces were discussed extensively during the interviews. A perception shared by six out of seven interviewees was the lack of certainty about the Swiss armed forces's effectiveness. Interviewees often admitted that they did not know if the Swiss armed forces had a deterrent effect or that soldiers would be ready to kill in case of a war. Three interviewees explained that the Swiss armed forces have a good reputation abroad because of the quality of the training, the militia format, and the myth around Switzerland's resistance capabilities. Two highlighted that they assume that the Swiss armed forces can fulfil their deterrent and defence role based on the example of the Ukrainian resistance against the Russian invasion. On the other hand, two interviewees argued that the Swiss armed forces do not have the capabilities to militarily protect Switzerland. Overall, no consensus emerged from the interviews neither around the perception of the Swiss armed forces' capabilities nor about their actual capabilities to deter and defend. However, all interviewees acknowledged that Switzerland does not exist in a vacuum and that NATO plays a role in its safety. All interviewees mentioned that NATO represents Switzerland's main security partner and estimated that Switzerland's security benefits from NATO as a security organization. Nevertheless, all interviewees deemed the relationship between Switzerland and NATO complicated for different reasons such as neutrality, security, independence or sovereignty.

It's a very complicated question because Switzerland benefits from NATO, for example, from the reinforcement of NATO in Eastern Europe, whether it's Hungary, Poland, or Romania. Switzerland indirectly benefits from the security provided by NATO. It also indirectly benefits from the nuclear shield, whether we want it or not. At the same time, it poses a risk because if NATO was to go to war, Switzerland would be in the middle of NATO countries, but would be isolated. (Interviewee 1)

For me, NATO is not something that endangers Switzerland, but that is paramount to Switzerland because we are in the midst of NATO although we are not part of it.[...]I think we have to be interested in cooperating with NATO because what would be the alternative? Not cooperating with our closest security partners and neighbours and doing everything on our own. [...] But we have to see that it is an American-dominated alliance and that Washington is in charge. We have to make to always highlight this dimension. (Interviewee 6)

3.2.3 Non-violent Resistance

The topic was addressed during only six of the seven interviews due to time constraints. All interviewees expressed their lack of knowledge about non-violent defence policies and

acknowledged having never heard and/or thought about such concepts. A common pattern observed during the different interviews consisted of highlighting the difficulty of imagining something new and challenging traditional approaches.

I need an example of where it worked. [...] There was always armed resistance. (Interviewee 3)

I find it hard to imagine how it works. I would be very surprised if governmental organizations were trying to get away from the violent component. [...] We are stuck in old patterns. (Interviewee 2)

[Members of the parliament] are old men who live in the past and as long as these people are in power, I would be very surprised if current models would be questioned. (Interviewee 4)

Four interviewees raised doubts about the feasibility and sustainability of non-violent resistance because of human nature. They argued that when non-violent people face violence they would naturally turn to violence due to instinct and fears and, in the case of Switzerland, easy access to weapons increases the likelihood of resorting to violence.

In the end, guns start talking. (interviewee 3)

The result is actually people becoming more violent because they can no longer organize something nonviolent. (Interviewee 2)

Institutions, especially the armed forces themselves play an important role in perpetuating conventional military defence policies according to five interviewees. Various explanations were provided:

The institutions are not unable to think outside of the violent paradigm, I think they have not tried yet. (Interviewee 5)

I think at the moment institutions are unable to conceptualize [alternative to violent defence policies]. The military is very self-focused on organized violence. (Interviewee 6)

There might be members of the armed forces who might be able to think differently, but they are a minority. (Interviewee 4)

There is a component [in the military] that seeks to find a way to exist and justify its existence. [...] The army is a non-political component of the state, but it fights to exist and to grow, that's clear. (Interviewee 2)

4. Discussion

The previous part presented the results from the data collection conducted for this research. The following part discusses these results within the framework of the civilian-based defence concept introduced in this study's second part. Civilian-based defence consists of a radical proposition and represents the final state of a defence policy. However, since this defence policy has never been intended in Switzerland, this study focuses on exploring the current situation through a civilian-based lens discussing the facilitating factors and the limiting ones regarding the potential relevance and implementation of civilian-based defence or a variation of it as suggested. Sharp (1990) suggested four main themes to assess the feasibility of civilian-based defence: 1) the country's external security situation and threats, 2) the country's internal security situation and the danger of usurpation 3) the country's perceived options in deterrence and defence, 4) the assessment and perception of civilian-based defence to meet the needs. These themes structure the discussion section. However, the discussions conducted during the interviews led to the conclusion that the second point is not relevant in the case of Switzerland for two main reasons. First, interviewees underscored the difficulty of strictly separating internal and external threats, especially regarding transnational crime and violent extremism which were often mentioned as primary security threats. Second, no interviewees had information about potential usurpers. For these reasons, this study will address the themes 1) and 2) in one section about security threats in general. In order to discuss the perceived defence options and to assess civilian-based defence, one should be made aware that a defence policy aims to protect a society which members believe is worth defending and the choice of such a policy should therefore fall on the most effective solution. Moreover, choosing a defence policy should be based on a comparison of different policies rather than on an absolute evaluation of one. No defence policy can be considered perfect and fully effective at all times. Defence policies have strengths and limitations and to ensure a democratic and informed decision a population must be aware of both when deciding upon which policy to favour.

4.1 Security Situation

In 2021, the Swiss Federal Council published a report on the Swiss Security Policy (Federal Council, 2021). This report identifies nine threats concerning Switzerland: Cyber threats, influence and disinformation, terrorism, violent extremism, armed conflict, weapons systems proliferation, espionage, organized crime and catastrophe and emergency situations. The interviewees mainly corroborated the perception of threats but expressed different priorities. Overall and reflecting the content of the report, interviewees mentioned civil threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and

consequences of climate change as the most likely and plausible threat towards Switzerland followed by violent extremism and organized crime. Military threats come last, usually considered unlikely but with too grave consequences to be ignored which the report also presents in these words. The lack of imminent military threat provides an ideal context for Switzerland to explore the possibility of developing civilian-based defence and start building its capacities. As explained by Sharp (1990), building a civilian-based defence requires time, which renders the process more difficult in a fragile context. Moreover, in the Swiss context, the development of partial civilian-based defence means without diminishing the current military means could strengthen the defence capabilities against the perceived threats. Indeed, influence and disinformation rely on disagreement among the members of a society (O'Shaughnessy, 2020). Disinformation spreads and/or reinforces inaccurate or false information to undermine the legitimacy and trust in a society's institutions and its foundation. The report classifies disinformation as a security threat which offers an example of classic securitization of a phenomenon (Balzacq et al. 2015). Disinformation in itself has always existed everywhere in different forms (Burkhardt, 2017; Gorbach, 2018; Soto Mayor et al, 2023) and will not disappear in the future. Disinformation becomes an issue within a society when it leads to mistrust, polarization and flawed decision-making (Federal Council, 2021). An effective mechanism against disinformation should therefore focus on preventing disinformation to achieve its goals. Consequently, disinformation cannot be primarily addressed through a security lens because that approach leads to counterpropaganda by the state and shrinking civic space rather than critical thinking and constructive debates among the population (Neo, 2020; Ponsonby, 1928; Sombatpoonsiri, 2020). As long as a fertile ground allowing disinformation to be effective persists, part of the population will be receptive to false information either due to the inability to critically evaluate information or due to the willingness to accept false information that fits into a narrative. Therefore, countering disinformation demands an efficient education system which provides the citizens with critical thinking and civic space with pluralistic media and space for debate. An open and participative society builds resilience and prevents the breach of trust in its institutions because it reflects the population's will. Nevertheless, the use of disinformation increases in what the Federal Council calls "hybrid conflicts" (2021, p.9) which are characterized by the diversification of means used to wage conflict. Hybrid conflicts "are initially aimed at political, economic and social stability of society and the state, as well as the state's ability to act. It is characterized by complexity and unpredictability, and primarily targets the population in order to win its sympathy and weaken social cohesion." (Federal Council, 2021, p.9-10). Hybrid conflict rationale builds on the conception of power that Sharp developed in *The Politics of Non-violent Actions* (1973) meaning that a society is as strong as the level of cooperation from its population. Therefore, building civilian-based defence capabilities by educating and training the population could

supplement the current defence capabilities in domains that the military is ill-designed to address such as preventing political gains and upholding social cohesion. Preparing the population to wage non-violent conflict further offers a strong deterrent effect since the strategy of hybrid conflict relies on the undermining of the social cohesion and the training for civilian-based defence focuses on the necessity of maintaining social cohesion throughout the conflict. Some components of civilian-based defence, such as rejection of authority or non-cooperation with the invader have been included in the Swiss defence policy in the past, notably during the Cold War. They complemented a guerilla resistance in case of an invasion of Switzerland. The population was informed about it through the book “Défense Civile” (Grosjean & Bachman, 1969), but the non-violent dimension never benefitted from training or large visibility. One of the interviewees mentioned that most likely Switzerland considered that “it is a nice to have, but it is really not a need. The most efficient option is organized defence by armed forces and then guerilla warfare.” The Swiss defence policy abandoned that component at the end of the Cold War and maintained only the military dimension. However, the reinforcement of the non-military dimension in hybrid conflicts suggests that non-military systems of defence should be considered. Indeed, non-military dimensions of hybrid conflicts such as fomenting dissent within a society either by the infiltration of disrupting agents or by the polarization of society through influence could be associated with offensive non-violent weapons and armed forces are unable to react to these. In the context of the development of new weapons used to wage conflict and the absence of an imminent military threat to Switzerland, the country benefits from a favourable context to explore civilian-based defence.

4.2 Deterrence and Defence

After discussing the security situation in Switzerland, the following paragraphs delve into the perceived deterrence and defence policy considered in Switzerland. The Federal Council published a report on Switzerland’s security policy in 2021 and a complement in September 2022 due to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. In the report, the Federal Council mentions three long-term higher interests influencing the Swiss security policy: 1) non-reliance on force and rules-based international order, 2) Self-determination and freedom of action, and 3) safety of the population and the critical infrastructures. The Federal Council aims to ensure these interests through nine objectives among which two directly concern the defence weapon system. Objective 3 aims to strengthen the focus on hybrid conflicts and Objective 7 aims to reinforce resilience and security of supply including goods and services critical to security and defence. Responding to the Federal Council’s report on security, the Swiss Armed Forces (Armée Suisse, 2023) published a report called “Strengthening the Defence Capabilities – Increasing Power: Objectives and Strategy” which

outlines the Swiss Armed Forces' vision of its development and its needs in the coming years. The Swiss Armed Forces rely on the assumption which is explicitly stated multiple times in the report that some threats can be addressed only through military means. If that assumption is unquestionable, the development of a civilian-based defence system will be objected and even exploring the possibility will likely be perceived as a waste of resources and time. However, in light of the interests and objectives of the Federal Council, exploring civilian-based defence could prove a strengthening of the defence policy, especially regarding the non-reliance on the use of force, the security of defence supply and the focus on hybrid conflicts. Indeed, while it is straightforward for the first two elements since civilian-based defence does not rely on violence and large quantities of material and infrastructures, hybrid conflicts would also benefit from the development of civilian-based defence. The Federal Council (2021) describes hybrid conflicts as conflicts in which adversaries use political, economic, military, informational, criminal and intelligence means to achieve their objectives. Civilian-based defence can prevent most objectives from being achieved because the sources of power rely on cooperation whereas military means of defence are ill-suited to address non-military means particularly political, economic, or informational. The Federal Council (2021) and the Swiss Armed Forces (2023) predict an increase in the hybrid dimensions of conflict, which questions the choice of deterrence strategy. Military deterrence promises high costs through military retaliation in case of military actions against society. However, it does not deter from using other means of waging conflicts whereas if the whole society is trained to deny any objectives through civilian-based defence, the defence system deters regardless of the potential means of action from an adversary. Besides, both reports mention the lifting of restrictions linked to neutrality in case of aggression which would authorize Switzerland to seek support and alliance among neighbouring countries. Both reports mention the need to develop the interoperability of military systems with NATO to ensure cooperation in case of attack against Switzerland. That position implicitly recognizes that Switzerland's military deterrence might fail and in such a case the defence capacities do not suffice in case of aggression. Interviewees acknowledged the benefits of NATO as the first and even main defence system for Switzerland's territory. Benefitting from NATO's existence does not represent an issue in itself but relying on a foreign military alliance undermines Switzerland's independence which remains essential in Switzerland's neutrality. Regarding international independence, even if civilian-based defence benefits from international actions such as economic and political sanctions which impose costs on an attacker, Erica Chenoweth (2011) argued that in the case of non-violent social movements, international actions are not a determining factor. If Switzerland developed a non-violent defence system, it would reduce its dependence on foreign states compared to its current system. Indeed, the dependence on NATO and international support would decrease. However, it does not mean that good relations with other

countries should not be a priority in the overall security policy. It only means that our defence system would be more independent because untied to external support. This paragraph presented the defence and deterrence perception of the Federal Council and the Swiss Armed Forces. At present, both institutions only consider military defence and the following paragraphs discuss the current system in light of the questionnaires and interviews conducted for this study.

The interviews highlighted uncertainties around some aspects of the current defence system which shows possible limits and shortcomings. It also shows that the support and adoption of a defence system are not bound to evidence-based proof of its effectiveness but that trust in it suffices to implement it. Indeed, 93% of the Swiss population feels very or somewhat safe (Tresch et al. 2023) regardless of the limits and uncertainties around the defence system. Sharp (1990) underscored the importance of creating the population's buy-in and the lack of objective definitive arguments for the current military defence system allows the possibility for building that trust and buy-in for a civilian-based defence. One of the doubts standing out from the interviews concerns the readiness of Swiss soldiers to defend and, if needed, kill to protect Switzerland. This lack of certitude about the actual defence capabilities shows that the Swiss defence policy focuses on deterrence. However, the interviewees' doubts can be nuanced by the questionnaire's results in which 44.87% of the participants positively responded to at least one item that explicitly mentioned conducting violent action against people. In a military defence system, half of the population accepting to bear arms and kill opponents satisfies the needs of that system which is less dependent on mass participation than civilian-based defence. Indeed, the Federal Council (2010) estimated that the Swiss Armed Forces need 140'000 effective soldiers to defend the country. During the interview, the representative of the Department of Defence, Protection of the Population and Sports differentiated between war of choice and war of necessity. The Department of Defence assumes that the Swiss population would engage in any actions in the latter scenario such as an invasion of Switzerland while being aware that large parts of the population would flee the country. The results of the questionnaire showed a significant difference between the sexes in the willingness to conduct violent actions. Conscription for all male citizens is established in Switzerland and can explain part of the difference, even if a third of the conscripts are discharged during the recruitment (DDPS, 2019) and another third do not finish their service (Carel, 2019). By definition, military training aims to replace civilian norms with military norms and beliefs to influence patterns of behaviour (Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978). The effect of militarisation on recruits, traditionally men, has been extensively studied and shows that it affects their behaviours (Hale, 2012; Henry, 2017; Higate, 2003; Nagel, 1998; Riley, 2020) and therefore military service in Switzerland partly explains the difference between men and women. However, the context of the studies on the effect of military

differs from the Swiss context. In Switzerland, the longest continuous service in the military remains relatively short for most people, typically five months, and then members of the military participate in a three-week military repetition training every year for several years. Overall, members of the Swiss Armed Forces typically serve for 12 months over seven years alternating between military and civil life. Military training increases the readiness to conduct violent actions (Grossman, 1995) regardless of the inherent risks of conducting such actions, similarly, the readiness of a population to participate in nonviolent resistance would increase through training. The questionnaire showed that 37.8% chose non-violent resistance as a defence strategy and that 96.2% of the respondents would participate in at least one nonviolent action. Non-violent resistance being the preferred strategy for a relative majority of respondents and the potentially high rate of participation in non-violent actions, in a context where the population has never systematically participated in non-violent training, supports the suggestion to explore the possibility of institutionalizing and building a credible deterrent and defence forces based on non-violent civil resistance.

Besides the lack of certainty about the human factor in the military defence system, the consequences of a failure of deterrence in Switzerland represent an important blind spot. Indeed, no interviewees offered definitive answers to questions relating to material consequences resulting from conventional military warfare in a highly urbanized and dense country like Switzerland. As presented in the theoretical part, deterrence is not guaranteed always to work, and a defence policy must consider the defence phase and its consequences. Therefore, the information about the consequences of a military confrontation should be forecasted and made accessible to the population for a democratic and informed debate which appears to currently not be the case in Switzerland. A recurrent argument used by non-violent resistance defenders lies in the difference in material destruction and human casualties between military and non-violent defence (Martin, 2019; Sharp, 1990). Therefore, the absence of information about possible consequences biases the debate and prevents citizens from best weighing various defence policies' pros and cons. Overall, the absence of various defence policies in the debate undermines the country's security because it prevents shortcomings and limits of the existing policy from being addressed. The previous paragraphs discussed elements arguing in favour of better exploring civilian-based defence due to flaws and limitations of the current defence system. However, this study primarily aims to explore the perception of non-violent resistance and the following paragraphs delve into this topic.

4.3 Non-violence and Civilian-based Defence

As presented in the results, interviewees doubt the feasibility of non-violent resistance because they are convinced that eventually, people resort to violence. The conception of a human tendency to resort to aggression and violence is common. However, studies have shown that human beings are not genetically programmed for aggression and wars but that our actions are shaped by our socialization and conditioning (Ardila, 2012). Besides, the development of civilian-based defence builds trust in non-violent resistance. If people believe that non-violent strategies are more effective than violent ones, assuming that people want to maximise their likelihood of success, the likelihood of resorting to violence decreases. Erica Chenoweth (2010) already showed that non-violent resistance is on average more effective than violent resistance. Her study focused on spontaneous social movements rather than institutionally trained cases due to their nonexistence but there seems to be no reason that training non-violent resistance decreases its effectiveness. Interestingly, the questionnaire shows that the choice of violent defence is not unanimous, especially between groups. Indeed, overall 60.0% of the population considers armed struggle more effective than non-violent struggle, but when disaggregated by sex, the results become nuanced with a majority of women (54.2%) considering non-violence as the more effective method of combating an armed occupation and a large majority of men (69.4%) considering armed struggles to be more effective. Some interviewees mentioned the gender dimensions. One of the interviewees, a member of the parliament, explained that as long as the people in power mostly consist of men over 60, it would be surprising that the paradigm of violence would be contested. A second interviewee raised the gender dimension when explaining the overall lack of research on non-violence. He mentioned that “especially men are drawn to violence and the direct use of force” and that violence attracts scholars because it connects to “action, to something that is not boring, in martial terms, blood is spilling”. Unfortunately, the interviewees did not reach parity at all with only one woman among the interviewees. It limits the representativity of the opinions represented in this study. The gender dimension of the perception of violence and nonviolence strongly supports the need to expand the discussion around defence policy to make it more representative and inclusive and scholarly work on non-violence, especially comparisons between violence and non-violence effectiveness, further support the need to critically assess the effectiveness of violence.

As presented in the introduction, debates around military tend to oppose only two solutions: a state with an army aimed at military protecting a country or a state without a military at all. However, scholars supporting civilian-based defence and non-violence in general do not necessarily support the complete suppression of the military. They question the role and strategy of military. The example of Costa Rica which suppressed its military presents one possibility but in the future

military institutions could simply receive the same missions but fulfil them with different means. Keyes (2013) proposed a conceptualisation of a future military acting on the motto “ever to give life, never to take it” (p.104) and fulfilling military missions during peace, conflict and war. He described nine missions and presented precedents for each of them: rescue action, civic action, colossal action, friendly persuasion, police action, buffer action, defence, expeditionary action and invasion. Sharp’s (1990) idea of civilian-based defence clearly address some of these missions such as friendly persuasion and defence. Discussing what a future military could look like matters in this research because the Swiss military has three missions: defending the country and its population, supporting civilian authorities when their means do not suffice and promoting peace at the international level (Armée Suisse, 2023). Civilian-based defence addresses the first mission, but discussing about the military should take into consideration all three missions. While this research does not aim to comprehensively delve into all aspects of the military and focuses on the defence dimension, offering insights on a future military addressing all aspects remains necessary to support a constructive debate. Keyes (2013) described the organization of a military meeting the needs to fulfil the mission to support civilian authorities. In his research, he presents the military as a unique institution due to its available resources and capabilities including human resources. Indeed, a military presents interesting capabilities such as logistics to support civilian authorities in relief disasters operations, social service projects and colossal actions, none of which requires military personnel to be armed and partially covers the second mission attributed to the Swiss military. Keyes further describes how the non-violent, unarmed military force would also be capable of intervening in conflicts and war abroad to de-escalate and prevent mass atrocities which can be assimilated to the promotion of peace at the international level mission of the Swiss military. However, peace promotion should not be apprehended mainly through a reaction approach, but primarily through a prevention approach which would undermine the causes of conflicts but that falls outside of the duty of a military and inside the responsibility of a broader peace foreign politics.

The previous paragraphs discussed the perception of civilian-based defence and the form a non-violent military could have. However, the critical question of how to transform an existing military remains. While Sharp (1990) suggests that the existing military must be involved in the development of a civilian-based defence, Johansen & Martin (2019) expressed doubts about the feasibility of such a process. According to them, expecting governments to develop and implement non-violent civil resistance remains unrealistic because empowering the population and renouncing the legitimate use of violence represent a threat to them. This argument represents the potentially biggest barrier to developing civilian-based defence. Some interviewees completely rejected this

idea arguing that in Switzerland the citizens are the government and that the mere fact that no one ever launched a popular initiative demanding to develop civilian-based defence proves that no interest in this policy exists. In this conception, the government has no agency and simply executes what it is ordered to by the population. On the other hand, a different interviewee presented a radically different perspective arguing that “people in power generally do everything to keep it” because they “are afraid of losing it”. However, the same interviewee recognized the merit of decentralization in the Swiss system and concluded in the end “there are majorities and minorities, and the majority wins”. Another interviewee abounded in that direction underscoring that the Swiss system is “the totalitarianism of the majority”. A fourth interviewee summarised the different perspectives expressed throughout the interviews “It is interesting because today [nonviolent resistance like civil disobedience] is mainly used for protest movements like the climate strike, feminist strikes, etc. and I can understand my colleagues who are not very keen on teaching this to all Swiss citizens. [...] The general feeling is that our democratic tools are extremely well designed for direct democracy, the right to initiative, referendums, etc. in that sense, any opposition that is not through the channels provided by the institutions is viewed very negatively by my colleagues in Bern. [...] It is clear. That’s exactly what I was saying before. Today the prevailing view among the majority of my colleagues is that civil disobedience in Switzerland should not exist because we have direct democratic tools to challenge the work of Parliament and in that sense, we won’t provide [non-violent resistance] tools to the citizens because we know they will use them against the State.” The answers to the question of the willingness of the government to genuinely investigate and possibly develop civilian-based defence raise concerns. Furthermore, one of the interviewees mentioned the political difficulty and political risks of promoting non-violence as another incentive for politicians not to pay attention to civilian-based defence. This paragraph questions the procedure for developing civilian-based defence. Whether non-violent resistance should be developed directly by the population with no expectations from the state as Johansen and Martin (2019) or whether the government and the current defence establishment should play a role as Sharp (1990) promotes remains unsolved.

5. Conclusion

Switzerland enjoys a stable situation with a relatively low level of security threats, particularly military threats. Historically and until now, the country's defence policy has mainly relied on a conventional military which is assigned three missions: defend the country in case of aggression, support civilian authorities when their means do not suffice and promote peace at the international level. However, during the Cold War, the Swiss defence policy also included a civilian resistance dimension in which the population was expected to conduct a guerilla warfare and non-violent resistance in case of invasion. During the same period, scholars such as Gene Sharp conceptualised a defence system based on non-violent resistance which uses the mass withdrawal of consent and cooperation from a population to prevent an aggressor to achieve its political, economic and psychological objectives ultimately rendering the aggression to costly. This research investigated what potential such a defence system, called civilian-based defence has today in Switzerland. Sharp's (1990) proposition of questions to investigate structures the research. The security situation, the perceived defence and deterrence system and the perception of civilian-based defence as a defence system were therefore explored. First, regarding the security situation, the interviews and official documents showed that Switzerland currently faces little to no military threats in the short and mid-term. Moreover, the perceived potential future military threats consist mainly of hybrid conflicts which aim to primarily politically, socially and economically destabilise a country to enable a military operation. The rationale behind hybrid conflicts matches the one supporting civilian-based defence and acknowledges that one needs at least a partial population's cooperation to achieve objectives. Undermining the social cohesion of a society becomes essential to diminish the costs of attacking and controlling a territory. Civilian-based defence argues that if a society withdraws consent and cooperation if an illegitimate ruler takes power, ruling the society does not provide any benefits and becomes so costly that the endeavour cannot sustain and ultimately, the society gain its sovereignty back. Finally, exploring and developing a new defence system requires time to build the capacities and the population's confidence in the new system. Overall, Switzerland's security context offers a favourable environment to explore the potential of civilian-based defence and the perceived threats show the need to consider alternative defence policy in an ever-changing world. Second, the research delved into the perceived defence options. The interviews and existing policies clearly indicate that no other option than traditional military defence is considered by the institutions regardless of the existing limits and uncertainties. It shows and has been confirmed in interviews that an essential dimension of a defence system lies in the trust the population has in it. The actual effectiveness and the consequences of a failure of the deterrent effect of the military present the main identified blind spots. Indeed, the Swiss militia

army relies on the citizens but no definitive proof of their readiness to participate in combat exist. Though, the questionnaire conducted for this research supports the argument that a sufficient proportion of the population would indeed participate in violent actions to defend the country. However, no interviewees were able to assess the consequences in the case of military combat in Switzerland either human or material. Without any idea of the results of militarily defending the country, weighing the pros and cons of the current defence system becomes biased and ill-informed. While the interviewees indicated that civil society never raised the idea of civilian-based defence for consideration, an overwhelming majority of the respondents indicated being ready to participate in non-violent actions which shows that the population does not automatically reject non-violence contrarily to state institutions. Finally, the research discussed the perception of civilian-based defence and showed that even if people tend to believe that armed struggle is more effective than non-violent one, it does not necessarily translate into their preferred strategy. Besides, the research showed that the gender dimension of the perception of violence cannot be dismissed. Overall, it appears that the perception of the use of violence for struggle among the population varies significantly even if non-violence has never been presented by the government as a credible strategy. It opens interesting avenues to explore the variations of beliefs among a population if a government endorses non-violent civil resistance.

To conclude, the research shows clues indicating that Switzerland could benefit from exploring the potential civilian-based defence. Indeed, when the population must choose between the existing military defence system and a new one through a YES/NO vote, the population opts for stability and vastly opposes sudden radical change, but when one investigates the population's perception of existing and potential defence system, including non-violence, more complex opinions emerge indicating a need for stimulating continuous debates and discussions to ensure a genuine wide democratic process. However, the question of who should stimulate and fuel such a process remains. Sharp (1990) suggests that the institutions be involved and even leading the process of developing civilian-based defence capabilities first complementary to the military to build trust and with time decreasing the military component to eventually rely solely on civilian-based defence. Yet, the interviews with institutions members showed that their conception of the Swiss direct democracy prevents them to initiate such discussion. Several interviewees clearly stated that until someone comes forward with a referendum, it means that no sufficient interest exists. Thus, it places the responsibility to argue in favour of civilian-based defence solely on civil society. Civilian-based defence remains a marginal conception of defence and therefore has not penetrated into civil society which makes the task of advocating for its assessment huge. Besides, on top of the lack of resources available among civil society to support research and conduct trials of

civilian-based defence to build trust and knowledge, the small group advocating for such a proposal will likely be perceived as moralist resulting in an opposition between pros and cons rather than a constructive and thorough collective effort to explore the possibility of developing civilian-based defence. This research does not offer a roadmap for developing civilian-based defence and not even a project of how civilian-based defence could look in Switzerland. This research aimed to explore the perception of civilian-based defence in order to participate in and widen the debate around the military defence system by offering a different approach. Challenging traditional perspectives can prevent missing innovative policies simply due to the ignorance of their existence and stimulate the democratic debate within a society. Civilian-based defence shows great potential and an interesting alternative to the current arms race and development of new disruptive technologies which put the whole world at risk (Mecklin, 2023). Switzerland benefits from a favourable context to explore and develop a civilian-based defence, but the idea needs to be spread among the civil society to set it in the political agenda. This research represents one step in that direction, but more research should be conducted on the topic.

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Appendix 1: Transcription Interview 1

- Oui, ça me va.
- Et ce sera un plaisir pour moi de vous partager le résultat de ma recherche quand j'aurai le travail terminé, si ça vous intéresse.
- Oui, volontiers.
- Alors, les questions, moi, ça fait maintenant quelques mois que je travaille dessus, donc il y a plein d'éléments qui sont assez clairs pour moi et peut-être intuitifs, mais qui ne le sont pas du tout pour tout le monde. Donc, n'hésitez pas à me demander des précisions sur les questions quand je vous les pose.
- Oui, ça marche.
- Dans la première partie de l'entretien, je voulais peut-être passer un peu en revue la situation sécuritaire de la Suisse actuellement. Donc, ma première question, c'est quelles sont les menaces extérieures actuelles pour la sécurité de la Suisse?
- Au sens large, elles ont été identifiées de façon répétée par le Conseil fédéral. On a des rapports sur la politique de sécurité de la Suisse qui posent le cadre tous les quatre ans normalement, pour les grands rapports. La plupart des menaces sont en droit civil qui pèsent sur la Suisse, que ce soit la question du réchauffement climatique et de ses conséquences, que ce soit une pandémie comme on l'avait vécue pendant le Covid, ou alors, et c'est la première fois qu'on le vit quand même un peu, pendant longtemps, il y avait cette question du risque de pénurie d'électricité qui pourrait, si elle va jusqu'au blackout, poser forcément énormément de problèmes. Et puis ensuite, les menaces d'ordre sécuritaire, plus dans le sens sécurité comme on l'entend, même s'il a largement diminué, mais il reste la menace d'une attaque terroriste d'un individu isolé, il reste. Et puis, très loin dans le rapport et très loin dans les menaces, il y a toutes les menaces d'ordre militaire dans la Suisse, mais où clairement le Conseil fédéral, dans ce cadre, l'a dit que 1, la menace est hautement, enfin ce risque est hautement improbable, mais comme il n'est pas, comme en termes financiers ou humains, il est achiffrable, il reste dans les perspectives aujourd'hui de la Suisse, qui justifient d'ailleurs le fait d'avoir une armée, mais on le voit aussi dans les tâches de l'armée, où l'armée sert beaucoup au soutien aux autorités civiles dans le cadre de catastrophes, dans le cadre de la pandémie, dans le cadre, maintenant, depuis quelques mois, par exemple, dans le cadre de l'accueil des réfugiés ukrainiens en particulier. Donc, voilà. Après, les menaces, il y en a des centaines. Ce rapport fait toujours le rapport entre le nombre de fois où le risque peut apparaître et puis les dégâts imaginables. Donc, par exemple, il y a toujours le risque nucléaire civil, on va dire, un accident dans une centrale nucléaire en Suisse, où le risque est extrêmement faible, mais les conséquences sont tellement importantes que c'est un risque qui est évalué dans ces rapports.
- Est-ce qu'il y a, et quelles sont-elles, des menaces intérieures pour la Suisse? Est-ce qu'il y a des services de renseignement qui travaillent sur des menaces de coup d'État ou de prise de pouvoir de l'intérieur, ou de sécession peut-être?
- Alors, sécession ou coup d'État, je crois, c'est peu, mais il y a le service de renseignement à cette mission qui pourrait changer, mais qui a cette mission de surveillance des activités, on va dire, extra-politiques de nature violente. Donc, la surveillance de groupes d'extrême gauche ou d'extrême droite qui pourraient- c'est toujours conditionnel – qui pourraient d'une manière ou d'une autre devenir violentes, avec la menace terroriste intérieure, on va dire, de terrorisme type classique, terrorisme islamique. C'est les menaces principales qui sont surveillées par le service de renseignement, avec l'aide de la police fédérale, de FedPol, et puis des polices cantonales, principalement. On est en train de... La consultation est terminée, mais il y a une volonté de donner plus de pouvoir au service de renseignement de la Confédération pour surveiller les activités politiques ou extra-politiques en Suisse de nature violente. L'autre chose qu'on a vu quand même, c'est pendant le Covid, où

effectivement, il y a certaines personnes qui pourraient aller très loin dans leur envie de ne pas renverser l'État, parce qu'on n'est pas aux États-Unis non plus, mais on a vu il y a des manifestations anti-Covid pendant la pandémie qui ont dégénéré au point où, à un moment donné, au Palais fédéral, on a été sorti par d'autres portes que celles qu'on utilise normalement.

- Merci. La Suisse est officiellement reconnue comme un pays neutre et a dans sa politique la neutralité. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie en matière de politique de défense?
- La Suisse, effectivement, il n'y a que deux pays, l'Autriche et la Suisse, qui sont reconnus internationalement comme pays neutres. Ce n'est pas eux qui ont décidé d'être neutres, mais finalement, c'est la communauté internationale qui, un jour ou l'autre, a reconnu la neutralité. La neutralité, selon le droit public international, il y a un certain nombre de devoirs. Le premier, c'est d'avoir une armée. C'est une neutralité armée, c'est d'être capable de se défendre. Le deuxième, c'est de ne pas exporter, on a tous ce débat maintenant, de ne pas exporter le matériel de guerre vers des pays en guerre, de ne pas autoriser l'utilisation de son territoire par les belligérants et rendre au cadre d'un conflit. Et puis, il y en a d'autres qui sont plus mineurs, mais qui sont actuellement importants dans le débat, cette question de traiter sur pied d'égalité les belligérants et rendent au cadre, par exemple, l'exportation de matériel de guerre par des privés ou la réexportation, comme aujourd'hui elle est prévue. Ça, c'est les règles du droit international public, ces conventions de l'AE de 1907, dont la Suisse doit être... A laquelle la Suisse doit se conformer si elle veut rester neutre. Après, rester neutre aujourd'hui, pour la Suisse, c'est un choix. Elle peut dire demain, on a envie d'arrêter, personne ou rien ne peut l'en empêcher. Les conventions... Le droit international public fixe aussi cette règle un peu particulière, mais que seul le Conseil de sécurité peut lever les devoirs et les droits liés à la neutralité. Donc si le Conseil de sécurité déclare un conflit illégal et prend des sanctions, à ce moment-là, la Suisse ne peut plus être neutre, par exemple, dans la livraison d'armements. Si on prend juste encore la doctrine en matière de sanctions internationales, parce que les conventions de l'AE de 1907 couvrent vraiment que la partie matérielle de guerre. Depuis 1993 jusqu'à la fin de la guerre froide, la Suisse s'est vraiment fixée une neutralité totale. Donc ne reprenez pas les sanctions, ne prenez... C'est toujours éloigné de la communauté internationale, on va dire, occidentale. Et puis depuis 1993, il y a cette nouvelle doctrine qui est entrée, qui a fait l'objet d'un rapport du Conseil fédéral qui dit clairement que lorsque des sanctions sont prises par la communauté internationale, on va dire en particulier par le Conseil de sécurité, qu'à ce moment-là, la Suisse peut les reprendre. Sans blesser la neutralité, en tout cas pas la neutralité du point de vue politique, puis du point de vue de la vision qu'on peut avoir, ou que certains ont de la neutralité, c'est déjà trop, mais du point de vue du droit international public, c'est pas un problème.
- Ensuite, l'article 54 de la Constitution fédérale fait mention de la promotion de la paix. Et comment est-ce que cela se concrétise dans les politiques de sécurité et de défense de la Suisse?
- La Suisse participe à quasiment toutes les missions internationales qui ont été décidées par le Conseil de sécurité, que ce soit dans les missions de maintien de la paix, par exemple entre les deux Corées, où il y en a... précisément, je ne connais pas le chiffre, mais il y en a, je dirais, comme ça, entre 10 et 12. Aujourd'hui, la Suisse dépêche des militaires de carrières, souvent, pour faire de la communication, pour faire de la logistique ou pour la conduite des opérations. Et puis la plus grande étant bien sûr la Suisse Koy, la participation de la Suisse au maintien de la paix au Kosovo, dans le cadre de la KFOR, qui est d'ailleurs une mission de l'OTAN, qui n'est pas une mission de l'ONU, c'est pas une mission de casque bleu au sens strict du terme, c'est une mission de l'OTAN. Et donc c'est une manière pour la Suisse de participer au maintien de la paix. D'ailleurs, on a des rapports, ça se dit, c'est le maintien militaire, le maintien armé de la paix, je conviens, toujours cette double vision, mais c'est le maintien armé de la paix. Puis ensuite, c'est participer à tous les efforts de paix

possibles et imaginables, que ce soit au niveau diplomatique, organiser des conférences, essayer de garder le contact, ce qu'on appelle pendant longtemps les bons offices de la Suisse, permettre de garder les contacts entre des pays qui n'en ont plus du tout, par exemple la Suisse, la Suisse transfère le courrier entre les États-Unis et l'Iran, l'ambassade de Suisse en Iran reste ouverte et puis s'occupe des affaires entre les États-Unis et l'Iran. C'est de la terre la paix.

- Merci. Donc vous avez parlé de l'OTAN et je me demandais exactement qu'est-ce que l'OTAN a comme implication et qu'est-ce que ça représente au niveau sécuritaire pour la Suisse? Est-ce que c'est un allié? Est-ce que c'est une projection de notre défense à l'extérieur? Est-ce que c'est une menace? Est-ce que c'est un élément totalement indépendant avec lequel on collabore? Quelle est sa position?
- C'est une question hyper compliquée parce que la Suisse profite de l'OTAN, par exemple aujourd'hui le renforcement de l'OTAN à l'Est de l'Europe, que ce soit Hongrie, Pologne, Roumanie, elle profite en fait de la sécurité liée à l'OTAN. Elle profite indirectement aussi du bouclier nucléaire, qu'on le veuille ou non. Et puis en même temps c'est un risque. Parce que l'OTAN devait entrer en guerre, la Suisse ne serait pas isolée au milieu de pays qui font partie de l'OTAN aujourd'hui. Et puis après pour les collaborations, la Suisse collabore à un certain nombre d'exercices de l'OTAN. Il y a ce qui s'appelle le partenariat pour la paix, auquel la Suisse a adhéré. Les parlementaires suisses participent aux assemblées parlementaires de l'OTAN. Mes collègues de la commission de politique de sécurité vont une fois par année ou deux fois par année à des sommets de l'OTAN dans le cadre de l'assemblée parlementaire. Et puis tous les systèmes de l'armée suisse, pas tous aujourd'hui, mais de plus en plus les systèmes de l'armée suisse sont intégrés à ceux de l'OTAN. Typiquement on a acheté le F-35 un peu pour cette raison là quand même, même si tous les autres avions étaient aussi intégrés à ceux de l'OTAN, mais c'est devenu l'avion de base qu'achète tout le monde pour être intégré dans les systèmes de l'OTAN. Et la Suisse profite en obtenant les informations à travers les canaux de l'OTAN, que ce soit les images, que ce soit les radars, que ce soit la possibilité de sortir du cadre national puisque on est quand même très petit, et puis de pouvoir identifier une menace par exemple pour l'espace aérien, pouvoir identifier une menace avant qu'il entre en Suisse. On a un débat sur l'interopérabilité, il y a une motion de mon collègue François Pointer qui demande que tous les systèmes de défense suisse soient interopérables avec ceux de l'OTAN. La réponse du Conseil fédéral, il le dit déjà, il le dit comme ça, nos systèmes sont ou seront un jour ou l'autre tous intégrés dans les systèmes de l'OTAN. Que ce soit armé de terre ou armé de l'air.
- Et donc ça nous amène un peu à la deuxième partie de la discussion qui porte plus spécifiquement sur l'armée suisse. Et donc ma première question, est-ce que vous savez quelle est la perception de l'armée suisse à l'étranger? Est-ce qu'elle sert, est-ce qu'elle remplit un rôle de dissuasion, est-ce qu'elle apparaît comme une force de défense du territoire crédible? Est-ce que c'est un symbole? Est-ce que vous savez la perception de l'étranger par rapport à l'armée suisse?
- Alors globalement, non, je ne peux pas répondre à la question, mais les discussions qu'on a pu avoir avec d'autres pays montrent qu'elle a relativement bonne presse. Il y a eu une visite par exemple de la commission de politique de sécurité en Autriche où les Autrichiens étaient très jaloux de l'armée suisse. Je ne sais pas si vous pouvez le mettre comme ça dans votre... en tout cas pas dire que c'est moi qui vous l'ai dit. Mais l'armée autrichienne, les gradés autrichiens étaient jaloux des moyens à disposition de l'armée suisse, de son organisation, du fonctionnement aussi de ce mélange milices, de partie professionnelle, partie armée de milices. Et puis la capacité à l'utiliser. C'était intéressant parce que je crois que l'Autriche a... ils ont essayé d'utiliser l'armée dans le cadre de la pandémie de Covid et il leur a fallu tellement de temps que c'était déjà terminé le temps qu'elle ait été mobilisée. Alors qu'en Suisse, en trois jours, on a mobilisé le personnel nécessaire pour le soutien aux autorités civiles. Donc il y a quand même cette perception qu'elle fonctionne, qu'elle a un rôle, et puis

- que la Suisse en tout cas, si on parle de la neutralité armée, je pense qu'on ne lui a jamais reproché de ne pas faire le job.
- Merci. Et ça m'amène à la deuxième question. Si on prend l'aspect, pas nécessairement d'aide en cas de catastrophe, mais dans le rôle plus défense du territoire, plus défense de la Suisse qui est attribuée à l'armée, qu'est-ce que l'armée défend? Est-ce qu'elle défend des personnes, un territoire, des institutions, des valeurs? On a vu par exemple que pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, le territoire était potentiellement, avec la politique du réduit national, on n'était prêt pas à abandonner un territoire, mais à faire des concessions dans le temps avant de récupérer ce territoire. Et comme j'ai dit avant aussi, pendant la guerre froide, il a été considéré comme possible qu'en cas d'invasion, le gouvernement aille se réfugier à l'étranger chez des alliés avant que les alliés et l'armée suisse reprennent notre territoire. Donc, qu'est-ce que l'armée défend en tant que telle? Est-ce que c'est un peu de tout aussi?
 - Ce n'est pas difficile parce que le débat de la guerre froide, où on pensait encore être largement et possiblement envahi et puis qu'il faille se défendre, ce débat se pose plus comme ça aujourd'hui. On a la volonté, si vous regardez par exemple, il y a ces rapports sur l'évolution des forces aériennes et puis l'évolution des forces terrestres qui datent de la fin des années 2010, c'était 2018 ou 2019 pour les forces terrestres et puis 2017 ou 2018 pour les forces aériennes. Ces deux rapports fixent le cadre comme étant celui de défendre l'ensemble du territoire contre une invasion, à quelques petites exceptions près. Par exemple, le système patriote de défense antiaérienne, il a été conçu à la base pour protéger le plateau suisse. Parce qu'on partait du principe, les régions les plus peuplées du pays, aujourd'hui je crois qu'on ne part plus du principe qu'on va abandonner le pays et puis se retrancher dans les Alpes. La doctrine militaire est claire, défendre les régions les plus peuplées du pays contre une invasion et puis donc défendre la Suisse dans ses frontières reconnues. C'est intéressant aussi parce qu'on a ce débat sur le plus en plus comment est-ce qu'on défend un territoire hautement urbanisé et avec des densités de population qui sont extrêmes dans les villes. Et puis comment s'il y a eu ce changement de doctrine, par exemple aujourd'hui on n'achèterait plus 450 chars Léopard mais on achète des véhicules à roue, on achète... ça a des débats un peu... alors moi je trouve un peu trop technique, des débats assez rigolos parce que les chars à roue sont plus difficiles à défendre que les chars à chaîne, des débats un peu techniques. Mais c'est clair que par exemple le rapport sur l'évolution des forces terrestres montre la volonté d'aussi réussir à défendre la population dans le cadre urbain. C'est beaucoup plus difficile à cause des densités. Il y a tout ce débat intéressant sur le... je ne sais pas sous quelle forme c'est aujourd'hui. Il y a une volonté d'avoir un accord international justement sur ce cadre-là, de fixer un cadre aux armées pour faire beaucoup plus attention à la population civile en particulier dans les villes, c'est là que le risque est élevé. On le voit en Ukraine. Le risque, les possibilités de tuer énormément de personnes, elle est plus grande. Il y a ce débat international sur la protection de la population civile dans les villes. Peut-être juste encore un élément, je pense qu'on va y venir ces prochaines années, mais qui montre aussi que la Suisse a envie de défendre, je pense l'ensemble de son territoire tel qu'il est aujourd'hui. C'est toute la question des défenses anti-chars à Aujour'd'hui, les portées des lances, je ne sais pas comment ils s'appellent, lance-mine anti-chars, c'est 20 km maximum. Et on réfléchit, en tout cas l'armée réfléchit depuis longtemps à s'équiper de systèmes à beaucoup plus longue portée. Aujourd'hui, je crois qu'il y a l'étude qui a été... Il reste deux choix sur la table pour l'achat de busiers de chars, avec des portées qui sont de 50 ou 100 km. Donc la volonté de se défendre, de pouvoir pousser un ennemi beaucoup plus loin que ce qui est possible actuellement.
 - La question suivante porte sur l'armée qui est composée des citoyens suisses. Comment est-ce qu'on fait pour être sûr que les citoyens seraient prêts à s'engager, à agir en cas d'invasion et qu'ils seraient prêts à tuer en cas de nécessité?

- On ne le fait pas en Suisse. On ne le fait pas vraiment comme ça. On le fait à travers l'école de recrue, qui est censée préparer les citoyennes et les citoyens. D'ailleurs maintenant, on n'a pas seulement les citoyens, la volonté de l'armée c'est d'avoir jusqu'à 10% de femmes dans les effectifs. Mais c'est à travers l'école de recrue qu'on prépare finalement les citoyens soldats à cette éventualité. Après, il faut être franc, on les prépare très mal à une crise. Si vous voyez la mobilisation dans le cadre du soutien sanitaire aux autorités civiles par l'armée, ça a été extrêmement difficile. On a eu énormément de plaintes de soldats qui étaient abandonnés dans les structures hospitalières, qui n'avaient jamais vu un mort avant d'être mobilisés à ce moment-là, et qui estimaient être très mal préparés par l'armée à une vraie mobilisation, et puis être très mal préparés face à la mort, face à ce qu'est finalement une crise comme a été celle du Covid, celle de la pandémie. Les plaintes sont reçues par la Commission politique de sécurité, je crois que c'est sorti dans les médias, donc c'était public. Il y a eu beaucoup de plaintes de soldats mobilisés dans les hôpitaux qui s'estimaient abandonnés, et puis il y a eu aussi beaucoup de plaintes, parce que finalement très vite le dispositif militaire était inutile, et puis les autorités civiles ont pris le relais. Très vite, ils se sont retrouvés à plus rien faire, à jouer aux cartes, et finalement à avoir l'impression de ne pas servir à grand-chose. C'est très intéressant parce que les civilistes ont beaucoup mieux préparé à ce genre d'intervention, principalement parce qu'ils sont beaucoup plus longtemps dans les structures, ça veut dire qu'ils ont le temps d'être formés, ils ne sont pas mobilisés dans un 6 heures et puis ensuite envoyés je ne sais pas où, dans un hôpital. Ils sont déjà formés souvent à des métiers qui correspondent à leur choix d'affectation. C'était assez intéressant de se rendre compte qu'en fait le service civil, déjà parce qu'il était déjà présent, donc avant l'amélioration de l'armée, il était déjà sur les sites, mais en fait il est resté aussi beaucoup plus longtemps. Donc il a été dans une création civile beaucoup plus utile, plus important dans l'ampleur de la tâche que l'armée elle-même.
- Merci beaucoup. Et la dernière question vraiment spécifique à l'armée, c'est quelle est l'importance économique de l'armée suisse pour l'économie suisse? Et, alors c'est une question séparée, le rôle symbolique en Suisse de l'armée?
- C'est intéressant le rôle économique parce que c'est à double tranchant. L'armée profite beaucoup de l'économie dans le sens où elle utilise finalement les compétences acquises dans l'économie privée pour son propre dispositif. C'est pour ça que je pense qu'on ne se passera jamais de la milice en Suisse. Si on ne prend pas une armée privée professionnelle, parce qu'il y a ce mélange entre l'économie privée qui va former des gens et qui ensuite pourront être utilisés par l'armée suisse dans le cadre... on va utiliser les compétences acquises dans le privé et en même temps on va fournir d'autres compétences aux gens qui sont de la conduite, du vivre ensemble, travailler ensemble, avec finalement ce double mélange. Pendant longtemps, pour certaines régions fédérales comme La Poste et encore un peu le cas, ou les CFF, mais pendant longtemps, pour grader dans le civil, il fallait grader à l'armée. C'était comme ça que fonctionnait le double système où finalement un officier militaire, c'était comme s'il avait fait un MBA, puis on pouvait l'utiliser dans l'économie privée pour conduire une entreprise, c'était beaucoup des hommes, plutôt être chef d'entreprise, etc. Il y a eu toujours ce mélange. On le voit encore aujourd'hui avec les troupes cyber où la loi fixe clairement la possibilité de l'armée d'utiliser les compétences acquises dans le civil. Donc typiquement, il y a des règles qui fixent comment est-ce que l'armée suisse peut accéder aux spécialistes de chez Swisscom, de La Poste, etc. En particulier dans le domaine cyber. Et puis en retour, c'est des formations qui sont extrêmement intéressantes. Donc quelqu'un qui dit je fais partie du bataillon cyber, il y a toutes les chances qu'il ait plus de facilité à trouver un job dans ce domaine-là que quelqu'un qui ne fait pas partie de ce bataillon. Ça répond entièrement à la question. Après, le poids économique au-delà des individus, le poids économique de l'armée, il est très régional. Il y a des régions qui bénéficient énormément de la présence des grandes casernes, de la présence des grandes entreprises liées à l'armement, que ce soit RUAG, que ce soit Pilatus, il y en a plein comme

ça. Après, si vous regardez les exportations de matériel de guerre suisses, comparé au PIB ou à l'ensemble des exportations, c'est plutôt peanuts. On ne connaît pas les chiffres sur Secret Défense, mais le département fédéral de la Défense, le DDPS, c'est le plus gros département, parce qu'on entend beaucoup, c'est 100 000 hommes mobilisables de la milice, etc. On dit en général il y a entre 5 et 10 000 militaires professionnels ou de personnes engagées par l'armée pour le soutien qui sont engagés professionnellement à l'armée. Et l'armée forme énormément d'apprentis dans des carrières un peu étranges, des minages, des choses... Le contrôle, on a visité une fois tout le contrôle des munitions suisses, c'est très intéressant. C'est aussi des formations que fournit l'armée, et ensuite ce sont des personnes qui vont les utiliser au civil.

- Merci. On arrive à la troisième et dernière partie qui parle des politiques de défense alternative. Là, on va parler plus de défense civile ou de résistance civile. Pendant la guerre froide, la Suisse a adopté la politique de défense totale, donc défense militaire, résistance civile non violente et résistance de type guérilla en cas d'invasion. Les chercheurs en général soutiennent que dans un mouvement de résistance civile non violente, avoir une composante violente est contre-productive car elle légitimise la répression et la violence d'un adversaire, ce qui affecte le soutien des partis tiers et empêche également l'alignement des partisans de l'adversaire. Ça, c'est une étude qui a été conduite par Erika Chenoweth dans un livre qui est paru en 2011, qui explique pourquoi la résistance civile fonctionne. Et on a donc vu, dans ce livre, elle montre également que les mouvements non violents sont en moyenne plus efficaces que les mouvements violents. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'ils réussissent à tous les coups, mais en moyenne, ils ont une plus grande efficacité que les mouvements violents. Est-ce que l'État et la composante militaire qui participe aux politiques de défense seraient prêts à abandonner la composante guérilla en cas d'invasion? Oui, non, pourquoi?
- C'est compliqué parce que, aujourd'hui, cette composante-là est très limitée, je crois, vraiment en Suisse. On a supprimé, alors il y a toujours l'arme à la maison, mais on a supprimé les munitions, on a supprimé... Aujourd'hui, on a une composante quasiment folklorique de l'arme à la maison. Je veux dire, alors le tir, le tir à la maison, alors le tir en campagne, les fêtes de tir fédéral, etc., mobilisent encore beaucoup de gens, mais c'est quand même devenu plutôt marginal que tout le monde le fait comme peut-être dans les années 60. Il faut se rendre compte que l'absence de menaces militaires réelles sur la Suisse, même aujourd'hui, avec la guerre en Ukraine, les menaces d'une guerre totale en Europe sont quand même très limitées, surtout quand on voit le fait que la Russie soit finalement pas si forte que ça. Le seul gros risque, il est nucléaire, en vrai, mais contre lequel il n'y a aucune défense possible. Et dans ce sens-là, moi, j'ai quand même l'impression comme ça, mais c'est plus parce que c'est un débat qu'on ne va jamais. J'ai l'impression qu'on se focalise sur une défense de l'armée faite par une armée petite mais très bien formée. C'est ce qui a changé, je l'ai dit, ça n'a pas été enregistré, mais jusqu'à Armée 95, tous les hommes entre 0 et 40, quelques années, 45 ans, étaient mobilisables. On avait une armée de 670 000 hommes mobilisables à tout moment, etc. Donc on avait vraiment une vision, effectivement, de dire tous les hommes doivent, etc. Aujourd'hui, on a réduit l'armée, on a réduit son champ de... On a finalement fait une armée plus petite, et puis en se focalisant sur des armes plus sophistiquées, avec une conduite, avec finalement une autre vision de la Suisse que celle qui était mise en ligne pendant la guerre froide. Mais il faut le dire, si vous écoutez les débats parlementaires sur les questions militaires, etc., il y a encore cette vision. Il y a encore cette vision de citoyen-soldat, en particulier à l'UDC qui revient tout le temps, il y a cette vision... La vision milice est très forte. Moi je la vois aujourd'hui plus... Le côté milice, c'est plus ce mélange économie-privé, et puis militaire, avec les deux pans qui profitent l'un de l'autre, et puis sinon un côté un peu folklorique, dans le sens de l'arme à la maison, par exemple. C'est une aberration folklorique, il faut le dire comme ça. En soi ça sert à rien, c'est de mon avis, ce n'est pas l'avis de mes collègues. Et puis... C'est intéressant parce que la complexification des systèmes de défense rend parfois beaucoup plus difficile le côté milicien de l'armée

suisse. On va prendre qu'un exemple, si on prend le Patriot, par exemple, il faut déjà très peu de personnel, parce que c'est beaucoup d'intelligence artificielle, le système Patriot, qui choisit lui-même, au moment de l'acquisition d'un objectif, il choisit lui-même ou quasiment lui-même le nombre de missiles qui sont tirés, entre un et quatre, quelles sont les batteries qui doivent être utilisées, etc. Et puis finalement il faut très peu d'hommes pour manipuler ces systèmes, et c'est des gens qui doivent être formés très bien. Donc l'intégration... Pour l'instant on ne l'a pas précisément, mais on fait toujours ça, on fait... L'armée suisse fait une évaluation, et puis tout ça c'est l'armée suisse qui fait, une évaluation scientifique, technique, etc., sur comment utiliser l'armement, il y a des échanges avec, parce qu'on ne les fait plus nous, enfin la plupart ne sont plus faits à l'interne, surtout que c'est un bon moyen que ça ne fonctionne pas. Donc on achète souvent des systèmes à l'étranger, et puis ensuite il y a la remise à la troupe, c'est comme ça que c'est dit, c'est comme ça que c'est prévu. Et puis là on se rend compte que de plus en plus, comme les systèmes deviennent très sophistiqués, très techniques, que c'est de plus en plus difficile de transférer ce matériel à une armée de milices. C'est très intéressant dans ce sens-là, où on va devoir professionnaliser une partie, en tout cas, je veux dire, sur le... L'aviation typiquement, on se rend bien compte aujourd'hui que c'est devenu tellement complexe, tellement que ce sera, c'est des militaires professionnels qui pilotent des avions de chasse, c'est... Ce côté milicien, il commence à être beaucoup limité à un soutien logistique, des questions comme ça.

- Pour revenir à la résistance civile, donc la performance d'action directe non violente contre, pour défendre des idéaux politiques, des institutions, qui a été incluse, enfin qui a été expliquée dans le livret Défense civile. Donc que ce soit de se préparer mentalement à contrer une propagande, que ce soit la volonté de faire des démonstrations, non, pas des démonstrations en français, des manifestations, ça a été expliqué dans ce livre, mais ça a eu des grèves également, afin de prévenir l'adversaire d'obtenir ses objectifs politiques, par exemple. Ils ont été expliqués dans ce livre, mais ils n'ont jamais été entraînés comme on entraîne l'armée. Pourquoi?
- C'est difficile de répondre. Donc ce qu'on dit non violente, ça veut dire à la Gandhi. Ça veut dire aller faire la grève de la faim, parce que c'est quand même un concept en Suisse, c'est assez intéressant que ce soit mis comme ça en avant, c'est un concept qui n'a pas la meilleure presse imaginable.
- Actuellement, non, c'est vrai. Non violente, ce serait ce qui se passe en Iran, c'est beaucoup d'actions non violentes, ce n'est pas... C'est des manifestations civiles, c'est blocage de route, c'est ce qui s'est passé pour la chute de l'Apartheid, boycott de certains... C'est ce qui s'est passé aux États-Unis avec Martin Luther King un petit peu avant, avec la présente Black Panther. C'est ce qui s'est passé en 1979 en Iran déjà pour la chute du Shah, donc des manifestations gigantesques avec différents modes d'action, que ce soit de la manifestation, du boycott, de la grève générale, de travailler lentement, de sabotage, mais pas dans le sens de sabotage qui va mettre en danger des vies, mais dans le sens de ce qui s'est passé au Danemark durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, donc produire de l'armement inutilisable par les nazis, ce qui leur fait augmenter les coûts au lieu de leur apporter quoi que ce soit. C'est ça qu'ils entendent par résistance civile non violente.
- C'est intéressant parce qu'aujourd'hui elle est utilisée principalement pour les mouvements de contestation type grève du climat, grève féministe, etc. Et je comprends du coup assez bien mes collègues qui n'ont pas très envie d'apprendre ça à tous les citoyens suisses. Ça fait vraiment... En tout cas, ça fait pas longtemps que je suis là et que je m'intéresse beaucoup à ces questions là, mais on sent bien que c'est plutôt mal vu que vu positivement de la part de mes collègues. On l'a vu, le gréviste de la faim, Père Mando qui était sur la place fédérale, pour lequel finalement on a trouvé une solution, etc. C'était comme si on capitulait devant cette manière. Le sentiment comme ça, général, c'est de dire que nos outils démocratiques sont extrêmement bien conçus sur la démocratie directe, le droit d'initiative, référendum, etc. Dans ce sens là, finalement, toute opposition qui n'est pas à travers celle que mettent à

disposition les institutions est très mal vue par mes collègues à Berne. Après, si on prend le domaine purement militaire, moi j'ai jamais entendu parler qu'on ait encore cette approche là. La question du soldat, citoyen, armé, celle-là elle vient souvent, parce que c'est toujours cette vision conservatrice, basée, issue d'ailleurs, de cette résistance héroïque et quand même très fantasmée de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et de la Guerre froide. Mais je crois vraiment aujourd'hui, les questions non violentes, elles sont, c'est difficile. C'est intéressant parce que le débat, il tourne, maintenant on a ce débat sur les services de milices. Donc les trois grands services, que ce soit l'armée, la protection civile ou le service civil. Le service civil c'est un service de remplacement de l'armée pour toutes celles et tous ceux, toutes en particulier, parce que les femmes il y en a pas beaucoup, tous ceux qui ont un problème avec la défense militaire du pays mais qui souhaitent effectuer un service au profit de la population. Et c'est vraiment vu comme étant inutile, que ça met en danger les effectifs de l'armée. Il n'y a jamais cette reconnaissance, un, du rôle important du service civil en tant que soutien à la population, dans les EMS, dans les hôpitaux, etc. Il n'y a jamais cette reconnaissance comme quoi c'est aussi une manière pour les hommes qui font du service civil plutôt que du service militaire de s'engager pour soutenir la population, de fournir un travail personnel là-dessus. Et puis de finalement jamais reconnaître le fait que l'armée a un problème d'image encore et toujours. La guerre en Ukraine, on l'a vu, n'a pas diminué le nombre de personnes qui passent du service militaire au service civil. Les effectifs continuent, c'est toujours entre 5 et 6 000 personnes sur 27 000 chaque année. Un quart tiers des citoyens souhaitent aider le pays mais autrement que par un soutien militaire. Ça ne répond pas vraiment à la question, je sais.

- Je vais revenir sur votre partie de réponse d'avant. Pour mettre en place une défense civile, une institutionnalisation de la résistance civile non-violente comme politique de défense, il faudrait changer institutionnellement, par exemple, la légalité de la désobéissance civile ou reconnaître le droit d'urgence. Est-ce que ce genre de changement institutionnel fait peur à l'État, aux parlementaires, parce que ça donne vraiment un pouvoir de contestation plus important et des méthodes de résistance pour que l'État devienne plus actif politiquement?
- Oui, pas besoin de développer, c'est clair. C'est ce que je disais avant, clairement. Aujourd'hui, la vision qui est celle de la très grande majorité de mes collègues, c'est-à-dire la désobéissance civile en Suisse, elle ne devrait pas exister, parce qu'on a les outils de la démocratie directe pour contester le travail du Parlement, etc. Et dans ce sens-là, on ne va pas donner ces outils-là aux citoyens et citoyennes, parce qu'on sait qu'ils vont l'utiliser contre l'État, etc. Donc je vois vraiment... Ouais. Je pense qu'il n'y a aucune volonté à faire ça.
- Et donc maintenant, pour parler plus précisément de la défense civile comme concept de défense nationale, c'est l'institutionnalisation d'une résistance civile non violente comme politique de défense. Donc ça comprend une préparation, un entraînement de la pratique, et c'est aussi basé sur une vision du pouvoir qui est pyramidale, et donc la population qui est en bas donne le pouvoir au leader. Si la population dans son ensemble refuse de coopérer avec le pouvoir, qu'il soit légitime ou illégitime, ce pouvoir n'aura plus d'intérêt à être présent. Donc dans les écrits de Clausewitz, il parle beaucoup de centre de gravité. Donc quel est l'élément à défendre pour que la défense puisse continuer, et d'après lui, dès que le centre de gravité a été perdu, c'est, entre guillemets, la défaite assurée. En Suisse, actuellement dans la défense, ce centre de gravité repose beaucoup sur l'armée. Si l'armée perd, la guerre est perdue. Dans une défense civile, ce centre de gravité est basé sur une volonté commune de défendre un mode de vie et des valeurs. Est-ce que vous voyez en Suisse des valeurs et des convictions qui font vivre la Suisse, qui sont l'essentiel et qui donneraient envie aux citoyennes et citoyens de se défendre pour protéger ce mode de vie qui est particulier?
- C'est intéressant, parce qu'on est un peu au cœur de ce débat sur la neutralité. Pendant longtemps, la neutralité, ce n'était pas seulement une manière, pas seulement une vision... J'ai pas comment dire, je vais recommencer. Si vous regardez les rapports, c'est hyper

intéressant. Chaque année, le CSS, le Centre for Security Studies de l'EPFL produit ce rapport sur la vision qu'ont les Suisses de l'armée de leur défense des risques qui pèsent sur le pays, etc. Et puis, il y a toujours cette question sur la neutralité. Et puis, jusqu'à l'année passée, la neutralité de la Suisse, cette vision de la neutralité de la Suisse, était défendue par 94-95% de la population. C'est-à-dire que quand vous posiez la question à 95 personnes sur 100, la réponse était la Suisse est neutre, elle a autre chose, elle porte d'autres valeurs sur la scène internationale que celles des blocs, de la logique de force, de toute cette géopolitique. Et puis, avec toujours la composante militaire, on était entièrement d'accord là-dessus, qui était aussi soutenue très largement, parce que toute vision de la Suisse sans armée avait de la peine à rallier plus de 20-25% de la population. Mais en même temps, on a failli ne pas avoir d'avions de combat, la vision de la population vis-à-vis de l'armée, elle est, je crois, très divisée sur son utilité, sur est-ce qu'elle est importante pour la Suisse, etc. Je pense que si on revoit aujourd'hui sur les avions de combat, je pense qu'on ne ferait pas 50-05%, comme on l'a fait il y a deux ans. Mais cette vision de la neutralité, je pense que c'est ça qui est quand même le cœur de ce qu'était la vision commune qu'avaient tous les citoyens de notre pays, et puis aussi la meilleure manière, je pense, pour une majorité, et ça change peu, mais la meilleure manière de nous défendre, c'est de ne pas attaquer, c'est de pouvoir avoir cette vision au niveau international, de dire à tout le monde, nous, on est neutre, laissez-nous tranquille. Si je peux me permettre. Si la Suisse n'a jamais vécu de guerre depuis 150 ans, Depuis le Sonderbrunnen, c'est grâce à ça. Qu'est-ce qu'on défend? Comment ça? Quand on dit la Suisse, est-ce qu'on défend les montagnes des Alpes et le Pura et le Plateau? Est-ce qu'on défend la démocratie directe? Est-ce qu'on défend une diversité culturelle? Quel est, entre guillemets, l'essence de la Suisse qui nous garde ensemble et qui pourrait unir la population, qui fait qu'on a envie de rester en Suisse et qu'on n'est pas une Suisse qui parte une partie en France, une partie en Allemagne, une partie en Italie? Déjà parce qu'on n'aime pas les autres. Les Suisses allemands n'aiment pas les Allemands, les Romands n'aiment pas les Français, sinon on n'en parlerait même pas. De toute façon, la Suisse a cette construction qui est celle de s'être mis ensemble et d'avoir un destin commun, mais aussi en ayant une vision de ce que sont nos voisins, en tout cas en termes linguistiques, qui est plutôt négative. Maintenant, tout ce que vous avez cité, ça fait la Suisse. Moi, je suis impressionné quand même depuis que je siége à Berne. Dans plein de sujets, je n'ai pas du tout la même vision qu'un élu du canton d'Uri, mais il y a aussi plein de sujets où on est largement d'accord sur le fonctionnement de nos institutions, sur la démocratie, sur la force du fédéralisme, sur l'autonomie, mais en même temps, une vision... Il y a vraiment... C'est intéressant. Parce que le Rustic-Raven, c'est un faux débat, c'est beaucoup un débat ville-campagne, mais c'est un faux débat aussi. Je vois qu'on peut avoir des visions communes avec plein de gens. En fait, les différences sont au niveau individuel, mais elles sont assez peu au niveau du fonctionnement des institutions et de la vision qu'on peut avoir du pays. Mais après, tout ce que vous avez cité, c'est sans doute juste. C'est une vision un peu idyllique d'un pays très vert, même si écologiquement, c'est une catastrophe. On a cette vision de la démocratie directe qui est un des piliers du fonctionnement de la Suisse, même si aujourd'hui, avec la capacité à payer des signatures, avec un nombre de signatures qui ne correspond plus tellement à la capacité des groupes, n'importe qui presque peut aujourd'hui, avec les systèmes électroniques et autres, faire aboutir un référendum. Il faut vraiment être mauvais, il faut être le parti pirate pour ne pas y arriver. Et puis, ça veut dire aussi que toutes les grandes institutions. Et puis, ça veut dire aussi que toutes les grandes institutions, ont la capacité d'influencer la démocratie. Toutes ces questions-là, c'est des questions de fond, le fonctionnement, le financement, la politique, les campagnes, etc. Mais globalement, on a une vision de la Suisse qui est la même entre moi et puis l'UDC, Valaisans, ou bien le PDC uranais. On n'est pas d'accord politiquement, je veux dire, gauche-droite, ça existe, on n'est pas d'accord sur le poids de l'État, on n'est pas d'accord sur le fonctionnement des institutions. Changer les institutions suisses, je pense que c'est le truc le plus difficile à

imaginer au niveau politique. Si demain, tous ceux qui viennent, on le voit, les débats sur les assemblées citoyennes, ce délire. On a tout le temps à dire non, mais on n'a pas besoin, notre système, il fonctionne. Et puis c'est très marginal ce débat de comment est-ce qu'on les crée. C'est intéressant.

- Dans une perspective de défense civile, pour rendre un pays, une nation plus résiliente, la décentralisation est utile. En Suisse, avec le fédéralisme, on a un système qui nous permet déjà une décentralisation. Et pourquoi est-ce qu'il n'y a pas plus de recherche de décentralisation et donc d'augmentation de la résilience de la Suisse dans des domaines tels que l'énergie, la production de nourriture, qui en plus d'avoir une utilité d'un point de vue de la défense, pourrait aussi soutenir dans la transition écologique? Ou est-ce que cette décentralisation est en cours? Ou autonomisation.
- C'est en partie? J'ai la peine de répondre à cette question, parce que moi, j'ai plutôt l'impression qu'en Suisse, comme on a... Alors, on ne sera pas d'accord sur l'ampleur avec certains de mes collègues, mais comme on a un État qui est quand même relativement svelte en comparaison de le poids de l'État dans les décisions économiques relativement limitées, la décentralisation fait que les cantons ont énormément d'autonomie dans plein de domaines, que ce soit l'éducation, que ce soit... Si vous prenez l'agriculture, c'est géré par une politique agricole fédérale, parce que les subventions sont versées par la Confédération, mais les subventions en vrai sont versées aux cantons qui les reversent aux agriculteurs, aux agricultrices et agriculteurs. Et puis dans le domaine énergétique, c'est centralisé au niveau économique. Il y a des très grandes entreprises, Axpo par exemple, qui contrôlent un marché énorme, mais après, pendant longtemps, les services industriels, chaque ville avait son service, etc. La plupart ont été privatisés. Et puis les citoyens et les citoyennes obtiennent à titre individuel des subventions, par exemple, pour poser des panneaux solaires, acheter une voiture électrique, etc. Donc le système finalement, moi, je ne trouve pas si centralisé que ça dans tous ces domaines stratégiques. C'est intéressant, l'armée aussi, parce que si l'armée est organisée au niveau fédéral, la protection civile, c'est au niveau communal et cantonal. Il y a près de 300, ce qui sert aussi le plus souvent, parce que dans le cas de catastrophes locales, etc. La protection civile est organisée au niveau des cantons et puis des communes, avec près de 300 organisations de protection civile sur le territoire suisse. Et on va avoir ce débat de savoir à quel point on veut fédéraliser, et je pense que c'est déjà mort. C'est un faux débat. Mais donc, aujourd'hui déjà, à travers le fédéralisme, il y a énormément de tâches qui sont déléguées ou partagées entre les cantons et la confédération. Même si on prend le débat sur les infrastructures de recherche en Suisse, c'est une tâche partagée. Les universités sont cantonales, privées, enfin semi-privées, autonomisées, on va dire, mais sont cantonales. Il n'y a que les écoles polytechniques qui sont gérées par la confédération. Ensuite, toute l'infrastructure, que ce soit, on va dire, toute l'éducation supérieure aussi, elle est la plupart cantonalisée, sur les HES, que ce soit... Dans tous les domaines, on a toujours ces tâches cantonales, mais avec des débats permanents, pour savoir... La confédération, elle agit à titre subsidiaire, soit lorsque les cantons ne font pas le job, sur une tâche qui leur est déléguée, soit... Je ne sais plus ce que je voulais dire. Soit en distribuant de l'argent, en espérant avoir un impact sur les cantons, mais en laissant toujours les cantons choisir s'ils veulent ou pas. Il y a énormément de ces programmes, on appelle ça convention programme, qui sont en fait des manières de la confédération de pousser les cantons à faire en disant vous mettez 50% des investissements, puis on met les 50% restants en espérant que ça aille à un impact, mais aussi en acceptant que tous les cantons ne vont pas utiliser... ne vont pas faire la même chose, ne vont pas faire les mêmes investissements au même endroit, ne vont pas avoir la même ampleur en fonction de leur propre capacité financière. Toute la protection de l'environnement, la nature, la biodiversité, etc. est organisée de cette manière-là, avec une co-responsabilité cantonale, fédérale. Mais après, la tension existe toujours. On fédéralise, on cantonalise, dans les cantons, puisque c'est fédéraliste, ça fait que vous aviez des petites Suisses, 26 petites Suisses un peu partout, les débats entre les compétences des communes et

des cantons sont encore plus violents que le débat qu'on a entre les compétences de la Confédération et la compétence des cantons. Donc c'est une tension permanente, cette centralisation et décentralisation dans tous les domaines. Et dire depuis les années 80 quand même, avec l'explosion du libéralisme on va dire, le politique a perdu énormément de compétences au compromis de l'économie privée. Et qui fonctionne, elle, c'est intéressant, mais dans certains domaines de façon beaucoup plus centralisée que l'État lui-même, avec des immenses entreprises, des holdings qui contrôlent. Mais on a encore toujours 99% des entreprises qui sont des petites et moyennes entreprises en Suisse.

- Et on arrive au bout, c'est ma dernière question, que là je l'ai écrite, mais je vais la reformuler un petit peu. Donc imaginons que la Suisse mette en place une défense civile et n'a donc plus la composante militaire. La défense du pays repose sur la capacité de la population à refuser les objectifs d'un envahisseur, que ce soit par la résistance économique, la résistance politique, mais qui fait que les coûts d'un envahisseur sont trop élevés par rapport aux gains qu'il pourrait obtenir en envahissant la Suisse. Cette position de la Suisse serait unique dans le sens où elle n'aurait plus une défense armée, elle aurait été le premier pays à faire ce qu'on appelle le transarmement. Est-ce que cela ne pourrait pas être un objectif de la Suisse d'un point de vue de promotion de la paix et de démilitarisation ou de transformation de la militarisation dans un monde qui se militarise toujours plus avec des dépenses qui augmentent et comme vous l'avez dit au tout début, des menaces qui sont peut-être moins probables mais si elles ont lieu seraient catastrophiques?
- C'est hyper intéressant, c'est une vision très pacifiste du monde. J'ai toujours eu cette impression que plus d'armes veut dire plus de guerres parce qu'on ne fait pas des armes pour ne pas les utiliser. Cela veut dire que le réarmement global et généralisé qu'on est en train de vivre depuis deux ans mais depuis plus longtemps, ce n'est pas la guerre en Ukraine en soi qui a accéléré le mouvement, mais le mouvement il est clair depuis plusieurs années, plusieurs décennies même. Après la fin de la guerre froide, on s'est dit que c'était la fin de l'histoire et qu'on ne pouvait pas repasser à autre chose et vivre en paix, mais on s'est vite rendu compte que ce n'était pas le cas. Aujourd'hui, je pense qu'au niveau global, cette course à l'armement c'est un risque plutôt qu'une chance. C'est un problème de stabilité internationale, c'est un problème. Finalement, on a aussi au niveau économique pas du tout la promesse qu'à travers le libéralisme, la démocratie, etc. on allait possiblement offrir à tous les citoyens de la terre une vie décente basée sur le progrès scientifique, la médecine, une nourriture suffisante, etc. On s'est rendu compte qu'en fait, pas du tout, parce qu'on a un problème de distribution des richesses, un problème d'inégalité sociale qui est extrême chez nous ça va, mais globalement à l'échelle de la planète qui fait que je ne crois pas, il a peine à imaginer qu'on puisse pas un, que notre pays puisse défendre ça sous cette forme là. J'ai l'impression comme ça que la plus grande force aujourd'hui c'est le multilatéralisme, c'est les grandes institutions internationales pour autant qu'elles aient un pouvoir, qu'ils soient contrôlés d'une manière ou d'une autre démocratiquement. On a ce débat, j'ai posé des questions sur le droit de veto du conseil de sécurité qui pose toujours ce problème en gros même en cas de crime de guerre, contre l'humanité, les puissances nucléaires peuvent toujours dire non, je ne veux pas de sanctions, je ne veux pas de décision ou de force de maintien de la paix, ou dans son propre cas, le cas de la Russie, elle peut utiliser le veto pour s'opposer à des sanctions qui la touchent directement. Là il y a un dysfonctionnement grave des institutions internationales, qui en même temps, sont le plus à même de permettre de régler les conflits au niveau international. Le bilatéralisme, bien même le repli sur soi qu'on vit depuis de nombreuses années, a plutôt l'effet inverse. Alors que la Suisse puisse défendre cette vision très pacifiste du monde, fait autrement on va dire. On a ce débat hyper intéressant sur l'interdiction des armes atomiques, avec ce traité qui est entré en force maintenant, qui a été ratifié par plus de 50 pays, et qui va aller de l'avant au niveau international. La Suisse ne l'a pas ratifié, ne l'a pas signé, parce qu'elle a une vision sur les équilibres que crée la dissuasion nucléaire, elle pensait encore que les protocoles type TP, ou

bien START, étaient plus efficaces que l'interdiction totale, que de toute façon l'interdiction totale ne serait jamais signée par les forces nucléaires, etc. Mais donc elle a une vision très attentiste sur une question comme celle-là. Je crois qu'on parlait de questions, parce que franchement, j'ai de la peine... Je trouve ça très intéressant, mais dans le monde actuel, on en est très loin. D'ailleurs on le voit, la résistance civile en Ukraine, on en a encore très peu parlé. C'est violent, on va dire. Ils veulent des armes, on part du principe qu'avec un agresseur comme la Russie, la seule réponse est militaire.

- Je vous remercie. Je vais couper l'enregistrement.
- Ok.
- Là, je vais couper. Donc merci beaucoup.
- Merci.

Appendix 2: Translation Interview 1

- In the first part of the interview, I wanted to review the current security situation in Switzerland a bit. So, my first question is: What are the current external threats to Switzerland's security?
- In a broad sense, they have been repeatedly identified by the Federal Council. We have reports on Switzerland's security policy that set the framework every four years, usually for major reports. Most of the threats are in the civilian sphere that weigh on Switzerland, whether it's the issue of climate change and its consequences, a pandemic like the one we experienced during Covid, or, and this is something we have been experiencing for quite some time now, there was the question of the risk of electricity shortage, which, if it leads to a blackout, would undoubtedly pose significant problems. And then, there are security threats, more in the sense of security as we understand it, although it has largely decreased, but the threat of a terrorist attack by an isolated individual still remains. And then, much further in the report and in terms of threats, there are all the military threats to Switzerland, but clearly the Federal Council stated within this framework that the threat is highly, well, this risk is highly improbable, but as it is not quantifiable in financial or human terms, it remains within Switzerland's current perspectives, which also justify having an army. However, we also see it in the tasks of the army, where the army provides a lot of support to civil authorities in the context of disasters, the pandemic, and now, for example, in the context of hosting Ukrainian refugees in particular. So, that's it. As for the threats, there are hundreds of them. This report always compares the frequency of the risk occurring with the imaginable damages. For example, there is always the risk of a civil nuclear incident, let's say, an accident in a nuclear power plant in Switzerland, where the risk is extremely low, but the consequences would be so significant that it is a risk evaluated in these reports.
- Are there any internal threats to Switzerland, and if so, what are they? Are there intelligence services working on threats of a coup or internal takeover, or perhaps secession?
- Well, secession or a coup, I think those are unlikely, but there is an intelligence service with a mission that could change, but currently it has the mission of monitoring non-political activities of a violent nature. So, monitoring extreme left or extreme right groups that could - conditionally speaking - potentially become violent, along with the internal terrorist threat, let's say, classic terrorism, Islamic terrorism. Those are the main threats monitored by the intelligence service, with the assistance of the Federal Police, FedPol, and cantonal police forces primarily. We are currently... The consultation is over, but there is a desire to give more power to the Federal Intelligence Service to monitor political or non-political activities of a violent nature in Switzerland. Another thing that we have seen, however, is during the Covid situation, where indeed there were some individuals who could go to great lengths in their desire to overthrow the state, not that we are in the United States, but there were anti-Covid protests during the pandemic that escalated to the point where, at one point, at the Federal Palace, we were escorted out through doors other than the ones we normally use.
- Thank you. Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country and has neutrality in its policy. What does that mean in terms of defense policy?
- Switzerland, indeed, there are only two countries, Austria and Switzerland, that are internationally recognized as neutral countries. It wasn't their decision to be neutral, but ultimately, it was the international community that recognized their neutrality at some point. Neutrality, according to international public law, comes with certain obligations. The first one is to have an army. It is an armed neutrality, being capable of defending oneself. The second obligation is not to export, we are all having this debate now, not to export war material to countries at war, not to allow the use of its territory by belligerent parties in a conflict. And then, there are other obligations that are minor but currently important in the debate, such as treating Belgians and belligerent parties equally, for example, the export of

war material by private individuals or the re-export, as it is currently planned. These are the rules of public international law, the 1907 Hague Conventions, which Switzerland must adhere to if it wants to remain neutral. However, remaining neutral is a choice for Switzerland today. It can say tomorrow that it wants to stop, and no one or nothing can prevent it. The conventions... International public law also sets this somewhat particular rule that only the Security Council can lift the duties and rights associated with neutrality. So, if the Security Council declares a conflict illegal and imposes sanctions, then Switzerland can no longer be neutral, for example, in arms deliveries. If we take just the doctrine regarding international sanctions, because the 1907 Hague Conventions only cover the material aspect of war. Since 1993, until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has maintained a total neutrality. So, no reprisals, no... It has always distanced itself from the international community, let's say, the Western community. And since 1993, there has been this new doctrine that was introduced, which was the subject of a report by the Federal Council, clearly stating that when sanctions are imposed by the international community, particularly by the Security Council, at that moment, Switzerland can impose them as well. Without violating neutrality, at least not neutrality from a political standpoint, or the perception and understanding some may have of neutrality, which is already seen as going too far, but from the perspective of international public law, it's not a problem.

- Next, Article 54 of the Federal Constitution mentions the promotion of peace. How does this materialize in Switzerland's security and defense policies?
- Switzerland participates in nearly all international missions decided by the Security Council, whether it's peacekeeping missions, for example, between the two Koreas, where there are... I don't know the exact number, but I would say, off the top of my head, around 10 to 12. Today, Switzerland dispatches career military personnel, often for communication, logistics, or operational management. And the largest one is, of course, Swisscoy, Switzerland's participation in peacekeeping in Kosovo as part of KFOR, which is actually a NATO mission, not a UN mission, it's not a strict UN peacekeeping mission, it's a NATO mission. So, it's a way for Switzerland to participate in peacekeeping. We have reports, it's said, it's armed peacekeeping, I agree, always this dual perspective, but it's armed peacekeeping

Then, it's about participating in all possible and imaginable peace efforts, whether at the diplomatic level, organizing conferences, trying to maintain contact, what has long been called Switzerland's good offices. Switzerland facilitates contact between countries that have none, for example, Switzerland transfers mail between the United States and Iran. The Swiss embassy in Iran remains open and handles affairs between the United States and Iran. This is about peacekeeping on the ground.

- Thank you. So, you mentioned NATO, and I was wondering what exactly NATO's implications are and what it represents in terms of security for Switzerland. Is it an ally? Is it an extension of our defense capabilities abroad? Is it a threat? Is it an entirely independent entity with which we collaborate? What is its position?
- It's a very complicated question because Switzerland benefits from NATO, for example, from the reinforcement of NATO in Eastern Europe, whether it's Hungary, Poland, Romania. Switzerland indirectly benefits from the security provided by NATO. It also indirectly benefits from the nuclear shield, whether we want to or not. At the same time, it poses a risk because if NATO were to go to war, Switzerland would not be isolated among countries that are part of NATO today. In terms of collaboration, Switzerland participates in a number of NATO exercises. There is what is called the Partnership for Peace, to which Switzerland has joined. Swiss parliamentarians participate in NATO parliamentary assemblies. My colleagues from the Security Policy Committee go to NATO summits once or twice a year as part of the parliamentary assembly. And then, all the systems of the Swiss army, not all of them today, but increasingly, the Swiss army systems are integrated with those of NATO.

For example, we bought the F-35 partly for this reason, even though all the other aircraft were also integrated with NATO systems, but it has become the standard aircraft that everyone buys to be integrated into NATO systems. Switzerland benefits by obtaining information through NATO channels, whether it's images, radar data, or the ability to operate beyond national borders since we are a very small country. It allows us to identify a threat, for example, in our airspace before it enters Switzerland. There is a debate about interoperability, and there is a motion from my colleague François Pointer that asks for all Swiss defense systems to be interoperable with those of NATO. The response from the Federal Council, as they have already stated, is that our systems are or will eventually be fully integrated into NATO systems, both on land and in the air.

- This brings us to the second part of the discussion, which specifically focuses on the Swiss army. My first question is, do you know how the Swiss army is perceived abroad? Does it serve a role? Does it appear as a credible territorial defense force? Is it a symbol? Do you know how it is perceived by foreigners in relation to the Swiss army?
- Overall, I cannot answer that question, but the discussions we have had with other countries show that it generally has a good reputation. For example, there was a visit by the Security Policy Committee to Austria where the Austrians were very envious of the Swiss army. I don't know if you can include it like that in your... in any case, don't say that I told you. But the Austrian military, the Austrian officers were envious of the resources available to the Swiss army, its organization, and the functioning of the mixed system with both professional and militia components. And also, its capability to be used effectively. It was interesting because I believe Austria... they tried to use the army during the Covid pandemic, and it took them so long that it was already over by the time it was mobilized. Whereas in Switzerland, within three days, we mobilized the necessary personnel to support civil authorities. So, there is a perception that it works, that it has a role, and at least in the context of armed neutrality, I don't think Switzerland has ever been criticized for not doing its job.
- Thank you. And that leads me to the second question. If we consider the aspect, not necessarily assistance in case of disasters, but in terms of the role of territorial defense, the defense of Switzerland attributed to the army, what does the army defend? Does it defend people, territory, institutions, values? For example, during World War II, with the policy of the National Redoubt, the territory was potentially not to be abandoned, but concessions were made in order to regain the territory over time. And as I mentioned earlier, during the Cold War, it was considered possible that in the event of an invasion, the government would seek refuge abroad with allies before allies and the Swiss army reclaim our territory. So, what does the army defend as such? Is it a bit of everything as well?
- It's not difficult because the debate during the Cold War, when there was still a significant and possible invasion threat and the need to defend ourselves, that debate is not relevant today. If you look, for example, at the reports on the evolution of the air forces and the evolution of the ground forces, they were published at the end of the 2010s, around 2018 or 2019 for the ground forces and 2017 or 2018 for the air forces. Both reports set the framework for defending the entire territory against an invasion, with a few minor exceptions. For example, the Patriot anti-air defense system was initially designed to protect the Swiss Plateau. We no longer assume that we will abandon the country and retreat to the Alps. The military doctrine is clear: to defend the most densely populated regions of the country against an invasion and thus defend Switzerland within its recognized borders. It's also interesting because there is a debate on how to defend a highly urbanized territory with extremely high population densities in cities. And if there has been a change in doctrine, for example, today we would not purchase 450 Leopard tanks, but instead, we buy wheeled vehicles... it's a somewhat... well, I find it a bit too technical, but it's a somewhat amusing debate because wheeled tanks are more difficult to defend than tracked tanks. There are technical discussions. However, it is clear that, for example, the report on the evolution of

the ground forces shows the desire to also be able to defend the population in an urban setting. It is much more difficult due to population densities. There is an interesting debate on how... I don't know what the current form is, but there is a desire to have an international agreement precisely on this framework, to establish a framework for armies to pay much more attention to the civilian population, especially in cities, where the risk is high. We see it in Ukraine. The risk and the potential to cause significant casualties are greater. There is an international debate on the protection of the civilian population in cities. Perhaps just one more element, I think we will come to it in the coming years, but it also shows that Switzerland wants to defend its entire territory as it is today. It's about the issue of anti-tank defenses... Currently, the range of anti-tank mine launchers, I don't know what they are called, is a maximum of 20 km. The army has been considering equipping itself with systems with much longer ranges for a long time. Today, I believe there are two choices remaining on the table for the purchase of tank destroyers, with ranges of 50 or 100 km. So, there is a desire to defend and push back an enemy much further than what is currently possible.

- The following question is about the Swiss army, which is composed of Swiss citizens. How do we ensure that citizens would be ready to engage, to act in case of invasion, and that they would be ready to kill if necessary?
- We don't do it in Switzerland. We don't really do it like that. We do it through basic training, which is supposed to prepare citizens, both men and women. In fact, the army's goal is to have up to 10% of women in its ranks. But it's through basic training that we ultimately prepare citizen soldiers for this possibility. However, to be honest, we prepare them very poorly for a crisis. If you look at the mobilization within the framework of providing health support to civilian authorities by the army, it has been extremely difficult. We had a lot of complaints from soldiers who felt abandoned in hospital structures, who had never seen a dead person before being mobilized at that time, and who felt very ill-prepared by the army for a real mobilization and for dealing with death in the context of a crisis like the Covid pandemic. The complaints are received by the Political Security Commission, I believe it was reported in the media, so it was public. There were many complaints from soldiers mobilized in hospitals who felt abandoned, and there were also many complaints because the military deployment quickly became unnecessary, and civilian authorities took over. They quickly found themselves with nothing to do, playing cards, and ultimately feeling like they were not serving much purpose. It's very interesting because civil servants were much better prepared for this type of intervention, mainly because they spend much longer in the structures, which means they have time to be trained. They are not mobilized in six hours and then sent somewhere, like to a hospital. They are already often trained in professions that correspond to their choice of assignment. It was quite interesting to realize that the civil service, already because it was already present before the army's improvement, was already on site, but it also stayed much longer. So it was much more useful and important in the scope of the task than the army itself.
- Thank you very much. And the last question specifically about the army is: what is the economic importance of the Swiss army for the Swiss economy? And, as a separate question, what is the symbolic role of the army in Switzerland?
- The economic role is interesting because it has two sides. The army benefits a lot from the economy in the sense that it ultimately uses the skills acquired in the private sector for its own operations. That's why I believe Switzerland will never do away with the militia system. If we don't have a professional private army, there is this mix between the private economy that trains people, who can then be utilized by the Swiss army with the skills acquired in the private sector, while also providing other skills to individuals in areas such as leadership, teamwork, and working together, with this double mix. For a long time, for certain federal agencies like the Swiss Post (La Poste) and still to some extent, or the Swiss Federal Railways (CFF), to advance in the civilian sector, one had to advance in rank in the

army. That's how the dual system worked, where a military officer was seen as having acquired an MBA and could be used in the private sector to lead a company. There has always been this mix. We still see it today with the cyber troops, where the law clearly allows the Swiss army to utilize the skills acquired in the civilian sector. So, typically, there are rules that define how the Swiss army can access specialists from Swisscom, La Poste, etc., especially in the cyber domain. In return, these are extremely valuable training opportunities. So, someone who says they are part of the cyber battalion has a much better chance of finding a job in that field than someone who is not part of that battalion. That fully answers the question. As for the economic impact beyond individuals, the economic impact of the army is very regional. There are regions that benefit greatly from the presence of large barracks, as well as from the presence of major defense-related companies like RUAG and Pilatus, among others. However, if you look at Swiss arms exports compared to the GDP or total exports, it's rather insignificant. The exact figures are classified as Secret Defense, but the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport (DDPS) is the largest department. We often hear about the 100,000 militia troops, etc. Generally, there are between 5,000 and 10,000 professional soldiers or individuals engaged by the army for support who are employed full-time. The army also trains a significant number of apprentices in various fields, such as mine clearance and other specialties. We once visited the Swiss ammunition control facility, which was very interesting. The army provides these training opportunities, and then these individuals go on to use those skills in civilian life.

- Thank you. We're now moving to the third and final part, which discusses alternative defense policies. Here, we will focus more on civil defense or civil resistance. During the Cold War, Switzerland adopted the concept of total defense, which included military defense, nonviolent civil resistance, and guerrilla-type resistance in case of invasion. Researchers generally argue that in a nonviolent civil resistance movement, having a violent component is counterproductive because it legitimizes the repression and violence of the adversary, which affects the support of third parties and also prevents the alignment of supporters from the adversary. This was studied by Erika Chenoweth in a book published in 2011, where she explains why civil resistance works. In this book, she also shows that nonviolent movements are, on average, more effective than violent ones. This doesn't mean they succeed every time, but on average, they have greater effectiveness than violent movements. Would the state and the military component participating in defense policies be willing to abandon the guerrilla component in case of invasion? Yes, no, why?
- It's complicated because, today, that component is very limited, I believe, in Switzerland. We have eliminated, so there is still the weapon at home, but we have eliminated the ammunition, we have eliminated... Today, we have a component of the weapon at home that is almost folkloric. I mean, shooting, shooting at home, shooting in the countryside, federal shooting festivals, etc., still mobilize many people, but it has become rather marginal compared to everyone doing it, maybe in the 1960s. It should be realized that the absence of real military threats to Switzerland, even today, with the war in Ukraine, the threats of total war in Europe are still very limited, especially when we see that Russia is not as strong as it seems. The only major risk is nuclear, in reality, but there is no defense against it. And in that sense, I still have the impression, but it's more because it's a debate that will never happen. I have the impression that we focus on a defense by a small but very well-trained army. That's what has changed, as I mentioned earlier, it hasn't been recorded, but until Army 95, all men between 0 and 40, a few years, 45 years, were mobilizable. We had an army of 670,000 mobilizable men at any time, etc. So we really had a vision, indeed, that said all men must, etc. Today, we have reduced the army, we have reduced its scope... We have ultimately created a smaller army, and then focusing on more sophisticated weapons, with a management, with ultimately a different vision of Switzerland than the one that was put forward during the Cold War. But it must be said, if you listen to the parliamentary debates on military matters, etc., that vision still exists. There is still this vision of

citizen-soldier, especially in the Swiss People's Party (UDC), it keeps coming up, there is this vision... The militia vision is very strong. Today, I see it more... The militia aspect is more of a mix of economy-private and military, with both sides benefiting from each other, and otherwise it has a somewhat folkloric side, in terms of the weapon at home, for example. It's a folkloric aberration, I have to say it like that. In itself, it serves no purpose, that's my opinion, not the opinion of my colleagues. And... It's interesting because the complexity of defense systems sometimes makes the militia aspect of the Swiss army much more difficult. Let's take an example, if we take the Patriot, for example, it requires very little personnel because it involves a lot of artificial intelligence. The Patriot system chooses itself, at the moment of acquiring a target, it chooses itself or almost itself the number of missiles to be fired, between one and four, which batteries should be used, etc. And ultimately, very few men are needed to operate these systems, and they must be well-trained individuals. So integration... We don't have it precisely at the moment, but we still do that, we do... The Swiss army does an evaluation, and all of that is done by the Swiss army, a scientific, technical evaluation, etc., on how to use the weapons. There are exchanges because we don't produce them internally anymore, especially since it's a good way to make sure it doesn't work. So we often buy systems from abroad, and then there is the handing over to the troops, that's how it's planned. And then we realize that increasingly, as the systems become very sophisticated, very technical, it's becoming more and more difficult to transfer this equipment to a militia army. It's very interesting in that sense, where we will have to professionalize a part, at least, I mean, in the... Aviation, for example, we can clearly see today that it has become so complex, to the point that it's professional soldiers who pilot fighter jets, it's... This militia aspect is starting to be much more limited to logistical support, questions like that.

- To get back to civil resistance, the performance of nonviolent direct action to defend political ideals, institutions, which was included, well, explained in the Civil Defense booklet. So whether it's mentally preparing oneself to counter propaganda or the willingness to organize demonstrations, not demonstrations in French, but rather protests, it was explained in this book, but there have also been strikes in order to prevent the adversary from achieving their political objectives, for example. These were explained in this book, but they were never trained like the army is trained. Why?
- It's difficult to answer. So when they say nonviolent, it means in the Gandhi sense. It means going on a hunger strike, because it's still a concept in Switzerland, it's quite interesting that it's highlighted that way, it's a concept that doesn't have the best reputation imaginable.
- Currently, no, that's true. Nonviolent would be what happens in Iran, a lot of nonviolent actions, it's not... It's civil demonstrations, road blockades, it's what happened for the fall of Apartheid, boycott of certain things... It's what happened in the United States with Martin Luther King a little before, with the Black Panthers. It's what happened in 1979 in Iran for the fall of the Shah, so massive demonstrations with different modes of action, whether it's protesting, boycotting, general strikes, working slowly, sabotage, but not in the sense of sabotage that would endanger lives, but in the sense of what happened in Denmark during World War II, producing weapons that are unusable by the Nazis, which increases their costs instead of providing them with any benefit. That's what they mean by nonviolent civil resistance.
- It's interesting because today it is mainly used for protest movements like the climate strike, feminist strikes, etc. And I can understand my colleagues who are not very keen on teaching this to all Swiss citizens. It really... Anyway, I haven't been here for long and I've been very interested in these issues, but it's clear that it's not seen very positively by my colleagues. We saw it with the hunger striker, Father Mando, who was on the Federal Square, for whom we eventually found a solution, etc. It was as if we were surrendering to this method. The general feeling is that our democratic tools are extremely well designed for direct democracy, the right to initiative, referendums, etc. In that sense, any opposition that is not

through the channels provided by the institutions is viewed very negatively by my colleagues in Bern. Now, if we look at the purely military domain, I have never heard that this approach still exists. The question of the soldier-citizen, armed, often comes up because it's still a conservative vision, based, in fact, on the heroic and somewhat romanticized resistance of World War II and the Cold War. But I truly believe that today, nonviolent questions are... it's difficult. It's interesting because the debate has shifted, and now we have this debate on militia services. So the three major services, whether it's the army, the civil defense, or the civil service. The civil service is a replacement service for the army for all those, especially women, because there aren't many, all those who have a problem with the country's military defense but still wish to serve the population. And it's really seen as being useless, that it endangers the army's ranks. There is never this recognition, firstly, of the important role of the civil service in supporting the population, in nursing homes, hospitals, etc. There is never this recognition that it is also a way for men who choose civil service instead of military service to engage in supporting the population, to provide personal work in that regard. And ultimately, there is never any acknowledgment of the fact that the army still has an image problem, always and forever. The war in Ukraine, as we saw, did not reduce the number of people who switch from military service to civil service. The numbers continue, it's always between 5,000 and 6,000 people out of 27,000 each year. One-fourth to one-third of citizens wish to help the country, but in ways other than military support. That doesn't really answer the question, I know

- I will come back to your previous response. In order to establish a civil defense, an institutionalization of nonviolent civil resistance as a defense policy, there would need to be institutional changes, for example, the legality of civil disobedience or the recognition of emergency rights. Does this kind of institutional change scare the State, the parliamentarians, because it truly gives more power of contestation and resistance methods for the State to become more politically active?
- Yes, there is no need to elaborate, it's clear. That's exactly what I was saying before. Today, the prevailing view among the majority of my colleagues is that civil disobedience in Switzerland should not exist because we have direct democratic tools to challenge the work of Parliament, etc. And in that sense, we won't provide those tools to the citizens because we know they will use them against the State, etc. So, I really see... Yeah. I believe there is no willingness to do that.
- Now, to speak more specifically about civil defense as a concept of national defense, it is the institutionalization of nonviolent civil resistance as a defense policy. It involves preparation, training in practice, and is also based on a pyramid-shaped power structure where the population at the bottom empowers the leader. If the entire population refuses to cooperate with power, whether it is legitimate or illegitimate, that power will no longer have any interest in being present. So, in Clausewitz's writings, he talks a lot about the center of gravity. What is the element to defend in order for defense to continue? And according to him, once the center of gravity is lost, quote, the defeat is assured. In Switzerland, currently, in defense, this center of gravity heavily relies on the military. If the military fails, the war is lost. In a civil defense, this center of gravity is based on a common willingness to defend a way of life and values. Do you see in Switzerland any values and convictions that give life to Switzerland, that are essential and would motivate citizens to defend and protect this unique way of life?
- It's interesting because we are at the heart of the debate on neutrality. For a long time, neutrality was not just a way, not just a vision... I don't know how to put it, let me start again. If you look at the reports, it's highly interesting. Every year, the CSS (Centre for Security Studies) at EPFL produces this report on the Swiss people's perception of the army, the defense, and the risks facing the country, etc. And there is always this question about neutrality. And until last year, the neutrality of Switzerland, this vision of Swiss neutrality, was defended by 94-95% of the population. Meaning that when you asked the question to 95

out of 100 people, the answer was that Switzerland is neutral, it has something else, it upholds different values on the international stage than those of blocs, the logic of force, and all that geopolitics. And then, with the military component always in mind, we were fully in agreement on that, which was also widely supported because any vision of Switzerland without an army had a hard time rallying more than 20-25% of the population. But at the same time, we almost didn't have fighter jets, and the population's perception of the army, I believe, is highly divided on its usefulness, on whether it is important for Switzerland, etc. I think that if we were to revisit the issue of fighter jets today, we wouldn't get a 50-05% result like we did two years ago. But this vision of neutrality, I think that's what still lies at the heart of the common vision that all citizens have of our country, and also the best- It's interesting because we are getting to the heart of the debate on neutrality. For a long time, neutrality was not just a way, not just a vision... Let me try again. If you look at the reports, it's highly interesting. Every year, the CSS (Centre for Security Studies) at EPFL produces a report on the Swiss people's perception of the army, defense, and the risks facing the country, etc. And there is always this question about neutrality. And until last year, the neutrality of Switzerland, this vision of Swiss neutrality, was defended by 94-95% of the population. Meaning that when you asked the question to 95 out of 100 people, the answer was that Switzerland is neutral, it has something else, it upholds different values on the international stage than those of blocs, the logic of force, and all that geopolitics. And then, with the military component always in mind, we were fully in agreement on that, which was also widely supported because any vision of Switzerland without an army had a hard time rallying more than 20-25% of the population. But at the same time, we almost didn't have fighter jets, and the population's perception of the army, I believe, is highly divided on its usefulness, on whether it is important for Switzerland, etc. I think that if we were to revisit the issue of fighter jets today, we wouldn't get a 50-05% result like we did two years ago. But this vision of neutrality, I think that's what still lies at the heart of the common vision that all citizens have of our country, and also the best way, I think, for a majority, and it hasn't changed much, but the best way for us to defend ourselves is not to attack, is to be able to have this vision on the international level and tell everyone, "We are neutral, leave us alone." If I may say so. If Switzerland has never experienced war in the past 150 years, since Sonderbund, it's thanks to that. What do we defend? How? When we say Switzerland, do we defend the Alps mountains and the Plateau? Do we defend direct democracy? Do we defend cultural diversity? What is, in quotes, the essence of Switzerland that keeps us together and would motivate the population to want to stay in Switzerland and not have a Switzerland where one part goes to France, one part goes to Germany, and one part goes to Italy? Partly because we don't like others. Swiss Germans don't like Germans, Romans don't like the French, otherwise, we wouldn't even mention it. In any case, Switzerland has this construction of coming together and having a common destiny, but also with a negative view of our neighbors, at least in terms of language, especially. Now, everything you mentioned constitutes Switzerland. I'm still impressed since I've been serving in Bern. In many subjects, I don't have the same view as an elected representative from the canton of Oury, but there are also many subjects where we largely agree on how our institutions function, on democracy, on the strength of federalism, on autonomy, but at the same time, there is a vision... There is really... It's interesting because the Rustic-Raven, it's a false debate, it's mostly a wild-countryside debate, but it's also a false debate. I see that we can have common visions with many people. In fact, the differences are at the individual level, but they are very minimal when it comes to the functioning of institutions and the vision we can have of the country. But after all, everything you mentioned is probably true. It's a somewhat idyllic vision of a very green country, even if ecologically, it's a disaster. We have this vision of direct democracy, which is one of the pillars of how Switzerland operates, even though today, with the ability to pay for signatures, with a number of signatures that no longer really corresponds to the capacity of groups, almost anyone can successfully launch a

referendum today with electronic systems and others. You really have to be bad, you have to be the Pirate Party not to succeed. And that also means that all major institutions have the ability to influence democracy. All these questions are fundamental, the functioning, the funding, the politics, the campaigns, etc. But overall, we have a vision of Switzerland that is the same between me and the UDC, the people from Valais, or the PDC from Uri. We don't agree politically, I mean left-right, that exists, we don't agree on the weight of the state, we don't agree on how the institutions work. Changing Swiss institutions, I think that's the most difficult thing to imagine at the political level. If tomorrow, all those who come, as we can see, the debates on citizens' assemblies, that madness. We always have to say no, but we don't need it, our system works. And this debate on how to create them is very marginal. It's interesting.

- In the perspective of civil defense, to make a country, a nation more resilient, decentralization is useful. In Switzerland, with federalism, we already have a system that allows for decentralization. And why is there not more exploration of decentralization and therefore increasing Switzerland's resilience in areas such as energy, food production, which, in addition to being useful from a defense point of view, could also support the ecological transition? Or is this decentralization already underway? Or empowerment
- It's partly? I have difficulty answering this question because I have the impression that in Switzerland, as we have... Well, we may not agree on the extent with some of my colleagues, but as we have a relatively slim state compared to the weight of the state in economic decisions, decentralization means that the cantons have a lot of autonomy in many areas, whether it's education or... If we take agriculture, it is managed through a federal agricultural policy because subsidies are provided by the Confederation, but the subsidies are actually given to the cantons, who then distribute them to farmers. And in the energy sector, it is centralized at the economic level. There are large companies like Axpo that control a huge market, but on the other hand, for a long time, industrial services, each city had its own service, etc. Most of them have been privatized. And individual citizens receive subsidies, for example, for installing solar panels, buying an electric car, etc. So, in the end, I don't find the system so centralized in these strategic areas. It's interesting, even with the military, because while the military is organized at the federal level, civil defense is at the communal and cantonal level. There are nearly 300 civil defense organizations throughout Switzerland, which are often the most useful in the case of local disasters, etc. There will be a debate about how much we want to federalize, and I think that debate is already dead. It's a false debate. But already today, through federalism, there are a lot of tasks delegated or shared between the cantons and the confederation. Even if we take the debate on research infrastructure in Switzerland, it's a shared task. The universities are cantonal, private, or semi-private, let's say, but they are cantonal. Only the federal institutes of technology are managed by the confederation. Then, all the infrastructure, whether it's higher education, is mostly canton-based, including the universities of applied sciences (HES) in all fields. We always have these cantonal tasks, but with ongoing debates to determine... The confederation acts subsidiarily, either when the cantons don't do their job on a delegated task or... I can't remember what I wanted to say. Either by distributing money, hoping to have an impact on the cantons, but always allowing the cantons to choose whether they want to participate or not. There are many of these programs, called program conventions, which are actually ways for the confederation to encourage the cantons to take action by saying, "You contribute 50% of the investments, and we'll contribute the remaining 50%, hoping that it will have an impact," but also accepting that not all cantons will do the same thing, invest in the same place, or have the same scale depending on their own financial capacity. All environmental protection, nature, biodiversity, etc. are organized in this way, with joint responsibility between the cantons and the confederation. But tension still exists. We have federalization, cantonalization within the cantons, because being federalist, you have little Switzerlands, 26 small Switzerlands everywhere, and the debates over the competencies of

municipalities and cantons are even more intense than the debate over the competencies between the Confederation and the cantons. So there is a constant tension between centralization and decentralization in all areas. And since the 1980s, with the rise of liberalism, politics has lost a lot of power to the private economy. And it functions, which is interesting, but in some areas in a much more centralized manner than the state itself, with immense companies, holdings that control it. But we still have 99% of companies that are small and medium-sized enterprises in Switzerland.

- And we come to the end, this is my last question, which I have written here, but I'll rephrase it a bit. So let's imagine that Switzerland establishes a civil defense and no longer has a military component. The defense of the country relies on the population's ability to resist the objectives of an invader, whether through economic resistance, political resistance, but in a way that the costs for an invader are too high compared to the gains they could obtain by invading Switzerland. This position of Switzerland would be unique in the sense that it would no longer have an armed defense; it would be the first country to undergo what is called "transarmament." Could this not be an objective for Switzerland in terms of promoting peace and demilitarization, or transforming militarization in a world that is increasingly militarizing with increasing expenditures, and as you mentioned at the very beginning, threats that may be less probable but would be catastrophic if they were to occur?
- It's very interesting, it's a very pacifist view of the world. I've always had the impression that more weapons mean more wars because we don't create weapons to not use them. This means that the global and widespread rearmament we have been experiencing for the past two years, but even longer, is not solely due to the war in Ukraine. The movement has been clear for several years, even decades. After the end of the Cold War, we thought it was the end of history and that we couldn't go back and live in peace, but we quickly realized that was not the case. Today, I believe that on a global level, this arms race is a risk rather than an opportunity. It is a problem of international stability, a problem. Ultimately, on an economic level, we don't have the promise that through liberalism, democracy, etc., we would possibly offer all citizens of the world a decent life based on scientific progress, medicine, sufficient food, etc. We realized that it's not the case at all because we have a problem of wealth distribution, a problem of social inequality that is extreme in our country, but globally on a planetary scale, I find it hard to imagine that we can't defend that in this form. I have the impression that the greatest force today is multilateralism, the large international institutions, as long as they have power and are controlled in some democratic way. We have this debate, I asked questions about the veto power of the Security Council, which always poses this problem, even in the case of war crimes, crimes against humanity, nuclear powers can still say no, I don't want sanctions, I don't want a decision or a peacekeeping force, or in its own case, like Russia, it can use the veto to oppose sanctions that directly affect it. There is a serious dysfunction of international institutions, which at the same time are the most capable of resolving conflicts at the international level. Bilateralism, even the isolationism we have been experiencing for many years, has the opposite effect. So, for Switzerland to defend this very pacifist view of the world, it's done differently, so to speak. We have this highly interesting debate on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, with this treaty that has now entered into force, ratified by more than 50 countries, and will move forward at the international level. Switzerland has not ratified or signed it because it has a vision of the balance created by nuclear deterrence. It still believes that protocols like TP or START are more effective than a total ban, and in any case, a total ban would never be signed by nuclear powers, etc. So, Switzerland has a very cautious approach to a question like that. I think we were talking about questions because honestly, I struggle... I find it very interesting, but in the current world, we are far from it. Moreover, as we can see, civil resistance in Ukraine, we have talked very little about it. It is violent, so to speak. They want weapons, assuming that with an aggressor like Russia, the only response is military.
- Thank you. I will stop the recording now.

- Okay.

Appendix 3: Transcription interview 2

- Je vous remercie. Et donc, à la suite de mon travail, si cela vous intéresse, je me ferai un plaisir de vous partager les résultats de ma recherche.
- Oui, c'est volontiers que je consulte vos résultats.
- Merci. Et finalement, il y a encore un point que j'ai besoin d'éclaircir. ça fait maintenant un petit moment que je travaille sur le sujet et c'est possible que des formulations ou des concepts soient très évidents pour moi, mais ne soient pas clairement exprimés à travers une question. Il ne faut pas hésiter à m'interrompre pour me demander une précision sur des questions.
- Oui, pas de problèmes.
- Et donc c'est tout pour mon côté, est-ce que vous vous avez des questions jusque-là?
- Non, jusque-là, pas de questions.
- On peut se lancer directement dans le cœur de l'entretien. Alors, tout d'abord, par rapport à la situation sécuritaire de la Suisse. Selon vous, quelles sont les menaces extérieures actuelles pour la sécurité de la Suisse?
- Alors les menaces extérieures, on est dans une situation géopolitique et mondiale assez complexe. En plus de ça, les moyens technologiques et puis le fait qu'on se balade tous dans le net, comme on est en train de le faire d'ailleurs, font que on a plus de distance physique entre des personnes qui voudraient agresser ou les pays qui voudraient agresser une personne. ça veut dire que ça devient très, très complexe, la menace extrêmement complexe et ses menaces, elles sont politiques avec une recrudescence des modèles politiques. Je ne veux pas dire non démocratiques, mais des modèles politiques totalitaires et liberticides. On dira ça comme ça parce que je ne veux pas imposer la démocratie. Il y a d'autres systèmes politiques qui fonctionnent et qui laissent des libertés et qui respectent les droits de l'homme et il peut en avoir d'autres. Mais pour moi, le respect des droits de l'homme et de la liberté sont essentiels. Donc, effectivement, on est un danger de ce point de vue là, ça, pour moi, c'est les dangers les plus importants qui viennent de l'extérieur au niveau géopolitique. Maintenant, il y a le grand banditisme qui n'est pas étatique, mais qui est tout aussi dangereux pour notre sécurité et qui nous met en difficulté parce qu'il n'y a pas que la présence physique des réseaux de grand banditisme, mais aussi la présence dans le net. Et un troisième aspect que beaucoup ont tendance à oublier qui est moins dans les réseaux mais quand même un peu, c'est les problèmes d'adaptation au changement climatique. Donc, catastrophe naturelle, on le voit aux Grisons, on évacue un village parce que la montagne va leur tomber dessus. Alors pour l'instant, on perd, on perd du terrain, on perd des maisons, mais on n'a pas encore perdu de vie. On n'a pas une catastrophe complètement, mais on peut imaginer que suivant les catastrophes, ça peut devenir très, très compliqué aussi pour tout ce qui nous permet de maintenir la société, ça veut dire communication, ça veut dire réseau de distribution, etc. Et on doit avoir les moyens de réagir à ce genre de catastrophes naturelles de manière très efficace. Donc, pour moi, c'est à peu près les trois menaces géopolitiques, grand banditisme et puis environnement naturel, parce que c'est un peu compliqué.
- Et pour vous, est-ce qu'il y a des menaces intérieures pour la sécurité intérieure, pour la sécurité de la Suisse?
- Alors intérieur de nouveau, c'est toujours compliqué. Si vous avez des réseaux de grand banditisme, ils sont à l'intérieur. Si vous avez de l'extrémisme violent, qu'il soit de gauche ou de droite, c'est aussi un danger intérieur, parce que c'est peut-être des organisations qui ont leur base en Suisse qui sont activées par des personnes qui habitent en Suisse ou qui habitent légalement en Suisse. Donc, en fait, on a le grand banditisme et l'extrémisme violents ça ce sont des menaces sécuritaires pour moi, qui sont d'ailleurs identifiés par le service de renseignement et qui rendent les tensions, toujours un peu compliquées, même si l'émotion des gens fait que on surestime beaucoup cette menace là, mais elle existe.

- Mais, sans demander d'informations confidentielles, est ce que la suisse se prépare, par exemple à des coups d'état ou à des mouvements sécessionnistes de certaines régions ou de certains groupuscules,
- Non, ça on est très loin de cette organisation là, mais on a, et c'est public, on a des craintes sur certains groupes extrémistes violents qui sont des fois un tout petit peu trop tranquilles, mais qui sont bien entraînés, mais de là, à ce qu'ils aient l'organisation nécessaire pour faire un coup d'état, c'est un petit peu compliqué maintenant. Honnêtement d'un point de vue personnel pendant la période COVID quand on a mis des grillages autour du Parlement, c'était pas un sentiment très agréable parce qu'on avait l'impression que des mouvements anti COVID voulaient pénétrer dans le Parlement. Et ça, disons, c'est peut-être aussi exagéré parce que c'est très émotionnel, mais c'est un danger pour notre démocratie. Maintenant, est-ce qu'ils ont la capacité d'aller aussi loin ça? Pour l'instant, je pense pas.
- Je pense que ce n'est pas uniquement émotionnel parce c'est aussi ce que les services de renseignement ont ressorti dans leur dernier rapport.
- C'est émotionnel, parce que j'ai un exemple clair, on est dans la salle du Parlement un jeudi soir ou un jeudi à 15 heures et puis le président fait une annonce en disant qu'il y a des manifestations prévues. On fera tout pour que les parlementaires puissent sortir par la porte principale, ce qui est un signe important, mais qu'il faudra quand même écouter ce que dit la police parce qu'ils avaient peur que ça soit très violent. Or ça ne l'a pas été, mais juste ce petit moment, vous avez l'impression d'être enfermé dans le Parlement et puis d'être barricadée c'est pas super agréable.
- La suisse est officiellement reconnue comme un pays neutre. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie et comment est ce que cela se traduit en matière de sécurité nationale?
- Ah, vous êtes, vous êtes dans le sujet chaud là, on parle bientôt que de ça.
- Oui, j'ai commencé ma recherche avant février 2022.
- Là, ça se complique les discussions sur la neutralité. Pour moi, la neutralité est un est un outil de sécurité pour la Suisse. C'est d'ailleurs comme ça qu'il a été pensé à l'époque où on est devenu officiellement neutre. Les grandes puissances européennes ont accepté parce qu'on était sur la ligne de front à l'époque et on nous a accepté comme tampon qu'on allait laisser plus ou moins tranquille dans les conflits. C'était quand même assez arrangeant pour nous. Donc, pour moi, cette notion de neutralité, c'est essentiellement pour notre sécurité. C'est un outil de sécurité et de politique étrangère. La politique étrangère étant aussi un outil de sécurité. Donc voilà, on doit s'adapter. Et c'est à l'heure actuelle, vous l'avez certainement entendu dans les débats, c'est compliqué de savoir comment on s'adapte à la situation. Mais je pense personnellement qu'on doit s'adapter à la situation actuelle et on doit adapter notre neutralité tout en conservant son grand principe, mais en admettant que ce n'est pas si simple que ça.
- Donc actuellement, on reparle beaucoup de notre neutralité, mais il y a un élément qui n'est jamais vraiment discuté. C'est pourquoi cette neutralité est armée.
- Ah ça, c'est un choix de la Suisse et les accords de la Haye qui, pour certains, devraient être révisés ou modernisés. J'en fais partie. Je ne suis pas tellement attaché à la neutralité de mes arrière-grands-parents parce que c'était peut-être utile pour mes ancêtres mais maintenant, c'est plus compliqué. Cette neutralité autorise le pays à se défendre, mais elle a aussi une autre contrainte, c'est-à-dire qu'on ne doit pas laisser les autres utiliser notre territoire. On doit donc quand même avoir un moyen pour empêcher un acte d'utilisation du terrain pour faire des opérations militaires. Donc, la réaction de la suisse, historiquement, c'est d'avoir une neutralité armée est de le faire reconnaître essentiellement en disant on est neutre. Vous devez respecter notre neutralité, mais attention, on est prêt à la défendre militairement. Donc c'est une décision, c'est une décision politique. Il y a d'autres pays qui ont choisi d'autres neutralité sans armée.

- Merci. Et ensuite, dans la constitution fédérale à l'article 54, il est fait mention de la promotion de la paix. Comment est-ce que cet article se concrétise dans les politiques de sécurité et dans les politiques de la suisse?
- ça n'a pas toujours été le cas, mais à l'heure actuelle, on a notre politique de bons offices. Donc on met à disposition notre diplomatie, nos moyens pour que les gens se parlent. Des fois c'est compliqué, mais par exemple, on a fait des bons offices en Amérique du sud dans des mouvements de grand banditisme, cartel de la drogue et des états. On a réussi à les faire parler pour au moins libérer les prisonniers. Donc ça, c'est une première chose qui est dans la promotion de la paix. Et puis une deuxième chose qui est civile aussi, c'est la DDC. Donc la direction de la coopération et du développement, qui est aussi un outil de promotion de la paix. C'est quelque chose à laquelle je tiens, si les gens ont du travail et peuvent commercer, généralement, ils ne se tapent pas trop dessus. C'est assez standard. Et puis dernier point, il y a la participation de l'armée suisse à des missions de promotion de la paix. Alors un peu partout dans le monde, il y en a une qui est particulièrement importante. C'est au Kosovo où on se retrouve dans une poudrière qui est essentiellement éteinte. Mais la poudre est toujours là et c'est extrêmement important pour notre sécurité. Parce qu'historiquement cette poudrière des Balkans, elle a toujours créé beaucoup de problèmes en Europe, même si cette fois ça explose un peu plus à l'est. Et on a une diaspora importante en Suisse de kosovares, de bosniaques et de serbes. Et puis on peut imaginer que si la guerre recommence avec les horreurs qu'on a vues, cette diaspora va aussi être en difficulté en Suisse pour des raisons émotionnelles. Donc typiquement ici, avec notre action au Kosovo, on préserve aussi les gens qui sont venus s'installer chez nous et qui sont certes pour beaucoup devenus suisses, mais qui ont encore des attaches très fortes dans cette région. Donc je pense que j'ai un peu cerné les outils qu'on avait. Ensuite de ça, le département des affaires étrangères travaille aussi de manière intense avec les organisations internationales pour essayer de mettre en place des règles. Il y a pas mal d'organisations à Genève, dont trois organisations sécuritaires dont on n'entend pas souvent parler. On va, je l'espère, mais ça ne devrait pas poser de problème, renouveler leurs moyens lors de la prochaine session. Et puis c'est justement de la bonne gouvernance sécuritaire et ce genre de choses. Il y a trois organisations comme ça, dont le centre de compétence déminage. Et puis un troisième, je sais plus, il y en a trois est ça, c'est des outils qui sont importants. M. Burkhalter a mis aussi en place et ça a commencé il y a quelques années, un groupement qui est GESDA à Genève, ils regardent les opportunités dans les technologies et comment va être la situation dans le futur. Et il y a une grosse partie sécuritaire aussi qui est développée ici. Et c'est intéressant parce qu'on fait venir le monde entier à Genève pour discuter de problématiques qui sont vraiment de la prospective. C'est intéressant d'attaquer ça sous cet angle.
- Merci.. Et ensuite, avant vous avez parlé de la KFOR, qui est donc la mission menée par l'OTAN, contrairement aux autres missions dont la Suisse fait partie. Et ça m'amène à la question de qu'est ce que l'OTAN représente pour la Suisse et sa sécurité? Est-ce que c'est plutôt un allié, une menace, notre projection de défense à l'extérieur ou autre chose?
- Alors c'est assez clair qu'en géopolitique on est au centre de l'OTAN. Je considère pas que l'OTAN est une menace. On n'a pas de bonnes relations avec nos voisins européens sur des tas de sujets, mais je ne pense pas qu'on en ait tout à fait là. On a encore les capacités de négocier nos accords bilatéraux et autres. Donc, toute menace classique terrestre va passer par des pays de l'OTAN. Ça c'est clair. Donc on se retrouve dans une situation où on est sous le parapluie de l'OTAN, en tout cas pour tout ce qui est terrestre. On nous demande de défendre notre espace aérien. C'est à dire qu'a priori personne ne s'en occupe ou plutôt, si on voulait que quelqu'un s'en occupe, il faudrait payer le prix fort sans avoir les compétences. Et puis maintenant sur cette organisation et comment ce qu'on se place dans cette organisation là. Il est clair que l'OTAN va un peu loin pour notre neutralité. On dira ça comme ça, parce que j'entends, ils sont quand même très actifs dans des combats qui ne nous concernent pas et qu'on ne réglerait pas comme ça. Donc c'est clair que rentrer la

bouche en cœur et dire on veut faire partie de l'OTAN, ce serait une révolution énorme en ce qui concerne la neutralité. Maintenant, il faut se rendre compte que la sécurité défensive de l'Europe, on peut y participer pour autant que ça soit vraiment défensif et participer sans vraiment mettre en danger, de mon point de vue, la neutralité. Toute la question est là. Mettez-y encore des difficultés politiques parce que la Turquie fait partie de l'OTAN parce que la Turquie a un jeu très sombre au Kosovo alors qu'elle fait partie de la KFOR, mais on est dans des situations extrêmement compliquées. Vous voyez que c'est un petit peu difficile. Mais maintenant, imaginons, j'espère que ça ne va pas se passer, mais on en est peut-être pas si loin que ça, que la guerre en Ukraine déborde sur la Pologne ou sur sur la Finlande. Je sais pas si la Finlande serait vraiment stratégique pour monsieur Poutine, mais quand on voit son comportement stratégique, on peut se poser des questions. Quelle serait notre attitude? Vu que notre voisin, puisque la Pologne devient notre voisin et fait partie de l'union européenne, est aussi agressé. Et toute cette question là fait qu'on doit se repositionner par rapport à l'OTAN et par rapport à cette architecture de sécurité européenne. Et puis, en passant, si on repose, cette question peut être que on pourrait se demander comment est ce on collabore aussi d'un point de vue protection civil, par exemple, parce que on pourrait aussi avoir de bonnes collaborations avec nos voisins sur ce sujet. Donc l'OTAN, ce n'est pas la panacée parce qu'il y a des tas de défauts, mais dans une situation géopolitique tendue, c'est quand même eux qui nous protègent essentiellement. Donc je suis toujours d'avis que si on est protégé, il faut qu'on ait une certaine contribution, même si elle n'est pas militaire, on ne peut pas rester dans le coin, puis dire vous êtes sympa, les gars, nous on n'a rien à faire. Et ça, c'est la discussion qui a été déclenchée par ce conflit en Ukraine chez nous un peu plus sérieusement qu'avant.

- Alors je vous remercie. On va passer à la deuxième partie qui concerne l'armée suisse en tant qu'institution. Et ma première question, c'est selon vous ou selon vos connaissances, quelle est la perception de l'armée suisse à l'étranger? Est-ce qu'elle est une force de dissuasion? Est ce que c'est une force de défense crédible, justement pour empêcher l'utilisation du territoire.
- Alors c'est toujours difficile parce qu'on vit quand même dans un monde bi ou tri polaire. Donc difficile de savoir ce que les personnes avec qui on a moins de contacts militaires pense, je pense que nos partenaires de défense, ça veut dire, l'OTAN considère qu'on a une armée qui est crédible, peut être un peu vieillot sur certains points, mais assez crédible. Donc je n'irai pas jusqu'à dire comme M. Maurer, la meilleure armée du monde, surtout que je ne sais pas laquelle c'est. Je pense quand même qu'il y a une certaine crédibilité et on arrive à montrer qu'avec l'armée, son équipement et les moyens qu'on met dedans qui sont loin d'être négligeables qu'on est prêt à se défendre militairement, c'est aussi le but de l'armée. Maintenant, on avait imaginé que les ukrainiens laisseraient passer les chars. Ça ne s'est pas tout à fait passé comme ça alors, ils ont beaucoup d'aide, mais c'est toujours eux qui font le travail. Donc il y a quand même pas que l'équipement qui compte. Il y a aussi la volonté de la population.
- Et donc cette armée suisse qui doit défendre notre pays, qu'est-ce qu'elle a pour objet de défense? Est-ce que c'est le territoire, les institutions, les citoyens, les valeurs de la suisse, est-ce qu'on a vu dans l'histoire de suisse que pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, le territoire, le plateau n'était pas nécessairement défendable soit par volonté politique, soit pour x ou y. Ensuite, pendant la guerre froide, on a aussi vu que le gouvernement envisageait la possibilité que la Suisse se fasse envahir et d'ainsi devoir relocaliser le gouvernement à l'étranger avant de pouvoir reprendre le contrôle du territoire. Et donc ça soulève la question de cette protection du territoire. Et donc qu'est ce que défend l'armée suisse?
- Alors l'armée suisse est organisée pour défendre le territoire, mais c'était déjà le cas pendant la guerre froide et pendant la deuxième guerre, sauf qu'on voyait bien que si ça se passait très mal, ce serait difficile. Mais pendant la guerre froide, on comptait le nombre de ponts

que nos ennemis soviétiques devaient traverser pour atteindre la Suisse puisque l'ennemi venait toujours de là. Et puis on essayait de savoir combien il leur fallait de jours pour traverser. Mais on peut imaginer que si vous prenez une force de millions de soldats qui veulent traverser la suisse, ça complique stratégiquement. Donc la mission reste la défense de la population. C'est un peu plus compliqué concernant la population, on est plutôt dans la protection civile qui est censée protéger la population des mouvements de guerre. Mais l'armée suisse, sa mission reste la défense du territoire. Mais il y a des coins compliqués parce qu'il y a des endroits qui sont géographiquement séparés de la suisse qui sont difficiles à défendre. Un exemple Schaffouse, l'Ajoie qui pousse tout petit peu trop à l'extérieur géographiquement,

- Le Tessin aussi, j'imagine
- Le Tessin.
- Et donc l'armée suisse est composée de ses citoyens. Si on le sait, comment est-ce qu'on sait que ces citoyens seraient prêts à se battre dans une guerre et seraient prêts notamment à tuer.
- Alors on le suppose, on le suppose par entraînement. Et puis on suppose. Et là, c'est peut-être une expérience intéressante. Avec la commission de politique de sécurité, on a fait une visite à Vienne et on a eu un exposé de notre attaché militaire là-bas qui nous a montré un sondage qui était fait dans la rue par la télévision autrichienne juste après l'invasion de l'ukraine ou l'agression de l'ukraine fait envahi qui demanda à la population s'ils étaient prêts à se battre. Et en fait, la population autrichienne répond non. Pense pas que vous auriez la même réponse en Suisse parce qu'il y a une espèce d'attachement, non, ça ne veut pas dire que vous aurez tout le monde qui est 100 pour derrière vous, mais en fait tout se mesure ici. Et puis on part du principe que les citoyens et les citoyennes, même les habitants de ce pays, parce que vous n'avez pas forcément besoin d'un passeport à croix blanche pour vouloir défendre le lieu où vous habitez, sont prêts à défendre leurs institutions, leur pays. Parce qu'il y a quand même des choses qui fonctionnent, notamment un système qui fonctionne, mais vous avez raison, ce n'est rien de sûr, parce que heureusement, ça fait longtemps qu'on n'a plus utilisé l'armée sur champ de bataille, puis si on pouvait éviter de l'utiliser, je signe tout de suite,
- Ce dont vous parlez, j'ai essayé de faire un petit sondage aussi comme ça. Dans la première partie de mon travail, je n'ai pas encore analysé les résultats, mais de voir si des gens seraient prêts à défendre la suisse. Et si oui, comment? Dans quels différents types d'actions ils seraient prêts à s'engager, mais je n'ai pas encore les résultats.
- Mais, il y a beaucoup de manières de s'engager. L'armée est une chose visible. Si on regarde l'histoire, il y avait beaucoup d'autres manières de s'engager après ça peut être violent ou pas les exemples les plus marquants généralement sont violents, en tout cas en Europe.
- Oui, j'ai essayé de couvrir un peu un spectre assez large qui va de la participation dans l'armée à la conduite d'assassinat ciblé, à la fuite du pays aussi, mais aussi à la manifestation, au boycott social et d'autres stratégies non violentes. Mais encore une fois, je n'ai pas les résultats. Et ma dernière question par rapport à l'armée suisse, c'est quelle est l'importance économique de l'armée suisse? Est-ce que, en plus de sa fonction, l'armée suisse pourrait être maintenue pour son rôle économique en tant que grand employeur, fournisseur de travail, etc.
- Alors c'est jamais un axe que j'ai essayé de défendre l'impact économique de l'armée. Si vous construisez des chars pour donner du travail aux gens, moi je ne vois pas l'utilité. Je ne suis pas vraiment un anti-militariste, mais je ne trouve pas l'utilité. Enfin, chaque chose à son utilité maintenant, c'est vrai qu'il y a un impact économique. Alors négatif et positif, il y a par exemple des vallées qui, lors de la diminution de la taille de l'armée, ont perdu beaucoup de revenus dû à l'absence des gens qui étaient en cours de répétition. Et ça s'est senti dans ces vallées qui ont fait utiliser ce revenu touristique pendant les périodes creuses, parce que l'armée avait l'intelligence de venir se placer dans ces périodes creuses. Donc il y

a un impact économique. Autre impact, on l'a vu Parkstrasse de Thoune qui certainement est tombée parce que l'armée commençait à avoir des diminutions, ça allait avoir un impact sur la région de Thoune. Maintenant, il y a eu des choses qui se sont passées, mais la région a fini quand même par se redévelopper. C'est aussi une ville, c'est plus facile pour eux. Donc il y a un impact économique. Ce qui est intéressant, il y a eu un rapport en 2012 ou 2014 qui a essayé de faire un calcul qui a été commandé par Maurer à l'époque, je ne sais plus quelle date. J'ai eu la chance d'avoir pour l'instant mon seul postulat accepté qu'était de demander, de refaire ce calcul et d'aller plus loin dans le calcul. Donc on verra ce qui sort, mais on m'a déjà dit que ce serait assez long. Il y a un impact économique. Mais si on parle d'exportations d'armes, c'est 0,2% de nos exportations. Alors c'est un petit peu ridicule. Par contre, d'un point de vue sécuritaire, ça peut être quand même assez important d'être capable si on veut une armée, de maintenir son matériel à niveau et puis d'avoir des connaissances. Donc économiquement, c'est pas grand chose. Mais au niveau sécuritaire, ça peut commencer à être problématique si on n'a plus aucune compétence dans l'industrie d'armement.

- Merci. Et on va passer à la troisième partie qui parle des politiques de défense alternatives. Pendant la guerre froide, la Suisse a adopté une politique de défense totale. Donc défense militaire en premier lieu, résistance civile et guérilla. En cas de défaillance militaire, les chercheurs et chercheuses soutiennent que la violence dans un mouvement de résistance civile avec une stratégie non violente. Donc, comme cela a été proposé pendant la guerre froide, la composante violente est contre-productive car elle légitimise la répression et la violence de l'adversaire. Elle affecte le soutien des tiers et empêche l'aliénation des partisans de l'adversaire. En plus de ça, Erika Chenoweth a écrit un livre en 2011 qui montre que les mouvements violents ont en moyenne une efficacité moindre par rapport aux mouvements non violents. Donc ma question est: est-ce que l'État et les militaires seraient prêts à abandonner la composante de guérilla dans les politiques de sécurité? Si non pourquoi?
- C'est assez difficile de parler de ces étapes-là parce que ça veut dire qu'on a échoué dans la défense, que tout le monde a échoué. Donc c'est toujours un peu compliqué. Donc c'est difficile d'avoir des réponses à ce genre de question. Mais je comprends et j'admire la résistance non violente de manifestations parce que je pense qu'on peut faire bouger beaucoup de choses. La manifestation, il faut le dire, est un droit démocratique. Alors après ça peut être embêtant pour les gens qui sont autour, ça dépend comment on fait les manifestations, mais c'est effectivement un droit démocratique. Et puis pour moi, une manifestation populaire dans la rue censée être non violente. Maintenant les impacts, toujours difficile de regarder un petit peu autour de nous, comment ça s'était passé, on a vu la Biélorussie ou la volonté de faire des manifestations non violentes à donner des choses compliquées. Et maintenant la situation est complètement sous contrôle, en tout cas vu de l'extérieur. Et le résultat va pousser en fait les gens à devenir plus violents parce qu'ils arrivent plus à organiser quelque chose de non violent. Alors peut-être que vous trouverez un moyen pour dire qu'on peut s'en sortir et faire revivre le mouvement non violent. Mais on voit bien que si vous avez en face quelqu'un qui est extrêmement réactif, extrêmement violent, puis qui a des moyens de coercition absolument inimaginable, c'est compliqué. Maintenant, si l'objectif d'une invasion armée est d'occuper un pays, c'est clair qu'une résistance non violente, une résistance économique va rendre la situation compliquée pour ceux qui occupent. Donc ça peut être une méthode sur le très long terme pour que ça devienne invivable, mais faut de la patience. Et je pense que ça paraît assez difficile de voir une organisation. On peut imaginer que l'organisation gouvernementale se soit expatriée pour essayer de conserver une manière d'agir. Ça m'étonnerait beaucoup qu'ils cherchent vraiment à sortir d'une composante violente. J'ai de la peine à imaginer comment ça fonctionne.
- Très bien, merci. C'est intéressant, parce c'est justement ça, le cœur du sujet de mon travail, parce qu'il y existe des pays qui ont inclus la résistance violente. Il y en a qui ont eu,

notamment la Lituanie, la résistance civile non violente comme principale politique de défense, directement à leur sortie de l'URSS. La Suède l'a aussi inclus. La Finlande l'a aussi inclus, mais avec le temps et sans nécessairement avoir d'invasions auxquelles résistait, ils ont maintenu ou rétabli une composante de violence. Est-ce que, comme vous avez commencé à le dire avant, les institutions traditionnelles, l'État ou l'armée, sont incapables de remettre en question le paradigme de la violence. Est-ce que ce paradigme de la violence légitime aussi leur propre existence ou défend leur propre existence.

- La réponse concernant l'État est plus compliquée. La réponse de l'armée est oui. Il y a une composante qui cherche à trouver le moyen d'exister et de justifier son existence. Mais ça, c'est peut être des personnes pas assez modernes pour tenir une armée moderne. On est un peu sur des vieux schémas, mais on a cette impression là. L'armée est une composante de l'État qui est non politique mais qui se bat pour exister et grossir, ça c'est clair. Maintenant, la violence de l'État, c'est plus compliqué de mon point de vue, parce que l'État n'a pas besoin de justifier son existence par la violence a priori. Et je pense que là, il y aurait un moyen d'agir pour que l'État trouve d'autres moyens que la violence. Maintenant, il faut être convaincu que ça peut fonctionner. Et c'est là que se situe tout le problème. Si on revient dans un schéma plus bas avec la famille et les enfants, on parle d'éducation non violente. Alors violenter un enfant, c'est évidemment scandaleux. Mais j'entends si l'éducation non violente, c'est ne plus mettre de barrière éducatives ferme, ça se complique beaucoup. Donc c'est toujours la discussion de savoir où est-ce qu'on place le curseur et qu'est ce qu'on attend comme résultat? Et puis quelle est la réaction de la personne contre qui on se bat même sans violence? Donc, je suis peut-être un peu trop imprégnée par le modèle sécuritaire avec une composante de violence.
- C'est ce que je cherche à explorer et ce n'est pas du tout un jugement de valeur..
- Vous savez, les jugements de valeur j'en vis tous les jours. Donc ce n'est pas quelque chose qui choque quand on fait de la politique.
- Pendant la guerre froide, cette composante de résistance civile a été incluse dans la politique suisse. Il y avait un petit livre rouge qui s'appelait défense civile, qui a été distribué à la population pour justement expliquer qu'on avait notre indépendance et que malgré toutes les imperfections que la Suisse peut avoir, c'est aux citoyens de décider ce qui s'y passait. Sauf que, contrairement à l'armée, cette méthode de défense prônée par le gouvernement, n'a jamais été entraînée. L'histoire de la résistance non violente est uniquement composée d'exemples qui ont été spontanés et non organisés. L'idée de la défense civile serait éventuellement d'institutionnaliser et d'organiser ça. Mais est-ce qu'on sait pourquoi cela n'a pas été entraîné pendant la guerre froide avec un entraînement se focalisant uniquement sur l'armée.
- C'est compliqué pour moi d'imaginer un entraînement spécifique à la non-violence. Je conçois une éducation, une formation à nos valeurs démocratiques, politiques et de liberté. Pour moi, si vous êtes imprégné de ces concepts et que vous y adhérez, normalement, vous avez le terreau parfait pour que la résistance s'organise et qu'une partie de cette résistance soit non violente. C'est pas clair parce qu'il y a des gens, même de notre système politique, qui voudraient bien un peu plus de totalitarisme. Donc c'est peut-être la préparation théorique ou bien le comment inculquer ces valeurs là et éviter que les gens puissent penser, c'est toujours un peu compliqué d'utiliser les mots, mais puissent penser qu'il est possible de vivre dans un système totalitaire à la biélorusse ou bien à la russe, parce que si on est empreint de liberté, on ne va pas admettre ça. Et maintenant, grâce à cet arrière-plan, vous pouvez développer les méthodes que vous désirez pour vous défendre, qu'elles soient violentes ou non violentes. Donc une éducation un peu plus claire sur ce qui se passe dans ces pays et sur la chance d'avoir le système qu'on a. Puis je prends l'ensemble européen avec parce que, même si on a un système un peu compliqué, les autres sont pas si mal que ça. Maintenant un entraînement, je vois l'entraînement un peu trop militaire. J'ai un peu de peine à imaginer.

- Dans les aspects théoriques développés par les chercheurs par rapport aux entraînements. Il y a notamment dans la dissuasion, la possibilité de montrer la masse de gens qui seraient capables de se mobiliser, que ce soit pour faire de la grève générale, pour éviter tout gain économique d'un envahisseur, que ce soit du sabotage, mais pas dans le sens de destruction, mais de ralentissement de la production de blocage. Il peut y avoir des gens qui sont plus motivés et plus dans l'action directe. Donc, le blocage physique de se mettre en face de soldats en boucliers humains et espérer que l'adversaire soit humain et refuse de tuer, de tirer sur quelqu'un qui est désarmé. Ça fait partie des éléments de défense. Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous sur ces aspects qui nous unissent. Et d'ailleurs, comment est-ce que la Suisse se défend face justement à cette nouvelle menace hybride dont on parle la désinformation sur internet, la promotion des gouvernements totalitaires, en offrant des récits alternatifs qui font que c'est peut-être moins bien vu et auparavant, vous avez parlé de l'espace d'internet qui est beaucoup plus complexe.
- Alors là vous tombez sur un sujet qui me préoccupe ces temps. Pour l'instant, notre réponse, elle est extrêmement mauvaise, elle est très mauvaise. Et un des défauts de notre système, c'est la liberté d'expression. Malheureusement, heureusement, je ne sais pas ce qu'il faut dire, vous avez le droit de publier des mensonges. Vous avez le droit de dire n'importe quoi. Vous avez le droit et on peut juste essayer de démontrer que vous avez tort. Et ça, c'est une très grosse difficulté. Indépendamment des techniques qui sont utilisées, on le voit dans les votations. Alors moi, j'ai la chance d'être un parti assez centriste. Donc je vois les deux ailes qui, pour moi souvent, racontent des bêtises quand ils veulent vraiment obtenir quelque chose, que ce soit de gauche ou de droite. Ils forcent le trait. Mais on n'est pas bon. Et moi, je n'ai pas de solution en ce moment pour ça, pas de solution qui permettrait de conserver la sacro sainte liberté d'expression. Et puis c'est compliqué, mais on devrait quand même agir. Et autre exemple, quand vous êtes élu conseil national, vous êtes à peu près abonné d'office, non pas par l'état, mais par les éditeurs, à tout ce qui s'écrit en Suisse, ça fait des piles. Donc je dois souvent aller débarrasser le papier. Il y a des publications en Suisse, mais c'est affreux dans les extrêmes, hallucinant ce qu'ils écrivent. Alors bon, heureusement, ils n'ont pas trop de lecteurs eux, mais il y en a qu'ont plus de lecteurs. Pour répondre à votre question, la lutte contre la désinformation ou la manipulation de l'information, je dirai qu'on n'est pas bon. Et puis je ne sais pas quels moyens on pourrait avoir.
- Je vais revenir plus sur la défense civile en soi. Donc, comme moi, je définirais comme l'institutionnalisation de la résistance civile non violente comme politique de défense, en incluant une préparation. Donc plus la formation à la citoyenneté dont vous avez parlé. Le pourquoi on se défend, à quoi on tient etc. Mais pour promouvoir cette stratégie de défense, il faut que les valeurs qui nous unissent soient fortes et que tout le monde ait cette conviction de se battre pour une même cause, de partager des valeurs. Selon vous, quelles sont ces valeurs qui unissent la Suisse actuellement, ou qui pourraient unir la Suisse?
- Alors les valeurs, c'est de mon point de vue, la liberté justement d'expression, la liberté de commerce, la liberté de choisir ses études, la liberté de choisir son lieu d'habitation. Enfin, toutes ces libertés là qui sont importantes. Et puis après, vous pouvez mettre par-dessus les valeurs institutionnelles parce qu'on a des institutions qui rendent cela possible. Et puis en Suisse, la chose qui est drôle, c'est qu'on n'a pas tellement de culture commune. Alors oui, il y a toujours un peu de chrétienté, mais elle était déjà assez divergente avant qu'on ait les mouvements de population avec d'autres religions. Et puis, à mon avis, ça pose pas de problèmes si graves que ça en Suisse. Donc on arrive à vivre avec ça. En fait, tout le reste, c'est tellement morcelé que ça ne nous unit pas tous ensemble. Ce qui peut nous unir, c'est la liberté. Elle et le système institutionnel. Et puis notre aspect un peu périphérique, c'est un peu de la négation, c'est-à-dire que les romans, il se sent un peu le français de seconde zone. Il préfère être en Suisse qu'en France. Et puis vous faites le tour de toutes les régions linguistiques comme ça, parce qu'on a un respect des minorités qui fait qu'on est capable de vivre ensemble. C'est des fois un petit peu étrange, parce que ce qui nous unit, qui peut être

un problème politique parfois, c'est un peu la peur d'être fondue dans la masse et puis de disparaître dans une masse qui ne nous permet plus de vivre notre culture hyper locale, nos particularités hyper locales et notre notre esprit minoritaire qu'on a tous en Suisse, parce qu'on est toujours le minoritaire d'une autre majorité, quel que soit d'où l'on vient. C'est un petit peu un mélange de tout ça. Mais je crois que c'est cristallisé dans la liberté qui est très importante en suisse. Et puis les institutions, parce qu'on a réussi à mettre en place un truc qui fonctionne et qui met des gens qui ne se comprennent même pas linguistiquement pour vivre ensemble.

- Pour inclure la défense civile dans le droit, il y aurait besoin d'adaptations, et notamment une dimension qui devrait être questionnée ou peut être légalisée ou intégrée dans la loi est la désobéissance civile. Est-ce que l'État aurait peur d'approcher ce genre de questions dans le sens où ça donnerait du pouvoir à ces citoyens qui pourraient remettre en question l'ordre établi?
- Je ne crois pas qu'en Suisse on ait vraiment peur du pouvoir citoyen, parce que c'est lui qui l'a. Quand vous avez fabriqué une belle loi et que trois mois plus tard, on vous la jette, on voit que la population a quand même beaucoup de pouvoir. Alors c'est toujours un peu diffus. C'est-à-dire que c'est le totalitarisme de la majorité. C'est un peu ça la démocratie. Donc, si la désobéissance civile vient du minoritaire, ça se complique pour l'État. Parce qu'en fait, vous avez tous les moyens. J'ai l'habitude de dire que dès je peux comprendre que des gens soient véganes, mais casser des boucheries, c'est pas la solution. Il faut faire une initiative. Si vous voulez interdire la viande en Suisse, vous avez la possibilité, mais à mon avis vous n'aurez pas de majorité. Donc on a déjà beaucoup de pouvoir maintenant sans la désobéissance civile pour faire de la résistance.
- Mais dans ce cas, elle serait dirigée contre quelqu'un d'autre, contre un occupant illégitime.
- Voilà après illégitime pour qui bref, contre un occupant illégitime qui pourrait être d'ailleurs représenté par un système politique et des dirigeants suisses. Donc c'est compliqué comme question parce que quand vous, dans un système qui fonctionne ou qui dysfonctionne pas trop que vous avez donné le pouvoir à la population, c'est difficile. La désobéissance civile, la manifestation, oui, ce n'est pas la désobéissance civile. Donc ça c'est difficile pour un état de donner la désobéissance civile sans mettre les quotas nécessaires.
- Ensuite, pour que la défense civile soit la plus efficace possible, il faudrait qu'un état soit le plus résilient. Et la décentralisation est un élément qui aide à la résilience, généralement parce qu'il est plus dur de perturber des structures décentralisées. La Suisse a un système qui est idéal pour ça avec le fédéralisme et elle est déjà passablement décentralisée. Mais peut-être qu'on pourrait faire plus sur certains aspects d'autonomie, que ce soit énergétique ou de production alimentaire, donc en augmentant la production ou en décentralisant cette production, comment est-ce que la suisse se positionne par rapport à ces questions d'autonomie?
- L'autonomie, elle est compliquée, hein? Si on réfléchit de manière globale, parce que c'est un problème qui est général. On n'arrive déjà pas à être autonome si on prend la Suisse en entier au niveau nourriture, bien qu'on ait dans la constitution des objectifs d'autosuffisance alimentaire. On a de la peine à y arriver, hein? Bon, en plus de ça, les paysans ne nous aident pas parce qu'ils n'ont pas tout à fait compris comment est ce qu'on pouvait y arriver. Mais ça, c'est un autre problème, parce qu'évidemment, ça a beaucoup d'influence sur le modèle économique. Et puis d'un point de vue énergétique, en tout cas, en temps de paix, c'est juste illusoire. On peut considérer l'indépendance énergétique au niveau européen. Là, on a une chance, mais seul c'est difficile, à moins qu'on se donne des moyens économiquement impossibles. Donc maintenant, si vous parlez d'indépendance décentralisée, c'est aussi compliqué. Maintenant, je pense que les gens en situation de crise vont s'organiser pour être le plus indépendant possible. On peut se référer au plan Wahlen de 39-45, on a assez de surface verte pour planter des patates. Si je regarde chez moi, je n'ai pas beaucoup de terrain, mais je pourrais quand même faire quelques patates. Je pense que ça peut faire partie de la

- préparation du pays, aller plus loin que des plans, c'est compliqué. Alors peut-être qu'il y aurait un moyen de rajouter dans l'approvisionnement économique des pays, des réserves pour pouvoir mettre en application ces plans afin que les gens puissent faire ce genre de choses. ça pourrait être une idée d'aller dans cette direction là.
- Merci. Et on arriva à la dernière question, l'avant-dernière question en fait. Dans le système de défense suisse, on a une géographie qui est assez particulière parce qu'on est hyper urbanisé. Et on a notamment des villes stratégiques et centrales à l'économie suisse, qui sont très proches des frontières, que ce soit Genève ou Bâle, ou même Zurich ou des villes dans Tessin ou Schaffhouse ou Saint-Gall. D'un point de vue militaire, c'est vraiment proche des frontières. Une défense armée de ces villes, amènerait assez probablement à une destruction complète de ces infrastructures. Et une question qui m'interroge est donc de savoir comment est-ce que cette balance des coûts est prise en compte dans les systèmes de défense, dans les politiques de défense en suisse? Parce que garder une indépendance avec un pays qui a été ravagé, c'est bien parce que ça peut être été plus vite, mais si on fait preuve de patience, peut-être qu'on s'en relève mieux après.
 - Je sais pas si la question s'est posée vraiment sous cet angle là, dans le sens où le tréfond de la pensée de l'armée, c'est quand même qu'elle soit juste là pour faire peur, pas pour dire ça va me coûter trop cher. Maintenant, je pense que si quelqu'un n'a pas compris que ça allait coûter cher ou considère comme m. Poutine avec l'Ukraine, que ça va passer tout seul, ça pourrait que même déclencher une résistance armée et vous avez raison, la situation, pas dans toute l'Ukraine, mais sur les terrains de bataille de l'Ukraine, elle est catastrophique. Oui, c'est un choix. Comment est ce qu'on se défend? C'est pas clair. Maintenant, il faut, si on dit en fait de la résistance, on laisse, on laisse rentrer fait de la résistance non violente. et puis on est patient. Ça peut être très, très long, hein? Attention, si on regarde les anciens des anciens états satellites de l'union soviétique. Ça a fait quand même plusieurs générations. C'est pas simple et après, quel est le risque qu'avec le temps ça s'amenuise? C'est compliqué.
 - Je prétends pas poser des questions simple
 - Non, mais c'est intéressant.
 - Et donc ça m'amène à ma vraie dernière question maintenant et notamment parce que plusieurs fois vous avez laissé entendre, j'ai eu l'impression en tout cas, que la politique de défense de la suisse ou la position de la suisse a été un peu réactive par rapport à des changements qu'on n'avait peut-être pas forcément vu venir, qu'on n'ait pas voulu anticiper ou qu'on avait jugé impossible. Cela pose la question de la vision à long et très long terme de la politique de la suisse au niveau de sa défense. Selon moi, la suisse pourrait éventuellement essayer de prendre une place de leader dans la transformation des systèmes de défense, notamment grâce à sa position unique au centre de l'OTAN et de l'Europe géographique et devenir ainsi un leader promotion de la paix et en non pas en désarmement nécessairement, mais en en réduction de l'armement, en tout cas. À quel point est-ce que ces aspects sont pris en compte et envisagés ou considérés comme crédibles à non pas moyen terme, mais à long et très long terme.
 - Je pense qu'il y a eu un choc avec le retour de la guerre en Europe, vision élargie. Alors il y a toujours eu des guerres assez loin pour qu'on s'en soucie moins. Et je pense qu'il y a un peu un retour de manivelle sur le fait que depuis la chute du mur de Berlin, on était sûr qu'on allait vivre en paix ad eternam. Donc, en fait, dans la politique actuelle, il y a un retour à la résistance armée très clairement. Et si vous dites on n'a pas vu venir oui, il y a aussi des choses qui me fâchent parce qu'on doit mettre plus de moyens dans notre système de renseignement et d'analyse politique. Bon plus que les moyens, il faut peut être aussi les bonnes personnes. Et puis on doit avoir des bonnes relations avec toutes les autres personnes qui font ça, tous les autres services de renseignement et d'analyse du monde. Parce que ce n'est pas parce que on s'entend pas bien avec les iraniens que ça nous empêche de collaborer avec eux pour échanger des renseignements. Mais moi, je vois pas de mouvement qui va

dans cette direction à l'heure actuelle. Donc pas de mouvement qui pousserait à trouver une alternative, la suisse est réactive. D'ailleurs, c'est un problème politique global, à mon avis. Qui vient d'une situation, on peut essayer de lui donner une explication, mais un peu sur tous les points, on est en train de subir politiquement. Donc là, mon analyse est qu'on ne change pas de paradigme en ce moment. On prend pas cette direction.

- Très bien, je vous remercie. Alors je vais arrêter l'enregistrement maintenant.

Appendix 4 : Translation Interview 2

- We can get straight to the heart of the interview. First of all, on the security situation in Switzerland. In your opinion, what are the current external threats to Switzerland's security?
- So external threats, we're in a fairly complex geopolitical and global situation. On top of that, technological means and the fact that we're all surfing the net, as we are doing now, mean that there's no longer any physical distance between people who want to attack someone or countries that want to attack someone. I don't mean undemocratic, but totalitarian and liberticidal political models. People will say it like that because I don't want to impose democracy. There are other political systems that work and that allow freedoms and respect for human rights, and there may be others. But for me, respect for human rights and freedom are essential. So, in effect, we are a danger from that point of view, and that, for me, is the most important danger coming from outside at the geopolitical level. Then there is organized crime, which is not state-run, but which is just as dangerous for our security and which puts us in difficulty because there is not only the physical presence of organized crime networks, but also their presence on the Internet. And a third aspect that many people tend to forget, which is less to do with the networks but still a little bit, is the problems of adapting to climate change. So natural disasters, as we've seen in Grisons, are evacuating a village because the mountain is going to fall on them. So for the moment, we're losing land, we're losing houses, but we haven't lost any lives yet. We haven't had a complete disaster, but we can imagine that, depending on the disaster, it could also become very, very complicated for everything that enables us to maintain society, including communication and the distribution network. And we need to have the means to respond to this kind of natural disaster very effectively. So, for me, it's more or less the three threats of geopolitics, organized crime and the natural environment, because it's a bit complicated.
- And in your view, are there any internal threats to Switzerland's internal security?
- So inside again, it's always complicated. If you have organized crime networks, they are on the inside. If you have violent extremism, whether left-wing or right-wing, that's also an internal danger, because it may be organizations based in Switzerland that are activated by people who live in Switzerland or who live there legally. So, in fact, we have organized crime and violent extremism - these are security threats for me, which are also identified by the intelligence service and which make tensions always a little complicated, even if people's emotions mean that this threat is greatly overestimated, but it does exist.
- But, without asking for confidential information, is Switzerland preparing, for example, for coups d'état or secessionist movements by certain regions or certain groups?
- No, we're a long way from that kind of organization, but we do have, and it's public, fears about certain violent extremist groups who are sometimes a little too quiet, but who are well trained, but from there it's a bit complicated now whether they have the necessary organization to carry out a coup d'état. To be honest, from a personal point of view, during the COVID period, when we put fences around Parliament, it wasn't a very pleasant feeling because we had the impression that anti-COVID movements wanted to get into Parliament. And that, let's say, is perhaps also exaggerated because it's very emotional, but it's a danger for our democracy. Now, do they have the capacity to go that far? For the moment, I don't think so.
- I don't think it's just emotional, because that's also what the intelligence services highlighted in their latest report.
- It's emotional, because I have a clear example: you're in the Chamber of Parliament on a Thursday evening or at 3 p.m. and then the President makes an announcement saying that there are demonstrations planned. We'll do everything we can to ensure that the MPs can leave through the main door, which is an important sign, but we'll still have to listen to what the police say because they were afraid it would be very violent. It wasn't, but just for that

- little moment, you get the impression of being locked in Parliament and then being barricaded in - it's not very pleasant.
- Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country. What does this mean and how does it affect national security?
 - Ah, you're, you're on the hot topic here, that's all we'll be talking about soon.
 - Yes, I started my search before February 2022.
 - That's where discussions on neutrality get complicated. In my view, neutrality is a security tool for Switzerland. In fact, that's how it was conceived when we became officially neutral. The major European powers accepted it because we were on the front line at the time and we were accepted as a buffer that would be left more or less alone in conflicts. It was quite convenient for us. So, for me, this notion of neutrality is essentially for our own safety. It's a security and foreign policy tool. Foreign policy is also a security tool. So we have to adapt. And at the moment, as I'm sure you've heard in the debates, it's complicated to know how to adapt to the situation. But I personally think that we have to adapt to the current situation and we have to adapt our neutrality while retaining its main principle, but admitting that it's not as simple as that.
 - So at the moment there is a lot of talk about our neutrality, but there is one element that is never really discussed. That's why this neutrality is armed.
 - Ah, that's a Swiss choice and the Hague agreements, some of which need to be revised or modernised. I'm one of them. I'm not so attached to the neutrality of my great-grandparents, because it was perhaps useful for my ancestors, but now it's more complicated. This neutrality allows the country to defend itself, but it also has another constraint, which is that we must not let others use our territory. We must therefore have a means of preventing the use of our territory for military operations. So Switzerland's reaction, historically, has been to have armed neutrality and to have it recognized essentially by saying we are neutral. You must respect our neutrality, but we are prepared to defend it militarily. So it's a decision, a political decision. There are other countries that have chosen other forms of neutrality without an army.
 - Thank you for your time. And then, Article 54 of the Federal Constitution mentions the promotion of peace. How does this article play out in Switzerland's security policies and policies?
 - This has not always been the case, but at present we have our policy of good offices. So we make our diplomacy and our resources available so that people can talk to each other. Sometimes it's complicated, but for example, we've done good offices in South America with organized crime, drug cartels and states. We managed to get them to talk and at least free the prisoners. So that's one aspect of promoting peace. The second thing, which is also civil, is the SDC. So the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, which is also a tool for promoting peace. It's something that's important to me. If people have jobs and can do business, they generally don't beat each other up too much. It's pretty standard. And then lastly, there's the participation of the Swiss army in peace promotion missions. There's one that's particularly important. It's in Kosovo, where we find ourselves in a powder keg that has essentially been extinguished. But the powder is still there and that is extremely important for our security. Because historically, this powder keg in the Balkans has always created a lot of problems in Europe, even if this time it's exploding a little further east. And we have a large diaspora of Kosovars, Bosnians and Serbs in Switzerland. And we can imagine that if the war starts up again with the horrors we've seen, this diaspora will also be in trouble in Switzerland for emotional reasons. So typically here, with our action in Kosovo, we are also protecting the people who came to live with us and who, while many of them have become Swiss, still have very strong ties to this region. So I think I've got a good idea of the tools we have at our disposal. After that, the Department of Foreign Affairs is also working intensively with international organizations to try and put rules in place. There are quite a few organizations in Geneva, including three security organizations that we don't

often hear about. I hope, but it shouldn't be a problem, that their resources will be renewed at the next session. And it's all about good security governance and that sort of thing. There are three organizations like that, including the mine clearance centre. And a third, I don't know, there are three of them, and these are important tools. Mr Burkhalter has also set up, and this started a few years ago, a grouping called GESDA in Geneva, which looks at opportunities in technology and how the situation will be in the future. And there's also a big security component that's being developed here. And it's interesting because we bring the whole world to Geneva to discuss issues that are really forward-looking. It's interesting to look at it from that angle.

- Thank you. And then, before that, you talked about KFOR, which is the mission led by NATO, unlike the other missions to which Switzerland belongs. And that brings me to the question of what NATO represents for Switzerland and its security. Is it an ally, a threat, our defence projection abroad or something else?
- So it's pretty clear that in geopolitics we're at the centre of NATO. I don't see NATO as a threat. We don't have good relations with our European neighbours on many issues, but I don't think we're quite there yet. We still have the capacity to negotiate our bilateral and other agreements. So any conventional threat on land is going to come from NATO countries. That much is clear. So we find ourselves in a situation where we are under NATO's umbrella, at least for everything on land. We are being asked to defend our airspace. In other words, a priori no one is looking after it, or rather, if we wanted someone to look after it, we would have to pay a high price without having the skills. And now to this organization and how we fit into it. It's clear that NATO is going a bit far for our neutrality. We'll put it that way, because I hear they're very active in battles that don't concern us and that we wouldn't settle just like that. So it's clear that coming in with our mouths agape and saying we want to be part of NATO would be an enormous revolution in terms of neutrality. Now, we have to realise that we can participate in Europe's defensive security as long as it is truly defensive and without really jeopardising neutrality, in my view. That's the whole point. Add to that the political difficulties because Turkey is part of NATO, because Turkey is playing a very dark game in Kosovo even though it is part of KFOR, but we are in extremely complicated situations. As you can see, it's a bit difficult. But now, let's imagine - I hope it doesn't happen, but it may not be that far off - that the war in Ukraine spills over into Poland or Finland. I don't know if Finland is really strategic for Mr Putin, but when you see his strategic behaviour, you have to wonder. What would our attitude be? Given that our neighbour, since Poland is becoming our neighbour and part of the European Union, is also under attack. And this whole issue means that we have to reposition ourselves in relation to NATO and in relation to this European security architecture. And then, by the way, if we take this question up again, perhaps we could ask ourselves how we are also collaborating from a civil protection point of view, for example, because we could also work well with our neighbours on this subject. So NATO is not a panacea, because it has a lot of flaws, but in a tense geopolitical situation, they are essentially the ones who protect us. So I'm still of the opinion that if we're protected, we need to make a certain contribution, even if it's not military, we can't just hang around and say you guys are nice, we've got nothing to do. And that's the discussion that has been triggered by this conflict in Ukraine for us a little more seriously than before.
- So thank you very much. We'll move on to the second part, which concerns the Swiss Army as an institution. And my first question is, in your opinion or that of your acquaintances, what is the perception of the Swiss army abroad? Is it a deterrent force? Is it a credible defence force, precisely to prevent the use of territory?
- So it's always difficult because we live in a bi- or tri-polar world. So it's difficult to know what people with whom we have less military contact think. I think that our defence partners, that is to say NATO, consider that we have an army that is credible, perhaps a little old-fashioned on certain points, but fairly credible. So I wouldn't go so far as to say, as Mr

Maurer does, that we have the best army in the world, especially as I don't know which one it is. I do think, however, that there is a certain credibility and that we are able to show that with the army, its equipment and the resources we put into it, which are far from negligible, that we are ready to defend ourselves militarily, which is also the purpose of the army. Now, we had imagined that the Ukrainians would let the tanks through. It didn't quite work out that way, so they got a lot of help, but they're still the ones doing the work. So it's not just the equipment that counts. It's also about the will of the people.

- So this Swiss army that has to defend our country, what does it have to defend? Is it the territory, the institutions, the citizens, the values of Switzerland? We have seen in the history of Switzerland that during the Second World War, the territory, the plateau, was not necessarily defensible either by political will or for x or y reasons. Then, during the Cold War, we also saw that the government envisaged the possibility of Switzerland being invaded and having to relocate the government abroad before being able to regain control of the territory. So this raises the question of territorial protection. So what is the Swiss army defending?
- So the Swiss army is organized to defend the territory, but that was already the case during the Cold War and the Second World War, except that it was clear that if things went badly, it would be difficult. But during the Cold War, we used to count the number of bridges our Soviet enemies had to cross to reach Switzerland, because the enemy always came from there. And then we tried to work out how many days it would take them to cross. But you can imagine that if you take on a force of millions of soldiers who want to cross Switzerland, it's strategically complicated. So the mission remains the defence of the population. It's a bit more complicated when it comes to the population; we're more in the civil protection business, which is supposed to protect the population from war movements. But the Swiss Army's mission remains the defence of the territory. But there are complicated areas because there are places that are geographically separate from Switzerland that are difficult to defend. Take Schaffhausen, for example, or Ajoie, which is geographically a little too far away from Switzerland,
 - Ticino too, I imagine
 - Ticino.
- So the Swiss army is made up of Swiss citizens. If we know this, how do we know that these citizens would be prepared to fight in a war and would be prepared, in particular, to kill?
- So we assume it, we assume it by training. And then you assume. And this is perhaps an interesting experiment. With the Security Policy Committee, we made a visit to Vienna and we had a presentation from our military attaché there who showed us a poll that was taken in the street by Austrian television just after the invasion of Ukraine or the aggression of Ukraine that was invaded which asked the population if they were ready to fight. And in fact, the Austrian population said no. I don't think you'd get the same answer in Switzerland because there's a kind of attachment, no, that doesn't mean that you'll have everyone who is 100 per cent behind you, but in fact everything is measured here. And then there's the principle that the citizens, even the inhabitants of this country, because you don't necessarily need a white cross passport to want to defend the place where you live, are prepared to defend their institutions, their country. Because there are some things that work, in particular a system that works, but you're right, it's not a sure thing, because fortunately we haven't used the army on the battlefield for a long time, and if we could avoid using it, I'd sign up straight away,
- What you're talking about, I tried to do a little survey like that too. In the first part of my work, I haven't yet analysed the results, but to see whether people would be prepared to defend Switzerland. And if so, how? What different types of action they would be prepared to take, but I don't have the results yet.

- But there are many ways of getting involved. The army is a visible thing. If you look at history, there have been many other ways of getting involved, after that it can be violent or not - the most striking examples are generally violent, at least in Europe.
- Yes, I've tried to cover a fairly broad spectrum, from participation in the army to carrying out targeted assassinations, to fleeing the country, but also demonstrations, social boycotts and other non-violent strategies. But once again, I don't have the results. And my last question about the Swiss army is, how important is it economically? In addition to its function, could the Swiss army be maintained for its economic role as a major employer, supplier of labour, etc.?
- So I've never tried to defend the economic impact of the army. If you build tanks to give people jobs, I don't see the point. I'm not really an anti-militarist, but I don't see the point. Well, everything has its uses now, and it's true that there is an economic impact. Some valleys, for example, lost a lot of income when the army was reduced in size due to the absence of people on rehearsal courses. And this was felt in these valleys, which made use of this tourist income during slack periods, because the army had the intelligence to come in during these slack periods. So there is an economic impact. Another impact was the Parkstrasse in Thun, which certainly fell down because the army was starting to have cutbacks, and this was going to have an impact on the Thun region. Now, things have happened, but the region has ended up redeveloping. It's also a city, so it's easier for them. So there is an economic impact. Interestingly, there was a report in 2012 or 2014 that tried to make a calculation that was commissioned by Maurer at the time, I don't remember which date. I was lucky enough to have my only postulate accepted for the time being, which was to ask for this calculation to be redone and to go further in the calculation. So we'll see what comes out, but I've already been told that it will take quite a long time. There is an economic impact. But if we're talking about arms exports, it's 0.2% of our exports. So it's a bit ridiculous. On the other hand, from a security point of view, it can be quite important to be able, if you want an army, to keep your equipment up to date and to have knowledge. So economically, it's not a big deal. But from a security point of view, it can start to be a problem if we no longer have any skills in the arms industry.
- Thank you for your time. And we'll move on to the third part, which deals with alternative defence policies. During the Cold War, Switzerland adopted a policy of total defence. This meant military defence first and foremost, followed by civil resistance and guerrilla warfare. In the event of military failure, researchers argue that violence in a civil resistance movement with a non-violent strategy. So, as was proposed during the Cold War, the violent component is counter-productive because it legitimises the repression and violence of the opponent. It affects the support of third parties and prevents the alienation of the opponent's supporters. On top of that, Erika Chenoweth wrote a book in 2011 which shows that violent movements are on average less effective than non-violent movements. So my question is: would the state and the military be prepared to abandon the guerrilla component in security policies? If not, why not?
- It's quite difficult to talk about these stages because it means that you've failed in your defence, that everyone else has failed. So it's always a bit complicated. So it's difficult to get answers to this kind of question. But I understand and admire the non-violent resistance of demonstrations because I think we can make a lot of things happen. It has to be said that demonstrations are a democratic right. It can be annoying for the people around, depending on how the demonstrations are organized, but it is indeed a democratic right. And as far as I'm concerned, a popular demonstration in the street is supposed to be non-violent. Now the impact, it's always difficult to look a little bit around us, how it happened, we saw Belarus or the will to make non-violent demonstrations to give complicated things. And now the situation is completely under control, at least from the outside. And the result is actually going to push people to become more violent because they can no longer organise something non-violent. So maybe you'll find a way of saying that we can get out of this and

revive the non-violent movement. But it's clear that if you're up against someone who is extremely reactive, extremely violent, and who has absolutely unimaginable means of coercion, it's complicated. Now, if the aim of an armed invasion is to occupy a country, it's clear that non-violent resistance and economic resistance will make the situation complicated for those occupying. So it can be a very long-term method of making things unlivable, but you need patience. And I think it seems pretty difficult to see an organization. It's conceivable that the governmental organization might have gone abroad to try and preserve its way of doing things. I'd be very surprised if they were really trying to get away from a violent component. I find it hard to imagine how it works.

- Thank you very much. It's interesting, because that's the heart of the subject of my work, because there are countries that have included violent resistance. Some of them, notably Lithuania, had non-violent civil resistance as their main defence policy straight after they left the USSR. Sweden has also included it. Finland also included it, but over time and without necessarily having invasions to resist, they maintained or re-established a violent component. Is it the case, as you began to say earlier, that traditional institutions, the state or the army, are incapable of challenging the paradigm of violence? Does this paradigm of violence also legitimise their own existence or defend their own existence?
- The answer for the State is more complicated. The army's answer is yes. There is a component that seeks to find a way to exist and justify its existence. But perhaps these are people who are not modern enough to run a modern army. We're a bit stuck in old patterns, but that's the impression we get. The army is a non-political component of the state, but it fights to exist and to grow, that's clear. Now, state violence is more complicated from my point of view, because the state doesn't need to justify its existence by violence a priori. And I think that there would be a way to act so that the State finds means other than violence. Now you have to be convinced that it can work. And that's where the problem lies. If we go back to the family and children, we're talking about non-violent education. Now, violating a child is obviously scandalous. But if non-violent education means no longer putting up any firm educational barriers, that gets a lot more complicated. So it's always a question of knowing where you draw the line and what you expect the result to be? And then what's the reaction of the person you're fighting, even without violence? So I'm perhaps a little too steeped in the security model, with its component of violence.
- That's what I'm trying to explore and it's not a value judgement at all.
- You know, I experience value judgements every day. So it's not something that comes as a shock when you're in politics.
- During the Cold War, this component of civil resistance was included in Swiss policy. There was a little red book called civil defence, which was distributed to the population precisely to explain that we had our independence and that despite all the imperfections that Switzerland may have, it was up to the citizens to decide what happened there. Except that, unlike the army, this method of defence advocated by the government has never been trained. The history of non-violent resistance is made up entirely of examples that were spontaneous and unorganized. The idea of civil defence would eventually be to institutionalize and organise this. But do we know why it wasn't trained during the Cold War, with training focusing solely on the army?
- It's complicated for me to imagine specific training in non-violence. I see it as an education, a training in our democratic, political and freedom values. For me, if you are imbued with these concepts and if you adhere to them, normally you have the perfect breeding ground for resistance to be organized and for part of this resistance to be non-violent. It's not clear because there are people, even in our political system, who would like a bit more totalitarianism. So it's perhaps a question of theoretical preparation or how to inculcate these values and prevent people from thinking, it's always a bit complicated to use words, but from thinking that it's possible to live in a Belarusian or Russian-style totalitarian system, because if you're marked by freedom, you're not going to accept that. And now, thanks to

this background, you can develop the methods you want to defend yourself, whether violent or non-violent. So a slightly clearer education about what's going on in these countries and how lucky we are to have the system we have. Then I'll take Europe as a whole, because even if our system is a bit complicated, the others aren't as bad as all that. As for training, I see it as a bit too military. I find it hard to imagine.

- In the theoretical aspects developed by researchers in relation to training. In dissuasion, in particular, there is the possibility of showing the mass of people who would be capable of mobilising, whether it's to go on a general strike, to prevent any economic gain from an invader, whether it's sabotage, but not in the sense of destruction, but of slowing down blocking production. There may be people who are more motivated and more into direct action. So the physical blockage of putting yourself in front of soldiers as human shields and hoping that the opponent is human and refuses to kill or shoot someone who is unarmed. That's part of the defence. I totally agree with you on these aspects that unite us. And moreover, how is Switzerland defending itself against this new hybrid threat that we're talking about - disinformation on the Internet, the promotion of totalitarian governments - by offering alternative narratives that are perhaps less well seen and, before that, you mentioned the Internet, which is much more complex.
- So you've come across a subject that's been bothering me recently. At the moment, our response is extremely bad, very bad. And one of the flaws in our system is freedom of expression. Unfortunately, fortunately, I don't know what to say, you have the right to publish lies. You have the right to say anything. You have the right and we can just try to prove you wrong. And that's a very big difficulty. Regardless of the techniques used, we see it in the votes. I'm lucky enough to be a fairly centrist party. So I see the two wings which, for me, often talk nonsense when they really want to achieve something, whether it's from the left or the right. They force the issue. But we're no good. And I don't have a solution for that at the moment, no solution that would preserve the sacrosanct freedom of expression. And it's complicated, but we should still take action. And another example: when you're elected to the National Council, you're pretty much automatically subscribed, not by the state, but by the publishers, to everything that's written in Switzerland. So I often have to go and clear away the paper. There are publications in Switzerland, but it's awful at the extremes, it's mind-boggling what they write. So, fortunately, they don't have too many readers, but there are others who have more readers. To answer your question about the fight against disinformation or the manipulation of information, I'd say we're not very good. And I don't know what resources we might have.
- I'm going to come back more to civil defence per se. So, like me, I would define it as the institutionalization of non-violent civil resistance as a defence policy, including preparation. So plus the citizenship training you mentioned. Why we defend ourselves, what we value, etc. But to promote this defence strategy, the values that unite us have to be strong and everyone has to be convinced that we are fighting for the same cause, that we share the same values. In your opinion, what are the values that currently unite Switzerland, or that could unite Switzerland?
- So values, in my view, are freedom of expression, freedom of trade, freedom to choose one's studies, freedom to choose one's place of residence. In short, all these freedoms are important. And then you can put institutional values on top, because we have institutions that make this possible. And the funny thing about Switzerland is that we don't really have a common culture. So yes, there's still a bit of Christianity, but it was already quite divergent before we had the population movements with other religions. And then, in my opinion, it doesn't pose such serious problems in Switzerland. So we manage to live with that. In fact, everything else is so fragmented that it doesn't unite us. What can unite us is freedom. It and the institutional system. And then our slightly peripheral aspect, it's a bit of a negation, in other words, the novelist feels a bit like a second-class Frenchman. He'd rather be in Switzerland than in France. And then you go round all the linguistic regions like that,

because we have a respect for minorities that means we're able to live together. Sometimes it's a bit strange, because what unites us, which can sometimes be a political problem, is a bit the fear of being melted into the mass and then disappearing into a mass that no longer allows us to live our hyper-local culture, our hyper-local particularities and our minority spirit that we all have in Switzerland, because we are always the minority of another majority, no matter where we come from. It's a bit of a mixture of all that. But I think it's crystallised in freedom, which is very important in Switzerland. And then the institutions, because we've managed to put something in place that works and that allows people who don't even understand each other linguistically to live together.

- To include civil defence in the law, there would need to be adaptations, and in particular one dimension that would need to be questioned or could be legalised or integrated into the law is civil disobedience. Would the State be afraid to approach this kind of issue in the sense that it would give power to citizens who could challenge the established order?
- I don't think we're really afraid of citizen power in Switzerland, because it's the people who have it. When you've drafted a fine law and three months later it's thrown out, you can see that the people still have a lot of power. So it's always a bit diffuse. In other words, it's the totalitarianism of the majority. That's what democracy is all about. So, if civil disobedience comes from the minority, things get complicated for the State. Because in fact, you have all the means at your disposal. I'm used to saying that I can understand people being vegan, but smashing up butchers' shops is not the solution. You need an initiative. If you want to ban meat in Switzerland, you can do that, but in my opinion you won't get a majority. So we already have a lot of power now without civil disobedience to put up resistance.
- But in this case, it would be directed against someone else, against an illegitimate occupier.
- After all, it's illegitimate for whom, in short, it's against an illegitimate occupier who could be represented by a political system and Swiss leaders. So it's a complicated question because when you've given power to the people in a system that works or doesn't work too well, it's difficult. Civil disobedience, demonstrations, yes, that's not civil disobedience. So it's difficult for a state to allow civil disobedience without setting the necessary quotas.
- Secondly, for civil defence to be as effective as possible, a state must be as resilient as possible. And decentralisation is an element that helps resilience, generally because it's harder to disrupt decentralised structures. Switzerland has a system that is ideal for this, with its federalism, and it is already fairly decentralised. But perhaps we could do more on certain aspects of autonomy, whether it's energy or food production, so by increasing production or decentralising this production, how is Switzerland positioning itself in relation to these issues of autonomy?
- Autonomy is complicated, isn't it? If we think globally, because it's a general problem. We're already unable to be self-sufficient if we take Switzerland as a whole in terms of food, even though we have food self-sufficiency objectives in our constitution. We're having trouble getting there, aren't we? Well, on top of that, the farmers aren't helping us because they haven't quite understood how we can do it. But that's another problem, because it obviously has a big influence on the economic model. And then from an energy point of view, in any case, in peacetime, it's just illusory. We can consider energy independence at European level. That's where we have a chance, but it's difficult to achieve on our own, unless we take measures that are economically impossible. So now, if you're talking about decentralised independence, that's just as complicated. Now, I think that people in crisis situations will organise themselves to be as independent as possible. We can refer to the Wahlen plan of 39-45, we have enough green surface to plant potatoes. If I look around my house, I don't have much land, but I could still grow a few potatoes. I think it could be part of the preparation of the country, going further than plans, it's complicated. So maybe there's a way of adding to the economic supply of countries, reserves to be able to implement these plans so that people can do this kind of thing. It could be an idea to go in that direction.

- Thank you for your time. And now we come to the last question, the penultimate question in fact. The geography of the Swiss defence system is quite unusual in that it is highly urbanised. In particular, we have cities that are strategic and central to the Swiss economy, very close to the borders, whether it's Geneva or Basel, or even Zurich or cities in Ticino or Schaffhausen or St. Gallen. From a military point of view, they are very close to the borders. Armed defence of these cities would probably result in the complete destruction of these infrastructures. So one of the questions I have is how this balance of costs is taken into account in Swiss defence systems and policies? Because maintaining independence with a country that has been ravaged is a good thing because it may be quicker, but if we are patient, perhaps we will recover better afterwards.
- I don't know if the question was really asked from that angle, in the sense that the army's basic thinking is that it's just there to scare people, not to say that it's going to cost me too much. Now, I think that if someone hasn't understood that it's going to cost a lot of money or considers, as Mr Putin did with Ukraine, that it's going to cost a lot of money. You're right, the situation, not in the whole of Ukraine, but on the battlefields of Ukraine, is catastrophic. Yes, it's a choice. How do we defend ourselves? It's not clear. Now, you have to, if you say in fact resistance, you let it go, you let non-violent resistance come in, and then you're patient. It can take a very, very long time, can't it? Mind you, if you look at the former satellite states of the Soviet Union. That was several generations ago. It's not easy, and after that, what's the risk of it diminishing over time? It's complicated.
- I don't pretend to ask simple questions
- No, but it's interesting.
- So that brings me to my real last question now, particularly because on several occasions you have implied, or at least I have had the impression, that Swiss defence policy or Switzerland's position has been somewhat reactive to changes that perhaps we didn't necessarily see coming, that we didn't want to anticipate or that we thought impossible. This raises the question of the long and very long term vision of Swiss defence policy. In my view, Switzerland could perhaps try to take a leading role in the transformation of defence systems, thanks in particular to its unique position at the centre of NATO and geographic Europe, and thus become a leader in peace promotion and not necessarily in disarmament, but at least in arms reduction. To what extent are these aspects taken into account and envisaged or considered credible not in the medium term, but in the long and very long term?
- I think there was a shock with the return of war to Europe. So there have always been wars far enough away for us to be less concerned about them. And I think there's a bit of a backlash against the fact that since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we were sure we were going to live in peace forever. So, in fact, in the current policy, there is a very clear return to armed resistance. And if you say we didn't see it coming, yes, there are also things that annoy me because we need to put more resources into our intelligence and political analysis system. But more than resources, we also need the right people. And we need to have good relations with all the other people who do this, all the other intelligence and analysis services in the world. Just because we don't get on well with the Iranians doesn't mean we can't work with them to exchange intelligence. But I don't see any movement in that direction at the moment. So there's no movement to find an alternative, Switzerland is reactive. Besides, I think it's a global political problem. It stems from a situation that we can try to explain, but on all points, we are in the process of suffering politically. So my analysis is that we're not changing the paradigm at the moment. We're not heading in that direction.
- Thank you very much. I'm going to stop recording now.

Appendix 5 : Transcription Interview 3

- Je vous en prie. Donc, si c'est bon pour vous, on peut commencer avec la première thématique qui concerne la situation sécuritaire de la suisse. Donc, selon vous, actuellement, quelles sont les menaces extérieures pour la sécurité de la suisse?
- Bon, elles sont multiples. Et il y a notamment l'aspect du terrorisme qu'on ne peut pas sous estimer, il y a l'aspect, je dirais criminalité d'une manière générale. Et puis il y a l'aspect cybersécurité, cyber attaque qui, je dirais, est au plus haut point aujourd'hui dans les risques, à mon avis principaux, avec une volonté assez globale de déstabilisation de la suisse dans son ensemble. Et globalement, on est plutôt aujourd'hui victime d'une crise, d'une attaque, d'une tentative de déstabilisation économique et le Crédit Suisse n'est pas tout à fait un hasard si ça se passe maintenant. On a de plus en plus de peine à se faire entendre et à discuter avec nos partenaires habituels que ce soit l'Union Européenne ou même avec les Etats-Unis. Quelque part, ça montre une certaine instabilité avec une volonté coordonnée ou pas mais je n'irai pas jusqu'à dire qu'on veut s'en prendre au modèle suisse qui a quand même fait ses preuves et qui est envié, voire jaloué par d'autres. Et d'autres voudraient notamment en ce qui concerne la place financière, évidemment l'anéantir pour la reprendre ailleurs chez eux, parce qu'ils sont jaloux qu'un petit pays comme la suisse soit capable d'autant d'innovations et de gestion aussi importante de fonds étrangers en particulier. Donc, en gros, le risque principal, à mon avis, c'est les cyberattaques. Donc, si on regarde les menaces, notamment sur les infrastructures critiques, et puis on a quand même encore des risques terroristes, il ne faut pas les minimiser, ça fait partie d'un doute. Et puis ensuite on a tout ce qui est migration. C'est aussi une menace en soi. Ça peut être très positif si on arrive à la maîtriser. Et justement on voit que l'Allemagne a à nouveau lancé un appel à trouver des gens qui viennent chez eux pour travailler parce qu'ils n'ont pas assez de main d'œuvre et chez nous, c'est la même chose. Mais chez nous, on a une certaine frilosité vis à vis de tout ce qui est requérant d'asile. Et en particulier, vis à vis des ukrainiens, mais pas seulement qu'on pourrait, à mon avis, mieux intégrer dans le marché du travail et qui nous rendrait aussi ce service, parce que on voit qu'on a aussi de grands défis, des déficits de main d'œuvre et en particulier de main d'œuvre qualifiés. Donc il y a la migration, ça reste quand même, malgré tout, une arme pour certains pays. Et je ne sais pas ce qui va se passer après les élections en Turquie, parce qu'on a vu que la Turquie a déjà utilisé cette arme de la migration une ou deux fois pour faire pression sur l'Union européenne et sur ses alliés. Donc ça, ça peut être aussi un élément déstabilisateur dans notre pays. Et aujourd'hui, on a vraiment le sentiment que les partis politiques traditionnels qui jusqu'à présent jusqu'à il y a quatre ou cinq ans, arrivaient à dégager des consensus pour le bien de ce pays. Aujourd'hui, on peine toujours plus à dégager des consensus en prenant prétexte de tout et de rien en particulier, on sait que l'UDC utilise au maximum la migration pour en faire son fonds de commerce, alors que on pourrait justement le positiver et essayer d'attirer le meilleur parti. Voilà un peu résumé parce qu'on pourra passer en revue, mais la criminalité organisée, ça reste aussi un risque pour le pays avec des mafias qui sont soit pesantes chez nous, soit qui utilisent la suisse comme plaque tournante, soit pour le blanchiment d'argent, soit pour d'autres commerces. Donc c'est vraiment beaucoup de petites choses qui sont mises bout à bout. La menace militaire existe, mais on sait qu'elle n'est pas immédiate. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'on doit la négliger pour autant.
- Merci. Et est-ce qu'il y a des menaces qui seraient intérieures plus qu'extérieures?
- Oui, il y a des menaces intérieures avec des groupes d'extrême droite comme d'extrême gauche, qui se radicalisent aussi. Et on le voit du côté de Zurich en particulier, il y a ce nouveau groupe qui commence à vraiment prendre pas mal de place. Et je crois qu'elle prend aussi pas mal de place dans le travail des services de renseignement de la confédération des cantons, notamment du canton de Zurich. Et je crois que ça, c'est quelque

chose qui est aussi quelque part inquiétant qui, pour l'instant est sous contrôle mais pourrait aussi déraiser, mais ça fait partie de cette déstabilisation générale où chacun y va de son avis et de ses propositions. On a vu que l'après COVID a laissé des traces aussi du côté des complotistes et on retrouve souvent les mêmes meneurs dans ces mouvements complotistes qu'on les retrouve dans ces meneurs d'opérations, justement de déstabilisation de leur public. Et là, je ne parle pas du tout des personnes engagées pour le climat, même si je partage leur opinion sur le constat, je suis tout à fait engagé dans cette direction aussi. Mais moi, je ne supporte pas qu'on vient de se coller les mains sur la route, mais ça, c'est une autre question. J'entends, c'est ce que je disais à quelqu'un que je connais bien, plutôt que de te coller les mains sur la route, tu ferais mieux d'aller porter les panneaux solaires pour les installer sur les toits. Alors qu'aujourd'hui on trouve assez peu de main d'œuvre pour le faire. Alors évidemment, ça choque un peu ce genre de propos, mais je suis toujours plutôt porté sur les côtés positifs et sur l'action pour faire quelque chose plutôt que pour emmerder les gens.

- Merci. La Suisse est officiellement reconnue comme un pays neutre. Et donc qu'est-ce que ça signifie en matière de sécurité nationale d'être neutre?
- C'est une excellente question parce qu'il y a le droit de la neutralité, puis la politique de neutralité et évidemment, selon de quel côté l'échiquier politique où vous trouvez, on assiste vraiment à quelque chose d'assez particulier puisqu'on a une vision convergente de la neutralité entre les verts et puis l'UDC qui veulent s'en tenir une neutralité intégrale, c'est à dire que j'ai reçu des emails parce que moi, je me suis engagé, je continue de m'engager en faveur de l'exportation d'armes vers l'Ukraine et ceux qui s'en défendent sous l'égide de la neutralité. J'entends, j'ai reçu des messages en disant mais ce n'est pas notre affaire, ce n'est pas notre guerre. Ça nous concerne pas. Je ne peux pas partager cet avis. Donc j'attends la neutralité, d'accord? La convention de La Haye de 1907. Ça fait plus de 125 ans. Entre-temps, il y a eu quand même la création des Nations unies et l'adhésion de la Suisse à l'ONU et de son adhésion au conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Donc on ne peut plus faire comme si on était un pays sous le couvert de la convention 1907 et la convention 1907 et la interdit juste de s'engager militairement aux côtés d'un ou l'autre des belligérants. C'est tout ce qu'elle impose sur le plan militaire. Et en 1815 si on remonte encore un peu plus loin. Elle vient des grandes puissances européennes. On dit à la Suisse vous devez vous donner les moyens de conserver, défendre votre neutralité. Donc, cette neutralité armée qui aujourd'hui est aussi parfois remise en cause par ceux-là mêmes qui disent on doit être neutres, notamment les verts et la gauche, la gauche dure estime qu'on n'a vraiment pas besoin d'armée pour rester neutre et que tout va bien se passer. Je ne suis pas du tout du genre à dire que c'est notre armée qui nous a permis d'échapper aux horreurs de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Mais ceux-là mêmes qui aujourd'hui disent on ne peut pas exporter des matériels de guerre, vis à vis de l'Ukraine parce qu'on est neutre, ils oublient quand même. Et je les invite aussi à les relire. Les quelques pages du rapport Bergier montrent quand même à quel point la Suisse a soutenu le régime du Reich en fournissant des munitions et de l'armement durant la deuxième guerre mondiale. Et c'est aussi grâce à cela, bien sûr, qu'il y avait une forte résistance et les allemands ont fait une pesée d'intérêt en disant oui, si on veut parler de la Suisse, ça va lui coûter cher. On a perdu du temps. Donc qu'on a contourné la Suisse après ils se sont dit de façon, elle est complètement entourée et peut rien faire sans nous sans nous. Et on préfère la laisser là où elle est, laisser son économie travailler. Mais pour autant qu'il nous fournisse les moyens dont on a besoin pour notre forte guerre. Et c'est ce qui était fait. J'entends donc je ne suis pas du tout à remettre en cause les engagements de nos grands-pères à la frontière. C'est pas du tout ça, mais c'était pas le seul élément qui a fait que la Suisse a pu échapper à la deuxième guerre mondiale, contrairement à ceux qui défendent la neutralité intégrale aujourd'hui. Mais donc la neutralité, pour moi, c'est un moyen de défendre les intérêts du pays, mais ce n'est pas une fin en soi. Et c'est un moyen de politique extérieure pour défendre les intérêts d'un autre pays et de sa population.

- Très bien, merci. L'article 54 de la constitution fédérale fait mention de la promotion de la paix. Comment est ce que cela se concrétise dans la politique de sécurité en suisse,
- De plusieurs façons. D'abord par une politique étrangère active avec la participation à de nombreux forums internationaux, voire l'hébergement de notre pays, d'un certain nombre de ces forums à Genève en particulier, de même que on participe aussi activement à certaines opérations de maintien de la paix ou de surveillance des frontières, ça fait longtemps qu'on est engagé entre les deux coréées avec les observateurs militaires, on participe à la KFOR au Kosovo et notre participation est très appréciée, voire reconnue à tel point que même les européens nous disent, les gens de l'OTAN nous disent mais si vous partez, c'est fini, nous on pourra pas rester à ce point là. Et les populations concernées le disent aussi, que ce soit les Kosovares ou les Serbes, là aussi, vous partez, c'est sûr que ça va dégénérer parce qu'on a confiance en vous. Donc c'est aussi par cette réputation suisse de sérieux de qualité, puis surtout confiance qu'on inspire dans les discussions qu'on a avec ces différentes populations ou les autorités. Et je crois qu'il y a les bons offices de la suisse, bien sûr. C'est une spécialité de la suisse, mais si on le rapporte à l'Ukraine, oui, on peut bien apporter nos bons offices. Mais pour autant que quelqu'un ait envie de discuter aujourd'hui, ni l'un ni l'autre n'a envie de discuter. On sera disponible quand ils le seront. Et on peut multiplier les contacts pour essayer de faire en sorte que les gens réfléchissent à l'après conflit, parce qu'à un moment donné, il va bien s'arrêter. On est bien impliqués dans la promotion de la paix, qu'elle soit civile par, par exemple, les tout l'aspect humanitaire, c'est le déminage, le savoir faire humanitaire qu'on apporte dans la reconstruction des villes ou des ponts. Tous ces éléments là qui contribuent quelque part à rétablir ou à maintenir la paix dans le monde, dans les différents pays qui ont été traversés par des conflits, soit internes, soit internationaux. Donc je crois qu'on a, on a engagé vraiment à plusieurs titres et la promotion de la paix ne doit pas s'entendre uniquement sous l'aspect militaire, mais sous l'ensemble d'un corpus d'action transversale mené par différents départements du pays et la participation aussi à des forums internationaux comme l'ONU, par exemple, qui nous permet d'apporter notre modeste contribution à ces efforts qui sont faits pour maintenir la paix dans le monde.
- Vous avez fait mention de l'OTAN en parlant de la cure plus globalement, qu'est-ce que l'OTAN représente pour la sécurité de la suisse? Est-ce que c'est une projection de la sécurité de la suisse vers l'extérieur? Est-ce que c'est une menace? Est-ce que c'est un allié? Est-ce que c'est notre véritable outil de sécurité?
- Donc je faisais référence tout à l'heure à la deuxième guerre mondiale. Et on sait aussi que la suisse, au début de la guerre, voire juste avant la déclaration de la guerre, avait passé des accords avec la France pour que celle-ci puisse venir aider la suisse en cas d'attaque. On a vu, comme cela s'est passé a posteriori, qu'on aurait plutôt dû se dire que la suisse aurait dû apporter son aide à la France, mais c'était une autre paire de manches. Mais je veux dire par là que si on devait être attaqué militairement aujourd'hui, on n'a pas le choix. Tout seul, on ne peut pas se défendre, mais militairement, et le seul allié militaire potentiel, c'est l'OTAN, l'union européenne aujourd'hui, ils sont bien en train de réfléchir, a commencé de mettre en œuvre un peu quelque chose d'une défense commune, mais il a fallu la déclaration de guerre en Ukraine. Maintenant, on a assez réfléchi. Il faut vraiment qu'on mette en œuvre ce qu'il faut pour essayer d'avoir nos propres moyens, mais même l'Union européenne sans l'OTAN serait bien seule. Et à mon avis, bien faible pour résister à la Russie ou à la Chine, à la Corée du nord, l'Inde. C'est peut être pas des guerriers. Ce sont pas les premiers qu'on verra, mais je pense que si on devait s'inscrire dans un texte, dans un concept de défense armé, le seul partenaire crédible, c'est l'OTAN qu'on le veuille ou non. Et dans ce contexte, on sait par des sondages qu'il y a d'ailleurs une assez forte majorité des suisses qui aujourd'hui se disent qu'il ne faut pas adhérer à l'OTAN. Il faut garder notre neutralité le plus longtemps possible. Mais on sait aussi qu'il faut se rapprocher de l'OTAN, parce que si on avait besoin d'être soutenu dans le cadre d'une défense militaire, il n'y a que l'OTAN qui peut nous l'apporter.

- Merci. Maintenant, on va passer à la partie qui traite plus de l'armée suisse, l'institution. Et la première question est de savoir comment l'armée suisse est perçue à l'étranger. Est-ce qu'elle représente une force de dissuasion? Comme on aime à le dire à propos de la deuxième guerre mondiale, est-ce que c'est une force de défense crédible? Ou est-ce que c'est un instrument symbolique et folklorique pour l'unité de la suisse? Et pour répondre aux obligations de neutralité armée.
- Cela dépend avec qui vous discutez. Mais je fais partie de la délégation de la commission de politique sécurité qui s'est rendue à Bruxelles en janvier dernier, fin janvier, où nous avons rencontré des responsables de l'OTAN et des responsables de l'Union européenne. Parmi les questions, c'était aussi celle-là, c'est-à-dire comment vous percevez la Suisse, le rôle de la Suisse, est-ce que vous pensez que c'est un partenaire crédible, fiable, un peu moins? Enfin, la réponse qu'on a pu retenir, c'est effectivement, peut être un peu moins fiable depuis qu'il refuse de participer à l'effort de solidarité des autres pays européens en lien avec cette exportation d'armes. Mais crédible oui. On a posé la question dans le cadre de cette volonté du conseil fédéral, aussi exprimée dans son complément au rapport sur la politique de sécurité de dire qu'il faut envisager des exercices avec l'OTAN, par exemple avec les pays de l'OTAN. Et on s'est posé la question, on aura posé la question dit, mais écoutez, vous savez, une armée de milice avec des soldats qui font trois semaines de coups de répétition par année est ce que vous pensez qu'ils pourraient être certifiés. C'est très américain, il faut des certifications à tous les niveaux. Et puis pour pouvoir participer à un exercice militaire, même sortir une cartouche il faut être certifié. Et ils nous ont clairement dit que dans les visites de troupes qui sont faites par des pays de l'OTAN ou l'OSCE, parce qu'il y a encore l'OSCE qu'il faut peut être pas oublier, même si elle n'a pas beaucoup de moyens, je dirais, pour vraiment être très concrètes dans ses actions, ils viennent régulièrement visiter les troupes suisses au travers la visite de troupes ou d'exercices qui sont organisés à leur intention et les gens de l'OTAN disent qu'avec ce qu'on a vu déjà vu à plusieurs reprises pour nous, on n'a aucun problème pour certifier vos soldats, même miliciens, pour participer à des exercices avec les pays de l'OTAN. Donc, pour nous, on est revenu avec la certitude que notre armée est plutôt bien perçue dans sa formation, dans la qualité de ses cadres, parce que ça sera aussi quelque chose qui se fait déjà depuis longtemps avec le partenariat pour la paix qui reçoit régulièrement des officiers étrangers pour des exercices et des échanges, notamment à Lucerne, au centre de formation des officiers et clairement ils ont dit vous êtes tout à fait crédible. Il faut qu'on accentue encore un peu sur la notion d'interopérabilité. Donc c'est de nouveau les modernisations de processus. Sinon, pour le reste, on est considéré, l'armée suisse est considérée comme un partenaire tout à fait crédible.
- Et qu'est que cette armée suisse défend en suisse est ce qu'elle défend un territoire est ce qu'elle défend les suisses, donc les personnes. Est-ce qu'elle défend la démocratie directe ou les institutions? Est-ce qu'elle défend, le Parlement et l'assemblée? Qu'est ce qu'elle défend? Pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, on a vu qu'avec la planification du réduit national, le territoire n'était peut-être pas la chose la plus significative ou la première priorité à défendre. Pendant la guerre froide, on a aussi vu qu'il avait été considéré que le gouvernement parte à l'étranger et encourage la résistance, mais depuis l'étranger, jusqu'à ce que l'armée suisse puisse reprendre le territoire. Et donc, je me demande qu'est-ce que l'armée a comme objet de défense?
- Je crois que c'est les valeurs de la civilisation et de la société suisse, c'est sa constitution. Ce sont des droits fondamentaux qui sont contenus dans la constitution. Donc, en soi, c'est la population et sa façon de vivre dans ce pays. Alors c'est vrai que ça peut passer par des étapes successives. Vous parlez du réduit institutionnel, l'idée, c'était vraiment de maintenir un territoire suisse non occupé pour sur cette base là et en lien avec la résistance civile, bien, plutôt la résistance armée et comme les français l'ont vécu ou l'ont organisé pour après regagner du territoire et faire en sorte que l'intégralité du territoire national reste national. Et je crois que la volonté aujourd'hui de l'armée, c'est déjà de garantir l'espace aérien parce que

la police du ciel, on ne sait pas ce qui peut venir de ce côté là et faire face justement à des attaques qui pourraient absolument être liées à des attaques terroristes et pas du tout militaires. Mais on sait qu'avec des drones ou avec des avions, on a vu ce que ça a donné à New York des avions qui n'hésitent pas à heurter des tours. Donc c'est aussi un stade dans la mission de la suisse. Mais pour moi, l'armée a pour mission de défendre le territoire, mais ce n'est pas une fin en soi. C'est aussi pour défendre les valeurs que nous défendons. La démocratie directe, liberté des droits fondamentaux, tout ce que je dirai, le monde libre représente. Et c'est aussi dans ce contexte là que je prétends que le monde libre aujourd'hui, sa frontière, c'est la frontière entre l'Ukraine et la Russie. Et c'est aussi dans ce cadre là que je m'engage pour dire, mais nous devons aussi apporter notre contribution à la défense militaire en acceptant d'exporter ce matériel militaire respectivement. Maintenant, la question des chars léopards qui n'iront certainement jamais en Ukraine, mais qui iront dans l'armée allemande pour rééquiper l'armée allemande qui s'est un peu démunie pour envoyer des armements en Ukraine. Je trouve que c'est notre rôle aussi, et pas seulement mais aussi de participer à cet effort. Le reste, on le fait déjà naturellement, comme je le disais, avec les bons offices, avec l'humanitaire, avec tout ce qu'on peut apporter dans notre savoir-faire et nos compétences sur place et dans les relations avec les belligérants. Donc on doit reconnaître qu'aujourd'hui, pour moi, on doit participer à cette défense du monde libre.

- Pour défendre le monde libre dont vous parlez. On sait que l'armée suisse, elle est composée de ses citoyens. Comment est-ce qu'on sait où on pourrait savoir que les citoyens et les citoyennes seraient prêts à se battre en cas de guerre? Est-ce que on sait s'il les les membres de l'armée suisse seraient prêts à tuer pour l'armée, pour la patrie?
- Pour l'armée? Sûrement pas. Pour la patrie et pour la défense de leurs populations, de leurs familles, de leurs proches, je pense qu'ils seraient prêts à le faire. Comme les Ukrainiens l'ont fait, alors qu'ils étaient bien moins préparés que nous. L'armée ukrainienne était bien moins préparée que nous et les réservistes entre guillemets et volontaires qui ont été équipés un peu à la hâte et sans trop d'instruction, ont démontré que quand il y a une volonté de se défendre, de protéger son pays, on fait des miracles parce que quelque part l'armée ukrainienne qui, selon Poutine, devait être éradiquée en moins de deux pour le moment, elle résiste encore. Alors elle a surtout résisté au début sur une farouche volonté de défense. Et je crois que quand on est attaqué, je suis convaincu que la population suisse réagirait de la même façon dans cette volonté claire de défendre, je disais le territoire mais la population et tout ce qui va avec moi, je suis convaincu.
- Merci. Et finalement sur l'armée suisse, quelle est son importance économique pour la suisse
- De moins en moins importante puisque l'armée s'est considérablement réduite. Mais alors c'est vrai que pour l'économie, il y a plusieurs aspects. Il y a l'aspect dans le domaine de l'immobilier, puisque l'armée est quand même un grand propriétaire immobilier en suisse. Donc ça fait vivre des entreprises pour la construction et l'entretien de ces bâtiments. Ça fait vivre aussi l'économie locale, les petits commerçants, les petits artisans, quand une troupe vient en cours de répétition quelque part. Et puis globalement, ça fait aussi vivre une partie de l'industrie du métal en suisse, par son industrie d'armement qui fabrique notamment des véhicules blindés ou de la munition dont je n'ai plus exactement les chiffres en tête. Mais ce n'est pas, je ne veux pas dire, c'est marginal par rapport au PIB suisse, c'est pas ça qui fait vivre le pays, mais on sous-estime parfois les effets collatéraux positifs de l'industrie d'armement, parce moi, je connais beaucoup d'entreprises jurassiennes qui ont fait des bonds technologiques importants en participant, par exemple, à des commandes compensatoires, ces fameux offset qu'un pays doit s'engager à acheter chez nous en échange d'avions qu'on va acheter ou du système sol-air qu'on va acheter ou d'autres investissements qu'on a. Et beaucoup de ces entreprises ont dit c'est tellement pointu. Les exigences de ces pays sont tellement importantes qu'on a fait vraiment des gains de productivité, des gains d'efficacité de notre entreprise qui nous a permis d'être plus compétents, plus compétitifs pour tout le

secteur qui n'était pas militaire parce qu'il y a très peu d'entreprises en suisse qui ne font que de l'armement. Vous avez la RUAG et ses camions, ses véhicules, mais sinon, c'est plutôt une partie vague. On voit qu'il y a des petits bouts par ci par là, mais ces gens là, ils vous disent, mais c'est un peu comme si vous pouviez travailler pour une entreprise dans le domaine industriel qui peut travailler pour l'aviation ou l'espace encore pire l'espace. Mais l'aviation, c'est un gain de productivité énorme pour ces entreprises. Donc ça les rend plus concurrentiels, ça leur permet de décrocher d'autres marchés à l'international et donc de créer des emplois indirects dans notre pays. Donc c'est toujours bon à apprendre.

- Ok, merci. Et un peu plus tôt vous avez parlé de déstabilisation et on parle parfois de menaces hybrides. Comment est-ce que la politique suisse, la politique de sécurité suisse s'adapte à ces menaces hybrides? Et qu'est-ce qui est fait pour lutter contre la stratégie de déstabilisation qui essaie de rompre la confiance entre la population et son gouvernement, d'attaquer ou de mettre des doutes sur les valeurs unissent le pays. Comment est-ce que là est considéré dans la politique de sécurité?
- Typiquement, c'est toute la cybersécurité pour laquelle on a pris pas mal de retards dans notre pays parce que quand bien même oui, il ne faut pas non plus dramatiser parce que les entreprises et les grandes qui étaient les cibles principales ont assez vite senti la menace, notamment dans le domaine bancaire. On ne sait pas combien les banques ont été attaquées. On ne sait que le 10ème de ce que les banques ont payé à leurs clients en leur disant vous dites rien, on vous indemnise pour une question de confiance dans leur système. Et je crois que là, il y a enfin vraiment une sérieuse prise de conscience des autorités par rapport à cette menace. Et aussi sur le plan civil, il y a beaucoup de choses qui sont faites avec, comme il s'appelle le centre national suisse de lutte contre la cybercriminalité qui maintenant devient un office fédéral. Donc c'est déjà ça, c'est un symbole, mais c'est important de comprendre que ce qui est un peu divisé dans deux ou trois départements se retrouve uni sous un même office et dans un même département. Et ça, c'était vraiment une nécessité parce que chacun y allait un petit peu de son côté. Qui est en lien avec les entreprises, en lien avec les administrations ou d'autres avec simplement l'administration fédérale? Donc ici, on a pris de conscience très clair avec un effort principal mené par l'armée aussi dans la création de son bataillon cyber et des moyens qui sont mis à disposition. J'ai eu l'occasion de visiter et de m'entretenir directement avec le responsable de la mise en place de tout ce système, c'est assez gigantesque. Les moyens qui seront mis à disposition, le problème qu'on a, c'est de trouver le personnel et comme un peu dans tout le domaine informatique d'une manière générale, mais là, en l'occurrence, ce que je dis aux jeunes qui ne savent pas trop ce qu'ils veulent faire: “ faites de l'informatique, parce que de toute façon, avec ce qui se passe, notamment dans la cyberdéfense, vous allez trouver du job sans aucun problème.” Et là, il y a vraiment cette prise de conscience qui est aussi bien sur le plan militaire que sur le plan civil. Et je crois que les deux vont de pair parce qu'une cyber menace peut venir de différents domaines de différentes directions avec des objectifs différents. Il y en a de purs escrocs qui veulent faire chanter le client auquel ils ont piqué les données, comme il y a justement cette volonté de déstabiliser et de réduire la capacité de fonctionnement du système avec les infrastructures critiques et que ce soit les centrales nucléaires, mais aussi des barrages dans le domaine de l'énergie, le transport, mais aussi les hôpitaux ne serait ce qu'aussi si vous intervenez dans le système, on le voit bien dans les films, mais ça se produit aussi de la réalité. La gestion du trafic dans les villes si vous arrivez à pénétrer sur le système de gestion des feux dans une ville, vous arrivez rapidement à paralyser une ville ou alors la distribution d'eau, par exemple, on n'y pense pas toujours, mais c'est quelque chose d'assez fondamental. Et là, il y a vraiment une prise de conscience qui se fait même si encore du travail et moi j'avais déposé une intervention parlementaire qui demandait notamment que la confédération, avec les hautes écoles, avec certaines entreprises de ce pays qui sont capables de le faire, c'est de créer une infrastructure souveraine qui permette de conserver en suisse, par les entreprises suisses, des données essentielles de ce pays. Alors on m'a dit que

ce n'était pas possible que de toute façon, on avait besoin de recourir à des entreprises étrangères, etc, etc. Alors oui, bien sûr, je demande pas qu'on construise nous-mêmes des tablettes ou des pc, mais enfin que même ces pc là soient soumis à un contrôle pour éviter que ceux qui sont utilisés dans la gestion de ces données essentielles pour le pays soit pas composés d'un mouchard qui permette d'intervenir depuis l'étranger dans ces domaines. Et on va faire un peu quelque chose, mais je pense que là, on est un peu trop frileux, on va pas assez loin, surtout que j'avais le soutien clair des deux EPF, qui disaient clairement aussi infomaniak disait, mais il n'y a pas de problème, vous avez raison, on peut faire ça dans ce pays pour des prix tout à fait concurrentiels. Et des fois, il faut, je pense qu'à d'ici une année ou deux, on va le faire, mais il faut de temps en temps un peu tirer la sonnette d'alarme. Il formule des propositions, même si après on n'arrive pas toujours. C'est un peu ça le problème de la Suisse peut-être, réagir un peu trop passivement et de réagir justement plutôt que d'agir d'anticiper.

- On a fini avec les deux premières parties. On va passer plus sur les politiques de défense alternatives. Donc la défense civile ou la résistance civile, notamment non violente. Pendant la guerre froide en Suisse, la Suisse avait adopté une politique de défense totale défense militaire, ensuite résistant civile avec une composante armée. Les chercheurs dans le domaine soutiennent que la violence dans les mouvements de résistance civile qui sont principalement non violents est contre productive car elle légitime la répression et la violence de l'adversaire, ce qui affecte le soutien des parties tierces. Et donc empêche aussi l'aliénation des partisans de l'adversaire. En plus. Erika Chenoweth, dans son livre qu'elle a publié en 2011, a montré que les mouvements non violents sont en moyenne plus efficaces que les mouvements violents. Est-ce qu' en suisse, dans une politique de défense totale, on serait capable de retirer la composante guérilla, résistance armée violente, en cas de défaite de l'armée? Ou je vais reformuler la question, on a d'abord une armée qui va protéger et en cas de défaite ou si l'armée se trouve submergée jusqu'à maintenant, on a demandé à la population de faire de la résistance civile et armée. Est-ce qu'on serait prêt à enlever cette composante de résistance armée grâce ou à cause des études qui montrent que cette composante armée peut être contre productive d'un point de vue stratégique et d'efficacité?
- Je ne connais pas ces études, donc c'est difficile d'exprimer une opinion à ce sujet. Vous citez dans votre introduction, les pays du nord plutôt qui sont très pacifique mais en parallèle, j'observe que la Suède et la Finlande ont renoncé à la neutralité et ont demandé leur adhésion à l'OTAN. Donc, quelque part, il y a un doute. Donc pourquoi pas? Mais mais renoncer complètement? Pourquoi est-ce qu'on a des polices cantonales armées? Pourquoi est-ce qu'on a armé les bobbies en Grande-Bretagne alors que jusqu'il n'y a pas très longtemps, ils n'étaient pas armés, sinon d'un bâton. Voilà, ça peut aussi faire partie d'une évolution de la société où la société est devenue plus violente. Est-ce que ça suffit de lui opposer une résistance non violente pour maintenir l'ordre et des droits dans ce pays? Moi, je ne connais pas les études auxquelles vous faites allusion. Moi, j'ai quelques doutes là-dessus, mais pourquoi pas? Mais ce n'est pas la seule composante. Il faudrait la combiner avec d'autres.
- Vous venez de parler des pays nordiques comme la Suède ou la Finlande, en l'occurrence la Suède et la Lituanie, notamment, ont dans leur stratégie de défense, leur politique de sécurité, cette composante de résistance dans laquelle ils incluent aussi la résistance violente. Et donc on voit que, comme vous dites c'est un schéma qui se répète, est ce que vous pensez que les institutions traditionnelles comme l'armée ou le politique sont capables d'envisager des modes de défense alternatifs.
- Écoute, il faudrait qu'il y ait un exemple ou ça a fonctionné pour que je puisse vous dire si, en fonction de la mentalité suisse, ce soit praticable chez nous, parce que je peux. Juste pour vous dire en suisse, on connaît le référendum et l'initiative. Donc la démocratie directe, mais c'est impraticable dans la plupart des autres pays au monde, parce qu'il n'y a pas cette culture, etc. Là dans ce que ce que vous dites là dans cette résistance non violente, oui, je ne

sais pas, peut être que ça peut être une des composantes de la défense alternative. Mais comment ça se décline? Ça, c'est ma question.

- Alors dans la résistance non violente et ça m'amène aussi à des questions qui sont plus loin, il y a différentes, il y a l'action directe. Donc, que ce soit la désobéissance civile, alors je vais juste présenter l'aspect un peu plus théorique qui soutient cette approche. Donc, pour Gene Sharp, le pouvoir est constitué de plusieurs ressources, que ce soit des ressources humaines, les ressources naturelles, l'obéissance, les moyens et les forces de sanctions, par exemple. Et toutes ces sources de pouvoir sont données par la population à un gouvernement ou un pouvoir ou un leader et par une très large collaboration de la population. Ce pouvoir peut être repris, notamment par la grève par un peu de sabotage. Alors ça place la limite, la zone grise entre la violence et la non-violence. Et dans la perspective plus de sécurité traditionnelle, on va dire avec cette non coopération ou cette action directe, on peut augmenter les coûts pour un adversaire en cas d'invasion, notamment principalement et afin de faire balancer l'équilibre pour que les coûts soient plus importants et que ça soit une force de dissuasion ou que sur la durée, l'occupation ne soit plus avantageuse. Et donc l'adversaire se retirerait. Et ça, c'est la partie théorique et l'idée sur laquelle ça se construit,
- Et je suis largué, peu pratique, vous donnez un exemple ou ça a fonctionné.
- Alors ça, il y a deux éléments. Alors la partie institutionnalisée, donc comme stratégie de défense, non? Parce que ça n'a jamais été vraiment utilisé ou choisi comme seule méthode. En revanche l'approche plus spontanée, donc les mouvements non violents qui ont réussi, il y a les plus connus qui sont la marche du sel de Gandhi ou le mouvement des droits civiques aux états-unis. Et dans les plus récents, il y a par exemple avec Milosevic en Serbie et le mouvement Otpor qui a fait une très grande campagne de non coopération et qui ont réussi à faire partir le dictateur. Il y a aussi avec le général Pinochet au Chili, il y a la république tchèque en 1961 et la révolution en Iran aussi, alors ça ne veut pas dire que le résultat est toujours idéal. On va dire, mais le départ du shah d'Iran a été causé par une résistance principalement et très largement non violente. Alors ça a mis en place le régime islamique qui donne le résultat aujourd'hui. Donc ce n'est pas une garantie de déroulement positif, mais ça a fonctionné. Et il y a quand même pas mal d'exemples dans l'histoire.
- Oui, bon moi, je ne suis pas sûr que les Suisses soient prêts, pourquoi pas? J'entends, mais enfin, on constate déjà ce genre de mouvement avec les grévistes du climat. C'est une première mise en œuvre de cette résistance non violente, mais à mesure on s'en prend à personne ou on s'attaque aux infrastructures ou aux propriétés ou je ne sais pas quoi, on peut effectivement assimiler ça de la résistance pacifique non violente est ce que dans un conflit, je dirais généralisé global est ce que la suisse pourrait mettre ça en œuvre. Il y aurait forcément une composante de cette forme de résistance. Et si on revient au dernier grand conflit mondial, la deuxième guerre mondiale, on sait aussi qu'en France ou dans les pays occupés, rien que le fait que certains employés des transports publics ou lignes d'énergie justement, oublièrent, entre guillemets, de presser sur le bon bouton pour que la machine se mette en marche ou bien que justement le train puisse partir une forme de résistance qui était mise en place. Mais dans ce cadre là, il y avait toujours à côté la résistance armée. C'était pour servir plutôt les intérêts de la résistance armée qui permettait d'anéantir l'adversaire ou l'ennemi, voire de le faire reculer dans ses certitudes et dans sa conquête du territoire. Donc oui, et comme vous l'avez dit, j'entends des exemples comme vous citez, ça a pu permettre le problème, c'est que ça a quasiment toujours pu permettre à d'autres dictateurs de se mettre en place des fois même au détriment de la démocratie. Et voilà, moi ça, c'est un peu un risque que je vois parce que je ne suis pas sûr que l'Iran peut un pays qui, ou la population est ou les droits de la population sont mieux respectés aujourd'hui qu'avec le shah d'Iran, je suis même convaincu du contraire. Mais voilà, c'est leur histoire. C'est non choisi. Moi, je ne peux pas remettre en cause ce qui a été fait, même si je ne partage absolument pas le régime des mollahs dont on sait à quel point ils ne respectent pas les droits de l'homme, notamment les droits des femmes et des personnes différentes dans ces régimes. Et quelque part, c'est

- quand on voit le résultat, je m'interroge. Mais si on revient sur un concept de défense totale, parce que c'est un peu là dedans qu'on pourrait l'inscrire, je pense qu'une partie de fait serait la résistance passive. Donc sans coup d'éclat en interventions. Mais à mon avis, ce serait pas suffisant à elle seule, connaissant un peu la population suisse pour arriver à l'emporter et rétablir la confiance et l'ordre antérieur, mais j'ai pas mené beaucoup de réflexion là-dessus.
- Et ça m'amène à une réflexion aussi sur cette politique de défense totale qu'on a eue, notamment pendant la guerre froide. La partie, la composante de résistance civile n'a jamais été entraînée. Alors elle a été transmise au peuple par le petit livre rouge de défense civile. Mais elle n'a jamais été entraînée comme a pu être l'armée qui a des millénaires d'histoires et de formation et d'entraînement, pas la suisse, mais le militaire en général. Pourquoi est-ce que ce n'est pas entraîné cette résistance civile?
 - C'est une bonne question parce que il n'y a personne qui jusqu'à présent a pris la peine de s'en occuper, pour être clair, mais si personne ne s'en est occupé, c'est aussi parce que personne au niveau des chambre fédérales n'est venu en avant avec cette question, c'est comme vous le disiez en introduction, c'est ou bien le militaire ou bien l'absence de militaire, mais il y a jamais eu de propositions alternatives en soi. Et voilà, j'entends, et puis après ma foi, comment l'entraîner bon, il faut pour réfléchir, sûrement possible de le faire puisqu'on arrive à entraîner des exercices de crise, que ce soient des pandémies ou des blackout ou même des exercices militaires. Donc j'imagine que ça doit être aussi possible d'entraîner des exercices de résistance civils et pacifique, mais c'est vrai qu'il y, tout comme je n'ai jamais entendu parler dans ce pays. Pourtant, ça fait quand même quelques dizaines d'années que je fais de la politique. Quelqu'un qui est venu avec ça, même pas le GSSA, le seul objectif, c'est de faire disparaître l'armée, mais n'a jamais rien proposé d'alternative. Si ce n'est la politique humanitaire, etc. Ce qu'on fait déjà de toute façon.
 - Oui, c'est exactement dans cette démarche que s'inscrivent les académiciens qui ont travaillé dessus. Et c'est pour ça qu'ils ont changé de termes pour passer de désarmement à trans armement afin de dire qu'on n'abandonne pas la défense en se désarmant et en se mettant vulnérable, mais qu'on trouve une solution alternative.
 - Mais bon, soyons clairs, j'entends pour l'instant, c'est pas le cas et c'est pas demain la veille, il faut s'estimer très heureux que ça soit comme ça. Mais le jour où vous vous retrouvez en face d'un fusil d'assaut ou d'un char vous pouvez toujours essayé de faire la résistance passive, on a vu Tienamen ce que ça a donné, hein? C'est comme ça que j'attends. On peut bien dire non, non, non, non. La révolution des œilletons au Portugal, j'attends il, il y a eu des morts aussi parce que à un moment donné, les armes parlent
 - Pour la défense civile. C'est l'institutionnalisation entre la résistance non violente comme politique de défense. Et ça inclut une préparation et un entraînement. Mais pour institutionnaliser cette politique, il faudrait une adaptation du droit, notamment par exemple, en légalisant la désobéissance civile. Dans certaines circonstances, ça donnerait des outils politiques très différents. Et dans quelle mesure l'État est-il prêt à se rendre vulnérable à ce genre d'outils et en donnant ce pouvoir aux citoyens? Est-ce qu'il a une peur ou une frilosité de la part de l'État par rapport à ça?
 - Mais en suisse, l'état, c'est le citoyen. Donc il n'y a jamais eu d'initiatives populaires qui est venue avec une telle proposition. Donc je ne pense pas qu'on puisse parler de frilosité de l'état vis-à-vis du citoyen parce que en suisse, l'état, c'est le citoyen de par l'exercice des droits populaires utilisés comme nulle part ailleurs. Et je crois qu'en termes de justification de l'appréciation de l'état, l'état fait ce que le citoyen lui dit en suisse, c'est une grande force. C'est cette proximité. C'est ses parlementaires de milice, même si on peut parfois remettre en cause cette notion de milice. Mais malgré tout, ça reste des gens qui sont proches de leurs concitoyens qui discutent avec eux, qui se font les porte-parole des préoccupations de la population. Et puis la population n'oublie pas chaque quatre ans de réélire ou non les élus respectivement par des initiatives populaires ou des référendums de dire à ces élus, non, c'est pas ça qu'on veut. Ou bien tu ne veux pas t'occuper de ça et bien par une initiative

populaire, on peut t'obliger à le faire. Et typiquement ce domaine là, il n'y a jamais personne qui a utilisé une initiative populaire. Donc je ne crois pas qu'il faut reprocher à l'État de rien faire parce que si les citoyens voulaient le faire, ils auraient peut-être déjà pu mettre cette question sur la table au moyen d'une initiative populaire. Donc, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait une attente en suisse par rapport à ça, parce que sinon, je pense qu'il y aurait déjà eu certainement une initiative populaire.

- Bien, pour augmenter en efficacité une résistance civile non violente, une défense civile, l'idéal, c'est de décentraliser les infrastructures et les modes de gestion. Donc la suisse, un modèle de fédéralisme est très adapté à ce genre de décentralisation. Est-ce que la suisse fait assez au niveau de l'autonomie, que ce soit en matière de production de nourriture d'énergie afin d'avoir une autonomie et en plus des ressources décentralisée pour augmenter sa résilience en cas de conflit,
- On la suit, c'est un petit pays, si vous voulez décentraliser la production d'énergie, par exemple, je souhaite bon courage, hein? Parce que moi je vis dans un canton où on nous empêchait de créer ou de remettre en service des centrales hydrauliques au fil de l'eau, parce que ça mettrait en péril des poissons qui sont comme ça grand. On veut pas, on a pourtant déjà pas mal contribué à l'implantation d'éoliennes, mais on n'en veut plus parce que ça heurte le paysage. Et puis de temps en temps, il y a quelques oiseaux qui se prennent dans les pales de temps en temps parce que des études ont clairement montré que c'était de loin pas de quoi s'alarmer. Et puis on a un projet de géothermie profonde ici qui a un projet pilote mené par une société suisse et largement soutenu par la confédération, mais où les populations locales ne veulent pas en entendre parler parce qu'elles ont peur des tremblements de terre. Et si vous les décentralisez, c'est bien. Mais de nouveau, dans un système très démocratique comme la suisse, c'est très compliqué et vous arrivez pas à faire en sorte que pourtant c'est une des volontés de la stratégie énergétique 2050, par exemple, c'est de faire en sorte que chaque canton puisse être maximum indépendant dans sa production d'énergie. Évidemment que moi, je suis convaincu que ça passe d'abord par des économies. Ça, on peut encore tous faire des efforts dans ce domaine, mais après dans la production, il faut voir quelque chose de beaucoup plus global. Et sans les barrages alpins, on n'arrive pas sans les trois centrales nucléaires qui nous restent, ça n'arrive pas. Et puis même sans un échange international en matière d'électricité, on n'arrive pas. Donc on peut toujours réfléchir de la même façon pour la nourriture. On sait aussi qu'en suisse et la politique fédérale maintenant est en train de remettre en cause davantage cette problématique. D'un côté, un article constitutionnel qui est accepté par le peuple pour dire qu'il faut garantir au maximum la souveraineté alimentaire du pays. Et puis d'un autre côté, pour sauvegarder la biodiversité dans ce pays, on veut réduire encore de 15% les surfaces d'assolement. Donc les surfaces à lesquelles on peut produire du blé, des éléments comme ça. Donc on est de loin, pas près d'atteindre une forme d'autonomie parce que c'est un peu ça, hein? J'entends ce qu'on veut délocaliser. Si on veut imaginer vivre seul au milieu de nulle part, il faut arriver à atteindre l'autarcie, c'est juste plus possible aujourd'hui avec une suisse qui compte bientôt 9 000 000 d'habitants. Voilà quoi?
- Merci sur du long terme et par sa position, notamment en plein centre de l'europe et de l'OTAN, la suisse pourrait être un leader dans la réduction de l'armement et la mise en place de politiques de défense alternatives, ce qui permettrait de renforcer la position de la suisse en tant que promoteur de la paix dans un sens de paix positive, plus que de paix, absence de paix militarisée, dans quelle mesure le secteur de la sécurité ou de la défense envisage ces options à long terme main.
- Bon, aujourd'hui, la mission est octroyée par la constitution et la loi au département de la défense, parce qu'il font partie de l'institution, c'est de préparer la défense du pays, défense armée, protection de la population, défense contre les risques qui sont identifiés, dont on a parlé tout à l'heure, en particulier la cyberdéfense, mais on n'a pas confié d'autres missions à la défense. Et si on veut prendre la défense au sens large, justement des maintiens de l'ordre,

le maintien de l'ordre dans le pays, par les polices cantonales en particulier, et celles ci peuvent avoir des approches différentes, mais toutes les polices cantonales ont des groupes d'intervention, ce qu'on appelle équipées de robocop pour faire face à des manifestations violentes. Et il y a, il y a bien la mise en place. Et puis aussi dans la formation des policiers qui a beaucoup changé ces 10 dernières années, 15 dernières années, beaucoup plus, une approche psychologique de la protection de la population avec une tentative d'utiliser la négociation plutôt que l'arme. Et heureusement, ça ne marche pas trop mal dans ce pays, mais on n'a pas donné la mission à la défense d'imaginer un modèle de défense non armée ou pacifique. Et ça de nouveau, c'est, c'est une question. Je répète, moi, depuis que je fais de la politique 60 ans, ça fait à peu près 40 ans que fait de la politique ou 30 ans? J'ai jamais entendu personne, comme je disais tout à l'heure, à part le gssa qui veut supprimer l'armée, qui n'a jamais préconisé non plus de la remplacer par un autre mode de défense. Parce que, bien sûr, c'est bien beau. Et c'est assez cyclique aussi à travers les siècles d'imaginer que tout le monde, tout le monde y est gentil, mais à un moment donné, la réalité de la vie c'est pas ça. Malheureusement.

- Et finalement, j'ai une dernière question qui porte sur la suisse qui a un très haut taux d'urbanisation. Dans une défense armée, comme on peut le voir actuellement en Ukraine, le coût pour les infrastructures et pour les vies est énorme. En suisse qui a quand même des grandes villes comme Genève ou Bâle, qui sont très proches des frontières, notamment le coût au niveau des infrastructures sur l'économie sur les gens, comment est-ce qu'on intègre ce coût potentiel dans la projection de la défense?
- Une question un peu difficile à vous répondre parce qu'on sait très bien qu'aujourd'hui les guerres se gagnent dans les villes ou se perdent dans les villes, mais on revient quand même à des formes d'attaque et de défense, tout ce qu'il y a de plus traditionnel. Si on regarde l'Ukraine, moi, je me souviens justement de l'Ukraine, avoir discuté avec d'autres politiciens et en particulier un jurassien qui disaient, de toute façon, c'est fini les guerres de tranchée, etc. Et qu'est ce qu'on constate en Ukraine, c'est des guerres de tranchée. C'est des armes antichars. C'est des chars contre des chars. C'est la défense sol air contre des drones. Ça, c'est une nouvelle composante, mais avec une composante hybride cyber, parce qu'on sait aussi que mais ça s'appelait autrement avant, mais ça existait déjà parce que si vous voulez immobiliser une armée, qu'elle soit à l'attaque ou la défense, vous immobiliser ses moyens de transmission et puis elle ne peut plus bouger et cyber c'est aussi ça aujourd'hui, c'est intervenir, interférer sur des systèmes de conduite qui bloquent tout. Alors oui, on n'a jamais vraiment, on sait très bien que s'il fallait mener le combat, c'est effectivement dans les zones urbaines qu'il faudrait le mener. Et c'est aussi pour ça que l'armée suisse, depuis un certain nombre d'années, a complètement réorienté son instruction à la défense. C'est du combat urbain. Et ça veut dire qu'il y aurait des bombardements comme ceux en Ukraine. Ça veut dire qu'il faut des infrastructures protégées en sous-sol pour que les gens puissent aller s'y réfugier. Ça veut dire qu'il faut effectivement imaginer, comme on l'a fait depuis très longtemps. Mais là aussi, on avait toute une série de politiciens illuminés, dont un célèbre jurassien qui été intervenu au conseil national pour interdire la construction des abris anti atomiques qui ont une vocation anti-atomique, mais qui ont aussi une vocation anti bombardement on voit qu'aujourd'hui, heureusement qu'on a éléments là, parce qu'en Ukraine, s'ils en avaient davantage, il serait content et quelque part, c'est vrai que quand on voit la dévastation qui a dans les villes en Ukraine, sur la frontière, en tout cas, on se demande oui, qu'est ce qui peut se passer après? Parce que pour reconstruire des zones comme celles-là, il faudra se lever de bonne heure. Donc, ce qui veut dire que et de toute façon la défense, elle se fera dans les villes des attaques aussi. Parce que si vous voulez maîtriser un territoire, vous devez maîtriser les populations et les populations et se trouver dans les villes.
- Merci beaucoup pour votre temps. Alors je vais couper l'enregistrement.

Appendix 6 : Translation Interview 3

- So, if it's all right with you, we can start with the first topic, which is Switzerland's security situation. So, in your opinion, what are the current external threats to Switzerland's security?
- Well, there are many of them. In particular, there is the aspect of terrorism, which cannot be underestimated, and there is the aspect of crime in general. And then there's the cybersecurity aspect, the cyber-attack aspect which, I would say, is at the top of the list of risks today, in my opinion the main one, with a fairly global desire to destabilise Switzerland as a whole. Globally, we are currently the victims of a crisis, an attack, an attempt to destabilise the economy, and it's no coincidence that this is happening now at Crédit Suisse. We're finding it increasingly difficult to make ourselves heard and to talk to our usual partners, be they the European Union or even the United States. But I wouldn't go so far as to say that we want to attack the Swiss model, which has proved its worth and which is envied and even jealousised by some. And there are those who would like to see the Swiss financial centre wiped out and taken over elsewhere, because they are jealous that a small country like Switzerland is capable of so much innovation and so much management of foreign funds in particular. So, basically, the main risk, in my opinion, is cyber attacks. So, if we look at the threats, particularly to critical infrastructures, and then we still have terrorist risks, we shouldn't minimise them, they're part of a doubt. And then there's migration. That's also a threat in itself. It can be very positive if we manage to control it. And we see that Germany has once again called for people to come and work in their country because they don't have enough labour, and it's the same thing with us. But in our country, there is a certain reluctance to accept asylum seekers. And in particular, towards Ukrainians, but not only, who could, in my opinion, be better integrated into the labour market and who would also do us this service, because we see that we also have major challenges, labour shortages and in particular skilled labour. So migration is still a weapon for some countries. And I don't know what will happen after the elections in Turkey, because we've seen that Turkey has already used migration as a weapon once or twice to put pressure on the European Union and its allies. So this can also be a destabilising factor in our country. And today, we really have the feeling that the traditional political parties, which until four or five years ago were able to reach a consensus for the good of this country, are finding it increasingly difficult to reach a consensus. Today, we're finding it increasingly difficult to reach a consensus, using anything and everything as a pretext. In particular, we know that the UDC is making the most of migration to turn it into a talking point, when we could be putting a positive spin on it and trying to attract the best party. That's a brief summary, because we can go over it in detail, but organized crime also remains a risk for the country, with mafias that either have a strong presence here or use Switzerland as a hub, either for money laundering or for other businesses. So it's really a lot of little things that add up. The military threat exists, but we know that it is not immediate. That doesn't mean we should ignore it.
- Thank you for your time. And are there any threats that are more internal than external?
- Yes, there are domestic threats, with groups on both the far right and the far left also becoming more radical. And we're seeing this in Zurich in particular, with this new group that's really starting to take up a lot of space. And I think it is also taking up quite a lot of space in the work of the intelligence services of the confederation and the cantons, particularly the canton of Zurich. And I think that's something that's also somewhat worrying, which, for the moment, is under control but could also get out of hand, but it's part of this general destabilisation where everyone is putting forward their own opinions and proposals. We've seen that the post-COVID era has also left its mark on the conspiracy movement and we often find the same leaders in these conspiracy movements as we find in these leaders of operations to destabilise their public. And I'm not talking at all about people who are committed to the climate, even if I share their opinion on the facts, I'm totally

committed to that too. But I can't stand the fact that we've just stuck our hands in the road, but that's another matter. Instead of sticking your hands in the road, you'd be better off carrying solar panels and installing them on roofs. And these days there's not a lot of labour available to do that. So obviously it's a bit shocking to hear this kind of thing being said, but I'm always more interested in the positive side of things and in taking action to do something than in pissing people off.

- Thank you for your time. Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country. So what does it mean in terms of national security to be neutral?
- It's an excellent question because there is the law of neutrality, then the policy of neutrality and obviously, depending on which side of the political spectrum you are on, we are witnessing something quite peculiar because we have a convergent vision of neutrality between the Greens and then the SVP who want to stick to complete neutrality. In other words, I have received emails because I have been and continue to be committed to the export of arms to Ukraine and those who defend it under the aegis of neutrality. I've received messages saying that it's not our business, it's not our war. It doesn't concern us. I can't share that opinion. So I expect neutrality, OK? The Hague Convention of 1907. That's more than 125 years ago. In the meantime, the United Nations has been created, and Switzerland has joined the UN and the UN Security Council. So we can no longer act as if we were a country covered by the 1907 Convention and the Convention just forbids us from committing ourselves militarily alongside one or other of the belligerents. That's all it imposes in military terms. And in 1815, if we go back a little further. It came from the great European powers. They told Switzerland that it had to give itself the means to preserve and defend its neutrality. So this armed neutrality, which today is also sometimes called into question by the very people who say we should be neutral, in particular the Greens and the left, the hard left, believes that we really don't need an army to remain neutral and that everything will be fine. I'm not at all the type to say that it was our army that enabled us to escape the horrors of the Second World War. But the very people who are now saying that we can't export war materiel to Ukraine because we're neutral are forgetting. And I invite them to read it again. The few pages of the Bergier report show the extent to which Switzerland supported the Reich regime by supplying munitions and armaments during the Second World War. And it was also thanks to this, of course, that there was strong resistance and the Germans weighed up their interests and said yes, if we want to talk about Switzerland, it will cost them dearly. We lost time. So we bypassed Switzerland and then they said, well, it's completely surrounded and it can't do anything without us. And we prefer to leave it where it is, let its economy work. But as long as it provides us with the resources we need for our strong war. And that's what was done. So I'm not at all questioning our grandfathers' commitments at the border. That's not it at all, but it wasn't the only factor that enabled Switzerland to escape the Second World War, contrary to those who defend complete neutrality today. So for me, neutrality is a means of defending the country's interests, but it's not an end in itself. And it is a means of foreign policy to defend the interests of another country and its population.
- Thank you very much. Article 54 of the Federal Constitution refers to the promotion of peace. How is this reflected in Swiss security policy?
- In several ways. Firstly, through an active foreign policy, with participation in numerous international forums, and even the hosting by our country of a certain number of these forums in Geneva in particular, as well as active participation in certain peacekeeping or border surveillance operations, We've been involved for a long time between the two Koreas with military observers, we're taking part in KFOR in Kosovo and our participation is very much appreciated, even recognized, to such an extent that even the Europeans tell us, the NATO people tell us, but if you leave, it's over, we won't be able to stay at this point. And the populations concerned also say it, whether it's the Kosovars or the Serbs, there too, if you leave, it's sure to get out of hand because we trust you. So it's also because of this Swiss reputation for seriousness and quality, and above all the trust we inspire in the discussions

we have with these different populations or the authorities. And I think there's the Swiss good offices, of course. It's a Swiss speciality, but if you relate it to Ukraine, yes, we can provide our good offices. But as long as someone wants to talk today, neither of them wants to talk. We will be available when they are. And we can multiply our contacts to try and get people thinking about the post-conflict period, because at some point it will come to an end. We're very much involved in promoting peace, whether it's civil peace or, for example, the whole humanitarian aspect, demining, the humanitarian know-how we bring to rebuilding towns and bridges. All these elements contribute in some way to restoring or maintaining peace in the world, in the various countries that have been affected by conflicts, whether internal or international. So I think we have, we have really committed ourselves in several ways and the promotion of peace should not be understood solely in military terms, but in terms of a whole body of cross-cutting action carried out by different departments of the country and also participation in international forums such as the UN, for example, which enables us to make our modest contribution to these efforts that are being made to maintain peace in the world.

- You mentioned NATO when you were talking about healthcare more generally. What does NATO mean for Swiss security? Is it a projection of Switzerland's security to the outside world? Is it a threat? Is it an ally? Is it our real security tool?
- So I was referring earlier to the Second World War. And we also know that at the beginning of the war, or even just before war was declared, Switzerland had signed agreements with France so that the latter could come to Switzerland's aid in the event of an attack. We have seen, as happened in retrospect, that it would have been better to say that Switzerland should have come to France's aid, but that was a different kettle of fish. But by that I mean that if we were to be attacked militarily today, we have no choice. On our own, we can't defend ourselves, but militarily, and the only potential military ally is NATO, the European Union today, they are thinking about it, they have started to implement something of a common defence, but it took the declaration of war in Ukraine. Now we've thought about it enough. We really need to do what we can to try and have our own resources, but even the European Union without NATO would be on its own. And in my opinion, it would be very weak in the face of Russia, China, North Korea or India. They may not be warriors. They're not the first ones we're going to see, but I think that if we were to sign up to a text, to an armed defence concept, the only credible partner would be NATO, whether we like it or not. And in this context, we know from opinion polls that a fairly large majority of Swiss people today say that they should not join NATO. We need to maintain our neutrality for as long as possible. But we also know that we need to move closer to NATO, because if we need support for military defence, NATO is the only place to get it.
- Thank you for your time. Now we're going to move on to the part that deals more with the Swiss Army, the institution. The first question is how the Swiss Army is perceived abroad. Does it represent a deterrent force? As people like to say about the Second World War, is it a credible defence force? Or is it a symbolic, folkloric instrument of Swiss unity? And to meet the obligations of armed neutrality.
- It depends who you talk to. But I'm part of the delegation from the Security Policy Committee that went to Brussels last January, at the end of January, where we met NATO and European Union officials. One of the questions was how you see Switzerland and its role. Do you think it is a credible and reliable partner, or a little less so? Well, the answer we got was yes, perhaps a little less reliable since it refused to participate in the solidarity effort of the other European countries in connection with this arms export. But credible, yes. We asked the question in the context of the Federal Council's desire, also expressed in its supplement to the report on security policy, to consider exercises with NATO, for example with NATO countries. And we asked ourselves the question, we will have asked the question says, but listen, you know, a militia army with soldiers who do three weeks of rehearsal exercises a year do you think they could be certified. It's very American, you need

certification at all levels. And to be able to take part in a military exercise, even to take out a cartridge, you have to be certified. And they clearly told us that when NATO or OSCE countries visit their troops - because there's also the OSCE, which we shouldn't forget, even though it doesn't have many resources, I would say, to be really concrete in its actions - they regularly come to visit Swiss troops, they regularly come to visit Swiss troops or organise exercises for them, and the NATO people say that with what we've already seen on several occasions, we have no problem certifying your soldiers, even militiamen, to take part in exercises with NATO countries. So, for us, we came back with the certainty that our army is rather well perceived in its training, in the quality of its cadres, because this will also be something that has already been done for a long time with the Partnership for Peace which regularly receives foreign officers for exercises and exchanges, notably in Lucerne, at the officers' training centre and clearly they have said you are completely credible. We need to place even more emphasis on the notion of interoperability. So it's back to modernising processes. Otherwise, as far as the rest is concerned, we are considered, the Swiss army is considered to be a totally credible partner.

- And what does this Swiss army defend in Switzerland? Does it defend a territory? Does it defend direct democracy or institutions? Does it defend parliament and the assembly? What does it stand for? During the Second World War, we saw that with the planning of the reduced national, the territory was perhaps not the most significant thing or the first priority to defend. During the Cold War, we also saw that it was considered that the government should go abroad and encourage resistance, but from abroad, until the Swiss army could take back the territory. So I ask myself, what does the army have to do with defence?
- I believe that these are the values of Swiss civilisation and society, and of its constitution. These are fundamental rights contained in the constitution. So, in itself, it's the people and their way of life in this country. So it's true that it can go through successive stages. The idea was really to maintain an unoccupied Swiss territory so that, on that basis and in conjunction with the civil resistance, well, rather the armed resistance and as the French experienced or organized it, we could then regain territory and ensure that the entire national territory remained national. And I think that the army's desire today is already to guarantee the airspace, because we don't know what can come from that side and face up to attacks that could absolutely be linked to terrorist attacks and not at all military. But we do know that with drones or planes, we saw what happened in New York with planes that didn't hesitate to hit the towers. So this is also a stage in the Swiss mission. But for me, the army's mission is to defend the territory, but that's not an end in itself. It is also to defend the values that we defend. Direct democracy, freedom of fundamental rights, everything I would say the free world stands for. And it is also in this context that I claim that the free world today, its border, is the border between Ukraine and Russia. And it is also in this context that I say that we must also make our contribution to military defence by agreeing to export this military equipment respectively. Now, the question of the Leopard tanks, which will certainly never go to Ukraine, but which will go to the German army to re-equip the German army, which has been somewhat deprived in sending armaments to Ukraine. I think it's our role too, and not just our role, but our role to participate in this effort. The rest, as I said, we are already doing naturally, with our good offices, with our humanitarian work, with all that we can contribute in terms of our know-how and skills on the ground and in our relations with the belligerents. So we have to recognize that today, for me, we have to participate in this defence of the free world.
- To defend the free world of which you speak. We know that the Swiss army is made up of Swiss citizens. How do we know, or could we know, that its citizens would be prepared to fight in the event of war? Do we know whether the members of the Swiss army would be prepared to kill for the army, for their country?
- For the army? Certainly not. I think they would be prepared to do it for their country and to defend their people, their families and their loved ones. As the Ukrainians did, even though

they were much less prepared than we were. The Ukrainian army was much less prepared than we were and the reservists and volunteers who were equipped somewhat hastily and without much training, showed that when there is a will to defend yourself, to protect your country, you can work miracles because somewhere the Ukrainian army which, according to Putin, was to be wiped out in less than two years, is still resisting. So at the beginning it resisted above all because of a fierce desire to defend itself. And I believe that when we are attacked, I am convinced that the Swiss population would react in the same way, with a clear desire to defend, I said the territory, but also the population and everything that goes with it, I am convinced.

- Thank you for your time. And finally, what is the economic importance of the Swiss army for Switzerland?
- Less and less important since the army has been considerably reduced. But then it's true that for the economy, there are several aspects. There's the property aspect, because the army is a major property owner in Switzerland. So there are companies involved in the construction and maintenance of these buildings. It also supports the local economy, small traders and craftsmen, when a troop comes to rehearse somewhere. Overall, it also supports part of the Swiss metal industry, through its armaments industry, which manufactures armoured vehicles and ammunition. But it's not, I don't want to say, it's marginal in terms of Swiss GDP, it's not what sustains the country, but we sometimes underestimate the positive collateral effects of the arms industry, because I know a lot of Jura companies that have made major technological leaps by taking part, I know a lot of Jura companies that have made major technological leaps by taking part, for example, in compensatory orders, those famous offsets that a country has to commit to buying from us in exchange for aircraft that we are going to buy or the ground-air system that we are going to buy or other investments that we have. And many of these companies have said, "It's so specific. The demands of these countries are so great that we have really made productivity gains, efficiency gains in our company that have enabled us to be more competent and more competitive in the whole of the non-military sector, because there are very few companies in Switzerland that only do armaments. You have RUAG and its lorries and vehicles, but otherwise it's more of a vague sector. You can see that there are little bits here and there, but these people tell you that it's a bit as if you could work for a company in the industrial sector that could work for aviation or space, even worse space. But aviation is a huge productivity booster for these companies. So it makes them more competitive, it enables them to win other international contracts and therefore create indirect jobs in our country. So it's always good to learn.
- OK, thank you. Earlier you spoke of destabilisation and we sometimes talk about hybrid threats. How is Swiss policy, Swiss security policy, adapting to these hybrid threats? And what is being done to combat the strategy of destabilisation that tries to break the trust between the population and its government, to attack or cast doubt on the values that unite the country. How is this considered in security policy?
- Typically, it's the whole area of cyber security where we've fallen behind quite a bit in our country, because even so, we shouldn't overdramatise either, because the companies and large corporations that were the main targets were quick to sense the threat, particularly in the banking sector. We don't know how many banks were attacked. We only know one tenth of what the banks paid out to their customers, telling them, "Don't tell us, we'll compensate you for a question of confidence in their system". And I think that the authorities are finally becoming seriously aware of this threat. And on the civilian side, a lot of things are being done with it, like the Swiss national centre for combating cybercrime, which is now becoming a federal office. So that's something, it's a symbol, but it's important to understand that what is somewhat divided between two or three departments is united under the same office and the same department. And that was really a necessity, because everyone was going their own way. Who has links with businesses, who has links with government departments or who simply has links with the federal administration? So here we have a

very clear awareness, with the army also making a major effort with the creation of its cyber battalion and the resources made available. I had the opportunity to visit and speak directly with the person in charge of setting up this whole system, and it's quite gigantic. The resources that will be made available, the problem we have, is finding the staff and, as in all areas of IT in general, but in this case, what I say to young people who don't really know what they want to do is: "Go into IT, because in any case, with what's going on, particularly in cyber defence, you're going to find a job without any problem". And there is a real awareness of this in both the military and civilian spheres. And I think the two go hand in hand, because a cyber threat can come from different areas and different directions, with different objectives. There are the pure swindlers who want to blackmail the customer from whom they have stolen the data, just as there is this desire to destabilise and reduce the system's ability to function with critical infrastructures, whether it be nuclear power stations, but also dams in the energy sector, transport, but also hospitals if you intervene in the system, we see it in the films, but it also happens in reality. Traffic management in cities, if you manage to penetrate the traffic light management system in a city, you can quickly paralyse a city, or water distribution, for example, we don't always think about it, but it's something quite fundamental. I tabled a parliamentary motion calling on the Confederation, together with the universities and certain companies in this country that are capable of doing this, to create a sovereign infrastructure that would enable Swiss companies to keep essential data in Switzerland. I've been told that this isn't possible, that we need to use foreign companies anyway, and so on and so forth. So yes, of course, I'm not asking that we build our own tablets or PCs, but I am asking that even these PCs be subject to controls to ensure that those used to manage the country's essential data are not fitted with a bug that allows them to be accessed from abroad. And we're going to do something about it, but I think we're being a bit too cautious here, we're not going far enough, especially as I had the clear support of the two EPFs, who also clearly said infomaniak was saying, but there's no problem, you're right, we can do that in this country for very competitive prices. And sometimes you have to, I think in the next year or two we're going to do it, but from time to time you have to sound the alarm a bit. He makes proposals, even if afterwards we don't always succeed. That's perhaps Switzerland's problem, reacting a little too passively and reacting rather than acting and anticipating.

- We've finished with the first two parts. We're going to move on to alternative defence policies. So civil defence or civil resistance, particularly non-violent resistance. During the Cold War in Switzerland, the country adopted a policy of total military defence, followed by civil resistance with an armed component. Researchers in the field maintain that violence in civil resistance movements that are mainly non-violent is counter-productive because it legitimises the repression and violence of the opponent, which affects the support of third parties. And therefore also prevents the alienation of the opponent's supporters. Plus. In her book published in 2011, Erika Chenoweth showed that non-violent movements are on average more effective than violent ones. In Switzerland, in a policy of total defence, would we be able to withdraw the guerrilla component, violent armed resistance, if the army were defeated? Or let me rephrase the question: first of all, we have an army that will protect and in the event of defeat or if the army finds itself overwhelmed up to now, we have asked the population to engage in civil and armed resistance. Would we be prepared to remove this armed resistance component thanks to or because of studies that show that this armed component can be counter-productive from a strategic and effectiveness point of view?
- I'm not familiar with these studies, so it's difficult to express an opinion on the subject. In your introduction, you mentioned the countries of the north, which are very peaceful, but at the same time, I note that Sweden and Finland have renounced their neutrality and have asked to join NATO. So somewhere there is doubt. So why not? But what about renouncing completely? Why do we have armed cantonal police forces? Why do we have armed bobbies in the UK when, until recently, they were armed with nothing more than a stick? It

could also be part of an evolution in society, where society has become more violent. Is non-violent resistance enough to maintain order and rights in this country? I'm not familiar with the studies you're referring to. I have my doubts about them, but why not? But it's not the only component. It has to be combined with others.

- You just mentioned Nordic countries such as Sweden and Finland. Sweden and Lithuania, in particular, have this resistance component in their defence strategy, their security policy, which also includes violent resistance. And so we see that, as you say, it's a pattern that repeats itself. Do you think that traditional institutions such as the army or politicians are capable of envisaging alternative modes of defence?
- Listen, I'd need to see an example of where this has worked so that I can tell you whether, given the Swiss mentality, it's practicable here, because I can. Just to tell you, in Switzerland we know about referendums and initiatives. So direct democracy, but it's impracticable in most other countries in the world, because there isn't this culture, etc. What you're saying is that it's not practical in Switzerland. So what you're saying about non-violent resistance, yes, I don't know, maybe it can be one of the components of alternative defence. But how does that work? That's my question.
- So in non-violent resistance, and this also brings me to questions that go further, there are different, there is direct action. So whether it's civil disobedience, I'm just going to present the slightly more theoretical aspect that supports this approach. So, for Gene Sharp, power is made up of several resources, whether human resources, natural resources, obedience, the means and forces of sanctions, for example. And all these sources of power are given by the population to a government or a power or a leader and by a very broad collaboration of the population. This power can be regained, in particular by strike action and a little sabotage. So that's where the line is drawn, the grey area between violence and non-violence. And from a more traditional security perspective, this non-cooperation or direct action can increase the costs for an adversary in the event of an invasion, particularly in order to shift the balance so that the costs are higher and it becomes a deterrent force, or so that over time, the occupation is no longer advantageous. And so the adversary would withdraw. And that's the theoretical part and the idea on which it's built,
- And I'm out of touch, impractical, you give an example where it worked.
- There are two elements to this. The institutionalized part, as a defence strategy, right? Because that's never really been used or chosen as the only method. On the other hand, the more spontaneous approach, in other words the non-violent movements that have succeeded, the best known of which are Gandhi's salt march or the civil rights movement in the United States. More recent examples include Milosevic in Serbia and the Otpor movement, which ran a huge non-cooperation campaign and succeeded in removing the dictator. There's also General Pinochet in Chile, the Czech Republic in 1961 and the revolution in Iran, so that doesn't mean that the result is always ideal. But the departure of the Shah of Iran was caused by a largely non-violent resistance. This led to the establishment of the Islamic regime that we see today. So it's not a guarantee of a positive outcome, but it worked. And there are quite a few examples in history.
- Well, I'm not sure that the Swiss are ready, but why not? I understand, but we've already seen this kind of movement with the climate strikers. It's a first implementation of this non-violent resistance, but as people attack people or infrastructure or property or whatever, we can effectively treat it as peaceful non-violent resistance. In a conflict, I would say a global conflict, could Switzerland implement this? There would inevitably be a component of this form of resistance. And if we go back to the last great world conflict, the Second World War, we also know that in France or in the occupied countries, just the fact that some public transport employees or energy lines forgot to press the right button so that the machine could start up or the train could leave was a form of resistance that was put in place. But in this context, there was always armed resistance. It was to serve the interests of the armed resistance, which made it possible to annihilate the adversary or the enemy, or

- even to make him retreat in his certainties and in his conquest of the territory. So yes, and as you said, I hear examples like you cite, it may have allowed the problem is that it has almost always allowed other dictators to establish themselves, sometimes even to the detriment of democracy. And that's a bit of a risk I see, because I'm not sure that Iran can be a country where the population is or where the rights of the population are better respected today than they were under the Shah of Iran, I'm even convinced of the opposite. But that's their history. It's not chosen. Personally, I can't call into question what has been done, even if I have absolutely no sympathy for the mullahs' regime, which is notorious for its lack of respect for human rights, particularly the rights of women and people who are different in these regimes. And somewhere, when you see the result, I wonder. But if we go back to a concept of total defence, because that's where we could put it, I think that part of it would be passive resistance. In other words, we wouldn't be making any major interventions. But in my opinion, knowing the Swiss population a little, it wouldn't be enough on its own to win the day and re-establish trust and the previous order, but I haven't given it much thought.
- And this leads me to think about the total defence policy we had, particularly during the Cold War. The civil resistance component was never trained. So it was passed on to the people in the little red book of civil defence. But it was never trained in the same way as the army, which has thousands of years of history and training, not the Swiss, but the military in general. Why hasn't this civil resistance been trained?
 - It's a good question because so far nobody has bothered to look into it, to be clear, but if nobody has looked into it, it's also because nobody in the federal chambers has come forward with this question, it's as you said in your introduction, it's either the military or the absence of the military, but there have never been any alternative proposals as such. And there you have it, I hear you, and then my goodness, how do you train it? Well, you have to think about it, it's certainly possible to do so since we manage to train crisis exercises, whether they be pandemics or blackouts or even military exercises. So I imagine that it must also be possible to train civil and peaceful resistance exercises, but it's true that there are, just as I've never heard of in this country. And yet I've been in politics for decades. Someone who came up with this, not even the GSSA, the only objective, is to do away with the army, but has never proposed anything alternative. Apart from humanitarian policy and so on. Which we're already doing anyway.
 - Yes, that's exactly the approach taken by the academics who worked on it. And that's why they changed the term from disarmament to trans-armament, to say that we're not abandoning defence by disarming ourselves and making ourselves vulnerable, but that we're finding an alternative solution.
 - But let's be clear, at the moment it's not the case and it won't be the case any time soon, so we should be very happy that it's the way it is. But the day you find yourself facing an assault rifle or a tank you can always try to put up passive resistance, we saw what happened in Tienamen, didn't we? That's how I wait. You can say no, no, no, no. I'm waiting for the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, there were deaths there too, because at a certain point, guns start talking
 - For civil defence. It's the institutionalization of non-violent resistance as a defence policy. And that includes preparation and training. But to institutionalize this policy, the law would have to be adapted, for example by legalising civil disobedience. In certain circumstances, this would provide very different political tools. And to what extent is the state prepared to make itself vulnerable to these kinds of tools and by giving this power to citizens? Is the state afraid or timid about this?
 - But in Switzerland, the state is the citizen. So no popular initiative has ever come up with such a proposal. So I don't think we can talk about the State being too cautious about the citizen, because in Switzerland, the State is the citizen, through the exercise of popular rights, like nowhere else. And I think that in terms of justifying the State's assessment, the State does what the citizen tells it to in Switzerland, and that's a great strength. It is this

proximity. It's its militia parliamentarians, even if this notion of militia can sometimes be called into question. But despite everything, they are still people who are close to their fellow citizens, who talk to them, who speak out for their concerns. And the people don't forget every four years to re-elect or not re-elect their elected representatives, or to use popular initiatives or referendums to say to these elected representatives, no, that's not what we want. Or you don't want to deal with it, and then we can use a popular initiative to force you to do so. And typically in this area, no one has ever used a popular initiative. So I don't think the state should be criticised for doing nothing, because if citizens wanted to do something about it, they might already have been able to put the issue on the table by means of a popular initiative. So I don't think there are any expectations in Switzerland about this, because if there were, I think there would certainly have been a popular initiative by now.

- Well, to increase the effectiveness of non-violent civil resistance and civil defence, the ideal is to decentralise infrastructures and management methods. So Switzerland, a model of federalism, is very well suited to this kind of decentralisation. Is Switzerland doing enough in terms of self-sufficiency, both in terms of food and energy production, so that it can be self-sufficient and also have decentralised resources to increase its resilience in the event of conflict?
- If you want to decentralise energy production, for example, I wish you luck, eh? Because I live in a canton where we were prevented from creating or re-commissioning run-of-river hydroelectric power stations, because that would endanger the fish that are so big. We don't want them, even though we've already contributed quite a bit to the construction of wind turbines, but we don't want them any more because they clash with the landscape. And then, from time to time, a few birds get caught in the blades, because studies have clearly shown that this is by no means cause for alarm. And then there's a deep geothermal project here, which is a pilot project run by a Swiss company and largely supported by the confederation, but where the local populations don't want to hear about it because they're afraid of earthquakes. And if you decentralise them, that's fine. But once again, in a very democratic system like Switzerland's, it's very complicated and you can't manage to ensure that, even though one of the aims of the 2050 energy strategy, for example, is to ensure that each canton can be as independent as possible in its energy production. Obviously, I'm convinced that the first step is to make savings. We can all still make efforts in that area, but when it comes to production, we need to look at the bigger picture. And without the dams in the Alps, we can't do it without the three nuclear power stations we have left. And even without international trade in electricity, we won't make it. So we can always think in the same way about food. We also know that in Switzerland, and federal policy at the moment, this issue is being called into question even more. On the one hand, there's a constitutional article that has been accepted by the people, saying that the country's food sovereignty must be guaranteed as far as possible. On the other hand, in order to safeguard the country's biodiversity, the government wants to reduce crop rotation areas by a further 15%. In other words, the areas on which we can grow wheat and things like that. So we're nowhere near achieving a form of self-sufficiency, because that's what it's all about, isn't it? I hear what they're saying about relocating. If we want to imagine living alone in the middle of nowhere, we have to achieve autarky, and that's just no longer possible today with a Switzerland that will soon have 9,000,000 inhabitants. So that's what?
- In the long term, thanks to its position at the very heart of Europe and NATO, Switzerland could be a leader in the reduction of armaments and the introduction of alternative defence policies, which would strengthen Switzerland's position as a promoter of peace in the sense of positive peace, rather than militarised peace, to what extent does the security and defence sector envisage these options in the long term?
- Today, the mission assigned by the Constitution and the law to the Department of Defence, because they are part of the institution, is to prepare the defence of the country, armed defence, protection of the population, defence against the risks that have been identified,

which we talked about earlier, in particular cyber defence, but no other mission has been entrusted to defence. And if we want to take defence in the broad sense, that is to say the maintenance of order, the maintenance of order in the country, by the cantonal police in particular, and these may have different approaches, but all the cantonal police have intervention groups, what we call equipped with robocops to deal with violent demonstrations. And there is, there is the implementation. And also in police training, which has changed a lot over the last 10 years, 15 years, much more, a psychological approach to protecting the public with an attempt to use negotiation rather than weapons. And fortunately, it doesn't work too badly in this country, but we haven't given defence the task of devising a model of unarmed or peaceful defence. And that again is a question. I repeat, since I've been in politics for 60 years, I've been in politics for about 40 years, or 30? I've never heard anyone, as I was saying earlier, apart from the gssa who wants to abolish the army, who has never advocated replacing it with another form of defence. Because, of course, that's all well and good. And it's also cyclical over the centuries to imagine that everyone is nice, but at some point, the reality of life isn't like that. Unfortunately.

- And finally, I have one last question about Switzerland, which has a very high rate of urbanisation. In an armed defence, as we are currently seeing in Ukraine, the cost in terms of infrastructure and lives is enormous. In Switzerland, which has large cities such as Geneva and Basel, which are very close to the borders, particularly the cost to the economy and to people in terms of infrastructure, how do we factor this potential cost into the defence projection?
- It's a difficult question to answer because we know very well that today wars are won or lost in cities, but we are still returning to traditional forms of attack and defence. If we look at Ukraine, I remember discussing it with other politicians, in particular a Jura politician, who said that, in any case, the days of trench warfare were over. And what we're seeing in Ukraine is trench warfare. It's anti-tank weapons. It's tanks against tanks. It's ground-to-air defence against drones. This is a new component, but with a hybrid cyber component, because we also know that although it used to be called something else, it already existed because if you want to immobilise an army, whether it's attacking or defending, you immobilise its means of transmission and then it can't move any more and cyber is also that today, it means intervening, interfering in control systems that block everything. So yes, we've never really, we know very well that if we had to fight the battle, it would have to be in urban areas. And that's why the Swiss army has completely reoriented its defence training over the last few years. It's all about urban combat. And that means there would be bombings like those in Ukraine. It means that we need protected infrastructures underground so that people can take refuge there. It means that we have to imagine, as we have done for a very long time. But here too, we had a whole series of enlightened politicians, including a famous Jura politician who intervened in the National Council to ban the construction of atomic shelters, which have an anti-atomic vocation, but which also have an anti-bombing vocation, as we can see today, It's a good thing we have these elements, because in Ukraine, if they had more, they'd be happy, and it's true that when you see the devastation in the towns in Ukraine, on the border in any case, you wonder, yes, what can happen next? Because to rebuild areas like these, you have to get up early. Which means that, in any case, the defence will take place in the towns where the attacks are taking place. Because if you want to control a territory, you have to control the people and the people have to be in the towns.
- Thank you very much for your time. So I'm going to cut the recording.

Appendix 7 : Transcription Interview 4

- Vous resterez anonyme dans l'étude, je peux vous citer parmi les personnes qui ont contribué, mais je n'utiliserai pas de citation dans le texte qui parlera de madame XY, ce sera une des intervenantes ou intervenants. Par contre, c'est un plaisir pour moi de partager le résultat de ma recherche quand je l'aurai terminé, si cela vous intéresse,
- Bien sûr, évidemment,
- Et finalement, avant de commencer, au moins ça fait un petit moment que je travaille sur le sujet. Et donc je suis très familier avec celui-ci, si des fois je vais trop vite dans les questions où il y a des liens logiques qui sont manquants, il ne faut pas hésiter à me demander, j'ai essayé de détailler un peu les questions, notamment pour fournir un cadre dans lequel elles s'inscrivent. Est-ce que vous avez des questions?
- Non.
- Alors on peut commencer pour moi, l'entretien. Et la première question que j'aimerais vous adresser est, selon vous, quelles sont les menaces extérieures actuelles pour la sécurité de la Suisse dans l'immédiat?
- Là maintenant, je parlerais de la centrale nucléaire de Zaporija qui pour moi est une menace importante. Pour moi, c'est la menace la plus proche, la plus probable, la plus éventuelle. On sous-estime complètement la situation dans la centrale nucléaire qui est la centrale nucléaire la plus grande d'Europe, qui est la cible de tir. Enfin, vraiment dans un état lamentable avec des équipes épuisées, je vous fais pas des dessins. Pour moi, ça c'est la principale menace en termes de sécurité, suivis de très près par le manque d'eau, le manque de ressources, notamment en eau. Et puis prochainement en nourriture, parce que l'effondrement de la biodiversité, on sait que dans moins de 10 ans, c'est quelque chose qui va nous toucher très, très vite, évidemment. En parallèle avec le réchauffement climatique et les catastrophes naturelles comme celle dans mon village de Crécy, il n'y a même pas deux ans. On a eu tout d'un coup un événement climatique avec des chutes d'eau très, très, très, très importantes, en très peu de temps. Il y a eu des inondations très graves dans mon village. Il y aurait pu avoir des morts. C'est un miracle, ça n'a pas été le cas. Donc ça pour moi, en termes de sécurité, c'est les menaces les plus graves, les plus imminentes. Et puis peut être à court moyen terme, il y a la question des réfugiés climatiques qui vont se compter par millions et évidemment la situation d'accueil. Ça va bien évidemment causer des tensions très importantes d'un point de vue de la cohabitation. Voilà.
- Est-ce que vous percevez des menaces qui seraient plus intérieures? Émanent directement de notre territoire.
- Oui. Alors je pense vraiment la guerre civile intérieure. Ça c'est sûr. Pour moi, la question c'est le manque d'eau et des aliments, l'alimentation et l'eau. Et ça, c'est vraiment imminent. Ce n'est pas moi qui le dis, c'est le rapport du GIEC. Donc c'est éminent en Suisse, on sait que le manque d'eau, ça a déjà été le cas l'année passée et ce sera à nouveau le cas, ça va être un des conflits très, très vifs rapidement. Le problème de l'alimentation aussi en Suisse, on va être touché vraiment très, très vite. Et ça, c'est des problèmes intérieurs, parce qu'à un moment donné nous on, on importe plus la moitié notre alimentation. Donc on va être touché de plein fouet et il va falloir faire des choix. Et ça, c'est vraiment des guerres civiles imminentes.
- Et dans ce contexte, est ce que la suite se prépare à des coups d'état ou à un coup d'états.
- Alors je dois vous donner des, je dois vous donner des informations confidentielles de la commission de sécurité du conseil des états. Ou bien c'est ça, quels sont les plans actuels
- Confidentiels? Non? Parce que je ne suis pas accrédité pour, mais est ce que ce sont des scénarios qui sont envisagés, notamment en cas de conflit civil en un terme, est ce qu'il y

- a des menaces qui sont identifiées à l'intérieur de l'armée, par exemple, le cadre supérieur qui pourrait envisager de prendre le pouvoir par la force afin de le rétablir.
- Non, j'ai pas l'impression, j'en ai jamais entendu parler. J'ai l'impression qu'on a plutôt une armée aujourd'hui qui réfléchit justement à ces menaces extérieures qui sont peut être des menaces plus "habituelles", c'est à dire avec un envahisseur tel que la Russie ou une guerre, une guerre mondiale tels qu'on les a eu connues, malheureusement. Mais on a quand même une armée qui réfléchit aussi quand même, gentiment, très, très gentiment, à ces problématiques de réfugiés climatiques, à ces problèmes de manque de ressources. Pour citer un exemple l'invité du rapport annuel de la division une, ce sera, madame Sonia, une des plus grandes climatologues au monde. Voilà. Et la division une, c'est la plus grande division. On sent qu'il a quand même, parmi ces cadres, des gens qui sont parfaitement au courant de ce qui est en train de se passer et qui ont identifié ces problématiques.
 - La suisse est officiellement reconnue comme pays neutre. Qu'est-ce que ça signifie pour la suisse en matière de sécurité nationale?
 - Bon, vous êtes que je vous explique le concept de neutralité. Ou bien parce que je crois que vous le connaissez, la suisse ne doit pas attaquer. Elle ne peut que se défendre.
 - Votre vision ou interprétation de la neutralité suisse comme politique de sécurité, pas nécessairement l'aspect légal et juridique, mais peut-être plus votre vision.
 - Pour moi, c'est intimement lié à l'aspect juridique. Je suis avocate quand même de formation. Je suis à la commission des affaires juridiques aussi. Pour moi, ça s'est vraiment pour moi. La suisse est neutre. Elle a, elle a signé des engagements internationaux à ce titre, elle doit les respecter. Et ça veut dire pas d'exportation d'armes de guerre, par exemple, c'est évident et absolument évident. Il n'y a pas besoin de faire 50 ans d'études en droit pour le voir, pour le savoir, pour les lire. Donc, c'est-à-dire aucun engagement qui permettrait d'aider l'une ou l'autre partie. Ça ne veut pas dire qu'on peut prendre position sur le conflit et c'est ce qu'on a fait. Je pense que la Suisse s'est très bien comportée de ce point de vue là. Par contre, on ne peut pas imaginer l'exportation d'armes de guerre. On ne peut pas imaginer fournir une partie en armes. Le rôle de la Suisse, c'est la promotion de la paix. En premier lieu, c'est le rôle de la Suisse. C'est la promotion de la paix. La Suisse ne fait pas la guerre, elle fait la promotion de la paix. Elle défend ses frontières et se défend si elle est attaquée. Même si entre nous, il faut quand même pas rêver. Je suis pas sûr qu'on puisse se défendre et combien de temps. Mais enfin, voilà. Mais cela dit d'un point de vue, disons vraiment en termes de neutralité, notre rôle, c'est vraiment la promotion de la paix et les bons offices.
 - Pour qu'est-ce la neutralité est armée?
 - Bon, alors ça, ah ça, c'est un débat. Ça, c'est un conflit de vues, hein? Il y en a des qui vont vous dire c'est parce qu'on promeut la paix qu'en se préparant à la guerre. Et puis il y a d'autres qui vont vous dire que pour se préparer à la paix on doit se préparer à la paix en promouvant la paix. On doit se préparer à la paix, ce qui est plutôt mon discours. Mais voilà des gens comme moi, ils parlent, ils passent pour des espèces d'idéalistes. Je peux l'entendre. Mais disons que quand je vois les milliards qu'on investit dans la guerre, je pense qu'on pourrait investir ces milliards dans la paix et il y aurait des résultats aussi quand même. Donc, et puis je trouve d'autant plus pour un pays comme la suisse, parce que disons, on n'est pas une force, on compte pas, on compte pour zéro en termes de force armée dans l'Europe, avec l'OTAN faut pas déconner quoi? Là, on va entrer enfin dans le programme de protection anti-missile sol-air. Qu'est à mon sens très bien. Ça fait partie de notre protection. On doit se défendre au cas où et un petit pays comme la suisse doit collaborer avec ses voisins. C'est évident. Maintenant, on pourrait aller beaucoup plus loin et demander est-ce que ça a un sens de garder une armée suisse ou pas. C'est un autre sujet.
 - Vous me parlez de la promotion de la paix qui est dans la constitution fédérale?

- Oui.
- Comment ça se concrétise dans les politiques de sécurité?
- Ben, c'est une vraie question. C'est vraiment une question que j'essaie d'amener en commission en disant comment est ce que la suisse apporte sa pierre à l'édifice en termes de promotion de la paix. Elle le fait très bien. Par exemple, au Kosovo et avec la Swisscoy Bosnie, ce sont d'excellents exemples. Je suis allée sur place. D'ailleurs, je suis allée voir les équipes sur place. Et puis ça a vraiment beaucoup de sens. C'est vraiment des gens qui habitent dans les villes concernées qui discutent avec les gens. C'est vraiment ça la promotion de la paix, être sur le terrain pour assurer un état de calme et de stabilité en premier lieu pour les civils. Voilà, c'est ça. La présence en soi apporte ce calme aussi. Ça apporte aussi une pression armée quand même, malgré tout, sur les états en question et sur les politiques concernés. Donc ça, je trouve, c'est un très bel exemple de promotion de la paix. Et puis moi, j'ai l'impression que disons que ça ne va pas beaucoup plus loin. Après cette promotion de la paix, elle est surtout politique. On devrait avoir un discours extérieur de promotion de la paix. Est-ce que c'est le rôle de l'armée de promouvoir la paix? Ben, ça discute, ça dépend dans quelle mission.
- Oui, merci. Et avant vous m'avez aussi parlé de l'OTAN. Qu'est ce que ça représente pour la Suisse? Est-ce que c'est une menace? Est-ce que c'est un allié? Est-ce que c'est notre projection extérieure? Est ce que c'est notre vrai système de défense? Qu'est l'OTAN.
- Alors, j'étais à Bruxelles et on a rencontré l'OTAN avec des délégués de la commission pendant quatre jours fin janvier. On a discuté longuement de ça. Quelle était la position de la Suisse par rapport à l'OTAN? Est-ce qu'on avait envie de collaborer plus avec l'OTAN ? La suisse va participer à des exercices d'envergure internationale avec l'OTAN. Bon, je suis assez partagée, mais je dois dire honnêtement que le contexte actuel, disons depuis l'invasion d'Ukraine depuis la guerre d'Ukraine, je pense que la Suisse a un intérêt à collaborer avec l'OTAN. Pour moi, de manière générale, je pense qu'on a toujours intérêt à collaborer avec les gens. De manière générale, construire la paix, c'est collaborer, discuter, échanger. Donc je pense qu'en étant un partenaire de l'OTAN, plutôt qu'un opposant, c'est beaucoup plus constructif. Et puis, et puis après de manière très pragmatique, mes collègues me tueraient s'ils entendaient ce que je dis, mais la Suisse, on est rien d'un point de vue de force armée. J'y crois pas trop, mais comme personne ne pensait qu'on allait envahir l'Ukraine. Si d'aventure, on devait être attaqué d'une manière ou d'une autre, on serait bien content que les voisins viennent donner un coup de main. Par exemple, j'étais opposée à l'acquisition des avions de combat. Là, j'aurais voulu effectivement que la suisse collabore avec les pays voisins pour bénéficier d'une protection air des voisins. Ça, pour moi, ça avait beaucoup plus de sens de fonctionner comme ça pour un si petit pays. Voilà, je sais pas si ça répond à votre question.
- Oui et ça m'amène directement à la deuxième partie thématique qui parle de l'armée suisse. Ma première question est: quelle est la perception de l'armée suisse à l'étranger? Est-ce que c'est une force de dissuasion? Est-ce que c'est une vraie force de défense crédible? Est-ce que c'est un outil symbolique?
- Écoutez, j'en sais trop rien. Honnêtement, franchement, je sais pas. Je pourrais pas bien dire, parce que j'imagine qu'il faut être un observateur alerte pour pouvoir juger de la force d'une armée d'un pays, être bien informé. Je ne sais pas du tout, mais j'aurais tendance à dire que de par sa petitesse... Alors d'un autre côté, on a quand même une armée de milices qui est mobilisable rapidement avec un très grand nombre de personnes. En ce sens, ça pourrait être perçu comme quelque chose d'assez fort finalement en se disant voilà tous ces hommes, mobilisable rapidement avec les dames à la maison. Enfin franchement, je ne sais pas du tout comment s'est perçu depuis

l'extérieur. Honnêtement, je ne pense pas qu'ils s'imaginent qu'on est des gars puissants. Je veux dire, on reste la Suisse.

- Et cette armée suisse, qu'est-ce qu'elle défend? Est-ce qu'elle défend un territoire des institutions? Les suisses, ses valeurs de la démocratie directe
- Non, je pense qu'elle défend avant tout un territoire. Elle ne devrait pas défendre autre chose. C'est l'armée c'est pas des politiques, c'est pas la police. C'est pas eux qui appliquent la loi. Je viens du droit et la justice défend des valeurs, tout notre appareil législatif. Mais l'armée, elle est là pour défendre le territoire et les gens qui y habitent ? Je crois que c'est clair, pour moi.
- Et donc cela m'intrigue parce que pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale ou même durant la guerre froide, les politiques qui étaient mises en place dans la défense de la suisse par l'armée, ont consisté notamment au réduit national qui abandonnent une grande partie du territoire tout de même, en tout cas temporairement. Et pendant la guerre froide également, il y avait la possibilité d'avoir un gouvernement qui s'exile à l'étranger et de laisser l'occupation du territoire, le temps de se réorganiser et de revenir.
- Mais vous dites de laisser l'occupation territoire par l'armée?
- Par un envahisseur potentiel par un adversaire.
- Mais vous croyez vraiment que ce serait le cas aujourd'hui? Je suis pas sûr.
- Ah, je sais pas
- Moi, je ne vois pas l'intérêt. Honnêtement, je ne sais pas. En suisse, le niveau de vie de la population est extrêmement élevé. Et les Suisses ont la possibilité de s'exporter seuls parce qu'ils ont les moyens de le faire. Si l'armée n'est pas là pour défendre nos maisons, nos prairies et nos forêts, je ne vois pas à quoi ils servent.
- Et en parlant des Suisses qui composent l'armée, ce sont des citoyens pas des professionnels comme dans beaucoup d'armées. Comment est-ce qu'on sait que l'armée serait prête à se battre dans une guerre et notamment que les membres de l'armée seraient prêts à tuer au nom de la Suisse.
- On ne le sait pas. On ne le sait pas. Je crois que c'est une question difficile parce que moi, je n'ai pas fait l'armée et dieu m'en garde. Je ne voudrais pas la faire, même si je ne suis pas une anti armée. Je pense que vraiment l'armée suisse a des qualités insoupçonnées. D'ailleurs, il y a des gens vraiment formidables dans l'armée aussi faut le dire. Mais c'est toujours une vraie question. Est-ce que vous, du jour au lendemain, vous êtes prêts à aller vous faire buter? Pourquoi? Ou pour qui? Honnêtement. Tuer des gens qui sont en face de vous, qui sont exactement dans la même situation. On les a aussi envoyés sur place pour faire la chair à canon, vous allez tuer des gens que vous ne connaissez pas qui vous ont rien fait. Un autre jeune homme comme vous, qui est là parce qu'on l'a obligé à être là. Pour moi, ça c'est impossible. Vous savez, moi, je fais partie plutôt de ces intellectuels qui ont fui pendant les guerres parce qu'ils sont des intellectuels. Puis voilà moi, tuer quelqu'un, je pense que c'est possible. Je pense que je peux tuer quelqu'un, mais vraiment si je dois, si c'est ma propre vie à laquelle on veut attenter ou celle de mes proches, de mes enfants. Mais sinon on doit pas pour moi. J'ai jamais compris ce concept. Et je trouve d'une tristesse absolue ces milliers de jeunes Russes qui vont se faire bousiller, des générations entières qui sont foutues en ce moment, y compris pour les Ukrainiens. Parce que vraiment ces jeunes, les trois quarts, si on leur pose la question, ils n'ont pas envie d'être là. Ils n'ont absolument pas envie d'être là. C'est les gouvernements, puis des espèces de cinglé, qui on envie de la guerre. Les gens qu'on envoie vraiment sur le terrain, si c'était les dirigeants, si c'était eux qui allaient sous le terrain, il n'y aurait pas de guerre. Il faut quand même être clair. Donc c'est difficile de répondre à votre question. Mais voilà, je pense qu'il y a ce truc, on se dit qu'il y a quand même cette idée où on a l'impression de faire quelque chose pour le bien commun. Et c'est vrai. On agit pour le bien commun. Il y a une obligation pour le bien commun. Et ça a beaucoup de sens. D'ailleurs, quand on voit, je sais qu'on ne peut pas

comparer, mais le service civil, par exemple, ça a beaucoup de sens. C'est vraiment très concret. Et moi, j'ai aussi beaucoup d'amis qui ont fait l'armée qui me disent qu'on y est comme dans un jeu. On joue à faire la guerre, mais ça n'existe pas, on fait rien, on produit rien.

- Et ça fait une très bonne transition vers la troisième partie, les politiques de défense alternative, parce que ces questions que vous m'avez posées, je me les suis posées aussi. Et c'est aussi pour ça qu'en partie je fais ce travail. Pendant la guerre froide, la Suisse a adopté une politique de défense totale, soit en premier lieu une défense militaire, puis en cas d'échec, résistance civile et guérilla. Les chercheurs en sciences sociales soutiennent que la violence dans un mouvement de résistance civile majoritairement non violent est contre productive, notamment parce qu'elle empêche l'aliénation des adversaires et la violence légitime une réponse violente. De plus, Erica Chenoweth, dans son livre en 2011, a montré que les mouvements non violents sont statistiquement plus efficaces que les mouvements violents. Est-ce que l'État et les militaires seraient prêts à abandonner l'aspect guérilla en cas d'échec de la défense par l'armée, donc dans la défense citoyenne. Est-ce que la violence est remise en question ?
- Non, moi, je n'ai pas l'impression. Il faudrait demander directement aux personnes concernées, mais je dirai non. Je n'ai pas cette impression là. Vous savez, moi, je suis toujours quand même étonnée avec la commission de sécurité des états. On est 13, très majoritairement des hommes fous d'armée. Et puisqu'il les fait vibrer, c'est des armes, hein? Il ne faut pas déconner, c'est ça. Je me souviens qu'on a été visité le centre Atoume où ils sont en train de développer ce qui concerne la robotique armée. Donc on a des robots capables de tuer je ne sais pas combien de centaines d'humains froidement en étant piloté par des mecs à distance. Moi, je suis absolument. Je trouve ça incroyable, en plus, c'est des robots qui peuvent se mettre dans des modes ou c'est eux qui butent les gens tout seuls. Je me dis, mais c'est le sommet de la connerie humaine, incroyable. On a donc construit des robots qui sont capables de buter tout seul. Bref, et moi, je suis là catastrophés, je trouve ça affreux. Tous mes collègues ont trouvé ça incroyable. Ils ont trouvé ça incroyable, génial. C'est comme des gamins devant des jouets. Donc moi, franchement, je suis un peu sceptique, je dois dire. Je suis assez persuadé que la violence n'a jamais rien réglé. Si on doit se défendre contre quelqu'un qui est violent, c'est autre chose. Je peux évidemment l'entendre. C'est aussi quelque chose de très instinctif de savoir ce qui est juste ou pas. Si on m'agresse, je pense que pour me défendre, je vais répliquer quoi, mais je crois pas que je peux vous en dire beaucoup plus.
- Alors là moi, je reste principalement sur l'aspect du choix politique de la violence et à l'aspect politique de défense, utilisations stratégique de la violence, pas à l'aspect individuel,
- Regardez qui c'est au pouvoir. Maintenant, regardez l'âge moyen du Conseil Fédéral. C'est eux qui vont mettre en place la politique. La majorité de mes collègues ont plus de 60 ans et sont donc encore dans un monde passéiste. Puis ce qui compte c'est les chars d'assaut, non? Il n'y a rien d'autre qui se passe dans leur tête par rapport à ça. Il n'y a pas d'alternative. Ils sont sur un modèle et il n'y a pas de remise en question. Donc non, j'ai envie de vous dire que tant que ces gens sont au pouvoir, ça m'étonnerait fort. Après, il y a des gens haut gradés à l'armée qui ont un certain pouvoir qui eux, peut-être, seraient en mesure de réfléchir un peu autrement. Mais il n'y en a pas beaucoup.
- Vous avez déjà en partie répondu à la prochaine question. Il y a d'autres pays qui actuellement incluent la résistance civile dans leur politique de défense, notamment la Suède ou la Lituanie. Mais ces pays soit maintiennent, soit ajoutent une composante violente, donc de guérilla. Et encore une fois, la question, c'est pourquoi est-ce que les institutions traditionnelles sont incapables de remettre en question le paradigme de la violence ou est-ce qu'elles ont aussi besoin de légitimer leur propre existence et de se protéger à travers ça?

- Moi, je pense qu'elles ont peur. C'est la peur, parce que c'est difficile politiquement. C'est très difficile à défendre. C'est très difficile de dire voilà : "Nous, on adopte la résistance non-violente." Les gens vont vous dire que vous êtes des bisounours, qu'ils veulent un état qui les défend. Il y a vraiment ce truc. Je pense que politiquement, c'est un risque énorme que de dire non à la violence parce que les gens vous diront "Vous, vous allez décider qu'on va se faire massacrer." Vous porterez cette responsabilité en tant que politicien, vous seriez prêt à faire ça? C'est une vraie question. Et le truc qu'on va toujours vous dire: merci, si vous le faites, il faut que les autres aussi le fassent parce que sinon, c'est bien gentil. Vous êtes là, vous attendez, vous ne faites rien. Puis ils nous envahissent et nous bute tous, puis c'est réglé. Donc franchement, je pense qu'il y a ça. Je pense que c'est trop difficile politiquement. Et quand bien même, les scientifiques ou les experts de la question nous diraient que c'est la solution. Je pense qu'il y a un réflexe et une peur qui dictent ses choix. D'ailleurs, on sait d'ailleurs que toutes ces décisions très importantes, avec des conséquences importantes, on les prend majoritairement avec son affect. Avec son instinct, on le sait, c'est le fonctionnement humain et il est rarement sur des bases raisonnables. Je pense que c'est une partie de la réponse.
- Très bien merci. Et pourtant, la résistance civile a été incluse dans la politique de la suisse. Mais pourquoi est-ce que cette composante n'est pas entraînée? L'armée est entraînée. L'armée et le système militaire ont 1000 ans d'expérience, d'apprentissage et de pratique. Toutes les armées sont entraînées. Les Suisses retournent chaque année en cours de répétition, du moins pour ceux qui sont encore astreints au service. La dimension résistance civile n'est pas entraînée, est-ce qu'il y a une raison à ça?
- Parce que je pense qu'on ne sait pas. Peut être que ma réponse est complètement à côté de la plaque. Il faudrait poser la question aux gens qui décident à l'armée et ce qui n'est pas mon cas. Mais il y a un élément aussi qu'on n'a peut-être pas amené. Il s'agit d'hommes, ce ne sont pas des femmes. Et puis quand même le rôle des femmes dans la résistance civile, il est conséquent. Et ça, je pense qu'il y a vraiment toute une catégorie de la population qui n'a pas voix au chapitre et qui pourtant aurait une tendance à penser de manière beaucoup plus pacifiste, à une résolution des conflits plus pacifique. Donc peut être que ça, c'est un bout de la réponse. Je ne sais pas.
- Ensuite. Donc la défense civile, c'est l'institutionnalisation de la résistance civile comme politique de défense. Donc ça inclut une préparation et un entraînement. Et pour que cette défense fonctionne, elle repose sur la défense d'un mode de vie de valeur. C'est ce que Clausewitz appelle le centre de gravité. Quels sont les éléments qui maintiennent le moral des gens pour continuer la défense? Quelles sont les valeurs qui unissent la population suisse ?
- Je pense qu'il s'agit de la démocratie, de la liberté, des libertés. Je dirais aussi égalité pour les femmes. Très important. On voit que la catégorie de population la plus malmenée systématiquement dans les conflits, c'est les femmes tout le temps. C'est des violences physiques, psychiques. C'est une perte de droit aussi.
- Pour institutionnaliser la défense civile, il faudrait une adaptation du droit et notamment un questionnement sur la légalité de la désobéissance civile. Est-ce que pour l'État, ce serait un trop grand risque de donner ce pouvoir à ses citoyens. Un trop grand risque d'augmenter les instruments de contestation du peuple. Est-ce qu'il y a une peur par rapport à ça?
- Mais je sais pas, je sais que je ne peux pas vous répondre. Encore une fois, posez la question aux gens qui ont le pouvoir. Honnêtement, c'est le conseil fédéral et c'est la majorité de droite. Moi, je suis toujours minoritaire. Donc, est-ce qu'il y a une peur? Les gens ont toujours peur quand ils ont le pouvoir, ils ont peur de le perdre. Et ça, c'est quand même un truc de vieux mal dominant de droite. Donc c'est le cas. Moi, j'ai vu dans ma chambre qu'en tant que jeune femme de gauche romande verte, maman, parce que j'ai l'outrecuidance d'avoir eu un enfant pendant mon mandat, ils ont peur. Bien sûr

qu'ils ont peur de perdre le pouvoir et d'autant plus si ce sont des gens qui leur paraissent illégitimes. Il disent:” ces idéalistes qui savent mieux que nous qui croient que machin là.” Et ça, je pense que c'est un truc de génération. Mais c'est aussi que les gens qui ont le pouvoir font généralement tout pour le garder. C'est pour ça qu'il faut quand même dire que le système suisse avec un pouvoir passablement décentralisé est un bon système. Après au Parlement, il y a des majorités et des minorités et la majorité gagne.

- Vous avez justement parlé de décentralisation. Pour que la défense civile soit le plus efficace possible, la décentralisation est essentielle. La structure politique de la suisse avec le fédéralisme est idéale pour la décentralisation. D'autres aspects sont importants tels que la production d'énergie, les productions de nourriture et simplement l'autonomie d'un pays. Est-ce que la suisse devrait plus développer cet aspect de décentralisation et d'autonomie, pour augmenter sa résilience en cas de conflit?
- Oui et non, oui et non. Par exemple, je prends un exemple sur les ressources en eau pour assurer la sécurité en approvisionnement d'eau des gens. En fait, il faudrait que la Confédération prenne la main parce que les cantons n'arrivent pas à s'entendre à propos de l'eau. C'est pas confiné un canton, et les cantons sont donc interdépendants. Là, il faudrait que la confédération prennent la main sur la gestion de l'eau pour pouvoir garantir cette gestion de l'eau efficace pour tout le monde et éviter les conflits, les tensions et sauvegarder le fait que les gens puissent avoir accès à l'eau. Donc, je dirais, ça dépend. Ça dépend de quoi on parle. C'est difficile pour moi de répondre
- Et je vais revenir à quelque chose que vous avez dit, notamment au début sur les différentes menaces. Est ce que l'armée est adaptée et équipée pour faire face à ses menaces. Un des rôles, un des trois rôles principaux de l'armée, c'est quand même de garantir la sécurité de la suisse, d'être adaptée pour répondre aux menaces.
- Non, elle ne l'est pas pour l'instant parce qu'elle n'identifie pas encore de manière sérieuse les véritables menaces. Donc je pense que non, je pense qu'elle n'est pas prête. On vient de faire, par exemple, le cyber bataillon. Ben, on vient de le faire alors qu'on est en 2023.. Et puis pour ses questions sur comment la suisse se prépare si la centrale nucléaire expose, sachant que c'est 10 fois Tchernobyl. On me dit qu'on ne sait pas. De toute façon, ça dépendra de la direction du vent. Donc non, l'armée n'est pas du tout prête à faire face à ces risques. Je pense qu'elle a une certaine expérience en termes de catastrophes naturelles contre lesquelles elle intervient de manière ponctuelle. Mais c'est parce qu'on est encore dans une vision où on pense que le principal envahisseur est le voisin.
- Et dans les dénouements, les transformations récentes des conflits, notamment ce qu'on a vu en Ukraine depuis 2014, la dimension hybride des conflits devient importante. Il s'agit de la désinformation ou pour semer le trouble à l'intérieur, le soutien à des pouvoirs dissidents ou ce genre de choses. Comment est-ce qu'on se prépare à cette dimension non militaire des menaces?
- C'est une bonne question. C'est une très bonne question. Par exemple, j'avais posé la question sur la guerre de l'information. Mais la guerre de l'information, c'est méga important dans un conflit. C'est hyper important comment on nous perçoit? Comment les alliés, comment les ennemis nous perçoivent, comment la population nous perçoit? C'est hyper important. Je pense qu'on peut gagner ou perdre une guerre avec ça. J'ai ce sentiment mais je peux me tromper. Honnêtement, je peux me tromper. Mais ça fait même quatre ans que je suis dans la commission de sécurité et j'ai vraiment ce sentiment qu'on est encore à des stratégies politiques. Je parlais de la création de ce bataillon cyber seulement maintenant. Franchement, c'est fou. Le fait que, par exemple, la Suisse n'ait pas cru quand l'ambassadeur américain est venu nous dire deux semaines avant que la Russie allait envahir tel jour. On n'a pas cru, personne, on est con. On est con. Les Américains le savaient. Deux semaines avant, ils nous l'ont dit. Tout le monde nous a prévenus. Personne n'a cru, comme si le mec allait se fatiguer à raconter des conneries.

Imaginez nous, les parlementaires, quand on a appris ça. Ça veut dire que l'armée suisse n'accorde pas de crédibilité à ce genre d'informations. Ça veut dire qu'elle comprend pas qu'il y a la stratégie militaire, les alliances, les échanges. Moi, j'ai toujours cet exemple en tête. A l'époque de Didier Burkhalter, il avait sauté dans un avion, puis était allé discuter avec Putin. Vous connaissez l'histoire? Donc, il est allé tout seul. Il faudrait que je recherche exactement. Pourquoi Cassis n'a pas fait ça? Le lendemain de l'attaque en Ukraine, il montait dans son putain avion et il allait voir Putin. Et puis quoi? Peut-être ça n'aurait pas marché, peut-être effectivement, mais peut-être que ça aurait marché comme ça avait marché. Et ça, c'est quand je remarque qu'on n'a pas de stratégie. C'est fou. Pour vous dire pour l'histoire de la centrale nucléaire, quand le conflit a démarré dans la semaine qui a suivi le conflit. J'ai tout de suite eu contact avec les différents départements disant qu'il y a des centrales nucléaires en Ukraine. C'est parmi les plus vieilles centrales. Elles sont mal en point dans cette région. Qu'est-ce qui se passe? Que fait la Suisse? Mais le gars, il n'y avait même pas pensé, je vous jure, c'est vrai. Non, mais je veux dire, c'est moi, la petite parlementaire qui ai dû activer les trucs pour que quelqu'un s'en soucie. Mais franchement, c'est fou. Donc voilà, ça répond pas du tout à votre questions, mais franchement, ça donne quand même un peu l'image de certaines faiblesses. Certaines faiblesses de l'armée suisse.

- Est-ce que vous connaissez le livre défense civile? Le petit livre rouge qui a été distribué à la population durant la guerre froide,
- Je crois pas, non.
- C'était un petit livre qui a été distribué dans toutes les maisons avec un manuel de défense civile. Dans ce petit manuel, il donne des stratégies en cas d'invasion. Et il parle de cette guerre de l'information, de la nécessité de lutter contre la désinformation, de lutter contre la propagande communiste à l'époque. C'est quelque chose qu'on voit réapparaître sur les réseaux sociaux par exemple. Le soutien de la population peut aussi être affecté par ce qu'on appelle des armées de troll ou des armées de bot. Est-ce que ce genre de question se posent ? J'ai vu qu'il y a la fondation d'un nouveau centre de sécurité hybride, est-ce que ce sont des questions qui sont abordées ou pas?
- Je ne sais pas du tout, aucune idée
- Parce que vous avez raison, en l'occurrence sur le fait que l'information peut aider à gagner ou perdre une guerre. Je pense aussi, et ça s'est vu en Russie encore plus en 2014 que maintenant encore ou la grande désinformation dans le Donbas et le Louhansk a beaucoup soutenu l'arrivée de ceux qu'on appelait les petits hommes verts à l'époque. Des russes qui ont pu venir s'installer et semer le trouble directement de l'intérieur ce qui empêche le soutien de la population à son armée nationale. Et puis maintenant avec l'intelligence artificielle, ça devient un vrai sujet.
- Oui, tu ne vas plus pouvoir discerner le bras du faux. C'était très compliqué. Et Chat GPT. Moi, je trouve ça fou. Quoi ça? On devait se concentrer sur ça plutôt que foutre des milliards dans des chars d'assaut qui vont arriver en 2048 dans lesquels il faudra mettre de l'essence quand il n'y en aura plus. Mais franchement, je vous jure. C'est pénible des fois cette commission, je vous le dis.
- J'ai une dernière question. A long terme, de par sa position unique au centre de l'Europe, la Suisse pourrait devenir un leader dans ce qu'on appelle le trans armement. Donc pas le désarmement, mais juste mettre en œuvre une défense différente.
- Non, j'ai l'impression qu'on va dans une autre direction. Honnêtement. La dernière année qui s'est écoulée, c'est tout l'inverse. On n'a jamais foutu autant de pognon dans le réarmement, rééquipement des hommes. Je n'ai pas du tout l'impression qu'on va dans cette direction.
- Dans quelle mesure le secteur de la sécurité envisage les options de long et très long terme?
- Mais est-ce qu'il les envisages?

- Ah, dans la mesure, ça peut être zéro
- Je ne sais pas, honnêtement. Pour moi, s'il envisageait ça, la question climatique devrait être centrale, absolument centrale. Et puis elle ne l'est pas. Après on va me dire qu'il faut prendre en compte l'instabilité, qu'il y a deux ans, personne ne pensait qu'il y aurait une guerre en Europe. C'est juste, mais l'un n'empêche pas l'autre. Il y a l'imprévisible. On peut toujours préparer une guerre, une vraie guerre, une guerre standard, mais ce qui est certain, par contre, c'est le réchauffement climatique. Ça c'est absolument certain. Donc on aurait intérêt à s'y préparer. C'est une certitude, ça va arriver. C'est juste une question de temps. La résilience. Comment l'armée va garantir la paix intérieure du pays? Comment elle va faire en sorte que les gens ne se tuent pas pour manger, pour avoir accès aux ressources? C'est une vraie question parce que personne d'autre que l'armée ne peut le faire. C'est fou parce que cette perspective est à 10-15 ans. Donc c'est demain. Donc je ne sais pas. Pour l'instant, jamais personne n'a pu répondre à cette question.
- Et j'ai oublié une question, qui relève du calcul coûts-bénéfice de la défense armée, particulièrement dans un pays comme la Suisse, qui est très urbanisé et proche de ses frontières. Une défense armée aurait le potentiel de détruire nos villes et nos infrastructures. Donc le coût de la défense armée pourrait être fatal à la Suisse à court ou moyen terme comparé à une occupation et à une résistance. Est-ce que c'est un élément qui est pris en compte ou l'indépendance territoriale de l'armée qui préserve un territoire, surpasse toute considération de ce qui se peut résulter après.
- Je ne sais pas. J'espère que c'est pris en compte quand même, mais en même temps, je ne sais pas.
- C'est tout bon pour moi. Je vous remercie. Je vais arrêter l'enregistrement.

Appendix 8 : Translation Interview 4

- So let's get on with the interview. And the first question I'd like to ask you is, in your opinion, what are the current external threats to Switzerland's security in the immediate future?
- Now I'd like to talk about the Zaporija nuclear power plant, which I see as a major threat. For me, it's the closest, the most likely, the most possible threat. We are completely underestimating the situation at this nuclear power plant, which is the largest in Europe and which is the target of fire. In short, it's in a really sorry state, with exhausted crews. For me, that's the main threat in terms of safety, followed very closely by the lack of water, the lack of resources, especially water. And soon food, because we know that in less than 10 years, the collapse of biodiversity is something that will affect us very, very quickly, obviously. In parallel with global warming and natural disasters like the one in my village of Crécy not even two years ago. All of a sudden, we had a climatic event with very, very, very, very significant waterfalls in a very short space of time. There was very serious flooding in my village. People could have died. It's a miracle it didn't happen. So for me, in terms of safety, these are the most serious, the most imminent threats. And then perhaps in the short to medium term, there's the question of climate refugees, who will number in the millions, and obviously the reception situation. This is obviously going to cause major tensions in terms of cohabitation. So there you have it.
- Do you perceive any threats that are more internal? Directly from our territory.
- Yes. So I'm really thinking domestic civil war. That's for sure. For me, the issue is the lack of water and food, food and water. And that's really imminent. It's not me saying it, it's the IPCC report. So it's eminent in Switzerland, we know that the lack of water, which was already the case last year and will be again, is going to be one of the very, very lively conflicts very soon. The problem of food supply in Switzerland will also be affected very, very quickly. And these are domestic problems, because at some point we're no longer importing half our food. So we're going to be hit hard and we're going to have to make choices. And that really means imminent civil war.
- And in this context, are we preparing for coups d'état or a coup d'état?
- So I have to give you some, I have to give you some confidential information from the Security Committee of the Council of States. Or maybe that's it, what are the current plans?
- Confidential? No? Because I'm not accredited to do so, but are these scenarios that are being envisaged, particularly in the event of civil conflict in a word, are there threats that have been identified within the army, for example, a senior officer who might consider taking power by force in order to restore it?
- No, I don't think so, I've never heard of it. I have the impression that we have an army today that is thinking about these external threats, which may be more 'usual' threats, i.e. an invader such as Russia or a war, a world war such as we've had, unfortunately. But we do have an army that is also thinking, very, very carefully, about the problems of climate refugees and the lack of resources. For example, the guest speaker for Division One's annual report will be Ms Sonia, one of the world's leading climatologists. And that's it. And Division One is the largest division. You can tell that among these executives there are people who are perfectly aware of what is happening and who have identified these problems.
- Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country. What does this mean for Switzerland in terms of national security?
- OK, so you want me to explain the concept of neutrality to you. Or, because I think you know it, Switzerland must not attack. It can only defend itself.
- Your vision or interpretation of Swiss neutrality as a security policy, not necessarily the legal and juridical aspect, but perhaps more your vision.

- For me, it's intimately linked to the legal aspect. I'm a lawyer by training. I'm on the Legal Affairs Committee too. For me, it really is. Switzerland is neutral. It has, it has signed international commitments in this respect, and it must respect them. And that means no export of weapons of war, for example, that's obvious and absolutely obvious. You don't need to have studied law for 50 years to see it, to know it, to read it. In other words, no commitment to help either side. That doesn't mean we can take a position on the conflict, and that's what we've done. I think that Switzerland has behaved very well from that point of view. On the other hand, we cannot imagine exporting weapons of war. We can't imagine supplying any part of the country with weapons. Switzerland's role is to promote peace. First and foremost, that is Switzerland's role. It is to promote peace. Switzerland does not wage war, it promotes peace. It defends its borders and defends itself if it is attacked. Even if, between us, we shouldn't dream. I'm not sure we can defend ourselves and for how long. But there you go. But having said that, from a point of view, let's say really in terms of neutrality, our role is really the promotion of peace and good offices.
- Why is neutrality armed?
- OK, so that's a debate. That's a conflict of views, isn't it? Some people will tell you that it's only by preparing for war that we can promote peace. And then there are others who will tell you that to prepare for peace you have to prepare for peace by promoting peace. We have to prepare for peace, which is what I'm talking about. But here are people like me, they talk, they sound like idealists. I can hear that. But let's just say that when I see the billions we invest in war, I think we could invest those billions in peace and there would be results too. So I think it's all the more important for a country like Switzerland, because let's face it, we're not a force, we don't count, we count for zero in terms of armed forces in Europe, and NATO is no joke? Now we're finally going to get into the ground-to-air anti-missile protection programme. Which I think is very good. It's part of our protection. We have to defend ourselves just in case, and a small country like Switzerland has to work with its neighbours. That goes without saying. Now, we could go much further and ask whether it makes sense to keep a Swiss army or not. That's another subject.
- Are you talking about the promotion of peace, which is in the federal constitution?
- Yes.
- How is this reflected in safety policies?
- Well, that's a real question. It's really a question that I'm trying to put to the committee by saying how Switzerland can contribute to the building of peace. It does this very well. For example, in Kosovo and with Swisscoy Bosnia, these are excellent examples. I've been there. In fact, I went to see the teams there. And it makes a lot of sense. It's really people who live in the towns concerned talking to the people. That's what peace promotion is all about, being on the ground to ensure a state of calm and stability, first and foremost for civilians. That's what it's all about. The presence itself also brings calm. It also brings armed pressure, despite everything, on the states in question and on the politicians involved. So I think that's a very good example of promoting peace. But I have the impression that it doesn't go much further than that. After all, this promotion of peace is mainly political. We should be promoting peace from the outside. Is it the role of the army to promote peace? Well, that's debatable, depending on the mission.
- Yes, thank you. And before that you also told me about NATO. What does that mean for Switzerland? Is it a threat? Is it an ally? Is it our external projection? Is it our real defence system? What is NATO?
- So I was in Brussels and we met with NATO and delegates from the Commission for four days at the end of January. We discussed this at length. What was Switzerland's position on NATO? Did we want to cooperate more with NATO? Switzerland is going to take part in international exercises with NATO. Well, I have mixed feelings about that, but I have to be honest and say that in the current context, let's say since the invasion of Ukraine, since the war in Ukraine, I think Switzerland has an interest in working with NATO. Generally

speaking, I think it's always in our interest to work with people. Generally speaking, building peace means working together, discussing and exchanging ideas. So I think that being a partner in NATO, rather than an opponent, is much more constructive. And then, in a very pragmatic way, my colleagues would kill me if they heard what I was saying, but Switzerland is nothing from an armed forces point of view. I don't believe in it too much, but nobody thought we were going to invade Ukraine. If, by any chance, we were to be attacked in one way or another, we'd be quite happy for our neighbours to come and lend a hand. For example, I was opposed to the purchase of fighter jets. In that case, I would have liked Switzerland to work with neighbouring countries to benefit from air protection from our neighbours. For me, it made a lot more sense for such a small country to operate like that. I don't know if that answers your question.

- Yes, and that brings me straight to the second section, which deals with the Swiss Army. My first question is: how is the Swiss army perceived abroad? Is it a deterrent force? Is it a truly credible defence force? Is it a symbolic tool?
- Look, I don't know. Honestly, I don't know. I couldn't say, because I imagine you have to be a keen observer to be able to judge the strength of a country's army, to be well informed. I don't know at all, but I'd tend to say that because of its small size... On the other hand, we do have a militia army that can be mobilised quickly with a very large number of people. In that sense, it could be seen as something quite strong in the end to say here are all these men, quickly mobilisable with the ladies at home. To be honest, I don't know how it's perceived from the outside. Honestly, I don't think they think we're powerful guys. I mean, we're still Switzerland.
- And what does this Swiss army defend? Is it defending a territory of institutions? The Swiss and their values of direct democracy
- No, I think she's primarily defending a territory. It shouldn't be defending anything else. It's the army, it's not politicians, it's not the police. They're not the ones who enforce the law. I come from a legal background and the law defends values, our entire legislative system. But is the army there to defend the territory and the people who live there? I think that's clear to me.
- And that intrigues me, because during the Second World War, or even during the Cold War, the policies put in place by the army to defend Switzerland consisted of reducing the national army and abandoning a large part of the territory, at least temporarily. And during the Cold War, there was also the possibility of having a government go into exile abroad and leave the territory occupied until it could reorganise and return.
- But you're saying let the army occupy the territory?
- By a potential invader by an adversary.
- But do you really think that would be the case today? I'm not sure.
- Ah, I don't know
- Personally, I don't see the point. Honestly, I don't know. The standard of living in Switzerland is extremely high. And the Swiss can export themselves because they have the means to do so. If the army isn't there to defend our homes, our meadows and our forests, I don't see what use they are.
- And speaking of the Swiss who make up the army, they are citizens, not professionals as in many armies. How do we know that the army would be prepared to fight in a war, and in particular that members of the army would be prepared to kill in the name of Switzerland?
- We don't know that. We just don't know. I think it's a difficult question because I wasn't in the army and God forbid. I wouldn't want to do it, even though I'm not anti-army. I really think that the Swiss army has unsuspected qualities. In fact, there are some really great people in the army too, it has to be said. But it's always a real question. From one day to the next, are you ready to go and get yourself killed? Why would you do that? Or for whom? Honestly. Killing people who are right in front of you, who are in exactly the same situation. You're going to kill people you don't know who haven't done anything to you. Another

- young man like you, who is there because he was forced to be there. For me, that's impossible. You know, I'm one of those intellectuals who fled during the wars because they were intellectuals. But I think it's possible to kill someone. I think I can kill someone, but only if I have to, if it's my own life that's being attacked or that of my loved ones, my children. But if I don't, I don't have to. I've never understood that concept. And I'm absolutely saddened by the thousands of young Russians who are going to be ruined, whole generations who are screwed up at the moment, including the Ukrainians. Because really, three quarters of these young people, if you ask them, don't want to be there. They have absolutely no desire to be there. It's the governments, and some crazy people, who want war. The people we really send into the field, if it were the leaders, if they were the ones going into the field, there would be no war. We have to be clear. So it's difficult to answer your question. But there it is, I think there's this thing, you think there's this idea that you're doing something for the common good. And it's true. We are acting for the common good. There is an obligation for the common good. And that makes a lot of sense. I know you can't compare things, but civil service, for example, makes a lot of sense. It's really very concrete. And I also have a lot of friends who have been in the army who tell me that it's like playing a game. You play at making war, but it doesn't exist, you do nothing, you produce nothing.
- And it makes a very good transition to the third part, alternative defence policies, because the questions you have asked me, I have also asked myself. And that's part of the reason why I'm doing this work. During the Cold War, Switzerland adopted a policy of total defence, starting with military defence and then, if that failed, civil resistance and guerrilla warfare. Social scientists argue that violence in a largely non-violent civil resistance movement is counter-productive, not least because it prevents the alienation of opponents and violence legitimises a violent response. Furthermore, Erica Chenoweth, in her 2011 book, showed that non-violent movements are statistically more effective than violent movements. Would the state and the military be prepared to abandon the guerrilla aspect if defence by the army, and therefore citizen defence, failed? Is violence being called into question?
 - No, I don't think so. You'd have to ask the people concerned directly, but I'd say no. I don't have that impression. I don't have that impression. You know, I'm always amazed by the State Security Committee. There are 13 of us, most of them men who are crazy about the army. And since he's got them all fired up, it's guns, isn't it? It's no joke, that's it. I remember we visited the Atoume centre where they're developing armed robotics. So we've got robots capable of killing I don't know how many hundreds of humans in cold blood by being remotely piloted by guys. I'm absolutely convinced. What's more, these are robots that can put themselves in a mode where they're the ones killing people on their own. I say to myself, this is the height of human stupidity, unbelievable. So we've built robots that can kill people all by themselves. Anyway, I'm devastated, I think it's awful. All my colleagues found it incredible. They thought it was incredible, brilliant. It's like kids with toys. So, frankly, I'm a bit sceptical, I have to say. I'm quite convinced that violence has never solved anything. If you have to defend yourself against someone who is violent, that's another matter. Obviously I can understand that. It's also very instinctive to know what's right or wrong. If someone attacks me, I think that to defend myself, I'm going to retaliate, but I don't think I can tell you much more than that.
 - So here I'm mainly concerned with the political choice of violence and the political aspect of defence, the strategic uses of violence, not the individual aspect,
 - Look who's in power. Now look at the average age of the Federal Council. They are the ones who are going to implement the policy. Most of my colleagues are over 60, so they're still living in the past. And it's all about tanks, isn't it? There's nothing else going on in their heads about that. There's no alternative. They're stuck on a model and there's no questioning it. So no, I'd like to say that as long as these people are in power, I'd be very surprised. After

- that, there are some high-ranking people in the army who have a certain amount of power who might be able to think a little differently. But there aren't many of them.
- You've already partly answered the next question. There are other countries that currently include civil resistance in their defence policy, notably Sweden and Lithuania. But these countries are either maintaining or adding a violent, guerrilla component. And once again, the question is why are traditional institutions incapable of challenging the paradigm of violence or do they also need to legitimise their own existence and protect themselves through it?
 - I think they're afraid. It's fear because it's politically difficult. It's very difficult to defend. It's very difficult to say, "We're adopting non-violent resistance. People will tell you that you're a carefree bunch, that they want a state that defends them. There really is this thing. I think that politically, it's a huge risk to say no to violence because people will say to you "You, you're going to decide that we're going to be massacred." Would you bear that responsibility as a politician, would you be prepared to do that? That's a real question. And the thing we're always going to say to you is: thank you, if you do it, other people have to do it too, because if they don't, that's very nice. You're there, you wait, you do nothing. Then they invade us and kill us all, and that's that. So, frankly, I think there's something there. I think it's too difficult politically. And even if it were, the scientists or experts in the field would tell us that it's the solution. I think there's a reflex and a fear that dictates these choices. In fact, we know that most of these very important decisions, with major consequences, are made with our emotions. With our instincts, as we know, that's how humans work, and they're rarely based on reasonable principles. I think that's part of the answer.
 - Thank you very much. And yet civil resistance has been included in Swiss policy. But why is this component not trained? The army is trained. The army and the military system have 1,000 years of experience, learning and practice behind them. All armies are trained. Every year, the Swiss go back to rehearsal courses, at least for those who are still liable for service. The civil resistance dimension is not trained, is there a reason for that?
 - Because I don't think we know. Maybe my answer is completely off the mark. You'd have to ask the people who make decisions in the army, which I don't do. But there's another element that may not have been brought up. These are men, not women. And yet the role of women in the civil resistance was significant. And I think that there really is a whole category of the population that doesn't have a say and yet would tend to think in a much more pacifist way, towards a more peaceful resolution of conflicts. So maybe that's part of the answer. I don't know, maybe.
 - Next. So civil defence is the institutionalization of civil resistance as a defence policy. So it includes preparation and training. And for this defence to work, it is based on the defence of a valuable way of life. This is what Clausewitz called the centre of gravity. What are the elements that keep people's morale high enough to continue defending? What values unite the Swiss population?
 - I think it's about democracy, freedom and liberties. I would also say equality for women. Very important. We can see that the population category that is systematically abused the most in conflicts is always women. It's physical and psychological violence. It's a loss of rights too.
 - To institutionalize civil defence, the law would have to be adapted, and in particular the legality of civil disobedience would have to be questioned. Would it be too great a risk for the State to give this power to its citizens? There would be too great a risk of increasing the instruments available to the people to challenge it. Is there a fear of that?
 - But I don't know, I know I can't answer you. Once again, ask the people in power. Honestly, it's the Federal Council and it's the right-wing majority. I'm always in the minority. So is there any fear? People are always afraid when they have power, they're afraid of losing it. And that's something that old right-wingers do. So that's the case. I saw in my bedroom that, as a young woman from the French-speaking left, a green mother, because I have the

audacity to have had a child during my term of office, they are afraid. Of course they're afraid of losing power, and all the more so if it's someone they consider illegitimate. They say: "those idealists who know better than we do and believe that what's-his-name". And that, I think, is a generational thing. But it's also true that people who have power generally do everything to keep it. That's why it has to be said that the Swiss system, with its fairly decentralised power, is a good one. Afterwards, in Parliament, there are majorities and minorities, and the majority wins.

- You mentioned decentralisation. Decentralisation is essential if civil defence is to be as effective as possible. Switzerland's political structure, with its federalism, is ideal for decentralisation. Other aspects are also important, such as energy production, food production and simply a country's autonomy. Should Switzerland further develop this aspect of decentralisation and autonomy, to increase its resilience in the event of conflict?
- Yes and no, yes and no. Take water resources, for example, to ensure that people have a secure water supply. In fact, the Confederation should take the lead because the cantons can't agree on water. A canton isn't confined to one area, so the cantons are interdependent. In this case, the Confederation would have to take control of water management in order to guarantee efficient water management for everyone and avoid conflicts and tensions, while ensuring that people have access to water. So, I'd say it depends. It depends on what we're talking about. It's difficult for me to answer
- And I'm going to come back to something you said, particularly at the beginning about the different threats. Is the army adapted and equipped to deal with these threats? One of the roles, one of the three main roles, of the army is to guarantee Switzerland's security, to be adapted to respond to threats.
- No, it's not at the moment because it's not yet seriously identifying the real threats. So I don't think it's ready yet. We've just set up the cyber battalion, for example. Well, we've just set it up, even though it's 2023. And as for his questions about how Switzerland is preparing if the nuclear power plant is exposed, knowing that it's 10 times Chernobyl. I'm told we don't know. In any case, it will depend on the direction of the wind. So no, the army is not at all prepared to deal with these risks. I think it has some experience in terms of natural disasters, against which it intervenes on an ad hoc basis. But that's because we still think that the main invader is our neighbour.
- And in the outcomes, the recent transformations of conflicts, particularly what we have seen in Ukraine since 2014, the hybrid dimension of conflicts is becoming important. It's a question of disinformation or of stirring up trouble internally, of supporting dissident powers or that sort of thing. How are we preparing for this non-military dimension of threats?
- That's a good question. It's a very good question. For example, I asked about the information war. But the information war is extremely important in a conflict. It's hyper-important how we are perceived? How we are perceived by our allies, our enemies, our population? It's really important. I think you can win or lose a war on that. I have that feeling, but I could be wrong. Honestly, I could be wrong. But I've been on the Security Committee for four years now and I really have the feeling that we're still working on political strategies. I was talking about the creation of this cyber battalion only now. Frankly, it's crazy. The fact that, for example, Switzerland didn't believe it when the American ambassador came to tell us two weeks beforehand that Russia was going to invade on such and such a day. We didn't believe him, nobody did, we're idiots. We're idiots. The Americans knew it. Two weeks before, they told us. Everyone warned us. Nobody believed them, as if the guy was going to get tired of talking bullshit. Imagine us, the members of parliament, when we found out. It means that the Swiss army doesn't give credibility to this kind of information. It means that it doesn't understand that there is military strategy, alliances and exchanges. I always have this example in mind. In Didier Burkhalter's time, he jumped on a plane and went to talk to Putin. Do you know the story? So he went off on his own. I'd have to find out exactly. Why didn't Cassis do this? The day after the attack in Ukraine, he got on his fucking plane and

went to see Putin. And then what? Maybe it wouldn't have worked, maybe it would have, but maybe it would have worked the way it worked. And that's when I notice that we don't have a strategy. It's crazy. To tell you the story of the nuclear power station, when the conflict started in the week following the conflict. I immediately got in touch with the various departments saying that there are nuclear power stations in Ukraine. They are some of the oldest plants. They are in bad shape in this region. What is happening there? What is Switzerland doing? But the guy, he hadn't even thought of that, I swear, it's true. No, but I mean, I'm the little parliamentarian who had to get things moving so that someone would care. But frankly, it's crazy. So there you have it, it doesn't answer your question at all, but frankly, it does paint a picture of certain weaknesses. Certain weaknesses of the Swiss army.

- Are you familiar with the civil defence book? The little red book that was distributed to the population during the Cold War,
- I don't think so.
- It was a little book that was distributed to all the houses along with a civil defence manual. In this little manual, he gives strategies in the event of an invasion. And it talks about this information war, the need to fight disinformation, to fight Communist propaganda at the time. This is something we're seeing reappear on social networks, for example. Public support can also be affected by what are known as troll armies or bot armies. Do these kinds of questions arise? I saw that a new hybrid security centre has been set up. Are these issues being addressed or not?
- I have no idea
- Because you are right, in this case about the fact that information can help win or lose a war. I also think, and this was even more evident in Russia in 2014 than it is now, that the huge amount of disinformation in the Donbas and Luhansk regions gave a great deal of support to the arrival of what were called the little green men at the time. And now with artificial intelligence, it's becoming a real issue.
- Yes, you won't be able to tell the arm from the fake. It was very complicated. And GPT Chat. I think it's crazy. We should have been concentrating on that instead of spending billions on tanks that will arrive in 2048 and need to be filled up with petrol when they run out. But frankly, I swear. This commission can be a pain, I tell you.
- I have one final question. In the long term, because of its unique position at the centre of Europe, Switzerland could become a leader in what is known as trans-armament. So not disarmament, but just implementing a different kind of defence.
- No, I think we're heading in a different direction. Honestly. The last year has been quite the opposite. We've never spent so much money on rearmament and re-equipping our troops. I don't get the impression that we're heading in that direction at all.
- To what extent is the security sector considering long-term and very long-term options?
- But is he considering them?
- Ah, in terms of measurement, it could be zero
- I honestly don't know. For me, if he was thinking about it, the climate issue should be central, absolutely central. And it isn't. Then people are going to tell me that we have to take instability into account, that two years ago nobody thought there would be a war in Europe. That's true, but one doesn't preclude the other. There is unpredictability. You can always prepare for a war, a real war, a standard war, but what is certain is global warming. That is absolutely certain. So it's in our interest to prepare for it. It's a certainty, it's going to happen. It's just a matter of time. Resilience. How is the army going to guarantee peace within the country? How will it ensure that people don't kill each other to eat, to have access to resources? That's a real question, because nobody else can do it. It's crazy because this perspective is 10-15 years away. So it's tomorrow. So I don't know. For the moment, no one has ever been able to answer that question.
- And I've forgotten one question, which has to do with the cost-benefit calculation of armed defence, particularly in a country like Switzerland, which is highly urbanised and close to its

borders. Armed defence would have the potential to destroy our cities and infrastructure. So the cost of armed defence could be fatal to Switzerland in the short to medium term compared with occupation and resistance. Is this an element that is taken into account or does the territorial independence of the army, which preserves a territory, outweigh any consideration of what might happen afterwards?

- I don't know. I hope it's taken into account anyway, but at the same time, I don't know.
- That's it for me. Thank you very much. I'm going to stop recording.

Appendix 9 : Transcription Interview 5

- So I have three main themes. The first one is Switzerland security situation. The second one is, are the Swiss armed forces, and the third one is alternative defence policies. If you don't have any questions so far, we can dig, Yeah. So my first question is, according to you, what are the current external threats to Switzerland from a security?
- Very good question. Depends. No, just joking. That's my favourite answer for everything. So first of all, are we talking about threats really in the sense we know the distinction between threats and dangerous threats? So we really talk about threats. Fair enough. I think, well, one of the threats that certainly exists in the cyberspace, the cyber government, I think there are some threats simply because it's easy to carry out a text. You don't need to cross any other national borders, whatever. There are no national borders in the cyberspace. I think this is certainly one of the feds. I had a couple of discussions about this actually with friends of mine who also work at HQ longer time ago. I don't agree with it, but one of my colleagues argues that one of the really the biggest threat will be a submarine, the coast of shooting ballistic, midsize or something. I can't see that happen. I don't see any state actor that would be interested in carry out carrying out such a military action. So I don't really believe in that. So I think in terms of threats, we are in a very good position. So cyberspace certainly one of them. I think also terrorist attacks, most likely low level terrorist attacks simply because there haven't been many big organized ones. Because for that, first of all, you would need a certain sanctuary to prepare your fighters, to prepare them to carry out this kind of attacks. And then second, Switzerland's not very high on the target list of pretty much any terrorist organization, which I think in general we're a pretty comfortable position. But of course the thing is also now what we also need to talk about, what timeframe are we talking about? So this is short term right now. The short term threats, I don't think there's that much midterm, I don't know. I mean, it really depends on a lot of circumstances. Again, I'm not saying this is going to happen, but for example, let's consider a scenario where there's even more tensions within the European Union, and we have sort of different blocks emerging, and I think the situation and the picture could change very quickly. But again, there's a lot of speculation all really have,
- According to you. Are there any internal security threats to Switzerland? Any groups that are willing to secede from Switzerland or any coup d'Etat could be on the plan?
- Well, I'm sure there are groups that have these intentions. They just don't have the capabilities, right, because that's always the main issue. You have the intentions fair enough, but you have the capabilities to carry out such a plan, such an action, action things. I think, yeah, once again, even in this regard, we also, we have a relatively stable political system, thanks to certain exceptionality. I would say we have a certain exceptionality, the bottom up democracy, a lot of involvement of the population through a lot of initiatives. Like I don't associations exactly, but I said I think, yeah, once again, we're a very comfortable situation in this as well, which doesn't mean that we shouldn't be vigilant and make sure it remains this way, but also I don't see many secure or any really serious security f threat from that side. Then of course, other threat, now that we talk about it, when we talk about external threats, something that is also always mentioned is illegal intelligence gathering, collection, et cetera by other parties, especially in cities such as Geneva or Zurich where you have a lot of international companies, industrial, esp, et cetera. But once again, I mean problem is we would really need to define what exactly do we need by threat. Is it like a threat to the very existence of Switzerland? Is it a threat to some of our interests and whatnot? So I think fundamental threat are like existential threats. I don't see any of them.
- Thank you. Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country. What does it mean in regard to national security?

- You really have only the big questions. I mean, with regard to national security, I would argue that it means as long as in peace time, we're not supposed to lie with somebody. At least don't join multinational alliances. But we all know once, and this is actually even in the law, once we are in a wartime situation, we're free to choose our allies. We know everything defend. But I think this is what this is from my understanding, I'm really not a lawyer. I'm not an expert in law, but this is what the law says. And then of course you have the legal level of neutrality, but then you also have the political level. This is where it really gets interesting because there you have a little bit of leeway where you can decide what is actually possible within the framework of our understanding of which is also something that is evolving. Because I mean, there was a time where we worked in pfp in the partnership for peace of major. Then is it about 30 years ago, something like that? I think a little less than 30 years ago. I think 96 actually, we decided to join it. So what I mean by that is that it can be evolving, and I mean you see some tendencies within at the political level that clearly go into a direction that will call for more integration of nato, for example. Doesn't necessarily mean that we're going to join them, but there's certain movements in this direction. I would say
- In the law, it is integrated that the swiss neutrality is armed. Why is it that way? Why does it have to be armed?
- Well, I would say, well, actually it's very simple because as a neutral country, you're not only allowed in a certain sense to be nunga, but you're also required to defend this neutrality and really to make, and still you as a neutral country. Also, you need to make sure that no other country uses your territory as a vote of operations and to use it to their own benefits and to ensure that this is not going to happen. You need to be harmed. Whether that works or not. Talk about fat fa, I don't know whether this is going to be a question that's going to pop up our capabilities, defensive capabilities, whether or not they exist, but this is why I want to stay in. I'm going to say things maybe aren't too good. My superiors might not like
- Peacebuilding is mentioned in the federal constitution in the article 54. How does this materialise in the security policies of Switzerland?
- Peace building? Well, I mean, I think through all the deployments that we do through the Swiss armed forces, I think. But not only that, I think you shouldn't only think in terms of Swiss armed forces. You also have the programmes by data, et cetera, or by the Foreign Affairs Department doing programmes against violent extremism. What else? There's not combating. It's now preventing violent extremism, et cetera, all those different kinds of programmes. But yeah, sure. I mean also the deployments. We do our military observers that are in Africa and Asia in the Middle East and the Balcon. I think this all contributes to that.
- And you talked about NATO before. What does NATO represent for Swiss defence? Is it our projected defence? Is it a threat? Is it an ally? Is it our substitution defence?
- I mean, I would, so I don't think it's a threat to us. I mean, perhaps given certain circumstances, they can give us some headaches and vice versa. Let's be fair. No need to argue about that. I think, frankly, obviously we're benefit from NATO a lot, right? Because we're basically pretty much surrounded by, except for Austria, we're surrounded by NATO members, and they obviously have capabilities that vastly exceed ours, and this is certainly beneficial for us also. Again, obviously there's, well, there's no official cooperation or whatever, but I mean, not with NATO directly, but of course when it comes to protecting our airspace and whatnot, of course there's certain coordinations of the countries, and again, we're also part of P F P, so it will be very weird if natives threat to us, let's be honest. But yeah, I think we're benefiting from nato. We can say that, and as I said, there's some people now argue that Tim supposedly received so much from nato, we should also give back. But obviously that's a very political discussion. This is where it really gets hard. Also, what does it mean to give back, for example, what does it mean to me? I think, for example, research and education is not that problematic. There's no problem working together with nato. I mean, we have know armies, right? So they also have a representative in Brussels and

NATO and EU missions, and I mean also they're in certain working groups with nature. Well, about that training capabilities, even just some databases and whatnot where you have information sharing and whatnot, that's not very problematic. Obviously, when it comes to multilateral exercises, then some people wouldn't be very immune by it, and I don't think that's going to happen anytime soon. But nevertheless, I mean, we also, we do certain exercise. You go to certain countries and train there. So again, I think there's a certain, but basically I don't need to make this decision. No need for that.

- You just talked about that. So we're switching to the Swiss armed forces now, and you just talked about that. What is the perception of the Swiss armed forces abroad? Does it represent a deterring force? Is it a credible difference force or is it more of a symbol, a symbolic rule?
- I mean, I would argue it also, it depends again about whom you're talking about. Well, I mean, they're not afraid of us, but for example, if you put them against Lichtenstein, then of course it will be the deterring because they don't have any capabilities. You put it against other countries. I don't know. I think, well, I would say at least in Europe, in the countries surrounding us, we're considered a partner, not an ally, but a partner. And I would hope we're considered a reliable partner. And I mean, I don't know whether your questioning goes somewhat in this direction, but I would argue, but maybe this is more my perception of the perception of people abroad, although I think it also overlaps to some degree that I think we are considered well trained, well armed forces compared to other. I think that's absolutely right. I mean, since I did my studies in Israel, for example, and since you're from the infantry, and I'm from the infantry initially as well, so I would argue that the average Swiss infantry soldier is just as good as the average Israeli infantry soldier. I'm, I'm not kidding about that. Obviously I'm not talking about special forces. I'm not talking about the Air Force. Obviously they have more operational experience, but just in terms of training, in terms of exercises, I think we're just as good as that. I would easily put this up against a basic US infantry soldier. Absolutely. again, here, I'm also not very objective. Can't help
- The Swiss armed forces of the mission to defend Switzerland. What are the Swiss armed forces defending? Is it the territory? Is it institutions? Is it the people, the values, democracy, all of it. Because we know that during the Second World War, the Federal Council was planning give up half of the country in order to protect, in a way, the soul of Switzerland, just to bring it back later on during the Cold War. It was also planned if needed for the central government to flee abroad until they would be able to come back. So what is the current situation of what is the Switzerland forces is defending?
- Maybe you should ask the head of the armed forces. Maybe you could tell. I'm kidding. Well, I think I'm not even sure anymore what You're probably more aware of it, but now in the official mission, whether, I mean, we had this concept of where it was also very clear we need to defend in our space, our territory. It's probably still this way, but I'm not sure whether it's still as explicit as it used to be during later parts of the past. I mean, certainly also the political system. Well, and the population, this should be the most important thing to affect the population. But evidently, if it really came to the worst, I think it would be a full, sort of a full scale defence. You would defend your people, you territory your institutions, your constitution. But again, good questions. You should really ask the armed forces, all the staff offices. At the very least, I, we'll be very interested to see what kind of spectrum, spectrum happens. Answers that they would be doing.
- I'll try to reach to from the division one, but not now, because they're very embedded in looks. So I just wait one or two weeks.
- Yeah, it makes sense.
- As you are very aware, the Swiss military is made of its citizen. We know that. How do we know that they would be ready to actually fight in a war that they would be ready to kill if it had to come to that point? Do we know?

- I mean, well, I would say we sort of know because that's also what happened in other countries. I mean, not everyone would be willing to shoot and kill. I think that's a reality. We need to accept that. And we know because we trained for it, maybe not. It's not a very political discussion. How much are we actually doing in terms of reading when it comes to defence? Okay, fair enough. Now, we also have this exercise books, but at least, again, that's also a long time ago, but when I went through basic infantry training and everything, what we did is mostly subsidiary tasks. We did checkpoints with, well, because it was during the time when counter ins services, it was a real big thing around the world. So we did a lot of tasks that were somewhat related to that. Not sure how much we did in the very basic mechanised infantry of fighting much. We trained them sort of the things that you also see now in Ukraine, right, in the T. I don't think we did a lot of stuff. And yeah, another very hard question.
- Good. Do you know how important is the economic role of the Swiss military?
- No, I really don't. I mean, you mean, well, in the sense that yes, obviously the department is a big employer. We have a lot of employees. So I would say that there's a certain economic role, and obviously we also, we have this notion of the security and technological, industrial base, security, technology, whatever. I don't know how to say. And obviously this creates employment for sure, but the exact dimensions or anything.
- My question is in the sense is the economic importance of the Swiss military important enough to maintain the Swiss military organization regardless of its utility or its purpose?
- Well, I mean, I think if that were the case that we just keep it because it's economically viable, that will be horrendous. I mean, that's not why there, right? Because I mean, if that were the case, then it would need to also say we need to make it as efficient as possible, and this doesn't work with armed forces. We're good in a lot of things, but not necessarily in efficiency at least. I don't know. Maybe I have different experiences, but that's my experience.
- Thank you very much. So now we are going to discuss a bit more about the alternative defence policies. So during the Cold War, Switzerland adopted a total defence policy. So military defence, civil resistance, and area warfare researcher argue that violence in a severe resistance movement that is predominantly or and chose a strategy of non-violence is counterproductive because it legitimises the violence of the opponent and prevents the alienation. It affects third party support, and it prevents the alienation of the opponent supporters besides Eric Ed, show that nonviolent movements are on average more effective than violent ones.
- More effective at what? More effective at what? Resisting
- Have a higher rate of success than violent ones.
- Yeah, no, of course. But success in what sense? They defeated their opponents or they made them leave or, you know what I mean?
- Yeah. So the success is defined as the primary goal of the movement is achieved. So if it is to resist or it depends on the goal they've set at the beginning, if it to overthrow a government or if it's to resist an opponent,
- That sense, I understand it'll be interesting to look at this data very closely and see whether this is really the case, but
- I can give you the reference of the book. She created data set, database. Database.
- Yeah. Okay, Great. No, I would love to look into that.
- Based on that, would states and the military be ready to abandon the guerillar warfare parts? I'm not talking about the first military defence, but in case of defeat of the military, would the state and the military be ready to only implement and promote nonviolence? I resistance according to you?
- No, I don't think so. I think also this idea is very much ingrained that we're look at Switzerland's history, right? I mean, we also, if you will, we waged really warfare against ler, right? I mean, that was a targeted assassination, if you will. So even based on our

national news, I don't think that it's very likely. And I think still this idea is still ingrained. And I mean, I was recently privy to a couple of discussions about this very issue. So in case of, well, basically it was a comparison between what's happening in Ukraine now with this voluntary mentality and whatnot. And basically the argument was that, oh, yeah, so actually if this happened in Switzerland, in fact, we would also be grateful for gains of FTE, Basel and fits and stuff like that to be on our side. I mean, that's not necessarily my position, but I don't, well, first of all, I don't think there's a different now to that. I mean, of course you could say, yeah, we need to make this a certain policy, but then you have the problem that there's, compared to other countries, you have a lot of weapons among the civil population. So how do you're going to make sure that it remains, in my opinion, it's pretty much impossible. You won't be able to control that.

- There are other countries that are including severe resistance in the defence policy. And I take as example Sweden and Lithuanian. Lithuania is that very ingrained in its defence policy, but it has maintained or reinstated in the recent years, the area warfare part, even though like Lidia had completely given up on it from the 19 91, 19, I think 1997, but they reintegrated it. Do you think that institutions are just unable to challenge the paradigm of violence and envision alternatives?
- I'm not necessarily sure that they are unable to do so. I think they haven't even tried yet. I don't think that this is something that is even considered, because you already mentioned also this is not really something that you find in the political discussions and the political discourse. So I think this notion is not very prevalent in European countries, and hence, I mean, we will find out whether they're really unable to challenge this paradigm that we'll actually try. But I don't think this has even really been tried, at least not in Europe as far as I know.
- So in Switzerland, during the Cold War, it was part of the defence policies, nonviolent civil resistance. It was taught through a small red book that was called "Défence civile" in French. But contrary to the military that has never been trained, why are we not training that box?
- Very interesting question. So most likely it's also, we probably considered that. I mean, of course it's a nice to have, but it's really not a need to have. Most likely. The consideration was that, well, first of all, that the most efficient option is obviously organized defence by the armed forces, while they're still capable of doing so, while they're still a force structure while procedure, procedures, process the rest of work. And then I would guess that the second option obviously would've been galium warfare, and maybe even already at a time where parts of the armed forces are still active, but in some other regions maybe that they were treated that, but you have the gallium movements popping out there. I would say that the civilian resistant, even though obviously, yes, it was being, you had this booklet, which obviously we shouldn't forget about this. Part of that was also information operation, right? In the sense that you wanted to sort of create this resistance or whatever throughout the whole population. But I think this was always geared towards still armed resistance, ideally through the armed forces, and then really actual civil resistance would've been a second fall, in my opinion.
- So now that you're mentioning that defence spirit or resistant spirit, how are we currently supporting that spirit, especially in regard to hybrid warfare and new means on social media, on cyber, all the cyberspace? How are we preparing? Because we've seen in Ukraine that it has been a huge part of destabilising and facilitating the physical intervention afterwards.
- I think frankly, we're not doing that much. Also, if you look at, for example, the EU and NATO obviously as well, they have a lot of initiatives against disinformation against that and public initiatives where you try to get the citizens to participate, to even just go to those websites, check those things out. And obviously also with some of the Baltic countries, they're very strong Baltic and it's scan naming countries. They're very strong that we're not doing anything like that. I mean, actually then if you talk to the people at the general

secretary, et cetera, about, but also we should inform the population. They say, well, you can read them in our security policy report, excuse me, but Mrs. Swiss or Mr. And Mrs. Swiss, they're not really interested in reading those reports, right? I mean, no. Again, of course you can also have the debate. Yes, we could start a campaign against this information. We also need to be aware that obviously these campaigns by the sector, they're also part of an information operation. So that's sort of an aside, but I always find it very funny when people talk about, oh yeah, there's so much propaganda, so we need to do strategic communications against it. Yeah, okay. Fair enough. You're saying you want to do propaganda against propaganda, fair enough. By all means no, but seriously. Well, man, I think maybe things are slowly changing. I'm not sure whether you're aware of this, but there's this new programme now by the army for young people to sort of onboard them with regard to the cyber cyber command. I think starting from 16 or something, they'll try to select those that might want to have their recruit ensure that their basic military training in the field of cyber or in the cyber command. So there are a few, it's sort of like, it's basically the cyber AC equivalent of the yit in course, and so there's some initiatives coming. But yeah, in general, I don't think we're doing that much. I mean, we all know that apparently, and we see that from certain polls and also from anecdotal evidence, and there's more goodwill in the population, again, because of the war in Ukraine, also, I think because of the Corona, and I guess at some point really need to have a very good after action review where we see whether army, what exactly they do during Corona and whatnot. Fair enough. Nevertheless, I think the public perception has changed the better for the Swiss armed forces. So the question is how do we leverage that? And I'm not sure that there's very much being done at this point.

- So civilian based defence in the sense that it is the institutionalization of non-violence, severe resistance as a defence policy, including preparation and training, it realised on, so from Clausewitz, it would be the centre of gravity. What would be the centre of gravity of Switzerland? What would be the values that the people would unite to defend?
- Well, I think in the end, I mean, now I could give you a list of buzzwords, but I think in the end, yeah, it's our sovereignty, our chosen way of life in a certain way, even though, again, obviously I'm a bit biased in that. But nevertheless, I think Switzerland is somewhat exceptional in many regards. Just by the fact that we have four official languages, we have different language groups that are also, I mean, let's be honest, there are certain cultural differences, but nevertheless, it works together very well, in my opinion. This is really exceptional. This is almost a miracle in some regards. Of course, there have been some ethnic tensions in the Jura, but nevertheless, all things considered, we did pretty well with that. Obviously, part of it is we also have a successful economy, which makes things easier. If you had one part of the country, one of those groups being completely marginalised, I think there would be much higher tension. So I think, yeah, in the end it will be this notion that yeah, it's our how many years? It's something like, well, 750 years. Yeah. Well, again, you know what I'm getting at. Obviously this is also national myth and well, not fair enough. I mean, we always say that, blah, blah, blah. But of course the story is slightly different. But yeah, I think that, but frankly, the centre of gravity is a concept that yes, well, Zu talked about, and then the Americans, they made centre of gravity out of it, and then Swiss armed forces took it and called it, which is idiotic. Anyway, I just want to say centre of gravity is a concept that is very poorly understood, including by the American military. I mean, I looked at all their, well, I'm working on an article actually at the moment that sort of traces the evolution from Clausewitz notion of to the American style centre of gravity, and basically what the American, I don't know, you're also familiar with soi?
- No.
- Okay, so he was a Swiss military theorist, actually was fighting for the French for Napoleon, et cetera. And what the Americans did is they took a lot of soi. They sort of misconstrued for Klauswetiz, and their centre of gravity is also very much influenced by Sun. There's really nothing to with the cloud, which actually, but nevertheless, because they wrote their

field manuals, we took it from them, and this is why we have it in the Swiss sound forces as well. That's the story of the centre of gravity. It's weird. It's really weird.

- Just to come back to your first point about the independence in the, it's not a quote, but I don't remember the exact word. It just said that Switzerland might not be perfect, but it is our own way of not being perfect, that we're imperfect, that we are defending.
- That's very beautiful, actually.
- And I really agree with that.
- That's a very beautiful sentence actually. I don't think I saw, I had to look in my hands, but I don't think I ever read the whole thing, so I missed this part. That's very good.
- It might not be written exactly that way, but that's the idea that behind
- Is that's really great. It might not be perfect, but it's our way of not being perfect. And it could be worse
- For civilian based defence to be institutionalized. We would need a certain adaptation of the law, especially regarding civil disobedience, for example. It would have to be kind of legal in special circumstances. Do you think that the state is willing to empower its citizen and taking the risk of the population to have more power to go against it in a sense that the state is protecting itself by keeping civilian disobedience illegal?
- Yeah. Well, I mean, have my doubts that they would do it during normal, during peace times, obviously, and I'm not sure whether you could add some closets that say, okay, based on it's the problem. Then you have those different states of emergencies. And usually actually what happens is that during the higher the state of emergency, the more restrictive the laws actually. So it's sort of what now, if you would say we want to actually legalise certain kinds of civil disobedience, then this would completely go against the notion of actually need to keep the population on a even tighter leash during such a state of emergency or state of exception. I also, also, et cetera that we also had during Corona. So I have my doubts that they would do that because I think there would also be the notion that this could be a slippery slope. And I mean, we already saw that obviously, because there are basically groups that preach that during Corona and now we need to be disobedient to protect our routes and our way of life and whatnot. Basically, they're already doing exactly what we would want in such civil resistance methodology in times of conflict, basically they did against their own staple we would want, or what we would expect the population to do against an external threat. But then what happens if, you know have groups that will argue, but actually now our own very own government, as you know, is portraying our values, our way of life. So now they're also sort of a threat to us, and that's why we need to be severely disobedient against them. So I think it sort of opens a can of worms. I doubt that the government will be enveloped to such a change in the laws.
- Thank you. And for civilian based defence to be as effective as possible, decentralisation is key. To what extent is Switzerland decentralising, for example, its production of food, its production of energy, and trying to gain autonomy to increase its resilience in case of conflicts?
- Well, I mean, I think the concept of decentralisation is not very alien to us because we have the communal level. So I think this kind of works, and I mean you also see it with the budget of every small village. I mean, they have their own budgets, they have certain discretions of what they could do with it and whatnot. So I think, again, I can't give you any exact numbers whatsoever, but I think this wouldn't be a very hard hurdle or a big roadblock for Switzerland, at least this part. I think we're already very, very used to that anyway,
- And we are slowly getting to the end already. I've been wondering how the cost benefits of defending very urbanised cities close to the borders like Geneva or Basel or even Zurich. It's not super close, but it's close enough. Or even Sanal or Ticino as well, Right? Defending the cities military would basically very likely destroy them. How is the cost benefits made for Switzerland that is hyper urbanised throughout the whole Middleland? Is this taken into

consideration because if we were to defend military, we could end up with a free country that has nothing left?

- Absolutely. Well, I would say probably it's being considered, no. I mean, there will be certain options that we say, okay, we actually, we would strike bethe of making sure that they don't, again, which enemy are we actually talking about? I guess it's a balogna and the Bonia, right? So we might want to try it for them to not even, so if they come from Germany, we might want to stop them at a black forest or something like that. But then again, this opens another kind of worms. How does that work with without neutrality? I would say, yeah, if we have very clear the cases that now the big attack is coming to tomorrow, maybe you can carry out an action today, but I didn't even know about that, Richard. Not all the politicians will be happy about it anyway, I'm already disa digressing again, but it's very fascinating. So yeah, I don't know. I mean, I would suspect that there are considerations in the joint operations command . About these kinds of things, but I would say that their assessments are most likely quite classified. But it would be interesting to see what sort of projective battle damage assessment that they would have for Swiss cities. But I think you're absolutely right. If they're, and again, once again, it also depends who's going to attack us with what means. But if there's a conventional attack coming from either direction towards associated, I mean you bet they're going to be destroyed. There's no way. I mean, we have, what are we going to have five or six patriot batteries? I mean, have fun trying to stop a huge barrage of rockets with that. And I think this, I would also say that it will be ballistic missile will be cruise missiles at the opening of a conflict. That sort of the first things that going to affect. Nevertheless, I mean the question is, is this a realistic scenario? Are we going to be confronted by that? Probably not in the next five years, probably also not by the next 10 years. But then again, this is also, I'm always warning against this so-called status co bias that we think, oh, because nothing happens today, most likely nothing is going to happen tomorrow as well. So my sort of region of interest, my specialty is the Middle East, middle East, north Africa. Somebody would've told you in summer 2010 that okay, next year Ali is gone, Mubarak is gone. Gaddafi is fighting for his survival, and Assad is facing huge problems as well. Everybody would've told you, you are fucking crazy. What are you on about this? Exactly what happened? So what I mean by that is that we can't be sure how the situation is going to be developed in five years. I mean, it had also a couple of years ago with a guy, a friend of mine from France, we had this discussion about EU armed forces, et cetera, and he said, yeah, in 10 years that the EU army is only be here. So I think we have two more years and then we're going to see what the EU Army is going to be there. I doubt it. And I told him, not in my estimate, most likely before there's an EU army, the European Union is not going to exist anymore. That was right around Brexit. And this is probably also why I said, I don't know whether maybe there's going to be a new army. They're going to have those, they already have those EU battle groups. But well, again, digressing massively again, but again, just what I want to say also about this ataxia read this status quo bias that we need to be careful that just because everything works well today, that this will also be this situation forever. Because also, again, this is something we need to consider. Our modern nation state doesn't exist that long. We were once one of the poorest countries in Europe. I mean, a lot of things have changed for the better, and it means that a lot of things could also change for the worse again.
- And that brings me very well to the last question. Nice. Which is about the long run in the long-term perspective, Switzerland could because of the ideal situation that it has from a security perspective. Absolutely. It could be a leader in decreasing armaments trying to make the world safer, or it could try to bring that perspective
- But you saw what happened with Ukraine when we said, oh no, we're not going to send our stuff. I'm just kidding.

- But to what extent is the security sector, the government, thinking about the very long term and projecting and envisioning a possibility of disarmament and decreasing the military, or is it a very international relations realistic perspective that we need to increase
- In Swiss government? I mean, well, I think also, and that's the beautiful of our concordance, right? Concordance that you will most likely you have, yeah, you have different sections, parts of the government or the federal administration of different ideas. I would say probably in the armed forces, perhaps we have more of a realistic perspective, but I'm pretty sure that or the Foreign Affairs Department, most likely that they would have this very perspective that, yeah, of course. And I think also this is sort of one of the state Swiss policies that obviously we want to support piece, we want to work towards that. And ideally, I mean, again, this is also a question again, can you have peace with less weapons that there are other positions that say, no, actually you need to peace, but this is really, but I don't know. Once again here, it depends. It's very hard to say. I think it really depends on what part of the government or the administration we're really talking about. It's sort of the answer to every of your questions, unfortunately. But that's the reality.
- Thank you very much.
- My pleasure. So.

Appendix 10 : Transcription Interview 6

- So now we can go into the interview per se. And it's divided into three parts, three main parts. The first one is the current Switzerland situation regarding security. The second one discusses the Swiss armed forces. And the third part discusses the alternative defense policy, which for me is the civilian-based defense. So to start, according to you, what are the current external threats to Switzerland's security?
- Obviously, the main external threat, although low, but that has to be on the radar of the armed forces is interstate war. A war between European nations or Switzerland and another European power that would start. That's the highest danger, but it's not the highest priority at the moment, I think. Then we also have transnational threats like, for example, terrorism, like pandemics and these things in which the army mostly would be used in a subsidiary manner because they would support the civilian authorities. But I think the army is using the Ukraine war, the war against Ukraine, as a reminder that interstate war is really the main thing that it has to be prepared. And probably it is not enough prepared at the moment.
- Thank you. What are, according to you, if there are internal threats to Switzerland's security, is Switzerland preparing against a coup d'état or against international internal secession movements?
- I think that danger is pretty low because of different precautionary measures that are in place in Switzerland, like federalism, like power diffusion, like an appropriate way of integrating minorities. So I would say in Switzerland, we're not so much endangered by this threat compared to other nations and countries, not so much in Europe, but if you look globally. And I think in that regard, we have pretty powerful means like the security cooperation or something like that in German, Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, where you have police, where you have also armed forces, but not in the main charge, where you also have the administrative bodies from the different cantons who are all coordinating each other against external but also against internal threats because this differentiation between external and internal security is probably not so much appropriate anymore these days as compared to the Cold War when you had a clear enemy that mostly came from the East and that was the shaper of Swiss security policy. Now it's probably more multipolar and it's probably shifted a bit. So that's why including civilian defense agencies and defense, like the police, has become more and more important.
- Thank you. Switzerland is officially recognized as a neutral country since 1815. What does it mean in regards to national security for Switzerland?
- I think it helps being safe, but it's also a challenge, especially these days when you look at how the powers abroad, like for example, Germany, France, and also the Eastern European nations, they don't understand and they think that neutrality benefits the aggressor. In this case, it would benefit Russia. And I think it's gotten very complicated to make our partners in Europe understand the concept and also to show that why we are still using it so much and why we want to keep it like a dogma, like something really almost like a religion. If you ask Swiss people, nobody wants to stop. It's like 90% of the population who wants to keep neutrality. So we have to accept this as researchers. But I think we also see that it's becoming the exception in Europe. If you compare with Finland and Sweden, who were both also neutral, they changed and they went to NATO now because they see there's a big danger, which is Russia, and they want to be protected. So neutrality has become, like I said,

almost like a religion in Switzerland, something that you... It's like a taboo, you can't question it. But I think that's good because it unites Switzerland and it keeps our national homogeneity. But it's also a bit dangerous now since a year because with the war material that we cannot export, some other countries might not understand it and might therefore be frustrated with us in the middle of Europe. So I see it as a twofold sword.

- Switzerland's neutrality is an armed neutrality.
- Yes
- Why? And would there be any alternatives? Remaining neutral, but not an armed neutrality?
- Yes, yes, of course, there would be neutrality unarmed. But I think that's not a feasible way because Switzerland has a very strong militia tradition. And has the feeling that neutrality protected her well over the ages. If you think back to the Cold War, World War I, World War II, it allowed us to be very, yeah, very rich and well-off country, undestroyed during the two world wars. And this led to a myth building around neutrality. And in this myth, the armed forces with each militiaman with his own gun has become almost idealized. So I think it's also internationally important to be armed because what would neutrality mean in the unlikely phase of war that we can really protect our territory, our territory on the ground, in the air. And in order to do that, in order to fulfill our role as a neutral power, we need to do that. And we cannot do that if we are not armed. So I think it's a connexion, it's connected. And that's why the neutrality discussion and the discussion on the armed forces is very closely interlinked and will probably be that way, especially now in the face of Russian aggression, where we can see that neutrality or also small neutral nations, they should be able to defend themselves. Otherwise, they're not credible.
- In the federal constitution on Article 54, peace building is mentioned. And how does this materialize in security policies in Switzerland?
- I think the most important one is the K4, the assistance force that we sent to the Kosovo, where Swiss soldiers go and they alternate. So they change every once in a while. But I think this is something that gives us huge recognition by other European partners and also by other European states that are in NATO. So I think it's always important to say in the time of crisis, when Switzerland would really be attacked, then close cooperation with NATO would be preferred. But close cooperation means it's a taking but also giving. And I think K4 is a very valuable thing, where also Switzerland gives something because most of the time we have this feeling that we're only taking and only in face of crisis, we would allow NATO to really give something. And I think K4 is the main important thing also to make ourselves visible and to show that we are very interested in a peaceful Europe and a peaceful way of cooperating. Obviously, there are also the diplomatic dimension with, for example, Geneva, which is very important. And also the Red Cross and this non-governmental organizations which are placed in Switzerland. But I think the main part is for really peace building is K4 with regards to the armed forces at least.
- So you just mentioned NATO with K4. What does NATO represent for Switzerland security? Is it a threat? Is it the substitute, the real defense system for Switzerland? Is it an ally? What is it?
- It really depends who you ask. It's like a political question. For me, NATO is not something that endangers Switzerland, but that is paramount to Switzerland because it's almost like all over Switzerland. There are NATO countries except Austria. And I think that is really important to highlight. So territorially, we are in the midst of NATO, although we are not a

member. I think Switzerland will not become a member of NATO because there is not the majority in the Swiss population and it won't be in the next couple of years in my interpretation. But I think we have to be very interested in cooperating with NATO in making sure that our systems are intercompatible, that we are sending soldiers also to educational missions, for example, because there's no alternative in my way. What would be the alternative? It would be not cooperating with our closest security partners and neighbors, so to speak, and really doing everything on our own. And we can't do that. It's impossible. If you think about the ammunition, if you think about materiel procurement, all that stuff is very closely intertwined with NATO countries. And for me, but that's a personal statement, it makes total sense to cooperate with NATO because there's no alternative. I don't want to live in a world where we're working together with Russia. So then NATO is the only option. And for me, NATO is not an aggressive alliance, but a defensive alliance. But we have to see that it's an American dominated alliance and that Washington is in charge. So this is very important. And we always have to be sure to highlight this dimension.

- Thank you very much. And now we're going to talk more about the Swiss Armed Forces itself. My first question is, how are the Swiss Armed Forces perceived abroad? Is it a credible deterrent force? Is it a credible defense strategy? Is it symbolic? Is it just a good learning institution for military? How does it represent?
- I think the Swiss Army is well regarded abroad because it is a militia still. That's the exception in Europe because it has endured two world wars without being used. I think that's a very good rate. And we can always debate what were the reasons for that. But I think most people in Europe and also especially in America, they still have fond memories and they still use symbols like the Swiss Army knife or the Swiss Army gun that's used in every private household, so to speak, as a marker. If they really think that we are a credible force, that's really hard to judge. And it's not up to me to charge that. But I think the myth is very important abroad. And I think the myth is probably a bit overstated compared to the abilities that the Swiss Army currently would be able to have. But I think most countries know that Switzerland, there's a militia, there's an army and there are weapons. So this can be a bit of a deterrent already.
- And what are the Swiss Armed Forces defending? Are they defending the territory, the institution, the people, the value, direct democracy? Because during the Second World War, the Federal Council planned on kind of giving up half of the country, territory and protect the institutions with the Reduit National and during the Cold War, it was considered possible for the Swiss government to flee abroad in case of invasion and encourage the civil resistance and guerrilla warfare until the Swiss military and its allies expelled the occupying force. So what is the Swiss Armed Forces defending?
- So in my view, primarily, it's the territory that has to be defended from attacks or also from passages from foreign powers from abroad. But that could also mean that you do tactical retreats, for example. So you let the enemy come in, for example, in the flatter middle lands and then counterattack or then give certain cities up in order to protect more important ones. So territorial defense doesn't mean the whole territory has to be defended at all cost. So we have to be a little bit flexible here. And you are completely right. During the Cold War, there was this very interesting guy. His name was Hans von Dönhof. And he had a really sophisticated theory of insurgency that would be applied when, for example, communist powers would be occupying Switzerland and what that would mean. So for me, primarily,

the armed forces do actually defend the territory because that's what Switzerland is. But it doesn't mean that they always have to be 100% defending the borders. You must be flexible in this way from a military perspective. And also the institutions, of course, but primarily against internal threats. That's something that the police has to do. And the army can only do it in a subsidiary way because there's this old fear of a coup, of a putsch. And that's why in internal subsidiary employments, the army is only secondary in charge. And that is good. That seems to be the case. So protection of institutions is important in a way of really high scale war. And also there's also another dimension, which is the symbolic cultural dimension, which you probably also have seen during your first days in the military, bringing people together from different classes, from different places in Switzerland, and always being some sort of a big unifier and culturally, symbolically uniting people. So I think that's additionally very important, although it doesn't really protect something very concrete. It's more something metaphysical, like the national idea. But I think we also have to keep that in mind.

- And as you said, Switzerland has a military militia. And how do we know, since it has not been asked from its citizens for many years, that the citizen would be ready to go to war and to kill? How do we know that they are trained in that way and that it would be effective if it was needed?
- Fortunately, we don't know. So we just have to accept it. But that's something that a lot of other, especially Western European countries, face the similar problem. So we have not been in a war in ages, which is fantastic and which is really good. But it at the same time poses the questions, how would the army perform or also the air force? We do have both. And I think that's impossible to answer. But we can try to be better or to prepare with exercises, for example. And I think that's something that has been neglected in the recent years, that exercises really big time strategic exercises on a national level have not been well prioritized. And I think this will change now, thanks to the war in Ukraine. But we don't know. We can only say that the Swiss army has not been well funded, that a lot of capabilities and also systems have had to be canceled after the Cold War. And this is a bit dangerous. And I see there some sort of a cliff between the popular interpretation of the Swiss defense will and capabilities and what the army really could do in times of crisis, because I think it's massively overrated, to be honest.
- And what is the economic role of the Swiss army? Is it huge? Has it a big impact on Switzerland? And what is the symbolic role? You already talked about that. Yes. So you do not need to answer that again, actually.
- But the economic importance of the Swiss military. That's a bit hard for me to answer. I'm not really a specialist in this regard, but I think it's becoming a bit something that many corporations and firms in the private sector are not really so much happy anymore when people have to go to the army. And they are increasingly a bit skeptical to that. And that could also be a reason why less and less male choose to continue their military service after the basic training, continue to become officers. And that's my perceived interpretation. And I think that not all industries, but some industries have become a bit ambivalent to the army and armed service. And they just see the negative impacts. So the costs and not so much benefits and also personal development that it could be in the career of a young man or woman. And so I think it's a bit ambivalent. I think for many people from the private sector, the army costs more than it benefits. But it also depends on the political view. Obviously, if

you're standing in the center or on the far right or on the right, you would probably be less skeptical and you would be able to give young men more days in the military that work for you. Instead, when you're on the left and really critical towards the armed forces, then you probably not be that open. So I think it also depends on the personalities and also military experiences that bosses and people in charge really had in order to judge the role of the armed forces. But mostly it costs, I mean, security costs, and the army is definitely not something that's cheap. And we have seen this in the parliamentary discussions all the time. And Switzerland would rather give the money to other sectors than to the armed forces. We're very low. I think we're now trying to get 1 percent of GDP, but still, it's not something that is comparable to NATO. There we are ideally with 2 percent and they're now increasing even more. So I think it's a bit of an ambivalent role and it really depends on your personal standpoint.

- We're going to talk now about the alternative defense policies. So the first question, during the Cold War, Switzerland adopted the total defense policy. So military defense, civil resistance, and guerrilla warfare if needed. Since then, researchers have been arguing that violence in a predominantly nonviolent civil resistance movement is counterproductive. That comes from Erika Shenoweth in her book because it legitimizes the opponent's repression and violence, affecting the third-party support and preventing the alienation of the opponent's supporter. Besides, Erika Shenoweth in her book showed that nonviolent movements are more effective than violent ones. They are not completely effective, but on average, they are more effective. In her case, it was mostly against an internal coup. Would the state and the military be ready to abandon guerrilla warfare and only train for nonviolent civil resistance?
- But to be completely honest, I don't think we have a guerrilla doctrine for the Swiss population in place anymore because, like I already said, it's not the Cold War anymore, and this total defense concept in German is called Gesamtverteidigung. It really has lost significance, and you are not allowed to talk about it in Bern anymore because it has this really Cold War violent face or significance to it. So I think the army is more self-referential and self-focused and really only educate soldiers in defending conventionally. And I don't think we really have a big time guerrilla concept in place. That's probably one of the changes to the time in the Cold War when the enemy was really clear and where we knew who against we had to defend and what we would defend. And there, it was an approach that was in all of the Swiss society. And now it's basically changed. It's only in the armed forces or mostly in the armed forces and security sector. So I'm not sure if we really have this doctrine. I would really question that. And with regards to Madame Cheneaux, I think we have to be a little bit careful with her thesis. There are also multiple examples where resistance, insurgency resistance probably led to a desired result. If you look, for example, at the Viet Cong, I know we cannot compare Switzerland with Vietnam, but they defeated the US. If you look at the war in Afghanistan, the recent wars and also the war against the Soviet Union, which ultimately led to the demise of the Soviet Union there, it was very bloody, very brutal. But in the end it was kind of successful. So of course I'm always for peace and non-lethal force but we can be a little bit, I'm not very familiar with her work to be honest, but I think we have to be a little bit cautious. And I think really Switzerland does at the moment not have a doctrine or a theory of partisan warfare in place that is widely shared with the population.

- Thank you. Other countries are including civil resistance in their defense policy. And I'm thinking about the Baltic States, mostly Lithuania and Estonia. Sweden has also included it. I don't know how it changed with the NATO application. If it has changed, I just found people from 2021, but in the civil resistance, they promote nonviolence. So refusing the political gains, the economic gains, but they always either reinstalled or add from the very beginning the violent component of civil resistance.
- Can you say that again? I didn't understand, sorry.
- So in civil resistance, you have the nonviolent part. So preventing like mass demonstration or like all the non-cooperation and means. And those have been included in defense policies in Lithuania and Sweden and other Baltic States, but they are adding or they maintain in this civil resistance, the violent policy. The violent component of guerrilla warfare in a way. Do you think that traditional institutions like militaries are unable to imagine a defense policy without the violent component?
- That's a very interesting question. I really haven't thought a whole lot about that, but I think at the moment, not, no. I think the military is very much focused on organized violence and engagement and not so much, at least not so much about nonviolent protest, sabotage. You can debate if sabotage is nonviolent or violent. The boundaries there of course are fluently. But I think it's a really interesting proposal that you are formulating. And I think it could be worthwhile to pursue nonviolent protests, nonviolent cooperation or non-cooperation in that regard for armed forces and especially for civilians under armed forces control. That could be interesting. And in my view, the armed forces have not spent enough time on focusing on this component of warfare or defense. Yeah.
- And coming back to Switzerland and the Cold War, the civil resistance was in the policies in the book the *Defense Civile*, the little red book. But that's where it stopped. So it was just giving the book and as for the military, The soldiers are trained for five months and then every year, but for nonviolent civil resistance, they have just received the booklets. Why in a defense perspective and a strategic perspective is nonviolent resistance not trained as is the military?
- I think it's two things. It's first a lack of attention, a lack of focus on the nonviolent dimension, like I said in my previous answer. And on the other hand, you can always debate if it's the role of the armed forces to do that, to employ themselves with citizens that don't have the duty to serve. So that would make a big time elaborate or expansion of the duties of the armed forces towards people that are not in it. So that's a bit problematic from a democratic point, and also from a juridical point if they are really allowed to do that. And then I also think the expertise is probably not in the armed forces. It would probably be in other places at all. If there is nonviolent expertise in this regard, I doubt that there is. Probably at universities, there could be points of contact, or maybe at some governmental institutions, but I don't think that there has been a focus on that dimension. Because war is so far away until at least last year, war was not the main point of reference for the transformation of the armed forces, and also not for civilian defense. It was terrorism, pandemics, and these things. And another point that I'm thinking about right now is you said that the Red Book was very important, and I absolutely agree. I think it's a really interesting document. And I also think that it has differentiated across Swiss society, because many men were in the military, and they were aware of the importance that it could have. They probably read it, and they had their own private shelters, for example, their own necessary

food procurements if something would happen. You had this danger of the atomic attack, for example. And I think it did actually cross Swiss society during the Cold War rather well, but since that, it hasn't.

- Thank you. So civilian-based defense, which is the institutionalization of nonviolent civil resistance as a defense policy, including preparation and training, relies on defending a way of life or values. So for Clausewitz, the center of gravity would be the values and the way of life. You've already started to answer that before. But what are the values that the Swiss population would unite to defend according to you?
- I think this is probably now not a really scientific answer, but I'm just trying to capture the Swiss identity and the Swiss together feeling, so to speak. So I think one thing would be solidarity. Solidarity across different age groups and language groups and parts of the society with each other, then a sense of common history, a sense of culture that differentiates us from the French, for example, from the Germans, from the Italians, from the Austrians, so identity and also something that is unique to Swiss people. From a scientific perspective, I would doubt that there is something, but from a cultural and symbolical perspective, obviously there is. So I think solidarity, then also the political institutions like federalism, power sharing, this strange thing with the federal council where you have seven ministers. I think this would be really important to defend because it's unique and also the positive experiences that we made in the past sticking together when it really counted, this would be worth defending for many Swiss people. And behind that, obviously, is also the prosperity that we had, but this would probably be on a, it would not be stated that much because it's kinda unpolite to talk about money. But I think that we also have to be clear that Switzerland was quite a success story in the last centuries. And this is something that is also important. But I think each Swiss would first say the reasons that I emphasized in the first part of my answer. That's my personal interpretation.
- Thank you. For civilian-based defense, there's a need for adaptation of the law. For example, the legality of civilian disobedience. Do you think that the state is willing to empower its citizens or is afraid of empowering them too much, which could lead to more challenges to the state itself?
- Can I just briefly add one thing to the previous answer that I was just thinking of? I think direct democracy, or in the real part, it's indirect democracy, but I think that's also something that's really deep in the Swiss psyche and would also be very important for many to defend. So this feeling that we don't have a king, we have a delegation of power, and ultimately every Swiss citizen can vote. So this would be also very important. Probably I forgot a little bit, but I was just thinking afterwards. With regards to your question, I think Switzerland is very liberal in that regard. And it delegates quite a lot of tasks to the cantons and to the communities. And I think Swiss people also appreciate this fact and they always react very aggressive almost when there are perceived rules that come from Bern or even from abroad, from Brussels, for example, with the European Union. So that's why that's something that's not very liked in Switzerland. And most Swiss people like to be empowered and also to have the self-power to regulate quite a lot of things in their lives and don't want the state to rule everything. Whether or not this will change in the future, I don't know, but I think freedom and self-rights are very important to Swiss citizens.
- For civilian-based defense to be the most effective, the society needs to be decentralized to make it more resilient. Switzerland is already quite decentralized thanks to federalism,

except for some domain as energy independence or autonomy and food production. Why is there no more focus on developing those autonomy and independence aspects in the defense policies?

- I think it just was not a priority in the last couple of years. I think security was perceived as normal and there was no external threat to that you could see that with the masks, for example, during the pandemic, COVID-19, and it was probably a bit neglected, not so much controlled. And that's the reason in my regard that just the threat was not perceived as high enough. So that's why it was neglected mostly. But compared to other countries in Europe or also in the world, it probably wasn't that bad as it is sometimes stated in the media.
- In case of invasion and Switzerland being highly urbanized, in case of violent conflict, there would be a lot of destruction quickly in Switzerland. Is there a cost benefit balance that is being made in security policies between the destruction of the infrastructures, the economy and so on? And the cost of living under control and expelling the invaders later on without endangering the country itself or the physical dimension of the country?
- First of all, I don't think you can really calculate that. I think it's almost impossible because there are dimensions that cannot be calculated in monetary terms. And I think that's why it probably couldn't even be done. And I don't think it's been done. Of course, there are scenarios. What would happen, for example, to Basel if an enemy would come from the north, because also Geneva would be one of the cities, Chiasso would be the other, that are really at the geographical extreme parts of Switzerland. Would it then make sense to give these places temporarily away and retreat to the higher places and then defend from there? This is a very scenario, Nick, or these are very much dimensions in a hypothetical world, but I don't think that you can do mathematical calculations in that regard, what it would cost and what the benefits really would be in order to keep the cities undestroyed. I think there are more emotional reasons and symbolic reasons that would come to play. And I think that a rational cost-benefit analysis probably is not gonna take place in this regard.
- In a more, well, from my perspective, idealistic world, in the long run, thanks to NATO, Switzerland could become the first country to fully implement and solely rely on civilian-based defense and become a leader in transarmament and the reduction of weapons worldwide. This would reinforce Switzerland's position as a peace promoter. And to what extent is the security sector or the defense policies considering that option and thinking about the very long term?
- Not enough, to be honest, not enough. I think we have this primacy of the political sector, which is very important. It is absolutely paramount that politicians decide what the armed forces need when they get it and what they don't get because, like I already said, the Swiss democracy is very high on the political agenda and also very high in a cultural sense, and it has to be. And so that creates a bit of tension because politicians also have a lot of other things that they have to cater to that are probably more important in the next cycle of elections. And I think the discussion that we see now about raising the defense budget and expenses is twofold. First, it happened because of the Russian invasion, of course, that was a big external shock of Ukraine. And the other thing is that we have elections in the fall. So now the politicians cannot go away from that discussion. So they have to face it and they have to have a plan. And I think the Ukraine war will be a decisive factor for many politicians, and that's why it came up on the political agenda. But what I was wanting to talk was that defense policy was not a sector for politicians that was very well liked in the last

couple of years or in the last teens of years, where you could really benefit and you could really have a good public reputation. It was always something that you had to do. You see this if you compare the role of the federal council, the defense department was always kind of last and something that people, in my view, politicians who got elected to the federal council didn't really want, they just had to do it. Now probably it could be a little bit changing, but I think that's the reason that defense policy was not very well liked. Accordingly, there was not enough finances and not long-term planning. We always had this Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht. I think in English it could be like security policy brief or paper or something like that, that the federal council had to do every three to four years. This was done, it was mostly accepted by the legislature, so by the national, how do you say this, Nationalrat and Ständerat, so the two chambers. And it was always kind of like, okay, that's it. But we only planned for three, four years at the most, mostly for the next legislative period. And there is nothing like a long-term defense strategy where you have ends, ways, means, defense, procurement, all that laid out. That's not what happened. Although that would be Swiss. That would be typically be something that Swiss people do, but it didn't happen in defense policy because it was a field that was not very well liked by politicians and that was expensive. And that money was for many politicians rather well invested in other sectors.

- Thank you very much. I have one last question. Especially because I saw that you are more of a specialist in history as well. And when we look at history, the violent part is researched and discussed, but much less the non-violent parts in conflict as it's not history yet. But like in Ukraine, we've seen a bit at the beginning, the civil resistance component of people blocking char with tanks with their bodies or providing food to soldiers and so on, which are necessary. In history, it has been the same. Like stereotypically woman taking over men's job to support which is not violent. Why is the focus so much on violence in history? Is it because it is the most important part, the most sensational part, or is it also to self-legitimize the violence itself in the future? Or any other answer?
- Yeah, it's a very good question. I'm not sure if I have the definite answer, but I can offer some thoughts maybe. I'm not sure if non-violent resistance is not studied at all. If you look, for example, Gandhi, that would be an example, or also South Africa with the end of apartheid. So there are case studies. And also in Argentina, for example, the end of the military dictatorship, there were a lot of non-violent elements that led to it. But I generally agree with your hypothesis that it's more thankful. I say that in a rather ironical term, thankful to focus on the violent part because I think that violence studies or the focus on violence has something very much connected to action, to something that's not boring, that's something where in really martialic terms, blood is spilling. And that's attractive for scholars to understand. And there you also have the direct results of forced employment and of violence. Whereas with non-violent movements, you probably don't see an immediate effect. It's more of a long-term effect that you can study. That's harder to illustrate. It's also harder to study on a temporal dimension, I think. And it's less tangent. So, especially men are drawn to violence and to the direct use of force. And I think that could be one of the reasons. And another reason would also be that the urgency to research violence has been higher than to research non-violence from a political and also from a scientific standpoint. Because you, as I already said, you see the direct results and you see death, destruction, torture, mutilation, and so on. You have a concrete, brutal result. And in order to avoid that, you

want to research that direct, and not so much the indirect non-violent trajectory. But I think it's also a bit changing now.

- Well, thank you very much for the interview. I'm going to stop recording now

Appendix 11 : Transcription Interview 7

- Yeah, it's good. Firstly, it wasn't quite clear to me if you're looking at the Cold War context or if you're looking at the current context, and in particular the post 24 February context, it seems to be you are mostly interested in the Cold War.
- I'm interested in the present because Switzerland has included part of severe resistance in the cold during the Cold War. It was part of the public Defence And it has been set aside from my perspective at least, and I'm trying to understand why and why was it included before?
- - Yeah. So if you think in terms of the Cold War, right, you need to start with what was the type of the threat, right? And the type Switzerland was only partially, and particularly in the early 1940s or late forties and early fifties, and also basically into the sixties during the hot phase of the Cold War, the threat spectrum was that the Soviet army, the washer puck forces would run through the gap between the neutralised Austria through neutral Switzerland. So it wasn't completely, from a military point of view, it wasn't completely surrounded by NATO, first point, second point, for large parts of the forties and the fifties, Switzerland's immediate neighbours were wobbly candidates, right? Germany, Italy, French in the forties you had, there was a real possibility that these countries would go communist. At the election booth, you had a very strong communist party. So in a way, Switzerland used to be surrounded or was far more staunchly, anti-communist and more stable in terms of its political institutions in also marketing institutions than its immediate surroundings often forgot, looking back there. So Switzerland, basically the threat spectrum was it'll be a symmetric conventional attack, which would hit directly at the border First point, or secondly, there will be some kind of civil unrest or maybe even civil war, and then some kind of military forces will be driven to the borders. And that's not me talking, it's basically repeating the official threat perception as perceived by the federal council. If you go back to this, so this was basically the early Cold War context in terms of the threat spectrum. And then the consequence was, well, foreign policy position is Switzerland is opting for a very strict neutrality, which was basically under the condition of a bipolar world that was having two ideologically completely opposite camps in terms of democracy, democracy on market forces and communism and socialist planning. Switzerland adopted for a super strict neutrality policy, has little to do with the legal core. So this was in a self Switzerland, could have done Sweden and joined the United Nations already at that time. And the core of this neutrality policy doctrine was you separate the fair of economics and trade from the political fair, and you basically say, we are fully cooperating bilaterally and multilaterally on the economic side, but we shy away from all political, not just military alliances, but also the European all political clubs that are not universal And on the condition of be bipolar work. There wasn't that. So anyway, this was the mystification of neutrality. Obviously this was never really in sanction regimes already Cocom regime during the Cold War, Switzerland was breaking its own new policy, simply no one knew it in the public. So this was the foreign policy position and then the logical opposite for it, we are completely on our own autonomous defence. So the big question is how do you organise an autonomous defence? And there you basically need to see, okay, deterrence, defence and resistance. And Switzerland tried to do in the fifties, everything 58, the federal council basically opted, let's go nuclear. So the C I A thought in the late fifties, he thought Switzerland would be sixth or seventh together with Sweden. And there was a majority, there were two referendum in 1963 again, and the Swiss population said, yes, we should leave the nuclear option open. So I mean that was clearly, this is the only independent way of having a deterrent, right? Against the military scenario was the Russians, the Soviets would drop a couple of nuclear bombs and then drive with mobile forces through this gap a bit. And then why didn't Switzerland buy this? Because then you had the Berlin and the Q missile crisis and it became clear you

need to have political stabilisation. So this was the first there, the big power started to look out for a way out of this nuclear dilemma. And the parliament after in 1963 basically said, we are not willing to invest money. So it wasn't dock driving it, it was if you really want to develop not just nuclear weapons, but then also a carrier system, it would be immensely expensive. And this would basically then have an impact guns versus potter. So it was a political decision. It's not needed anymore because the threat spectrum is not as immediate as it used to be. So this was off the table. And then the second point was, okay, we go for defence, conventional defence forces. And if you go back to the sixties, 50 sixties, Switzerland had one of the bigger armies. It was mostly an infant army, basically using the mountain in sterile. This was the logic bit. And again, there was a big push in the 1950s to go for a large organized tank forces, which would get protection on with a large 300 aeroplanes . And again, after the 1960s, the parliaments had no, we don't need, we are not prepared to give the money. It's not needed anymore. And then now here comes the interesting thing where there was big agreement was we will resist. And this was basically it's the threat. What deters is, do they have the capability? And here they were trying to build the capability, but they never really had it. And what about the intent and the willingness to defend themselves? And here was we will resist. And this was the whole, once we would have a subversion of our political institutions right by the Soviet communism, Switzerland would resist. And this was so no one actually doubted that the Swiss, even if they would be overall, they would keep fighting. Now the interesting thing is here, so it was part of the political identity to we would keep fighting. This meant, okay, we go for, have you read about the P 26? This was basically the, how do you call it, right? The Gladio NATO was the gladio version. So you had predefined arms caches, a predefined structure within the general staff for resistance only. And obviously the other side was you had a rather far state security police of everything, which is leftist, right? So have you heard about the fish in fair?

- No.
- So the police and state security organs were observing large parts of the Swiss population. This only got known after the end of the Cold War to I think 1.5 million out of 6 million. So anyway, and that was socially accepted by the majority of the citizen. So this is basically the resistance part of it. But what was interesting, what was really doing the deterring was okay, you couldn't quit during the second World War. If Germany really would have decided to overthrow Switzerland, they could have done it. If the Russians would have only thrown, they could have done it. But Switzerland basically prepared, and this is a very interesting thing, it prepared to destroy its whole country, all the bridges, all the tunnels, and this was exactly what the Germans wanted during the second World War, right? The tunnels. So it is a kind of a civilian resistance, you say sitting on the Alps north south thing. And my father was basically in a unit whose only task force, whenever they had kind of those two training, two training weeks, they basically always were marching to the places and simulating basically the destruction of one of the bridges along the tunnel. And this was obviously a very important deterrent in particular against the Germans, right? You destroy yourself, your own infrastructure. So it's not, you use physical force, but you actually make your own country. You destroy parts of important civilian infrastructure of your own country, and then it can be used by the outsiders. And this I think was an important part of the deterrent.
- Sabotage is like at the,
- It wasn't sabotage. It would only be sabotaged. It was preplanned and publicly totally cleared and accepted. Then it is in sabotage, it was demo. It would be a sabotage if it's a foreign power will destroy the bridges or Switzerland would go to Germany and destroy the German bridges. But this was the Swiss population voting, yes, we are willing to destroy our own infrastructure in case of war. And we every year train for this. So you see, this is no sabotage. It's the expression of a political willingness to resist even if your military already have lost by destruct, destruction, your own infrastructure.

- But if you're occupied, then the government is not willing to destroy its own infrastructure. So the population has to take it against the occupying government.
- No, no, you would've done it before they occupy you. This is the point. You would've done it within the first 24 hours. So the army that would've marched into Switzerland could not cross the bridges and the tunnels and then obviously the infantry part of the army could withdraw into the red. That's in a way, a civilian resistance movement, right?
- Yeah, absolutely. That would be included in civilian based defence. Exactly. From my perspective. And that's why it diverged from Gandhi perspective, that is completely against any use of force or violence because it's very ideological and moral. Whereas in Gene sharp, it's more of a strategic approach. And as long as you're not killing people like destroying bridges, if you're not killing people, then it's your own private property. So you're allowed to do basically whatever you want with it.
- So you see, this is why I actually think Switzerland was trying to do everything, but given the limitations of founding, and it was basically we don't want to trade our economic success against really building a fortress. So the broader population, and this was a political decision. So we don't go for nukes, we go for an infantry army, no big tanks and mobility. But this was basically what was picked up in the fifties. So this is why I think it's actually one of the countries we have at least elements in it, right? Obviously this, if you need to see as a process, the fact that Switzerland was not going for those elements was only once it became clear that no one really wanted a big war in Europe, neither was nor nato. So this is a different context. If you think back to the days of Korea war, I mean there was the Russians really that they escalated and expanded in Asia Pacific. They'll also do it here if they can. So this was an imminent threat in the sixties. It wasn't an imminent threat anymore because both sides realised after the Cuba missile crisis, oh, this is not going to end well for me, this side. So this is why I think during the days of the Cold War, Switzerland actually had such an element in here, right?
- Yeah, absolutely. Yeah.
- - Now after the Cold War, it's completely different. So after the Cold War, obviously there was a lot of, hey, we were really going far too. This was the red scare, and this anti communism was really going overboard in Switzerland. So this, to the degree that we were spying on parts of our population to the degree we were building a resistance army. So this was in the early 1990s. These were the big scandals popping then up. And obviously the whole civil's comprehensive civil defence system was dismantled. And it was interestingly enough politically dismantled without having a substitute. So this is basically where it went. And then from the nineties into the two thousands Switzerland forces were basically, defence was Switzerland, didn't even have a defence policy because there was basically we now we are in the middle of Europe. Europe is integrating and expanding, so we only have a remnant defence forces. So we want to have basically an integrated command structure, but we don't have, don't go for broader capabilities. We keep this as a fallback option. But the main and primary task of the army was then basically to support the cantons in disaster cases of disaster, technical or otherwise. And in terms against a backdrop nine 11 against terrorist threats. And why is this important? Because obviously by the constitution's responsibility for domestic security would lay with the cantons. But Switzerland, after nine 11, Switzerland looked at it and said, well, hey, we have actually in all of Europe, the lowest number of police person, there's no reserve, there's a huge gap. So the question was, who will fill this gap? And this was debated for almost a decade. And this was then basically, okay, now we fall back on the personal and logistical resources of the army. Because at the level of the federation, there is only one operational instrument, and this is the army. There is a federal police, there isn't a federal disaster response unit. So the army is a multifunctional interest. It's the only strategic reserve the federation has. So it's a medication which needs to get pro, but then the organization of the army, the doctrine, the training, everything was geared to the subsidiary functions in support of the cantons and now to the

Ukraine defence policy back now, do you see, so Yeah, but what I don't see is how the artillery or some training in the infantry or some of the troops in tune. So the simulators, this was all, they are not supporting the canones, but they're still in the ministry. So dynamic material is actually, say for instance, the helicopters. The air dimension was always a bit a different thing because air policing was always considered a necessity, partially also because Switzerland needed to be prepared to protect international Geneva. So this was not disputed, but then you could go for a light creep in aeroplane and a small number of planes. And during the past 15, or now since only about five years, is the Air Force on 24 hour, 365 Alerts. Before there wasn't any operational capability around over Christmas, over the holidays and during the night. So it was a pure training, training army. The remnants of the artillery, these were basically legacy systems. And you now see some of the tanks that are now the federal council agreed to basically give back to the arms procurement days, agencies, the private ones, and they could sell it. This is outdated material. So it was lightly mobile forces and some heavy material, but particularly in terms of disaster, air mobility, the helicopters for all kinds of disasters. So this used to be the focus for the past 20 years and now enter the Ukraine. Now, it's a very interesting thing. The debate we are having since then is obviously, oh, the chief of the armed forces couple of days after 24 said Switzerland's army could not resist a direct military attack for longer than a couple of days. But now the interesting part is basically is if you look at it, okay, what is the threat? The threat is no longer a symmetrical and territorial one because if anything, the I Russians are proving is that they have surprisingly the military, most military experts overestimated the operational capacity of the Russian army. So now it's quite clear they are a threat, but mostly for the post Soviet base. And then you would have Russian tanks or operational capabilities knocking at the probability went even down since the 24th. But now what type of threat you are having, and this is now an expansion of threat scenarios that could reach the intensity of norm combat it up until 10 years ago, article five, we don't call it that way, but basically a norm combat was always exclusively a scenario where territorial forces would hits the Swiss borders. And then in the context of the radicalised Shia terrorist units, the first expansion was, well, if you think about a terrorist group with a couple of seniors, they could basically create havoc which could potentially have an intensity that it would reach the level of armed combat and the police would be totally overloaded. So the first expansion was, well, armed combat can actually also, if it's coming from within the country and from a non-state actor force, that was in 2016. So it was an expansion. And currently if you look at this is Switzerland, there is an expansion of defence scenarios that come over. Were great distances. So different dimensions, right? First dimension is what if the Russians cruise missiles, they basically threatened to use cruise missiles, other types of missiles in Switzerland and start to put political pressures on Switzerland. So there are those people, I don't think it's highly realistic that they would say, okay, precisely because Switzerland is not a nato member. If Moscow wants to demonstrate we really are prepared to hit the western thing, they may actually throw something at Switzerland. It was an article in the newspapers two days ago. Exactly this argument in the New Year circuit item.

- So it's assuming that the ballistic missiles would just fly over many NATO countries and not be destroyed and just be able to, yeah,
- Well, it would fly over many NATO countries. It would not be destroyed, right? I mean, if the Russians really would use these missiles, you've seen how long it actually took and how the air defence forces are so loose through Germany. But the point is, I mean it's not so much the act, it would be a coercive threat. This is the point. And then the second element would actually be, well, Switzerland, in terms of the capacity of its territorial integrity, there are three dimensions. So threats that have an intensity that affect all of Switzerland, the whole society threats that threaten the territorial integrity second category. And the third category will be threats that threaten and independent decision making, political decision-making, so the political sovereignty of the country. So in particular the third

element, what if now threats are coming through cyberspace or space in terms of being in a highly networked world. So this is again, an expansion in terms of where potential coercive threats or actions could come from. And the third element would be hybrid threats. Basically disinformation that undermines, the political institution processes in the election. So this is an expansion of scenarios that are now labelled defence scenarios because they could reach the intensity of armed combat and then it's the responsibility, the federal government, and obviously it would be the responsibility of the army against it. So you see what is now the focus of the defence debate as opposed to the Cold War is not hitting at the territorial border, Is its coercive threats that come from over grade distances there. And obviously that's now what's happening. And then automatically the question is, okay, if we are still neutral, but at the same time we would like to cooperate with all these guys here, the NATO countries, you have NATO corporation in the defence area, there's a tension here between being a neutral country and having tied their defence corporation. This is precisely which the foreign policy debate, which is popping up. Secondly, very interestingly, if you actually look at it, the Swiss parliament and the federal council were increasing the defence budget considerably. By the way. They also, they said it should be 1% by G D P by 2030 this year they already postponed it to 2035, which is 10 billions less if you, right? So the point is, but there is considerably an enlargement of the defence budget, and now they are not going for lightly armed stuff in support of the countries. But you have F 34 8 patriot defence systems and you in particular focus on investing to cyber command. So what that basically means, Switzerland is now investing, this is the start of the digitalization of the Swiss armed forces. And in practise or in theory, but also in practise, the F 30 fives are going to be interlinked with all the effort, 30 fives until the NATO Russian border. So you now, and obviously you see this is even this attention to neutral neutrality now. So you are now having military capabilities that can coercive threaten across largest distances. That was now happening on the dock part for 20 years, since the end of the Cold War. If you look at military doctrine, it was about protection and helping out the civilians. Deterrence. Switzerland is not using the word of deterrence. It's this, the French one goes back to the days of the Cold War. It was basically deterrence meant you align yourself with NATO deterrence theory and concepts. And the goal with the forced Toro, with the logic, we don't need to be able to completely deter symmetrically the Russians. The only thing is if we can actually cut out an arm, we can politically decide independently from the us, decide when the war would start. So this gives us coercive power. And already during the days of the Cold War, the Swiss war going for disuasion, And guess what? Since one year, this was the only coming back. There used to be now half a year debate in the defence ministry, should Switzerland build up deterrence the policy? And now they again, for mirror imaging, the debate in the Cold War, they go for disuasion. Here you now have a disuasion policy, and that's because the threat is a different one. So the assumption is the Russians realise Switzerland is now not having a super light, there aren't Swedish plane, the Grippen, but it is part of an integrated European wide air defence system. And this, so Switzerland would have the capabilities where it could strike back over long distances. So now you are seeing, in a way, it's a bit back to the early days of the Cold War where Switzerland given a different threat where Switzerland would actually go or is going and trying to buy some element of hitting back, not just let's wait until they are rolling over us a bit. So you see, what you are looking at is really the days of the Cold War. That's where you had the civil defence system, right? And then after the Cold War until basically 2022, this was all, there wasn't a defence policy, it was basically a reserve on behalf of the candidates, the sub function. And now after the Ukrainian war, defence policy is back, but it's definitely moving into a different direction and not into, how do you label it defence based defence, right. Now I shut up on

- No, no, no. Then it makes me think the minute the Swiss army has become obsolete then, or it has to change, it cannot remain a militia with citizen fighting in it because the cyber dimension, the F 35 are just too complicated and they need professionalisation.

- I see absolutely the point. But I mean that applies to the Air Force. This is the only professionalised storm of the Swiss army and since many years, right? FA 18 already was the case. So yes, this is true. It's, it's only true for the core of the cyber command. But Switzerland now is building up a militia of, Because they have a lot of highly trained IT security specialists. This is very much this militia tradition. They try to leverage. And if you actually look at how well they do, they've just been participating in the, what is the cyber war game in T? So where they benchmark each other, these militia forces are number four, number six, number seven. So they are outperforming many professional armed forces. Why? Because those who have the best skillset are too expensive for most of the armies to really be hold back. And so in a militia system, and I'm not singing the song of it, there's many reasons to be critical, but I mean it's the, interestingly enough, during 2020 13, there used to be varying majorities for switching from conscription to a professional army. But this was against, the only task of the army is basically peace support operations or intervention at the periphery. And in 2013 it was very interesting the GSOA, the group against the army. So they first twice were basically trying to oish the army. Both times large majorities of the population went forced to take a stand, right? Bio referendum, they said, no, no, yes, less money, but we want to keep the army. Then they were trying to have the budget again, the population was overthrowing it. And I'm not sure if you've seen we have this since more than 20 years. We have this annual survey. Have you seen it?
- That is conducted by this institute.
- Exactly. And the military academy, right? Which is basically serving the popular opinion on foreign security and defence policy. And if you look
- At it and it increase the support last year, right after the 24th February, yes.
- But if you look between 2020 and 2012, you see there used to be almost 60% majority to get rid of conscription. The guys running, I know them. So they came to me and said, well, so they wanted to see the numbers there and they said, so we are putting a referendum together and put a conscription up for a political vote. And because they've seen the number. So my reaction was, guys, this won't work. If you ask the Swiss population and force in particular the younger generation to make a choice, it'll backfire. No, no, no, no, no. The numbers are clear. In 2013, we had the referendum look at the numbers in 2013 when the Swiss, the younger population, this is the generation of male population that serves, went in one year against the mobilisation of the referendum, 20% of which is huge job. And why is this the case? Because then every individual of us asks, do we really want, is a professional army compatible with our political culture? And so this is a bit deeply ingrained in the Swiss political culture. The army is only here, this citizen soldier thing. You only pick up a rifle in the defence of your country and you're not going to do this for ulterior purposes outside of the country. So this was hugely interesting. This was basically the first element that where you've seen a nationalisation and why did it renationalize? Because geopolitics returned. So the whole Washington ins the end of history for KU or there is going to be only one liberal world or the pressure for Switzerland to open up and to integrate Nine 11 Iraq war, Afghanistan war, old Europe was fighting new Europe. The Americans were disagreeing with the old European there. And that always translates into disagreement among the S, right? Translates into, oh, we might still better keep our independence and neutrality there. And so you could see this exactly coming since there was a certain Brexit, the old miracle left right with Trump, a transatlantic relationship, even nato, macro brain death, nato. So I mean that translates into, and why is this the case? And this is quite different from the Fins or Swedish neutrality because Switzerland doesn't even have a regional setting. The three biggest European Union member are its neighbours. So when they are not agreeing, Switzerland needs to choose. And that's a domestic political problem because either then the French speaking part flows into the direction of France. And this is precisely now happening, the fact that you have very little agreement and German French leadership in the European Union, if you actually look at this year's number, last year's number neutrality

support went down. Now it's already rebounding. And that's a reflection where the war is really in the distance. And there is a gap between how the eastern country see together with the Anglo sections. And the support for the Ukraine is far smaller in all the south because they all look or the Mediterranean into the Middle East. So Switzerland, France, it's again there. It's not just looking to the north and the east, it's also looking to the south. And at the same time, Germany and France don't get direct together in the European Union. So this is obviously then why, yeah, we would like to be, solidarity would be great, but this time is feeding into nationalisation forces and uc. This, I'm not saying I agree with this. I'm trying anyway to analyse the debate.

- According to you, how credible is the threat of Russia then hitting Switzerland by air? Very small. Because the way I'm understanding what you're saying That this is kind of the only threat on the major power that could hit us from far away. Otherwise it would be terrorist groups or from within or maybe small attacks that would not threat. It's not an existential threat to Switzerland. Do we need to prepare against that threat to Russia? Because I think the situation you're talking
- I see what you mean. I think if you say, is it really credible that the threat will be carried out, the military threat will be carried out. I'm even on record and to that I say, well, no. And to the degree, the probability went actually down. But at the same time the Russians were attacking the laboratory Spitz. They were killing people in Switzerland. They were hacking the website, they were stealing the data of the MoD. They were spying around the United Nations. China is also starting to behaving more unrestrained. So no doubt if you actually read the intelligence reports, the threat reports that there is an anual threat reports and you can actually see the trajectory. And super unusual since about five years, both China and Russia are explicitly mentioned. And that has been drawing a lot of, because I know that being a non-member, non-member of European Union nato, between the 1990s and the two thousands, Switzerland had close relationship to Russia And Not just lets them cooperative security and integration wire trade. It had a closer relationship with the Russian army jointly training for mountainous defence than it had to brussel. Why? Because politically the defence minister didn't want to travel to Brussels. So Russia, there was both on the defence ministry, M O D, but also F D F A, there was a proRussian support and that has been completely collapsing over the past five years. So there is a coercive element when Switzerland decides not to sell some of the springs. The Chinese ambassador publicly engages since with internal politics that goes down very badly in a direct democracy. You see what I mean? So I think there is, at the political level, an element of political coercion has been perceived as getting stronger and stronger over the also when the Russians, the Russians basically now say Switzerland is no longer neutral. So you have a foreign power defining your neutrality. So there is a certain element of a cursive coercive threat. It's a political threat, not so much the likelihood that it would be really great in terms of evolving into a militarised threat. So this is again, when you then say, well, since there is discourse that this might elements in, this might be an important point,
- But not reinforcing defence also on the political level, if Switzerland as fighting disinformation, that is at least from my perspective, a real threat to,
- Yeah, this, it's a big issue in Bern. So the parliament has been pushing the government to do more about this information and they now are forced to come up with a policy and we've been advising them now my opinion. And so the point is a bit, Switzerland is really not that exposed to this information why the target is very decentralised. So it's the very fact that you are very decentralised, right? Gives you a certain resiliency against this first point. So I think this is now it's not France where you can or the US where you can mingle a bit into the presidential election. We don't have presidential election. So I think it's overblown an overblown issue first point, right? Second point is, and there has been elements because the parliament was pushing the government should now the government should do more against disinformation. I think this is counterproductive, right? Because then what is the

government doing? They will be building up, they actually were even hiring 15 peoples that were doing public diplomacy. But that's not the way a liberal state would be doing it. If you want to be robust against disinformation, it's up to the media, it up to societal forces is up to having a broad dialogue.

- The education system.
- Education system, exactly. And that's where Switzerland's in comparison is doing fine. So you see that I think there's almost no reach on the side of the government because they think we need to do something. But I tell them when I was actually talking to the defence minister, he's from the SVP, I told him, well, if you really want to protect Switzerland against this information, give up your fight against the public radio on public TV station. They want to liberalise. And I think that is Switzerland has a public TV in it. So this is robust journalism still, right?
- The funding has been decreasing in the past years and it has been challenged and challenged again.
- Exactly. And so this was my point, you shouldn't actually challenge it.
- But also the intelligence services have brought during Covid that it has been the main threat during that year, I think. And I think it remained in the threat.
- You mean what has been the main threat? This information?
- No, Don't remember how they call it in the report. But the Covid movement or the Covid.
- Oh yes. But again, I mean again, the splinter groups in terms of the violent opposition party, the point is a bit. We will have a referendum coming up. I've already voted. It's the third vote on the Covid Law. And you will see it is going to be a large majority. So you publicly re legitimize that this is a french group. So I would again say what direct democracy that has. It's a bit like if you are forced to decide should we abolish conscription or not, you are politicised every time. So I see this as a strength. There are obviously big weaknesses. You can't react very quickly. But if you ask about how legitimate and resilient the system is, it has decentralised systems. They have this inherent characteristics of redundancy, rebounding, some learning. Covid reaction is a perfect case. Switzerland, the national crisis management was a disaster, total disaster. There was a 120 pages plan and trained, there was a law, everything was thrown out the window on the improvisation if you look at, so you could actually say, and we evaluated it. So it was in a way a tragedy, but there was experimentation bottom up and then there was emulation. So the Canton of Graben installed very good. So Switzerland had an open, it didn't have a centralised covid policy. So it was a lot of trial and error and what worked was then picked up. It is an interesting case. So I don't dare I actually say there is a certain danger of overreaching against a broader international public, which is very much focused on this information and propaganda by the Russell. And to the degree propaganda is a threat. Yes, it is a threat to American democracy, but because American democratic institutions are broke, because you have polarisation. So that would mean you better would actually fix the broken institution, the broken social contract, And then automatically you'll be resilient against it. So I think this is a bit, and this is an old debate going back to the Cold War, right? Propaganda. And so we also, in the European Union, these hybrid centres, I really ask myself how much are they doing and how much are they basically then leading to entrenchments of elites, right? Also, if you actually look on the Balkans, right? So yes, we need to defence against the auction. The local elite can say, well, we need to control, give us money, we can. And then they can build up their state control systems there based on the back off. So there is a certain tendency to be counterproductive if you overreact in this particular sense.
- It depends how you react If you're investing. For me, the education system should be the core. The Core to public
- States also the things, right? The suites all doing great stuff in there, right?
- I don't have that much more time,

- But I was just wondering then is the military, the way it's structured and especially how the people are spread within the Swiss military, does it still meet the Swiss military mandate? Because from my perspective, there's still a lot of people that are trained in the territory defence. No?
- Now, really not. We don't have enough time. I think you see a bifurcation because most of the infantry units, They are still the reserve forces for all contingencies, including disasters. So lightly armed, lightly mobile, and you fall back on them and you have a covid pandemic, you fall back on them menu, you have an earth would have an earthquake or avalanche or whatever, right?
- Well first as the ung part, the supporting case of catastrophe. But that would intervene.
- What would this be?
- Ung? There's a part of the military that is designed especially and that's not part of the infantry? No, no,
- No. But the human resources, so during Covid you had a mobilisation. It was the first mobilisation of the armed forces since the second World war. And so Switzerland could have mobilised 20,000 personnel to distribute, right? And am I, yes, they would have had a uniform on, but they would have left their weapons somewhere is But
- Those were not the infantry those the hospital?
- No, no, no. It went widely beyond this also. Yeah,
- At the border as well. Yeah.
- And also subsidiary functions for you think if you would have an earthquake, you might actually have secondary effects in terms of, okay, people starting to riot, starting to steal stuff from the Migros. You would basically get the army and have security. So it's a reserve function, a multidimensional, and that's still the infantry's forces are still mostly geared to this role. And then you have in particular the air defence and cyber forces, which is now really in a way, so there's a bifurcation because you have the digitised or something which starts to digitise. The plans are there to also modernise the ground forces, the plans, but the money is spent onto the mid thirties. So the judge will be still out there. So should it eventually be this whole crisis stop, right. Then the political swing, and again, there will be stability there, right? Then defence budget for reasons there's not that many parts of the overall federal budget can actually be lowered or expanded. It's education, it's the army. And for all other expenses, you would need to first change the law. So If the threat would go down and there will be stability there, you might have a highly modernised there and cyber stuff, and you would have little really ground forces that could be integrated into this shoot to sensor loop in way. So you go for a backbone of a digitised through the sensor loop, which is compatible with, so in a way, should Switzerland ever be in a position of the Ukraine, which is unlikely, it would have a supermodel C4IStar system, which would allow to also integrate external forces. But it would've a limited amount of heavy gears forces on the ground so far. And so I think the picture as of now, is one of a bifurcation and the modernization of the, we would have had around this year, over the F 35, and without the Ukrainian war, it would have been not unlikely that the Swiss population would've said no again,
- Which is why we didn't vote on it.
- Well, no,
- One of the reason why the federal council decided to sign even before.
- No, that's a bit unfair, right? Because the point was there were so many countries wanting to buy F 35 and the quote by the Americans would've expired. So
- In March, no.
- Yes. And
- We were voting in February,
- No, no. The vote would not have been possible within this. And then there was a big debate and in the end it was the committee withdrawing the initiative, the federal council. And why

did they withdraw? Because they realised there is a large majority against the backdrop of the crisis in the parliament that basically wants to go. And yes, if there would be a referendum in the context of Ukrainian crisis, the population, you wouldn't have the 51% margin. You would have had 65 or something like. Right. So anyway, it is no question that this is the expression of a legitimate political will. I wouldn't doubt that at all. Right. My point is this would have looked quite differently without a Russian invasion to Ukraine. And there you might actually have seen. Yeah, no, why should Switzerland really go for one fifth generation American aeroplane? Right.

- Last question if I may.
- Yeah, sure. And then I'm already overtime they waiting for me downstairs.
- I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I can stop. Europe has been a bit shaken by Brexit, France and Germany is not on the best state. Hungary, Poland are also a bit shaky at some point. What would happen to Switzerland if Europe were not to be dismantled, but to start not fading away, but become much weaker And could some country become a threat to Switzerland,
- Yeah, I mean this is a question from a scientific point. You get the answer because this is exactly, all those who want to build up the ground forces need to create the threat from the vicinity. So there is political push. And so they have been approaching us and said, well, can you come up with a scenario where NATO and the European Union would implode? I mean, it's very difficult to imagine institutions have a tendency to not implode. But whether away the first point, second point, I think it's hard to imagine that even if you look into the next 20 years, you would have a clear and present territorial threat by Germany, France, or Italy. For me, this is hard to imagine. So I think there is little, in terms of a scientific based scenario that would have close reality to scenarios are often also instrumentalized politically. And that's fine, but then they should do it on their own. So you see it. So what I'm trying to say, that this nationalisation Rebound, If you actually look into the first days of the beginning of the Russian invasion, against the backdrop of every American talk show saying the Swiss saw no longer neutral. There was a big push against neutrality. Now it's already rebounding. And that has something to do with the Swiss saw very how long the Western support or large parts of the population are very, how long The Western support is really staunchly behind Ukrainians. And not unlikely, I mean, no one knows what's happening. If the fancy fault is at some point the Americans basically limited with the upcoming collection there. And then you even don't know if Trump is coming back into White House. So within two years. So the volatility in terms of the political situation, and if there is volatility, that has a tendency to translate into independence. Independence pro neutrality, right? Pro armed forces, forces. Right. So anyway, the swing turning point is already behind it. Right?
- Yeah. Okay.
- Thank you very much. Yeah, I'm.