

*Nationality and nationalism  
in Italy and Finland  
from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century to 1918*

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NATIONALITY  
AND NATIONALISM  
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# Preface

Cooperation between Finnish and Italian historians started officially at the symposium in Perugia, Italy, in October 1979 with the theme "Italy and Finland during World War ii (1939—1945)". The second symposium was held in Helsinki under the auspices of the Finnish Ministry of Education and organized by the Finnish Historical Society on May 24—28, 1982. The general theme of this symposium was "Nationality and Nationalism in Italy and Finland from the mid-nineteenth century to 1918". The present publication includes the papers on this theme, with the exception of Professor Clara Castelli's contribution, which has been published, with the title "Il panslavismo" in "L'età contemporanea" (ed. by Lucarini) in Rome, Italy in 1983.

Maija Väisänen



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Mario Belardinelli

# Catholics and their attitude to nationality in Italy

I think it would be a good idea first to make a definition of the subject I am going to discuss. The term "Catholic" in a country like Italy, where in the 19th century the Catholic religion (by habit or convenience) was the one normally professed, only seems valid to me in respect of those distinct groups who explicitly considered religious values important in the choice of politics. I know it is not easy to distinguish religious motivation from politico-social or even economic motivation, but I have tried to do so when sources and coherence of attitude have permitted.

Secondly, I should particularly like to dwell on three distinct problems: independence and national unity, the unified state of 1861 and finally the relationship between Catholics and Nationalism.

In the period following the Vienna Congress the prevalent attitude among Italian Catholics was to favour a return to the 'good old days', the authority of legitimate sovereigns and ancient regional states; this seemed to them the most suitable climate, although with just a trace of past jurisdictionalism, for the calm civil and religious life which had been shaken by the events of the revolution and Napoleonic domination. However, not all the Catholic world was in favour of a conservative and reactionary policy; with the flowering of the romantic

movement there had arisen a desire to look beyond the narrow confines of the 'little fatherland' and to aim at an independent and modern political organization which could hopefully comprise all the Italian people. Such a reaction had been prompted partly by the short-sighted dynastic polities of the small Italian states and the fact that in Lombardy and the Venetian states Austria was ruling with a rod of iron. The national organization envisaged could draw its roots from the culture and glorious memories of the free cities (communes) of the Middle Ages when the church had been able to defend the peninsula from the foreigner and exert a civilizing influence. At the beginning the movement was composed only of a few personalities and their circle of friends: Manzoni, Cantù and Pellico in Milan; Cesare Balbo in Piedmont; Lambruschini and Capponi in Tuscany; Nicolò Tommaseo in exile in Paris wrote "Dell'Italia" (About Italy) in 1835 in which he affirmed his faith in an initiative of the people and maintained that "peace and freedom can come to the world and Italy only from the religion of Christ"; Tommaseo, instead, spoke of "the spectre of Rome" (that is, a rhetorical recollection of imperial Latin grandeur) which represented another characteristic source of inspiration for the nationalist movement.

But a much larger sector of moderate Catholic opinion which had until then been influenced by Mazzini's call for unity was influenced by Gioberti's work: "Of the moral and civil primacy of the Italians" (Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani) (Brussels 1843); although containing little religious inspiration and a lot of politics, it did present the attractive idea of national unity to be realized not by a *revolutionary* change of the existing state of affairs but by voluntary adherence of the Sovereigns of the peninsula themselves to a federation to be presided over by the most prestigious figurehead — the Pope himself. This solution aimed at overcoming the serious obstacles created by the notable difference between institutions and habits among the different Italian populations, and in addition ensured the Church's support and the respect of other nations.

I do not wish to dwell further on the Neo-Guelph movement: I will only recall how, after the election of Pius IX (who seemed to personify the ideal of a patriotic and evangelistic Pope ready to fulfil the role predicted by Gioberti) the

nationalist cause gained enormous ground among the Catholics in all classes everywhere. It has now been ascertained that the Pope's intentions has been misinterpreted and that there had been forced persuasion by many liberals and by Mazzini himself of their followers to take part in demonstrations in favour of Pius IX in order to encourage the expression of patriotic and anti-Austrian sentiments.

As you know, the Italian phase of the war of 1848 with Austria appeared to be directed at the liberation of Italy from the Austrian yoke, and the name of Pius IX had appeared large in manifestos: the clergy in many places never missed a chance of preaching a "Holy Crusade against the foreigner", and the volunteers who rallied from all over Italy to the Paduan plain were termed *Crusaders*.

Pope Pius IX's declaration of 29 April 1848 (after the Austrian threats of schism) announced that he could not participate in a war against another Catholic country and this supernatural religious choice of the Pontiff shattered the Neo-Guelph dream. Even if the Pope on 3 May did send the Austrian Emperor a plea to renounce domination of Italian territories, the Pope immediately lost his charisma and the anti-unification attitude of the Pontiff and his state (and even his supporters) in withdrawing from national solidarity was denounced.

The events which followed, from the failure of the war against Austria and experience in democracy (firstly of the Roman Republic) up to the second Restoration, provoked notable divisions between Catholics as regards political unity.

The Legitimists, faithful to the old dynasties and advocates of the traditional alliances between throne and altar which, to their mind, provided the best guarantee of religious and civil peace, affirmed the need for obedience to the existing authorities and defended the status quo in Austrian Lombardy-Veneto.

The clerical groups (that is, those who held that it was morally acceptable to be guided by an ecclesiastical hierarchy in political matters) only in part sided with these views: the clerics were harshly critical of anti-ecclesiastical arrangements whether of absolutist jurisdictionalist type or liberal stamp and were watchful enough of intellectual and mass public opinion to reject the nationalist principle entirely. Thus, the Jesuit

"Civiltà Cattolica" ("Catholic Society") (which was the most influential voice in this field) did not deny that national unity could offer advantages, but denounced the dangers of a mass rising to achieve it and the diffusion of 'Jacobin' ideas. As De Rosa has recalled, Luigi Taparelli (who was the most solid thinker of the Jesuit school) had theorised from a Catholic viewpoint on the primacy of civil society: the latter was seen as a living organism whose fundamental nuclei (families, communes, regional populations) constituted a reality endowed with their own autonomous rights. Every State had to come to terms with this reality and thus society (as similarly the Church) could not be subjected to any national plan which did not respect its requirements.

But these philosophical motives were not the only ones to influence the Catholics, clergy and people. They were also to no small extent influenced by the reactionary withdrawal of Pius IX and the appearance of rationalist-Voltairian tendencies inside the innovating liberal movement on both the left and right. The phenomena of secularization which had been developing for some time in Europe began to appear in Italy in this period, and it is worth noting that they were at their most advanced precisely in liberal Piedmont, which was hastening to become leader of the national movement.

However, in the 1850s there was no shortage of patriotic Catholics: ex-Neo-Guelphs, liberal Catholics such as Ricasoli and Minghetti, exiles of 1848 like Tommaseo and D'Ondes Reggio, some rare Republican priests such as Anelli and Don Tazzoli who were hanged in 1852 at Belfiore; and in addition many without precise ideological or party connotations whose sentiments had been won over by the national ideal. For them there was no incompatibility between realizing independence, the formation of a constitution and religious life; they looked sympathetically at the government in Turin and hoped that the national initiative would stem from there. Although in general rejecting extremist solutions, they held that it was necessary to move in pace with the times, and solicited the Church itself to update its ideals and rethink its attitudes even through a renunciation of temporal power which was no longer acting in support of religion but was instead a burden and scandal.

When the war of 1859 and the risings of Central Italy took place, followed by the expedition into the Mezzogiorno

(Southern Italy), on the one hand there was enthusiasm from the Catholic-Patriot circles who fully supported Cavour's initiative, and who favoured solution of unity; on the other hand there was unconditional hostility in Legitimist quarters and stern lecturing by the clerics which became increasingly bitter when the possibility of the creation of a unified state under the Savoy Monarchy arose.

According to "Civiltà Cattolica" Italy had not become "mistress of herself" but "a servant of others". The war had broken out not between the people and the oppressing government but between a faction of "greedy, ambitious and fanatical men" and "legitimate powers surrounded by all that is honest Catholic, knowledge able ... conservative." The annexations had been "a farce", in reality amounting to a military conquest by the Savoy State which was tyrannically exerting its power through the "revolutionary party formed by Cavour's league and the rebels and revolutionaries of all the other Italian states."

This line received support from the clerics not only on account of the blows suffered by the Pontifical State in 1860 but also on account of Cavour's own declaration in Parliament in March 1861 in which he declared Rome as the capital of the new Kingdom. As A.C. Jemolo recalled, Cavour made this declaration not because he was attracted by the ideal fascination of Rome but for political utility, to put an end to the rivalry of other Italian cities for the primacy. In that period Cavour was involved, through the Pantaleoni-Passaglia mission, in trying to obtain a spontaneous renunciation of temporal power from the Pope (Pius IX), offering in exchange a renunciation, by the Italian State, of all jurisdictional bonds then in existence. Cavour's formula "A free church in a free state" however, satisfied neither the Curia nor the clerics: they saw it as a way of excluding the Church from society, moreover of depriving the Pope of his traditional security (now reduced to Latium alone). In a moment when secularizing pressure was increasing and the Church was going through the profound crisis of a change in attitude and values within itself, the spontaneous renunciation of privileges, power and substance was something of extreme seriousness.

Thus the Catholic clerics chose the path of protest against a State which, in their view, prevented the beneficial, social

influence of the Church and tended to undermine the Pope's independence; they abstained from participating in the elections of a National Parliament and decided almost to isolate themselves from public life while waiting for some catastrophe to dissolve the Italian State, as had happened for the Napoleonic Empire in 1814.

The positions, which were mostly coincidental, of clerics and Legitimists were, however, destined to become more distinct in the space of a few years: already in 1866 when, despite the military defeats against Austria, the national campaign appeared solid, the clerics, firm in their condemnation of the origins of an Italian State, realized that which such a tide in favour of Unification they would have to act to defend their own religious positions. So, after their very first attempts to promote a "Catholic Movement" they moved to assume a national denomination and organization, thus progressively excluding Legitimist tendencies and rejecting conspiratorial methods in favour of legal ones.

After the Italian conquest of Rome in 1870 the clerical protest at the "Pope's imprisonment" increased but did not change direction: between solemn invectives against the "evil Masonic State" the clerics decided not to participate in the political life of the country, dominated by the political, liberal *élites*, and dedicated themselves to the organisation of religious and social associations and to the conquest of municipalities in order to defend their beliefs among the people.

Reacting against those who accused them of not loving their country, they declared that they did not accept the "legal Italy" of the revolutionaries, but would honour the Italy of the Catholic people and its civil and religious interests which the ruling class were almost unaware of.

A notable differentiation took place among patriotic Catholics after Unification. Some of them like Ricasoli, Peruzzi, Minghetti became exponents, in the full sense of the word, of the moderate ruling class and identified with the system.

Many thousands of members of the patriotic clergy sympathised with the view published by the Jesuit Passaglia, who asked the Pope to renounce Rome and temporal power in favour of the new Kingdom and to reconcile himself with the nation; but the censorship of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the stern attitude of Liberal governments towards ecclesiastical

matters were such that this initiative was short-lived.

Some Catholics such as Cantù and D'Ondes Reggio who were in favour of Unification but critical of 'Piedmontesism' entered Parliament but found themselves very soon in a minority, protesting in vain about the laws of centralization, dispersal of congregations and destruction of ecclesiastical goods.

A group of Catholics, natives of the ex-Savoy States and Lombardy, decided to issue some newspapers and magazines such as the "Catholic Annuals" (Annuali Cattolici) and "The Universal Review" (Rivista Universale) which aimed at exalting the new National and Constitutional State and weighed up the role the Catholics could play with their participation in elections and public activities. This group (which was called 'transigent') after the election of Leo XI, who appeared in favour of a settlement of the conflict, was responsible for the publication of the "National Review" (Rassegna Nazionale), which looked towards the formation of a *conservative-national party*: this party, however, which, with the support of moderate liberals and constitutional Catholics, was to have led to a reconciliation between the Italian State and the Church, avoiding a radicalization in an anti-religious and social sense, was never formed because of the suspicions of the Holy See and the ruling class itself.

The two ranks of 'transigent' and 'intransigent' had different developments. While the transigent, after a fortunate period in the first ten years of Leo XIII, were reduced to a small minority, the intransigent increased in numbers also because of the political and social crisis which had hit Italy in the last decade of the century. Having formed a big politico-religious organization called "L'Opera dei Congressi" (the work of Congresses) which had hundreds of thousands of followers, they took a position against the concept of national grandeur which had especially been advocated by Crispi through colonial expansion and military power. While the transigents' mouthpiece, the "Rassegna Nazionale", upheld an increase in religious Catholic influence in proportion to Italian political representation (for example, through the work of missionaries in Africa), the intransigent thought it absurd to link the "society of blasphemers" and of brute force with that of the Faith.

The pattern of the argument, however, changed between the end of the century and the period which preceded the First World War. While the Liberals ceased considering the Pope and Catholics as mortal enemies, and encouraged their electoral support for conservative reasons inside the clerical camp, there was, at the same time, a new generation growing up which had not experienced the politico-religious conflict of the Risorgimento and which considered a National State as an indisputable reality. These young people hoped to be actively useful not only in a social and municipal field but also on a political level. From 1904 onwards, although without creating an actual party (which was only created in 1919), some of these Catholics offered themselves as candidates in Parliament with declarations of national and constitutional loyalty, and were elected. Thanks also to Giolitti's tolerant government, which often sought Catholic votes to support the vacillating liberal system, a hope was taking shape in the Catholic world of being able to 'escape from the Ghetto' and to have some influence in the new State, provided, however, that it was able to make a clear national choice; it would thus be possible to modify from the inside all those anti-popular, centralizing and secular characteristics of the Italian State.

This explains the well-known national patriotism which in the ten years preceding the First World War became more heated in all fields, except perhaps for the circles of the intransigent survivors gathered around the "Unità Cattolica" in Florence. This 'national development', which implied recovery by the nation of the people's Catholic energies which had been overlooked in the solution of the early Risorgimento, was also useful in the battle which was taking place at that time between ranks of conservative constitutionalists and groups of the 'masses' from the extreme left, the latter strongly impregnated with Masonry, internationalism and anti-clericalism.

The support which the majority of the Catholic movement (but not the democratic groups of Murri and Sturzo) gave to liberal conservative coalitions represented both support of a political sector which was prepared to give the Catholics and their ideas some space, and also a new position in favour of the institutions which were no longer hostile.

The most clamorous demonstration of *national* feelings



among Catholics was on the occasion of the Italo-Turkish war of 1911—12 for the possession of Libya. There was an enormous gathering of clergy and catholic laymen and a great demonstration of enthusiasm. Many saw the war as a crusade against the infidels and also — and above all — the way to demonstrate that they were real patriots. Philip Meda, one of the greatest political exponents among the Catholics, is said to have scorned this abandonment to "the national wind which blew from the coasts of Africa"; and this leads us to the problem of the relationship between Catholics and the Nationalist movement, which was then put to its most incisive test.

As Veneruso recalls, the first genuine expressions of a nationalist attitude, that is the reviews "Il Marzocco" (1896) and "Il Regno", (1903) with their explicit *Nietzschean*, *Pagan* and *Individualist* attitude, were seen by the Catholics as an affiliation with Liberalism. Corradini, however, avoided in "Il Regno" any hostile reference to the Church considered as a powerful, openly political institution, inheritor of 'Latin genius' and a possible vehicle of Imperialist expansion for Italy. It was a conception of religion as a skilfully used "instrumentum regni" which would have its influence in the following years when the growing tension within the extreme left and the restraint that the ecclesiastical hierarchy exercised in a political direction led some groups of young people to gravitate towards the Nationalist movement. The latter was considered an expression of new patriotism, unconnected with anticlerical prejudices and the old bourgeois parties and capable of absorbing and stimulating the country's energies of whatever origin. Such young people were not just exponents of the Catholic right, nostalgic for Neo-Guelphism or promoters of antisocialist reaction, but were also democrats such as Arcari (similar to the "Osservatore Cattolico" of Albertario) who played an important part in the events of the Nationalist Association. They wanted to fight both Giolittism, that is the political system of the sceptical and parasitical, and also classic, atheist and anti-patriotic socialism.

In addition there was also a certain sympathy for Nationalism from within the National Democratic League, formed by young 'Murrian' Catholics and politically autonomous among the ecclesiastical hierarchies.

According to Areari, the function of Nationalism was to break up the liberal patriotic monopoly and to supply a doctrinal base which was able to appeal equally to all of Italy's spirits: the pagan and christian (Savonarola and Lorenzo de' Medici); the industrial and proletariat (patriotic 'disinfection' of the working classes); bringing to light, that is, "the deep solidarity between the individual and the nation" (equation between nation and people). The war with Libya coincided with the peak of Catholic and Nationalist convergence, but already in 1912 more precise standpoints had been taken: Meda in the name of Catholic constitutional reformists declared that "as a moral and political system Nationalism cannot belong to us" and, exalting peace among classes and nations, affirmed the necessity of maintaining their own identity.

It was the "Osservatore Romano", semi-official mouthpiece of the Vatican, which denounced the new Nationalist Party as "warmongering and arrogant", and it was Cacciaguerra in the newspaper "Azione", mouthpiece of the National Democratic League, who now maintained the incompatibility between the universal mission of civilization and fraternity advocated by Christianity and the Nationalist cause.

The electoral alliances between Catholics and Nationalists which were set up in 1913 were not the result of growing understanding but rather the result of the ideas contained in Gentiloni's pact, that is: the agreed support of those constitutionalist candidates who undertook to respect religion and not promulgate laws against her.

If the philo-catholic declarations of the Nationalist Congress of Milan of 1914 and the clear separation of the Nationalist Party from the Liberal ideological survivors pleased many Catholics, the debate on Italy's intervention in the First World War provoked a definite division: while the Nationalists since August 1914 had sought in every way to urge a war to allow Italy to expand her frontiers and rid herself of the dregs of humanity, the Catholics, for various reasons, were prevalently neutral.

Even if many Constitutionalist Catholics in the spring of 1915 ended by accepting intervention in favour of an Accord as proof of loyalty towards the nation which aspired to the unredeemed lands of the Trentino and Venezia-Giulia (the clerical-moderate group from Brescia, not to mention the

Christian Democratic League, were, indeed, open supporters), such a decision never assumed an imperialist colour or exalted the call to arms.

One must finally remember that Italian intervention in the war provided the occasion for a declaration by the Pontifical Curia which could be interpreted as the first signs of a solution to the Roman question. Cardinal Gasparri, at the manoeuvres of the Central Empire, declared that the "Holy See, out of respect for neutrality, does not intend to create embarrassment for the (Italian) government and places its trust in God in the hopes that a convenient solution to the problem will be found — not through foreign arms but through the triumph of justice which the Holy See sincerely prays will continue to inspire the Italian people in their quest for their ideal".



Yrjö Blomstedt

# National and international viewpoints of the Finnish upper class in the 19th century

In the beginning of the 19th Century Finland was a remote and out-of-the-way corner of Europe. In reverse, the great world was beyond the horizon for the common Finns. The majority of the nation, which was very small in numbers, were common peasants for whom the world ended at the parish church or the nearest small town. Most members of the insignificant upper class were only concerned with their personal goods, offices and properties.

Some figures of the population development are quite illustrative. In the beginning of the 19th century the total population of Finland was about 900,000, and when Russia, the new overlord from 1809 onward, had incorporated in 1812 the former Finnish provinces behind the frontier of Peter the Great in the newly annexed Finland, the figure rose to about one million. The growth during the century was rapid, so that in the 1860s the population had risen to about 1.8 million, and in the end of the century about 2.5 million were living here.

The country was almost purely agrarian, with over 90 % of

its population living in the beginning of the century in the countryside, and 80 % earning its living from agriculture. The upper class was a thin film of cream risen to the top of the milk of country bumpkins. In the last census during Swedish rule, in 1805, the number of the upper strata was about 21 000 including all family members, wives, widows and children. In the 1860s the upper strata were absolute figures of the same size, which means that they had in relative figures shrunk from 2.3 % to only 1.3 % of the total. In the more modern society of the 1890s such figures are no longer available, but we know, for instance, that people with more than elementary education amounted to only 36,000.

The Finnish nobility, aristocrats by parentage, were a very small group of society, and also very poor. Grown-up male noblemen numbered only about one thousand, their significance small or non-existent; here the thirty, forty or fifty prominent people of the upper strata are not to be taken into account. In 1819 the former Swedish diplomat and political tool of king Gustavus III, Johan Albrecht Ehrenström, with the splendid Russian-style title of Conseiller d'Etat actuel was leader of the building enterprise at Helsinki, whose imperial style can still be admired here. This Ehrenström wrote in 1819 asking rhetorically: "What is the use of this nobility, with seats in the House of Nobles only by right of a small copper plate with their coats of arms on the wall, but without a square inch of land to their name."

Of course there were some individuals with broader views and deeper knowledge of state and world affairs, even a few with experience of high life on the continent. Before the French Revolution one or another young Finnish officer had served in the Royal French Army, or in Dutch or Ducal or Royal German Armed Forces, perhaps even in the British Navy, but after the great revolution the attractiveness of foreign military service had quite faded. For the surplus sons of Finland's rural aristocracy a new way opened when Finland in 1809 became an autonomous Grand Duchy under the Russian Empire. During the Russian interlude of Finnish history hundreds of Finns rose to the rank of General in the Imperial Army, and there were thousands upon thousands of Finns in the lower ranks. Not a few of them returned to Finland having retired from active service, and some brought with them broader views than when

they had left.

In this society members of the aristocracy or upper strata with international viewpoints were exceptions. Some of these, however, were splendid and illustrious. Count Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, a luminescent personality, was, I think, the most remarkable. Already in 1778 — just twenty years of age — he was forced to quit Sweden and go abroad. He made his tour through Petersburg, Warsaw and Berlin to Paris, but nobody was in need of his sword. He went to his king, Gustavus III, then staying at Spaa, and became one of the king's most preferred favourites. He was appointed to posts in the Swedish court, and even in the army his career was very rapid. He was a general at thirty. He organized theatrical performances at the court, and, which was very important to his intellectual development, went with Gustavus III to Italy in 1783, travelling through Europe, being introduced at the court of Vienna, to His Holiness Pope Pius VI and staying several months with his king in Naples. King Ferdinand and Queen Caroline became his friends for the rest of life. Then the Swedish king went back north through Paris and Versailles and the court of Louis XVI. Armfelt took part as a statesman in the negotiations between the two kings and their ministers, thus learning important things for a politician. After a period in the royal sunshine Armfelt was pushed aside after the murder of Gustavus III. He did not become a member of the regency council, but was more or less expelled to Naples as Swedish ambassador. Then in 1794 he was accused of high treason and had to escape from Naples; in contumaciam he was sentenced to death in Sweden. He lived three years in Kaluga in Russia in a kind of deportation, then in Courland and Bohemia; in 1800 he was pardoned in Sweden and in 1802 he became Swedish ambassador to Vienna. From 1804 until 1808 he was in military service. After some hesitation he went back to his home country Finland in 1811, after having sworn his oath of fidelity to the Russian Emperor. He became very soon one of the favourites of the Emperor Alexander I and was entrusted with Finnish and also important Russian affairs until his sudden death in 1814.

As one of the most intelligent men in his generation, Count Armfelt was an industrious writer of letters and aide-memoires. He saw the world theatre as a whole and was capable of

evaluating the actors and the play in detail. He was involved in plans for post-napoleonic Europe, not only plans concerning the position of Finland. But Count Armfelt, called the splendid Armfelt or the Alcibiades of the North, was a unique personality. Some of the younger men he had dragged along with him to Petersburg were in a way trying to imitate or copy him, some of them not without success. But already in academic circles, at the University of Åbo, there was no interest in bigger things than academic gossip and intrigue. At the university men were lacked contact with their colleagues on the continent, and most modern studies were not practised at the Finnish university.

But the ideological atmosphere in Finland was not a hermetically closed entity. The ideas of romanticism and nationalism were finding their way to Finland. The Finnish academic world from the 1820s onward was more and more interested in the development of science on the Continent, especially in Germany, where many Finns then begun to travel for the purpose of studying. Our national philosopher, the great J.W. Snellman, went in the 1840s to Tübingen, to mention only one example. And through other channels influences from, let us say, Great Britain and France reached Finland's shores. England and Scotland were at that time the most important merchant nations, and many a Finn was practising merchandise and business in London, Liverpool and Edinburgh. Johan Jacob or John Julin, then ennobled as von Julin, was studying pharmacy, commerce and banking when he married a Scottish vicar's daughter and became a founding father of the savings bank and trading bank systems in Finland. One of the adepts of Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, the bureaucratic statesman and privy councillor Baron Lars Gabriel von Haartman, called "His Dreadfulness", often paid visits to the continent and as leader of the financial administration of the Grand Duchy studied very keenly the modern transportation systems, canals and railroads of Europe. He became an ardent supporter of canals.

There was great pressure towards the formation of a more international upper class, arising quite simply from the need to communicate with the Russians. All Finnish officials coming in direct contact with His Majesty the Emperor-Grand Duke had to speak French, and French was also often used in



correspondence between Finnish officials. In those parts of Finland which had been under Russia during the 18th century the Baltic-German influence was more or less to be seen, so that in the capital of the Viipuri Government, it was a common saying, that old Viipuri was an international city where the inhabitants talked four languages: Swedish, German, Russian and Finnish. It may be called provincial internationalism.

In the nationalistic struggle a major part of the Finnish upper class was on the side of the swedophils. Swedish had through six centuries been the official language in Finland, and the upper class considered Swedish as the language of their culture. Finnish was for them only the language of peasants, a *langue de pärkele*, lingua di diavolo, as Lars Gabriel von Haartman once put it. Never, most of the upper class members thought, could the Finnish language rise to the level of a cultural language, it was too undeveloped and too raw to be used in complicated expressions.

The major part of the upper class or the bureaucratic upper strata was not favourable to Finnish and could not understand Snellman's nationalistic views based on the conviction that only a Finnish national awareness could save Finland from being swallowed in the grey mass of depressed Russian nationalities. But there were also some dissidents, who thought that the nationalism of the Suedo-Finns could lead the nation to the right way of development. Both nationalistic movements were based on the common people, and the real aristocrats were thinking in more universal terms. It was the noblesse oblige principle that they tried to follow; it was their duty to save the country from such democratic tendencies as were the aims of both nationalistic movements.

One of those real aristocrats was Casimir von Kothen, brother-in-law of Lars Gabriel von Haartman. As pro-chancellor of the university (which had the Tsarevich as Chancellor) and as first Chairman of the Central Board of Schools in Finland he followed a conservative school programme: good humanistic schools for the sons of the upper classes, good practical schools for sons of Finnish extraction, elementary schools for the sons of peasantry and workers. He also wanted to intensify both the quality and quantity of the teaching of Russian as a means to strengthen the bands between the Empire and the Grand Duchy. von Kothen was not only a Finnish but also an

international aristocrat, as much a member of the Finnish House of Nobles as of the European aristocracy. After failing in his school policy he lived his last years in Mecklenburg-Strelitz.

Through Russia and the court of St Petersburg the Finnish aristocracy was in contact and linked with the Russian aristocracy. Since the latter was part of the continental aristocracy there were many beautiful Finnish girls married to foreign aristocrats, not only Casimir von Kothen's daughter, but many more. The great-uncle of Field Marshal Mannerheim, August Mannerheim, Chamberlain of the Imperial Court, former Member of the Board of the Bank of Finland, died at San Donato in Italy in 1876. His death was announced to his relatives and friends through a printed letter signed by his nearest relatives. First of these were his brother Fridolf living in Nice and the children and sons-in-law of another brother, the late Count Carl Gustav Mannerheim; the Italian diplomat Francesco Cotta, the Finnish-Swedish explorer A.E. Nordenskiöld and Count Carl Robert Mannerheim, the Field Marshal's father, a gentleman of the bedchamber at the Russian Court. Then his cousins, the Privy Councillor and Minister-State Secretary of Finland Emile Stjernwall-Walleen, Aurora Karamsin, Lady-in-waiting of the Russian Empress, and their brother-in-law the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris, Jose Maurizio Correa de Henriques, Count do Seisal. Then the son of Aurora Karamsin in her first marriage, the multimillionaire Paul Demidov, Principe di San Donato, and his wife, née Princesse Bonaparte. This mourning notice contains a real example of the diffusion of this group of Finnish aristocrats in international circles, the jet set of the 1870s. The Baroness von Oertzen-Kittendorf — the daughter of Casimir von Kothen — was also a member of this family group.

But I think that these relations or links with European aristocracy were of no consequence to Finland during the 19th century. They were merely a curiosity, because international affairs until the 1880s had very little impact on Finnish affairs.

Of course it would be an exaggeration to assert that all Finns were living in innocence, unaware of the great world around them. For instance, the academic world in the 1840s obtained its first scholarships or travel grants for studies abroad. Many of our famous scholars studied in their younger years in Paris

or in Germany and maintained contacts with foreign colleagues through their whole life.

And, of course, the Finnish upper class was forced to think in terms of international politics during the Crimean war and the Polish insurrection in 1863. The bureaucrats were naturally loyal to the monarch and the Empire, the so-called national Finnish army was defending Finland in 1854—55 against French-British naval actions and taking part in the subduing of the Polish insurgents in 1863 (as already in 1830). Merchants and academic youth were in different ways not on the official line; the merchant shipowners intended to raise a Finnish merchant flag of their own design, and students were drinking to freedom and the health of the Poles.

And, during the *risorgimento* period, Finnish students were full of enthusiasm for Garibaldi and his campaign; Carl August Weurlander, who had been studying modern literature in Paris since 1857 took part in it. He enrolled as a volunteer in the French army in 1859 and was at Solferino. After the peace of Villafranca he returned to his books and went to London, where he was caught by the news of the rise of Sicily and the Spedizione dei mille of Garibaldi. Without hesitation he took ship to Sicily and followed Garibaldi to Cosenza, where he enrolled as a volunteer in the bersaglieri. In February 1861 he got his commission as an officer. After the campaign he was transferred to the Volunteer corps of Piedmont, and then to the Garde mobile at Naples. In 1862 he is mentioned as a lieutenant in General Istwan Türr's legion. We have no facts concerning his further life. Some sources tell us that he was with Colonel Francesco Nullo in the Italian Legion on the insurgent side in Poland in 1863 and was killed there; according to others he went to America and was killed in action somewhere during the Civil War in the Confederate Army of the South.

The Spedizione dei mille also inspired some Finns living in Finland; the former non-commissioned officer Herman Liikanen arrived in Italy too late to become involved in the campaigns, but took up arms for Denmark against Prussia in 1864. The younger son of our national poet laureate J.L. Runeberg, Lorenzo Runeberg was aiming also to enrol in the garibaldian army, but he did not complete his military training before the war was over. He became instead a very

distinguished district physician.

But these enthusiastic young people were without doubt exceptions in the Finnish society of 1860s. The late Professor Lauri Hyvämäki in his doctoral thesis from 1964 analyzed Finnish newspapers and their following the international affairs. He found out that in the end of the 1870s the Finnish press was still not very interested in international politics, when it took up such a question it wrote in pro-Russian terms and with great understanding for the Russian viewpoint. Then in the 1880s, and especially during the Afghanistan crisis of 1885, some of the liberal newspapers, especially *Dagbladet* and its editor-in-chief, the stubborn liberal A.H. Cydenius were ventilating their thoughts of Finnish neutrality during a possible war between England and the Russian Empire. Warned by Russian reactions, the Finns very soon learned to be more discreet in discussing world politics openly. Strict censorship is another reason for the Finnish unwillingness to express opinions.

But from 1890 onward Russia attempted to change relations between the Empire and the Grand Duchy — which Professor Jussila will discuss in his article. The Finnish upper class was in fact seeking contacts with the European cultural elite and asking for moral aid in their struggle against what was called Russian oppression. Scientists were using their established contacts, business men their liaisons, the aristocracy their relations with influential people on the continent and in England.

When in 1899, after flagrant violation — as it was commonly regarded then — of the constitutional rights of Finland through the so-called February Manifesto, which allowed Russian intervention in Finnish affairs and thus violated the autonomy of Finland, names were collected in Europe to sign an address of protest, the collecting was organized by the Finns using their international contacts. They got a thousand and fifty names, among them some of the most prominent members of the European intelligentsia. In this seminar it may be correct to mention that more than 25 % of the names were collected from Italy, mostly university professors. There were about 280 Italian names, but only 180 Scandinavian names. The operation was led by Professor Emilio Brusa in Turin, the most renowned Italian name was, I think, Carducci.

Finland had thus become quite clearly a part of European intellectual circles. The struggle against Russian oppression strengthened the bonds with Western Europe. Already from the 1880s Finnish upper class families had been visiting European Holiday Centres; some of the most well-to-do Finns retired to live in high style on the Italian or French Riviera, where they found some kinsmen among the retired Russian generals and Privy Councillors. Still, the Finnish upper class as a whole had during the 19th century become more and more nationalistic. The large core of this class had embraced Swedish nationalism, partly because Swedish was the language of their culture, partly because of their inability to adopt the democratic attitudes of the Finnish national movement. But the Finnish national movement was gaining ground steadily. In 1882 the leader of this party, Professor G.Z. Yrjö-Koskinen was invited to be a member of the Finnish Government, and on the same day the leader of the Swedish Liberals, Leo Mechelin, joined the Senate.

Both these leaders of the Finnish intelligentsia were Finnish nationalists: Yrjö-Koskinen was strengthening the national identity of Finnish-speaking Finns, Mechelin trying to fight Russian aggression with legal weapons. And both were also men with large international interests. Yrjö-Koskinen had contacts occasionally with the great peace theoretician Frederic Passy, and Leo Mechelin was also very well known in the peace movement of the 1890s. But still, their major concern was the development and progress of the Finnish people, the Finnish nation, both economically and ideologically.

To put the whole problem in a nutshell: throughout the future of the Finnish nation was for its upper class the 19th century the most important question. Firstly, the international contacts were mainly on a private and personal basis; then, when the turmoil of Great Power politics began more and to raise high seas even on Finnish shores, the Finnish upper class was forced to rely upon their social and intellectual counterparts in Europe.

Of course there was also immigration, caused mostly by industrialisation and enlarging trade, also by the enormous rise of the standard of living in Finland which followed in the steps of urbanization. But the Finnish upper class — in spite of its origin — was mostly national and nationalistic. And as a result

of the educational system, which had been enlarged step by step with Finnish as the teaching language, the Finnish upper class, at least the younger generation, was mainly Finnish-speaking. Belonging to a national culture with few traditions, this younger generation perhaps was less disposed to think in international categories than its predecessors.

Patrick Bruun

## Freedom fighters at close quarters

In European history Garibaldi and Mazzini stand out as magnificent and colourful figureheads in the incessant struggle of the nineteenth century for national independence and civic liberties. Supporters of ideas formed and expressed in the French revolution and with the Bonapartist empire transferred *in concreto* to southern and continental Europe, they carried the fight of the *carbonari* into the harsh climate of the restoration.

Though the political history of Europe during most of the nineteenth century was permeated by this struggle for freedom at different levels, autonomous Finland generally speaking played the part of an interested but neutral spectator. Many times sympathy for liberal ideas was expressed indirectly, often focussing on individuals, fighters and heroes rather than movements or philosophical abstractions.

In the programme of this symposium I have named my contribution "Freedom fighters at close quarters. Fenno-Italian friendship in Greece". My point of departure is the fact that Finnish citizens who engaged actively in European wars of liberation or rebellions were very few indeed. One only is fairly well known to us, a legendary hero venerated by all his compatriots when in retirement, but always suspected of conspiratorial activities by the authorities. He was buried in Stockholm with full military honours in 1867 as a protest against Russia and the suppression of the Polish rebellion of 1863.

His name was August Maximilian Myhrberg, born 1797 in Raahe (Brahestad), a student of Uppsala and Turku — and a somewhat unruly student at that — when he suddenly in 1823 decided to go to Sweden in order to get some military training, this being the time when security conferences under the guidance of Metternich suppressed all efforts to light the torch of freedom in Europe and beyond the seas. Myhrberg fought successfully and valiantly in Greece and in the course of four years was promoted from private to captain, next to major commanding the fortress of what was the capital of Greece, Nauplion; he fought in Poland in 1831 and at least once in Spain (1823 and possibly later during the Carlist war). He was a modest and reticent man who never commented upon the fantastic feats of bravery connected with his name — a particularly interesting one seems to connect him with Garibaldi's flight to South America and his subsequent transatlantic military successes. Documents have been preserved from his time in Greece — a batch comprising well over 100 items unexpectedly turned up in 1964 in an attic in Bromma, a suburb of Stockholm. Very few of them are official documents, the majority being private notes and letters dealing with the everyday drudgery of camp life. Thus they give glimpses of the international society of freedom fighters at that time engaged in an effort to liberate Greece from the yoke of the Turks — the world of the Philhellenes in action.

Among these Philhellenes the most interesting group, to my mind, is the Italian, and it would appear that among Myhrberg's friends Italians formed the majority.

The Greek war of liberation has proved an inexhaustible source of historical research both on the level of great power politics and at the grassroots level focussing on the aims and activities of the indigenous population as well as the volunteers, the Philhellenes. According to the records of all Philhellenes known, the Italian group with 137 freedom fighters was the third largest, surpassed only by the 342 Germans and the 196 French (cf. Appendix). Myhrberg's papers reveal some hitherto unknown participants. Without indulging in any analysis in depth of the Philhellenic movement, I believe that the different ethnic or national groups of volunteers can, in an general way, be accorded some common characteristics. The Germans and British were strongly influenced by the



slogan of repaying the debt of Europe to ancient Greece, the cradle of western culture. A Winckelmannian enthusiasm, we are told, emptied the German universities of professors and students very soon after the outbreak of the war; similarly the Byronic example exerted a strong moral pressure on British opinion, yielding a quota of 99 (the majority of whom arrived fairly late, after the death of lord Byron). The French and Italians, however, flocked to recruiting offices in two instalments, the early period of 1821—2 and the period of mid-1825 or later. In between very few came, because at that time radicals were fighting in Spain. The picture of the Italians is clearly revealing. After the abortive rebellions in Italy of 1820-1 many fugitives went to Spain (a minority to Greece), and from Spain, after the French intervention, to England. From England a great number of prominent Italian Philhellenes arrived with the ship *Elizabeth* on June 4, 1825. The purpose of most Italians seems to have been specifically to gain experience and to train for the final struggle to liberate Italy. We even know that some Italians volunteered on the Turkish side (in the army of Ibrahim Pasha) for the same reason, and entrenched in hostile camps they nevertheless could remain in touch with one another, exchanging and comparing notes.

The French contingent was dominated by unemployed Bonapartists longing for revenge after so many adversities; a young member of the former imperial dynasty, Paul Marie died by accident in the harbour of Nauplion in 1827; Mme Laetitia Bonaparte's residence in Rome seems, incidentally, to have been a rallying point for Bonapartists. After Navarino, I suggest, it was mainly the genuine freedom fighters who remained, those who had nowhere to return to, and mainly the Italians (if we exclude the heavy German contingent preparing for the arrival in Greece of the Bavarian king). Myhrberg, too, without specific plans, lingered on until early 1831 when he, failing to be promoted, was passed over in favour of a Russian officer.

Myhrberg shared the fate of the Italians in lacking the support of the great powers present in Greece.

The Greek background of the revolutionaries or, rather, of the revolutionary movement which fearlessly in subsequent decades continued the struggle for a better world, can be reconstructed with fair certainty, but a considerable amount of

research is required, for instance in the archives of the secret police, in order to map out the course of events which followed. Liberals and radicals were under close observation even before the Congress of Vienna, as the spies of the Russian Czar, acting in Italy, suggest. In trying to discern the connections between opposition to the Holy Alliance and the revolutionaries of the later part of the nineteenth century. I propose to employ my compatriot Myhrberg once more as a suggestive link.

Myhrberg, as already mentioned, left Greece early in 1831, obviously planning to return to the North. This brought him in the first instance to France, where much had changed with the revolution of July 1830. The Bonapartist Philhellenes were no longer outcasts — Myhrberg's one-time military commander Fabvier had in fact been hailed as a national hero in advance of the revolution when returning to France in 1828. Thus the progressive forces could gather in France. Here Mazzini in 1831 founded *la Giovine Italia*. Several years later he was joined by Garibaldi after the break with *la Charbonnerie*, that frail offshoot of the *carbonara*.

In the meantime Poland exploded and rose against the prototype of oppression, Czar Nicolas and his brother Constantine, viceregent of Poland. With the usual efficiency, offices for the recruitment of volunteers were opened in Paris. Myhrberg left his luggage in Paris and joined the freedom fighters, amply equipped with letters of recommendation to various commanding officers in Poland. He arrived, however, only to be taken prisoner during the final phase of the war. Though he succeeded in escaping, his way back to Paris caused him many hardships and lasted several years. The late thirties saw him probably in Spain — volunteers for both sides in the Carlist war were recruited in France — and he reappeared in the French capital in 1839, whence he secured his return to Sweden with the aid of the personal agent of the Swedish king (Bernadotte).

Let me now proceed to the 1860s. Myhrberg lived a peaceful life of retirement in Stockholm, a popular figure who moved in the best circles, a legendary hero much publicized by writers of fact and fiction. He was not welcome in Finland; during the Crimean war he must have been regarded as representing Swedish revanchist ideas, plans aiming at the reconquest of Finland.

In the early sixties the activities of Polish agents, emissaries from the Czartoryski residence, Hotel Lambert, in Paris, increased preparations for the next Polish war of liberation. The general idea of the Poles was to co-ordinate a Polish rising with Swedish military intervention in order to liberate Finland. The Polish agents found ready support in a group of liberal politicians and journalists mixed with influential Finnish immigrants. Myhrberg belonged to this group, not because of political talent, analytical power, or practical knowledge of world affairs, but simply because of his popularity. In connection with the Polish question, moreover, he had the reputation of a participant in the rebellion of 1831. In fact, when the rebellion broke out in 1863 and Prince Konstantin Czartoryski visited Sweden for a final effort to convince the Swedes of the wisdom of military intervention, Myhrberg was introduced to him and invited by him to Paris and Rome, an innocuous and friendly gesture, though with a slight flavour of propaganda.

If Myhrberg, when approaching seventy, could not be considered an active agent as far as power politics go, this does not mean that the Polish conspiracies were void of political value. The activities of the Polish agents gain in importance when seen in conjunction with another remarkable visitor to Sweden with a similiar purpose — to entangle Sweden in the Russo-Polish conflict. This was the famous anarchist Michael Bakunin, who stayed in Sweden from March to October 1863. He was received with friendship by the already mentioned group of Scandinavists who had liberal leanings. He was even smuggled into the Royal Palace for a personal audience with the king himself. He was uncommonly popular among the liberals. Silvio Furlani, an expert on this subject, writes: "Bakunin aveva annodato rapporti di personale conoscenza con molti eminenti sostenitori del liberalismo politico e dello scandinavismo come pure con personalità di rilievo delle alte sfere governative. L'attività oratoria . . . gli aveva praticamente aperto quasi tutte le porte politicamente rilevanti che esercitavano una loro influenza sulla formazione dell'opinione pubblica, dai Finlandesi emigrati . . . e ad eminenti uomini politici quali . . .".

Bakunin's stay in Sweden, protracted far beyond the point when the Swedes definitely refused to be dragged into the war,

indicates that he had other tasks to complete in Scandinavia, namely to organize a transport service by which literature could be smuggled into Russia through Stockholm and Finland. He had also to investigate the possibilities of printing in Stockholm. Albert Bonnier, founder of one of the greatest publishing houses of Sweden, appears to have been interested in the latter project. The real planner of this diffusion of propaganda was, however, not Bakunin but the Russian emigrant N.P. Ogarev in London. However, other matters brought Bakunin back to Sweden the following year for a sojourn of six weeks (Sept. 6 to Oct. 12, 1864).

Interesting traces of these visits are known to us, first and foremost a draft of a secret international society for the emancipation of mankind (*Société internationale secrète de l'émancipation de l'humanité*) found in 1953 among the papers of the Swedish journalist August Sohlman, now in the Royal Library of Stockholm and properly analyzed for the first time by the Finnish scholar Prof. Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg. Since then this document has been discussed, for instance, at the *Quinto Convegno degli storici italo-sovietici* in Moscow and later at *Il convegno di studi "marxisti e riministi"* in 1972.

From Sweden Bakunin in 1863 went by way of London to Florence, where he took up residence on January 26. Refugees of diverse origin and nationality visited him there, and his home was turned into a centre of revolutionary planning. The police reported that even the Swedish author and journalist August Blanche, "questo capopopolo del regno Scandinavo", was saluted there. The debates were republican in tenor, and the participants discussed "dell'alleanza dei popoli contro tiranni, del trionfo completo del principio democratico e dell'urgente bisogno de rinovare il diritto pubblico europeo". Other problems of major concern were the Polish question and the possibility of rebellions in Hungary and Austrian Galicia. At this juncture Denmark was attacked by Prussia and by Austria.

Europe was certainly ripe for a revolution, but in order to prevent or exclude shortcomings such as those of 1848 an international secret organization was to be formed with centres ready to strike in each country. This was to be a union of the revolutionaries in all countries united against the Holy Alliance of all the tyrants of Europe, religious, political,

bureaucratic and financial.

Having completed this plan, Bakunin left Florence and arrived in Sweden on Sept. 6. According to new documents discovered in the Royal Library his purpose was to create an "organisation de la Famille des Frères Scandinaves" as a branch organisation of *La grande société révolutionnaire internationale de l'Europe*. The supplementary documents start with an analysis of the political situation in the Scandinavian countries which Bakunin did not yet find ripe for republican reform. One question could, however, activate these surprisingly liberal but slow northerners, he reflects — *l'union Scandinave*, because of the instinctive and general hatred of Russia and the new very deeply felt hatred of Prussia.

In a letter from London discussing the Scandinavian union with regard to publication of the programme, Bakunin exclaims: "Et pourquoi . . . ne feriez-vous pas un appel courageux à la Finlande?" You are a group of free citizens, not members of the government. "Il faut oser — comme disait Danton".

He goes on to point out the negative side of maintaining silence concerning Finland. If that were done, the Finns would not be prepared to act and the Russians could easily persuade them that if the political situation in the North were aggravated, Sweden would simply try to reduce Finland to the state of a province, and those Finns who nevertheless persisted in their hopes of future liberation from Russia would be reduced to contacts with the king alone. Consequently, what ought to have been a great national cause would reveal itself as a petty intrigue according to Quanten or Nordström (two Finnish émigrés holding key positions in Stockholm. In this context it should be pointed out that J.V. Snellman, the Hegelian philosopher and leading spirit of the Finnish nationalist movement with its stress on the Finnish language, had criticized with searing sarcasm in a well-known essay the behaviour of his fugitive compatriots, Quanten, Nordström and others).

If I were one of you, Bakunin continues, I would make a solemn appeal to Finland and declare that in given circumstances Finland would return to Sweden "comme une soeur égale en indépendance et en liberté, non comme une province, mais comme un état confédéré seulement pour les

grands intérêts généraux politiques de toute Scandinavie et conservant toute son indépendance intérieure, la langue, et sa législation particulière”.

The advantage of such an appeal and such a policy would be that it would attract a large part of the Finnish population of the northern regions of Russian Europe, possibly also Estonia and Lithuania, without conquest and violence; by a spontaneous movement would thus be born *La grande fédération du Nord*. Bakunin was prepared to accept, at least at the beginning, a king as head of the Nordic federation. But, and this was much more important, the union should be directed by a Scandinavian parliament as a superstructure of the national parliaments.

The statutes of *L'organisation régionale scandinave* stipulate that the regional government was to be formed by the four Scandinavian countries (Finland included); that it would comprise three members chosen without regard to their Scandinavian nationality, and four members representing one each of the four countries. The national governments would be subordinate to the Regional Government. All cabinet members on both levels had to be *Frères internationaux*, but exceptions were permissible at the outset.

It seems superfluous, in this context, to dwell upon the lesser details of the Statutes; the general programme of *La société internationale* also falls outside the scope of this paper. With regard to Michael Bakunin it should be sufficient to say that his plans came to nought; his Swedish correspondents August Sohlman and Adolf Hedin did not take any definite steps towards forming the Scandinavian union, though there are proofs that an English section of the international federation was constituted.

We have now seen, in two different contexts, the pattern of European radical and/or revolutionary co-operation. We have seen the radicals taking the field in Greece in the 1820s, and plotting and conspiring in Sweden and Italy in the 1860s. My link between these two peaks of activity was weak, admittedly, but on the other hand, beyond the valiant Major Myhrberg, who gave us the lead, other common denominators are discernible, in the first place the Italians, in the second place the Poles.

The recruiting offices for the Greek war subsequently served

volunteers going to Poland and, later in the thirties, to Spain and Portugal or South America. After the failure of the Polish rebellion Mazzini's *Giovine Italia* and the Czartoryski headquarters in Paris constitute the institutional framework of radical conspiracy embracing most European countries; after the labours of 1848—9 London becomes the active centre with at least two nuclei, one formed by Mazzini with the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth and the Frenchman Ledru-Rollin as prominent and conspicuous members planning for a future pan-European republic, the other by Karl Marx developing his socialist ideas and working for the international solidarity of labour. In the first International, founded in September 1864 during Bakunin's absence in Sweden, these camps effectuated an unholy alliance, ultimately torn asunder by the rivalries of Marx and Bakunin, the socialists and the anarchists.

Meanwhile, Garibaldi's active intervention in 1860 in Italian politics with his 1,000 brave "redshirts" had aroused the enthusiasm and admiration of all freedom fighters and radicals, and Bakunin's plan for the European brotherhood had found nourishment in the companionship of successful Italian radicals in Florence in 1864. Here, I assume, is to be found one source of inspiration for his Scandinavian secret society and for a regional alliance including not only Denmark, Norway and Sweden but also Finland.

The international brotherhood outlined by Bakunin was never, as far as we know, converted into fact in the form and to the extent suggested by the Russian anarchist. Nevertheless, it could be said that the flesh and blood fraternity of the freedom fighters of the nineteenth century was a fact of life. It was created in the backwash of the French Revolution by the Napoleonic expansion transmitted to large parts of Europe; it began to assume cohesion in Greece and Spain in the 1820s and was further articulated in the decades to follow and frequently interspersed with outbursts of armed insurrection.

The sixties provide us with sufficient material to reconstruct certain features of these underground movements, which normally are reluctant to deposit the literary evidence of their activities with the national archives. Garibaldi had become not only the liberator of Italy but also the champion of European liberty. The indomitable recluse of Caprera took an active interest in everything that happened on the European scene,

but particularly when it came to the possibilities of returning Venetia to Italy and to striking at Austria, his ingenuity and resourcefulness knew no limits. Little known are, for instance, his endeavours to weaken the position of the Austrians in the Balkans both by direct attack and by getting the support of the Greeks. Late in 1861 Garibaldi's emissary Lombardos in Athens submitted to King Otto a *Rapporto confidenziale sottoposto all'eroe delle Nationalità oppresse Generale Garibaldi*, wording which eloquently illustrates the aspirations of the great freedom fighter. Garibaldi at that juncture hoped for a Slavonic uprising (in 1862) in the Balkans against Austria. This could have been brought about by the concerted action of an expedition into the Tyrolean mountains (volunteers had, in fact, assembled at Sarnico on Lake Iseo, not far from Bergamo) and a landing on the east coast of the Adriatic, either at Antivari (Montenegro) or Durazzo (Albania). The support of Greece, moral or active, would have been of prime importance for successful operations.

His appeals from Caprera for the Polish cause were numerous — Poles had fought with him in all his campaigns. His relations with the Hungarians were intimate. A Hungarian legion was scheduled to take part in the Balkan campaign. Lajos Kossuth from his London exile with Mazzini moved to Italy in 1861 and finally settled down in Turin, another indication of the bond between Italian and Hungarian revolutionaries.

Details such as these serve to demonstrate that the revolutionary movements, as far as we know them, display a fair amount of unity combined with an international outlook and a common purpose. The Nordic countries were but little touched by these activities for reasons perspicaciously outlined by no other than Michael Bakunin. The main function of Scandinavia was to serve as a supply route for revolutionaries, providing the oppressed peoples of Russia with political propaganda when the Polish rebellion had closed the continental frontiers of Russia. In addition Sweden might be induced to intervene with force, and the émigré Finns in Stockholm formed a nucleus of those interested in such a venture. The Philhellene and freedom fighter Myhrberg symbolizes the political aspirations of these liberals.



## Analysis of known philhellenes by nationality and time of arrival in Greece<sup>1</sup>

	Early Period 1821— end 1822	Middle Period 1823— mid 1825	Late Period Mid 1825 onwards	Time of arrival uncertain	Totals
Germans	265	10	50	17	342
<i>Died</i>	116	9	13	4	142
French	71	2	114	9	196
<i>Died</i>	19	—	39	2	60
Italians	62	12	48	15	137
<i>Died</i>	19	4	13	6	42
British	12	31	56	—	99
<i>Died</i>	4	7	10	—	21
Swiss	19	—	14	2	35
<i>Died</i>	8	—	3	—	11
Poles	24	—	3	3	30
<i>Died</i>	10	—	1	—	11
Dutch and Belgian	12	1	4	—	17
<i>Died</i>	1	1	1	—	3
Americans	1	5	10	—	16
<i>Died</i>	1	—	2	—	3
Hungarians	4	2	3	—	9
<i>Died</i>	3	—	3	—	6
Swedes	5	—	3	1	9
<i>Died</i>	3	—	—	1	4
Danes	7	1	—	—	8
<i>Died</i>	3	—	—	—	3
Spanish	3	—	5	1	9
<i>Died</i>	1	—	3	—	4
Others and unknown	4	—	8	21	33
<i>Died</i>	—	—	—	3	3
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>940</b>
<i>Died</i>	188	21	88	16	313

<sup>1</sup> William St. Clair: *That Greece Might still be Free*, Oxford, 1972, p. 356



Mario D'Addio

## Political thought and nationality in Italy

The new concept of nationhood which inspired European politics in various ways from the end of the Restoration to the First World War, was without doubt connected with the political experience gained through the French Revolution: the French nation had taken over from the monarchy of the old regime; the principle of legitimacy which had been expressed in the divine right of hereditary monarchy had been replaced by the will of a nation which expressed itself through its representatives and which laid the foundations for a new political and social order. The nation, in that it was the active subject of politics, was the people, while the people found their personality, that is the factor which distinguished them from all other races in the nation: the French people became the French nation, gained liberty not just for itself but for all other nations. The famous Decree of the Convention of 19 November 1792 expressly proclaimed this principle with the new international order in mind based on the freedom of the people: "The national convention declares, in the name of the French people, that it will grant fraternity and assistance to all those peoples who want to reclaim their lost freedom; it encharges the executive power to give the generals the necessary orders to aid these peoples and defend the citizens who have been oppressed or who might be oppressed in the cause of freedom." The wars fought by the victorious revolutionary armies aroused enthusiasm, hopes, new civil and political energy forcing

friendly and hostile countries to acquire self-awareness and thus a desire to see their national rights recognized.

The new European order instituted by Napoleon damped these inspirations in many ways, in that it tended to channel the new, national energies of the people into a bureaucratic, military and exceedingly centralized organization to guarantee the French Empire's power. But precisely for this reason, while it gave a new, unified order to populations who, like Italy, had been divided for centuries by different traditions, laws and institutions, it simultaneously created a historical and political situation which would allow an organic, systematic formulation of the idea of a nation: it is worth remembering Fichte's "Speeches to the German Nation" resulting from a course of lectures in Berlin during the French occupation. The idea of a nation, expressed for the first time as an idea-force during the course of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era had in certain ways been pre-announced by those writers and political thinkers such as Montesquieu, Burke, Moser, Herder, and Vico who considered customs, laws and institutions as the result of a historic process in which the people gradually came to express their own specific and particular characteristics and therefore common identity.

It was above all Vico who inspired the first Italian theorists of nationality with his concept of a political society as a human world deriving from the creative activity of people and nations who in their symbols, languages, legends, cultures and poetry gradually became conscious of their own personality, identity and those elements which an individual recognizes as being unifying: language thus expresses the life of a people, preserving its memories and traditions and expressing itself in different forms during the course of a people's history while retaining its basic identity. The Italian nation is thus found in both the vernacular of the new language arising at the end of the ancient Greco-Roman civilization and in Dante's great poem in which the spoken language becomes the bearer of ideas and values of a universal nature.

We find the first interesting ideas on nationhood in the political writings of those Southern political writers who participated in the events of the Republic of Naples in 1799 and in whom the Vichian cultural tradition was much more alive. They began to pose the problem of the political unity of Italy

which began to be considered no longer a "nation" in the 18th century sense (which was mainly based on the classic meaning) but which was considered in the context of all those factors which lead populations to become just one people. Francesco Lomonaco, in the last chapter of his "Report to the Citizen Carnet" (Rapporto al cittadino Carnet), significantly entitled "A look at Italy" (Colpo d'occhio sull'Italia) began by remarking that Italy had precise geographical limits; that its boundaries consisted of the Alps and Mediterranean, and that its territory was characterized by the Appenines. From this point of view Italy was "separated from the other populations by a chain of inaccessible mountains, and was as if destined by nature to from a single power." But, in addition to the geographical factor, Lomonaco emphasized the general unity of the people which was mainly evident in common language, sentiments and passions, and in a common moral development and a single religion. "Its inhabitants speak the same language, have the same type of passions and character, enjoy equal moral development and physical energy, are not divided by either interests or religion, and are made to be members of the same family". These, for Lomonaco, were the basic requirements for Italy's political unity and therefore its independence — independence being the solution to all problems — political, civil and social — which Italian society had to bear. Italian political unity, seen as a consequence of the diffusion of these principles arising out of the French Revolution, was considered as one of the essential conditions of the new European equilibrium: "because, to be brief, in Europe there is a political balance, war is ceasing and it is right for Italy to be united in a single government, creating a line of strength." Now it is precisely through political unity and independence that Italy will affirm itself as a nation. That is, through the knowledge of its own strength to defend itself from possible foreign attacks, through guaranteeing its own autonomy with respect to other powers, through an awareness of the close link between love of one's fatherland and love of freedom, the principle which confers a genuine moral value to the nation: "By realizing these ideals the Italians, by having a nation, will acquire a spirit of nationality; by having a government, will become politicians and warriors; by having a fatherland, will enjoy freedom and all its benefits; by forming a

united population they will be inspired with a feeling of strength and public pride and they will establish a power which will not be subject to the attacks of foreigners, for woe betide that nation which has to resort to others to conduct its home affairs!"

The political problem of making an actual nation out of Italy was precisely defined in its historic dimensions by Vincenzo Cuoco, who was certainly the most interesting political writer of a group of patriots who participated in the dramatic events of the Neapolitan Republic. In his essay entitled "History of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799"\* he bases his interpretation of political events on the fact that every people and thus every nation has a concrete historic individuality which must absolutely be taken into account whenever a radical reform of the laws and institutions needs to be made. It is not a matter of creating a constitution which faithfully resembles the French one, but more of creating a system of government inspired by the principle of freedom which derives its strength and legitimation from the traditions, customs and long-established institutions of self-government which every nation has retained. "If I were invited to be the law-giver of a nation, I would first wish to be acquainted with it. There is no nation, however corrupt or wretched, which has no customs worth preserving . . . every nation which is now in slavery was once free . . . these remnants of customs and governments of time past which are found in every nation are precious to a wise law-maker and must form the basis of his new legislation. The nation always respects what its superiors give it: such respect sometimes has bad affects but often enormously beneficial, ones. Do not those who wish to destroy this realize that, by doing so, they are destroying every foundation of justice and social order?"

The political problems which were raised by the French Revolution, as far as Italy was concerned, all consisted in finding the most suitable way of allowing the Italian population to participate in the new rules of the constitution: that meant that they had to acquire knowledge of their own traditions, customs and finally their own history from which to

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\* Saggio Storico sulla Rivoluzione Napolitana del 1799

draw the inspiration and impulse necessary for a suitable response to the new political and civil regulations. The latter could not be a simple imitation of the French ones, but had to be essentially Italian, that is the result of the active participation of the people. Not an abstract legality but a concrete, actual, historic reality and therefore not purely theoretical ideals and principles. For this reason Cuoco did not believe in constitutions which were "too philosophical", since the true base of a constitution should be the traditions, opinions and habits of a people deriving from their character and from that which the people have in common. "This base must rest on the character of the nation and must precede the constitution; and while the way in which a nation must exercise its sovereignty is in this way determined, there must be many more sacred things in the constitution itself which the Sovereign, whoever he is, must not change."

According to Cuoco it was necessary to realize that the most efficient way of limiting a Sovereign's power so that it was not transformed into absolute power did not lie in the constitution but in that system of principles and values, precisely the expression of the character of the nation, which represented the real complement of the constitution. Such a system of principles and values implied a living and functional political reality.

For Cuoco, the new political legislation introduced into Italy thanks to French influence had to be enlivened by public spirit and a sharp national awareness: the Italian Republic and the Kingdom of Italy were not to be considered as mere political entities set up to guarantee France's influence and maintain the system of Napoleonic states, but more as the beginning of a political experience which would prove itself 'legitimate' in the true sense of the word by bringing about a real national awakening. This idea is developed by Cuoco in his famous "Project proposed by an Italian Newspaper" (*Disegno di un giornale italiano*) which he presented in 1805 to the Vice President of the Italian Republic Melzi d'Erilisi. Briefly it dealt with the formation of an Italian public opinion which was both cognisant of the reasons why the Italians formed a nation and aware of their affinity, founded of course on common interests but essentially moral, deriving from their traditions and history. Only by remembering the historical events which had

influenced political events in Italy and by reflecting on the significant contribution that Italian civilization had given to Europe could Italians feel and exert their national dignity, the feeling that induced citizens, i.e. the people, to participate in the new Institutions of the State: "In Italy it is not a question of preserving the public spirit but of creating it". We should accustom the minds of the Italians to think nobly, and introduce them, almost without their realizing, to the new ideas that their destiny requires, transform all those who were born in the provinces or even in the humblest village of the provinces into citizens of the State. The new State which arose from the French Revolution, observed Cuoco, had to relate to everyone, not just the 'active' citizens but also the 'passive' citizens, those who formed part of the poorer classes and who lived far from the political centre. Now this was only possible through a feeling of national dignity. Thus the people acquired a new confidence of their own strength and deeds, accompanied by a self-esteem and respect for the things which belonged to them. Thus "a consensus of opinion on those objects which could be useful or harmful" was made possible. National consciousness, therefore, becomes a power to accomplish and does not remain in the abstract. It rennovates, transforms, works in such a way as to make society and institutions correspond to its ideals. It is therefore a stimulus of activity which redeems individuals from their servile habits and from simple imitation and reminds them of the responsibility of their actions and their duty to make a personal, individual contribution in order to achieve a common end. From this they acquire the energy necessary to carry out generous and noble works, and likewise the strength of spirit to support general difficulties and to make the sacrifices which will sometimes be required of them to achieve a common end: "self-esteem and respect for their own possessions arise in great nations as a result of that strength which has enabled them to accomplish great works, and that patience which has allowed them to support difficulty and serious sacrifices and that affection for their own government which is cooled or killed at the thought that it is not operating in their interests; and finally that constancy of thought in deeds and actions which, based on the respect we have for our superiors, cannot prevent us from obtaining the very best results."



According to Cuoco, when nations are compared their differences, both in attitudes and sentiments, can easily be seen; the nation's historic personality is founded on a principle of development and activity which in the course of history leads to a unity of behaviour and activity in individuals, groups, social classes and their works and obligations, which thus from the root of a people's identity. In this perspective a nation's essence is represented by the contributions it has made to the formation of modern civilization, and in this respect Cuoco thinks that it is useful for nations to discover themselves through comparison with others. This prompts Cuoco to urge the Italians to recall the unity of their history, to recognize the most significant works of Italian genius and to meditate on the errors, divisions and internal strife which led to Italy's domination by foreign powers. Cuoco in "Giornale Italiano" exhorts and defends the virtues and genius of the Italians, but at the same time is severely critical of Italy's vices, above all those which affect the Italian civil sense, such as separatist sectarian movements. He repeatedly recalls the attention of readers of "Giornale Italiano" to the fact that national spirit does not mean the attitude of a person who only regards and values what takes place in his own country, thus isolating himself from the outside world. On the contrary, he urges the Italians carefully to note what is going on in other countries and points out that, once provincialism and municipalism have been eliminated, it is necessary to enter into debate with other nations by promoting an exchange of ideas — which is the true climate for national renewal. In this context Cuoco dwells on the theme of the ancient Italic primate in the philosophical-pedagogical novel "Plato in Italy" which, as he wrote to the Vice-King Eugenio, was "aimed at forming the Italians' public morale, and inspiring them with that spirit of unity, love for their country, and love for their armed forces which they have not so far possessed". The great civilization of the Italic cities of Magna Grecia thus represents a model which helped understanding of the processes behind the political union of peoples and which could therefore be useful experience at the present time.

In contrast, in a work of Giandomenico Romagnosi printed anonymously in 1815 with the title "The Constitution of a National Representative Monarchy" (*Della costituzione di una*

monarchia nazionale rappresentativa) we find the concept of a nation seen from a different cultural viewpoint, that is with precise reference to Italian Enlightenment at the end of the 18th century. This work was published in its entirety after Romagnosi's death in 1848 with the title "Science of Constitutions". (Scienze delle costituzioni).

Romagnosi felt that political problems must be considered in a systematic way from a rational-utilitarian point of view: he dwelt particularly on the positive factors which should be considered when dealing with problems regarding the organization of society. Romagnosi held that there was no difference between people and nation since both were formed of the same individuals with the same specific interests in common and able to establish an exchange of such interests. He saw the consequences, for political order, deriving from this: the unity of the people-nation existed even if it was subdivided into various state-political systems (as was the case in Italy) because whatever was the result of a completely natural formation could not be destroyed: "I say nation: and when I use this term I mean to denote a population which has been imprinted with a moral and geographic natural unity".

The existence of nations is thus the result of both a natural and a people's law, in the sense that men, for reasons of ambience, ethnic characteristics and on account of their cultural patrimony tend to gather in large collective communities whose characteristics are, indeed, completely natural: nations are the result of the process of organization of diversification which has characterized the history of the human race. From this Romagnosi moves on to become a theorist of 'Ethnarchy', that is, the right all nations have to establish their own particular political system and therefore government. The *arché*, the command, the principle, which legitimizes the political power derives from the unity of action of the individuals and therefore of the nation. Ethnarchy asserts itself as a right that cannot be denied upon a nation's conclusion of its natural cycle of development and upon its reaching its natural limits: in this event the need for "natural domination" arises and this is realized through "the reunion of the nation's physical and moral forces in a united political power". This factor, according to Romagnosi, characterizes modern history: the formation of great unified states such as

Spain, France and England demonstrates that a genuine natural impulse pushes nations to seek political unity. Resistance to such an impulse means altering the politico-social balance formed through the completely natural laws of the great human communities and their reciprocal influences. The political order of every people, like that of a nation, will always be precarious, and often cause ruinous wars until nations are based on the principle of nationality: "Equilibrium between the nations of Europe will never be re-established until every nation has acquired its own independence".

The idea of a nation is expressed in an organic, philosophical concept by Vincenzo Gioberti in a work which had very great impact on the Italian culture of the Risorgimento: "Of the Civil and Moral Primacy of the Italians" (*Del primato morale e civile degli italiani*), first printed in Brussels in 1843. For Gioberti the relationship between religion and politics was of particular importance and he was interested in the role that Christianity and, in particular, Catholicism, had to play in the formation of modern civilization. He was convinced that civilization's origins, like those of development, lay in religion, which is the root of organization, preservation and rebirth. Already in 1838 in his "Teorica del sovrannaturale, or sia discorso sulle convenienze della religione rivelata colla mente umana e col progresso civile delle nazioni" (*Theory of the supernatural or discourse on the aptness of religion as revealed by the human mind and the civil progress of nations*) he had observed that the "political conditions of a people have their foundation in corresponding moral conditions which precede it, form it and preserve it and the two principal elements of the moral life of a people are language and religion". The crisis of the modern world for Gioberti derived from the scission which had taken place between religion, the Catholic Christian faith, and philosophy and science. He attempted to show the basic relationship which existed instead between religion and civil progress, simultaneously giving rise to an intense renewal of Catholic culture. Religion and, in particular, Christianity forms the basis of the historical individuality of nations, and in religion the particular character, vocation and almost the destiny of every people is manifest. Gioberti observes that "every race is a creation of God and carries its own destiny within itself from birth and its beginnings. Such destiny differs

from that of other races because nature, the creator, which is as rich and varied as the mind governing it, never copies and never exactly reproduces itself but changes the different aspects of its work incessantly. Any nation wanting to contradict this law is punished like the individual who turns against his natural or given vocation; that is, he becomes unproductive . . . (1875). Every nation, therefore, has its own personality, that is its own vocation and finally a particular mission to fulfil, mission which can only be understood in its true sense in the context of a history of civilization, in which the relationships which exist between individual civilizations and the principles on which they are based can be seen.

The principle of nationality requires a nation to be constantly faithful to itself, to have activities which correspond to its "ethnological statute" and therefore to continue to perfect itself; it should avoid settling for a bland imitation of other nations because this means weakening and sometimes changing the national spirit by introducing a slow and inevitable process of dispersion of the national community". Gioberti observes "it is difficult for a race to grow and prosper without statutes which are inborn and incorporated into its character and connected with its history . . . this does not prevent occasional changes from taking place, corresponding to the successive growth and perfecting of the original rudiments, changes which concern occasional events and not the essence of institutions which are immune from every event". Just as it is necessary to maintain and defend, with the appropriate education, the character, spirit and talent of a nation, it is not necessary to make the mistake of retaining at any cost the customs, intellectual habits, laws and institutions which have been superseded and are of no more use in the process of renovation and perfecting which characterizes all nations in that they are endowed with an autonomous spirit of life and organization: the idea of a nation, therefore, promotes the civil progress of races, implies a decisive criticism of every form of traditionalism which does not know how to distinguish the constructive from the destructive and which idolizes superficial forms, mortifying and suffocating in this way the free creative energy which belongs to the national spirit. "This maturing and successive development is very necessary to the happiness of a nation, just as much as the constant perpetuation of the

basic intrinsic order of its institutions; for this reason the life and progress of states are preserved in two such conditions which are in harmonious accord. There are many nations which want to change their composition and some which want to perpetuate outdated procedures in contrast to the dictates of time. The latter nations are not alive but dead or at least ill, and their civilization will collapse immediately at the onset of a sudden unexpected event or will come to a standstill and die of sloth and languor" (i, 138, 139).

It is thus necessary to distinguish the ideal nation from the actual nation: the latter exists (in the corresponding etymological sense of the Latin word *ex-sisto*) in that it derives from the former and subsists (always in the Latin sense *sub-sisto*) in that it is supported by the ideal nation: the idea in fact, does not change but guarantees continuity which becomes intelligible through language — language being the means through which the People's individuality and personality are expressed: "In such a way one can distinguish from the real Italy the ideal Italy . . . which is so much more substantial and constant than the other, since the former varies from year to year and century to century while the latter is immutable (ii, 250).

Now, according to Gioberti, Italy's primate, the ideal material for nationality consists in its civilization; in Italy, ancient Greek civilization came to an end with the Roman Empire; in Italy, Christianity laid the foundations for medieval civilization from which modern civilization drew its origins in that it expressed the nations which formed a better, because ideal, community: Europe. Italy's primacy was expressed in literature, art and philosophy as a capacity to 'link itself' to its past, revive it and reformulate it in universal terms for all other nations: the mark of Italy's nationality was being able to express the universal in a form of civilization which made the cooperation of peoples possible and sanctioned their equality and fraternity, excluding any superiority or hierarchy."

According to Gioberti, Italy's decadence depended on the fact that Italy had failed in her mission: Italians no longer had any awareness of the genius of their nation, they were ignorant of the factors influencing their history and did not understand the real meaning of their civilization. For these reasons Gioberti exhorted them to be aware of themselves as a nation, and of

their unity which is for most the ideal expression of a civilization which recognizes itself as such, and secondly a material or rather political expression. "Italians, in order to be able to perform deeds of great merit and genius, both mental and physical, must above all be aware of their strength and of the immortal privileges of their race. The only people capable of this are those active, ardent and magnanimous spirits who stimulate enterprises which, by virtue of the formers tenacity, succeed. Certainly no people can achieve its destiny if it has no knowledge of it. In this respect, the Delphic precept "Know yourself" which the father of the renewed Greek philosophy held sacred, is also applicable to nations no less than to mankind" (ii, 250-1).

The political unity of a nation is the necessary consequence of a revived and reformed national awareness. Such awareness forms the nation's real foundation, since from it derives the necessary energy to achieve and, above all, defend the nation and allow her to be esteemed by other nations. From this point of view political unity and thus independence represent the most important safeguard for national spirit: "First of all I say that Italy must revive, above all, her life as a nation and that life as a nation cannot exist without political union between its various members. This union may be interpreted and conceived in many ways; but it is necessary in one way or other for without it the nation is weak and defenceless" (i, 70).

Piedmont's defeat in the first war of Italy's independence, as we know, meant the end of the Giobertian political plan to realize a federation of Italian states under the aegis of the Piedmontese monarchy and the Pope and, at the same time, reminded Italian patriots of the necessity of a more careful consideration of the positive historical factors of the Italian nation. Giacomo Durante in this connection wrote an interesting analysis in an essay published in 1846 with the title "Italian nationality: a politico-military essay". (Della nazionalità italiana. Saggio politico militare.) Durando did not believe Gioberti's Neo-Guelph plan to be possible, as events were later to confirm. The greatest obstacle was represented precisely by the Church, which could not neglect its universal mission and which was to have a decisive influence on the league of Italian states being formed. Durando observed "The Pope at the top of his hierarchy cannot allow his office to

become secondary and completely temporal, as would be the case if this plan of a league aiming at Italian independence were carried out. It is improper for him to become the first and only person responsible for the consequences of an undertaking which tends to combat a Catholic and apostolic nation such as the Italian" (250).

The political program to rebuild Italian political unity and to guarantee the independence of the peninsula had to take into account some real political forces, especially military ones, which were to maintain the action of a league of Italian States against Austria. In such a way the initiative of the Italian States would be linked with actual factors and conditions of Italian nationality. Of particular relevance, according to Durante, to the history of the formation of nations were strategic requirements connected with the territory in which those populations forming nations abode. It was also necessary to take into account the formation of the territory favouring or discouraging the social factors on which the artificial conditions of nationality, such as language, customs, laws, institutions, common interests, were founded. According to Durante nationalities evolve in a strategic sense: that is, one can identify in a nation's history the original nucleus which offers the best possibilities of offence and defence and which, with the existence of corresponding social conditions, is able to succeed in attracting all the adjacent populations to itself, thus promoting that process of unification which will form the nation.

Italy was divided into three strategic areas: Northern and Continental Italy, limited by the Alps and Northern Appenines; peninsular Italy, characterized by the Appenine chain, and insular Italy. The Appenines had always represented the great enemy of the nation and of political unity in Italian history. This geostrategic factor had to be taken into account in the preparation of alliances between the Italian states to ensure political independence. In other words, the principle which governed the policy for the formation of nationality had to be considered. "When a people manages to take possession of that proto-strategic point of a country destined in itself to serve as the base for a concentration of other peoples, and when they know how to exert a political and religious power from this point, then they have their future destiny in their hands (77)."

Durante thus indicated the ultimate goal which Piedmontese policies should have taken into consideration in order to promote Italian political unity. But Durante did not stop at underlining the importance of geostrategic conditions: he knew that, by then, the war had to have a legitimate policy that corresponded to the people's need for renewal. "The war is no less, and need not be other in the present state of civilization, than the putting into practice of a political concept, to which all strategic operations should be coordinated and directed" (239). Therefore, the cause of nationality, political unity and independence for the Italian nation is inseparably bound to freedom and the institutions which express such freedom. Only Parliament is able to express a true national public opinion and only parliamentary representatives can blend the Italian sub-nationalities to form just one nation. Liberty must finally be understood as the true base for the construction of nations: "a nation's strength consists in its moral cohesion; this moral cohesion can only derive from political freedom since anything else will mean uncertainty, confusion, continual terror, and therefore no cohesion, no strength, no national independence (180)".

The idea of nationhood assumes significant proportions in Giuseppe Mazzini, where it becomes the centrepiece of all considerations of Italian and European problems that the great Italian patriot had matured during his long political career. In the authors we have so far considered, the fulfilment of the plan of unification and national independence depended on the nature of the political systems, the harmony of the States and especially the ruling classes who, after the experience of the French Revolution and the failures of insurrection in Italy and of July 1830 in Paris, were sceptical of 'mass' initiatives. Instead, for Mazzini, the nation above all signified the people and thus the people's initiative directed at realizing the fundamental principles, in their entirety, of national political order, unification and independence; therefore the wars of Kings and Princes had to be contrasted with the war by the people to conquer that which could not be given, presented or ceded to them, since it was by its origin theirs: freedom. The people were the nation in that they formed a substantial ethnic unity. This had a very important consequence insofar as the conception of political unity was concerned, since it could not



be achieved either with a confederate or a federal solution; from this point of view Mazzini, let us say, was passionately for Unification: political unification had to sanction and guarantee the indivisibility of the nation.

The relationship between nation and people has, for Mazzini, a politico-social content of which we must be fully aware. The people's initiative, like its freedom and independence, is put into effect through a democratic and republican political system: a democracy and a republic are the two forms of government which complement each other alternately, since one cannot be without the other. Freedom interpreted as full participation of the people in public life can only be achieved in democracy, and the sovereignty of the people requires that the supreme authority of the State be elected by the people and by their representatives.

For Mazzini, a Republic is founded on the principle of association which eliminates any element of dominion or subordination and which establishes relations of solidarity and cooperation among all citizens who are given a new feeling of freedom which derives from recognition of their own duties. Such a principle is particularly important for a solution to the social problem. That is, it allows the working classes to redeem themselves from their harsh working conditions through 'work in association': the principle of association finds its application, according to Mazzini, primarily in the organization of economic production allowing the workers to dispose of the capital necessary for their activity. Republican democracy represents the political and social system in which the people's new need for a religious, moral and civil renewal are fully met. In some respects this is the result of that constant progress which characterizes Western history. The great achievement of the French Revolution was to have finally freed the individual, recognized his fundamental and inalienable rights and adequately guaranteed them; but freedom, if it lacks an awareness of the ethical-religious foundation of the law which disciplines and defines it, is reduced to the affirmation of anarchic individualism, a disuniting principle in every form of society, which therefore ends by encouraging the battle between opposite factions.

The work of the French Revolution, according to Mazzini, was complete: a new era was beginning in which the individual

was to fulfil himself as a man, that is recognize and utilize all the bonds which link him to mankind and which make him thus participate in the destiny of humanity. "We are now between two epochs: between the grave of one world and the cradle of another: between the ultimate in individual synthesis and the threshold of *humanity*." The new feeling of humanity, that is of participation in the experience of mankind implied, for Mazzini, an authentic religious reform which expressed itself in perception of the inseparable link between God and humanity, God who manifests himself in humanity which in turn becomes trustee and interpreter of the laws. Thus men acquire awareness of their duties in the sense that they now have a sure point of reference to the definition and foundation of such duties. But man cannot acquire knowledge of the principles and values which should inspire and guide his life without the nation and the people, which therefore constitute the necessary intermediary between man and humanity: "when the idea . . . of mankind's collective and progressive life . . . became the supreme aim of every step made along the road of righteousness, then so was humanity recognized. And from that day the importance of the nation grew, the nation representing the intermediate step between humanity and the individual: the latter, if he cannot rely, during his work, on a collective force formed of millions who share his tendencies, customs, traditions and language, fails in his intent and, for want of anything better, sinks back into selfishness and egoism . . . nations are the individuals of humanity as citizens are the individuals of the nation".

From this viewpoint Mazzini believes that just as it is every citizen's duty to make the nation prosperous and happy, so every nation has the duty to cooperate in the best possible way with all other nations along the road of human progress. The new historical epoch must, in fact, be characterized by the affirmation of the principle of nationality and consequently independence, equality and fraternity of nations and their harmonic development, and by working together to attain common ends. France with the revolution completed her mission; now political initiative passes to the oppressed nations such as Poland, Germany, Hungary and Italy. They are the bearers of new values on which the new Europe has to be founded: a new Europe which must transform itself from a

system of powers founded on internal and external oppression into a real association of peoples and nations. "As we believe in the freedom, equality, fraternity and association of individuals composing the State, so we believe in the freedom, equality, fraternity and association of nations" (677).

The Mazzinian idea that the nation must be taken as the base of a new international order was given a systematic formulation (especially in the patriot's busiest years) in the field of international law: in 1851 Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, introducing the first course of international law at Turin University gave his opening address entitled "Nationality as the foundation of law for the people" (*Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti*) which was said to have aroused lively debate in Italy and abroad, not to mention the protests of Austria and the Kingdom of Naples.

For Mancini the social factors of nationality must instead be considered like its conditions, that is the material elements which made up the nation. The principle which constitutes it is completely spiritual and of the mind, and is an awareness of nationality. "But the two lines of natural and historic conditions so far discussed, the same sharing of territory, origin and language are still not enough to constitute nationality as we understand it. These elements are like inert materials which manage to live but in which there is no life. Now this vital spirit, this divine complement to a nation, this root of its visible existence — what does it consist of? Ladies and Gentlemen, it is the awareness of nationality, the feeling that the nation has of herself and which makes her able to constitute herself within and manifest herself without". Such an awareness is possible thanks to a common shared way of thinking which allows the nation to realize itself as a moral unity. And it is precisely from the latter that the personality of the nation derives, which correspond to the personality of individuals: just as each man's inviolable right to exercise his freedom must be recognized, so it is necessary to recognize an equal right for communities of individuals who form their own unity and personality, that is the nation. A nation's right to freedom is the juridical consequence of the individual's right to freedom, so that the "preservation and development of nationality are for men not merely a right but due to them by law." The affirmation of the principle of nationality as a

foundation of international law manifests itself in two ways: with the free inner constitution of the nation and with its independence in respect of other nations. In such a way every nation has precise limits to its freedom of action: she can carry out any act which does not injure or offend another nation. According to Mancini, Kant's formula of law, seen as a necessary form of co-existence for free individuals, can be used as the base on which international society is formed, which becomes the "coexistence and agreement of the free nationalities of all peoples".

Mancini gave international law a basic plan which permitted new forms of collaboration and supernational organization to be created, with respect, however, for the rights of individual nationalities. In this way he expressed the common belief of Italian political writers of the time of the Risorgimento that the idea of the nation, precisely because of its intrinsic moral essence, sanctioned recognition of equal dignity and equal rights for all nations: a policy of power and dominion could, therefore, find no justification in the principle of nationality.

Franco Gaeta (†)

# Nationalism in historiography

Before dealing with the subject which has been assigned to me, a linguistic and likewise a conceptual comment needs to be made. The Anglo-Saxon term *nationalism* has a far wider meaning than the Italian word "nazionalismo". Nationalism, in fact, is used to indicate not only the movement and political development which, during the 19th and first half of the 20th century, led to the constitution of national states, but also those intellectual currents and operations which, after states had been constituted in more or less complete forms, tried to establish the supremacy of single national states to the detriment of others in the period which is commonly called the Imperialist Era. In general, a historical survey reveals that while the process which led to the formation of national states contained (although with some exceptions) democratic elements which were maintained or subsequently forgotten after the formation of these states, the national currents in, let us say, the Italian sense were always of an authoritarian and antidemocratic character. Such currents for different reasons criticised and contested liberal institutions in the historical form they had assumed and in their actual functioning which, especially at the beginning of the 20th century, led to the establishment of those systems which are commonly called liberal-democratic.

In all West-Central Europe during the 19th century the principle of nationality was first of all affirmed and then, from

nationality, the transition was made to nationalism. In whatever form it took, the principle of nationality was correlated to an ideal of human harmony. At the root of the concept of nationalism there was, in fact, a need for harmony: once nations had formed themselves into national states, what other motive for struggle could exist among them if every nation were intent on fulfilling its duty? This was a two-fold illusion, and founded on two ideas. The first was a direct consequence of the purchasing power of the bourgeois classes who were supporters of nationalistic ideas. In Europe there was a bourgeois cliché founded on: respect for the right of ownership, national representation formed of members having this right, and faith in the system of free trade which was then considered the natural regime of the economy. International commerce had been considered by Cobden as a guarantee of peace, but this could only stand if the conductor of this commerce were one alone and if the ruling body were also one alone.

Today it is easy to prove that the free trade system was indeed not a 'natural' system but a product of British economic supremacy which had created an open market for its own interests: it was, however, much less easy to see in the first 40 years of the 19th century. Secondly, there was a deeply rooted conviction that the wars and conflicts of the past were the work of egoistic princes and tyrants. It was not generally thought that the individuality of nations might have the very same results. The idea or ideology of a hard-working bourgeoisie dedicated to production and commerce, anxious for peace so that business would prosper, was gradually taking hold. And this bourgeoisie, for better or worse, was or represented the nation because the great revolution of 1789 had had the result of identifying political capacity (that is national activity) with ownership.

Things began to change when western nations achieved their aim of a national state when the central European order of 1815 underwent a definite change and when the development of national states, together with great progress in technology, gave rise to *Weltpolitik*. Symbolically this turnabout can be dated to 1870. It is true however that it had been foreseen thirty years before by Friedrich List who had published "*Das Nationale System der politischen Oekonomie*" in 1841. This

book criticised the elaborate mechanisms of the traditional schools of economics and measured the economic possibilities of the nation. Between 1843 and 1891 it was translated into Hungarian, French, English, Japanese, Swedish and Russian and had an indisputable influence. Briefly, List posed the problem of development, or rather stages of development, and came to a conclusion which was not very different from an economic point of view from that which the Italian economist, Mazzini, had formulated on an ethical-political level: that is, how the individual acquired knowledge, strength, productivity, security and prosperity thanks above all to the nation and within the nation. Likewise, civilization of the human race was only attainable progressively through the development of individual nations.

After 1870 and especially after 1890 Europeans, following the economic crisis of the continent, began to think and act in different ways. The economic-social process in turn started a complicated spiritual and political process which profoundly modified the way in which nationhood was imagined and which generated the phenomenon of nationalism. The latter must not be considered as just a new conception of international relationships but as an organic vision of all political life. Since the political problem of the transition from nation to national state had been resolved, the new problem was that of confrontation between nations and between classes within each nation. The necessity and logic of industrial development destroyed not only the illusions of free trade but also the ideals of a harmonious co-existence of nations. The first results of the new ideas were protectionism and the search for a balance of power through various ingenious alliances. The 'people' were considered in the abstract while the State was concrete, and the classes, especially the dominant ones, were rendered increasingly stronger by the success they achieved in building the state and in founding the national economies, all of which seemed to legitimize their powers of government. The nation's will to exist evolved into a will to possess power, and anything which appeared to oppose or undermine such actual and ideal efficiency was destined to be called 'anti-national'. The nation, from a spiritual unity, had evolved into an organic unity, reaching economic-political success through acquisition of suitable strength.

It would, however, be wrong to reduce nationalism to the ideology and action of second-comer countries. It was something much more complex, because the crisis in itself did not bring about antidemocracy, the prospect of oligarchy and the cult of violence. There were, however, in the doctrine of nationality some elements which made their presence strongly felt in the new European political, economic and social context. As regards Italy, the Mazzinian ideas of the mission of nations, of the third Rome and of the duties of man along with Gioberti's exaltation of Italian 'moral pre-eminence' which relied on reviving the past in terms of tradition, were far more enthusiastically welcomed than other ideas that the philosophers had expressed.

Naturally, one does not have to wait until the present day to find a state with desire for power and expansion, but in comparison to the past there then existed a political nation which was a collective person, capable of desiring and achieving its desires. Paradoxically, however, the politically active 'people' was in no way the vague 'people' created by national mythologies. The poorer classes with lower incomes were simultaneously the nation and not the nation. They were the nation when they were called to contribute to the life and grandeur of the national state in terms of taxes and military service: they were not the nation when determination of the size and distribution of taxation, the politics of the state and the formation of the nation's representatives were concerned. There was a deep rift between class and nation which could, however, be overcome by accepting a democratic solution: increasing the political capacity of those who were now called the 'masses' would allow them to learn their own strength while the nation's economy was gradually getting off the ground.

The problem for the ruling classes was not to lose control of the State, and this problem from their point of view had two solutions: the first consisted in satisfying the basic requirements of the lower classes so that their desire to challenge the institutions was diminished, the second consisted in refusing to allow the very existence of class dialectics and in proposing the nation as a synthesis of the interests of social groups which, while in conflict inside the state's classes, could be seen as an 'external' fight between the nation and the



individual. Both solutions led to the national integration of the masses but in different ways and with different results. The first relied heavily on the hypothesis that the proletariat would transform itself into the bourgeoisie of its own accord; the second aimed at smothering social clashes within the nation and forcibly transferring them onto an international plane by means of the myth of the 'proletariat nation' and the struggle between proletarian and plutocratic nations. The national cohesion which had ended in this struggle implied the suppression of the class struggle. The workers' movement was in reality becoming nationalized, but that was not all: this very nationalization and the adoption of an increasingly less revolutionary and more pointedly reformist base made it more dangerous by making it more aware of the problems of the State. Reformist socialism became the No 1 enemy of the ruling bourgeois class because of its proletarian nature and daily repercussions which reduced the margins of capitalistic profit and led to a systematic penetration of local power.

It is an established fact that — leaving aside all that has misleadingly been said about precursors and precedents — the Italian nationalist movement was born in the first years of 1900. It gained strength in 1908, boomed after the war with Libya, exploded in all its virulence on the outbreak of the First World War and was one of the principal elements in the crisis of the liberal State and its transformation into a totalitarian State. It spread myths which only apparently and initially were of the decadent type, as Benedetto Croce noted in 1907 (reconfirming, with less foundation, the same view in 1929). For the decadent movement decadence was an ideal, not a stage to surpass, as it was for nationalism. For the decadent movement contemporary society was, above all, anti-aesthetic because it was anti-individualist; nationalism did not reject the society of the masses but wished to introduce bourgeois order into it as part of its scheme for an industrial society without a difference in class dialectics. For nationalism, liberalism had been the instrument with which the bourgeoisie had asserted its power, but this same liberalism had had become a means of suicide when the bourgeoisie used it as the base for their programme of government. The founder of the nationalist movement, Enrico Corradini wrote in 1904: "If we wanted to replace the abstract, utopian and fatal concept of freedom with

a realistic, beneficial concept which could be put into practice, we would feel the need for a very rigid regime of repression and surpression."

The nationalists were first of all against reformist socialism and against the democratic wing of the bourgeoisie. Their movement began in 1903 at precisely the same time as the Giolitti era began and with the beginning of a policy of wide liberal tolerance of the workers' movement which corresponded to vigorous action by trade unions to improve the conditions of peasants and workers. In reaction to the large-scale strikes of agricultural and industrial workers, Enrico Corradini and Giovanni Prezzolini exhorted the Italian bourgeoisie to be more militantly class-conscious and not to be afraid of entering the class struggle against the reformists. He encouraged them to withdraw their support from Giolitti because the latter, aiming at integrating the workers' movement with the bourgeois state, would end up by handing over (in their opinion) this state to the new forces which were emerging from the industrial development. The strikes and workers' demands created disorder, reducing profits and the motive force behind development; socialism, besides, was opposed to a policy of military reinforcement and colonial expansion which for the nationalists was a necessity and a duty for Italy.

From the first vague but symptomatic affirmations of a group of men who, like Corradini, Prezzolini and Paganini, were writers of dilettante philosophers, the Italian nationalist movement evolved, in the space of a few years, into a series of precise political proposals which, on the eve of the First World War, constituted a sufficiently organic whole and which were later perfected. In my opinion almost all these nationalistic proposals were fulfilled in the construction and juridical structuring of the authoritarian-totalitarian fascist state.

Here a methodological comment needs to be made. Nationalism must be studied in its historical autonomy, that is not as pre-fascism, although it cannot be denied, as I have said, that many nationalistic proposals were welcomed by the fascist regime. The distinction between the fascist regime and fascism as far as the movement is concerned which Renzo de Felici introduced into the study of fascism, is useful in this case despite the observations and objections which can be raised to it, not without, in my opinion, a certain foundation. But in any case,

to study Italian nationalism from, let us say, a fascist observatory means making a substantially reduced evaluation of it. Such studies originated in the writings of the nationalists themselves after 1922—23. During 1922 and especially after the march on Rome and the fusion of nationalism with fascism in 1923, the nationalists were particularly energetic in proclaiming that they had been the political and intellectual precursors of the victorious fascism which was presented as the final result of the "National Revolution"; when fascism fell, the surviving nationalists did not withdraw from their position, but maintained that fascism had, with time, become a political, ideal, dictatorial and plebeian 'degeneration' of fascism. Rather than historiography in this case we are dealing with political literature: one which contains, however, a basic truth which I will try to show in my conclusions. On the other hand, publications and democratic historiography have very often reached conclusions not far different from those of nationalist-fascist historiography and publications. For democratic historiography the objective was to throw into relief the deficiencies and lack of balance inherent in the process of Italian national unification and to demonstrate that decadence and the elimination of liberal institutions and of the pseudo-democratic bourgeoisie derived precisely from this lack of balance and deficiency. For nationalist-fascist historiography nationalism and fascism were presented as inheritors of the Risorgimento tradition after the dark period of Italian history in the post-1870 period and especially in the Giolittian era. In such a way, with inverted values, nationalism, for better or worse, was presented as the inheritor of the Risorgimento. Historiography and liberal publications of every type presented nationalism as a break with all the political and idealistic politics of the Risorgimento, indeed, as a contorted negation of this tradition.

An early phase of historiography on nationalism can be dated to the pre-First World War period. Nationalism in the early years of the 1900s was portrayed as a movement of rather gladiatorial attitudes: not only did it appeal for a bourgeois 'reaction' but it also defended the war, condemned democratic mentality in its entirety plus any demonstration of humanitarianism, and exalted expansionism and militarism. Corradini, Papini and above all Prezzolini sought to confer

greater intellectual dignity to their historico-political arguments by linking them with the complex theory of the 'circulation of the élite' of Pareto and Mosca whose function they declared was purely instrumental. In 1907 Benedetto Croce in a fundamental essay "Di un carattere della più recente letteratura italiana" drew a very precise picture of contemporary literary and political currents and concluded that the majority basically represented the activity of what he defined as "the great industry of the void", fruit of a radical insincerity deriving from the "lack of inner clarity". As regards nationalism in particular, Croce commented ironically on the mania for grandeur, the imperialistic desire for expansion and the love of violence which were backed by scanty means and hazy objectives. He also condemned the pretence of wanting to destroy the workers' movement in a delirium of aristocratism. Nationalism was an expression of surging irrationality, of an enormous spiritual crisis which was primarily the crisis of reason and an illness of the mind.

Twenty years later in "Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915" Croce further defined his position. This was primarily the result of historical developments which he could not disregard. Croce defined nationalism as precisely the transition from a literary phase to a more purely political phase. He saw it as a mouthpiece for some sectors of major industries; he very clearly saw the implications of an alliance of catholic forces with the "atheistic catholicism" of the nationalists; he appealed against the uncalled for appropriation by the nationalists of some of the great figures from recent Italian history; and finally he had no hesitation in indicating that the nationalists' reactionary imperialism would end upon Italy's participation in the First World War: "they wanted war to be able to achieve, through such a war . . . success . . . industrial expansion, victory over liberalism and the authoritarian regime".

Croce's works, those of the other great idealistic intellectual Giovanni Gentile and the works of almost all those who wrote to various extents about Italian nationalism before the First World War invariably consist of evaluations in ideological or prevalently ideological terms. This is a characteristic of a large part of Italian historiography about nationalism for reasons we have indicated. Gentile's criticism particularly fell into this category.

The first person to give nationalism not only a cultural-ideological but also a political-sociological interpretation was Luigi Salvatorelli in a book which has rightly been considered a minor classic on this subject and which contains in its very title an indication of the themes it carries: "Nazionalfascismo". To understand Salvatorelli's argument we must remember that this volume was published in 1923, shortly after the fusion of nationalism with fascism, and that it had two parts: the first was made up of a series of articles written between 1919 and 1923, the second by an essay entitled "Nazionalfascismo" which had been written especially for the occasion. Salvatorelli's analysis, although based on the observation of specific political facts, was however substantially psychological, moralistic and cultural. According to Salvatorelli, nationalism resembled the ideology of the Italian humanist petite bourgeoisie: a petite bourgeoisie which was not a true social stratum but an agglomeration whose purpose was the inherent productive process of capitalist society, in respect to which nationalism represented a delayed ideological stage. The meaning of this evaluation lay in Salvatorelli's view of international capitalism; a view that he explained in another volume called "Irrealtà nazionalista" from which it is clear that the author identifies capitalism, tout court, with the great Anglo-American capitalism which was for him a economic force which was *healthily* international. The question, put in these terms, was clear: that no causal link could be established between the economic forces which Salvatorelli had defined as "healthily international" and nationalism or rather "nazionalfascismo"; but things changed when a comparison was made between nazionalfascismo and the economic forces which were "not healthily" international or in no way international. In these cases one could see that nazionalfascismo was not an ideologically delayed stage in relation to capitalist economy, but was the ideological stage of a newly born or almost newly born capitalism, that is of an emerging capitalism which had to struggle in conditions of technological, financial and political inferiority and which obviously had to resort to the crudest methods to give itself space in international struggle. Salvatorelli made a series of observations on the rhetoric of nazionalfascismo and on what he defined as the "illiteracy of the illiterate", alluding with this

to the "generic culture" of the Italian petite bourgeoisie of mainly humanistic education: but he did not realize that this rhetoric was the weapon with which Italian capitalism defended itself to hegemonize precisely the petite bourgeoisie, by using a heroic vocabulary to mask the ambitions of the more enterprising industrial groups and planning to insert this class in the new structures which were being built following a progressive (and disorderly) economic development.

The concept of nazionalfascismo, coined by Salvatorelli, was a concept which was suited to the vague ensemble of nationalistic currents which represented a state of mind common to the middle classes but were not carriers of a political plan. Obviously these currents were important, above all with respect to a study whose aim was a history of fascism, of the origins and development of fascism which can also be interpreted as nationalistic mobilization of the masses. The Italian historian who has studied these currents more than anyone else is Gioacchino Volpe, a nationalistic historian who in his "Italia Moderna" studied what he has defined as "the various Italian nationalisms". Together with Croce's works, this book by Volpe is one of the most serious written on nationalism and still represents today the starting point for any attempt at an organic reconstruction of the history of the Italian nationalist movement and its relationships with other European nationalisms. Here it is impossible to sum up the contents of this work, but one can say that it describes the Italian situation in the early years of the 1900s and that it is of no lesser importance than the works of Croce.

Volpe's definition of nationalism in the very first years of the 1900s was a national-liberal movement. It was not yet quite a doctrine but rather "a more active feeling of national life" which he described as "more coherent, more solid, more willing and more strongly projected into the future". The picture that he drew was of a heterogeneous complex of forces: of a nationalism which was *varied* in which the unifying element from a strictly historic point of view was gradually lost: that is, amid this variety, the progressive development of an idea of the State which could only be connected with the Risorgimento tradition in an abstract way, at least as Volpe presented it. In reality the insistence with which Volpe emphasized some not only antidemocratic and antiparliamentary, but also

popularistic aspects of nationalism depended on his general outlook: he saw the Italian national Risorgimento as concluding in an imperialistic war and the construction of a trade-unionised-corporate fascist State. It was logical that from this viewpoint mature nationalism constituted a sort of political ideological prerequisite for corporatism, but it was also true that its *variety* contrasted with the ideological clarity that nationalism would subsequently lend to fascism. Volpe, however, was right in pointing out how fascism would harvest the fruits of this variety. In his opinion it was here that Italy's last revolution would take place: in the integration of the bourgeois man with the citizen to form the new figure of the productive man.

Post-Volpe historiography, that is post-1945 developed some of Volpe's ideas and those of Salvatorelli and, as I have said, tried to illustrate the relationship between fascism and nationalism with a tendency to criticize more harshly the development of Italy's history during the whole of the Risorgimento phase. The majority of this historical production has vacillated between describing the backwardness and inconsistencies in Italy and the censorship (not completely undeserved) exercised by the ruling class. In this context it also illustrated fascism's long incubation period which was particularly facilitated by nationalism. Many authors, in attempting to explain fascism on a long- to medium-term basis have again related nationalism to the political ideals and philosophy of the "historical right". However, today it seems more plausible to make a rather different analogy: to relate fascism to the ideals and politics of the "historic left" which laid the foundations of Italian industrialism by adopting a protectionist policy and by initiating colonial expansion which was not alien to authoritarian imposition.

From the interpretation of nationalism as "literature" one therefore passed to a very different evaluation. Gian Piero Carocci in his essay on Giolitti and the Giolittian period rightly affirmed that nationalism coincided with the establishment of large-scale private interests of a monopolistic tendency and that in substance it was the ideology of monopolistic, national capital in conflict with stronger foreign capital and, subordinately, with internal, competitive capital. Silvio Lanaro followed the same line of thought broached by

Carocci. The former maintained that nationalism was nothing less than the ideal and political projection of the corporate-protectionist block established as a result of industrialization. When Lanaro reached these conclusions the first edition of my book entitled "Italian Nationalism" had appeared. Naturally, I can hardly be expected to express judgment on this book — I can only say that in it I have tried to give, in the first part, I hope, a complete summary of historiography on nationalism and in the second part an outline of the history of nationalism from a political and economic point of view. I would like to add, with gratitude, that the opinions which I have expressed have been approved and shared by eminent colleagues such as De Felice, Aquarone and Richard Webster.

Before concluding I should like briefly to indicate the problems to be debated and the most fruitful lines of research, at least for the period up to 1918. I believe the main problem to be that of writing a political, economic and cultural history of the Italian "right" which shows both the continuity and the discontinuity in which the "historic right" became "the right" pure and simple. It is obvious that the starting point should be Chabod's volume on an introduction to Italy's foreign policy. Less obvious but worthwhile are the works already completed by Giuseppe Are, Alberto Aquarone, Angelo Tamborra and in part by Giovan Battista Salinari, all of whom have gone well beyond the limits of a simple research into the "right". These studies will probably lead us to abandon the traditional idea of Italian nationalism as "beggars' imperialism" and will enable us to see the connection between nationalism and fascism more clearly. They will, above all, allow us to see nationalism in both its autonomy and origins in the political-economic-cultural scene of Italy between 1800 and 1900.



Seppo Hentilä

# The Finnish labour movement and national thinking until 1907

As is well known, Marx and Engels left behind no particular political theory which might have provided the later labour movement with direct instructions for concrete political activity. As it was the practice to appeal to classical utterances in questions of doctrinal dispute, the history of the labour movement throughout the period of the Second International (1889—1914) was characterized by a certain irreconcilable conflict of theory and practice. Scholars are widely in agreement that in various countries the movement encountered several unsettled issues of marxist theory while composing its line of practical politics.<sup>1</sup> Attitudes to war and militarism, to colonialism, to political general strikes and to the tactics of labour parties in general featured on the agenda of congresses of the International year after year.<sup>2</sup> Owing to the nature of the International all these questions were subject to a common denominator: the relation between national and international. At issue therefore was not merely the attitude of socialist

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<sup>1</sup> See Helmut Konrad, *Nationalismus und Internationalismus*. Wien 1976, p. 2 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Published agendas include Fricke Dieter, *Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 1869—1914. Ein Handbuch über ihre Organisation und Tätigkeit im Klassenkampf*. Berlin 1976, pp. 590—593.

theory and the labour movement to nationalism but, more widely, the relation of the national and international character of the labour movement as a whole.

The present study will examine national thinking in the Finnish labour movement together with concrete national policy until 1907 within the broad framework already outlined: the nationalism and internationalism of the movement as a problem of reconcilability. Limited space will allow no more than a critical survey of the matter and the formulation of new questions. To answer them will not be possible here.

## 1. The problem of reconciling nationalism and internationalism in the labour movement

Although great difficulties and serious disagreement within the labour movement were caused at the time of the Second International by the effort of reconciling theory with practice, no critical reservations of importance were made to the theory itself except for Bernstein's revision of Marx. In fact, the nationalist policy of Marxism was in theory a doctrine without contradictions about whose authenticity there seemed to be a wide measure of agreement within the movement.<sup>3</sup> But in this, as in many other questions of practical politics, the problems which arose produced greatly varying models of procedure. In research the view has been widely accepted that the main followers of the Marxist classics, such as Karl Kautsky, created a basis of growth for political reformism with their efforts to retain purity of doctrine to the last.<sup>4</sup>

As we think of the rise of the labour movement and the historical period of the Second International we observe that during those decades nationalism raised its head more, perhaps, than at any other time. The problem in its full extent

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<sup>3</sup> See Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism & Socialism*. New York and London 1967, p. 211 ff.

<sup>4</sup> This interpretation is summarized by Lucio Colletti, *Eduard Bernstein und der Marxismus der II. Internationale*. Frankfurt/Main 1971.

includes the uniting of Germany and Italy, the attempts at liberation of minorities subject to multinational great powers such as Austria-Hungary and Russia, and the intensified competition for colonies between the imperialist great powers. Against this background the classics of Marxism in fact paid surprisingly little attention to the question of nationalism.<sup>5</sup> Besides, later interpretations of their thoughts are a chapter to themselves.<sup>6</sup>

Although the Second International displayed a great variety of tactical viewpoints with regard to nationalist policy, there was a large measure of unanimity on certain basic theoretical questions. In the first place national differences were regarded as among the problems which only a socialist community could finally remove. On the other hand there was firm belief in the nature-derived (*naturwüchsig*) internationalism of the working class. The latter was seen as the first social class in world history with the ability to cross national boundaries.<sup>7</sup>

In the "Communist Manifesto" of Marx and Engels there is a famous statement that the workman has no fatherland; this was interpreted literally,<sup>8</sup> which led at once to an underestimation of the national question, for Engels, with the revolutionary events of 1848/49 in mind, classified certain Slavic minorities of Austria-Hungary as "unhistoried" (*geschichtslose Völker*) in the sense that they had never formed a nation. Their historic role in the process of world revolution was even described by Engels as reactionary, because the separatist aspirations of their peoples slowed the realization of revolutionary internationalism.<sup>9</sup>

The faithful expectation of socialism shown by the Second International led in practice to an underestimation of the nationalist issue. In the London conference of 1896, to be sure, a general appeal for the selfdetermination of peoples, introduced by Polish representatives, was approved. This meant, in theory at least, that the International condemned the

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<sup>5</sup> Konrad p. 6 ff.

<sup>6</sup> These interpretations are examined by Davis p. 27 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Roman Rosdolsky, *Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen Völker"*, *Archiv f. Sozialgeschichte* Bd IV, Hannover 1964, p. 245.

<sup>8</sup> Julius Braunthal, *Geschichte der Internationale* Bd. I. Hannover 1960, pp. 355—356.

<sup>9</sup> Rosdolsky p. 186.

oppression of national minorities and supported their claims for cultural autonomy.<sup>10</sup> It was entirely typical, however, that not until 1906 did certain workers' parties representing national minorities become fully entitled members of the international socialist bureau (ISB).<sup>11</sup> Only after this, for instance, was the Social Democratic Party of Finland able to send its own representatives to the meetings of decision-making bodies of the International.

In this connection the nationalist viewpoints which emerged in the international labour movement cannot be classified with any thoroughness. Various main groupings can be distinguished in any case. The mainstream following Kautsky did indeed aim at securing the rights of minority peoples in accordance with the rulings of the above-mentioned London congress and others, but attempted at the same time to put the nationalist question in its right place in the prevailing Marxist interpretation. It was believed, in other words, that the internationalism of the working class would cross national frontiers of its own volition. The objective of Kautskyist theory was to subordinate nationalist policy to the aims of the class struggle, which were supported by cultivating class strength in the particular form of organized labour. In the practical aspects of nationalist policy Kautskyist thinking was based on the political status quo; some attempts at freedom by national minorities were even regarded as troublesome separatism which turned working class eyes away from the main issue — the class struggle.<sup>12</sup>

The importance of the nationalist question was most seriously underrated by the so-called left wing of the labour movement in central and western Europe. In old national states such as France, England<sup>13</sup> and Sweden<sup>14</sup> the left wing was clearly inclined to an optimistic cosmopolitanism and "antipatriotism" which in practice had no realistic basis whatever.

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<sup>10</sup> Braunthal p. 356.

<sup>11</sup> Fricke p. 595.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Konrad pp. 77—83.

<sup>13</sup> Braunthal p. 366 ff.

<sup>14</sup> For unpatriotic feeling in the Swedish labour movement see Seppo Hentilä, *Den svenska arbetarklassen och reformismens genombrott inom SAP före 1914*. Helsingfors 1979, p. 184 ff.

By contrast, the nationalist question was overrated particularly in the labour parties of minority nationalities. In these the nationalist struggle was given primary importance, and it was not believed that an international working class would be realized. These separatist groupings were more than ready to ally themselves with the bourgeois nationalist movement.<sup>15</sup>

Political problems arising from the question of nationality naturally affected the labour movement in Austria and Russia most closely. In these countries, moreover, discussion of the matter reached the highest level within the International. The leading representative of Austro-Marxist nationalism was Otto Bauer, whose work "Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie" was published in 1907. In it he attempted to deal with the nationalist question as an all-embracing problem of society as a whole, not as a mere phenomenon of "Überbau" or superstructure such as it had become in Kautsky's reduced interpretation of Marx. Bauer's theory aimed at union between the socialist revolutionary movement and the progressive nationalist struggle. In this spirit Bauer was prepared to make important concessions to the Czech labour movement, which was trying to free itself from the pattern of the Austrian Social Democratic Gesamtpartei.<sup>16</sup> This question was not finally settled until the conference of the Second International was held at Copenhagen in 1910.<sup>17</sup>

Still clearer in a practical political sense was the nationalist thinking of the Bolsheviks in Russia, whose leading theorist and practical exponent was V.I. Lenin. In articles for a journal called *Iskra* shortly after 1900 he started to outline the doctrine of self-determination for peoples. At a meeting of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party held in London in 1903 a programme containing such doctrine was approved. It provided for a large measure of territorial autonomy in Russia after the suppression of Tsarism. In the last resort all minority peoples would be allowed to decide whether they wished to belong to this federation or not. However, the programme did not aim necessarily at the dispersion of multinational combinations but,

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<sup>15</sup> Davis pp. 140—149.

<sup>16</sup> Konrad pp. 93—99.

<sup>17</sup> James Joll, *The Second International 1889—1914*. London 1955, pp. 120—121.

on the contrary, at their preservation for the common purpose of suppressing Tsarism.<sup>18</sup>

## 2. The question of nationality and its status in Finland's "old" labour movement

Finland's autonomous position in connection with Russia made it unavoidable that the Finnish labour movement should clash with difficult problems of nationalist policy. The relation with Russia also provided the movement with a many-sided touchstone in tactics. Particularly after Russia had started the so-called period of oppression in 1899 — the integration of Finland in the realm — the labour movement could not avoid defining its attitude to the defence of autonomy. The national and class struggles had to be reconciled. In practical policy great difficulty was caused by the attitude to bourgeois groupings, between whom there were important tactical differences of outlook regarding methods of conducting the defence of autonomy.<sup>19</sup> The nationalist question was made still more complicated by Finland's bilingualism: the labour movement contained a separate Swedish-language department, *Finlands svenska arbetarförbund* (established 1899).<sup>20</sup> Finno-Russian relations in the labour movement took on a special importance in nationalist policy. This problem was further complicated by the fact that the main influences on the ideology and programme of the Finnish labour movement came from Germany on a basis of the Kautskyist interpretation of Marxism. In a sense, therefore, a meeting occurred on Finnish ground between the Central European mainstream and an underground labour movement adapted to special conditions of Russia and specialized in illegal, conspiratorial activity.

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<sup>18</sup> Davis p. 185 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Osmo Jussila, *Nationalismi ja vallankumous venäläis-suomalaisissa suhteissa 1899—1914*. Helsinki 1979, p. 24 ff. (Nationalism and revolution in Russo-Finnish relations 1899—1914. Helsinki 1979, p. 24 ff.)

<sup>20</sup> Anna Bondestam & Alf-Erik Helsing, *Som en stubbe i en stubbåker*. Vasa 1978.

The chain of problems sketched above may serve as a preliminary explanation of the central position occupied by nationalist policy in the Finnish labour movement. If we now try to link the nationalist policy of the Finnish labour movement to the general problems of the relation between national and international in the movement,<sup>21</sup> we shall encounter question of great difficulty which are still for the most part unanswered. It must then be asked how the Finnish movement could connect a national struggle for autonomy with a revolutionary objective. Seeking an answer to this question would involve reflection on the true significance of Kautskyism in the Finnish labour movement. How did this ideological mainstream of the international labour movement become a reality in the concrete political activity of the Finnish movement?

It was already a contradiction that Kautskyism should be linked mainly with the facilities for action of labour parties in the industrialized countries of central and western Europe. The structure of the Finnish working class was quite different, and at the beginning of the 20th century the strengthening of class power based on mass movement — perhaps the main feature of Kautskyism — appeared extremely difficult in Finland. We shall return to these matters in more detail later (Chapter 5).

### 3. Main features of the Finnish labour movement's nationalist policy

Theoretical and programmatic views expressed in Finland's labour movement on the subject of nationalist policy reflected a belief in the "nature-derived" internationalism of the working class. In practical policy the question was far more problematical, causing endless disagreement on interpretation. Not only the social mass basis of the labour movement but also

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<sup>21</sup> For closer study see Michael Futrell, *The Northern Underground*. London 1963 and William R. Copeland, *The Uneasy Alliance. Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground 1899—1904*. Helsinki 1973.

the changes which had occurred in the relation with Russia continued to influence, indirectly at least, the movement's facilities for political action.

### 3.1. Before the General Strike of 1905.

At its inaugural meeting held at Turku in 1899 the Finnish labour party professed its connection with the "general" international labour movement.<sup>22</sup> In the Forssa programme approved in 1903 the internationalism of the labour movement was proclaimed in almost the same phrases as the Erfurt programme in Germany.<sup>23</sup> Thenceforward the Kautskyist interpretation of Marxism dominated the ideological and programmatic line of the Finnish labour movement, and faith in the final victory of labour internationalism was unwavering.

Within the labour movement, however, the struggle to defend autonomy produced an attitude which caused disagreement on methods of procedure from the first. In principle it was a question of whether the labour movement should join the struggle under bourgeois leadership or not. Even before the labour party was founded the most radical left-wing leaders were in favour of withdrawal by refusal to vote in elections or other means.<sup>24</sup>

After the February Manifesto of 1899 the editor Matti Kurikka wrote in "Työmies" ("Working Man") that workers should dissociate themselves from the compilation and signing of the great national address (as it was known). Part of the labour movement's most radical wing agreed with Kurikka, but the majority condemned his procedure as unpatriotic.<sup>25</sup>

As yet the Kurikka dispute by no means implied a breakthrough of the socialist theory of nationalism: his motives were mainly personal. Those leading the venture of the address

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<sup>22</sup> Seppo Hentilä, *Veljeyttä yli Pohjanlahden*. (Brotherhood across the Gulf of Bothnia) Helsinki 1980 p. 40 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Heikki Laavola, *Kun Suomen työväki heräsi*. (When Finland's workers awakened) Helsinki 1974 p. 123 ff.

<sup>24</sup> Hannu Soikkanen, *Sosialismin tulo Suomeen*. (The coming of socialism to Finland) Porvoo 1961 pp. 65—66.

<sup>25</sup> Soikkanen 1961 p. 67.



had not in fact asked Kurikka and other advocates of the election ban to join the delegation working for the address. The conflict was such as to draw a clearer borderline, however, between the socialist and Wrightian forms of leadership in the labour movement, as Soikkanen has shown.<sup>26</sup>

Within the movement in any case the thought was beginning to germinate that the main task of the labour party was to settle the social question. In principle all other problems were subordinate to this, or at least secondary to the main question.

These matters were stressed more forcefully after the Forssa meeting, though the breakthrough of socialism in the party programme was no guarantee of unanimity in matters of procedure. In 1904 two main lines defined themselves, known in the literature as the Valpas and Mäkelin trends.<sup>27</sup> The dispute over procedure too had as its background, indirectly, the attitude to the Russian question, though whether to take part in state elections or not was a matter for discussion. The Valpas line secured a clear majority at an extraordinary meeting of the party held in Helsinki in September 1904. This meant that Valpas, taking his stand on Kautskyist theory, succeeded in giving first priority to the socialist objective of the labour movement. To this chief aim any tactical line taken by the party must be subordinated. In elections, for instance, collaboration with the middle class was possible, but the labour movement had first to obtain guarantees that its partner would work for a general and equal right to vote. Otherwise the labour party should refuse to vote.<sup>28</sup>

Mäkelin with his supporters showed clear sympathy with the national programme of the bourgeois constitutionalists, with whom he sought collaboration in elections on a foundation of the struggle to defend the Finnish autonomy.<sup>29</sup> Also the Swedish-speaking labour movement of Finland was practically unanimous in support of the constitutionalists.<sup>30</sup>

Formed in Helsinki in 1904 was a group of so-called labour

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<sup>26</sup> Hannu Soikkanen, *Kohti Kansanvaltaa I. (Towards democracy)* Vaasa 1975 p. 37.

<sup>27</sup> Soikkanen 1961 pp. 104—105, Jussila pp. 49—50.

<sup>28</sup> Edvard Valpas, *Mikä menettelytapa. (What procedure?)* Helsinki 1904.

<sup>29</sup> Soikkanen 1961 pp. 104—105.

<sup>30</sup> Hentilä 1980 p. 80.

activists who prepared underground and armed activity for the labour movement.<sup>31</sup> At first the party leaders gave partial approval to the labour activists, but Valpas in particular sharply resisted all violence. In this respect also he was an orthodox Kautskyist: revolution ought not to be "made", but would come of itself in time, when the internal conflicts of capitalist society had ripened sufficiently. Besides, Valpas feared that labour activism would endanger the rights of the labour movement to act as a public body. In his opinion these rights must not be risked for a "second-rate" objective such as the policy of nationalism.<sup>32</sup>

Labour activists from the first had good underground relations with many Russian opposition groups and revolutionaries. From this followed the links between Finnish contact men and bolsheviks which continued until the Russian revolution, although labour activism withered away in Finland soon after the general strike. In the early stage this network of underground relations was variegated: it included Finnish middle-class and labour activists, Russian oppositionists and international professional revolutionists. Finland, located in the "hinterland" of St Petersburg, became a base for Russian revolutionaries and at the same time a point of contact with Stockholm and further west.<sup>33</sup>

Thus the Finnish labour movement was divided into three camps on the issue of procedure. The division misleadingly recalled the separation of the middle class into constitutionalists, concessionists and supporters of active resistance. The constitutionalism of the Mäkelin line and the Swedish-speaking Finnish labour movement was quite beyond dispute. To connect Valpas with the concessionist trend would be to oversimplify matters, however, though he was accused from time to time of actually collaborating with Russian officialdom. In this matter Valpas was a cautious tactician. At no stage did he wish to hurry the course of events. His chief aim was to maintain purity of doctrine by stressing the final socialist objective. As he did not actively support the struggle

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<sup>31</sup> Soikkanen 1975 pp. 65—68.

<sup>32</sup> Valpas 1904 p. 76.

<sup>33</sup> For closer study see Futrell (note 21.).

to defend autonomy he could with reason be criticised for conciliating the Russian bureaucracy.

### 3.2. Epoch-making effect of general strike

The general strike of 1905 produced violent changes in the Finnish labour movement's scope of action: the labour movement became a mass movement and the world's strongest labour party in a parliamentary sense after reforms had been effected in the Diet. Before the strike the organizing power of the labour movement had been scanty, but the whirl of events forced the masses into motion. From 1904 to 1906 the membership of the Social Democratic party rose from 16,000 to some 85,000 and the number of member associations grew from 99 to no less than 937.<sup>34</sup>

The political composition of the general strike compelled the labour movement to take a stand on the struggle for autonomy with its aims and tactics. The division of the movement into three which outlined itself during 1904 may be taken as a starting-point for scrutiny, but in the avalanche of events which attended the strike totally new aspects appeared. In any case — as Jussila has noted — Finland's labour movement was drawn in the directions of "revolution" and "nationalism": "Kautskyist Marxism demanded isolation from the middle class, its idea of nationalism and the fatherland, yet the first stage of 'oppression' was felt as a threat to the activity of the working class, which was thus drawn into opposition alongside the middle class in defence of a common constitution."<sup>35</sup>

Within the Finnish labour movement, finding its way through the difficult ground between revolution and nationalism, several differing trends of procedure appeared at the time of the general strike and its direct after-effects. If we confine ourselves to the politics of autonomy and nationalism we may provisionally divide the movement into two main groups: those wishing in some way to take part in the nationalist struggle against Russian oppression, and those who stressed the social

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<sup>34</sup> Soikkanen 1975 p. 113.

<sup>35</sup> Jussila p. 26.

objective of the movement as the primary aim of the general strike itself.

As the general strike began this division was extremely clear and rigid. Followers of Mäkelin who sympathized with the constitutionalists criticised "Työmies", the party's chief organ which Valpas edited, more violently than previously for its resemblance to the newspaper "Suometar". An easy target was provided for these accusations: Valpas was supported by a group of young intellectuals, the so-called November Socialists, most of whom had been members of the "Old Finnish Party". They included Edvard Gylling, Otto W. Kuusinen, Kullervo Manner and Sulo Vuolijoki. Only Yrjö Sirola among this group had a background which was clearly both constitutionalist and "young Finnish".<sup>36</sup>

In the final phase of the general strike the nationalist line under Mäkelin's leadership suffered a distinct setback, however, because the bourgeois constitutionalists rejected Mäkelin's suggestion of an interim government. After this the line represented by Valpas and the November Socialists, stressing the emblems of socialist class struggle and withdrawing from the nationalist conflict, took a clear lead within the labour movement.<sup>37</sup>

This tracing of boundaries, which affected nationalist policy, and the clear rapprochement of the "Työmies" newspaper to the "Old Finns" who had moved from government to opposition began to cause anxiety especially among Swedish-speaking members of the Finnish labour movement. Severe attacks by the November Socialists, particularly against Swedish-speaking constitutionalism, were such as to arouse fear among Swedish-speaking Finnish socialists also. As evidence of their assertions that the November Socialists were "Suometar" in character, Kuusinen, Sirola and others worked actively in the association called "Suomalaisuus", founded in 1906.<sup>38</sup>

In spring 1906 a language dispute blazed up in the labour movement. The Swedish-speaking socialists went so far as to

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<sup>36</sup> Soikkanen 1961 p. 91, pp. 212—215.

<sup>37</sup> Soikkanen 1961 p. 272 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Pekka-Kalevi Hämäläinen, Luokka ja kieli vallankumouksen Suomessa. (Class and language in revolutionary Finland) Helsinki 1978 p. 34, note 25.

demand eagerly the foundation of their own separate labour party. This venture was led by Karl H. Wiik and others. The reason for it was, on the one hand, that the party led by Valpas had shown its underestimation of the nationalist issue in the question of autonomy and, on the other, that the pressure exerted on Swedish speakers in the labour movement had become extreme. In local workers' meetings and trade unions, for instance, Finnish-speaking workers readily condemned the whole Swedish-speaking community — from big capitalists to labourers — as members of the same "upper class".<sup>39</sup>

It was not without reason that leaders of the Swedish-speaking labour movement in Finland compared their situation with the so-called Czech question in the Austrian labour movement. In the perspective of Russia as a whole they felt in an even weaker position than the Czechs in Austria: Swedish-speaking Finnish workers in fact belonged to "a linguistic minority of a minority people". When the newspaper "Työmies" mockingly remarked that "a few Swedish ministers had ensured that this should be so", the newspaper "Arbetaren" replied that the Finnish-speaking leaders of the labour movement, in their national enthusiasm, appeared to have no notion of the difference which existed between the just demands of workers in a national minority and the position of the Swedish-speaking upper class in Finland.<sup>40</sup>

During the general strike and in the heated atmosphere which followed it, support for labour activism in Finland was at its most widespread. The underground labour movement maintained a network of contacts with Russian revolutionaries and bourgeois activists which was close-knit. The possibility of armed action was also kept in being by the existence of the Red Guards and the prolongation of revolutionary events well into 1906. The attitude adopted by the leaders of the Finnish labour movement to underground activity was hesitant for a considerable time, but the Viapori mutiny in the late summer of 1906 and certain acts of terrorism in support of Russian revolutionaries forced the party to dissociate itself firmly from labour activism.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Työmies 20.6.1906 and 22.6.1906, for closer study of this discussion see Hentilä 1980 p. 78.

<sup>40</sup> Arbetaren 14.7.1906.

<sup>41</sup> Hentilä 1980 pp. 59—61.

The events briefly sketched in the foregoing may suffice to show the political difficulties encountered by the Finnish labour movement during the general strike. To be regarded as a clarifying factor is the parliamentary reform finally ratified in summer 1906, after which the Social Democratic Party adopted parliamentary tactics unmistakably. The party conference at Oulu in August 1906 proved important in this connection. Its agenda covered all the most inflammatory problems of the movement's history. The conference abolished the Red Guards, disavowed anarchism and terrorist action, dismissed the "minister socialist" J.K. Kari and approved Swedish and Russian as official party languages alongside Finnish. At least in theory, therefore, an orthodox answer was found to the question of language and nationality at Oulu, and Swedish-speaking Finns gave up the foundation of a labour party of their own.<sup>42</sup> These Oulu decisions certainly implied that the main line of the Second International was confirmed by the Finnish labour movement, but the outcome remained incomplete. After the conference there were still several trends of party procedure: Valpas advocated "a political general strike and ballot", Kuusinen "a union of parliamentary and extraparliamentary activity", Haapalainen "preparation for a Russian revolution"; also supported were open help by labour activists for Russian revolutionaries and a policy following the constitutionalist line of the moderates on nationalism. Besides this there were separate "public" and "secret" viewpoints, as in the case of O.W. Kuusinen, who condemned armed underground activity but at the same time worked actively for an organization connected with it even after the Oulu conference.<sup>43</sup>

If the Oulu conference did not succeed in settling the question of procedure, its results were still more doubtful in the question of nationalism. The declaration of solidarity in language and nationalism remained largely symbolic in practice. When the so-called second period of oppression began, problems of procedure in the Social Democrat nationalist

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<sup>42</sup> Suomen Sosialidemokratisen puolueen viidennen edustajakokouksen pöytäkirja (Oulun kokous). (Report of fifth convention of Finnish Social Democratic Party at Oulu) Helsinki 1906 p. 327 ff, 477 ff.

<sup>43</sup> Hentilä 1980 p. 62.

policy were still unsolved. To be sure, the political influence of the labour movement was very different after the parliamentary reform from what it had been before the general strike: in spring 1907, when the first elections for the unicameral Diet were held, the Social Democrats secured no less than 80 members out of 200. Underground agitation, which had intensified during the strike, now adapted and the growth of the labour mass movement was interrupted.<sup>44</sup>

From 1907 to 1917 parliamentary activity became the main tactic of the Social Democratic Party. The Kautskyist tactic of "waiting for the revolution" acquired a firm foothold in Finland as elsewhere. While waiting the intention was to increase the power of workers as a class, which meant in practice to strengthen organization and raise the cultural standard of working people till they were ripe for socialism when the time came.

In this period of parliamentary tactics the relation with Russia took on one aspect of supreme importance: attempts at reform by parliamentary means failed continually because the Tsar dissolved Parliament time after time. In this way "revolution" and "nationalism" were firmly bound together, and the question of labour movement procedure became involved with the Russian connection.

The position was practically the same as before the general strike: the labour movement had to define its attitude toward the struggle to defend autonomy. Other questions of importance were its attitude to the "Jääkäri" (light infantry) movement formed during the first World War and to the various groupings of Russian revolutionaries, but these problems cannot be dealt with here.

### 3.3. The Finnish labour movement and social democratic lines of policy on nationalism

To draw a parallel between the disputes over nationalist and linguistic policy in the Finnish labour movement and the

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<sup>44</sup> Soikkanen 1975 p. 124 ff.

trends of the international movement is not without risk, of course, as conditions in some countries differed greatly from those in others. Finland belonged to those peripheral areas of Europe where the question of nationalism was both inflammatory and topical.

The nationalist line followed by Mäkelin and the Swedish-speaking Finnish labour movement may be compared with the "separatism" typical of labour parties among the "unhistorical" Slavic minority peoples of Austria-Hungary. This comparison is no more than an analogy, of course, as it is not based on similar historical conditions. A further common feature was the willingness of the socialists, who had supported the national struggle, for collaboration with the progressive middle class. In Finland Mäkelin and the Swedish-speaking Finnish socialists were taken as representatives of the so-called moderate trend and criticised for excessive fraternization with the constitutionalist middle class.

Valpas and the November Socialists may be taken as Kautskyists of the Finnish labour movement. Their characteristic was an endeavour to preserve pure doctrine at almost any price. Valpas in particular went far in caution: he preferred to wait and do nothing if not sure of his position.

It is the line pursued by Valpas that requires further illumination, for the historical picture which remains of him is somehow secret and mysterious. It appears too that the picture of his work given by contemporary sources needs considerable revision, for his inaction over the autonomy question was interpreted bitterly by his opponents as fawning to Tsarism. Guilty of this were embittered middle-class constitutionalists and also the opposition adherent to Mäkelin of the labour movement itself. For the moment the attitude of Valpas to the question of nationalism is obscured by myths based on contemporary notions.

The "third line" of labour activism signified in one sense the extension of the Russian revolutionary process to Finnish territory. It was here that the labour parties of Finland and Sweden differed markedly in character.<sup>45</sup> From the first, however, underground conspiracy was foreign to the Finnish

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<sup>45</sup> Hentilä 1980 pp. 64—70.



labour movement's leaders, who followed western doctrines. Sharply rejecting conspiracy, they strove purposefully to direct party tactics along parliamentary lines. Geography was inescapable, however, and Finland's labour movement in the end could not detach itself from the influence of the Russian revolutionary process. The events of the revolutionary years 1917—18 finally showed this in the most tangible manner.

#### 4. Nationalist image of Finland's labour movement in history

The ideas of Finland's old labour movement are usually characterized as Kautskyist, strongly aligned with the notion of class struggle. The movement was mainly influenced, it has been thought, by ideology proceeding from Germany and, to a lesser extent, from Sweden, Russia and elsewhere in Europe.

On the other hand, the movement's political line before 1918 has been thought eminently "nationalist". There is now reason to ask what these two prevailing interpretations actually mean, as they seem to be seriously conflicting. How is it possible that a party whose programme followed the main line of the Second International could have been especially "nationalist" in practical politics? The answer may be sought provisionally from the way in which these interpretations originated.

In its reference to nationalism the historical image of Finland's labour movement derives from the settlement of the 1918 civil war. For the Social Democrats it was essential to stress how little the Finnish labour movement had been influenced by the Russians, particularly the Bolsheviks. Connections of the movement with the Russians must be wiped out of history as far as possible, for this was a political necessity after 1918 in Finland. As a counterweight the western and Scandinavian models of the movement could be referred to, but most important of all was to refute the charges of unpatriotic behaviour levelled by the middle class. For this reason the Social Democrats were obliged to emphasize the historical attitude of the labour movement in support of nationalism, Finnish autonomy and a policy of independence.

The leaders of the old labour movement, who took refuge in

Soviet Russia, founded the Finnish communist party in summer 1918. In explaining defeat in the civil war they were obliged, for reasons quite opposite to those of the Social Democrats, to belittle the relations of the old labour movement with the Russian revolutionaries. In other words, too little had been known in Finland of Bolshevik revolutionary theory, and for this reason the people's delegation (the red government) had been unable to carry the Finnish revolution to final victory.

The "national image" of the labour movement has been projected almost intact into later historical accounts. The conflict between Kautskyism and "national character" can be explained simply by the situation regarding study. First to be examined was the ideological and programmatic development of the labour movement in the form of international influences, and this made it possible to trace thoroughly the international contacts (ideological mentors, correspondence, journeys, underground conspiracy etc) of many types of Finnish socialist. But the concrete political activity of the labour movement has also been studied in detachment from these influences, with no attempt to combine the two elements, which would in any case have been impossible.

## 5. Summary — new questions

In the last few years basic research on Finland's old labour movement has advanced so far that questions can be put in an entirely new form, particularly regarding the general strike, the time preceding it and the years 1917—18. Reference can be made here to the studies of Soikkanen, Jussila, Kirby, Upton, Hentilä, also to those of Ketola and Kujala, which are still in progress.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> See the already mentioned studies of Soikkanen 1961 and 1975, Jussila 1979 and Hentilä 1980. See also David Kirby, *The Finnish Social Democratic Party 1903—1918*. London 1971.

Anthony Upton, *Vallankumous Suomessa 1917—1918 I-II*. (Revolution in Finland 1917—1918 I—II) Jyväskylä 1980—1981.

Antti Kujala, *Suomen työväenliikkeen kehitys ensimmäisellä sortokaudella erityisesti vuosina 1903—1904*. (Development of Finnish labour movement in first period of oppression, especially 1903—1904) Suomen historian pro-gradu-

The new form of question should be based on the above-mentioned conflict between stress on Kautskyism and the national historical image. Jussila has opened the way for this by surveying the dilemma of the Finnish labour movement as a contest between nationalism and revolution. For purposes of historical study the question should focus on scrutiny of the relation between class struggle ideology and nationalist policy. What attempt was made to solve this problem in the concrete policy of the Finnish labour movement before the civil war? In practical terms this would imply special concentration on the significance of political activity by the labour movement during the so-called period of parliamentary tactics from 1907 to 1917. This is clearly the least studied period of the old labour movement. The attempts of leading persons within the labour movement to combine class struggle and nationalist policy would form a special topic.

Although in practice the relation with Russia controlled the labour movement's scope of action, it should be possible to go beyond it. In other words it should be linked with the concrete relation between the nationalism and internationalism of the labour movement. This does not imply a mere interaction of the two, but their historic, concrete significance in the work of the movement. It must be asked, therefore, how the internationalism of the movement was realized within the nationalist policy. This may also provide an approach to the question of the part played by Kautskyism in the movement. In practical research this would mean addressing ourselves to entirely new questions dealing with the relation of Kautskyist theory to the concrete political activity of the labour movement. How for instance was the Kautskyist theory realized in labour party attempts to decide the status of crofters and the landless farming proletariat? It would be necessary to work through the whole period of parliamentary tactics question by question. In addition the nature of the

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tutk. Helsingin yliopisto 1978. (Pro gradu study in Finnish history, Helsinki University 1978).

Eino Ketola, Suomen sosialidemokrattien itsenäisyyspolitiikan muotoutuminen ja suhde Venäjän vallankumoukseen maaliskuusta kesäkuuhun 1917, poliittisen historian lis. tutk. Helsingin yliopisto 1981. (The shaping of an independence policy by Finland's Social Democrats and their attitude to the Russian revolution from March to June 1917).

labour movement as a mass movement and the relation between its various forms of activity would have to be investigated, for these are the questions central to the Kautskyist aim of developing class strength.

The new form of question outlined here is based on the assumption that comparison or analysis of effects has not sufficed to give an exact picture of the relation between national and international in the Finnish labour movement. To show this relation in a concrete historical sense requires a study of how internationalism was manifested in the everyday nationalist political action of the movement.

In that case the objects study would be simply the attempts at an elucidation (or the abandonment of such attempts) of items of Marxist theory or programme by the labour movement, and the latter's response to political challenges produced by the prevailing system. This might enable the dispute between theory and practice mentioned at the beginning of this article to be formulated more precisely.

Osmo Jussila

# Finland's progress to national statehood within the development of the Russian Empire's administrative system

In accounts of Finland's national history the picture of the birth and development of a Finnish nation is strongly tinged with the thought of a national awakening and those who brought it about. The nation as an organism which awakens, grows and thrives is not a concept peculiar to Finland but a more general tendency of thought belonging to the romantic age. The national awakening is considered to have occurred here in the early half of the 19th century, and two phases are often distinguished in it, an earlier and a later. The foremost awakeners were A.I. Arvidsson (1791—1858, in Sweden from 1823) and J.W. Snellman (1806—1881).

These men, particularly Snellman, saw the birth of the nation as an inborn process, whereas the young poet-historian Z. Topelius in his well-known work of 1843, "Åger finska folket en historie?", regarded an external factor, the separation from Sweden, as highly significant: only thereafter did Finland possess a history of her own. In general, however, the words "place désormais au rang de nation", spoken by Tsar

Alexander I in his closing address to the Porvoo Diet (*sejm*) began to be interpreted, under the lead of the historian Yrjö-Koskinen (1830—1903) as meaning that the Tsar was merely recognizing an accomplished fact: that Finland had become a nation. Contemporaries with the spirit of the Enlightenment, such as Secretary of State R.H. Rehbinder, interpreted the words thus: Finland became a nation in 1809 by acquiring a "political existence" of her own (*existence politique*).

The picture of awakening current in the romantic period was still alive in Finnish historical writing after the second world war. During the last few years, however, increasing stress has been laid on matters of state policy — the question asked by Topelius in 1843 has become topical once more. In his thesis dealing with the Committee for Finnish affairs 1811—26 Keijo Korhonen (1963) showed the development of a "idea of Finland" in the context of that Committee, in whose deliberations arose the first clear realization that the areas joined to Russia by the Peace of Hamina formed a separate political entity of their own. Later this thought took flight in the words of A.I. Arwidsson: "We are not Swedes, we do not wish to be Russians, so let us be Finns."

Factors of state policy and their importance for the development of the Finnish nation have been discussed further by Matti Klinge. His basic standpoint is crystallized in the title of his book "Between Bernadotte and Lenin" (1975), which implies that the Finnish nation emerged from the frontiers drawn as a result of the policies pursued by the great powers of Europe. Finland is the strip of land which Bernadotte finally recognized as belonging to Russia, and which Lenin for his part recognized in 1917—18 as an independent state.

The emergence of a "idea of Finland" within a Committee for Finnish affairs was not haphazard but almost unavoidable. The Committee and the Finnish State Secretariat, which succeeded it in 1826, were in fact the bodies which most clearly expressed the special character of the new political unit compared with other parts of the Russian realm. The Secretariat also acted as an intermediary for Finland and Finnish affairs with the Russian authorities. In St Petersburg, where the Committee and Secretariat worked, it was important and necessary to emphasize Finland's special character, which was not so self-evident at first as it became later. This is clearly shown by the

uncertain basis of the notion of a fatherland, of which Keijo Korhonen gives several examples in the above-mentioned study.

The Committee for Finnish affairs and the presentation of matters directly to the Tsar, not through ministers, (defined by law in Finland 1.12.1808) were not exceptional in the Russian Empire, however, but were rather the rule in the administration of new peripheral territories. Before the Empire of St Petersburg regional administrative bodies (prikaz) had been added by conquest to Muscovite Russia in addition to the normal departmental bodies, which, in fact, were finally exceeded in number by the regional bodies. Among others Novgorod, Kazan, Smolensk, Vladimir and Siberia each received their own prikaz alongside "financial", "ambassadorial", "bandit" and other departmental bodies. The line of least resistance when adding a new area was to transfer its central administrative organ to Moscow, so that it would be governed in the same manner as before but under new masters.

The regional administration system lost none of its practical utility when Muscovite Russia became the Empire of St Petersburg; rather, the opposite is true. In his reforms Peter the Great preserved the foundations of the order followed by Moscow for state and community, borrowing new names and forms from the West. The Empire's first conquest was the area of the Baltic States, and in 1727 a collegiate body for the administration of justice in Livonia and Estonia was established in St Petersburg. This was one of a system of "regional colleges" created by Peter. At first it formed a department of a general "college of justice" but was then detached to function independently, also after 1786, when the general college was abolished. For economic affairs the principle of regional administration was observed in 1731, when a collegiate chamber for Livonia and Estonia was opened in St Petersburg.

The county of Viipuri was made subordinate to the college of justice for Livonia and Estonia in 1735 and to the above-mentioned collegiate chamber at the same time. A special Finnish department was added and the name of Finland was added to the title. The Committee for Finnish affairs formed in 1811 in fact had its roots in this department, whose records were later transferred to the Committee's archives.

Finland's "promotion to nationhood" in 1809 meant in practice that the areas of Sweden joined to Russia by the Peace of Hamina were formed into a separate administrative unit such as they had not been previously. After the Peace of Uusikaupunki in 1721 Finland (including Ostrobothnia) became gradually detached from the rest of Sweden, but this implied a new trend of political thinking caused by the growing threat of Russia rather than an administrative or "national" separation.

Provincial assemblies had been held in Finland when it was part of Sweden, the last important occasions being in Helsinki in 1616 and in Turku in 1676. Although the representatives in 1616 came from broadly speaking the whole area which was joined to Russia in 1809 (also Ostrobothnia, which was unusual), there was a vital difference between these earlier occasions and the Porvoo assembly of 1809: those held in the 17th century and before were part of the system of provincial assemblies common to the realm of Sweden. Thus the representatives of 1616 in Helsinki did not regard themselves as "the Finnish provincial assembly", but as "councillors of state and provincial estates in Finland," that is to say the councillors and estates which existed in Finland during the war.

When examined against this background, the Porvoo assembly of 1809 was a new institution, a national assembly or Diet, although representatives were elected in accordance with old forms and regulations. For instance Courland, unlike Finland, was actually able to preserve the former institution intact, for its provincial assembly was an already complete whole with a clearly defined area for representatives. For the Porvoo assembly, on the other hand, the area was defined only during the assembly, and no final definition was made until after it.

Thus representation was arranged for the Åland Islands, which were not finally conquered until the Porvoo assembly was in progress. While drawing a new state frontier, in fact, the Russians created a new institution: the Diet of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Its jurisdiction was limited to advisory functions, however, in accordance with the autocratic Russian mode of government. It was an "advisory body" such as could be allowed to exist in the autocratic mode of government



according to the opinion of M.M. Speranski, chief advisor to Alexander I.

Still less was old tradition observed in the institution of Governor-General, though from time to time this office had existed earlier in Finland and its holder in 1808 was a Finnish emigrant, G.M. Sprengtporten. By 1809, however, the appointment of Governors-General in conquered provinces bordering Russian territory had become a standard practice of the Empire. Set up to assist the Governor-General was an official body under which the administrative machinery of the conquered country continued work as before, observing and upholding civil, criminal and other laws. After Sprengtporten, who resigned in 1809, all Governors-General were from other parts of the realm than Finland.

A new institution also created in 1809 was the governing Council, known as the Senate from 1816. Before 1809 Finland had had no central administrative organ separate from Stockholm. The instruction of the governing Council begin with an expression of this new requirement: "The success of the State demands a central point, a supreme official body for provincial administrations . . ."

In Finnish historical accounts the governing Council is usually seen as an institution similar to such Swedish models as the supreme court and drafting body for general affairs of Gustav III. Many facts indicate, however, that its basic plan was of Russian origin, especially the combination of the highest executive and judicial power in the same organ. Finnish attempts to detach the department of justice from the executive department as an independent supreme court did not succeed, despite many endeavours, before the period of independence. Further evidence of Russian origins was the fact that the Finnish governing Council was not the only one of its kind in the realm. A governing body similar in structure and operating principle was established in Bessarabia in 1812. There at least the hope was fulfilled which J.F. Aminoff, a member of the Finnish nobility and later a senator, expressed in 1811: that governing Councils as good as that in Finland would be founded by the Tsar for other national minorities in Russia.

When the title of Senate was granted to the governing Council in 1816, it was with the desire to make a clearer borderline between the administration of Finland and the rest

of the realm. Some contemporaries saw it as a strengthening of Russian influence, which of course it was. After this elevation in rank statutes and laws promulgated by the Imperial Senate of Finland had the same authority as the ukases of the ruling Senate, whose application to Finland without modification could not be demanded. At this time too it became an established practice to send ukases to the Governor of Finland for information only: if it was desired to put them into force in Finland, the Tsar's ruling had to be obtained through the Finnish secretary of state. This limitation, formally confirmed in a regulation of 1826, was of great importance for the maintenance of a separate Finnish legislation. In 1822 the Imperial Senate received premises in a location suited to its dignity, the Senate Square in Helsinki.

Founded in St Petersburg in 1811, the Committee for Finnish affairs — whose origins have already been explained — was a body for the ordering of affairs in a new area which was similar to many other regional committees of the Russian state. (Such committees included those of "the western governmental districts" 1831—1848; 1862—64, Siberia 1821—38; 1852—64 and Caucasia 1840—1882.) The Committee for Finnish affairs existed in two separate phases, as did two of the above-mentioned committees, 1811—26 and 1857—91.

The Finnish secretary of state with his office founded in 1826 was raised in 1834 to the position of Minister Secretary of State, whereupon he became, with a Polish official bearing the same title, the second "regional minister" of the realm, ranking with other ministers in his relation to the Tsar. Later his office came to be known as "His Imperial Majesty's Office for Finland".

In the time of Tsar Nicholas I the system of regional administration created for Finland in 1809—26 survived for the general reason that the reign of this Tsar was not susceptible to changes in the realm as a whole. In Finland's case there were several further influences, not the least of which were the conservatism and loyalty of the Finns. Finland, unlike Poland, was no place for revolutionary thoughts. Among the most concrete demonstrations of loyalty was the participation of a Guards Battalion recruited from Finns in the suppression of a Polish revolt.

A remark by Nicholas has become famous in Finland: "Leave

the Finns in peace. That is the only province of my great realm which has caused me no anxiety or dissatisfaction throughout my reign."

Another important means of preserving the regional administration was a strong Governor-General such as A.S. Menshikov (1833—55). Although Governor-Generalships had been abolished in Russia in 1837 they were retained in Moscow, St Petersburg and important frontier areas such as Finland. Menshikov's predecessor A.A. Zakrevski (1823—31) had already in 1826 obtained restoration of the right of direct presentation to the Tsar in civil matters affecting Finland, and had used it. Menshikov continued the practice and in 1834 secured the further right to introduce Finnish affairs to a Committee of ministers. Through a strong Governor-General Finland was of course firmly integrated with Russia as represented by the Tsar and his Governor-General in Finland, but at the same time effectively detached from Russian ministers and the rest of the administrative machinery, with which it had dealings only through the Governor-General and Minister Secretary of State. One sign of integration was that in Menshikov's time, far more than earlier or later, uniform statutes and laws were enacted for Finland and the rest of the realm. In the preparation of these Russian ministers and other officials took part, but communication and consultation passed through a narrow channel formed by the Governor-General and Minister Secretary of State.

Detachment in its turn was shown by the fact that Menshikov prevented several attempts by Russian ministers to interfere in Finnish affairs and bring Russian institutions into Finland. The most important example of this was in 1835, when the codification of laws, already started, was torpedoed. If carried to a conclusion, as it was in the Baltic States, codification would very probably have led to the same results in Finland. Menshikov is believed to have said: "I will answer for Finland, I alone."

This framework of nationhood which originated with Alexander I and survived through the time of Nicholas I gathered strength in the reigns of the two following Tsars, Alexander II and III. The basic reasons for this were in principle the same as before: loyalty and strong Governors-General. When the Poles again revolted in 1863 Finland was

peaceful, and in the same year the Diet met in Helsinki after an interval of over 50 years. When the administrative status of Poland was lowered to that of a governmental district (admittedly a so-called separate district), a new Instruction for the Diet was confirmed for Finland (the first constitution for the Grand Duchy of Finland to be endorsed by the Tsar's signature) and the meeting of the Estates was made a regular procedure; Finland received a separate currency (the silver mark) and the national army during the Turkish War of 1878. By participating in this war the Finnish guards again showed their loyalty.

Menshikov was followed by two strong Governors-General who effectively watched their sphere of interest, F.W.R. von Berg (1855—61) and Nicholas Adlerberg (1866—81). Between them for a short time came the weaker Platon Rokassovski (1861—66), but his time was also free from serious injury to the sphere of interest. (It may be conjectured, however, that a stronger Governor-General would have secured not only an Instruction for the Diet but also confirmation of a separate form of government, the latter having belonged to the same set of proposals as the Instruction confirmed in 1869.)

These strong Governors-General, particularly Adlerberg, were of great importance at exactly this time because from the 1860s onward Russian ministers began to strengthen their position and rise above Governors-General. If the latter had not watched their sphere of interest ministers would have been able to intervene directly in Finnish affairs and nullify or decisively restrict the principle of national administration and its scope in Finland. The strong position of these Governors-General "near the Tsar", as it was expressed, did not mean, however, that Russian ministers had no part in preparatory work affecting Finland: they merely did not hold a controlling position as yet.

This system of administration for the Grand Duchy of Finland served as a basis for the judicial theory of Finland's status in the Russian realm or, as the authors of the theory preferred to say, the "relation" between Finland and Russia. This theory, the creation of Professor J.J. Nordström, originated in the early 19th century and developed further as it became more widespread. According to the theory Finland was in a state of real union with Russia (even the term "personal

union" was sometimes used), having its own legislation parallel to that of Russia, its own constitution and form of government providing for a division of legislative power between the ruler and the Estates; the state of Finland was to be ruled by its own officials. Held in common with Russia were only the ruler, his court and order of succession, foreign policy and supreme command of the army. According to the theory the so-called general state legislation neither existed nor was necessary outside the above-mentioned common topics.

Although the Russians never approved or recognized a doctrine of the state of Finland in the form presented by its main exponent Professor and Senator Leo Mechelin (who died in 1914) they were obliged to note the surprising emergence de facto of a new state north-west of St Petersburg. In 1889 this was expressed as follows by Johannes Gripenberg, an official of the Minister Secretary of State of Finland:

"They see with surprise and annoyance that this embryo of a state created hurriedly by Alexander I in the stormy dawn of the century 'somewhere behind Viipuri' has grown in threequarters of a century into an autonomous entity displaying all the characteristics of a state more or less perfectly developed. They see, moreover, that a few hundred thousand Chuds, dressed in rags, shod with birchbark, fed with bark bread, easily ruled by a handful of 'Swedish noblemen' and scraping a living at the time of the conquest in the swamps and forests of which the newly conquered province consisted, now compose, in their eyes at least, a unified nation of two and a quarter million thirty kilometres from the gates of the capital; a nation which reckons the roots of its culture to stretch further than those of the Russians themselves and which, to crown all, speaks and demands to be addressed in a language that the Russians in their pride are accustomed to rank with the bellowing of cattle and the howling of dogs. To their astonished eyes appears a well organized self-governing community with thousands of schools where, *horribile dictu*, the language of the realm is not

taught, with industries which in part compete with their own at the head of the market, with well-based finances and enjoying a self-established credit on world markets such as many richer countries might envy."

A similar observation, merely expressed in a different manner, was made some time later by the well-known Russian revolutionary V.I. Uljanov (Lenin), who wrote in 1913:

"In Russia there are two nations, highly civilized and unique for many reasons both historical and connected with their conditions of life, which could quite easily and naturally exert their right to separate from Russia. They are Finland and Poland."

\* \* \*

By 1890 Finland was the only surviving remnant of the zone of autonomous territories which had arisen on the western periphery of Russia. In 1866 the Russian provincial administration had been extended to Poland and its legislative system merged with a general system. In the Baltic states after 1840 codification of laws had meant a considerable degree of integration with the laws of the realm. From then on the Baltic states were Russian provinces with separate administration. The governor-generalship there was abolished only in 1876. Bessarabia had lost its special status in 1828 during the reign of Nicholas I.

Finland's turn came at the end of the 1890s. The "ministerial" administrative system of the realm, as it grew stronger and more uniform, came into irreconcilable conflict with Finland's separate development as a state. Though the new Tsar Nicholas II was weaker than his predecessors, his minister of war Kuropatkin was strong and enjoyed the support of a new governor-general, N.I. Bobrikov. Minister and governor-general pulled together, the latter's sphere of interest having lost its former significance. The Minister Secretary of State who had represented Finland's separate national administration in St Petersburg had lost status to other ministers. The conflict between the "state" of Finland, its legislation and Diet and the "state" of Russia became acute with the enactment of a new law for conscription or, to be

more exact, with the revision of the law of 1878. To circumvent the resistance of the Finnish Estates the Tsar quickly ratified the so-called February Manifesto in 1899. Speed was possible because the basic work of preparation had been done by committees in the 1890s. The manifesto with its instructions signified final acceptance of the interpretation that "local Finnish law" was an exception to the Russian law in general, as had also been decided when the laws of the Baltic states were codified in 1840. But the manifesto also recognized the fact that for purposes of legislation the realm was still divided into two parts: Finland and Russia. Finland's own statute book neither was nor would have been abolished, as had happened in Poland, nor was the extension of Russian provincial administration to Finland even planned. Even after the manifesto, therefore, Finland was a single clear exception to the rest of the realm, though it was not recognized as a state in the sense intended by Mehelin, but as a self-governing country (oblast).

Comparisons with Poland and the Baltic area did not console the Finns of 1899, however. Large numbers were mobilized for passive resistance to the February manifesto and the new conscription law of 1901. Against the manifesto an address bearing half a million names was compiled, while conscription was boycotted systematically under the direction of the Kagaali group, which was organized on military lines. One important consequence of this mobilization was the strengthening of national consciousness and its widespread diffusion. When the great address was compiled and conscription resisted, broad sections of the people awoke to the thought of how often the fatherland was mentioned and what it signified.

At this stage the emblems which attracted the Finnish nation were not linguistic or, as a rule, ethnic but historical and legalistic, the social order inherited from Sweden and the system of statehood built on it. The core of this was found in constitutional law. At its clearest and most vivid this notable legalistic concept of nationhood during the "years of oppression" is seen in the celebrated painting of E. Isto called "Attack", in which the two-headed Russian eagle tries to seize the book of laws from a maiden representing Finland. Thousands of copies of the painting were circulated round the country.

During this phase language did not serve as the emblem of nationhood for the reason that Finland had two main languages. Finnish, spoken by the majority, might in other circumstances have become a unifying factor. This was not possible now because its position — unlike that of the constitutional laws — was not threatened. On the contrary, the progress of the Finnish language to a state of juridical equality with Swedish reached its conclusion in the language statute of 1902 at the worst period of oppression.

The foundation and framework of the structure of Finland's nation- and statehood were established as an organic part of the extended Russian Empire and the system of regional administration typical of it. The framework also received a uniform content, well perceived by the people, as part of the process through which this system passed, namely its dissolution, in the judicial struggle for the constitutional laws, the cornerstones of the structure.

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Aira Kemiläinen

## Initiation of the Finnish people into nationalist thinking

There are two sides to the idea of nationalism. One is the political principle of national self-determination exemplified by the birth of the United States of America in 1776. At that time the 13 colonies of England appealed to natural law and the equality and rights of man (the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness) in their search for independence. Similarly the Greek Proclamation of Independence in 1822 appealed to natural rights, individual liberty and the protection of property and honour. Under the principle of nationalism a nation (community with a strong sense of solidarity) has a natural right to form its own state or at least to gain autonomy. The other side of the nationalist idea is concerned more with culture than with politics. It stresses the right of population groups known as nationalities to develop their own language, customs and intellectual culture, which in the Romantic Age included in particular folk poetry, folk song, literature and art in general. The field of culture widened to the extent that laws were regarded as national and national sciences were spoken of, though science is generally considered international. This idea of nationalism did not necessarily aim at an independent state though it was often linked to a demand for national self-determination. There was political overtone in the demand that a community's own language should have its

rights in administration or cultural life. Often counted too as unifying factors were native country and common descent, not merely land of birth but biological kinship (tribe, race).

The idea of nationalism applied to language and culture was actually formed in Germany in the literary works of Johann Gottfried Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Romantics, especially Friedrich Schlegel. This notion had its influence on Finland through Professor Henrik Gabriel Porthan of Turku Academy, also by the agency of Sweden from the 1820s onward. In particular it influenced the Turku Romantics Adolf Ivar Arwidsson and J.G. Linsén during the 1820s. As for Porthan, he began to publish his work "De poësi Fennica" as early as 1766, when Herder was merely starting. Enthusiasm for popular language, history and poetry was not the merit of the Germans alone, it belonged to the spirit of the age. Pursuit of folk poetry, which started independently in Finland, acquired typically romantic features from Germany and Sweden. Another influence felt in Finland at the same time was the Enlightenment, which demanded theoretical education and better knowledge of the Finnish language by officials. The status of Swedish as the language of officialdom had led to neglect of Finnish. Alongside Romanticism and the Enlightenment there also emerged enthusiasm for antiquity. The ideal hero of the nationalist poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg contained features of Greek and Roman patriotism.

From the 1830s onward the national epic Kalevala collected by Elias Lönnrot gave a new direction to Finnish intellectual life. The importance of the Kalevala to Finnish national consciousness is difficult to estimate. In his book "Folklore and Nationalism in Modern Finland" (1976) William A. Wilson writes:

"Julius Krohn once said: 'I consider it a certainty that without a Juslenius there would not have been a Porthan.' We might add that without a Juslenius and a Porthan there would not have been an Elias Lönnrot and a Kalevala. And without the Kalevala and the cultural revival its publication precipitated, perhaps there would not have been an independent Finnish nation." (p. 26)

In the following article it is intended to give some material for

comparison and estimation of the national importance of the Kalevala and other factors.

*The notion of national self-determination* — in so far as it came from outside — had little influence in Finland at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Finnish officer Göran Magnus Sprengtporten took as models the American Revolution and the Dutch form of government when he tried to detach Finland from Sweden as an independent state under Russian protection (1786—88). He had little support, but after moving to Russia he exerted a considerable influence on Finland's destiny in 1809. In turn, the world of ideas created by the French Revolution probably caused less agitation in Sweden and Finland than in many other countries because their constitution was already far more democratic than elsewhere. The idea of freedom and the principle of nationalism may have affected Finland's position in 1809 and later through the conqueror, the Emperor Alexander I. He started to rule Finland as a Grand Duchy according to the country's own laws. If account is taken of the Emperor's weighty contribution and Sprengtporten's influence there is no reason to underrate the importance of the nationalist principle, though it cannot be credited with the country's intelligentsia or the broad nature of its society.

The true effect of the nationalist idea on the Finnish people as a whole can only be observed in the late 19th century and early 20th. We must now examine the reaction in Finland to the country, the people and to "Finnishness". Were patriotism and national consciousness to be found among the population, and what was their vision of the country, state and nation of Finland in the 19th century?

If we examine the premises and development of nationalist thinking by the Finns, certain facts must be noted. Russia was utterly strange to them, as its religion, form of government, language, customs and culture were different. Through Carelians and Ingrians — Finnish in descent — who lived in Russia there had admittedly been contact with the Russian way of life unofficially, and south-east Finland had belonged to Russia for almost 100 years before being reunited with Finland in 1812, but stories of conditions in Russia were frightening, at least from the popular peasant standpoint. Sweden on the other hand was familiar, for the Finns had been Swedish subjects

and citizens, but in the time of Swedish dominance the Finnish language and culture had not developed and such a situation could not continue. Swedish could not remain the only official language in a country where 85—88 % (according to A.I. Arvidsson 7/8) of the inhabitants were Finnish-speaking and which had no further political connection with Sweden. In 19th century Finland this situation caused a twofold nationalist movement, of Fennomania against Swedish influence and of cautious but gradually more intensive resistance to Russia. The Finns did not revolt but created their own state. The issue of Finnish nationalism took on a unique character. To be noted also is the increase in Finland's population. This had always been small, but in modern times it advanced at a good pace, especially in the period 1700—1900. About the year 1500 the country's inhabitants numbered 100,000—300,000. In 1900 the figure was about 3 million with an increase of some 2 million during the 19th century. In numbers the Finnish nation began to resemble a normal small state.

*Finnish nationalism* in the 19th century was of *three main types*.

1) The nationalism of the Finnish autonomous state or "nation state" developed from the earlier patriotism and affection for a home region which had been felt in the time of Swedish power toward Finland or, more poetically, toward "the island of Finland".

2) *National feeling for Finland*. The *Finnish language* played an important part in this. It broke out among the intelligentsia in the form of *Fennomania* with Arvidsson as its leader in the 1820s and the notable statesman Johan Wilhelm Snellman in the 1840s and later. Their aim was a state whose language should be Finnish, with Swedish in a minority position. It was held that the Finnish upper classes and intelligentsia were originally Finnish-speaking and had adopted a foreign language, Swedish. On this basis part of the Swedish speakers adopted Finnish ways, even taking Finnish surnames. Fennomanes favoured *linguistic supremacy for Finnish*, while the more moderate aimed at *linguistic equality*. This nationalist movement conquered the Finnish speakers before long — farmers, crofters, cottagers, labourers and servants, who from the end of the 1850s were able to send their children to Finnish-

speaking secondary schools.

3) *National feeling of Swedish speakers toward Swedish nationalism in Finland.* Their aim was for Finland to be as Swedish as possible, with Swedish as the official language and Finnish as the language of the common people. The most ardent representatives of this trend identified language and race, explaining that Finnish speakers were incapable of culture. Finland's future would depend on preservation of the status of the Swedish language.

In fact there were two or even three theories opposing or supporting each other. By the notions of Romanticism nation and language belonged organically together. Snellman for his part had noted that one language in a realm strove to dominate, and he applied this observation to Finland. By the opposite theory language and race belong together, and among Swedish speakers in the mid-19th century this was connected with the thought of supremacy for the Germanic race. All these theories have proved wrong — at least in Finland. Swedish is still the second national language of Finland. The race theory has turned out to be wrong both scientifically and in practice. Only modern — and mainly Finnish-speaking — Finland has created an independent higher culture and asserted a sense of power (Independence 1917, Winter War 1939). Latin scholarship and Swedish administration consolidated western culture and Scandinavian society in Finland, but a Finnish-speaking population and a national awakening brought an individualist Finland to the foreground. Swedish speakers have of course contributed to Finnish achievements. When Finland became part of Russia in 1809 the country's inhabitants had full reason to seek a national identity. The situation in fact contained features of a crisis of identity.

We shall now examine nationalist thinking separately among the intelligentsia and the common people. The intelligentsia or gentry included perhaps 2 % of the population. Its native language and home language was almost exclusively Swedish — except in south-east Finland, where it might be German or Russian. The lower orders of Swedish speakers — mainly in cities and coastal districts — were identified only partly with the gentry, though they had the same advantages. The Finnish-speaking elementary and secondary school, the established institution of Parliament and municipal administration to-

gether with Fennomania created a Finnish-speaking intelligentsia from the 1860s onward and to some extent earlier. The two Estates of the Diet, the nobility and the middle class, were almost entirely Swedish-speaking until the parliamentary reform of 1906. The home language of the clergy too was partly Swedish. The peasant class was mostly Finnish-speaking. As a rule the clergy knew Finnish, as did the lower ranks of officials. In rural districts the higher orders usually knew Finnish, even if they considered it so inferior that they were glad to hide their knowledge. Among social groups there were contradictory developments. As a rule there was progress toward equality, but in 19th century Finland the difference between gentry and common people was emphasized precisely on the basis of language. Rapid population growth, on the other hand, deepened the gulf between farmers, crofters and cottagers, also between farmers and labourers. Farmers belonged to the middle class of the more modern society, and from among them arose a Finnish-speaking intelligentsia.

How did the higher Estates look on Finland at the beginning of the 19th century? During the time of Swedish power they clearly felt that it was a home district. They saw Sweden and Finland as parts of the Swedish realm, as they also saw Estonia and Ingria before the Peace of Uusikaupunki in 1721. Finland to them was a country, not merely a province of Sweden. In the 17th century when nations and realms were in search of a brilliant antiquity — Olaus Rudbeck in the case of Sweden — the Finns found mighty kings and an independent realm for themselves, or explained their forefathers as descendants of the tribe of Israel. Although this was erroneous it was a sign of national feeling, even of national pride. Although the status of the Finnish language weakened in modern times, as a background factor it evidently played a part in the acceptance of the Finnish people as a unique entity. The languages used in Finland from the 13th to the 19th century were Finnish, Swedish and Latin. Latin, in which official documents were written in the Middle Ages, was mainly an academic language in the 19th century. Swedish had always been the language of officialdom. On the other hand it had never been the language of the church for the Finnish-speaking population. As the language of conversation for the higher ranks of society Swedish supplanted Finnish in the 18th



century, and in schools it replaced Latin. At the end of the 18th century the Enlightenment and the early romantic movement worked against this development. Porthan, the leading scholar of Turku Academy, regarded Finnish as his actual mother tongue and initiated the study of folk poetry, the Finnish language and Finnish history. Sprengtporten, a cosmopolitan officer and politician, also said that Finnish was his true mother tongue. In 1809, however, most of the intelligentsia probably believed that Swedish would remain the language of officialdom and culture. A new perspective was added by the information that Finnish had several related languages such as Lappish, Estonian and Hungarian and that it belonged to an extensive family of languages which probably stemmed from the east and was beginning to be known as Finno-Ugrian. After 1810 this realization led the young intelligentsia straight to an appreciation of folk poetry and popular language, and traced the path to Fennomania and a Finland more conscious of itself. Of notable importance was the Diet of Porvoo in 1809, where the four Estates swore loyalty to the new ruler and Alexander I, the Emperor and Grand Duke, gave his affirmation as ruler, the country's constitution and former rights, in their main features, were confirmed and its inhabitants spoken of as a nation. On that basis Finnish self-government and an autonomous state were created. Enlightened officials soon noticed the possibilities of Finland and began to lay stress on the country's position as a state. The Finnish Estates had accepted the conqueror's invitation to the Diet despite the fact that no peace had been signed between Sweden and Russia, and thus the assurances given at the Diet could be understood as an agreement. The Emperor received abundant thanks from the Finns, but despite relief there was perplexity in Finland. Leading officials were anxious and in the next few decades were careful not to provoke the Grand Duke while they quietly and tactfully built up self-government. The main point was that the country had a government and direct access to the Emperor. A unique nation was to develop between Sweden and Russia. Part of the intelligentsia opted for a "Finnish" Finland and part for a bilingual native land. The most Swedish section wished to remain as before. It favoured political liberalism but forgot the Finnish speakers and would have left them at the lowest level of society.

Finland's intelligentsia was progressive in science and art, political thinking and — especially at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century — in social activity. The reign of Alexander II (1855—1881) was a time of great reforms. Contributing to this work was the elite of the intelligentsia, a fairly extensive body. There were also those who strove to build a personal career in the splendour of the Imperial power without regard for the Finnish people.

What was the situation among *the people themselves*, representing 98 % of the population (85 % if only Finnish speakers are considered)? What did it mean to be a Finn under Swedish power and after 1809? Did they possess national feeling and pride, and was it directed to Sweden or Finland? Did they understand what happened in 1809? This is the section of the population whose opinions are most difficult for a historian to elucidate. It involves explaining the progress of the 19th century.

The events of 1899 may be taken for purposes of comparison. It was then that the Finns answered the challenge offered by the first stage of the russianization process. The so-called February Manifesto was issued, making it possible to enact laws affecting Finland without giving a hearing to the Finnish Estates. In about 10 days university students — sometimes skiing long distances in the countryside — collected more than half a million signatures for an address to be given to the Emperor-Grand Duke. In a courteous letter the Finns expressed deep anxiety but also their belief that the ruler had not wished to injure Finland's form of government. This, known as the Great Address, was signed by 522,931. Finland's total population was 2.7 million. Those above 15 years of age numbered 2.2 million. In 1900 their level of education was as follows:

Attended elementary school or otherwise able to read and write	Able to read only	Unable to read
40.7 %—905,025	58.1 %— 1,289,404	1.2 %—26,261

Over half of those able to write had, in fact, signed the address. The number is astonishing even if it is assumed that in some cases a father or mother wrote the names of their children.

This peaceful demonstration was also a sign of national vigilance. At the same time it showed that conditions were stabilizing. The signatories hardly feared persecution from the Emperor or the Russian government. On the other hand they showed notable boldness in putting their names to a document criticising the Emperor's actions. The political atmosphere had been clouded for some years. The Great Address showed a national consciousness of the state of autonomous Finland.

Another example can be given from 1939 (and 1944). When Finland ceded south-east Finland to the Soviet Union after the Winter War, about half a million people moved in 10 days to the main part of Finland. They left the land of their fathers, their homes, most of their cattle and other property, wishing to belong to the state and nation of Finland. A clearer sign of national consciousness there could hardly be. It may be added, of course, that in the last few decades over 300,000 inhabitants of Finland have left voluntarily for Sweden to find a better standard of living. They live in good conditions but many are not happy, for they have lost their language and culture, which has proved disastrous for their children. These examples show once more the nature of Finnish relations with Russia, Sweden and Finland itself.

How did the Finnish people picture their country in the time of Swedish power? In principle Finland had enjoyed equal standing in the Swedish realm for 400—500 years. In church and court the people were informed of laws, statutes and political events. Part of the laws and statutes were translated into Finnish. Peasant representatives were sent to the Diet of Stockholm. They certainly told acquaintances what they had heard. Like the intelligentsia, the people were well aware that the realm consisted of Sweden and Finland and that Finland contained many provinces and clans such as Häme, Savo and Carelia. The name of Finland, which originally had meant the south-west part of the country, had been extended to cover the whole "Eastland" belonging to Sweden. Not only soldiers and officials but also rural inhabitants travelled a great deal. In the Middle Ages farms possessed lands hundreds of kilometres away. Land settlement had continued vigorously for centuries. Rural inhabitants travelled to coastal cities for trade. Farm hands and servant girls wandered in search of new employment. To the parish church people drove, rowed or

walked scores of kilometres. Courts were at great distances. Clergy and officials came from far off, and school journeys were hundreds of kilometres long.

In 1809 the Finnish people was obliged to realize that its political status had changed radically. The Finns had been involved in war, and their army had fought. Now they were under Russian power. They might know little of revolution, but more important to them was the freedom of a Scandinavian people and their own religion. They sent their own representatives to the Porvoo Diet. On this multilingual occasion speeches and documents were interpreted and translated for them. The representatives carried the message all over the country. The Emperor seemed to attach great importance to the oath of loyalty he received from the peasants. Most valuable in terms of information may have been the fact that Alexander I's affirmation was read in churches and placed on church walls to be read in Finnish. Most of the people could read, and though reading was not easy for all, there were those who could read well. The Finns seem to have reiterated that their religion, laws and rights had been confirmed.

There was little literature in the Finnish language and most of it was religious. An exception was the so-called Chronicle which was printed in the hymnbook and thus was in the reach of most Finns. It was a short chronicle of world history in very conservative terms — it began with the creation of the world 6,000 years ago — but little better knowledge of these matters was available even to the educated. Finns had considerable knowledge of the history of the Israelites, Assyrians and Babylonians, also of Greece and Rome. In 1813 the hymnbook contained a different Chronicle. There was an addition in the form of Russian history, with no mention made of the destruction wrought by Russians or of the "unhappy" battle of Pultava in 1709, where Charles XII lost to Tsar Peter the Great. But it contained the combined history of Sweden and Finland and — most important of all — a description of the Porvoo Diet in 1809, the oath of loyalty and the ruler's affirmation.

The Lutheran church considered that authority, that is the ruler and the government, received their power from God. In the Finnish catechism of 1764 it is stated — in a text framed

and hung on walls — that authority is God, and the assurance is given that those who do good do not need to fear authority. Spelling books included authority with father and mother in the fourth commandment. For this reason religious peasants were allowed to think that the authority over them had been changed by God. It should be mentioned that the Swedish king Gustavus IV Adolphus had been dethroned just before the Porvoo Diet. It appears that Alexander I took note of this situation. He said cautiously that Russian arms apart — Providence had seen fit to place Finland in his power. Bishop Tengström said at the opening ceremony of the Diet that "tous les bons citoyens" were "enchantés de rendre à César les choses qui sont à César, et à Dieu celles qui sont à Dieu." In his turn the Emperor said at the opening on 28.3.1809: "Par les décrets de la Providence appelé à gouverner un peuple bon et loyal." In his opinion the task of the Diet was: "à compléter les droits que le sort de la guerre m'a déferés par les droits plus chers à mon coeur, plus conformes à mes principes, ceux qui donnent les sentiments de l'amour et de l'affection."

In his closing speech on 18.7.1809 the Grand Duke began his famous statement on the elevation of the Finnish people to the rank of nationhood by saying: "Ce peuple brave et loyal bénira la Providence qui a amené l'ordre de choses actuel." He urged representatives to assure their fellowcountrymen that the laws would remain in force and that their personal security and property were unassailable. He hoped that they would deal with the matters of greatest importance to the people's political existence. Belief in providence and Alexander's attempt to conciliate his new subjects made the transfer to association with Russia more easy. The smooth assurances of loyalty and the show of veneration were partly due to this state of affairs, but linked with them still was anxiety as to how the Finns would manage matters in their new position.

In the time of Swedish power ordinary people may well have felt that the realm of Sweden and the home country of Finland were their native land. Now only Finland remained to them, and though Russia could not be regarded as foreign, few can have taken it as their native land. When the map and the geography of Europe were discussed in the Finnish newspaper *Turun Wiikkosanomat* in 1821, it was said that east of Finland is Russia and north is Lapland. At that time Lapland was

undivided. At the Porvoo Diet it was made very clear that the whole Finnish population was being addressed as "the nation of Finland."

In the early and mid-19th century there were numerous peasant poets especially in central and eastern Finland. They used the metre of the Kalevala and combined verse writing with other work, but they also recited their poems to the public and were in touch with The Finnish Literary Society. They rejoiced in the foundation of this society and in its work for the benefit of folk poetry and the Finnish language. They also followed other happenings of their time, speaking in their poems of Finland and its various provinces and clans. When Paavo Korhonen (1775—1840) of Rautalampi wrote his poem "For the Defence of Savo" in 1822, he combined with Savo the people of Häme, Kainuu and Ostrobothnia, also mentioning "southmen", "coastmen" and "fine fellows from the central lands". Pietari Väänänen, a juryman from the Kuopio district, had attended the Norrköping Diet in 1800 and the Porvoo Diet in 1809. When he wrote a poem of praise to Alexander I he addressed it to "the Finns of Finland" saying that the Finnish people would bless the Grand Duke who had performed a great work for them. Väänänen wrote:

I say to Finland,  
Making my joy sound,  
playing the strings of the kantele.  
People of Savo, people of Kainuu,  
dwellers in Häme,  
lovable Carelians,  
let it sound in the lanes,  
let it echo in villages,  
instruments and song  
expressing your joy.

Paavo Tuovinen (1769—1827) wrote in verse of "the growth of the Finnish language", thanking Reinhold von Becker who in 1820 had started the production of Turun Wiikkosanomat and had written a Finnish grammar. Paavo Korhonen was also a follower of Turun Wiikkosanomat, as is clear from his verse. Pietari Makkonen (1785—1851) complained in a "song of rejoicing for the growth of the Finnish language" that this language "was not allowed in drawing rooms" but "was used

in poor villages, low huts, peasant homes, ploughmen's mansions." But then "a praiseworthy book society" began to teach "the orphan" who then "grew into a beautiful maiden" who "can now stand unsupported among the great in drawing rooms and splendid chambers." The farmer Antti Puhakka, a member of the Diet 1863—82, may have been thinking of the past in his poem about "Bad Boy Jussi" whose letters in Finnish were not received by officials. In 1847 he demanded an improvement and was himself engaged in political activity when in 1863 a statute was passed giving Finnish equality in principle with Swedish.

Had they national pride, those whose language was Finnish? They were modest in bearing, but showed signs of ability and the wish to learn. The popular song "We too deserve respect" written in 1816 by the educated official Jaakko Juteini, a farmer's son, may be regarded as symptomatic. Respect is deserved by the man who clears fields, capable in the work of peace and valiant in war, by the gentle, virtuous Finnish girl whose red cheeks the grey frost cannot pale, and by the learned Finn. Enlightenment has been kindled and new kanteles of Väinämöinen are made. Juteini's message has much of social import, at the same time bringing out the ordinary people of Finland, but he also aims at art, learning and enlightenment. On this basis in 19th century Finland great importance was acquired by the notion that the main task of a small nation is to take part in the development of human culture.

Finnish-language newspapers showed what information was offered to the people and what was the aim of development. In 1820 Reinhold von Becker, a teacher at Turku University, founded the newspaper *Turun Wiikkosanomat* (1820—31) specifically for farmers. It was printed in an edition of 1,000 and readers were difficult to find, which shows that reading was not a vigorous pursuit. It was read nevertheless and in this way information was spread. News was given of the countries of Europe, of Finnish geography and history and of Finno-Ugrian peoples. Thus, as it were, a place was sought for the Finns among the peoples of the world. Becker ordered a map from Stockholm, coloured it himself and distributed it to his readers. When Snellman in the 1840s founded "Maamiehen Ystävä" (Countryman's Friend) a map — this time of the world — was also considered important by that newspaper. The

mathematician Ernest Bonsdorff (born 1843) relates that in his childhood country people knew little of the ways of the world, but when they came to his father's vicarage the latter told them of events and also displayed a map. Popular educators seem to have wished to give the people an identity. When it was stated in a Swedish newspaper that country people should not be given the same information as the intelligentsia, the editor of Turun Wiikkosanomat — though urging that a dispute should be avoided — gave an assurance that enlightenment belonged to all. All are then children of "a common fatherland".

The newspaper also gave information on constitutional laws, on the birth of realms and forms of government and on the rights and duties of Finns. There may well have been national pride in the observation that the literacy of Finnish country dwellers was praised even in southern Europe. It was noted at the same time that Finnish peasants formed an Estate because they had political rights. A common language and constitutional laws were presented as the most valuable possession of a people. The message was social and nationalist in tone. The importance of patriotism was stressed. The period of Russian rule had started well with Finland becoming a state. A period of reaction from 1810 to the early 1850s was oppressive, but a gradual work of preparation came to fruition in the second half of the 19th century, a time of social reform and great nationalism at least in the intelligentsia and enlightened circles. The Kalevala had appeared in 1835, while Runeberg had written the tales of Vänrikki Stool and a national anthem in connection with them. The Finnish-language newspaper Suometar with an edition as high as 4,500 began to appear in 1847. The university was given a professor of the Finnish language, Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen wrote a textbook of Finnish history and Finnish elementary and secondary schools took root in the 1860s. Fennomania flamed forth in politics and education during the 1840s and against it the Swedish influence rose with equal fervour. The Finns began to develop their state institution with a trend so independent that the Russians began to accuse them of separatism. Connection with Russia was compulsory, forcing the Finns to be careful in their words and deeds, but the situation was not inspiring. What could so small a people do against the might of Russia? The Finns had a need, however, to speak of their own task in world



history — a strong indication of national consciousness — and the task they found was to work for education. A means of defence was to evolve their own way of life, society, science and art, and to make Finland known abroad.

The Kalevala had great importance in that sense, for the attention of the learned in great countries was now turned to the previously unknown Finnish people. To the Finnish intelligentsia it was a guarantee of their people's ability. To ordinary people too it was noteworthy because folk poetry still lived to some extent. In Finnish newspapers such as Lönnrot's *Mehiläinen* folk poems were published and there were tales of *Väinämöinen* and *Lemminkäinen*. The Kalevala provided great amounts of cultural material and a good deal of national self-confidence. However, Finland's independence in 1917 hardly depended on it. The nationalist movements were in no specific need of folk poetry. An institution of state and the national languages Finnish and Swedish were the prerequisites of independence. Finland and Russia had very little in common. The only uniting factor, in truth, was Russia's military and political interest. This in turn was a danger to Finland, as the periods of oppression (1899—1905, 1908—1917) showed. When the Finns spoke of "national independence" they were not thinking of revolt but of their autonomous status; undoubtedly, however, they were ready to secede from Russia if a suitable opportunity came.

Finland's intelligentsia was highly nationalist in favour of the Finnish state or the Finnish way of life. In most of the intelligentsia these halves united, which did not prevent supporters of nationalism from being cosmopolitan. Wide circles among Finnish speakers agreed with the attitude of intellectuals and officials. There had been an extraordinary increase in the level of education and in participation in politics and administration. In country and town people went to school, read newspapers and literature and engaged in social activity. Their success depended largely on the success of their own state, though the Russians had favoured emphasis on Finnish matters. In the first period of oppression attempts at russianization gave strength to political national consciousness where it had been weak. The result was the previously mentioned Great Address of 1899. Before that, perhaps, the Finnish way of life had in practice long been of supreme

importance to the people.

In 1845 Maamiehen Ystävä had deplored the fact that Finns gave their names a Swedish form when entering secondary school. Until the end of the 19th century first names were marked in church registers in the Swedish form. People themselves began officially to use them in the Finnish form. At least from the 1850s onward first names of Finnish origin started to be used. Especially popular were Väinö and Ilmari — names from the Kalevala. Also favoured were Toivo, Onni, Jalo, Lahja, Oiva, Armas. Surnames were also given a Finnish form, and on Snellman Day in 1906 about 100,000 surnames were so changed. This was a year of parliamentary reform. The first period of oppression had ended in 1905.

With Marxism and the labour movement at the beginning of the century came a more international outlook and indifference to nationalist issues. In reality Finnish socialists wished for the country's independence in 1917 though unhappy coincidences caused the civil war, in which the Reds took support from Soviet Russia and the Whites from Germany who had trained activists, that is rebels, the so-called Light Infantry, to fight against Russia. They were the elite troops of the battle for national liberation — eager university students and plain men — who were tragically involved in a civil war. Despite the wounds this caused and thanks to national integrality Finland fought as a united country in 1939.

# Matti Klinge

## Let us be Finns!

The rise of Finland's national culture in the 19th century provides an opportunity for analysing the factors that influence the shaping of a cultural form: the political structure and ties, the manifestations of isolation and special efforts to create a separate national culture and the circles of influence which participated in this active endeavour. The development of Finland in the 19th century is an example of the moulding of a culture from the starting point of a changing political status and subsequent withdrawal from the earlier cultural affinity. Even in broad terms, the role of such a change in status is important, if not decisive, and that for at least two reasons. One, to which I shall soon return with reference to Finland, is institutional separation from the cultural and administrative ties of the earlier political connection. The other event that occurs with a change in political status is independence or autonomy. This is essential, for the birth of a national culture is the distinct definition of the geopolitical development within which a national culture evolves. With the change in political status there comes a definition of the geographical basis in accordance with the natural prerequisites and especially the ethnic and traditional conditions on which the new culture is created.

The term people or nation is never so strictly circumscribed a concept as to be incontrovertible if based on ethnic or linguistic boundaries. We require a special political step which decides that these tribes or those regional units shall be separate while others fuse together. Knowledge of the culture and people to

which we must belong then spreads from above, from the centres and cultural institutions controlled by them. And this doctrine tends in quite a number of remote districts and frontier regions to oppose sharply local belief that the ethnically and linguistically close dwellers across the frontier are strangers while those who live far away in the centres are kin. The Catalans of southern France must turn their backs on the Catalans of northern Spain and their faces towards distant Paris, while the institutions on the other side of the frontier stress the importance of Madrid. The boundary has fixed the sphere in which each national culture has its being.

In Finnish conditions, this important change of status occurred in 1809 when under the Peace Treaty of Hamina a number of provinces listed by name were incorporated in Russia, and the victor had decided before the treaty was signed on its own institutions for the administrative area that was formed in this way. This area had never before constituted an administrative entity, though the main parts had from time to time been placed under a temporary common administration. A distinct but not precisely defined concept of "Finland" had already originated earlier. The traditional administrative, political and trading centre was Stockholm, capital of the centrally governed kingdom of Sweden. The frontier adjustment left on the Finnish side many Swedish-speaking ethnic groups and on the Swedish side a large Finnish settlement, and Lapland with its Lapps was also divided. On the eastern frontier, again, in relations with Russia, the new administrative area was enlarged with territories some of which had earlier belonged to the Swedish realm proper but had been detached in various phases, and some of which had never belonged to it or had been taken for a short time as the spoils of victory but had not come under the traditional Swedish-Finnish administration or enjoyed the political rights of the realm. But the greatest part of Russia's tribes that spoke Finnish or closely related languages was *not* incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Finland. Thus, the geographic formation of Finland left it with two ethnic minorities which are still distinguishable, the Swedish linguistic minority and the Orthodox religious minority of Karelia. Still beyond the new frontier were groups which might in one way or another have qualified for consideration when the regional entity of Finland

was formed. There is especial reason to refer to these features of regional determination when discussing Finland. In the ensuing debate later in the 19th century on the essence of national culture, a debate which retained a character of importance until World War II, there was a significant polarisation. On the one side there were those who stressed the role of the Swedish-speaking part of the people and emphasised western ties. On the other side there were those who in a sense used the Karelian population as a fulcrum for leveraging the argument on the national culture towards eastern origins.

The new geopolitical unit was not the only outcome of the separation of Finland from the Swedish realm. Sweden, too, was then born as the geographical entity which generations now have known. Although Norway was under the sovereignty of the King of Sweden, it retained its own administrative organs, language and institutions. A contrary situation existed in the bilingual Kingdom of Sweden which historians often call Sweden-Finland. The name depicts for present generations the size and boundaries of the realm. But in the search for false historical continuity it can readily lead us to forget — both sides have been guilty of this — that the conception of Sweden and Finland dates back to the year 1809. On the institutional level this is not immediately apparent for Sweden, for the old administration continued. In reality, the difference was enormous even at the institutional level, for the Revolution, the new constitution and the new royal house resting on French revolutionary traditions meant a sharp break from the old. But it is especially at the cultural level that an entirely new Sweden begins to emerge after 1809. The creation of an altogether new national spirit began there immediately under the lead of great and minor poets. Prior to 1809, Sweden with its Lapps, Finns, Swedes and Pomeranians was still in principle a small empire whose inhabitants were joined neither by language nor national spirit, but by a common ruler. The mental image of Sweden now is a national state, the birthplace of Vikings and peasant romanticism, propagation of the people and language. From as early as 1810 Geijer began to write and teach the history of the Swedish *people*. The historians before 1809 had been writing about the history of the *state* or kingdom of Sweden.

It must be remembered that the development of Sweden was of decisive importance for the birth of Finland's national culture. An essential initial feature of this culture can be seen in retrospect in the fact that the culture of the end of the 18th century by and large continued in Finland although it was so strongly renounced in Sweden. Thus, the national moulding of Finland starts largely and simply from isolation. It no longer follows the path signposted by its former centre. The Swedish language continued to be the cultural and administrative tongue in Finland. Swedish law and the Swedish constitution were preserved in Finland, but Sweden itself adopted a new form of government. The Swedish hymnbook was revised under the direction of romantic poet bishops soon after the separation. But the old Swedish hymnbook remained in official use in Finland for another half century. And so on.

It might be thought that this isolation — in a way without any effort on our part — from the former cultural contact which had given our culture a specific character was due solely to the poverty of Finnish cultural resources. The preservation of a cultural profile already regarded as obsolete in Sweden might be regarded as a phenomenon indicative of the withering of culture, its total inability to keep up with the times. Perhaps this was so to some extent. But a more essential consideration is that while Sweden plunged directly into the maelstrom of Romanticism — not only in the domain of art, literature and even politics, but also very manifestly in the humanistic, natural and medical sciences, as has been shown recently — Finland was incorporated in the Russian empire, where romantic idealism was not to have the same influence. The ideals of rationalism and neo-humanism of the age of Enlightenment were prevalent especially in the western capital of the realm, St. Petersburg. It was there that both the highest nobility of Finland set on a military career and the broad masses from eastern Finland in search of additional means of livelihood began to look. The population of St. Petersburg and its surrounding provinces had a nationally disparate character. German, Finnish and Lutheranism were as perceptible as Russian and Orthodoxy. The European languages and the cultural tradition of the age of Enlightenment set the trend in court circles and among the aristocracy. The new centre for Finland came to manifest expressly and at many levels the

influences of St. Petersburg which made a suitable continuation to Finland's own traditions of the enlightened age. The old political, administrative and even cultural centre had been Stockholm. There, too, a great part of the burghers had spoken German in the 17th and 18th centuries, and a large proportion of the lower classes, fishermen, maids and shippers of firewood had been Finnish. Both Stockholm and Leningrad (St. Petersburg) still have a Finnish church, fairly centrally located. Helsinki, the new centre of Finland's administrative organs and culture, was built to show imposingly and concretely to both foreigners and the Finns themselves that a separate political unit, Finland, had come into existence. The demonstratively built Helsinki was henceforth to be the centre to which the periphery of Finland was to look.

Romanticism in Sweden, Germany and England was already directed both in literature and in historical conception to idealisation of the German Middle Ages. But the monumental centre of Helsinki was created in conformity with the Petersburgian-Baltic neo-humanistic ideals. This "Empire" style, which spread everywhere through official blessing, became an essential mark of Finland and, thus, of Finnish culture. Romantic idealism was a weak current also in Finnish intellectual life. While the old university of Finland was still in Turku, a wave of German-Swedish romanticism was felt there in the 1810s, but it was attenuated even then by the vigour of the local neo-humanistic-rationalist tradition. When the university moved to Helsinki at the end of the 1820s both it and its influential intelligentsia began to express primarily neo-humanistic thinking. This, I would repeat, is particularly important when comparing Finland's development with Sweden's as an indicator of the differentiation of their mutual national culture.

The Finnish Literary Society was founded in Helsinki in 1831. Its aim was to spread knowledge of the motherland and its history, further the use of its tongue and develop literature in the Finnish language for both "educated compatriots" and the "lower classes". In its early years the Society defined its main objectives as follows:

1. The achievement of a Swedish or German translation of the *Kalevala*;
2. A compilation of Finnish mythology;

3. A clarification of the Finnish reflexive verb;
4. The production of a memorial publication in Finnish on Porthan;
5. A Finnish translation of Runeberg's poem "The Elk Hunters"; and
6. The compilation of a theory to establish whether Finnish poetry is based on the quantity or stress of the syllable.

The academic intelligentsia — the only one in the country — sought to begin the establishment of Finland's national culture. The cornerstones were historical research, study of the language and folklore, and dissemination of the *Kalevala* and *Elk Hunters*.

The *Kalevala* (1835) was Finland's national epic compiled by Lönnrot on classical lines from poems discovered in Russian Karelia. Its especial importance was that it laid the groundwork on which to build the national continuity — or rather an illusion of it — of Finnish culture. The active desire of the Finns to make the *Kalevala* known in foreign languages is natural against the background of this continuity of national culture. The *Kalevala* as it were legitimates the aspiration for a new national culture. This culture would not be artificial or constrained, for in addition to history and language it had a monument indicative of an ancient artistic culture of high standard.

The *Elk Hunters* of Runeberg portrayed the Finnish landscape and common men and women in the setting of antique bucolic ideals. Runeberg depicted the Finns as harmonious, balanced people, cheerful and content even in their poverty. This Arcadian idyl was the first and most profoundly effective Finnish patriotic portrait. It is of the essence that Runeberg's picture of Finland is decisively non-historical, based on neo-humanistic admiration for the people and scenery in which the ancient ideals of balance, moderation and harmony dominated. This view of the mother country was central still in the song *Our Land*, adopted as a national symbol in 1848, our national anthem which emphasises the aesthetic. Pljetnov, Rector of the University of St. Petersburg, kept in touch with Runeberg and wrote: "What could be more pleasant and useful than to travel in a country where the beauty of Nature is in harmony with the customs and civilisation of the people. Switzerland had something similiar



earlier. But now natural beauty has been spoilt by the horror stories of the Revolution. Yes, I am ready to believe that there is only one country in the world for you and me in which we can find our idea of happiness, and that is Finland. If I mastered the two languages spoken there, I would not hesitate to adopt that country as my motherland..." This passage dates from 1848, the year when stories of the horrors of the Revolution were despoiling natural beauty, to use Pljetnov's words. The beauty of Nature also covered man's Rousseauian freedom from corruption. And this brings us to the question of how imperial Russia viewed the idea of Finland's national culture.

The Russian attitude had been outlined before the Peace of Hamina. The preservation, unchanged but appropriately supplemented, of the religion, official language, legislation and administrative organs of Finland meant in itself abandonment of the idea of assimilation. It was never Russia's intention to russify Finland, make it a part of Russia. Finland was occupied as a marchland protecting St. Petersburg, a buffer against Sweden and its western allies. The approval of a special administrative system for the country and the emphasis on its political existence by building a separate capital make it clear that the creation of a national culture was also one of the government's aims. The birth of a national culture could not in any case be a negative phenomenon from the government's point of view, for it widened the separation from Sweden. A national culture would gain the people's loyalty and infuse it with a spirit of resistance to possible Swedish revanchism. Thus, in the government's view, both the *Elk Hunters* and *Kalevala* and the Finnish Literary Society were positive phenomena, and were supported. The government slowly but purposefully moved towards increasing command of the Finnish language among civil servants. In fact, knowledge of Finnish was made a requirement for some civil service examinations as early as in the 1840s after a lectorate in Finnish was established at the University in Helsinki in 1828. Research into Finnish-Ugric philology was begun at the St. Petersburg Academy of Science. The first professor of the Finnish language was appointed in 1850 in Helsinki, at a time when chairs in modern languages were still very rare in the world. Indeed, Finland had no chair in any other modern

language for over two decades. After certain vicissitudes, the position of Finnish alongside Swedish as an official language was confirmed by government initiative in 1863 even before the parliament that convened then requested it and before any other pressure was exerted on the government. These examples show the falsity of an assumption often made in earlier literature: that the attitude of the Russian government towards a national Finnish culture was negative. The government opposed all revolutionary trends and western political doctrines such as socialism and democracy, but it opposed nationalism only when it occurred in association with them, as it often did in 19th century Europe.

National and social thinking were combined in our country in the mid-1840s by Snellman. He was an opposition man during the reign of Nicholas I, but a government man and even a member of the domestic government under Alexander II. Snellman's great idea was the replacement of a bureaucratic society with a civic society, but in Finnish conditions broad participation demanded a change in the language situation. It is important in this connection to remember that Snellman's doctrine embraced not only education of the masses but also nationalisation of the educated class, i.e. gradual finnification. Snellman did not want to create a new leading stratum or élite by direct education of the people. He wished primarily to preserve the old élite, but to change its language. This endeavour was largely successful. The movement across class lines injected new blood into the leading element, but the old leadership comprising noble, bourgeois and particularly clerical families remained in charge until the country gained its independence and even long after that, until the end of World War II. This can be perceived from the lists of cabinet ministers or rolls of senior civil servants, for example. Even when an "outsider's" name appears, he was frequently linked by marriage, often very closely, with the upper class network of relations and, thus, with the net of traditions. It may perhaps be said that only the entry of the Agrarian Party leaders into the political leadership in connection with the gaining of independence infused a sizeable new force and agrarian emphasis into the élite. Because of their defeat in the Civil War of 1918 the working class had to wait until the time of World War II (cf. the Social Democrats in Sweden).

The upper or middle class of the stratum that was developing and moulding the national culture is clearly discernible in the pictorial arts and even in the literature. The dominant character in Finnish-language literature was Aleksis Kivi. He was familiar with the life of the people at their own level. He wrote his main works in the 1860s and 1870s, but was not widely known and recognised until the 20th century, in fact only when the upper and middle classes after the great political and intellectual transitional period embracing the General Strike of 1905 and the subsequent years were ready to abandon the Runebergian popular portrait for the realistic image of Kivi. The Finnish pictorial arts of the 1880s and 1890s produced a picture of the country and the people that until then had been drawn almost exclusively in words. It is typical that this picture of the native country was drawn very largely in Paris and for the most part mirrored the Runebergian harmonious idealism in the new media of bright colours inspired by the exoticism of Brittany and the fashion of Japan. It is symptomatic that one of the painters of this great period of our art, one who had been least instructed and was of humble social origin, participated hardly at all in portraying the landscape of his country. We can still see today, mostly through the lens of the camera, the Finnish landscape as the *fin de siècle* Finnish painters saw it. Runeberg in his landscape poems gave the painters of our golden era the guidelines to which "Kalevala" elements were added later. The art of painting thus remained for a long time, until the period of political transition to which reference was made earlier, an extension of the national cultural tradition that was shaped in the first half of the 19th century.

There are also artists and works which are suggestive of another line or part of our national culture, its aristocratic tradition. The thin ranks of the Finnish nobility went over to the victor readily in 1809 and immediately afterwards. They were prompted by the political development and new trend in Stockholm. There had been sympathy on the Finnish side earlier for the era of King Gustavus III and its leading personalities. Some leading Gustavians became central figures in Finland's new administrative organs. To them Alexander I was closer to Gustavus III, whom they missed, than was Gustavus's son, to say nothing of Bernadotte who was thrust

up by the Revolution. But the considerable rewards given to nobility also played a role in gaining general acquiescence and later loyalty. Moreover, noble titles continued to be bestowed fairly generously until 1905, whereas the practice had decreased in Sweden and other countries several decades earlier. Our very earliest nationalist movement originated with the Finnish aristocracy. This attitude had hardly any literary or linguistic influence, but it created a firm national tradition in the administrative sphere, the civil service and monarchic loyalty, and gained success when its members took service with the Russian army. Representatives of this aristocratic national tradition of ours are Count Rehbinder and Count Armfelt, both Minister Secretaries of State, Senator Baron von Haartman, the painter Albert Edelfelt, Marshal of Finland Baron Mannerheim, and many cabinet ministers and statesmen of independent Finland.

A part of this aristocratic tradition fused with the liberal trend which spread to Finland in the 1850s and flowered with the beginning of regular parliamentary meetings in 1863. The liberal group approved of the Runebergian idea of the native country and people, but wished to add historical elements to it. Runeberg himself had begun later to fix attention on them, especially in Part II of the *Tales of Ensign Ståhl* which appeared in 1860. The liberal concept of history emphasised the continuity of Finland's institutions, law, culture and parliament, even the continuity of religion which bound Finland with Sweden and with the west in general. In the liberal optimistic view of history, the institutional and cultural germanisation of the Finns was progress, movement towards a higher form of culture. The Swedish regime was accorded a positive colouring and contrasted especially with the bureaucratic censorship of the reign of Nicholas. Pursuing this view of history, the liberals revived memories of the war of 1808—1809 so strongly that the Russians were annoyed.

The liberal trend was connected with the restructuring of the economy. The forest industry gained momentum in the 1860s and 1870s, foreign trade expanded considerably, the railways enlarged the opportunities for trade, legislation opened the way to the establishment of limited liability companies, private banks and the industrial use of labour, together with freedom of trade. The liberal tradition eventually had a long-term

influence on our national culture in the sciences and arts, politics and the economy. We might even say that Finnish urban culture has continued this tradition both spiritually and materially. It has supported the traditions of the Finnish Press. The liberal trend cannot be judged solely against the influence of the political party that represented it, the so-called Swedish Party. For the development of the national culture 19th century liberalism was a power group which stressed the role of institutions and history and stood for the continuity of western influence. Working under its wings for a long time was a weak Sweden-oriented trend which did not really come into the open until the parliamentary reform of 1906. But nor has the Swedish People's Party, which is small, ever been a group of Swedish nationalists proper; aristocratic and liberal traditions have been more important in it. The 19th century liberals had no aspiration to build a unilingual national culture. What they wanted was a culture which both linguistic groups could share. It favoured, not opposed, the advance of the Finnish language, but did not regard any language as the sole or even salient attribute of the national culture.

If liberalism was the cultural trend of the progressing bourgeoisie and towns, its counterweight from the 1860s on was the Fennomania which stressed agrarian values and found its political support in the traditional rural community, among the farmers and the clergy. This trend gave itself out to be nationalist and saw the moral and material values of traditional rural society as the underpinning of the national culture. The ideal was the independent, land-owning farmer, a living witness to ancient agrarian continuity, a Finnish independence free as it were of external political events. The leader of the movement, Yrjö-Koskinen, developed a new historical view, the history of the Finnish *people*, in which the past was explained in the light of the needs that had led to the growth and strengthening of Finnish nationalism. Yrjö-Koskinen wanted to create historical continuity for the Finnish-language culture which the Fennomans were building up and which was understood as national. Thus, Fennomania turned against emphasising external influence and its manifestations, especially western influences which were stronger in the prevailing cultural climate than the rather negligible eastern currents. Indeed, Fennomania was ready to approach Russia

and the Russians with a view to displacing the liberal Swedish-language elements. A part of the Fennomane youth saw their movement as socially binding and approached the line represented by the Russian Populists (Narodnichestvo).

However, the Fennomane vision of a rural society left a large part of the population on the sidelines. This sector was the rural proletariat, the surplus population, some of who moved around the turn of the century to the cities and emigrated to Russia and America. Similarly, the urban proletariat was excluded from this shaping of the national culture. The importance of these groups was not revealed until the General Strike of 1905 and the first elections by universal suffrage in which the socialists unexpectedly gained almost half the votes. At this juncture, the national culture was split by internal suspicion which was darkened, too, by stiffening Russian policy. Finland's quiet but distinctly advancing economic and cultural independence had made it questionable whether, in the changed international situation of the 1890s, the country was any longer the loyal buffer state envisaged in 1809. Opposition to the more aggressive policy of the Russians led at the turn of the century to intensified education and propaganda aimed at gathering broad strata of the population into the fold of united opinion. Enormous quantities of legal and historical pamphlets and Runeberg's poetry were distributed. After the first parliamentary elections, it was felt that the intellectual grounds for this activity had ceased to exist, though there was no change in Russian policy. Only after the Civil War of 1918 and after the rural leaders assumed public prominence was it possible cautiously to recommence the revival of the Runebergian picture of the people that had been put aside in 1905 and 1907. But there emerged at the same time other proposals for the groundwork of a national culture.

National culture is, of course, a concept that is under constant revision. But it does include the information and traditions essentially common to the people or a great part of the people, common explanations of the national character, landscape and history, unanimity on certain values.

For Finland, the creation of these common values and traditions really began after 1809. The primary connecting link between citizens both in our country and elsewhere was for long the suzerainty of the same ruler, the same semi-religious

respect for the monarchy which was the cement that held the people together regardless of language, tribe, religion and even social class. On this foundation arose new structures of common identification which were then consolidated by the school system into a code of fundamental national knowledge. To a Finland without history came first the *Kalevala* and the peasant idyl, Runeberg's lyrics of the folk and the land, gradually other literature of its own. Then came a national anthem, its own monuments to Porthan, Runeberg and Alexander II, the Press and the railway system. It acquired its own capital and administrative organs, then its own monetary unit, parliament and, finally, universal suffrage. The great triad of Runeberg-Snellman-Lönnrot was canonised. A history was written which linked the people who had been contained within a given regional frame since 1809 with the twilight of antiquity. It learnt the lesson contained in the aims of Alexander I when he said in 1809 that Finland had been raised to the rank of a nation. Hence the demand for a national consciousness: "Swedes we are no longer, Russian we cannot become; let us be Finns". It is a theme that has been expressed with many variations, first in the letters and exhortations of the aristocracy, then in the writings of the intelligentsia. It was voiced by swelling numbers of Fennomans and liberals. Finally, it was uttered from the lips of thousands of elementary school children, heard in the patriotic songs of countless choirs and in many other connections, with different nuances and in different forms.





Fortunato Minniti

# The role of the armed forces in national politics (1887—1914)

## 1. Chosing a date

In order to define the role the armed forces have played in national policy between the 19th and 20th century we must analyze the ways in which such forces have contributed to Italian life and, after considering the most important periods, choose a date from which to start our discussions. In this respect 1887 seems to me to be the most apt, mainly because it is equidistant between the establishment of the armed forces of the Unified State and their participation in the World War, the first difficult, long-term test to which they were subjected. However, my interest lies not so much in an analysis of dates as in the type of experience gained and the transformations undergone by army and navy after 26 years of life and after a very disappointing test in the field (1866).

The army was reformed on the basis of the Prussian model (1871—1875); the problem of its command was solved in 1882 and at the same time the greatest continental military power, Germany, and its eternal enemy, Austria-Hungary, showed (however relatively and indirectly) that they esteemed its quality and capacity by entering into a political alliance with Italy, an alliance which could at any moment entail serious

military commitment. Moreover, the army had already set foot in Africa (1885) and, despite serious conflicts in that continent (1887), its German ally was about to entrust a whole sector of its Rhine front to the Italian armed forces (composed of 10 to 12 infantry and 2 to 3 cavalry divisions) in the likelihood of a war with France (1888).

The navy was in full evolution: new types of ships had been adopted (battleships, cruisers, destroyers) and a second plan of development was rapidly being prepared (1887).

The armed forces, besides, could also avail themselves of the first production of the national war industry (1884—1886). They were, therefore, at the peak of a period of expansion which was well backed by an increase in military spending after sufficiently thorough tests of structures, capacity and obligations had been made. This strategic arrangement was to remain substantially unchanged until 1908.

## 2. The numbers and their significance

First of all, what was the composition and the strength of the army and the navy?

The Bertolé-Viale law was rapidly approved in the first half of 1887 and closed the large cycle of organic reforms based on the principle of obligatory military service. Such reforms begun by Ricotti and continued by Ferrero, brought the number of front-line armed regiments to 115 in respect of the infantry (of which 12 were for attack — 'Bersaglieri', and 7 were mountain troops — 'Alpini') and to 24 in respect of the cavalry. Special troops consisted of 43 regiments of artillery (5 for garrisons, 1 for mountain operations and 1 mounted) and 4 regiments of engineers. With the addition of a numerous following of service troops (medical, veterinary, disciplinary, accountancy) and specialized personnel (military magistrates, geographers, topographers, pharmacists, teachers, technicians) these forces were governed and administered by 14,208 officers, almost 11,000 of them trained in combat, and 1,032 specialists. Above this was an 'elite' of 479 generals and colonels. All of the foregoing was divided into 12 army corps (each with 2 divisions of infantry, 2 regiments of artillery, 1 regiment of

Bersaglieri, 1 regiment of cavalry and service troops), 6 regiments of cavalry and 7 regiments of alpine forces. In Africa another infantry brigade was stationed, reinforced from the other troops and composed of volunteers. In the case of war another 3 army corps, formed of the youngest soldiers finishing service and in the charge of officers in active service, could be called up. At the end of the period under consideration, the army was strengthened mainly by an increase in artillery and corps of engineers (with the addition of 10 and 2 regiments respectively) while for cavalry and alpine troops the increase (of 5 and 1 regiment respectively) was obtained by reducing the number of squadrons and companies which composed them. The 6 brigades of cavalry were grouped into 3 divisions together with 12 corps of active armed troops divided into 4 armies whose command was already established. The substance and upper echelons of the corps of officers remained substantially unchanged, but there was a significant increase in favour of the artillery (585 extra officers, of whom 13 were colonels).

The navy in 1890 consisted of 273 ships, total tonnage 311,923, armed with 587 items of artillery. There were a mere 736 captains and 247 assistant engineers and machinists. More than 20 years later (1911), the navy possessed 342 ships, total tonnage 506,755, armed with at least 1,939 items of artillery. Captains numbered 999 and assistant engineers and machinists 411.

As you can see, this was quite an impressive complex which could bring considerable pressure to bear the military equilibrium of Europe. A pressure which increased in direct proportion to the use of offensive strategies, since the number of large units was certainly disproportionate to the requirements of the Italian war theatre. The simple defence of Italy's borders, in fact, required less. In particular the North-Western Alpine arc (which for 30 years was held to be the most likely theatre for war) only permitted the marshalling and manoeuvre of 5—6 armed corps. But an important point must be made. Despite the fact that the navy was undergoing a period of intense development the nature of the fleet was not such as to rival the French (while it was more than sufficient to confront the Austrian). Now, politicians, army and navy were all well aware of Italy's naval weakness and of how this would

affect its land forces: landings on some points of the Tuscan coast could easily take by surprise all the defensive battalions stationed on the Paduan plain, at the foot of the Alps and among the mountains. The very capital itself was exposed to sea attack; and finally, for mobilization, long stretches of railway line ran along the coast. These fears, not unreasonable nor unfounded, originated from the fact that an entire army, in case of war, had to be assigned to the defence of the most exposed points of the peninsula. Here the naval forces were insufficient to guarantee safety either directly, given the extent of the coast, or, more importantly, indirectly, having to cruise in open sea in order to drive away the enemy fleet. But since such a duty of defence was mainly entrusted to corps of reserves, 12 active corps were always available for defence alone.

### 3. Reasons for lack of balance

Most of the resources destined for military expenditure obviously went to the army. Only 18.80 % of effective expenditure was reserved for the navy in the first 10 years after Unification, falling to 16.66 % in the second decade and rising to 23,31 % in the third. This increase was enough to ensure a great improvement in the quality of Italy's fleet so that, although only for a few years, it was ranked third in the world after the British and French. The moment in which expenditure on the navy was increased in relation to the rest of the armed forces can be dated to the mid-1880s (when it reached 25 %). At the end of the century it exceeded 30 % and this level was maintained for the first 5 years of the new century. Between 1906 and 1913 the percentage rose to 35 % and finally 43 %.

However, land forces have always been a determining factor in Italian military arrangements. A factor which can be described as characteristic, because if one speaks of the role of the armed forces in the life of a country one principally has to speak of the army, and this may come as a surprise to those who consider, as we must, the geography of Italy. Although Italy has a relatively narrow and easily defended territorial border (apart from a small section of the Eastern frontier), she

has a very extensive shoreline which is completely unsafe. In spite of this, the State's military structures are markedly terrestrial in nature. The relatively small naval budget is explained by the logic of army 'privilege', which I will here explain.

Why, I ask myself, in a country surrounded on almost all sides by the Mediterranean, is the army considered so much more important than the navy? The reason I can offer, without going too far back in time, is three-fold. Firstly the conditions in which the Unification of Italy was achieved, through a process directed by a State, the Kingdom of Sardegnna, whose politico-military traditions were of a strictly continental nature; the ravages of war and attacks of a decidedly terrestrial nature; the opposition, finally, of a power, the Habsburg Empire, which only looked onto a landlocked sea, the Adriatic. Secondly, we must bear in mind the lack of confidence which the navy inspired and inspires in political parties — a navy which in practice arose from a mechanical lumping together of the fleets and officers of two very different states: Sardinia and that of the two Sicilies, which were shortly to be shaken by a major defeat. Thirdly, for 20 years the new State had lacked its own strategy of expansionist policy while the policies that prevailed were those dictated by the need to coordinate and preserve the recent unity, threatened during the whole of the 1860s by a single hostile country, Austria-Hungary, and then by two when France joined the former. Only in the 1860s did the maritime element become an essential component in Italian defensive strategy, but it was then not given all the consideration it deserved. In the early years of the 1870s, in comparison with the large-scale reforms of the army, the modernization of the navy (carried out thanks to an extraordinary man, Benedetto Brin who will be influential in this field for the next 20 years) aroused less interest because it was of less social and political importance. In the middle of the 1880s a different attitude was taken, but the prevalent mentality of the past lingered stubbornly on and this, coupled with the weakness of the armament industries, prevented faster progress from being made.

## 4. Power and Strategies

Having remarked on the characteristics of the armed forces we must now ask ourselves what their effective value was, resulting from their degree of (theoretical) power and (practical) reliability. The value, that is, that political and governmental powers could rely on if forced to decide between war and peace, diplomacy and use of force. In other words, how did the army and navy figure as a deterrent and what chances of success did they have if they actually had to be employed? Since the armed forces were certainly quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient for defensive use, I would reply to the first question by saying that their threat potential was indisputable, though more toward Austria-Hungary than France given the inferiority of the fleet. I am less convinced of their chances of success if actually called upon to attack on account of the time needed for mobilization — which usually took about a month — but also because of the difficulties which the terrain presented close to the frontier — which was a disadvantage to attackers but aided the defence. In fact, it is true that the adoption of an offensive strategy in the case of war with France was subordinate to an alliance with other powers.

The Italian armed forces had also been tried out (against Austria) in coalition with the French and Prussians. The military convention of 1888 provided, as we have said, that about half the Italian army should fight on the Franco-German front (utilizing these troops to the full in an explicit recognition of their efficiency). From a naval point of view it was necessary to wait until 1900. An agreement on balance of forces was made with the Austrians in Italy's favour, allowing the release of her fleet from the defence of the Adriatic basin and successively (1913) from that of the Ionian.

Anti-French alternative strategies to the sending of forces into Germany through Austria were elaborated by the Italian General Staff both before and after the convention of '88. But the obstacle presented by the Alps and various fortifications always rendered plans in this direction dangerous to such an extent that even the violation of Swiss neutrality in the event of Austrian opposition to the transit of Italian forces through

its territory (1900—1907) and the possibility of a landing in Provence (1912) were studied. The Convention was thus based on a very precise, carefully prepared and continually updated strategy whose only weak point was more political than military, that is the attitude of Austria-Hungary.

The *latent reasons* for the opposition of the Empire to Italy not only rendered the application of the Convention dubious at some times but also induced the Italian state to prepare 6 plans of war (between 1885 and 1913) despite the alliance. These, which all centred around the Trentino "wedge" along whose sides the Italian troops were to be marshalled, provided for a decisive battle in the Trentino as a necessary first step prior to an offensive beyond the river Isonzo. The last two plans (1909 and 1913) together with a seventh prepared in 1914 to reinforce the system of fortifications along the Eastern front, were precautions taken in a different politico-strategic situation from the previous one in that Austria-Hungary was again considered hostile.

All things considered, I think it is quite clear that the Triple Alliance was a very efficient protective measure against both Austria-Hungary and France. It also seems clear that the armed forces' influence in attaining a high level of Italian security was very important and represented their most valid contribution to foreign policy.

## 5. Internal Order

Of equal importance, however, was their influence on home affairs. Governments, in fact, found the army to be a responsive and safe instrument with which to keep public order. In the first decade following Unification it was used in repeated, large-scale and complex operations (stamping out southern brigand activity and uprisings, also in search-operations) and in the normal keeping of public order. In the 1890s the army's assistance was required in a task which was a direct result of this, when a state of siege was proclaimed in Sicily in 1894; four years later it was again required to reaffirm the State's authority in Milan, half of Lombardy, Tuscany and Naples. But no longer, as in the 1860s, with the general consent of all politicians.

The harshness of the repression appeared, in fact, to some of them, and not only the left, to be out of all proportion to the danger of the demonstrations. So much so that the military lost a considerable amount of popular and also bourgeois support — support which had already been shaken by the African wars and which had never failed before in difficult moments.

The keeping of public order, though important, was only one of the daily duties of commands and troops working at the orders of the political authorities. Nor was it always a popular duty. Troops were frequently called upon to assist the populace not only in cases of great calamity but also in smaller incidents: providing a means of contact between army and country which we will expand upon later. The impression from what I have so far said that the armed forces were completely subordinate to the political powers in external, internal and civil defense leads me first of all to approach the crucial problem of the relationship between politics and army.

## 6. Political Influence

The figure of the military officer has always been held in respect by the public (only in a moment of deep crisis at the turn of the century did this esteem waver when the enrolment of cadres lagged and resignations abounded, coinciding with the significant changeover from upper to middle class as provider of new officers); the ruling class considered the armed forces, which had already been the instrument of national unification, to be the ultimate guarantee of the State's internal and external unity. Precisely as such they could not fail to have a political influence, and I think it possible to define this by looking at the changes in balance of power at the top of the military hierarchy and between the latter and the Government.

The nomination of the Army's Chief of Staff was technically at least ten years late because of the pre-existing structure of command of the Savoy monarchy: the Minister of War was responsible both politically and technically since the Sovereign was Chief Commander. When the appointment of a Chief of Staff could no longer be delayed — in the context of bringing Italian military systems into line with European — the relevant



legislation was ambiguous, but the division of power with the creation of two authorities — political (Minister), and technical (Chief of Staff) — was established. It is difficult to say when the latter became more prominent than the former, but it was certainly the case in the early 1890s, and in 1900 Chief of Staff was officially, not only in fact (as was already the case at the end of the 1880s) responsible for the preparation of war plans and military agreements with allies, always of course, with the Sovereign's agreement.

Still later came the creation of a Chief of Staff of the Navy. There had been a Chief Research Officer dealing with "war preparations" working at the orders of the Minister of the "Superior Navy Council" (a collegiate body) from 1884 to 1889 who then, from 1889 to 1907, operated inside the Ministerial structure (in a "State and Cabinet Office".) Only in 1907 did the Chief become autonomous upon a redefinition of the responsibilities of the various ministerial offices and upper echelons of the hierarchy (Committee of Admirals), possibly because of the larger scope given by the navy to collegiate institutions, which, in the army, were only introduced much later.

A "Civil" Minister of War was appointed in 1908 while a parliamentary commission was enquiring into the functioning of the institution. But this was a much smaller concession ("Army Council") than the Navy's, since the determining elements were merely the Chief of Staff and the four army commanders. The Minister, although Chairman, had no right to vote; neither had the President of the Council of Ministers at the "Supreme Joint Commission for the Defence of the State" (created in 1899), whose President was always a member of the House of Savoy.

The years 1907—1908 thus also represent a turning point in politico-military operations. Lying behind the Executive and Legislative Committees' system of control of military organizations was a recognition of the clear difference between the two fields of responsibility, political and military, that had been created. Such a division quickly became worlds apart on conclusion of the process which I have placed as beginning at the *start* of the 1880s. Such a process had inevitably been put in motion, on the one hand, by the influence of increased technology on the military profession, that is by its spe-

cialization, and on the other by the progressive growth of a society which was becoming more and more divided into military and political élites. There were obvious signs that Society had assumed different positions from those of the 2nd half of the 19th century — thanks also to the development of forces which were hostile to the liberal system of politics and the institutions thereto related.

Long before 1908 the most important military men, although remaining obedient to the political power as regards employment of forces (thus precluding the problem of militarism for Italy), were able to reject any direct influence (felt to be "extraneous") of politicians in the carrying out of the 'home' affairs of their institutions. This separation had great political significance because it showed that in the running of the State the armed forces played a role that was certainly greater than that of the Legal and Administrative bodies. This was not only on account of their sensitive function but also because of their social importance. (At least 200,000 people at the beginning of the century depended on this profession against 330,000 in all other public bodies). The higher grades were in direct and constant contact with the Sovereign — although without constituting a "Crown Party". However, since the armed forces did not have an autonomous political role and a certain number of their personnel participated in both governmental and opposition positions in politics, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, the separation was not politically destabilizing. The authority of the Executive and Legislative Committee was not threatened. Politicians, however, ended up by granting the military powers complete autonomy of choice both in governing the cadres and in solving problems of a not necessarily technical nature. This allowed them to maintain a high level of cohesion in the officer corps, permitting individual opinions to be expressed but forbidding the formation by officers of movements in support of different causes which might lead to factions or groups in conflict with the administration. There had been the case of a so-called "Modernistic" movement led by a subaltern officer in 1903 who had voiced the discontent of the more junior ranks of officers and non-commissioned officers encountering in this the almost immediate hostility of the military hierarchy.

The main consequence of this separation thus lay in the fact

that not only the Executive Committee (also through the redimensioning of the role of Minister) but also, as a result, the Legislative Committee, lost their chance of directly participating in decisions relating to the most important matters. All that was left them respectively was the presentation of such ideas to the politicians or the approval or rejection of them by voting accordingly.

As you can see, the influence exerted by the armed forces was enormous and the relationship between the hierarchy and politicians, founded on an increasingly sharp distinction in duties, functioned smoothly so long as neither of the two parties changed its basic composition. And in the post-war period it was always the politicians who changed position, while the armed forces adapted to such a change to symbolize their basic continuity.

## 7. Their Influence on Society

But the Italian military institution did not exist merely in relation to politics, which in this period (up to 1913) was the expression of a limited few. It also functioned in respect to those citizens who were excluded from political life. Its impact on society took place through compulsory military service which meant, for society, the form of a draft. Compulsory service, however, did not yet mean for the Italian State that all men judged fit and of drafting age could or had to do service. In addition to numerous exceptions and rejections on health grounds, the call-up, for financial reasons, of a small number (chosen by lottery) of the eligible category reduced the number of conscripted and trained men to a quarter of the whole in the 1880s. Such a proportion, which rose by a small percentage in the early 1890s, began to drop at the end of the decade, and was drastically reduced in the first 5 years of the 1900s. It then began to rise and reached 34.46 % in 1914. Thus the proportion of men performing military service rose from a quarter to just over a third. This was not very high, and even allowed the drafting of over one million conscripts who had been declared unfit (at least half of them from the more elderly categories) during the war years. The influence exerted by compulsory

military service does not, therefore, seem so serious, especially if one considers that it was not equally distributed through the regions of Italy. The South and the Islands contributed on a smaller scale than other regions, mainly because of increasingly massive emigration, but also — undeniably — through the people's feeling of complete alienation to the State. These very same reasons were probably responsible for the whole phenomenon of draft-evaders which in the middle of the 1880s rose constantly, until from just under 3 % it reached 10 % in 1911 and 12 % in 1915.

If we consider, as we must, compulsory military service as a symbol — and for many years the only one — of the active participation of citizens in the life of the State, we are forced to conclude that neither the lower, higher nor middle classes could accept it or were willing to oblige. In particular the latter were disinclined to take advantage of one year's military service (as from 1871) to keep professional cadres in their jobs and thus establish a more efficient communication between civilian society and the military institution.

## 8. The Economic Burden

A fact of undeniable importance on both a political and economic level was that in the period from Unification to the eve of the First World War, governments allotted an average of 25 % of the State's budget to the armed forces. This equalled half the amount available for intervention in key sectors of the country's life (in that payment of interest on the public debt and administrative expenses inexorably eroded the other half of the budget). Amongst other things, it shows us in economic terms the importance that the ruling class placed on the armed forces and how anxious they were that such a percentage should not rise by 5—10 % so as to jeopardise the economic and financial equilibrium of the country. There were two periods — the end of the 1880s and the period between 1906 and the war — when military funds were more readily available than usual, and this was mainly during the deep crisis of the 1890s.

The question which is often asked is whether this fluctuating

but continuous movement of resources was or was not an efficient stimulus for economic development through the active demand for goods and services it activated. In particular, in this period, acquisition of industrial materials shifted from the external to the internal market for goods with high technological content (large and medium artillery, ship's motors, steel plates for battleships). When, in fact, the Navy wanted to rid itself of foreign dependence it directly and indirectly caused the growth or birth of private iron and steel industries, private mechanical and naval industries — including those founded on foreign capital like Terni, Armstrong, Ansaldo, Guppy, Vickers-Terni — while the Army's demand could primarily be satisfied by a similar number of state-owned arsenals, factories and plants. The army's demand, in fact, was only later directed to private war industries.

Ultimately the industries to benefit from military expenditure were the iron and steel, mechanical, chemical (whether private or State-owned) and "traditional" leather and wood industries, together with construction and various tertiary components. A young and brilliant scholar and writer, Francesco Saverio Nitti, lamented in this respect that the benefits were not equally distributed and were to the South's disadvantage. It is also indisputable that there was a disproportion as regards the size of the sectors and plants, and the characteristics of the technologies used; these were marketing considerations which showed the Unified State to be the purchaser of the products of one, or very few producers. However, I think I may conclude by saying that the advantages on the whole outweighed the disadvantages.

## 9. The "National" Army

The close link between the armed forces and the nation thanks to the former's participation in the achievement of Unification and, more precisely, because of the determining influence they had had in wars and armed encounters throughout the period did not weaken as time passed. Their participation in national politics was, for better or worse, intense. International relationships and the internal security of the State — to the

extent that it was determined by politicians — could not do without their intervention. Their presence was marked in both society and economy. And their progressive independence from politics, which had definitely been brought about by Adua and the states of siege between 1894 and 1898, meant that although the public eye lost sight of them their relationship with the nation was certainly not severed. In fact, the cadres' education and system of values and the indoctrination of the troops always found constant application in the nation, or, to use an all-embracing term, homeland (*Patria*), which united people and dynasty rather than the more sober term State (with its political overtones). Consequently it is not surprising that the armed forces represented the professional class socially more exposed to the influence of nationalist ideology.

This was so for a variety of reasons such as mutual recognition of traditions and the national ethos; mutual aspiration to national power; respect for the principle of hierarchy; attitude towards industrialization, which was seen, contradictorily, with suspicion (as a subverter of social traditions and with regard to tested and "safe" war weapons) and also with fervour (as a promoter of development and new war techniques which could give material superiority); and finally, on account of the state of political ill-being for nationalism and of technical-professional, social and economic ill-being for the armed forces.

To these common values we must add the obvious 'nationalist' recognition of the armed forces, the military stronghold of the nation, and the adoption of a military program (formulated by an officer in service with the authorization of his superiors) which did not basically move away from the objectives of the Army's Staff and which was therefore directed at strengthening military preparations on the land and sea borders with Austria.

However, on the whole the cadres and their higher echelons did not openly side, as an institution, with the nationalists nor could they do so. There were many reasons: first of all their "need to be separate", fruit of their detachment from the political world; then the tendency of the nationalist movement to transform itself from a movement of the élite into a movement of the masses, towards which hierarchies are always diffident; also unattractive was the presence in the movement

of promoters and followers of "dissident" military policies: (some "modernists" and Enrico Barone). Finally, the myth of Italy as a Great Power did not find much following in the armed forces. This was so because recent results on the battlefield did not permit it, nor did the possibility of employment of these forces in a future large-scale international conflict, subject as Italy was, after all, to an alliance; nor, for the moment, did the memory of having laboriously climbed up the hill since 1906 and the daily difficulties encountered in doing so. All this did not allow the armed forces to assume that attitude of trust and abandonment to a glorious past and future which nationalism required of its followers.

If, however, the armed forces could not adhere to the movement they could at least regard it with sympathy. Nor, let us be clear, did the nationalists desire otherwise. For a qualified representative of the movement like Luigi Federzoni the army, in fact, should be "independent of the nature of the State it is called to defend; it need be only national; The Army must know how to keep quiet and do nothing else but keep quiet." Political silence was thus the great virtue of this "national" army (a virtue which in reality was not imposed but derived from its character and its most recent past, not to mention — as we now know — its future). Such an army largely replaced the "Risorgimento" army when the men of the 1840 generation retired from the scene — the last generation to have a direct experience of the facts and passions of that great period when the armed forces too, along with the politicians, turned a nation into a State. In comparison things are quite different for the armed forces now, when the prevailing trend is to reject the political content of the life of the State, thus impoverishing the armed forces' very relationship with the nation and reducing it to a simple defence of dynasty and territorial integrity, interior order and the attainment of an abstract power in an international field.





Alberto Monticone

# Probleme und Perspektiven einer Kulturgeschichte des italienischen Volkes während des Ersten Weltkrieges

Meine kurzen und allgemeinen Betrachtungen gehen — ausser von einem persönlichen Interesse — von zweierlei Beobachtungen aus, die sich beim Überfliegen der Geschichtsschreibung über den Ersten Weltkrieg machen lassen: einerseits ist ein Punkt erreicht worden, an dem eine Kulturgeschichte der unteren Volksschichten fällig scheint, andererseits wurde jedoch deutlich, dass der Wille zur Inangriffnahme einer Geschichte der Gesellschaft in ihrem alltäglichen Ablauf weitgehend fehlt. Es hat sich nahezu ein Widerspruch gebildet zwischen einem vielfältigen Anstoss zur Schreibung einer Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges aus der Sicht des Volkes und der Unentschlossenheit, die Untersuchungen dazu mit einer für andere Epochen der italienischen Geschichte gültigen Methode auszuführen. Es handelt sich augenscheinlich nicht bloss um — sicherlich vorhandene — Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf das Quellenmaterial, sondern auch um eine gewisse Voreingenommenheit, die man

— sei es auch nur rückwirkend — der Bedeutung der damaligen Ereignisse und den zahlreichen, in der bürgerlichen Kultur und im Volke entstandenen Mythen zuzuschreiben hat.

Um aus der durch diese Mythen geschaffenen Voreingenommenheit herauszufinden, sollte man vor allem vermeiden, diese zu bekämpfen, stattdessen wäre in Geschichtsschreibung und Forschung an die Ausarbeitung einer dem Objekt der Untersuchung angepassten und dem heutigen Geschichtsverständnis entsprechenden Arbeitsmethode zu gehen. Ich meine damit eine Geschichte, die das tägliche Leben einzelner Menschen oder Gruppen (vor allem von Familienverbänden) berücksichtigt, die die Beziehungen zwischen den historischen Ereignissen und den alltäglichen Vorgängen des menschlichen Lebens aufzeigt und die die wechselseitigen Einflüsse des Alltäglichen und der Politik beleuchtet, kurz die Darstellung der Umrisse der Volkskultur und der darin zu beobachtenden Veränderungen im Italien zwischen Giuliotti, Salandra und Mussolini.

Bei dieser Betrachtungsweise erweist es sich als nötig, zuerst für das Jahr 1915 die Formen und das Ausmass des Patriotismus in den unteren Schichten des Volkes festzustellen, das heisst die Auswirkungen und den Grad der Übernahme der in den vorangegangenen zwei Jahrzehnten propagierten patriotischen Ideen zu erfassen. Allerdings schenkte die bisherige Geschichtsschreibung den Quellen, die diesen Vorgang der Propagierung des Patriotismus von oben und dessen Übernahme durch die unteren Schichten beleuchten, wenig Aufmerksamkeit. Viele Fragen über die Zusammenhänge zwischen dem Nationalismus und Patriotismus der herrschenden Klassen und der Aufnahme dieser Ideen in den unteren Volksschichten sind bis heute nur unzureichend beantwortet. Im folgenden ein rasch zusammengestellter Katalog von Fragen, die miteinzubeziehen wären in eine solche Untersuchung: die territoriale Ausdehnung des italienischen Staates; die Idee der "Italianità" selbst; die Auswanderung und ihre Wirkung auf die Idee der Italianità; der König; der Begriff des Feindes (der Österreicher, der Deutsche oder der Negus, der Schwarze, der Andere); die territoriale Expansion mit dem Ziel der Gewinnung neuen Kulturlandes; die Funktion der Frau im Patriotismus (Mutter von zukünftigen Soldaten, Erzieherin); die Idee des Krieges und des Kriegsdienstes als Virilitätsbeweis; die Wirkung der Uniformen, der Fanfaren, der Nationalfeiertage usw. Man könnte diese Li-

ste natürlich fortsetzen und die tieferen Schichten in der Mentalität des Volkes zu erforschen suchen, aber wichtiger scheint die Erkenntnis, dass eine neue Methode zusammen mit einem neuen Geschichtsverständnis zu den für eine gültige Antwort brauchbarsten Quellen führen wird. Im folgenden einige dieser Quellen, die dabei berücksichtigt werden sollten: die mündlich überlieferten Lieder, Sprichwörter, Gedichte und Erzählungen; die Quellen zur Aushebung und Ausbildung der Truppen; die Quellen über das Schulwesen (Lesebücher, Register, Berichte der Lehrer und Rektoren, Hausaufgaben, Lehranweisungen); der Briefwechsel der Soldaten, der afrikanischen Siedler, der Auswanderer; das Volkstheater, Plakate; Verlautbarungen kirchlicher Würdenträger, Predigten, Gefallenenmessen, Dank sagungen; illustrierte Volkszeitungen, Zeitschriften, Romane, Bücher und Kataloge der Volksbibliotheken und fahrender Bibliotheken; Heiligenbilder, Devotionalien, Ex Voto; Tagebücher von pädagogisch tätigen Leuten aus der Oberschicht (Priester, Lehrer, Offiziere, Politiker, Ärzte); Kinderspiele und Kinderliteratur und schliesslich auch Quellen "sui generis" (Lieder und Hymnen öffentlicher Musikkapellen, Veranstaltungsanzeigen, Abfahrts — und Ankunftslisten von Schiffen und Truppeneinheiten, Informationen über öffentliche Vorbeimärsche usw.).

Vergleicht man diese Aufzählung der Desiderata mit dem bisher Vorliegenden, so wird deutlich, wie wenig hier geleistet worden ist; über die tatsächliche Penetration der historischen und patriotischen Ideen ins Bewusstsein des Volkes weiss man ausser in Bezug auf einzelne politische Splittergruppen oder von politischen Parteien abhängige Korporationen (Sozialisten, Republikaner, Katholiken, Anarchisten) kaum etwas. Andererseits ist auch festzustellen, dass viele dieser ideellen Faktoren im Volk über den Ersten Weltkrieg hinaus erhalten und verschiedentlich noch im Faschismus und während der Übergangsperiode von der Widerstandsbewegung zur Republik wirksam blieben. Ebenso stösst es sicherlich auf Schwierigkeiten, den realen Pazifismus der Massen, z.B. der Bauern zu verstehen, noch mehr betrifft dies die Mentalität der in der Armee eingeteilten Bauern.

Wir haben in der Tat bessere Informationen über die Frontsoldaten und über die Formen der Auseinandersetzung in der Öffentlichkeit oder in der Familie, es lässt sich jedoch noch wenig aussagen über die Beweggründe, die zum Aufbruch in den

Krieg führten sowie über die Veränderungen, die die Begegnung mit dem Krieg an der Idee des Vaterlandes und des Staates bei den Bauern auslöste. Auch über die alltäglichen Lebensformen auf dem Lande erfährt man aus den Untersuchungen fast nichts, es liegen lediglich einige Studien vor über die Handarbeit der Frauen und über die bedeutendsten Volksfeste. Vollkommen fehlen schliesslich Analysen der religiösen und zivilen Rituale im Zusammenhang mit Krieg und Frieden, der Umformungsprozesses der Bildungsinhalte und der Lebensweise in den verschiedenen Schichten.

Man könnte einwenden, dass hier nun lediglich ein "Neophilologismus" betrieben werde, der einfach anstelle der Oberschichten das Volk zum Gegenstand habe. Um diesem Einwand zu begegnen, sollte man meiner Meinung nach die Untersuchungen auf drei parallelen Ebenen vorantreiben: 1) durch serielle Untersuchungen, wie sie bereits für andere Epochen Anwendung fanden; 2) durch die weniger auf die Rekonstruktion des Individuellen, sondern mehr des Spezifischen abzielenden Untersuchungen modalen Charakters, die sich mit den Denkweisen, den Verhaltens- und Arbeitsweisen sowie den Kommunikationsarten bei den verschiedenen Schichten in den einzelnen Regionen unter verschiedenen Bedingungen befassen; 3) durch die Verlagerung des Betrachtungsschwerpunktes von der Front auf das Heim, um die Variationen des Alltäglichen in ihren typischen Funktionen sowie im Gesamtbild zu erfassen. Es empfiehlt sich ausserdem, das Thema "Volk" nicht von den vielfältigen Beziehungen mit den führenden Schichten und mit den politischen Vorgängen zu isolieren, bei denen die Unterschichten — wenn auch marginal — beteiligt waren.

Es reicht indessen nicht aus, den Schwerpunkt der Untersuchung zu wechseln und den Bauern in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses zu rücken anstelle des Bürgers oder den Soldaten anstelle des Offiziers; dies kann — wie bereits in anderem Zusammenhang geschehen — schwerwiegende Missverständnisse und eine Pseudorevision seitens der Geschichtsschreibung mit sich bringen. Eine wirkliche Revision und eine grössere Validität der Geschichtsschreibung kann nur durch eine andere Methodenwahl herbeigeführt werden, die von einer übergreifenden Gesamtidée und von einem echten menschlichen und sozialen Interesse für das Gedankengut des Volkes ausgehen sollte. Die zahlreichen Querverbindungen zu den übrigen, meist dominie-

renden Bildungsschichten der Gesellschaft sollten dabei allerdings nicht ausser Acht gelassen werden. Man setze nicht eine Geschichte der Besiegten gegen die der Sieger — wie dies in der Geschichtsschreibung über das "Risorgimento" vielfach geschehen ist — sondern bemühe sich, um bei diesem Bild zu bleiben, eine Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges sowohl von der einen wie auch von der anderen Seite aus zu schreiben, zusammen oder getrennt, vorausgesetzt man geht von einer gemeinsamen Perspektive aus; dies auch deshalb, weil diese hypothetische innere Frontlinie keineswegs undurchlässig war, zumindest nicht für fünfte Kolonnen, mehr oder weniger bewusste Deserteure und beispielsweise auch das Rote Kreuz. Man sollte nicht den Fehler wiederholen, der bereits einmal in den Jahren 1945 bis ca. 1960 anlässlich einer Revision der Geschichtsschreibung über das Risorgimento gemacht wurde, als eine Wiedereinsetzung der Bedeutung der Besiegten in jener Zeit versucht wurde, während man sie in Wirklichkeit von der Sozialgeschichte, in der sie eingebettet waren und aus der sie eine weit klarere und der Wirklichkeit besser entsprechende geschichtliche Wertung hätten gewinnen können, isolierte.

Inwieweit befindet sich nun die Geschichtsschreibung über den Ersten Weltkrieg bereits auf dem angegebenen Weg? Ich glaube nicht, dass dies der Augenblick ist, um eine bibliographische Übersicht über die anzuwendende Arbeitshypothese anzufertigen, man sollte eher im Rahmen eines allgemeineren Urteils herauszufinden versuchen, welche der bisher erreichten Resultate brauchbar scheinen.

Für die Neutralitätsperioden konnte festgestellt werden, dass die grosse nationale Debatte die Masse der unteren Schichten mit Ausnahme einiger fortschrittlicher Arbeiterzellen nicht erreichte. Die hier weitgehend als Quelle benutzten Berichte der Präfekten liefern Informationen über das Interesse oder die Apathie die Bevölkerung; aus diesen und aus ähnlichen Quellen lässt sich entnehmen, dass die Idee des Vaterlandes auf dem Lande an das Bild des Emigranten gebunden war und dass das Bild des Feindes vielfältig und widersprüchlich blieb; für die Piemontesen war der Feind der Franzose, für die Lombarden und die Veneter der Deutsche, für die Süditaliener eine mythische Personifizierung des Türken, des Negus, des Deutschen oder des ausbeuterischen Fremden. Der Interventionismus stellt sich in Süditalien als ein Problem der städtischen und bürgerli-

chen Schichten heraus, das die umliegenden Landgebiete unberührt liess; erwähnt seien hier die Feststellungen von Persönlichkeiten wie Nitti oder Fortunato.

In der Zeit der Neutralität wurde der Krieg als Plage angesehen, und selbst in der Kirchenpredigt ertönte der auf den Krieg gemünzte Ausruf: *a peste et tempestate libera nos Domine*. Der König und die Regierenden wurden als Hüter und Garanten dieses Schutzes angesehen, so dass die Bischöfe in der Folge grösste Mühe hatten, der Idee des Gehorsams gegenüber der Autorität des Staates genügend ethischen Inhalt zu geben, um den bisher als Plage aufgefassten Krieg moralisch akzeptabel zu machen. Das libysche Abenteuer, die Enttäuschungen der Kolonialbestrebungen und die Aushebungen unter der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung verstärkten jedoch nur die Auffassungen vom Krieg als Plage. In den Jahren 1914/15 schienen jedenfalls die Wiedereingliederung der Emigranten und die Versorgungslage nach dem Erdbeben weit wichtigere Probleme. Auch der anti-deutsche Mythos war noch nicht verbreitet — im Gegenteil, Bewunderung und Hoffen auf Unterstützung prägten hier das Bild. Informationen aus dem Norden erreichten die unteren Schichten Süditaliens oft besser über die in den Häfen ankern den Schiffe als über Rom, und überspitzt könnte man sogar formulieren, dass Nachrichten aus dem übrigen Italien die süditalienische Landbevölkerung auf dem Umweg über Amerika erreichten.

Nach der Kriegserklärung schuf sich das Volk eine eigene, von der offiziellen und nationalen abweichende Einteilung der Kriegsperioden, die nach Regionen und sogar dort noch unterschiedlich gegliedert wurde. Die Rythmen wurden durch die Jahreszeiten, Naturereignisse und Ernten bestimmt, unterbrochen nur durch die ersten Wellen von Todesfällen. Im ersten Kriegsjahr veränderten vor allem kirchliche Veranstaltungen zugunsten des Friedens oder für Gefangene diesen Rythmus; des weiteren machte sich bereits das Fehlen von Männern bei Dorffesten und als Mangel an Arbeitskräften bemerkbar. Die Kontakte zwischen Front und Bevölkerung waren spärlich; man bekam kaum Bewilligungen für persönliche Begegnungen, es herrschte noch Analphabetismus und die Post funktionierte schlecht. Im ersten Kriegsjahr wurde der Krieg vor allem als "Corvée" aufgefasst. Materielle Hilfe und patriotische Propaganda á la "Salandra" drangen nicht — oder nur am Rande —

in ländliche Gebiete und in den Süden ein. Die Idee von der zeitlich begrenzten Corvée und das Warten auf den Frühling 1916 als Ende des Kriegsdienstes waren die Hauptmerkmale der Reaktion des Volkes und der Bauern, die den Anforderungen der Corvée ohne innere Anteilnahme und ohne nach einer Erklärung zu fragen Genüge taten.

In der Periode vom Frühling 1916 bis Februar 1917 mit dem Schwerpunkt im Sommer 1916 schwenkte die Volksmeinung von der Idee der zeitlich begrenzten Corvée auf die Auffassung des Krieges als einer lange andauernden Plage über; dies veränderte auch die Einstellung gegenüber dem Kriegsdienst, der nicht mehr als etwas Vorübergehendes, sondern als eine Plage angesehen wurde, mit der man sich abzufinden hatte. Diese neue Auffassung verursachte tiefe Einschnitte in der Volksmentalität und führte einerseits zu dem Bemühen, den neuen Anforderungen gerecht zu werden, erzeugte jedoch andererseits auch Gefühle der Resignation. Die Mythen entwickelten sich stark; der Feind, der in sich alle Schrecken des Krieges vereinigte und das fruchtbare Land, das es zu erobern galt; diese Auffassungen wurden allerdings bald von den Briefen der Soldaten Lügen gestraft. Die Einnahme Gorizias wurde noch festlich begrüßt wie der Endsieg, die sog. Strafexpedition weckte kaum noch Emotionen; ausserdem löste sich der Korpsgeist in den Schützengräben von der Volksmentalität in den Dörfern. Auch auf dem Lande versuchte man die Mobilisierung der Geisteshaltung und beschwor in Schule und Rathaus die nationale Einheit sowie erteilte Anweisungen für Hilfsmassnahmen und für das Anlegen der Notvorräte.

Das Charakteristische der nächsten Kriegsperiode vom Frühjahr bis Sommer 1917 war der Widerhall, den der Aufruf zur Befreiung von der Kriegsplage in den unteren Schichten fand. Die bäuerliche Struktur des Dorfes hielt das andauernde Fehlen von Arbeitskräften auf die Dauer nicht aus; in der Stadt konnten die fehlenden Männer leichter durch Frauen ersetzt werden. Die Art der Kundgebungen des Volkes und der Frauen zwischen 1916 und 1917 waren nicht nur von spontaner Art sondern wiesen auch eine andere Stossrichtung auf als die Demonstrationen einiger politischer Bewegungen; gefordert wurde Unterstützung für die Familien der Einberufenen und Nahrungsmittelhilfe — das Volk akzeptierte die Kriegsplage nur noch mit Mühe.

Der Staat wurde nach der anfänglichen Resignation immer mehr als schlechter Vater oder gar als Feind angesehen; im Volksempfinden zeichnete sich das Auseinanderbrechen in verschiedene Italien ab.

Charakteristisch für das letzte Kriegsjahr waren die grossen Differenzen, die sich besonders in der Zeit zwischen den Schlachten von Capretto und Vittorio Veneto in der Volksmentalität zwischen Nord- und Süditalien zeigten: die süditalienische Frage verschärfte sich entscheidend. Im Norden kamen die alten Mythen des "deutschen Feindes" wieder zum Vorschein, während zugleich eine vage Politisierung festzustellen war; die Menschen fühlten sich persönlich zur Diskussion und Beurteilung des Krieges und zur Mitarbeit aufgerufen. Es bildete sich beinahe ein alternatives Volksbewusstsein heraus, sei es defaitistischer oder patriotischer Natur, aber jedenfalls ein der Regierung entgegengesetztes eigenes Empfinden — das in diesem Zusammenhang wichtige und vom Nationalismus zu unterscheidende Phänomen des ursprünglichen Volkspatriotismus harrt noch einer näheren Untersuchung.

In der Volksmentalität des Südens kündete sich nun, nach der Corvée, der Kriegsplage und den überstürzten Erwartungen das Gefühl an, Objekte einer Fremdherrschaft zu sein, fast einer Art Besatzungsmacht: wie bereits in der Vergangenheit Heere und fremde Mächte das Land beherrscht hatten, so beherrschte und verwaltete es jetzt der Staat, um sich selbst zu retten.

Das süditalienische Volk wollte in der Tat über die staatliche Besetzung verhandeln in der Hoffnung auf eine Reform der erstarrten Bodenrechtsverhältnisse; die innere Front Italiens verlief eher hier, zwischen dem süditalienischen Volk und der Regierung, als zwischen Interventionisten und Neutralisten (oder Defaitisten). Das Volk begann ziemlich bald, noch vor dem Auftreten der Nachkriegskommission, eine Verhandlungsbasis in den Beziehungen zu den herrschenden Klassen aufzubauen.

Aus den Trägern der ständig anschwellenden Flut der patriotischen Propaganda begann sich das Volk jene Protagonisten herauszusuchen, die eine patriotische Leistung verlangten und von denen man in der Folge auch eine Gegenleistung erwarten konnte. In diesem Streben nach einem Do-ut-des-Konsensus der Jahre 1917—1918 steckte ein stärkeres Moment des Aus-



gleichs als im auferlegten Zwang der vorangegangenen Jahre; dies erklärt auch die Verwunderung des demokratischen Interventionismus, als er sich in der Nachkriegszeit auf Volksebene angegriffen sah. Schliesslich möchte ich auch nicht die spanische Epidemie vergessen, die 1918 über eine halbe Million Tote forderte: Krieg und Pest gaben sich noch einmal vor den Augen des Volkes die Hand.

Die herrschenden Schichten, aber auch die Arbeiterbewegung hatten offensichtlich grosse Mühe mit dieser Vielzahl von Meinungen, die in der letzten Zeit des Krieges im Volke entstanden waren, und auf dieser Zersplitterung baute anfänglich auch der Faschismus auf, während die nationale Propaganda der Nachkriegszeit sich dieses Umstandes nicht bewusst wurde und in ihrem Versuch zur Schaffung eines einheitlichen Patriotismus scheiterte.

Von 1964 bis heute wurde in der historischen Forschung bereits ein grosses Stück Weges zurückgelegt; man hat das Augenmerk auf die Belange der Bauern und Arbeiter im Heer und auf dem Dorfe gelenkt und Untersuchungen angestellt über die Parteien, die öffentliche Meinung, die Wirtschaftsstrukturen, die Bürokratie u.a.m. Mir scheint, dass man über das Verhalten der Soldaten des Ersten Weltkrieges an der Front und nach der Entlassung bereits einen wertvollen Komplex von Studien der europäischen Geschichtsschreibung besitzt. Tiefes Dunkel liegt dagegen noch über den Auswirkungen des Krieges auf die Familie: nach der ersten Welle von Geschichtsschreibung über diesen Bereich in der kurzen Zeitspanne von 1918 bis in die ersten Jahre des Faschismus — charakteristisch sind dafür die Arbeiten G. Pratos, L. Einaudis, G. Montaras und der letzten Vertreter der ökonomisch-juristischen Schule — herrscht hier eine grosse Leere; die damalige Realität der Landbevölkerung hat noch keine genügende Darstellung erfahren, auch wenn verschiedene Forschergruppen aus der Macerata, aus Padua, Turin und Rom dazu wichtige Ansätze geliefert haben. Spärlich ist auch die Produktion an Untersuchungen, die einen Schnitt an einem bestimmten Punkt der zeitlichen Entwicklung darstellen; als wichtiger wurden Arbeiten diachronischen und thematischen Charakters angesehen. Ein Beispiel dafür sind die von Nuto Revelli publizierten Dokumente über die bäuerliche Welt, in der die Konstante der Mentalität die Reaktionsdauer auf das Unvorhergesehene und auf schnelle Umwälzungen verlängert.

Aus der traditionellen Sicht der Geschichtsschreibung kann man viel über das Heer, wenig über das Dorf und noch weniger über die Verbindung dieser zwei Komponenten derselben Wirklichkeit aussagen. Armee und Dorf, Sieger und Besiegte resultieren so aus den Ergebnissen dieser Geschichtsschreibung als konträre Elemente, die sich gegenseitig aufreiben. Nun ist jedoch offensichtlich der Moment erreicht worden, um im Rahmen einer Geschichtsschreibung, die die Realität einer Gesellschaft von Grund auf zu verstehen sucht, solche gegensätzliche Positionen in einer generellen Perspektive der Volkskultur zu überwinden; besondere Aufmerksamkeit muss dabei den thematischen Studien geschenkt werden, die versuchen, die feinen und vielfältigen Beziehungen über die inneren Grenzen hinweg zu rekonstruieren.

Wichtig scheinen in diesem Zusammenhang die Beiträge verschiedener Forscher, die an einer Geschichte der italienischen Gesellschaft in der Zeit des Übergangs von der europäischen Krise des Imperialismus zur Nachkriegszeit arbeiten; hier scheinen wegweisendere Ansätze vorzuliegen als in den Einzeluntersuchungen verschiedener Zeitabschnitte oder Gesellschaftsteile.

Pietro Pastorelli

## Italy and the Finnish nation, 1917—1919

This paper has been written with the purpose of discussing the attitude taken by Italy towards the independence of the Finnish nation from the moment it was declared (Dec. 6, 1917) until the day it was recognized by Italy (June 27, 1919). Neither for Finland nor for Italy was this to be considered a historic event. It does, however, merit some closer attention as it was the somewhat laboured beginning of a relationship between the two countries which, since then, has always been one of friendship, even in periods difficult for both, as I have demonstrated in the course of our first meeting at Perugia.

Prof. Paasivirta has exhaustively dealt with the recognition of Finland's independence by the States who won the Great War and he has studied Finland's relations with the British, French and USA governments in 1918—1919. Naturally he had not forgotten that Italy was one of the victorious States, but judging its weight inferior to that of the great powers and not disposing of Italian sources, he devoted only a few words to the Italian attitude: he mentions (p. 37) Orlando, of whom he sketches a rapid image, but not Sonnino, who handled the whole affair. Also Italian historiography neglected the matter — an attitude which is surprising to me, seeing that in Italy much thought was given to the subject of nationality during the first world war. In some studies the Finnish nation is mentioned occasionally, but when this occurs it seems a faraway, unknown country to be referred to only for the sake of

completeness. Its reality seemed to awaken no more interest than that of other national minorities of the Tsarist Empire — with the exception of Poland — or of nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, as though the "real" nationalities were only those that had been "oppressed" by the Habsburg Empire. The explanation of this strange lack of interest could be that today's studies reflect the various degrees of importance given to Italy's relationship with the Austro-Hungarian world as well as the Ottoman and Tsarist — the former being near and familiar and the other two far away and little known, specially the Tsarist. Only very recently Giorgio Petracchi has dedicated an excellent study to Italian-Russian relations in the years between 1917 and 1925, and in the problem of the Finnish nation carries some weight; this is also due — I presume — to the conversations I had with him when I published Sidney Sonnino's papers. But this can be considered an exception to the rule.

Naturally the situation concerned both sides. For the Finnish nation Italy was then a distant and scarcely known reality significant only for its art, and the point was overlooked that among the most important countries of the Entente Italy was the only one which had recently acquired its national independence. The first appeal for recognition contained in Svinhufvud's message of Dec. 5, 1917 was made to France, Great Britain and the USA as well as to the three nearby Scandinavian countries, but not to Italy (Kirby, Documents, p. 203). The Italian government was informed of what was going on in Helsinki by the French ambassador in Rome, Barrère, who on Dec. 9 received the order to find out if Italy was disposed immediately to recognize the new State together with the other Western Allies.

Sonnino's advice was to respond to Svinhufvud's appeal by saying that "for the Allies there was no fundamental issue opposed to Finland's plea for her independence to be recognized, but that any official decision had to be postponed until the situation in Russia had become more stable" (Sonnino, Diario, p. 223). Sonnino explained why two fundamental reasons existed which spoke against a formal recognition: the decision made one week earlier at the Paris Conference not to take any action which could be interpreted as a complete break-off of the alliance with Russia, and the

possibility that the Germans might use the recognition as an excuse for trying to demonstrate that the Allies were attempting to accelerate the process of the "crumbling" of the Russian State.

It was Sonnino's objective not to discourage those Russians who still had feelings of friendship towards Western Allies, in the hope of thus favouring their return to power. He had succeeded in having his point of view accepted at the Allied Conference in Paris and did not now want to see it compromised by raising the Finnish question. In fact, the breakdown of the Russian State in March 1917 had had a special significance for Italy. It represented not only the loss of an ally, as had been the case for France and England, but of an ally with whom Italy had had to share the burden of the war against the Austro-Hungarian State, according to the military agreement of May 21, 1915, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Treaty of London. One of the fundamental conditions which had induced Italy to come into the war had disappeared. The consequences could be observed at Caporetto. Now that the Bolsheviks had definitely pronounced themselves in favour of peace there existed only one alternative for Sonnino: to hope that the internal situation in Russia might change after the elections.

The British, the French and the Americans had accepted Sonnino's point of view more to demonstrate their solidarity towards an ally in difficulty than by conviction, considering his policy of waiting too passive to produce the result he was hoping for. They immediately took different paths: the Americans towards a political answer which was given in Wilson's speech of Jan. 8, 1918 which, it was hoped, would have its influence on the moderate wing of the new Russian Parliament. The British and French on the one hand intensified their efforts for a separate peace with the Austro-Hungarian State, hoping thus to weaken the enemy's coalition, and on the other supported the dismemberment of the Russian State, attempting to produce an anti-German line-up in the East.

As far as the nationalities were concerned, these policies differed from each other. Wilson's policy was the most coherent, promising the frontiers of 1914 to Russia except in the Polish case and the same to the Austro-Hungarian State except for adjustments to be made in favour of Italy. The most

that the various nationalities could expect was to have their autonomy recognized. The British and the French, on their part, were also in favour of autonomy for the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire, but asked for independence for the Russian ones. To sum up; the great powers shaped the principle of nationality according to their own interests.

The same thing happened in Italy in the case of the Finnish nation. When, on Dec. 25, Barrère returned to speak of the "convenience" of recognizing Finland, Sonnino replied that the Allies "could show sympathy for the autonomy or even for the independence of the Finns . . . helping them in the meantime materially by supplying them with food and in other ways", but that it was not possible officially to recognize their independence for the reasons he had already indicated (Sonnino, Diario, p. 240).

As we know, the French government continued to proceed on its path, but was not imitated by the British government. When Barrère tried for the last time on Jan. 4, 1918 to convince Sonnino by using the argument that the Bolsheviks had given their consent to Finland's independence, Sonnino objected that, as the Western Allies did not recognize the Bolshevik government it was impossible "formally to adhere to a dismemberment of the Russian State simply because they had agreed to it". He again explained that the alliance with Russia (that of Sept. 5, 1914, to which Italy had adhered later) had not been dissolved and that it was the intention rather "to try and maintain it by supporting Ukrainia and the other provisional governments which continued their adherence". He said furthermore that "the formal recognition of full Finnish independence would discourage all Russian patriots, who would despair of ever seeing the reconstitution of a Great Russia, be it as a federation only". Sonnino repeated that the Allies "should assure the Finns of their sympathy, helping them not only morally but materially, but postpone any formal recognition of full independence until the installation of a legal government in Russia" (Sonnino, Diario, p. 248). These quotations indicate that the cause of Finnish independence had made progress with the Italian government and was near reaching the goal of de facto recognition. It continued to be impossible to go any further, merely in consideration of the general policy of the government.

Sonnino told the Finnish delegates Kihlman and Wolff clearly how things stood when the Helsinki government decided to ask for Italian recognition in Rome. "I talked things over with them", he writes, "and told them that Italy feels deep sympathy for Finland . . . I said that I had no difficulties in keeping up relations with a de facto government. But at this point it was impossible to recognize the independence of this part of the Russian State, especially in consideration of the extreme strategic importance that Finland had for Russia. I concluded that we had to postpone any definite deliberation until the Peace Conference, expressing the hope that the Finnish move towards independence would not lead to a position of subordination to Germany, which was strenuously attempting to make a German lake of the Baltic Sea" (T. Gab. n. 357, Feb. 28, 1918).

I have given this detailed report of nearly the entire document not only because it represents a testimony of the first direct encounter between the two countries but also in order to demonstrate clearly the Italian position, that is the establishment of de facto relations long before de jure recognition. Finally it gives a lucid picture at this early date of the hazards which the Finnish nation was to face in the course of its existence as an independent State.

The de facto relations thus established had no practical consequences whatsoever for the moment, also because Italy, unlike the other Great powers of the Entente, had only an honorary consul at Helsinki; but it must also be stressed that on the Finnish side nothing was done in reply to the encouragement received in Rome.

The general events characterizing the conflict and particularly the situation of Finland, which fell — as Sonnino had feared — into the German orbit (and even France broke off diplomatic relations), blocked contacts with the Allies in any case until Germany was defeated. Within the new framework created after Nov. 11, 1918 the Finnish government took up its battle for recognition again, finding itself in a less favorable position than it had been in December 1917. To the obstacle represented by the Russian problem was added the fact that Finland had found itself siding with Germany. Therefore it was a nation which, according to the philosophy of the Allies, did not have the same rights as the "good" nationalities, those that

had been oppressed by the Austro-Hungarian State.

An attempt to modify this situation was made by the Mannerheim mission in London and Paris, but the most noticeable results for the attainment of recognition were achieved by the Americans of Finnish origin who insisted in defending the cause of their compatriots, and by the comprehension which the USA subsequently displayed of Finland's food requirements. In fact, while the British and the French made political conditions for official recognition (elections, new government, favourable attitude towards Allies), the Blockade Committee achieved a rapid agreement among the British, French, American and Italian delegates, proposing that the governments concerned should consider Finland a neutral State and therefore establish traderelements through the Inter-Allied Trade Committee composed of the consuls of the four countries in Helsinki (Dec. 2, 1918). With the assent of the Allied governments the Committee was formed on Dec. 18 and set to work at Helsinki in the second half of January, though no Italian delegate had yet been appointed (DDI, v, 1°, pp. 250, 265, 399, 471). The Italian government, once having agreed that the Committee should be instituted, had immediately proceeded to nominate Emanuele Grazzi, a diplomat attached to intelligence services at Rotterdam, as consul in Helsinki (Borsarelli a Comando Supremo, telespresso n. 18485, Dec. 22, 1918). However, due to reasons I have not been able to discover, Grazzi was officially assigned to Helsinki only in February 1919, and he arrived there and began to participate in the deliberations of the committee only on April 9, 1919.

This delay had no influence because the political importance lay in the fact that the Allied governments had decided to institute the Helsinki Committee, which made it clear that they considered Finland an economic entity, no more a part of Russia. The consequences soon made themselves felt. When the Russian problem was discussed at the Peace Conference and Lloyd George's proposal to invite representatives of every organized group "within the boundaries of European Russia as they stood before the war" to the Princes Island was approved, Wilson excluded Finland from the list. Nobody objected or expressed reservations (FRUS, PPC 1919, III, pp. 676, 686, 691). "This was generally interpreted to mean", wrote Prof. Paasivirta, (p. 87), "that the Western Powers did not regard



Finland as any longer belonging to the Russian sphere of political control". It should however be stressed that opinions regarding de jure recognition of Finland continued to differ, though it should have been the logical consequence of this decision. The French immediately exercised pressure in favor of such recognition, which for them only meant resuming diplomatic relations (this happened on Feb. 3); the British, on the other hand, continued to make their political conditions and the American attitude was more or less the same.

The Italian government took the same stand towards the Finnish nation as in February 1918. It greatly favoured Finland's independence, but its de jure recognition had to be subordinated to the Russian problem. The reason for this was not, as for the British and Americans, that political conditions had to be met: it was rather the desire not to complicate relations with the Antiboldshevik elements whose eventual victory — so Italy hoped — would reinsert Russia into a European equilibrium. According to Sonnino's view, the new "legal" Russian government should have agreed to Finland's independence, but at the same time it should have had to treat with the Allies on how to fix the frontiers of the new State respecting Russian problems of security and strategy. A one-sided decision on the part of the Allies would not only have been inadvisable but would have deprived Finland itself of an essential element of its future existence, that is to say the consent of its powerful neighbor to its frontiers.

Therefore, when the British informed the Council of Ten on Jan. 27, 1919 of the French request for them to recognize Finland, Sonnino insisted on the frontierproblem. "Any decision concerning the frontiers of Finland might be regarded as a settlement hostile to Russia, if made without hearing the Russians," say the minutes of the meeting (FRUS, PPC 1919, III, p. 734). Wilson agreed to this viewpoint and the solution of the problem was further postponed.

Sonnino took up the same attitude one month later when the British tried to bring the question of the Åland Islands before the Council of Ten. He observed that de jure the islands were still Russian and that it was therefore inadvisable to discuss the matter in dissociation from the Russian problem, "especially as in the case of Åland the conference was being asked to take something from someone and to give it to a third

party", that is to Sweden (FRUS, PPC 1919, iv, p. 171).

Official recognition by the USA and Great Britain was decided at the Peace Conference between April 28 and May 3, the initiative having been taken by Herbert Hoover who convinced Wilson of its advisability after Finland had fulfilled the political conditions that had been made. The frontier question did, however, play a certain part in this decision, because it was agreed to communicate to the Finnish government that it would have to accept the frontiere fixed by the Peace Conference.

When this decision was taken the Italians were absent from Paris because of the Adriatic question. Had he been present, Sonnino would probably have brought up his objection concerning the Russian problem again. However, as Italy had not been among the decision-makers it was not bound to apply it, and in fact Sonnino did not take any action. The Finnish government, possibly under the impression that the Italian silence was due to reasons of protocol (the lack of a formal request), sent Sonnino an official note on May 18, 1919, signed by the Foreign Secretary, Holsti.

When Sonnino received the document, he added the following note for his collaborators: "In practice we maintain a relation of friendship with the Finnish government, but we can take no further steps until the Conference has discussed the general policy to be adopted towards Russia". When also the consul at Helsinki, Grazzi, pressed for recognition, saying that the Italian silence by now provoked a "painful impression" (T. n. 1911/51, June 3, 1919), Sonnino insisted on his point of view. "The Royal Government", he wrote, "though expressing its most heartfelt sympathy for Finland's national aspirations, does not consider it possible to proceed to a formal recognition of Finland at the moment, as the other Allies have done. The Royal Government maintains friendly de facto relations with the Finnish government, but is of the opinion that a definite recognition will have to be settled together with the other questions concerning Russia" (T. CP. n. 712, June 14, 1919).

The insistance on this reserve naturally did not mean that Italy had changed its opinion on the main issue — the independence of the Finnish nation. As a matter of fact Orlando signed the letter to Admiral Kolcak on May 26 in which the Allies asked, as a condition of recognition of his

government, for a promise to recognize Finland's independence and to accept the arbitration of the League of Nations if the frontier problem between the two States had not been settled by a direct agreement (FRUS, PPC 1919, vi, p. 36).

Prof. Paasivirta gives two reasons for the delay of the Italian recognition: the desire not to offend the White Russians, who were known to be opposed to Finnish independence, and unwillingness to admit the principle of self-determination because it was in contrast with the territorial demands made by Italy on the Eastern coast of the Adriatic (p. 107).

From what I have discussed so far it is possible to support the first reason, not in the restrictive sense in which he proposes it, but in the way I indicated before; without, that is, making onesided decisions to obtain Russian consent at any cost for a condition (Finnish independence) indisputable for the Allies just as much as for Italy. The second reason does not seem defensible to me. Firstly, because certain demands made by Italy were based on the principle of nationality (apart from strategic security); one for example, concerned the coast of Dalmatia, and others, as in the case of Fiume, were based on the principle of selfdetermination. In the second place, because the principle of nationality was never officially questioned, though the ways of applying it had been discussed. In any case, it had always been consistently supported in favour of the Finnish nation, as has been demonstrated in this paper.

The delay was caused by Sonnino's insistence on his own way of considering the question of de jure recognition, an attitude which undoubtedly could be called obstinacy after the Anglo-American decision in May. One of the first actions of the new Foreign Secretary, Tittoni, the day after his appointment, was the authorization of Finland's official recognition (T. n. 394, June 24, 1919), which was declared by the consul, Mr. Grazzi, on June 27. He was able to act so quickly, because it was only necessary to reverse an obstinate point of view on the method to be used. There were no other reasons and thus Tittoni thought it opportune immediately to align Italy with the position of the other Allies. Also on this point my conclusions differ slightly from Prof. Paasivirta's, who attributes this alignment almost exclusively to Italy's desire to identify itself with prevailing opinion among the Western Allies.



Hannu Soikkanen

# Nationalism and internationalism as concepts of the Finnish working class in the critical situation of 1917—1918.

## 1. Conflicting traditions

By the time of the First World War the Kautskyist interpretation of socialism had established itself as the ideological centre of the Finnish labour movement, stressing the thought of a social development in which the importance of nationalism diminished steadily. Kautskyism held that the growing international division of functions, which was linked with development toward capitalism, led to international solidarity among capitalists and, following the same course, among the working class also to an increasing extent. Nationalism was regarded as a concept of farmers and the petty bourgeoisie, groups of declining importance. To take one's direction from it would be to drag the burden of the past. From this angle, particularly after the Kotka conference of

1909, Finland's Social Democratic Party tried to interpret the most difficult question, the relation between Finland and Russia. In every party conference before 1917 it was pointed out that the two countries had bourgeois interests in common and that the bourgeoisie did not defend Finland's autonomy in earnest. This notion was repeated in a way which suggested up to point that its exponents were uncertain. When the party's basic ideas were forming at the beginning of the century, the recourse of employers to Russian strike-breakers and their assertions that workers had broken national solidarity by going on strike had convinced workers that for capitalists an appeal to nationalism was merely a means to an end. Thus it happened that historical reality and central notions of socialism supported each other.

Within the labour movement, however, factors of some weight were working in another, quite opposite direction. Even those active in the labour movement lived in a community where, particularly after the February Manifesto, the influence of nationalist thinking was growing deeper and spreading to a broader public. Thus alongside orthodox Kautskyism a pro-nationalist line began to form. It led first to the creation of dissimilar groupings within the movement. At the beginning of the century and then in the new situation of the second period of oppression there arose on the other hand the so-called "Siltasaari line". Its main figures were the editor of "Työmies", Edvard Valpas, and the November Socialists who had joined the labour movement at about the time of the general strike of 1905, O.V. Kuusinen being perhaps the most influential of them. They held Kautsky's interpretation to be the most important, though they did not despise nationalism. But they stressed that the labour movement could not resort to collaboration with the bourgeoisie in order to protect autonomy. Important for the nationalist line was Yrjö Mäkelin, who emphasized combined activity as a means to that protection. This line of nationalism had some connection with reformism and some also with revisionism, whose influence in Finland remained slight. The trade union movement was small in membership and weak, whereas its strength was indispensable for the reinforcement of revisionism. Socialist internationalism based on the Kautskyist interpretation of capitalist development dominated the party ideology, but a

potential force was the powerful stress on nationalism which might emerge if the situation changed decisively. In 1917 the situation did indeed change after the Russian revolution of February.

## 2. Bolsheviks work with Finnish Social Democrats who pursue nationalist aims and collaboration in a changed political situation

After the revolution the Finnish Social Democratic Party served with bourgeois parties in the government of Tokoi. This signified a strengthening of reformism. Although it could be stressed that this was an exceptional situation in which joining the government implied a change of principle in relations with ministerial socialism and abandonment of the Kautskyist line with its insistence on the class struggle, Finland's Social Democratic Party found itself in an extraordinary position during the summer. More and more strongly it drew attention to nationalist emblems at the same time as collaboration intensified with international left-wing socialism. The interlocking of events in Russia and Finland led to an alliance between the bolsheviks and the Finnish labour movement, in which the new possibilities of the situation had caused stress to be laid on nationalism. Parties differed greatly in their understanding of the revolution, but recourse to collaboration showed the importance of the Russian question to Finland. Drawn by the nationalist policy of the Bolsheviks, the Finnish Social Democratic Party in June 1917 joined the Zimmerwald left-wing Socialist International. This emphasized working-class internationalism and criticized the parties of the Second International for their support of war exertions; this was done primarily to satisfy the bolsheviks. Bolshevik promises to allow Finland the right to secede from Russia led to this attitude. The growing nationalist activism of Finnish party now led to a clash with the interim government of Russia and to collaboration with the bolsheviks. To what extent this was a matter of tactics and to what extent a matter of principle

is difficult to decide.

The Finns received no support from the Social Democratic Party of Sweden for instance, nor from social democratic parties of the Entente. In their view the Finnish party's quarrel with the interim government of Russia was an act of opposition to democratic Russia which also weakened the latter's military effort and indirectly benefited Germany. At various stages of the war there was a community of interests between Finland and Germany, as expressed in the birth of the light infantry movement. It extended to the labour movement, which was also prepared to make use of German support. Such was the attitude of the group which had earlier stressed the emblems of nationalism. Reliance on Germany did not lead to wider collaboration, however, and the nationalist policy of the bolsheviks played a part here. By offering help in the struggle against the interim government the bolsheviks neutralized the alternative of support from Germany. For the same reason collaboration between the labour movement and the so-called activists of the nationalist bourgeoisie faded to nothing; it had first appeared in the light infantry movement, then in contacts occurring in Stockholm during spring 1917, then in the enactment of the so-called Enabling Law of July 1917. The bolsheviks, who sharply criticized this line, were able to exert some influence on the procedure of the labour movement. They tried in various respects to strengthen the revolutionary wing of the Finnish party and to persuade the latter to cease its collaboration with the bourgeoisie parties in the government. The Finnish party preserved its unity, which is to say that it did not openly divide into two parties, as had happened elsewhere. Collaboration, a kind of unholy alliance with the bolsheviks which satisfied both nationalists and those who aimed at social revolution, kept the two wings of the party together and even drew them closer.

Russia's internal power struggle involved Finland more and more clearly as autumn approached. The bolsheviks wished to make Finland a support area independent of the influence of the interim government, and at the same time the Finnish party became more and more opposed to that government. The Enabling Law passed on July 18th, which substantially extended Finnish rights and established Parliament as the highest authority, was partly an expression of nationalism and



partly a sign of collaboration with the bolsheviks. In connection with this legislation a national front formed when the social democrats and part of the bourgeoisie gave their approval. In these circumstances nationalist considerations might have forced social tension into the background. But the interim government had sufficient power to assemble loyal forces in Finland. Bourgeois activists had in fact been in connection with Germany, and the latter's aims were served, of course, by part of the Enabling Law. In association with this law a national front came near formation. Social democrats, bourgeois activists and agrarians would have composed it. The situation thus made it possible for ever-sharpening class conflicts to be overcome, and provided an impetus for national solidarity. It would have been necessary, however, for the interim government to fall or for a front to be formed against it. A nationalist front could only have been strengthened in a war situation where Germany could have intervened by delivering light infantry to the country, in which case the chance to accept German aid, which had fleetingly appeared to the labour movement at various stages, would have found concrete realization. That situation, however, was complicated by two matters, the social democrat majority in Parliament and the powers conferred on it by the Enabling Law. On the bourgeois side it was thought that the main motive of the social democrats was to pursue some of the nationalist aims contained in the Enabling Law. It is noteworthy that at this stage nationalist aims ran parallel with social democratic objectives for the extension of democracy or even for tactical advantage.

The Enabling Law also ran parallel with bolshevik aims; this fact and the contacts which it implied provided a justification for the class struggle viewpoint. The bolsheviks tried unceasingly to weaken Finnish national solidarity and criticized the participation of Finnish social democrats in the government, with the result that the party was divided. This social democratic collaboration with the bolsheviks roused the suspicion of bourgeois advocates of independence.

No nationalist front arose on behalf of the Enabling Law. The middle-class parties took advantage of the interim government's manifesto of dissolution to get rid of the socialist majority in Parliament. This cut the ground away from the

nationalist standpoint that a united front would be reached over social obstacles of increasing severity. Such was the disappointment from this stand taken by the middle class that the reformist wing of the labour movement was also undermined. A situation of such complexity appeared to open possibilities for development in many directions. In retrospect it also seems that a broad nationalist front might have arisen against the Russian interim government. Whether it would have been able to prevent the increase of social tension is difficult to say. The political events accompanying the dissolution of Parliament with its socialist majority led in the same direction as social tension. Possibilities for a nationalist common front weakened substantially.

When the interim government had dissolved Parliament and the middle class had approved this action, the social democrats did not find a clear procedure to follow. Enactment of the Enabling Law was linked with rapidly changing situations in Russia and had been accelerated by the belief that the interim government would be overthrown there. When this did not happen the social democrats were uncertain how to proceed. They engaged in elections but announced their illegality. The social democrats felt themselves in an advantageous position because their aims combined radical social promises with the struggle to extend the rights of Finland. At the same time, however, the social unrest which they had condemned only half-heartedly and their collaboration with the bolsheviks turned against the social democrats. The elections were won by the agrarians, who had been in favour of the Enabling Law and were anti-Russian. Despite an intense struggle in opposition to the interim government the national spirit turned partly against the social democrats. This is explained by their collaboration with the bolsheviks and their understanding attitude to the military forces in the country, who had been infected by the revolution.

### 3. Strengthening of class solidarity over national frontiers

The attitude of Finland's middle-class groups changed sharply when the bolsheviks came to power. They were now ready to

approve detachment from Russia. This was due partly to the radicalism of the bolsheviks, partly to their collaboration with the social democrats and partly to the dissolution of the Russian realm. The labour movement now showed more caution in pursuit of independence, at least in the methods adopted. From the summer onward the bolsheviks had promised Finland the opportunity to secede, and the Finnish social democratic leaders relied on this. But they feared an open conflict with the socialist Russia then forming. For their part the Russian bolsheviks in the previous autumn had placed no confidence in the Finnish representatives of the labour movement. This was because in negotiations held on 19th October the Finns had asked a regional military committee to provide arms for the Red Guard. The Russians were unwilling to do this, not placing full reliance on the Guard in the event of a German landing. Though internal social tension continued to grow in Finland, a situation was looming up in which a nationalist attitude might replace internationalism with a bolshevik reference. It might turn against the bolsheviks if they, as holders of power, did not keep their promise of giving Finland the opportunity to secede from Russia. As a further possibility, part of the bourgeoisie, the so-called activists who had stood behind the Enabling Law and to whom separation from Russia and anti-Russian feeling were all-important, might be prepared to compromise with the social democrats in social and political matters. The Finnish Social Democratic Party still contained those who hoped to find a common line with the agrarians and activists and who looked askance at collaboration with the bolsheviks. Yrjö Mäkelin, for instance, who had earlier been the most prominent representative of the "nationalist" line, was embittered by the dissolution of Parliament and at that time prepared to abandon collaboration with the bourgeoisie; on 28th October he was again prepared to seek a compromise with the activists and to adopt a doubting attitude to collaboration with the Russians. Ideas differed greatly within the party, for many leaders of the labour movement thought at the same time that in October-November the revolutionary spirit of the masses was the decisive factor and that the party leaders would be literally forced to join the revolution and to lead the movement or national rising which would in all cases be set in motion. The difficult food situation

and the example given by the Russian revolution were elevating the revolution into a mass movement, that is a popular movement. Class contrasts in Finnish society and the critical political situation were a combination pointing to civil war from the lowest level. Combined with this was the creation, starting in the spring and confirmed in the autumn, of two armed citizens' formations, the bourgeois protective corps and the workers' guards for maintenance of order. Both were partly political and class-based, but they were also intended for use against Russian troops, that is they contained a nationalist element.

Revolutionary activists were also to be found in party circles, and they included in particular certain Finns of St Petersburg. They were bolsheviks in the Finnish labour movement. The Finnish nationalist viewpoint held no importance for them. They placed the interests of the revolution before those of Finnish nationalism, and what mattered to them was the success of bolshevism and the creation of a protective wall around the Russian revolution. A Finnish revolution could serve as this wall.

Partly as a consequence of political contrasts in Finnish society and partly as support for the recent accession of the bolsheviks to power, a week-long general strike broke out in Finland on 14th October 1917. It did not lead to a revolution, however, as the parliamentary group opposed it and a compromise was reached in the Diet. Despite internal contradictions the Finnish Social Democratic Party was still formally intact. The explanation for this is that the situation had been so complicated ever since spring. It was not a case merely of the activist and revolutionary spirit in Finnish society: also involved were a process of extreme complexity in Russia and attitudes to issues arising between the two countries.

Since the party had been formed in Finland social questions had never been the only or even the principal concern: more important was the procedure to be followed in matters connected with Finno-Russian relations. Thus revolution and the nationalist viewpoint did not clash even when the bolsheviks took power in Russia. The starting-point of Lenin's policy of nationalism was the acceleration of the revolution by means of nationalist self-determination. It was clear that under

Tsarism and during the Russian interim government there had been no opposition between the nationalist struggle and the class struggle of the labour movement except on the question of whether to join forces with the middle class on the nationalist issue. But this conflict did not arise when the bolsheviks came to power, though it had been an issue with all previous Russian rulers. To be sure, it brought its own set of problems and provided the middle class with nationalist weapons against the labour movement.

#### 4. Nationalism and internationalism in the midst of war

When war broke out the Finnish labour movement still remained largely an uniform whole. Though some individuals of importance stayed apart from the revolutionary movement, no breach of notable size occurred. One explanation of this is that the perpetual linking of events in Finland with those in Russia created patterns of events in whose connection there was no clear conflict between, for instance, socialist internationalism and national identification. Intensified social and, especially, political contrasts brought it about that no adequate feeling of national solidarity arose. Whether the latter could have prevented the outbreak of civil war is difficult to say.

In the early phase of the war a powerful sense of solidarity prevailed between the bolsheviks and the Finnish leaders of subversion. Bolshevik support in the shape of arms and exhortations to troops in Finland to take part voluntarily in the struggle to be waged here suggested an uniform series of revolutions which had first been realized in Russia and then spread to Finland. But matters continued in a totally different way. The constitution drafted by the people's delegation (revolutionary government) was not based on the dictatorship of the proletariat according to the bolshevik model, but on democracy in the widest sense and on the right of popular initiative. In the circumstances of war, to be sure, a situation resembling the dictatorship of the proletariat prevailed and there were signs that the system was moving in that direction,

but the clear aim of the revolution was to "conquer" the support of a popular majority. Thus the revolution was stamped unmistakably with Finnish individuality. It might be characterized as a revolution of Kautskyist social democracy. Its aims differed clearly from those of the bolsheviks.

When the constituent bodies of red Finland were formed, their attitude laid stress on the special character of two sovereign states, even on their conflicts of interest. An agreement was made on 1st March, when the Finns attempted to make it clear that two traditionally sovereign states were concerned. Lenin and the Russians wished to proclaim that this was something quite new, an agreement between two socialist states whose dominating feature would be internationalism, solidarity of the working class regardless of national frontiers. In negotiations the Finns drew attention to the great advantage the middle class would gain in propaganda if they consented to emphasize internationalism in an agreement. This was only part of the truth, as Finnish red nationalism grew stronger after the opening days of the revolution. "Red" Finland, admittedly, was too short a time in being for anything to be said with certainty, but despite a common socialist ideology it appears that stress on nationalism in relations with bolshevik Russia was growing stronger at the expense of internationalism. Nationalism was forcing its way into the new identity of Finland.

## 5. Summary

Though the ideology of the Finnish labour movement was Kautskyist socialism, which stressed internationalism, this was counterbalanced by a strong nationalist potential which appeared in the labour movement in a situation where defence of autonomy against the aims of Tsarist Russia became the central concern. This is shown by the fact that the main source of disagreement in the second period of oppression was the tactic to be followed in this defence. The party's general line remained strictly Kautskyist with emphasis on the class struggle. This is explained by the nature of Finnish society. Although since 1907 a unicameral Diet had been chosen in

general elections of an identical pattern, this did not create a channel on influence on legislation nor a sense of participation in the use of power such as would have turned the Finnish labour movement in the direction of nationalism. The nationalist tendency of the movement is linked with a certain political situation and a resulting attitude to the struggle against the interim government. When these factors were removed, internationalism grew stronger. From the spring of 1917, to be sure, the social democrats formed part of the government and had a majority in Parliament, but this phase was so short that a true social patriotism had no time to form, though there were indications of it.

From spring 1917 till the bolshevik revolution events in Finland and their connection with the struggle in Russia lent a certain tone to the tension between national and international. Conflict with the Russian interim government encouraged nationalism, while collaboration with the bolsheviks promoted identification across national frontiers.

The Finnish revolution and the formation of a "red" Finland pointed to internationalism. In war conditions the bolsheviks and Russian troops in this country were seen as allies, while the Whites were known as mortal enemies. Measured in this way national solidarity was a slight factor during the civil war. Yet for a short period there were signs that the transfer of power to the Reds was creating a foundation for red nationalism. The internationalism shared by red Finland and the bolsheviks did not remove the problems which were part of Finno-Russian relations. The stress on nationalism is partly explained by the wish of the Reds to rule with the approval of as many Finns as possible, and they were aware that the attraction of nationalism was powerful. But this clearly was not a sufficient explanation. Despite a surface touch of Kautskyism, nationalism in the Finnish labour movement was a strong potential force which emerged unless prevented by a situation or by social factors.





Massimo Finioia

# Politique économique et pensée nationale en Italie de l'Unité à 1918

En 1860, au moment de sa formation, le Royaume d'Italie n'était pas un Etat moderne. A l'intérieur du pays on pouvait observer la plus grande diversité de monnaies, d'impôts, de droits, de lois et de coutumes civiles, de législations, d'habitudes agraires et commerciales et, surtout, de mentalité et de culture.

La structure géographique et les ressources naturelles entravaient la modernisation par l'industrialisation. Voilà pourquoi le chemin suivi par la politique économique italienne a été si différent de celui du Royaume Uni, souvent proposé comme modèle de tout système économique.

Au siècle dernier, l'Etat Italien a joué un rôle actif dans l'économie. Sur le plan de la doctrine, un des premiers problèmes examinés était celui du choix entre l'agriculture et l'industrie. Le développement agricole et le développement industriel ne s'excluent pas l'un l'autre mais, ils sont, au contraire, complémentaires.

Il s'agissait donc d'un faux problème. Le vrai problème était celui de choisir entre libéralisme et protectionnisme. Choisir l'agriculture signifiait mener une politique libérale, tandis que choisir l'industrie exigeait de mener une politique protectionniste.

Les plus grands économistes italiens se sont ralliés au

libéralisme. Ces économistes critiquèrent systématiquement presque toutes les interventions de l'Etat en matière d'économie, en soulignant principalement les gaspillages qu'elles entraînaient. Les thèses libérales eurent un grand retentissement dans le débat culturel et politique, mais leur effet réel fut minime sur les décisions de politique économique. Le groupe protectionniste était très hétérogène: il était formé d'économistes, de juristes et d'industriels.

Selon certains auteurs, l'élément de cohésion entre des hommes provenant d'horizons si différents était le nationalisme. Ainsi Richard Webster écrit: "Entre 1887 et 1915, le milieu parlementaire italien demeura libéral dans ses convictions politiques, mais ses initiatives en matière économique et le concept même d'intérêt national étaient déjà imprégnés d'esprit nationaliste". Selon l'opinion de Vera Zamagni: "le nationalisme fut l'idéologie de l'industrialisation, idéologie commune, en Italie, aux spécialistes et aux industriels, aux politiques et aux administrateurs, ce même nationalisme qui inspira la politique des dépenses publiques comme les mesures douanières, l'aventure coloniale et même la participation à la première guerre mondiale, et qui continua à exercer son influence sur les événements politiques du Pays et même après la guerre". Les 16 premières années du Royaume d'Italie virent toutefois la suprématie d'une ligne libérale, mais également très active. Avant 1860, l'unification douanière du pays était réalisée avec l'adoption de tarifs douaniers plus libéraux que les précédents existant dans les différents Etats.

De nombreux historiens soutiennent que cette ouverture de l'Italie aux importations des produits industriels étrangers, fut le prix que l'Italie paya à la France et au Royaume Uni pour les secours reçus pendant les deux guerres d'indépendance.

Au cours des premières années du Royaume d'Italie l'unification du système fiscal continua l'oeuvre d'unification. Toutefois, l'augmentation des dépenses fut plus forte que celle des entrées. Ceci s'explique avant tout par les différentes traditions fiscales qui existaient dans chaque partie de la péninsule. Il ne faut pas oublier, par exemple, que l'impôt le plus important, établi d'après le cadastre, était l'impôt sur les terrains; mais, en Italie, il existait jusqu'à 22 cadastres, établis à des différentes époques, et selon des critères différents. En 1864, on avait déjà introduit l'impôt sur le revenu et les impôts

sur les produits de consommation courante avaient été augmentés. Pour en revenir à la situation des finances publiques pendant les premières années de l'unité italienne, le déficit était couvert par la dette publique. Les titres de la dette publique se dévalorisaient à mesure qu'augmentait le déficit du budget et que des nouveaux titres étaient émis. Le rendement des titres, en effet, augmenta de 5 à 9 %. On décourageait ainsi les investissements dans l'industrie et dans l'agriculture là où le rendement était plus faible. De plus, les variations de valeur des titres de la dette publique entraînaient des mouvements spéculatifs. C'est justement pour faire face aux spéculations sur les titres de la dette publique qu'en 1886 on décida de suspendre la convertibilité de la monnaie. La contrainte de la couverture-or n'existant plus; l'Etat réussit ainsi à obtenir des banques la couverture de son déficit.

L'augmentation de la circulation monétaire eut un effet positif sur l'économie, parce qu'elle entraîna une dévaluation de la monnaie qui favorisa l'exportation. L'équilibre du budget fut atteint, quand la gauche remplaça la droite au gouvernement dupays. En fait, contrairement à ce à quoi l'on aurait pu s'attendre, la droite mena une politique de déficit du budget public, tandis que la gauche mena une politique d'équilibre. Examinons rapidement les dépenses de l'Etat durant les premières décennies de l'Unité italienne.

Au point de vue de l'économie, au delà de l'unification monétaire, fiscale et douanière (qui ne comportaient pas de frais), il était nécessaire de poursuivre une unification permettant le développement du trafic, des communications et des échanges; il était donc nécessaire de bâtir des routes et des bureaux de poste, d'étendre le réseau télégraphique aussi bien que le réseau des chemins de fer.

L'histoire des chemins de fer italiens est très complexe et ne peut pas être résumée en quelques mots. Il est important de souligner que l'Italie fut le premier pays qui nationalisa les chemins de fer; que les frais pour la réalisation du réseau absorbèrent une part considérable des dépenses publiques, enfin, que ce ne fut que grâce à l'intervention de l'Etat que l'Italie a eu la possibilité de disposer d'un réseau de chemins de fer, ce qui constituait la condition nécessaire pour l'unification économique du pays et la défense de ses frontières.

En ce qui concerne les structures de crédit, l'unification ne se

réalisa que très tard. Contrairement à ce qui se passait dans d'autres pays industrialisés, en Italie ont existé jusqu'à 1926 plusieurs banques d'émission. Une telle situation, parfaitement cohérente avec la pensée libérale dominant le pays à cette époque-là, dérivait du fait que les instituts d'émission du Sud s'opposaient à l'unification, voyant en elle la fin de leur pouvoir. En tout cas, même dans le secteur du crédit, l'Etat opéra d'importantes interventions. Etant donné l'insuffisance des banques sur tout le territoire national, furent fondées pour recevoir les dépôts, les Caisses d'épargne postales qui les versaient à une banque fondée, elle aussi, sur l'initiative de l'Etat, et qui accordait des crédits aux Communes.

Dès les premières années de l'unification, donc, nous trouvons à la base du développement économique italien une initiative d'Etat visant à créer les conditions et les infrastructures nécessaires à l'économie moderne. Et pourtant, les résultats ne furent pas satisfaisants, au moins dans l'immédiat. La raison principale doit en être attribuée, à mon avis, au fait que l'intervention de l'Etat dans le processus d'industrialisation a un effet à long terme. L'intervention de l'Etat dans les économies de marché en retard sur la voie de l'industrialisation est une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante. Pour que le mécanisme économique se mette en marche, il exige une multiplicité de conditions différentes, qui ne peuvent se manifester que graduellement: capacité des entrepreneurs, connaissances techniques et culturelles (dans un sens anthropologique) de la classe laborieuse, disponibilité de ressources, existence de marchés de débouchés, etc.

Une incitation vers une politique économique plus active vint justement de l'action entreprise par l'Etat. Loin de favoriser le développement de l'industrie métallurgique nationale, les dépenses militaires et les dépenses pour le développement des chemins de fer donnaient lieu à un flux croissant d'importations.

Au début des années 80, le ministre de la marine recommandait la création d'une aciérie pour la fourniture de matériel sidérurgique destiné à la construction de navires de guerre. Avec les fonds de l'Etat et des crédits fournis par les banques, l'aciérie de Terni fut fondée en 1884.

En réalité l'opération ne fut pas satisfaisante et l'on dut avoir recours à des subsides qui donnèrent lieu à des affaires

complexes et peu édifiantes; c'est ce qui arrive à ces entreprises qui ne se développent pas graduellement. Dans les années 80 on mit également en place l'industrie de la construction navale grâce à des subventions pour les fournitures militaires et ferroviaires, on adopta des critères visant à favoriser l'industrie nationale. Grâce à ces mesures, l'Italie voyait la naissance, à la fin du siècle dernier, d'une industrie de base et, par conséquent, les constructions navales et ferroviaires ne dépendaient plus des importations.

La politique industrielle des années 80 fut accompagnée d'une politique douanière protectionniste, réclamée par l'industrie aussi bien que par l'agriculture. Le blé et les produits agricoles américains, à cause de la diminution des coûts de transport due à l'introduction de la navigation à vapeur, étaient devenues considérablement concurrentiels par rapport aux produits nationaux. Cette nouvelle politique douanière eut un effet positif immédiat tant sur l'industrie que sur l'agriculture.

En réalité, cette politique a été sévèrement critiquée par les libéraux, car elle donnait lieu à des privilèges et à des inégalités. Elle a de même reçu des critiques de la part d'autres spécialistes. On a, par exemple, affirmé que le prix très élevé du blé, en maintenant des salaires élevés, a empêché la formation d'un équipement industriel moderne. La question très complexe, est encore débattue aujourd'hui. Nous partageons l'opinion démontrée par différents arguments suivant laquelle il faut placer à la base du développement économique italien, l'action entreprise par l'Etat. Le tournant de la politique industrielle et douanière correspond à l'avènement de la gauche au pouvoir. A mon avis, on devrait parler non d'un tournant, mais d'une évolution cohérente de la politique économique, datant des premières années de l'unité nationale. Cette évolution est liée surtout à l'affirmation définitive et l'évolution de cette pensée nationale qui avait largement inspiré même l'action des gouvernements de droite.

Pour en revenir aux faits, il faut reconnaître que le début de la politique protectionniste ne fut pas suivi d'une période de prospérité. De nombreuses banques connurent une crise, et l'intervention de l'Etat fut, une fois de plus, décisive pour le redressement de l'économie. Entre 1893 et 1894, les deux banques plus importantes accordant des crédits à l'industrie

firent faillite.

De nombreuses banques, qui étaient en plus impliquées dans de graves scandales, furent aussi sur le point de faire faillite. Même la Banque Nationale, l'une des 5 banques d'émission se trouvait en difficulté. Par des sauvetages directs des industries et indirects des banques, de la part de la Banque Nationale, on parvint enfin à une reprise de l'activité économique. En 1893, la Banque d'Italie fut fondée, absorbant trois des cinq banques d'émission. Les différents aspects de la crise bancaire se révèlent intéressants, parce qu'ils mettent en relief le troisième instrument de l'intervention de l'Etat en matière d'économie: l'aide qu'il accorde en cas de menace de faillite (les deux premiers étant les subventions accordées à l'industrie et les protections douanières).

Cet ensemble d'interventions est à la base du développement industriel, localisé principalement dans l'Italie nordoccidentale et se caractérise par le développement de la sidérurgie, ainsi que par la naissance de l'industrie automobile et des industries chimiques et électriques. L'Etat, en tout cas, conserva toujours un rôle actif dans le développement économique en passant des commandes pour de grands travaux publics, chemins de fer, armée et marine. En même temps, il continua sa politique de sauvotage économique. En 1907 à la suite de la crise économique qui toucha le monde occidental, la Société Bancaire Italienne connut de graves difficultés, qui pouvaient entraîner de nombreuses industries dans sa faillite. L'aide de la Banque d'Italie évita le désastre. On a écrit à ce propos: "La valeur réelle de la crise de 1907 et de sa solution réside dans la démonstration du rôle irremplaçable joué par l'Etat dans le processus de développement; . . . . il fut évident alors que sans la présence active et fonctionnelle de l'Etat . . . . le développement industriel italien aurait été compromis". En 1911, une nouvelle structuration technique et financière de la production sidérurgique apparut indispensable. Cette opération nécessita d'importants capitaux, introuvables sur le marché financier, on constitua, en coordination avec la Banque d'Italie, un consortium de banques qui se chargea du financement de l'industrie sidérurgique nationale. Dans cette même période, on introduisit le régime "d'importation temporaire" des produits sidérurgiques, dans le but d'aider l'industrie mécanique, qui ne pouvait être concurrentielle sur le

marché international en raison du prix très élevé des produits sidérurgiques. Entre les premières années du XXI<sup>ème</sup> siècle et la première guerre mondiale, la politique, économique commença à s'intéresser plus activement à l'agriculture, surtout par des interventions dans le domaine de la bonification agricole. Les problèmes de l'agriculture firent apparaître immédiatement ceux de l'Italie méridionale, zone dont la surface couvre plus d'un tiers du territoire national et comprend 40 % de la population italienne. Le Sud était, et est encore aujourd'hui, dans une position de sous-développement par rapport aux régions du nord: il est caractérisé par une agriculture peu productive et par l'insuffisance d'industries.

Le problème du développement de l'Italie méridionale fut littéralement ignoré, au siècle passé les interventions de politique économique n'ont été décidées qu'au début du XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle. On pourrait même dire qu'il y eut à cet égard un lien étroit entre la politique économique gouvernementale d'inspiration avant tout nationaliste et interventionniste, et la pensée économique dominante, nettement libérale. On pensa que l'émigration était l'instrument le plus efficace pour lutter contre la pauvreté du Sud. Entre la fin du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle et le début de la première guerre mondiale, plus de deux millions d'Italiens quittèrent l'Italie méridionale vers d'autres pays. Mais ce phénomène fut favorisé par l'intervention de l'Etat qui se chargea de maintenir à un niveau plus élevé les prix du voyage, par des crédits accordés à la marine.

La politique économique de l'Unité à la première guerre mondiale ne fut d'aucune utilité pour le Sud. Selon l'avis de nombreux spécialistes, le choix de l'industrialisation entraînait inévitablement des avantages pour l'Italie du Nord, vue la difficulté, voire l'impossibilité, d'industrialiser le territoire national tout entier. Selon d'autres économistes, qu'ils soient libéraux ou marxistes, la politique économique ne fut pas inspirée par la recherche d'un intérêt national ou général, mais par les intérêts des plus importants groupes de pression, c'est à dire la bourgeoisie industrielle du Nord.

Pour en revenir aux faits, mentionnons rapidement les dispositions prises en faveur du Sud. En 1903, l'intervention toucha l'une des régions, les plus pauvres, la Basilicate. On accorda à cette région des allègements fiscaux, une augmentation du crédit agricole, et l'on programma aussi des

travaux de reboisement, de voirie et de approuvée bonification. L'année suivante fut approuvée une loi pour l'alimentation en eau des Pouilles ainsi qu'une loi spéciale qui rendit possible, au moins en partie, l'assainissement de la ville de Naples et, entre autre, la création d'une usine sidérurgique. Plus tard les allègements fiscaux et la législation relative aux travaux publics fut étendue à toutes les régions du Sud.

La politique économique pour le Midi contribua seulement à remédier à quelques graves dysfonctions externes, mais n'eut aucun effet sur la structure sociale et productive.

Selon l'avis de nombreux économistes la politique économique poursuivie fut l'instrument à travers lequel, on parvint à raffermir ce système d'alliances qui avait été à la base du protectionnisme: l'alliance entre la bourgeoisie d'entreprise du Nord, qui réclamait le changement, et qui l'obtenait grâce à la politique économique suivie, et les propriétaires fonciers du Sud, qui ne voulaient aucun changement, et qui atteignaient leur but grâce à cette politique économique.

A la fin de ce bref tableau de la politique économique italienne qui couvre à peu près un demi siècle, il est également nécessaire de mentionner la politique sociale. Contrairement à ce qui s'est passé dans d'autres pays, les formes modernes d'assurance et de sécurité sociale ne se sont pas développées, en Italie, sur la base de l'associationnisme ou de l'initiative privée, mais grâce à l'intervention de l'Etat. Dans le domaine social il faut rappeler que, vers la fin du siècle dernier, l'Etat commença à se charger de l'instruction primaire par un vaste programme de constructions scolaires, fonda un institut d'assurance spécifique (INAIL), rendit obligatoire l'assurance contre les accidents, organisa enfin un deuxième institut où l'adhésion était volontaire, mais qui recevait une subvention de l'Etat. L'assurance contre les maladies resta aux Sociétés de secours mutuel et c'est seulement après la guerre qu'elle devint obligatoire et releva de la compétence de l'Etat. Les premières lois en matière de travail (interdiction du travail de nuit des femmes et des enfants; limites d'âge pour le recrutement de la main d'oeuvre infantile; plafond de onze heures de travail journalier), furent inspirées, dit-on, par le désir de favoriser certains secteurs industriels en régularisant le marché du travail, plutôt que par des idéaux humanitaires ou des principes démocratiques. Le rôle décisif de l'Etat dans le



développement économique italien apparaît donc en pleine lumière. Et ce rôle n'a pas produit un mécanisme d'auto-propulsion du marché, mais a été formé par une pluralité d'instruments de politique économique qui, l'un après l'autre, ont provoqué ou orienté les mécanismes du marché au point de prendre leur place dans les moments de crise. Ces instruments sont: les protections douanières, les commandes de l'Etat, les subventions à la production, le caractère public de certaines structures de crédit, les nationalisations et les aides accordées dans le cadre d'une politique de travaux publics, des allègements fiscaux et des crédits pour les zones sous-développées. Comme nous l'avons déjà dit, suivant l'avis de nombreux économistes, l'emploi d'une série d'instruments de politique économique si ample a été indispensable pour la réalisation rapide de l'industrialisation en compétition avec les pays dans lesquels la révolution industrielle avait eu lieu des décennies à l'avance. Il faut reconnaître que, historiquement, les pays qui, après l'Italie, se sont proposés l'objectif du progrès économique, ont réalisé une politique économique encore plus active que l'Italie, sans pour autant suivre le modèle anglais classique.

Comme on l'a dit "le capitalisme italien se proposait dès le début d'être un capitalisme d'Etat", et de l'unification à la première guerre mondiale, et même au delà, il est aisé de reconnaître les lignes de développement de l'intervention de l'Etat en matière d'économie aussi bien que les instruments à travers lesquels cette intervention fut réalisée.

Ce n'est pas à moi de tirer des conclusions, mais je crois pouvoir déduire, d'après ce que je viens d'exposer, que les vicissitudes de la politique économique italienne pendant les 50 premières années de son histoire qui ont suivi son Unité, ne peuvent pas être mécaniquement rattachées au développement d'une idée nationaliste. A mon avis, la politique économique, dans chaque période et en tous temps, n'est pas inspirée par des principes ou des théories, mais plutôt par l'intérêt des groupes de pression qui, dans le but de maintenir leurs positions, peuvent accorder certaines concessions à d'autres groupes qui s'opposent ou même représentent l'ennemi à abattre. Cette thèse a été largement développée en Italie par de nombreux spécialistes des finances publiques, par les théoriciens de cette branche d'étude que l'on appelle "sociologie financière".









