OPTIMAL FOREST TAXATION WITH MULTIPLE-USE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREST STANDS**

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ABSTRACT: The paper studies optimal forest taxation under the following conditions: private forest owners value amenity services of forest stands; forest stands have public goods characteristic, and there is idiosyncratic uncertainty about future timber price. It is assumed that preferences of forest owners can be described by a quasi-linear, intertemporal utility function which reflects risk aversion in terms of consumption and constant marginal utility in terms of amenity services. The comparative statics of current and future harvesting in terms of timber price risk, land site tax and yield tax are developed first. These behavioral properties are then used to study optimal forest taxation. It is shown that, given the optimal land site tax, which is independent of the timber harvested and thus non-distortionary, it is desirable to introduce the yield tax at the margin; it both corrects externality due to the public goods characteristic of forest stands and serves as an insurance device. The optimal yield tax is less than 100 % and depends on the social value of forest stands, timber price risk and properties of compensated timber supply. In the general case the "inverse elasticity rule" -- according to which the optimal yield tax is negatively related to the size of the substitution effects -- may not hold. Under certainty, the desirability of the yield tax, given the optimal land site tax, depends only on the existence of public goods characteristic and is thus a pure Pigouvian tax.

KEY WORDS: multiple-use forests, timber supply, optimal forest taxation.
JEL classification: D62, H21, Q23.


ASIASANAT: metsien monikäyttö, puun tarjonta, optimaalinen metsäverotus.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Besides timber and timber revenues, forests provide a large variety of tangible and nontangible services. These nontimber services are produced jointly with timber - nontimber services vanish with the standing stock. Therefore, the decision to harvest timber affects automatically the flow of nontimber services one can get from standing stock of forests. This joint production property is not, however, reflected in the property rights over forests. Forest owners typically own timber stock and forest land, but most of nontimber services belong to the class of public goods or common property resources. This creates a problem: as the trees are owned privately, the harvesting decisions tend to neglect the amenities of forests causing an external effect to the society as a whole even though the amenity services of forest stock would have some private value. These ecological relationships are further complicated by an underlying uncertainty associated at least with the future timber prices. This uncertainty may be either idiosyncratic or aggregative. These features raise several interesting issues to be studied: (i) what are the qualitative properties of timber supply when standing stock has private value?, (ii) what are the implications of risk associated with the future timber prices in this context?, (iii) what is the nature of optimal policy from the point of view of the society when amenity services are public goods? Or to be more specific, what kind of tax system is needed to deal with inefficiencies associated with the public goods nature of amenity services and uncertainty about future timber prices? The purpose of this paper is to analyze these largely unexplored issues. Before getting down to business we present a brief review of the relevant existing literature which provides an additional motivation for our analysis.

Hartman (1976) was first to analyze the implications of the public good characteristics of amenity services for the optimal rotation in the so-called Faustmann rotation framework. He showed that accounting for amenity services would lengthen the rotation period under the assumption that amenity services are homogenous and increase with the age of the forest stand. This analysis was clarified and extended in various ways by Strang (1983). The role of nontimber services was empirically evaluated in Calish, Fight and Teegarden (1978). The production of amenities in
many land sites and stands has been analyzed in Bowes and Krutilla (1989), Swallow and Wear (1993) and, Vincent and Binkley (1993). Some further elaborations are also given in Knapp (1981) and, Snyder and Bhattacharyya (1990).

Production of amenities has also been studied in the utility maximization framework starting from Binkley's (1981) static model, where the forest owner is assumed to get utility from timber revenues and non-timber services. Max and Lehman (1988) used a two-period consumption cutting model, where standing values of the forest are fully captured by forest owners, to develop comparative statics of various forest taxes. Hyberg and Holthausen (1989) combined utility maximization with an analysis of reafforestation and amenity services. While these models differ from the rotation models in details, their basic results are similar to the Hartman solution; accounting for nontimber services either individually or socially decreases harvesting compared with the case where only timber revenue matters.

The divergence of private and social valuation of nontimber services raises a question of how the externality caused by the private harvesting decision could be eliminated via taxation so that the flow of amenities would reach the socially efficient level. Using the rotation framework, Englin and Klan (1990) define the socially optimal Pigouvian rates for property, severance and yield taxes and offer a case study for Douglas fir for finding out how the taxes would work in practice. Neutral taxes, such as an unmodified property tax, do not change the rotation period and cannot increase the production of amenities. A modified property tax, yield and severance taxes affect all the length of rotation period and, therefore, change the mix of timber and amenities produced from the forests to the socially desired level. Their analysis, however, abstracts from uncertainty and government tax revenue considerations. Thus the relative efficiency of various taxes, when the tax revenue remains constant cannot be compared.

This paper explores various issues associated with taxation and harvesting behavior of nonindustrial forest owners when they value amenity services of forest stands, when forest stands
have a public goods characteristic and when there is an idiosyncratic uncertainty about future timber price which vanishes at the aggregate level. It is assumed that preferences of forest owners can be described by a quasi-linear, additively separable intertemporal utility function, which reflects risk aversion in terms of consumption and constant marginal utility in terms of amenity services. The paper extends the earlier analyses in several important respects. First, it develops the comparative statics of harvesting in terms of timber price risk and forest taxes by decomposing the total effect into various subcomponents in what is a relatively complex set-up. Second, in complement to the earlier literature, which has analyzed forest taxes in isolation, we study the optimal forest taxation from the public finance point of view. This means that we pose the question: given that government has to acquire a certain amount of tax revenue from forests, what would be the optimal way of doing it? The forest taxes to be compared are land site tax and yield tax. The land site tax has no effect on relative prices and is thus non-distortionary so that it is natural to regard it as the benchmark tax to which other taxes are compared. The yield tax, on the other hand, is a forest tax which is commonly used in various countries.

To anticipate results, it is shown that timber price risk affects current harvesting positively, while it has an a priori ambiguous effect on future harvesting. A rise in the land tax increases harvesting, while the effect of the yield tax is a priori ambiguous both on current and future harvesting. As for the optimal taxation, it is shown that given the optimal land site tax it is desirable to introduce the yield tax at the margin; it both corrects the externality due to the public goods characteristic of forest stands and serves as an insurance device. The optimal yield tax, which is less than 100% for incentive reasons, is the Ramsey-Pigou tax with social insurance; it depends on the social value of forest stands, timber price risk and properties of compensated timber supply. The "inverse elasticity rule", according to which the optimal yield tax is negatively related to the size of the substitution effects, may not hold. Under certainty, the desirability of the yield tax, given the optimal land site tax, depends only on the existence of public goods characteristic and is thus a pure Pigouvian tax.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of timber supply and forest taxation when standing forest has private value and there is an uncertainty about future timber price and develops its behavioral implications. The optimal forest taxation with and without timber price risk, when forest stand has public goods characteristic, is analyzed in section 3. Finally, there are some concluding remarks.

2. TIMBER SUPPLY AND FOREST TAXATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY WHEN STANDING FOREST HAS PRIVATE VALUE

2.1. A Model of Timber Supply under Uncertainty with Amenity Services

The forest owner is assumed to have a preference ordering over present and future consumption \((c_1\) and \(c_2\)) and over present and future amenity services provided by the forest stands \((k_1\) and \(k_1)\) respectively. This is represented by a utility function which is assumed to be both additively separable and additive across periods and concave in each argument so that

\[
U = u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2) + v(k_1) + \beta v(k_2)
\]

where \(\beta = (1 + \rho)^{-1}\) describes the time preference factor. Thus \(U\) describes the discounted utility from consumption and amenity services in both periods. In what follows the partial derivatives are denoted by primes for functions with one argument and by subscripts for functions with many arguments. E.g. \(u'(c_1) = \partial u(c_1) / \partial c_1, A_1(x, y) = \partial A(x, y) / \partial x\) etc. The joint production of timber and amenities is given in equations (2a-2b). By harvesting a part \(h_1\) of the initial forest stand \(Q\) the owner chooses also \(k_1\) according to (2a). This remaining stock will grow according to a concave growth function \(F(Q-h_1)\) with \(F'(\cdot) > 0, F''(\cdot) < 0\). By choosing the size of future harvesting \(h_2\) the owner decides also the future forest stand \(k_2\) which gives future amenity services. All this is described in
(a) \( k_i = Q - h_i \)

(2)

(b) \( k_2 = (Q - h_i) + F(Q - h_i) - h_2 \)

Notice that \( (dk_2 + dh_2) / dh_1 = -(1 + F') \times 0 \). Thus e.g. a rise in current harvesting implies that the sum of future harvesting and future forest stand decreases by the amount which depends on the growth function of forest.

The government is assumed to levy two forest taxes on forest owners, namely the land site tax \( T \) and the yield tax \( \tau \). The land site tax is a lump-sum tax, which is independent of harvesting. The yield tax is a proportional tax imposed upon timber revenues. If the timber price is denoted by \( p_i, i = 1,2 \), then the post-tax price is \( p_i = p_i(1 - \tau) \). During the first period the forest owner allocates the net revenue from harvesting between consumption \( (c_1) \), saving \( (s) \) and land site tax \( (T) \) so that

(3) \[ c_1 = p_i^* h_i - T - s \]

where we have abstracted from other incomes for simplicity. The (uncertain) future consumption is defined by the sum of the future net revenue from harvesting and capital income plus savings minus the land site tax so that we have

(4) \[ \tilde{c}_2 = \tilde{p}_2^* h_2 - T + (1 + r)s \]

where \( r \) denotes the interest rate on the capital market and tilde for stochasticity of future timber price and future consumption. Combining the flow-of-funds equations (3) and (4) yields the intertemporal budget constraint for the forest owner

(5) \[ \tilde{c}_2 = \tilde{p}_2^* h_2 - T + (1 + r)[p_i^* h_i - T - c_1] \]
In the spirit of traditional public finance we have assumed that both the land site tax $T$ and the yield tax $\tau$ are the same now and in the future, but their levels are determined by maximizing the social welfare function under the government tax revenue requirement. This means that the policy maker is assumed to commit future policy so that before any private decisions are made, government announces a tax policy to which it commits.\footnote{In the terminology of game theory we study a Stackelberg equilibrium with the government as the dominant player. If the government cannot enter into binding commitments, but instead reoptimizes at the beginning of each period, then we have the Nash equilibrium without commitment. In the model once the harvesting decision in the first period has been made, its tax base becomes predetermined and it is ex post optimal to tax it as much as needed (or as much as possible). If forest owners see that possibility, they anticipate it and change their behavior beforehand. The analysis of tax policy without commitment, however, lies beyond the scope of this paper. See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1990) for an excellent survey on the literature about this relatively new research area.}

Assuming that the forest owners behave according to the expected utility maximization hypothesis and are risk averse so that $\mu''(\bar{c}_2) < 0$. The decision problem can now be posed as maximizing the expected utility $EU$ with respect to $c_1, h_1$ and $h_2$ subject to (5) (2a) and (2b), where $E$ denotes the expectations operator. The first-order conditions for the expected utility maximization are

\begin{align}
\text{(a)} \quad EU_{c_1} &= u'(c_1) - \beta REu'(\bar{c}_2) = 0 \\
\text{(b)} \quad EU_{h_1} &= \beta R p_1^* E u'(\bar{c}_2) - v'(k_1) - \beta (1 + F') v'(k_2) = 0 \\
\text{(c)} \quad EU_{h_2} &= E \left[ \tilde{p}_2 u'(\bar{c}_2) \right] - v'(k_2) = 0
\end{align}

where $R = (1 + r)$. What kind of harvesting rule emerges from the set of first-order conditions (6b) and (6c)? Substituting (6c) into (6b) yields the generalized harvesting rule

\begin{align}
R p_1^* - \tilde{p}_2^* (1 + F') &= \frac{\text{cov}(u'(\bar{c}_2), \tilde{p}_2^*)(1 + F')}{Eu'(\bar{c}_2)} + \frac{v'(k_1)}{\beta Eu'(\bar{c}_2)}
\end{align}
where \( \bar{p}_2 \) denotes the expected future timber price and \( \text{cov}(u'(\bar{c}_2), \bar{p}_2) < 0 \) because of risk aversion.

Several interesting observations can be presented on the basis of the equation (7). First, if there is no uncertainty and no valuation of amenity services, then the RHS of (7) would be zero and the harvesting decisions would be separable from the preferences of the forest owner. Harvesting would be carried out to the point, where the post-tax marginal returns from harvesting \( R P_i^* \) are equal to the post-tax marginal costs of harvesting \( p_i^*(1 + F) \).\(^2\) Second, under uncertainty with no valuation of amenity services the first RHS term is negative and the second zero so that the LHS of (7) is negative. Thus allowing for future timber price uncertainty with risk aversion will have the effect of increasing harvesting today compared with the certainty situation. Moreover, harvesting is no longer separable from the preferences of the forest owner (see e.g. Koskela (1989a))\(^3\). Third, under certainty when the forest stand has private value, the first term in the RHS is zero, while the second term is positive so that the LHS of (7) is positive. Thus allowing for the valuation of amenity services will have the effect of decreasing harvesting today. This is another channel via which the harvesting decisions become dependent on preferences of the forest owner.\(^4\)

2.2. Analytics of Timber Supply under Uncertainty with Amenity Services

In general terms comparative statics becomes messy and not very illuminating. In order to get sharper insights we proceed by simplifying the analysis in some respects. First, we assume that the marginal private valuation of amenity services as a function of the forest stand is constant so

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\(^2\) Thus under certainty with no amenity valuation, yield tax is neutral in terms of harvesting decision. Because land site tax is also neutral, it does not matter which of those taxes is used from the welfare point of view. Note also that under constant timber prices one gets the Jevons-Wicksell rule for one rotation period \( r = \bar{r} \).

\(^3\) It is possible to extend the analysis to deal with multiple sources of uncertainty. See e.g. Ollikainen (1993) for an analysis of forest taxation with two sources of uncertainty.

\(^4\) Credit rationing in the form of a binding borrowing constraint provides the third channel, through which harvesting decisions may depend on the preferences of forest owner (see e.g. Koskela (1989b)).
that we have $v(k_i) = mk_i$, for $i=1,2$. This is of course a simplification. One can think of amenity services provided by the forest, for which this is incorrect, e.g. biodiversity. Yet it is possible to think of many amenity services, where it does apply. For instance if amenity services, like campsites or recreational facilities are offered under the circumstances, in which congestion is not an issue over the relevant range, then the assumption seems to hold. Second, the future timber price is assumed to be normally distributed $\bar{p}_2 \sim N(\bar{p}_2, \sigma_p^2)$, where $\bar{p}_2$ is the expected future timber price and $\sigma_p^2$ its variance. Finally, the utility function in terms of consumption is described as $u(c_i) = -\exp(-Ac_i)$, where $A = -u''(c_i)/u'(c_i)$ is the Arrow-Pratt constant absolute risk-aversion (see Hirschleifer and Riley (1992) for details). Under these assumptions, the forest owner’s decision problem can be rephrased as maximizing

$$EU = -\exp(-Ac_i) - \beta \exp(x) + m(k_1 + \beta k_2)$$

where $x = -A\bar{c}_2 + (1/2)A^2(1-\tau)^2h_2\sigma_p^2$ and $m$ is the constant marginal valuation of amenity services.

It is easy to show that maximizing (8) with respect to $c_1, h_1$ and $h_2$ produces a cutting rule similar to (7), as can be seen in (7.‘)

$$R_{p2} - \bar{p}_2(1 + F') = -A(1-\tau)^2h_2\sigma_p^2(1 + F') + \frac{m}{\beta A \exp(x)}$$

Given that the second-order conditions hold, the first-order conditions define implicitly the optimal consumption and harvesting in terms of exogenous parameters, especially in terms of timber price risk and taxes so that $c_i = c_i(\sigma_p^2, T, \tau, \ldots)$, $h_1 = h_1(\sigma_p^2, T, \tau, \ldots)$ and $h_2 = h_2(\sigma_p^2, T, \tau, \ldots)$. Substituting these for the respective variables in (8) makes it possible to express the expected utility indirectly in terms of the same parameters. Utilizing the envelope theorem to the expected indirect utility function $E(U^*)$ gives
(a) \[ EU^*_{\sigma_p} = -\frac{1}{2} \beta A^2 (1-\tau)^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x) < 0 \]

(9)  
(b) \[ EU^*_T = -\beta (1+R) A \exp(x) < 0 \]

(c) \[ EU^*_z = (1+R)^{-1} y EU^*_T + \beta A^2 (1-\tau)^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x) \]

\[ = (1+R)^{-1} z EU^*_T < 0 \]

where \( y = \bar{p}_2 h_2 + Rp_1 h_1 > 0 \), \( z = [\bar{p}_2 - A(1-\tau)h_2 \sigma_p^2]h_2 + Rp_1 h_1 > 0 \) and the risk-adjusted price \( \bar{p}_2 - A(1-\tau)h_2 \sigma_p^2 > 0 \). An increase in timber price risk, land site tax and yield tax decrease the maximum expected utility attainable to the forest-owner.

Given that \( EU^*_T < 0 \), \( EU^* = u^0 \) can be inverted for \( T \) in terms of timber price risk, yield tax and maximum expected utility so that \( T = g(\sigma_p^2, \tau, u^0) \). Substituting this expression for \( T \) in \( EU^* \) gives the compensated indirect utility function \( EU^*[g(\sigma_p^2, \tau, u^0), \tau] \).\(^5\) The expected compensated indirect utility function answers the following question: if, e.g., the yield tax rate \( \tau \) is increased, how much the land site tax \( T \) has to be changed so as to keep the expected utility of the forest owner unchanged? Differentiating with respect to \( \tau \) produces \( EU^*_T g_{\tau} + EU^*_z = 0 \) so that \( g_{\tau} = -EU^*_zEU^*_T^{-1} = -(1+R)^{-1} z \). This expression is useful later on and indicates the required compensation necessary to keep the level of expected utility unchanged as the yield tax changes.

It is known that at the expected utility maximization point

(10) \[ h_i(\sigma_p^2, \tau, T) = h_i^{c}(\sigma_p^2, \tau, u^0) \quad \text{for } i=1,2 \]

where \( h_i \) is the uncompensated timber supply and \( h_i^{c} \) is the compensated timber supply, which is the timber supply, when yield tax is changed and the forest owner is compensated by a change in

\(^5\) See e.g. Diamond and Yaari (1972).
land site tax so as to keep the expected utility unchanged. Substituting the \( g \)-function for \( T \) in the uncompensated timber function \( h \) and differentiating the equation (10) with respect to \( \tau \) gives

\[
h_{it} + h_{it} g_{\tau} = h_{it}^c \quad \text{for } i=1,2.
\]

Thus one gets the Slutsky decomposition for current and future harvesting in terms of the yield tax:

\[
(11) \quad h_{it} = h_{it}^c + (1+R)^{-1} z h_{it} \quad \text{for } i=1,2
\]

where the total effect of yield tax consists of the substitution effect \( (h_{it}^c) \) and of the 'wealth' effect \( ((1+R)^{-1} z h_{it}) \).

2.2.1 Comparative Statics under Certainty

It turns out useful to look first at the simpler case of certainty. The Slutsky decomposition reduces to

\[
(11') \quad h_{it} = h_{it}^{0c} + (1+R)^{-1} y h_{it}^{0y} \quad \text{for } i = 1,2
\]

where \( h^{0} \) denotes timber supply under certainty and \( y = p_2 h_2 + R p_1 h_1 > 0 \). As for the 'wealth' effects one can show

(a) \( h_{it}^{0y} = 0 \)

(12)

(b) \( h_{it}^{0y} = m F'' p_2^* \Phi > 0 \).

where \( \Phi = \Delta^{-1} \left[ \beta R A^t (1+R) \exp(-2A c_2 - A c_1) \right] < 0 \) with \( \Delta < 0 \) due to the second-order conditions for utility maximization.

A rise in land site tax has no effect on current harvesting but it increases future harvesting. The
first-order condition (6b) determines \( h_1 \) by equating the marginal utility of future consumption \((\beta R p^*_1 u'(c_2))\) and the marginal utility of current amenity services \((m(1+\beta(1+F^*)))\) from \( h_1 \). A rise in \( T \) increases the marginal utility of future consumption, which tends to increase current harvesting. But according to (6a) a fall in current consumption due to a rise in \( T \) decreases the marginal utility of current consumption so that there is no need for current harvesting to adjust. And \( h_2 \) is determined by equating the marginal utility of future consumption \((p^*_2 u'(c_2))\) and the marginal utility of future amenity services \((m)\) from \( h_2 \) as in (6c). A rise in \( T \) increases the marginal utility of future consumption, but leaves the marginal utility of future amenity services unchanged. Hence, it is optimal for forest owners to increase \( h_2 \) and decrease \( k_2 \). Thus future amenity services are normal goods.

As for the substitution effects of yield tax one gets

\[
\text{(a) } h_{1\tau}^c = 0
\]

\[(13)\]

\[
\text{(b) } h_{2\tau}^c = \frac{m F'' p_2 N^0}{N^0} < 0
\]

where \( N^0 = \Delta^{-1} \left[ \beta^2 AU_{c_2} \exp(-2Ac_2) \right] > 0 \). The substitution effect of yield tax is zero for current harvesting, but negative for future harvesting. This is because the changes in current consumption take care of the need to change current harvesting, while a rise in \( \tau \) tends to decrease the marginal utility of future consumption relative to the constant marginal utility of future amenity services. Therefore future amenity services (future harvesting) increases (decreases).

These can be summarized in

**Proposition 1:** Under certainty and private valuation of amenity services (a) land site tax has no effect on current harvesting, but affects future harvesting positively, (b) yield tax has no effect on current harvesting, while its effect on future harvesting is a priori ambiguous, (c) the substitution
effect of yield tax is proportional to the wealth effect and zero (negative) for current (future) harvesting.

2.2.2 Comparative Statics under Uncertainty

Let us now turn back to the Slutsky decomposition (11) which divides the total effect of yield tax into the substitution and wealth effects respectively, the latter expressed in terms of land site tax. The effect of land site tax under uncertainty can be written as

\[(a) \quad h_{1T} = h_{1T}^{00} - \beta R p^*_1 A^2 (1 - \tau)^2 \sigma_p^2 \Phi > 0 \]

\[(12') \quad h_{2T} = h_{2T}^{00} \left[ 1 - A (1 - \tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_p^2 \overline{p}_2^{-1} \right] > 0 \]

where \( \Phi = \Delta^{-1} \left[ \beta^2 A^4 (1 + R) \exp(2x - Ac) \right] \times 0 \) with \( \Delta \times 0 \) due to the second-order conditions for the expected utility maximization, \( h_{1T}^{00} = h_{1T}^0 = 0 \), and \( h_{2T}^{00} \) is almost equal to \( h_{2T}^0 \), in which just the variance term has vanished from the exponent of \( \Phi \). Thus allowing for uncertainty makes also current harvesting positively dependent on land site tax. This is due to the fact that a rise in land site tax increases precautionary saving which can be done by harvesting more today. Under uncertainty both current and future amenity services are normal goods.

Before developing signs and economic interpretation of the substitution effects of yield tax we look at the relationship between harvesting and future timber price risk. Differentiating the compensated indirect utility function \( EU^* [g(\sigma_p^2, \tau, u^0), \sigma_p^2, \tau] \) with respect to \( \sigma_p^2 \) gives the compensation required to keep the owner's utility constant as \( \sigma_p^2 \) changes, \( g_{\sigma_p^2} = -(1/2)(1 + R)^{-1} A (1 - \tau)^2 h_2^2 \). Utilizing the equality (10) between compensated and uncompensated harvesting and differentiating it with respect to \( T \) and \( \sigma_p^2 \) gives the Slutsky decomposition for the effect of timber price risk.
(14) \[ h_{i\sigma}^c = h_{i\sigma}^e + \frac{1}{2} (1 + R)^{-1} A (1 - \tau)^2 h_{i\tau}^2 h_{i\tau} \] for i=1,2.

One can show that the substitution effect of variance is positive for current harvesting \((h_{i\sigma}^c > 0)\) and negative for future harvesting \((h_{i\sigma}^c < 0)\). The risk-averse forest owner increases (decreases) current (future) harvesting when future timber price risk becomes higher. Wealth effects of timber price risk are positive; a rise in timber price risk is like a decrease in the expected timber price: harvesting tends to increase. Hence, timber price risk increases current harvesting, while its effect on future harvesting is a priori ambiguous (see appendix 1 for details).

The next and final step is to use the substitution effect in (14) to re-express the substitution effects of yield tax. These substitution effects under risk can be decomposed into two components as follows.

\[ h_{i\tau}^e = S_{i\tau} - (1 - \tau)^{-1} \sigma_{i\sigma}^2 h_{i\sigma}^e < 0 \]

(15)

\[ h_{i\tau}^e = S_{2\tau} - (1 - \tau)^{-1} \sigma_{i\sigma}^2 h_{i\sigma}^e = ? \]

where

\[ S_{i\tau} = -(1 - \tau)^{-1} \left[ p_1 h_{i\tau}^e + \bar{p}_2 h_{i\tau}^e \right] < 0 \]

(16)

\[ S_{2\tau} = -(1 - \tau)^{-1} \left[ p_1 h_{i\tau}^e + \bar{p}_2 h_{i\tau}^e \right] < 0 \]

The substitution effects of yield tax \((h_{i\tau}^e)\) under uncertainty can be decomposed into the substitution effects due to a change in after-tax timber prices \((S_{i\tau}^e)\) on the one hand and into the substitution effects due to a change in timber price risk \(-(1 - \tau)^{-1} \sigma_{i\sigma}^2 h_{i\sigma}^e\) on the other hand.

The substitution effect is negative (a priori ambiguous) for current (future) harvesting. A rise in yield tax works like a fall in timber price risk, which tends to increase (decrease) current (future) harvesting. But it also decreases the after-tax timber prices decrease, which tends to decrease
current and future harvesting. Thus the after-tax price and risk substitution effects reinforce for current harvesting, while run counter to each other for future harvesting\(^6\).

One can summarize these in

**Proposition 2:** Under uncertainty and private valuation of amenity services (a) timber price risk affects current harvesting positively, but has an a priori ambiguous effect on future harvesting, (b) amenity services are normal goods so that a rise in land site tax increases both current and future harvesting, (c) the effect of yield tax is a priori ambiguous both on current and future harvesting and (d) the substitution effect of yield tax is negative (a priori ambiguous) for current (future) harvesting.

One might be tempted to believe that in the presence of sign ambiguities, there is no hope to characterize the optimal forest taxation at all. This belief is not, however, justified.

3. OPTIMAL FOREST TAXATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY WHEN AMENITY SERVICES ARE PUBLIC GOODS

After having developed comparative statics of timber supply under uncertainty about future timber price when the forest stand has private value, we turn to consider the issue of optimal forest taxation from the point of view of the society. Before doing that we have to clear up some things. First, it is assumed in what follows that forest taxes are chosen so that to keep the government tax revenue requirement as given. Under future timber price uncertainty one has to solve how to deal with uncertainty in the government tax revenue requirement. If the risk associated with future timber price is idiosyncratic, i.e. that it is identically and independently distributed across individual forest owners. Under these circumstances government tax revenue

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\(^6\) See Koskela (1984) for a similar decomposition and interpretation in a different context.
requirement at the aggregate level remains deterministic. The discounted value of government
tax revenues can be written

\[ G = T(1 + R^{-1}) + \tau \left[ p_1 h_1 + R^{-1} p_2 h_2 \right] \]

Second, one allows for the possibility that amenities of forest stands are public goods. This means
that people, who are not forest owners, can benefit from the amenity services of forest stands
without depleting their availability to others. If \( n \) people benefit from amenity services, then the
extra component of the social welfare due the public goods-characteristic of forest stand is
\( (n - 1)m(k_1 + \beta k_2) \), when the valuation of amenity services of non-forest owners is the same than
that of forest owners.

The social planner's problem is to choose the land site tax \( T \) and the yield tax \( \tau \) so as to maximize
the social welfare function

\[ W = EU^s(T, \tau, ...) + (n - 1)m(k_1 + \beta k_2) \]

subject to the government tax revenue requirement (17). In the expression (18) the first RHS
component describes the maximum expected utility of a representative forest owner in terms of
forest taxes \( T \) and \( \tau \), while the second RHS component is just the external benefits to the society
from the assumption that amenity services of the forest stand have public goods-characteristic.

3.1. A Command Optimum

---

7 The idiosyncratic risk case has been analyzed in an optimal income taxation context e.g. by Varian (1980). If
the risk is aggregative -- as is quite likely in the case of stochastic forest growth -- then the government tax
revenue function is stochastic and in one way or another private agents must ultimately bear all the risk whether
through random taxes, random government expenditures or random government deficits. See Gordon (1985) for a
general equilibrium analysis of risk-shifting issues in the context of corporate taxation when risk is aggregative.

8 See e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for an advanced textbook on the optimal taxation from the public finance
point of view.
It is helpful to start by looking at the first-best problem of choosing the current and future harvesting so as to get an efficient solution without worrying about government tax revenue requirement. This means that one should find the current and future harvesting which maximize the social welfare function (18) without taxes. In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, there is no risk at the aggregate level so that the command optimum can be written as

\[(a) \quad W^\alpha_{h_i} = \beta R p_1 u'(c_2) - nB_i = 0\]

\[(19)\]

\[(b) \quad W^\alpha_{h_i} = p_2 u'(c_2) - nm = 0\]

where \(B_i = m(1 + \beta(1 + F')) > 0\).

The corresponding expressions at the individual level are

\[(a) \quad EU_{h_i} = \beta R p_1 E u'(\tilde{c}_2) - B_i = 0\]

\[(19')\]

\[(b) \quad EU_{h_i} = Eu'(\tilde{c}_2) \bar{p}_2 + \text{cov}(u'(\tilde{c}_2), \tilde{p}_2) - m = 0,\]

where \(\text{cov}(u'(\tilde{c}_2), \tilde{p}_2) < 0\).

If society could directly control harvesting, optimal harvesting would amount to equating the marginal benefits from harvest revenues and the social valuation of amenity services. On the one hand, individual forest owners value amenity services, but less than society. This suggests that from the point of society individual harvesting is too high; in terms of taxation one should levy a lump-sum subsidy \(s_1 = (n-1)B_1\) for current harvesting and a lump-sum subsidy \(s_2 = (n-1)m\) for future harvesting. If the subsidy cannot vary over time, then the command optimum cannot be obtained. On the other hand, individuals face uncertainty but society not. This suggests that apart
from externalities the harvesting is too high from the viewpoint of the society. One should set \( \tau = 1 \) and give revenues back as lump-sum transfer. These considerations, however, neglect government budget constraint and the fact that subsidies and taxes affect the behavior of forest owners.

### 3.2. Ramsey-Pigou Taxation with Social Insurance

Assume that before any private decisions are made, the government announces a tax policy and commits to it. The first-order conditions for the social welfare maximization under the tax revenue requirement can be obtained by setting the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian function \( \Omega = W + \lambda G \) with respect to \( T \) and \( \tau \) zero so that

\[
\begin{align*}
\Omega_T &= EU_T^* - (n-1)\left[B_1h_{1T} + B_2h_{2T}\right] + \lambda G_T = 0 \\
\Omega_\tau &= EU_{\tau}^* - (n-1)\left[B_1h_{1\tau} + B_2h_{2\tau}\right] + \lambda G_{\tau} = 0
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \lambda > 0 \) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the government tax revenue requirement (17), \( B_i = m(1+\beta(1+F')) > 0 \) and \( B_2 = \beta m > 0 \). The equations (20) and (21) implicitly define optimal values \( T^* \) and \( \tau^* \).

According to the equation (20) the optimal land site tax \( T \) is determined by equating the loss of marginal social utility due to the land site tax \( (W_T = EU_T^* - (n-1)\left[B_1h_{1T} + B_2h_{2T}\right] < 0) \) to the increase in tax revenues evaluated at the value of the Lagrangian multiplier \( \lambda G_T \), where \( G_T = (1+R^{-1}) + \tau(p_1h_{1T} + R^{-1}p_2 h_{2T}) > 0 \). The loss of marginal social utility results from two effects: the maximum expected utility decreases directly and the social welfare indirectly via the fact that current and future harvesting increase thus decreasing social value of amenity services.

---

9 In the literature of dynamic games this kind of equilibrium with commitment would be described as "open-loop equilibrium", see e.g. Basar and Olsder 1982.
Utilizing the envelope results and the Slutsky decompositions for timber supply the expression (21) can be written in terms of (20) as

\[(21') \Omega_x = (1 + R)^{-1} y \Omega_T - (n - 1) \left[ B_1 h_{1x} + B_2 h_{2x} \right] + \beta A^2 (1 - \tau) h_2^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x) + \lambda \sigma [p_1 h_{1x} + p_2 h_{2x}] = 0 \]

Given the optimal choice of \( T = T^\ast \) defined by (20) the equation (21') is reduced to

\[(22) \quad \Omega_x (T = T^\ast) = -(n - 1) \left[ B_1 h_{1x} + B_2 h_{2x} \right] + \beta A^2 (1 - \tau) h_2^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x) + \lambda \sigma [p_1 h_{1x} + p_2 h_{2x}] = 0 \]

where the first RHS term in (21') has vanished. The expression (22) gives the optimal yield tax when the land site tax has been chosen optimally. In order to see, whether the yield tax is needed at all, one has to look at the corner solution. The partial derivative of the Lagrangian at the margin, when the yield tax is zero is

\[(22) \quad \Omega_x (T = T^\ast, \tau = 0) = -(n - 1) \left[ B_1 h_{1x} + B_2 h_{2x} \right] + \beta A^2 h_2^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x) \geq 0 \]

Thus given the optimal land site tax, it is welfare-increasing to introduce the yield tax at the margin. This happens for two reasons: First, introducing the yield tax decreases harvesting via the substitution effects and thereby corrects for the externality due to the public goods characteristics of forest stand (the term \(-(n - 1)(B_1 h_{1x} + B_2 h_{2x}) > 0\), see appendix 2 for details). Second, introducing the yield tax at the margin decreases the risk due to the future timber price uncertainty which is also welfare-increasing from the point of view of risk-averse forest owners (the term \(\beta A^2 h_2^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x)\) in (23)).

How far should one go of increasing the yield tax? The partial derivative of the Lagrangian (22) at the margin as \( T = T^\ast \) and \( \tau = 1 \) can be written as
\begin{equation}
\Omega_{\tau}(T = T^*, \tau = 1) = -(n-1)[B_1 h_{1*}^c + B_2 h_{2*}^c] + \lambda[p_i h_{i*}^c + R^{-1} \bar{p}_2 h_{2*}^c]
\end{equation}

The first-order conditions (6b) and (6c) are not feasible with \(\tau = 1\) since \(EU_{h_i} < 0\) for \(i=1,2\), so that \(h_i \to 0\) as \(\tau \to 1\). Under these circumstances the forest tax base goes down to zero and welfare can be increased by decreasing \(\tau\) so that the optimal yield tax is less than 100\%.

The expression for the optimal interior yield tax can be obtained from (22)

\begin{equation}
\tau^* = \frac{(n-1)K}{\lambda(M-L)} - \frac{L}{\lambda(M-L)}
\end{equation}

where

(a) \(K = B_1 h_{1*}^c + B_2 h_{2*}^c\)

(b) \(L = \beta A^2 (1-\tau) h_2^2 \sigma_p \exp(x)\)

(c) \(M = p_i h_{i*}^c + R^{-1} \bar{p}_2 h_{2*}^c\)

Equation (25) is not an explicit solution, since current and future harvesting depend on the yield tax, but it can be used to discuss the determinants of \(\tau\). The optimal yield tax can be decomposed additively into the externality component (the first RHS term) and into the social insurance and efficiency components which interact (the second RHS term).\footnote{See Sandmo (1976) for a seminal analysis of optimal taxation with externalities.} When private and social valuation of amenity services coincide, only the second RHS term in (24) is relevant.

One can summarize the findings in

\textbf{Proposition 3:} Ramsey-Pigou Taxation with Social Insurance: When the land site tax has been set to the optimal level (a) it is desirable to introduce yield tax at the margin under the circumstances, where forest stands have public goods-characteristic and there is idiosyncratic
uncertainty about the future timber price. (b) the optimal yield tax is less than 100 % and reflects three considerations; (i) the social value of forest stands, (ii) timber price risk and (iii) properties of compensated timber supply. (d) yield tax is still needed as an insurance device even though amenity services would not be public goods.

An intuitive explanation goes as follows. Under idiosyncratic uncertainty the partial insurance through the yield tax is optimal for incentive reasons. Second, the public goods-characteristic of forest stand provides also a reason to introduce \( \tau \); the externality-correcting factor depends on two things: (a) the amount of public goods characteristic (the Pigouvian aspect) and (b) the strength of the behavioral responses (the incentive aspect).

3.2.1. On Comparative Statics of the Ramsey-Pigou Forest Taxation with Social Insurance

Can one say anything more precise about the comparative statics of the optimal yield tax in terms of underlying determinants on the basis of the equation (25)? It is immediate that the higher is the public goods characteristic of forest stand, the higher is the yield tax, ceteris paribus. As for timber price risk and risk aversion, the results are indeterminate. Both of them affect \( \tau^* \) directly via the L-term and indirectly via the compensated harvesting effects \( h_{i*,i} \).

What is the role of the substitution effects of yield tax for its optimal level? It is usually argued that tax rates should be negatively related to the strength of the substitution effects. According to this 'inverse elasticity'-rule the more sensitive the behavior is in terms of distortionary taxes, the lower the taxes should be, ceteris paribus.\(^{11}\) Does the inverse elasticity rule hold in this case? Differentiating (25) with respect to \( h_{i*} \) gives

\[
(27) \quad sgn \frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial h_{i*}} = sgn[(n-1)X + p_t L]
\]

\(^{11}\) See e.g. Varian 1993, 410-412.
and

\[ sgn \frac{\partial r^c}{\partial h^c_{1\tau}} = sgn \left[ (n-1) Y + \bar{p}_2 R^{-1} L \right] \]

where

\[ (a) \quad X = p_i (1 - B_1) h^c_{1\tau} + (\bar{p}_2 R^{-1} - p_i B_2) h^c_{2\tau} - B_1 L \]

\[ (29) \]

\[ (b) \quad Y = (p_i - B_1 \bar{p}_2 R^{-1}) h^c_{1\tau} + \bar{p}_2 R^{-1} (1 - B_2) h^c_{2\tau} - B_2 L \]

If \( h^c_{1\tau} < 0 \), both derivatives are positive in the absence of public goods characteristic of forest stands \((n = 1)\), which means that yield tax decreases as compensated timber supply becomes more sensitive to yield tax. Generally the signs are indeterminate, however. Thus it is possible that, in contrast with the inverse elasticity rule, the yield tax increases with sensitivity of compensated timber supply.

Hence we have

**Proposition 4:** The optimal yield tax (a) increases with the public goods characteristic of forest stands, while the effect of timber price risk and risk aversion is a priori ambiguous, (b) is negatively related to the compensated timber supply in line with the 'inverse elasticity' rule if private and social valuation of amenity services coincide and (c) in the general case, the relationship between compensated timber supply and yield tax is a priori ambiguous; a rise in the sensitivity of compensated timber supply may lead to an increase in the optimal yield tax.

The reason for the indeterminacy of the relationship between the optimal yield tax and the size of the substitution effect lies in the offsetting effects of compensated timber supply. A rise in the sensitivity of compensated timber supply tends to make a distortion higher, and the optimal yield tax lower on the one hand. But on the other hand, it makes the yield tax more effective in correcting the externality due to public goods property of amenity services. If the latter effect is strong enough, then in contrast with the 'inverse elasticity'-rule there might be a positive
3.3. The Pigouvian Forest Taxation with Public Goods Characteristic of Forest Stand

What happens if there is no future timber price uncertainty? Under certainty the risk terms vanish and both the comparative statics and envelope results are slightly different. Now the equation (20) for the optimal land site tax \( T^* \) can be written as

\[
\Omega_T = 0 = U_T^* - (n - 1)B_2 h_{2T}^0 + \lambda G_T
\]

where \( G_T = (1 + R)^{-1} + \tau R^{-1} \tilde{p}_T h_{2T}^0 \). Again, the optimal land site tax equalizes the loss of marginal social utility \( (U_T^* - (n - 1)B_2) \) to the increase in tax revenues evaluated at the value of the Lagrangian multiplier \( (\lambda G_T) \).

Given that \( T = T^* \) the partial derivative of the Lagrangian at the margin, when the yield tax is zero is

\[
\Omega_T (T = T^*, \tau = 0) = -(n - 1)B_2 h_{2T}^{oc} \geq 0
\]

The first-order conditions (6b) and (6c) are not feasible with \( \tau = 1 \) so that the optimal yield tax is less than 100%. Given \( T = T^* \), the expression (21) can be written as

\[
\Omega_T (T = T^*) = \omega h_{2T}^{oc}
\]

where \( \omega = \lambda \tau p_2 R^{-1} - (n - 1)B_2 \), \( B_2 = \beta m \geq 0 \) and \( h_{2T}^{oc} \leq 0 \). Thus the optimal \( \tau \) is determined from (29) by

\[
\tau^* = \frac{(n - 1)B_2}{\lambda R^{-1}p_2} \geq 0 \quad \text{as} \quad (n - 1) \geq 0.
\]
It is noticeable that it depends only on the public goods characteristic of forest stand, but has nothing to do with the properties of the compensated timber supply.

**Proposition 5**: The pure Pigouvian Taxation: If the land site tax has been set to the optimal level under certainty, (a) it is desirable to use the yield tax which is now a pure Pigouvian tax, (b) when private and social valuation of amenity services coincide, the yield tax is not needed once the land site tax has been set to the optimal level.

There is an assignment of instruments to targets. Once the land site tax has been set, the yield tax can be used as a pure Pigouvian corrective tax\(^\text{12}\).

### 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of the paper has been to explore various issues associated with harvesting behavior of nonindustrial forest owners, when forest stand has multiple-use characteristics and there is an idiosyncratic uncertainty about the future timber price. The paper has extended the earlier analyses in several respects. First, we have developed the comparative statics of timber price risk and land site and yield taxes and decomposed them in a way that makes it possible to give an economic interpretation about relatively complex relationships. Second, in complement to the earlier literature, which has analyzed forest taxes in isolation, we have studied optimal forest taxation from public finance point of view. Given that government has to acquire a certain amount of tax revenue from forests, what would be the optimal way of doing it?

As for the comparative statics of current and future harvesting, in the general uncertainty case

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\(^{12}\) Thus far we have argued that given the optimal land site tax, it is desirable on welfare grounds to introduce the yield tax, which is less than 100%. But what is the sign of the land site tax \(T\)? If forest taxation would be purely redistributive across forest owners, then the land site tax should be a subsidy. In that case forest taxation is linearly progressive in the sense that the average forest taxes increase with the tax base. But if there is a positive tax revenue requirement, the sign of \(T\) depends on how much the government collects tax revenues via the optimal yield taxation. To say more would necessitate the analysis of the optimal tax revenue requirement, which lies beyond the scope of this study.
timber price risk affects current harvesting positively, while has an a priori ambiguous effect on future harvesting. A rise in land site tax increases harvesting, while the effect of the yield tax is a priori ambiguous both on current and future harvesting. Under certainty, the behavioral effects of taxes are more determinate though still some ambiguities remain.

One might be tempted to believe that in the presence of sign ambiguities the optimal forest taxation cannot be characterized at all. This belief is, however, is not justified. It is shown that given the optimal land site tax -- which is independent of the timber harvested and thus non-distortionary -- it is desirable to introduce the yield tax at the margin under uncertainty; it both corrects the externality due to public goods characteristic of forest stands and serves as an insurance device for risk-averse forest owners. The optimal yield tax is less than 100 % and depends on the social value of forest stands, timber price risk and properties of compensated timber supply. In the general case the inverse elasticity rule -- according to which the optimal yield tax is negatively related to the size of the substitution effects -- may not hold. Under certainty, the desirability of the yield tax given the optimal land site tax depends only on the existence of the public goods characteristic of forest stands and is thus a pure Pigouvian tax.

There are several agendas for further research. This paper has developed the implications of idiosyncratic risk, which vanishes at the aggregate level thus providing an insurance role for taxation. If the risk happens to be aggregative then the insurance role of taxation vanishes, and one has to tradeoff between variability of private consumption and tax revenues, which may imply variability in public consumption. We have made a special assumption about the incidence of forest taxes, namely that forest owners bear them. But this is not so if the demand for timber is not infinitely elastic in terms of timber price. It is an area for further research to find out whether the incidence considerations modify the results. Finally, the paper has been explored the optimal taxation in a Stackelberg equilibrium with the government as the dominant player. If the government does not want to enter into binding commitments but instead reoptimizes at the beginning of each period, then one ends up in a Nash equilibrium without commitment.
APPENDIX 1: Comparative Statics of Timber Supply

This appendix derives the comparative statics of timber supply reported in the text. The maximization problem is reproduced here for convenience.

\[
(1) \quad MAX \quad EU = - \exp(-Ac_1) - \beta \exp(x) + m(k_1 + \beta k_2)
\]

where \( x = -A \bar{c}_2 + \frac{1}{2} A^2 (1 - \tau)^2 h_1^2 \sigma_p^2 \), subject to

(a) \( k_1 = Q - h_1 \)

(b) \( k_2 = (Q - h_1) + F(Q - h_1) - h_2 \)

(c) \( \bar{c}_2 = \bar{p}_2 h_2 - T + (1 + r)[p_1 h_1 - T - c_1] \)

The first-order conditions are

(3) \( EU_{c_1} = A \exp(-Ac_1) - \beta RA \exp(x) = 0 \)

(4) \( EU_{h_1} = \beta ARP_1^* \exp(x) - m[1 + \beta(1 + F')] = 0 \)

(5) \( EU_{h_2} = \beta A[p_2^* - A(1 - \tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_p^2] \exp(x) - \beta m = 0 \)

Utilizing \( EU_{h_2} = 0 \) in \( EU_{h_1} \) leads to the cutting rule given in equation (7) of the text.

The second-order conditions in equation (6) hold due to the assumptions the concavity of the utility function and the forest growth function. These are

a) \( EU_{c_1 c_1} = -A^2 \exp(-Ac_1) - \beta A^2 R^2 \exp(x) < 0 \)

b) \( EU_{h_1 h_1} = -\beta(ARp_1^*)^2 \exp(x) + m\beta F'' < 0 \)

c) \( EU_{h_1 h_2} = \beta A^2[p_2^* - A(1 - \tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_p^2] \exp(x) - \beta A^2(1 - \tau)^2 \sigma_p^2 \exp(x) < 0 \)
d) \[ \Delta = \begin{vmatrix} EU_{c_{\theta_1}} & EU_{c_{\theta_h}} & EU_{c_{\theta_2}} \\ EU_{h_{\theta_1}} & EU_{h_{\theta_h}} & EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \\ EU_{h_{\theta_1}} & EU_{h_{\theta_h}} & EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \end{vmatrix} < 0 \]

where the cross-derivatives are

\[ EU_{c_{\theta_h}} = \beta A^2 R^2 p^*_1 \exp(x) > 0 \]
\[ EU_{c_{\theta_2}} = \beta A^2 R (p^*_2 - A(1 - \tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_p^2) \exp(x) > 0 \]
\[ EU_{h_{\theta_2}} = -\beta A^2 R p^*_1 (p^*_2 - A(1 - \tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_p^2) \exp(x) < 0 \]

To find how current and future harvesting change as the land site tax \( T \), yield tax \( \tau \) and timber price risk \( \sigma_p^2 \) changes we use Cramer's rule. First of all, we have

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
EU_{c_{\theta_1}} & EU_{c_{\theta_h}} & EU_{c_{\theta_2}} \\
EU_{h_{\theta_1}} & EU_{h_{\theta_h}} & EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \\
EU_{h_{\theta_1}} & EU_{h_{\theta_h}} & EU_{h_{\theta_2}}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
dc_1 \\
dh_1 \\
dh_2
\end{bmatrix}
= -
\begin{bmatrix}
EU_{c_{\theta_1}} & EU_{c_{\theta_h}} & EU_{c_{\theta_2}} \\
EU_{h_{\theta_1}} & EU_{h_{\theta_h}} & EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \\
EU_{h_{\theta_1}} & EU_{h_{\theta_h}} & EU_{h_{\theta_2}}
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
dT \\
d\tau \\
d\sigma_p^2
\end{bmatrix}
\tag{7}
\]

where the determinant \( \Delta \) of the LHS matrix of (7) is negative by the second-order conditions.

Solving (7) for \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) in terms of \( dT \) gives

\[
h_{1T} = -\beta R p^*_1 A^2 (1 - \tau)^2 \sigma_p^2 \Phi > 0, \text{ where } \Phi = \Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 A^4 (1 + R) \exp(2x - Ac_1) \right\} < 0,
\tag{8}
\]
\[
h_{2T} = m F'' \left[ p^*_2 - A(1 - \tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_p^2 \right] \Phi > 0.
\tag{9}
\]

A change in the variance of the timber price leads at the margin to

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad EU_{c_{\theta_p}} = EU_{c_{\theta_1}} \left(1/2\right) (1 - \tau)^2 h_2^2 (1 + R)^{-1} EU_{c_{\theta_1}} \\
(b) & \quad EU_{h_{\theta_p}} = EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \left(1/2\right) (1 - \tau)^2 h_2^2 (1 + R)^{-1} EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \\
(c) & \quad EU_{h_{\theta_p}} = EU_{h_{\theta_2}} \left(1/2\right) (1 - \tau)^2 h_2^2 (1 + R)^{-1} EU_{h_{\theta_2}}
\end{align*}
\]
where $EU_{\sigma_t^2}$ and $EU_{h_2\sigma_t^2}$, $i=1,2$, refer to the substitution effects. Solving (7) for $h_1$ and $h_2$ in terms of the substitution effects of $\sigma_t^2$ yields

\begin{align*}
(11) & \quad h_{1\sigma_t^2}^\tau = -\Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 A^\tau (1-\tau) \sigma_t^2 h_2 R_p \left[ \bar{y}_t^\tau - A(1-\tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_t^2 \right] \exp(2x - Ac) \right\} > 0 \\
(12) & \quad h_{2\sigma_t^2}^\tau = \Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 A^\tau (1-\tau) \sigma_t^2 h_2 (R_p^*)^2 \exp(2x - Ac) - EU_{\sigma_t^2} \beta^2 A^2 (1-\tau)^2 h_2 mF'' \exp(x) \right\} < 0
\end{align*}

The total effect of a change in the variance on harvesting is thus given by the Slutsky equation

\begin{align*}
(13) & \quad h_{1\sigma_t^2} = h_{1\sigma_t^2}^\tau - \frac{1}{2} (1-\tau)^2 h_2^2 (1+R)^{-1} h_{yt}, \text{ for } i=1,2.
\end{align*}

As for the effects of the yield tax note first that

\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad EU_{c_t^2} = EU_{c_t^2}^\tau -(1+R)^{-1} z EU_{c_t^}\tau \\
(b) & \quad EU_{h_t} = EU_{h_t}^\tau -(1+R)^{-1} z EU_{h_t^}\tau \\
(c) & \quad EU_{h_t^\tau} = EU_{h_t^\tau} -(1+R)^{-1} z EU_{h_t^}\tau
\end{align*}

where $z = \left[ \bar{y}_t^\tau - A(1-\tau)^2 h_2 \sigma_t^2 \right] h_2 + R_p h_t$.

Solving (7) for $h_1$ and $h_2$ in terms of the substitution effects of $\tau$ and utilizing (11) and (12) gives

\begin{align*}
(14) & \quad h_{1\tau}^\tau = h_{1\tau}^\tau - (1-\tau)^{-1} \sigma_t^2 h_{1\sigma_t^2} < 0 \\
(15) & \quad h_{2\tau}^\tau = h_{2\tau}^\tau - (1-\tau)^{-1} \sigma_t^2 h_{2\sigma_t^2} = ?
\end{align*}

where $h_{i\tau}^\tau$, $i=1,2$ denote for the conventional substitution effects defined as follows

\[ h_{i\tau}^\tau = (1-\tau)^{-1} \left[ p_i h_{i\tau}^\tau + \bar{y}_t^\tau p_i \right] - \Delta^{-1} \left[ \beta A^3 R_p (1-\tau) \sigma_t^2 EU_{\sigma_t^2} \exp(2x) \right] < 0 \]
\[ h_{22}^0 = -(1 - \tau)^{-1} \left[ p_1 h_{22}^c + p_2 h_{22}^c \right] = \Delta^{-1} \left[ \beta^2 AmF''(\bar{\rho}_2^* - A(1 - \tau)h_2^2 \sigma^2) E U_{e_{cr}} \exp(x) \right] < 0. \]

The total effect of a change in the yield tax can be obtained by utilizing the Slutsky decomposition and equations (14) and (15),

(15) \[ h_i = h_{it}^c + (1 + R)^{-1} z h_{it}, \ i = 1, 2. \]

* * *
APPENDIX 2: The sign of \((B_1 h_{1\tau}^c + B_2 h_{2\tau}^c)\) as \(\tau \to 0\)

This appendix fixes the sign of \(B_1 h_{1\tau}^c + B_2 h_{2\tau}^c\) in the equation (23) of the text as \(\tau \to 0\). Recalling that \(B_1 = m(1 + \beta(1 + F'))\) and \(B_2 = \beta m\) we have to determine the sign of

\[
\phi = \left[1 + \beta(1 + F')\right] h_{1\tau}^c + \beta h_{2\tau}^c.
\]

Using the expressions of \(h_{1\tau}^c\) and \(h_{2\tau}^c\) and arranging the terms gives the following expression.

\[
\phi = -\sigma_{p}^2 \left\{ \left[1 + \beta(1 + F')\right] h_{1\sigma_f}^c + \beta h_{2\sigma_f}^c \right\} + \left[1 + \beta(1 + F')\right] h_{1\tau}^0 + \beta h_{2\tau}^0.
\]

The substitution effects \((h_{1\tau}^0, h_{2\tau}^0)\) are negative at \(\tau = 0\). As for the first RHS term, notice first that \(EU_{h_{\tau}} = 0\) is equivalent to \((\bar{p}_2 - Ah_2 \sigma_{p}^2) = m(\exp(x))^{-1}\) as \(\tau = 0\). Utilizing equations (11) and (12) from appendix 1 and substituting \(m(\exp(x))^{-1}\) for \((\bar{p}_2 - Ah_2 \sigma_{p}^2)\) yields

\[
\phi = -\sigma_{p}^2 \Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 A^6 h_{2R_p} \left[ \beta R_p \exp(x) - (1 + \beta(1 + F')) m \right] \exp(x)^{-1} \right\}
\]

\[
-\sigma_{p}^2 \Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 A^2 h_2 m F'' \left[ \frac{EU_{\eta_1}}{\eta_1} \exp(x) \right] \right\}
\]

The first term in (2) is zero by \(EU_{h_{\tau}} = 0\). Hence what is left from \(\phi\) is

\[
\phi = \left[1 + \beta(1 + F')\right] h_{1\tau}^0 + \beta h_{2\tau}^0 - \sigma_{p}^2 \Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 A^2 h_2 m F'' \left[ \frac{EU_{\eta_1}}{\eta_1} \exp(x) \right] \right\}
\]

This is equal to \(\phi = \left[1 + \beta(1 + F')\right] h_{1\tau}^0 + \beta \Delta^{-1} \left\{ \beta^2 Ah_2 m F'' (p_2 - 2Ah_2 \sigma_{p}^2) \exp(x) \right\}\), which is clearly negative so that \(B_1 h_{1\tau}^c + B_2 h_{2\tau}^c < 0\).

* * *
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