Ethical Education in the Military
What, How and Why in the 21st Century?

Edited by Jarmo Toiskallio
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Preface

“Quality education can contribute to stabilizing conflicts, eliminating cultural stereotypes, and building understanding and mutual respect for other religions and cultures. … High quality learning materials and pedagogical approaches that promote tolerance, social cohesion and respect for human rights are … crucial, and they need to be adapted to both formal and nonformal educational contexts.” (Koïchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, in May 2006)

Does the military have the kind of “quality education” – very much ethical by its nature - meant by the Director General of the UNESCO? Is the military even interested in education which contributes to “building understanding and mutual respect”? According to the traditional military view, that kind of thinking is not the most important issue, because war fighting is taken self-evidently as the main role of the military. As the American professor James Wirtz, who teaches courses on nuclear strategy, international relations and intelligence, says, educational programs tend to focus on technical and operational matters, “not on providing officers with the analytical skills and knowledge they will need to deal with broad political, strategic and ethical issues … Consideration of military ethics in such an environment generally falls by the wayside” (Wirtz 2003, 37).

There are good reasons to argue that the military of the 21st century should become more interested in “quality education” in front of the new peace support and crisis management challenges. It is even time to seriously ask whether military ethics is perhaps a contradiction in terms or a paradoxical issue. Do we need new paradigms and concepts? Alongside with the new challenges, this kind of asking is especially important, because in the last few years it has become quite popular to speak about military professionalism with its ethical codes.

Inspired by the problems of military ethics, the Centre for Action Competence, Identity and Ethics (ACIE) at the Finnish National Defence College (National Defence University from the beginning of 2007) sent a call for papers for a publication in the beginning of the year 2006. The call was sent to several researchers and teachers specialising in some areas of military pedagogy and military ethics, as well as peace education. The idea was not to receive some official papers representing the views of specific nations and institutions. Rather, the aim was to gather different and personal views and opinions about ethical education in
the military from different aspects and in different environments. Especially, the call for papers was motivated by the concept of ‘human security’ launched by the United Nations in the 1990s.

Ethics, in its broadest meaning, is about how to live. Or it is about humanity. The contemporary bioethics goes beyond human life; it covers all living beings. Ethics is also said to refer to the most profound relation between me and the other. Already these few descriptions show that there are no easy and simple ways to talk about ethics. It is not just a study of right and wrong actions. Rather, ethics is about good life. It is about decision making on how to act in a right and good way in morally complex and difficult situations. But it is also something that should be thought about when considering the type of person one wants to be, and does not want to be. Too often ethics is taken to be a formal list of so called basic or core values – or ethical codes - which have to be learned by heart.

It is a big challenge to write about military ethics in an era, when military thinkers like the British General Sir Rupert Smith insist that “war no longer exists”, when the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, said that more important than the military centred state security, it is to ensure that each individual has opportunities to fulfil his or her own potential, and when some distinguished philosophers, like John D. Caputo, say that “I am against ethics” because of the danger that a formal and rule-based ‘ethics’ turns against ethicality. Emmanuel Levinás (1906-1995) is the most well-known thinker highlighting ethicality in the meaning of being ethical. For him, the profound mode of human life is ”my ethical relation to the other”, because it is a fact that ”the self cannot survive by itself alone” (Levinás 1986, 60).

Even the terminology seems to be confusing; different writers use terms like ‘ethics’, ‘ethic’, ‘ethos’, ‘morals’, and ‘moral’ in different ways. In everyday conversation ‘ethics’ and ‘moral’ are often used interchangeably. For some writers the only difference is that the first one comes from Greek and the latter from Latin. Some of the writers use ‘moral’ to refer to the social aspect as something collective and public, whereas ‘ethics’ is used to refer to the individual aspect, for instance personal character. But on the other hand, some writers regard ‘moral’ as more individually and personally conceived and ‘ethics’ as more collective and public. For instance, Elizabeth Campbell (2003) in her book ”The Ethical Teacher” takes the stance that ethics is ”more indicative of the collective sense of professionalism I hope to inspire by illuminating the moral practice of some individuals”. According to her, ‘ethics’ is a more universal and all-
encompassing way to think about and to lead the practice of individuals. Levinás (1986, 65), on the other hand, explicitly says that "by morality I mean a series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic duty". Morality "operates in the socio-political order of organizing and improving our human survival". Because morality has this kind of role, it has to be founded, according to Levinás, on "an ethical responsibility towards the other".

There are many different aspects from which military ethics can be considered. On the one hand, there are the actions of individual soldiers or warriors, and on the other extreme initiatives like "the Alliance of Civilizations", launched by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan in 2005. The latter aspect, as well as the concept of human security, is not customarily included in military ethics, although in my opinion it should. Otherwise we might deal with military ethics as abstracted from its worldwide, cultural and spiritual contexts. But we should see ethics as a very personal issue as well: it is me who makes choices and decisions. It is me who is responsible for my actions. In their brilliant book about military ethics, Theo van Baarda and Desireé Verweij (2006) use the term "moral competence" to refer to this kind of personal aspect. It includes the moral development of one's self as well as "practical skills such as value communication, ethically responsible leadership and moral judgement" (op. cit., 13).

More than ever before, the "morally competent" soldiers of the 21st century should understand their actions – and already their choosing the military career - within a broad context of nations, cultures and religions; all societies are interdependent, bound in their development and security, and in their environmental and economic well-being. The Alliance of Civilizations is one of the initiatives which seek to forge a collective political will and to mobilize concerted action at institutional and civil society levels to overcome the prejudices, misperceptions and polarization that militate against a consensus. Might this kind of initiative form a basis also for a new military ethics of the new century?

The call for papers for this publication was delivered to scholars and experts from nine countries. After that, also new contacts emerged. It was underscored that perhaps the military must learn to think about ethics in new and broader ways. Especially it was hoped that some of the authors would like to write about the concept of human security: what it might actually mean from the ethical education point of view in the military. But as expected, human security still seems to be quite far from the military ethical sphere of thinking. The human security
paradigm argues the importance of simultaneous progress in a variety of domains: economic, health, environmental, political. As Dan Henk (2005) says, this requires a degree of holistic thinking somewhat at odds with the dictates of Western military efficiency.

In the course of the profound and complex contemporary developments, the paradigm of human security might be the ‘third step’ coming after the first step to the ‘postmodern warfare’ and the second step to ‘fighting against terrorism’. The very challenging second step can be described by using Asa Kasher’s and Amos Yadlin’s (2005) words: "Since missions of fighting terror are significantly different from both military missions of fighting armies and law enforcement missions of fighting criminals, it is desirable to form a conception of fighting terror within the framework of a democratic state.” Perhaps ‘fighting terror’ still has to be included in the human security paradigm, although the interest of this paradigm is more in two core principles, "freedom from fear” (safety) and "freedom from want” (well-being).

As the coordinator of ACIE and as the editor of this publication, I am deeply grateful for all the writers making important and valuable contributions. I also thank Dr Peter Foot from Britain, Dr Martin L. Cook from the USA, and Dr Alan Okros from Canada for their interest and impressive advice, although because of other duties they were not able to write articles for this publication.

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References


Introduction: Edifying Military Ethics

Jarmo Toiskallio

In a crisis a truly thinking person will not look for rules and laws but will say, ‘I must be true to myself, I must not do anything that I cannot live with, that I cannot remember’

Hannah Arendt, according to her student and biographer, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (2006)

The political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) was not a military ethicist, although she as a German Jew worked actively in 1941-1942 for the plans for a Jewish army against Hitler. Many of her ethical reflections important for military ethics – for instance her concept the "banality of evil" - are included in her reports from the trial of the Nazi officer Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961.

Arendt represented the generation of thinkers interested in ethical-political questions, the generation battling against Nazism, Stalinism, dogmatism, and totalitarianism (Bernstein 1991). All of these are existential contexts which make people incapable of telling right from wrong. They only obey orders. They cannot understand that even laws can be immoral. In Arendt’s terms: people become "thoughtless". Thoughtlessness – inability to think, what is good and right - is in the core of "the banality of evil". In her analysis of the suitability of Arendt’s thinking in the contemporary globalizing world, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (2006) shows some dark pictures. Arendt still matters: although globalisation distributes some beneficial features, it also implicates the entire world in a mentality that identifies people as superfluous "and leads to the imperialist techniques of ghettoization and massacre". This is the mentality with "Eichmann-like indifference to life and death" (op.cit., 76).

For me, military ethics cannot be anything else than ethics of thoughtfulness. In the globalizing world it is extremely important that military ethics can be developed on the basis of the ideas of 'human security', bioethics, and global ethics. In other words, it is not possible to develop military ethics from the inside of military organisation.
Towards human security?

Military ethics is in many ways a difficult and challenging – even contradictory - area, as Desirée Verweij, Veli-Matti Värrri and Bo Talerud point out in their articles. These three articles actually construct the basis for this book with their problematizations of military ethics and ethical education. Both Werveij and Värri deal with what the latter calls “the main paradox”: how is it possible to maintain one’s ethical consistency and be an ethical subject by justifying killing and respecting human dignity at the same time? Verweij also argues about the three levels – micro, meso, and macro – of military ethics. The first one operates at the individual, meso at the organizational, and macro at the level of the international community and international relations, including the relationship with national and international politics.

Military ethics deals with individual human beings as soldiers as well as military organizations as social, and nowadays even global, institutions within the civil society. As Stuart A. Cohen and Tamir Libel from Israel say, the organizational, judicial and educational steps of ethics taken by the armed forces need particular attention. There must be institutional sensitivity to the vast scale of ethical challenges that troops confront in action, and there must also be an appropriate assessment of the multiplicity of steps that need to be taken in order to meet the challenges.

In contemporary discussion ethics is often linked to professionalism. In this volume, especially Amira Raviv from Israel and Arto Mutanen from Finland discuss this point of view. Also Vesa Nissinen from Finland and Daniel Lagace-Roy from Canada deal with this aspect in a practical way. The personal and global aspects of ethics together make ethics to appear as a rapidly changing issue. Lagacé-Roy inquires in his article into providing insight on how to (re)think moral behaviour when environments reshape the boundaries of ethical conducts, and new ethical dilemmas arise every day.

Amira Raviv argues that for the military profession, ethics as a subject takes soldiers to see contradictory and complementary tensions between the ideal and the real, between the explicit and the implicit, between the answers and the resounding questions. Vesa Nissinen highlights that there is an urgent need for pedagogical programs that support the personal development of military leaders from the ethical point of view. He also includes the concept of human security in his framework. Arto Mutanen says in his profound philosophical analysis that the military profession is strongly ethics-laden. Therefore, discussing the profession is of extreme
importance. Over and over again, we have to ask questions like ‘What does being a good soldier mean?’ or rather ‘How does one act like a good soldier?’

Hubert Annen from Switzerland is the only one of the writers to concentrate on military pedagogy. He distinguishes between the strategic and operational levels of pedagogy. According to him, things become more tangible on the operational level, where concrete questions arise for instance how, against the background of current conflicts and army deployments, human dignity can or should be taken into account. Here, in everyday military pedagogical work, cases and dilemmas need to be discussed. This requires personal commitment both from teachers and students. Audrone Petrauskaite gives a description, based on empirical research, about the ethical thinking of officer cadets. Her article is important, because she inquires into a post-communist society, and she uses the theory of post-modern society as her framework. She argues that the biggest part of cadets is still based on a modern, not post-modern, paradigm of the military. According to Petrauskaite, the priorities of education should include the formation of a deeper moral maturity of the cadets and the intellectualisation of the studying process: “Ethics as one of the academic subjects has to be more oriented to creating the critical thinking abilities of the cadets.”

Basically, ethics is a very personal issue: it is my relation to the other, and it belongs to the self-understanding of every human being. If we understand ethics as ‘my relation to the other’ – especially in its deepest sense as diacony, being the servant of the other – it becomes clear that ethics is far from ego-centric individualism. Rather, ethics is my responsibility for other people and for the whole world as Bo Talerud, who teaches at the Swedish National Defence College, says in his article:

“Our global future is in danger due to the combination of greenhouse effect and ‘global dimming’ of many pollution particles in the air decreasing the sunshine. In my vision an intense discussion about, and development of education in ethics (including "self-education") could have some impact on the heat and ‘fog of brains’ in armed conflicts.”

Hubert Annen uses the distinction between strategic and operational levels. In their articles, Reijo E. Heinonen from Finland and Dan Henk from the USA, write at the global-strategic level. For Hannah Arendt, power and action belong tightly together, they refer to ‘people coming together’. In a way, this kind of framework is described by Professor Reijo E. Heinonen, a distinguished proponent of global ethics: we should
understand power as meaning action as a dialogue and as competence for dialogue. In a way also Dan Henk refers to this kind of idea of power and action: the paradigm of human security calls attention to the limits of military capability and provides a conceptual framework for the collaborative roles of civil society actors, scholars, international organizations, other government agencies and the military. Professor Henk, a retired Colonel and veteran of the Vietnam war who teaches at the US Air War College, says that although the concept of human security "does not currently dominate mainstream thinking in the world about security or about the roles of military forces, its time may well come."

From not thinking to thoughtfulness

As individuals we are responsible in larger contexts than before. Global and individual problems are not two different issues any longer. In this sense the two important modes of ethics -- global ethics and bioethics - have evolved since the 1990s. One of their common nominators is the idea of human vulnerability and the vulnerability of the whole life. That is why military ethics should leave its "macho ethics", as Hilary Putnam (2004) calls ethics which values first of all "courage and manly prowess". Rather, military ethics should understand that there can be glory and dignity "in siding with the victims of plunder and conquest, with the poor and downtrodden."

There are reasons to argue that we must step outside military ethics in order to develop it. We have to take 'courage' as an ethical virtue into a new framework. By using the terminology of Hannah Arendt, we should put 'power' into the place of 'violence'. This will be an extremely challenging task, because the difference between these two concepts, analysed by Arendt in the beginning of the 1950s, is still not well understood in the 2000s. In her book "Why Arendt Matters", Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (2006, 13) writes that "violence has become so habitual and easily rationalized that politicians, revolutionaries, and now terrorists no longer even wonder whether the violence they want to undertake might do more harm than good". This kind of habitual thinking represents for Arendt "not thinking" or "being thoughtless". The opposite of not thinking, thoughtless is "thoughtfulness", and it is near to courage in the sense of responsibility.

Not only professional, but also universal rules, norms and codes are needed. But at the same time, ethics should be understood most of all as decision making, action and responsibility. At the final stage, ethics
is always very personal: "How should I act in this particular situation in order to act in a right and good way?" Ethics, action and responsibility belong tightly together. We are not only responsible for our contemporary world, but also for the future generations. There can be no reasonable and serious military ethics without this kind of view on action – although "the glorification of warfare and machismo" are very old in the history of human cultures (Putnam 2004, 23). But the other kind of ethics, highlighted by global ethics and bioethics, also has very long historical roots. The deep roots are in the great religious traditions of the world, not only in the Judeo-Christian tradition, but also in Islam, Confucianism, Hinduism and Buddhism.

Only in the latter tradition – in the ethics of compassion – can we speak about universal rules, norms and codes, like for instance universal ethical equality, the Golden Rule, and the above mentioned ethics of 'me as the servant of the other'. The other tradition, macho ethics, highlights victory over the other, and as such it cannot be universal. The other is something that must be defeated, not served. In the traditional military training, the other – the enemy – must be dehumanised. Arendt was present in the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961. She concluded that Eichmann was "thoroughly conformist to his thoroughly banal society, with no independent sense of responsibility, motivated only by a wish to move up in the Nazi hierarchy ... without common sense or the ability to think" (Young-Bruehl 2006, 3). When asked, Eichmann could recite moral rules, even Kant's categorical imperative. But he could neither ask himself nor think through the central question, according to Arendt and derived from Socrates, of moral experience: "Could I live with myself if I did this deed?"

It is a very huge step from the principle of Frederic the Great, according to which a soldier must be more afraid of his officers than the enemy, to the ethics of courage as thoughtfulness and responsible action.

**Have we lost our comprehension?**

In everyday talk we use the word ‘ethics’ quite easily, as if we all knew its meaning, and even in a similar way. But actually there is no single common meaning, and in different traditions and paradigms the term is used in different ways. Of course, there is something in common. In general, ‘ethics’ refers to well based conceptions of right and wrong, good and evil that prescribe how we ought to act. Ethics often speaks in terms of rights, obligations, fairness and specific virtues. Unethical
actions mean for instance rape, stealing and murder. Ethical actions include virtues like honesty, compassion, and loyalty. Ethical standards relate for instance to the right to life, the right to freedom from injury, and the right to privacy. But individuals, and even governments, may have quite different aspects and opinions about these properties, and many of them are interpreted in different ways in different cultures.

There are still big problems in speaking about ethics and morality. Martin L. Cook, a professor at the United States Air Force Academy, says that "many in the ...military openly state that the military and its culture is in many ways morally superior to the civilian population …", but actually it is "surprising to observe the confusion about the meaning of central terms of this discourse" (Cook 2006). Alasdair MacIntyre (1985), although not speaking especially about military ethics, puts it even stronger when he looks at the whole contemporary discussion about morality: "... we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension" both in theory and in practice.

One reason for the confusion, even for the loss of comprehension, is the rapid and profound change of existential circumstances. The traditional role of the military in modern times has been to apply lethal violence on behalf of the state. Military ethics with its martial virtues has been tightly linked with this role. But in the late modern or postmodern age, when governments use military establishments for purposes other than applying or threatening lethal violence, we are in need of military ethics different from that of the ages of the World Wars and the Cold War. Military "and other armed security forces in the 21st Century face an array of requirements quite unlike those of the past" (Rose 2005). As John P. Rose, the director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies says, there will be "new and nontraditional roles, missions and functions – not at all of which are well suited for traditional military forces."

The term ethics is often used to refer to principles, norms and codes. But as said, ethics means most of all our own personal views, decisions and actions – how we as persons constitute ourselves as moral subjects of our own actions, as Michel Foucault (1986) says. Foucault defined ethics as the self’s relation to itself. In this sense, ethics means our constant self-forming activity, self-education.

According to Davidson (1989, 231), most contemporary moral philosophy is focused only on moral codes; virtually nothing about one’s relation to oneself is thought to be relevant to ethics. And when something is said about it, it is always with respect to the question of whether or not there are duties to oneself. In other words, ethics is reduced to the
elaboration and justification of moral codes without one's self-formative activity, which Foucault calls "asceticism" needed for "the art of living". Although Foucault's conception of ethics sounds quite individualistic, it is not. Ethics is based on morals in the meaning of people's actual behaviour, morally relevant actions, and a moral code. Ethics is the process, by which the subject does not only learn moral codes and morally relevant actions, but forms herself as a moral subject of her own actions. This is also the only way for the development of morals.

In the thinking of Aristotle, there is – or should be – a link between reason, ethics and politics. It seems that practical wisdom (phronesis) is the link. And it also seems that we can become practically wise only by the self-formative process described by Foucault. Perhaps this would also be the way to the "universal cosmopolitan existence" that Immanuel Kant envisioned to guarantee "perpetual peace". According to Thomas McCarthy (1999, 178) the practical way is to establish cultural and institutional conditions which can be called "multicultural cosmopolitan discourse". But there cannot be any such kind of discourse without individuals as competent agents with their situated actions guided by practical wisdom. The competent agents are always already socialized individuals, whose agency is informed by the cultural patterns they take for granted. That is why the ascetic self-formation is important: nobody cannot have a universal cosmopolitan existence by birth.

There is also the problem that using the word 'ethics' does not necessarily mean that we really speak about ethics, but for instance about laws, norms, orders and obedience – even about political or religious doctrines. That is why ethical thinkers should always be critical, and ethical education should be oriented to empower the students to become aware of ethical problems and the nature of ethics. Where is ethics actually situated: in the individual, in the community, in the society, or in some kind of transcendence? Where do the bases for ethics come from, or are there no bases at all? In the late modern/postmodern age it seems to be the main stream to speak about "ethics without ontology", as Hilary Putnam says, or about "discourse ethics", as Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel do.

**Professionalism and ethical codes**

During the last ten, fifteen years many professions – also the military profession - have been writing ethical codes for themselves, and ethics as a subject has been taken into various training and education programs.
But it is not only the professions who are interested in ethics – there have been numerous discussions about how ethics reflects increasing public interest and concerns moral and ethics in general: “Today, hardly any policy areas of sectors can avoid a discussion about ethics and unethical behaviour” (Demmke & Bossaert 2004).

But, once again, we should understand that there has never been a uniform understanding of ethics - and there will never be in the future. This belongs to the nature of ethics, because its basic questions concern the ways of, how to live. For instance, there is a big difference between the classical and modern traditions, or paradigms. Still both of them strongly affect the contemporary conceptions of military ethics. Good institutions in the service of a good life for eternal happiness as the final aim of the society and action are central in the classical paradigm. Instead of a good life, power, law and rationality are central for the modern paradigm: there is no eternal happiness for humans to orient themselves to.

In one way or another, we are ‘prisoners’ of these conflicting traditions. It might feel quite easy to talk about military ethics from the modern, Hobbesian, point of view: instead of a good life, the reality is a war of all against all. But on the other hand, the traditional, Aristotelian, paradigm is often said to be the most important for the military. Especially in their ethical instruction, the armed forces often highlight one of the main themes of the classical paradigm, that of virtue ethics and character development. But perhaps the martial virtues – good character traits of soldiers – are seen within the Hobbesian framework. It might be that the modern paradigm forms a suitable platform for war-centric military ethics, and a peace-building military ethics can benefit from the classical paradigm.

From the war-centric viewpoint, it can be asked why to strive for ethics at all in the armed forces. Rather, would it be more important to "brutalize and tribalize" soldiers so that they are capable "to operate effectively in the brutal, tribal world of combat" (Griffith 2000)? And if we want to talk about ethics, we should strongly prefer the so called morality of war instead of the morality of decency with the latter’s fundamental respect for all human beings as moral agents (Prior 2000). Or perhaps we should try to combine the morality of decency with the morality of war by insisting that rules that respect the humanity of the enemy and civilians must be followed also in combat. But as William Prior says, in the environments of war these kinds of attempts often result in the death of the people who try to behave in a morally decent
fashion. In the heat of combat, respect for the enemy is likely to be the first casualty of war — as Prior writes: "As soon as one's own comrades begin to die, it goes right out the window."

Many would reject the claim that the morality of war is a morality at all: war is essentially immoral. But even in combat, as Prior writes, the morality of decency belongs to the personal worth of a combatant; failures "to respect the humanity of enemy soldiers ... would alienate him from his own humanity, from the best part of himself." Prior seems to be right, unfortunately, in analysing the two moralities to be in an irreconcilable conflict: "Both the morality of war and the morality of decency place absolute moral demands on people. These demands cannot be reconciled." It means that "to be a warrior is to be required, morally required, to do things that the morality of decency cannot approve." In practice, according to William Prior, it means that a warrior, "educated at home in the morality of decency, must inevitably feel conflict, and indeed guilt, about his actions in combat."

**Edification needed**

The American philosopher Richard Rorty introduced the term 'edification' into philosophical discourse. Etymologically, edification (to edify) refers to building (to build). But Rorty puts edifying philosophy strictly against 'constructive' or 'systematic' philosophy. Edification was designed "to make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than to supply him with a new philosophical program" (Rorty 1989, 5-6). Rorty had the old humanistic German term of Bildung as well as 'education' in his mind, but "since 'education' sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung a bit too foreign, I shall use 'edification' to stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking" (op. cit., 360).

It really seems that in the area called military ethics, finding new, better, more interesting, and more fruitful ways of speaking are needed. More than trying to define military ethics we should edify ourselves in that sphere of life (actually ethics covers the whole life!). It might be waste of time, even impossible, to try to train or to instruct people to become ethical. The only reasonable way is education in the meaning of Bildung — or edification - which highlights personal self-formation. In Rorty's words, this is the way that makes us better "to cope with the world". Of course, this kind of self-formative education needs knowledge: "...we need a sense of the relativity of descriptive vocabularies to periods,
traditions, and historical accidents. This is what the humanist tradition in education does…” (op.cit., 362).

This is much the same that Aristotle, and the contemporary neo-Aristotelian communitarians, insist upon - that we can become truly human, and practically wise, only by adopting the culture of our community. But this is only the starting point. Rorty sounds like a Hegelian dialectical thinker, when he says that a three-stage process of growth is needed: “… stages of implicit, explicit, and self-conscious conformity to the norms of the discourse going on around us” (op. cit., 365). It may be questionable, why Rorty uses the term ”self-conscious conformity”, because it is not conformity at all, but something that goes beyond 'normal'. But with using the word 'conformity', he wants to underscore that ”edifying philosophy is not abnormal but reactive, having sense only as a protest against attempts to close of conversation by … hypostatization of some privileged set of descriptions” (op.cit., 377).

With his three-stage model Rorty is very pedagogical: the model represents the learning process in which ”… even the education of the revolutionary or the prophet needs to begin with acculturation and conformity” (op.cit., 365). And we must add: even the education of a soldier. But we cannot speak about ethics at that level. Rather, we are learning moral codes and norms of morally acceptable behaviour. As Hegel described the process of Bildung, it requires the sacrifice of one’s particularity for the sake of the universal, but in this process the ”working consciousness finds itself again as an independent consciousness” (Gadamer 1988, 13). As Hans-Georg Gadamer underscores, spirit’s ”return to oneself … constitutes the essence of Bildung” (op.cit., 15). In more everyday words: the highest level of Bildung means that we are capable of reflection in which we understand both our place in a large context (historical, social, cultural, etc.) and the strength of our own thinking.

For our edification, it is one of the challenges that we somehow should try to learn to understand – also in military ethics - the meaning of action as Hannah Arendt did. For her, the basic meaning of action is what she calls ”continuation of action”. She poses a very difficult question: how it is possible that there can be continuation of action in spite of death. At least this means that action is strictly different from individual behaviour. According to her, ‘action’ is different from ‘labour’ and ‘work’, but for our modern way of thinking it is typical to understand action in terms of labour and fabrication, or production. Arendt goes back to the pre-Platonic Greeks who understood that action depends on people
coming together to share words and deeds. This coming together of actors is what Arendt called power, sharply distinct from both individual strength and instrumental violence and force. According to her, power is not the same as possession of means of violence. On the contrary, people resort to violence when they do not have power or they have lost it (Young-Bruehl 2006, 89-90). Military ethics is too late, if it only talks about violence, as it most often does.

Action as the ”coming together of actors” serves as a fruitful and challenging concept for the new, broad conception of security. It is not any more enough to think about the military as the only producer of security. There is a long list of them, for instance border security forces, paramilitary police forces, private military firms and other commercial security providers. Seen from another aspect, there is a plenty of civilian crises management organizations, many of them NGOs (non-governmental organizations). It seems no more reasonable to restrict military ethics only inside the military understood in the traditional way. Could – and should – we try to develop a new kind of `security ethics’? The concepts of power and action might be its main constituents.

The Human Security Report (2005) says that proponents of the broad concept of human security argue that the threat agenda should include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined. The human security policy should seek to protect people from these threats as well as from violence. In its broadest formulations the human security agenda also encompasses economic insecurity and threats to human dignity. All proponents of human security agree that its primary goal is the protection of individuals.

**Contextualising military ethics**

Ethics belongs tightly to our real, practical life. That is why we have to contextualise our reflections on ethics: there cannot be any decision making and action in a vacuum. For ethical decisions some universal basic principles - like dignity and responsibility – are crucially important, but they always have to be interpreted and solved according to certain environments. This is what practical wisdom means.

The context for military-ethical decision-making might have changed radically, because according to Rupert Smith (2005) the nature of war has changed: instead of wars between armies, ”war amongst the people”
has emerged. Battles are not fought on battlefields, but amongst the civilian population. On the other hand, there is the concept of human security, which embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict.

The late modern (or postmodern) age in many ways differs from the industrial-minded, nation-state-centered and rule-based modernity. Modernity means the historical period characterised by the development of science and technology, the nation state, modern industry, and modern war. Modern war means war between states, fought by armed forces, for state interests (Kaldor 2001). General Smith's point is that the 21st Century is quite different from the 20th, though the militaries and our mindsets still seem to be formed by modern, industrial wars. The military sociologist Charles Moskos (2000) refers with 'postmodern' to the new situation of the armed forces: the postmodern military loosens the ties with the nation-state, it becomes multipurpose in its mission, and it moves toward a smaller volunteer force. The modern military that emerged in the nineteenth century was associated with the rise of the nation-state. It was a conscripted mass army, war-oriented in its mission, masculine in its makeup and ethos, and sharply differentiated in its structure and culture from the civilian society.

Martin Shaw (2005) has developed a sociological theory about what he calls the new Western mode and way of war. With "the mode of warfare" he refers to the complex of social relations, processes and institutions through which wars are prepared, military power organized, and wars fought. With the other concept, "way of war" he means the particular way of organizing war adopted by an actor or group of actors. Shaw does not inquire into ethics, but his theory opens very well the macro context for military ethics. He differentiates between the "modern industrial mode of warfare" and the contemporary "global mode of war", in which it seems reasonable to think differently about ethics. For instance, the industrial, total warfare with mass conscript armies had the capacity to dominate the society. On the other hand, the global warfare with smaller and more flexible professional forces is generally subordinate to economy, polity and culture: wars must play much more by the rules of politics, markets and media.

The links to ethics come perhaps even clearer when Shaw differentiates between four types of ways of war: the Western, the national-militarist, the ethnic-nationalist, and the terrorist. It is hard to imagine that ethics could be the same in these types of forces. Why is it so? It is because ethics can be considered as a vision of the good life (Kemp 1999, 283). As Peter Kemp says, ethics expresses itself in certain ideas about the
values of human beings, of human society and of the living nature. In that sense, says Kemp, ethics belongs to the self-understanding of every human being. As a vision, ethics shapes us as human beings. Instead of codes, the basis of ethics is the imagination of what is good in human beings, society and nature.

Kemp also constructs a relation between ethics and morals. Morals consist of norms for right action derived from ethics as vision of the good life. Moral rules and laws are always secondary in ethics. It can be said that morals belong to the social sphere, when ethics is a very personal issue – without being individualistic. Kemp’s model belongs very much to the classical, Aristotelian, paradigm. The whole idea of this paradigm is difficult to understand without the concept of a person. Kemp defines it as follows: "A person is … a self-conscious physical being who lives by receiving something from and giving something to other self-conscious physical beings." (Op. cit., 284-285.) In these interactions a person needs ‘practical wisdom’ about the good life. Practical wisdom (phronesis) is one of the core concepts of Aristotle’s ethics. Practical wisdom can be learned only by practice and by the good example of others. That is why it is very difficult to think that the "national-militarists", "ethnic-nationalists" and "terrorists" mentioned by Shaw (2005) could have the same kind of ethics. All of them have a different "ethical life", or in German "Sittlichkeit", a concept introduced by Hegel.

Is there any hope? But we have to keep ethics alive!

As already said, we have to start from the outside. The situation is similar with Jacques Derrida’s reflection of philosophy: “I have attempted more and more systematically to find a non-site … from which to question philosophy” (Derrida 1986, 108). With purely military terms and modes of thinking we cannot question military ethics.

The idea about the morality of decency – coming from outside the military - can be taken to be a step towards the most profound interpretation of ethics. It is Emmanuel Levinás’ ethics as a basic relation between me and the other. Levinás is strongly against the whole Western, Greek-based tradition, because subjectivity is reduced to consciousness, and knowledge is claimed to come before ethics. On the contrary, according to him, ethics is the most basic level of life, in which ‘the other’ is always more important than me. If we take the idea of human security seriously as a possible philosophy for peace-building oriented military ethics, we cannot go ahead without Levinás.
In reflecting issues like those of the morality of decency and morality of war, we have to ask whether war and battle will still in the future be the dominant life-sphere of the military and its professionalism. Perhaps we should think like Tony Corn (2006) that "in the five years since the 9/11 events, the old military adage has undergone a 'transformation' of its own: Amateurs … continue to talk about strategy, but real professionals increasingly talk about - anthropology." There are, I think, deep relations between ethics and anthropology, although ethics should not be reduced to anthropology. Especially in the "new wars", both anthropology (in the sense to "shed light on the grammar and logic of tribal warfare", as Corn writes) and ethics in the sense of how to act in order to act in a good and right way – as I would like to understand ethics – are important. As Mary Kaldor (2001) describes, unlike the typical wars of the modern period (state against state), in the new wars actual battles are rare; most violence is directed against civilians; ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a technique for gaining control of territory; massacres and atrocities are ways of ruling through terror. Alongside the new wars, peace building in its large sense of preventing conflicts, managing crises, and doing post-conflict rebuilding seems to become the main field of action of the armed forces of democratic countries.

It is often believed that ethics provides us with moral principles or universal rules, which tell us what to do. But as Hilary Putnam says, the primary aim of the ethicist is not to produce a "system", but to contribute to the solution of practical problems. Some thinkers, in the footsteps of Emmanuel Levinás, go much further and say that it is not enough to talk about ethics. Rather, we should be interested in ethicality – in being ethical beyond ethics. John D. Caputo (1999) prefers ethicality instead of ethics, because ethics is too often understood as "the land of rule and normativity". For him, "the unconditional hospitality owed to the other is the ethical beyond ethics". To take this kind of ethicality as the guiding principle goes beyond the traditional military culture. But it forms the basis of human security, a post-Cold War paradigm different from military or state security.

Rather than from ethics, the contemporary military very easily adopts concepts and ways of thinking from technology and business, as for instance Randy Martin (2006) shows: "a New Age sounding vocabulary is introduced". Soon after the Cold War the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was introduced "as a self-justifying juggernaut of military planning and expenditure", and on the basis of RMA, the concept of transformation as "a kind of meta-managerial approach" was developed. Randy Martin critically says that there is a connection between training
and the military’s more general conception of labor: “The few, the special, will be trained and hardened to become ‘the point of the spear’. For the rest they will be left with an ethos of self-managed risk.” He means that in training doctrines like the “Warrior Ethos” in the US Army, there is the risk of transferring the responsibility for managing the dangers of combat to the individual soldier. In this kind of context the ethical researchers and teachers should be very careful in using concepts like ‘responsibility’.

Ethical considerations always somehow reflect the given social, cultural, political and economical contexts (Demmke & Bossaert 2004). For Aristotle, the context was the city state of his time, and it is difficult for us to make use of his ethics if we do not understand his polis-context. The contemporary discourse on military ethics is influenced, perhaps most of all, by the Post Cold War, or postmodern, situation with its ‘new wars’ and the new kinds of views on security environments, including ‘the war on terror’. Military ethics cannot be discussed and understood as an abstract entity without contexts, which are social, cultural, political and economical by nature, including the often very powerful ethnic and religious aspects with long historical roots.

For a serious reflection on ethics, it is crucial to understand the traditions of thinking about life and human beings from the ancient times through the Medieval Age and the Modern Age to our ‘Postmodern Age’. Although ethics is not the same as religion, the religious traditions have very much influenced, and still influence, our ethical views. Without a historical and religious understanding there is a great risk to devalue ethics to a technical tool for indoctrination.

At the very basic level, ethics is about the dignity of life. It deals with virtues like honesty, compassion, and loyalty. Our feelings as well as social norms and even laws can deviate us from what is ethical. That is why we should constantly examine our ways of action to ensure that they are reasonable and well founded. In other words, ethics is self-reflection in the meaning of continuous effort of studying our own moral beliefs and our moral conduct in order to ensure that we and our institutions live up to the principles of good and righteous life. This is what Arendt meant with thoughtfulness. Rules and codes as such, even when learned by heart, mean nothing. But they can be tools which make it possible for us to live with ourselves when we act in our chosen ways.
References


Part I:

Problems and Challenges
Some Problems of Ethics in Military Education

The question of ethics in the military space

Veli-Matti Värrri

In the following article I will outline some basic dilemmas concerning the ethical foundations of military education and being an ethical soldier in the postmodern era. Because of the specific purpose of military training, my presentation is doomed to deal with (ethical) paradoxes. The main paradox is interwoven with the problem of killing: how is it possible to maintain one's ethical consistency and be an ethical subject by justifying killing and respecting human dignity at the same time? Is there any space for ethics beyond the conception of human dignity? These questions are still relevant after admitting the necessity of defence forces under the possible threats of the conflicting human reality.

By accepting the defensive purpose of a military agency I exclude the prospect of aggressive war beyond the ethical framework. As a precondition for my more detailed consideration it is necessary to characterize the existential background of military orientation. Behind the socio-cultural constituents forming the space for military ethics and education there is the 'metaphysical' level of common beliefs concerning the ontological nature of the social world. The crucial beliefs legitimating military forces are based on the conception of threatening otherness: there exists an actual, potential or fictional enemy that makes military education and continuing armament credible and worthy of support within the majority of people. This conception of threatening otherness, based on real historic experiences of previous generations casts a peculiar shade on encountering the world: the professional soldier must be ready for the worst scenarios of war and as a military trainer his or her duty is to educate servicemen to cope with utmost situations on the battlefield. For this reason the sharp distinction between 'us' and 'others' is pregiven as the apriori aspect of "communication" in the military world. Professional soldiers may be too familiar with these aspects but they are worth presenting for fair argumentation in my ethical problematization.
The macro conditions of military ethics

It is not relevant to consider the conditions of military ethics without their governmental, legislative and ideological commitments in the nation-state. In my presentation I will sketch (1) the level of the macro-system of prevalent military thinking, and (2) the level of an individual soldier with his or her moral commitments as a moral agent.

In the framework of modern thinking there is no legal military service without a nation state and the conception of citizenship. The macro-level of the social world forms the objective power structure for the realization of military education. It consists of the formal structure of governmental power with its legislative regulation and the informal sphere of public morality as the basis for the acceptance of national service. Although the public opinion in Finland still strongly supports the idea of general national service, there have been radical changes in the moral sphere of the nation state in setting common conditions for subject-formation both as a citizen and as an individual. With these changes I refer to the process of postmodernization with its impacts on the whole cultural sphere of the society. The ongoing era has been defined with many ”post” descriptions (postmodern, post-traditional, post-industrial, post-national, post-human…) all referring to undeniable changes in our social world. The clarity, certainty and continuity of traditions and ideologies have been left behind. The disappearance of security spreads from the higher structure of the nation-state to the daily life of citizens and their identity formation (see Giddens 1991; Bauman 2002; Delanty & O’Mahoney 2002). To understand the cultural process of postmodernization it is relevant to outline four changes in the macro-level of the social world (Smith 1999, 9 in Toiskallio 2001, 451): the decrease of size and meaning of nation states, increasing consciousness of risks, globalized capitalism and the ending of European imperialism. We encounter more radical and continuing changes with the instability of the world and the absence of firm foundations having their effects on the level of state, market, life-world, art, science, religion, politics, work, leisure time, reason, emotion, production and education (Toiskallio 2001, 451).

These changes set great challenges for military education in the present-day nation-state. As described in Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’, the state project is more than government in traditional terms; it is also about the regulation of populations through the control of the social body, such as health, sanity, crime, education and poverty (Foucault
governmentality is still more than social regulation in this sense; it is also about the actual constitution of the subject as an individual and member of the national polity. In order to achieve this objective, the state project must set about to create citizens (Delanty & Mahony 2002, 11). Education and a national curriculum are the main instruments in the formation of subjectivity along the virtues of citizenship.

To understand the moral influences of the changed basis of postmodern governance it is useful to turn to Charles Taylor’s (1996) “socio-constructionist” moral philosophy. According to Taylor’s thinking, the societal conditions of ethics and the formation of one’s identity are intertwined. There is no moral subject without one’s relation to the common moral perspective (horizon of significance) of an actual society. As a historical perspective for my analysis, it is possible to discern different phases with their respective “moral cosmologies” of governance (see Foucault 1979) in the history of society. These “moral cosmologies” can also be called transcendental horizons and a kind of shared perspective of hegemony (see Gramsci 1979) for citizens’ moral orientation. For further analysis, it is possible to discern different phases for educating citizens with their own “moral cosmologies” in the history of a society. From this point of view the horizon of significance (Taylor 1996) and Gramsci’s of hegemony can be used as conceptual tools in interpreting discrepancies in different curriculum discourses. This is valid also in the case of Finland. Finnish history can be divided into different periods with different “moral cosmologies”. These periods render the historically variegated foundations for education, curriculum, and identity construction. The conditions of ideological governmentality in shaping moral subjects as citizens have changed from a communitarian moral horizon and later welfare-state politics to a late-modern society with neo-liberal tendencies.

Finnish history can be summarized as three stages, which are a) the ‘First State’ (1917-1939), b) the ‘Second State’ (1945-1970/1980s), and c) the ‘Information Society’ (1990-). In the early years of the “First State” (1917-1939) the moral sphere (horizon of significance) of education, teaching and curriculum was constituted by religious and national values. School and citizen education were expected to integrate the nation divided by a civil war (1918). In the sense of Hegel and J.V. Snellman (the most prominent Hegelian philosopher and statesman in Finland in the 19th century), the state was regarded as the highest moral sphere, setting the common ideals and norms for citizenship. The individuals were expected to grow to moral subjects in the family by
performing their duties in the civil society in accordance with the notions of a common good. A citizen will achieve his or her freedom by reason as the highest virtue of the innermost telos of a human being. Thus, as a rational subject the citizen is the moral subject according to the ideals of the Enlightenment (see Hall 1992).

After the Second World War (the "Second State"), the earlier conception of a citizen lost its philosophical foundation. This period can be interpreted as the rise of a sociological subject (Hall 1992), as a shift from virtue-based morality (communitarian theory) toward individual rights and subjective life style choices (liberalism). The sociological shift reflects the increasing complexity of the modern world and the increasing awareness of the lack of an autonomous, self-sufficient self. According to G. H. Mead this kind of a subject is dependent on "significant others". The socio-cultural conditions for the new kind of awareness of subjectivity originated in the post-World War II situation. The ruined society had to be rebuilt on concrete, political, and symbolical levels. The project of the welfare state set the moral framework for social life in general, and especially for education and teaching. The grip of the nation state was still strong in the citizens' life-worlds, although the mass media and popular cultures expanded peoples' global awareness. The comprehensive school, the liberalization of the army (more rights to servicemen) and many other social reforms were constituted at that time.

In the late modern information society the horizon of significance is more dispersed and fragmented than ever before. The questions of education and citizenship must be set in the sphere of globalized nation states marked by multi-culturalism, marketization and neo-liberal economy. Instead of a national policy, the discourse and terminology of education emerge increasingly from the neo-liberal economy and global markets. The moral sphere has changed from a national identity toward post-structural and postmodern meanings of subjectivity. According to Hall (1992), there are at least three conflicting tendencies in the process of globalization that characterize the identity construction: (1) national identities will be degenerating as a consequence of cultural homogenisation and global postmodernisation, (2) national and other local or limited identities will strengthen as a consequence of resistance against globalization, and (3) national identities will be degenerating and replaced by new hybrid identities. All these possible tendencies lead to the same conclusion: one's identity is the task of construction in the postmodern situation. Therefore there is no clear direction for the citizen or military education.
Military education in the postmodern obscurity

It has been considered self-evident that the commission of a soldier is tightly connected to his or her loyalty to the nation-state and its legitimacy as an objective moral authority. We are used to thinking of the professional and conscripted soldier as a loyal servant of the nation-state with his or her duties based on virtue-ethics and permanent objective values. In this sphere military education and national service have been regarded as an essential part of citizen education. In Finland, the neighbourhood with the former Soviet Union confirmed the spirit of threatening otherness as a realistic ontology of the social world. After the Soviet Union and the Cold War, the world has changed considerably, but the moral orientation of military service as citizen education is still upheld.

However, the ideological and moral basis for educating citizens and the identification to the nation-state are not as self-evident as they used to be in the earlier days. As Bourdieu (1998) has argued, the nation-state is a historical and ideological construction without any essential foundations. Therefore the common meaning horizons (including educational aims) constituted by the nation-state are not fixed essential truths by nature. In the globalized context of postmodernity, both the prospect of the nation-state and the contents of the national curriculum have become under critical reconsidering. The obscurity of educational contents in the national curriculum sets crucial questions to military ethics and education. The spirit of the Winter War (the Finnish defence-battle against the Soviet Union in 1939-40) is still respected, but more as a common narrative than as a commonly challenging obligation for military service. Because of the changed meaning of authority in education and generally in the society, there is no firm moral 'cement' among the young generations for sustaining the sense of patriotic duty and sacrificing oneself.

The question of one's identity-construction with its individualist interpretations have come to the center of educational thinking. As a social praxis, education is originally intertwined with the current moral horizon of significance in society (see Taylor 1996; Puolimatka 1999). Thus the common experience of obscurity penetrates necessarily also to the interpretations of education and educational aims. Because we are the heirs of the nation-state project – there is neither a modern citizen beyond the nation-state nor a nation-state without citizen education - the problematization of setting educational aims must be traced from changes in the prospects of the globalized nation state. Global economy
estABLishes the framework for the nation state and the moral landscape is even more global, multi-cultural and permeated with the effects of the media. In postmodernity, the nation-state is not a self-evident legitimation basis either for the institutions of education and schooling or for the formation of one's individual identity. Plurality and the dispersion of individual life-plans are signs of the time.

The common moral horizon has dispersed in the nation-states but there is still something to share in the sense of govermentality: instrumental rationality. In the late modern and post-structuralistic context there are still universalistic aims in education, coming now from the neo-liberal invasion in global economy and its impacts on the national school policy and education. This new kind of hegemony is a manifestation of pure secularization and instrumental rationality. It has no reference point to other values outside the aims of instrumentality. There is still a national spirit in the moral context of the nation-state but the transcendental horizon based on religion or political and ethical ideals has been replaced by instrumental aims in accordance with the global market. In worldwide capitalism the globally oriented economy has got the status of a new fatherland which everyone must be ready to struggle for and devote himself to. To be slightly sarcastic, if the economic life is the present fatherland, and if economy is a section of global capitalism, how can military education give reasons for patriotic virtues and sentiments?

The postmodernization and economization of the society with more diversified life-worlds of citizens make the educational perspective rather complex and obscure. Are there any bases for objective educational aims? What are these aims? How to intercorporate societal prescriptions with the postmodern subjectivity with its individual variations? These are real questions in military education, which is rooted in a communitarian view of ethics based on common basic values. During last decades the communitarian conception has been slowly challenged by the liberalisation and diversification of societies. Child-centered education with its dialogical ideals has strengthened the moral basis for a liberal interpretation of subjectivity. This kind of evidence is given in the educational and didactical school rhetorics with a strong trust on individuality and childrens’ ability to construct their own views of values (Launonen 2000). In the background of these constructivist beliefs there is the slow cultural process aiming at withdrawing from the repressive forms of the old hierarchical society of discipline and punishment. In this atmosphere the sense of rights is stronger than the sense of duty.
What are the implications of these changes for the military service? Traditionally, the military has been attractive for patriotic reasons and its inner morality has been constituted by the common beliefs to perennial virtues and duty ethics. Also the recruitment of new servicemen has been thought to be based on these traditional values, but obviously this kind of thinking is too romantic. Purely patriotic reasons for choosing the military profession may be rare even among career officers. It is more than probable that most (post)modern officers prefer the demands of high-validity expertise (for example the pilots) and their possible international duties in peace support operations. Thus, military education with its communitarian orientation faces demanding educational and dialogical challenges when encountering "postmodern" young citizens with strong consciousness of their subjective rights. However, we must admit that military education has been quite flexible and successful in following the spirit of the time by re-orientating its doctrines of education and leadership. The voluntary female service is one of the concrete results of the new kind of thinking.

**Technological imperative as the framework of military ethics**

Despite the ideological changes in the common moral horizon of the society, the army is a special kind of institution with its own inner virtues. In a specific sense the 'closed' and hierarchic institutions like the army and the police are among the last formal institutions and professions based on traditional virtues like loyalty, honour and bravery.

These principles may possibly stay rather abstract under peaceful circumstances, but they are strong motivating reasons for commitment and trust in the sensibility of service. Ethics is strongly needed on every level of the military world and at the same time its space is very limited and pre-structured by pre-given factors coming from the 'outer' world and the praxis of military action in itself. The objective framework of defence and being prepared for outer threats set the conditions of military ethics under the global competition of armament. To be credible in the eyes of others, the defence ability must be continually sustained and improved. Thus, all discourses of military education and ethics are kept under an technological imperative, which can be defined as the metaphysical power of our instrumental reality. Though we are ready to admit the necessity of military defence, we are doomed to the vicious circle of endless armament, which in the ecological sense is a deeply unmaintainable relation to the world.
Concluding my macro-level sketch, it can be argued that at the same time with decreasing national and patriotic values for military education, the military world is permeated with pure performative (see Toiskallio 2001, 459) and instrumental thinking coming from the technological challenges of ‘postmodern’ information war. In that situation the meaning of individuality becomes crucial for military training, but purely in a performative and functional sense: the "knowledge"-based war needs specific experts with their individual skills and capabilities.

**The touchstones of military ethics**

The questions of military ethics are not for professional soldiers only. The question concerning the acceptability of military defence has to be reduced to the basis of citizenship. From Heidegger’s (1984) and Levinas’ (1985) ontological perspectives we are fundamentally and originally responsible in being and for being, and as Levinas states it, in this meaning ethics is the first philosophy. By broadening our fundamental responsibility to the social world as human beings and citizens we have no way to solve our moral problems by closing our eyes and freeing ourselves from unpleasant duties by handing them over to a professional army.

Naturally ethics always concerns an individual decision making, but there are some restrictions concerning the possibility of being ethical as an individual soldier. To certain limits an individual soldier is and he or she must be able to make his or her own personal moral choices. This is also the view of the new ideology of military leadership. In the modern war strategy every soldier is trained to be more competent in acting as an individual in the complex battle circumstances of the "postmodern" war needing specific expertise. Strictly speaking this kind of activity is not yet ethical by its nature, it is rather a soldier’s ability and virtue to be an effective part of his or her own military group.

We have finally arrived at the essential dilemma I presented in the beginning of my article: how to be ethical in the atmosphere of killing? At first we may say that moral attitudes and emotions exist in the war time, but they are exclusively restricted to one’s own group with the desirable virtues of loyalty, bravery and credibility. In that meaning there are virtue- and duty-based ethics among the own crew while the people on the other side of the front have lost their human dignity. This is the functional and necessary logic of social psychology in war. It is a psychological and logical necessity to dismantle the enemy from their human dignity. Otherwise there is no sense or reason to kill them.
What about Kant’s demand for treating other people firstly as an end but not as a means at all? What about his demand that we ought to behave so that our behaviour could be constituted as a general moral law? It is clear that in preparing for the battle and in the battle there is no room for Kantian or any other moral principles in the relation to enemies, but somewow it is relevant to argue that there exists contextual and casual forms of ethics also in the war time. Primarily this means bravery and confident behaviour among one’s own crew. For example my uncle Hannes Rokka (1917-2002) risked his own life by bringing his wounded brother-in-arms to safety under heavy enemy fire. There are a lot of similar experiences among our grandfathers, fathers and uncles.

One of the main ethical norms concerns the treatment of surrendered, captured or wounded enemies. They should be allowed to have their human dignity back immediately after the battle, but unfortunately we have crude examples of how fragile these ethical norms are in the damaging circumstances of war. Despite the romantic and idealistic literature and war movies it its perverse to imagine that war cultivates our character. However, sociologically speaking there are also moral differences and variations among the people in the military. Abstaining from cruelty against captive enemies or civilian people is a universal ethical principle, and how this principle is followed is also a sign of the moral discipline in the whole troop. Thus, the realization of ethics is also one of the responsibilities of good leading. One essential difference between soldiers comes up in their moral attitude towards deceased enemies. Morally sensible soldiers leave them in peace but unfortunately there have always been morally damaged soldiers who rob the bodies, dig out their gold teeth and dishonour dead bodies. I have heard true stories about how voluntary executioners have earned a few days of vacation. My uncle has told me that this kind of behaviour degenerated the common sense of morality among the whole troop.

From the officer’s viewpoint there are many restrictive conditions for being ethical. The officer’s first principle is to be a confident leader in front of his troop. A competent officer tries to spare his own men’s lifes. Therefore his capability to calculate between expenses and benefits is one of his virtues. In the strategic central position the officer must be able to calculate the probable and acceptable defeats for achieving the military goals and he must also have a clear conviction of how to treat civilians and captive enemies. Unfortunately provoking horror and causing defeats among civilian people is one of the main strategies of the modern total war.
The military situation is thoroughly functional by nature and therefore the possibility of ethics depends on the task to be performed. So, ethics is contextual or casual in military action. It is even possible to claim that ethics is almost impossible in proper military executing. How to solve the obligation of Kant’s categorical imperative in proper guerilla action? If the task of an intelligence squad is to acquire essential information about the movements of the enemy far away in front of them, they need valuable civilian informants from the enemy territory. At a great distance from their own front line, they strive to perform their dangerous task as effectively as possible without taking captives. On the other hand if their task is to catch a captive, he or she must be worthy of bringing back to the home base. Therefore, to save their own lives and ensure enough time for their escape, they do not release their informants. In fact they will be silenced forever. These kind of facts make the attempts to outline military ethics intertwined with basically unsolved dilemmas and paradoxes. However, in real circumstances soldiers have to solve these paradoxies in the framework of military action itself.

**Why do we need military ethics in military education?**

Ethics is a paradoxical issue in the military world and this is precisely the reason for the need of ethical education in military training. In our fragmented postmodern world we are too trustful in believing people’s innate ability to grow into moral subjects without any education. In fact our time needs a highly developed ability to be reflective in our identity formation in the middle of the multiple conflicting messages and demands of the virtual social world.

According to Bauman (2002) our fragmented time produces hybrid and casual identities with very loose social ties. His metaphors for these identities are the tourist, gambler and adventurer. The reverse side of the postmodern liberation is the ”aesthetic” subject continually seeking the fullfilment of his or her own pleasure. Kierkegaard (2001) would say that this kind of orientation is still the lowest level of social being and as such it is very far from an ethical way of being. In my mind the utmost representative of an ”aesthetic” adventurer is the rich Finnish male studying architecture who wanted to seek deep “vibrations” in a real war. Therefore he travelled to the midst of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia to join any troop he might encounter. Croats were the first military troops he accidentally met and so he signed a contract to fight
as a mercenary in the Croatian army. After his experiences this doubtful “veteran” wrote an ostentatious novel about his war adventures.

In our postmodern situation perhaps the most essential task of ethical education in military training is to create a sense of reality, reflexivity, fairness, justice and joint responsibility. In that meaning there is no sharp distinction to citizen education in general. Ethical education is a very demanding attempt in our postmodern complexity, and in military education it is almost a ”mission impossible”. That is why ethical education is an unavoidable task in military training.

References


Military Ethics: A Contradiction in Terms?¹

Desirée Verweij

Introduction

For many people, the pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq illustrate what they have always believed: ‘In time of war, laws are silent’. Yet, that old Latin phrase (Inter arma silent leges) was already highly contested in ancient Rome. And although the Prussian military theorist and general von Clausewitz wrote that war is an act of force which theoretically can have no limits, it had been decided long before von Clausewitz that war without limits is unacceptable, introducing thereby ethics into military practice.

Yet, to some people military ethics remains a contradiction in terms. How, after all, can a person be trained to kill and likewise be trained to act in a morally responsible way? Nonetheless, both ways of training have been in actual practice for quite some time now, which, of course, does not dispense with the contradiction, a contradiction that seems as old as the existence of states and their armies and seems inherent to military practice. It forms the basis, on a theoretical level, for the distinction between the so-called ‘Realists’ and the adherents to the so-called ‘Just War Tradition’. The latter are, beginning with Aristotle, the great-grandfathers of the guidelines on ethics in war that have been evolving for centuries.

The willingness to bind war to rules has developed throughout the course of history. The restriction of violence is necessary because, as von Clausewitz observed, war has a tendency towards extremes. In his view, war is a rational action in spite of the emotions and sentiments that underlie it. The link between rationality and emotions referred to by von Clausewitz, indicates the problem, or rather, perhaps, the pitfall, precisely. In a war, emotions, or perhaps it would be better to speak of drives, can easily get the better of people. Hence the attempt to bind wars by rules.

¹This article is based on a paper presented at the International conference ‘The Barbarisation of Warfare’, at the History and Governance Research Institute, University of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton 27-28 Juni 2005.
According to the Just War theorists, war can be considered to be just if it conforms to two sets of criteria. The *ius ad bellum* criteria, which should be taken into account before going to war, and the *ius in bello* criteria, the directives for waging war. In his latest book, Just War theorist Michael Walzer adds a third set of criteria: *ius post bellum* (justice after the war).

The present war on terror, waged by the US and its allies, seems to ride roughshod over all three sets of criteria. Moreover, politicians in favour of the war on terror use moral and Just War discourse to state their case. This raises the question of whether military ethics, in addition to being a contradiction in terms, is not also a form of ‘window-dressing’, disguising the pursuit of immoral and illegal ends. In order to answer this question, I will start by discussing the Just War criteria and place them in the context of the war in Iraq. This context will present an opportunity to show the sort of consequences that an ‘unjust’ war generates and how it contributes to the barbarisation of warfare and to the undermining of the aim of military ethics, i.e. moral competence.

Even though we label certain wars as unjust, however, they are still being fought. This leaves us with some crucial questions. Is there too big a gap between moral theory and military practice? Are Just War and military ethics futile attempts to create and stimulate moral competence in the military? And, one could even go one step further and pose the question, also posed by Jabri (1996), of whether Just War does not in fact legitimise cruelty and violence. With regard to these last questions, I will discuss Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* and take a closer look at the contradiction in terms that both Just War and military ethics seem to represent. I will conclude that the contradiction in terms reflects our human duality and that it is precisely on account of our human duality that we need ethics, especially in the military.

**Just War**

Although many philosophers and social scientists emphasise the fact that war is a human phenomenon, it is often considered to be an inhuman activity. War is violent and destructive and turns every social and political order into terrifying chaos. That is why Walzer states that we have to insist that war is “a morally dubious and difficult activity” (Walzer 2004, 15). Yet, as indicated above, wars can be just in the sense that they are justifiable and even morally necessary. There are situations in which intervention and therefore war represents the only adequate response.
There are acts of aggression and cruelty that can only be stopped by force. (e.g. the genocide in Rwanda, as the UN admitted in retrospect.) Just War can only be ‘just’, however, when it conforms to the three sets of criteria mentioned in section 1. These three sets of criteria will be discussed in the next three sections and placed in the context of the war in Iraq. This context will present an opportunity to show what sort of consequences an unjust war generates and how it can contribute to the barbarisation of warfare.

I shall focus on six crucial Just War criteria, with passing reference to the other criteria when discussing those six. The six criteria are: the four *ius ad bellum* criteria of ‘just cause’, ‘just intent’, ‘legitimate authority’, creation of ‘lasting peace’; and the two *ius in bello* criteria of ‘immunity for non-combattants’ and (force) ‘proportionality’. The *ius ad bellum* criteria of ‘last resort’ and (resources) ‘proportionality’, respectively, are part of the creation-of-lasting-peace discussion and the *ius in bello* (force) proportionality principle. In the latter context, the *ius in bello* principle of ‘double effect’ will also be examined. To conclude, the *ius post bellum* principle will be examined.


**Just cause**

The reason for waging war should be righteous. In the Just War literature, references to this principle refer to wars of defence against aggression against one’s own country and against other countries. The aggression referred to is a threat for values such as freedom and equality. Humanitarian intervention also falls under this criterion. Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a humanitarian intervention operation? The intended ‘liberation’ of the Iraqi people has often been referred to. Many Iraqis, on the other hand, have indicated that they did not want to be ‘liberated’ in that way and certainly did not want to be democratised under U.S. ‘occupation’. The attacks on the occupiers and their allies, which continue up to the present day, serve as an illustration of those positions. The peaceful demonstrations with regard to Iraq in other countries also make this clear. The question then arises as to the degree to which one can talk of ‘liberation’. (I shall return to this question below.)

Furthermore, the US has characterised the war as a pre-emptive strike. Leaving the question of the setting of a dangerous precedent for this
type of war to one side, the reasoning behind it seems to raise some questions. There was, after all, no imminent threat to the US from Iraq and the weapons of mass destruction that could have supported that threat, do not appear to be present. Does this mean that we must conclude that other reasons lay behind the war against Iraq? This is a question that was answered in the affirmative by Undersecretary of Defence Wolfowitz two years ago (NRC 30 May 2003). Be that as it may, Bush himself continues to justify the war by referring to the links between Iraq and Al-Qa’ida (NRC 21 June 2004). Links which were denied by an official US commission that investigated them. (NRC 18 June 2004). The question into the grounds on which the war was actually fought therefore remains unanswered. That brings me to the second *ius ad bellum* criterion: just intent.

**Just intent**

The criterion of ‘just intent’ refers to deeper motivations that lay behind the decision to wage war. In relation to the ‘just cause’ principle discussed above, this should actually mean opposing aggression and restoring peace and freedom. In respect of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the question posed earlier of whether the main goals of Operation Iraqi Freedom were liberation and preventing terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction can be repeated equally well here. Or was the whole operation a pretext to achieve a goal that had been on the (hidden) agendas of neo-conservative Republicans for a long time? Could it be about less noble and idealistic principles and purely about strategic and economic power?

It appears incontestable that those elements played a part. In contrast, however, according to journalist and author Bob Woodward (2002), Bush really believes that God has given him a task to spread ”Western” values. Blair shares this view, according to Van Rossum who writes in this regard of the ‘moral crusade’ of the two political leaders, thus aligning himself with the statement by the French philosopher and essayist Paul Bruckner, who refers to, ”The American conviction that America is the cradle of good” (NRC, 15 May 2004).

Despite the irony of these words, one must note that few people would object to replacing a dictatorship with a democracy. The oppressed population itself least of all. Is there something else at stake then? It seems hard to answer this question, either in the affirmative or the negative. It often is. International politics is always a mix of ethics and
power, idealism and realism, which does not, by the way, answer the question of how justified and legitimate 'moral crusades' that spread democratic "Western" values are. They are certainly not justified and legitimate if there is no broad support for these Western values and if the way the proliferation of these values occurs is questionable, to say the least. The persistent resistance to Western values, including so-called democratic values, calls us to reflect on these values and demands willingness to take the criticism seriously. Especially since it is criticism that has been heard before (cf. Buruma and Margalit 2004).

**Legitimate authority**

The decision to wage war should be taken by the proper or legitimate authority. But who is that or who are they? Is it a sovereign state or is it the Security Council? If international peace and security are at stake, it should be the Security Council. Is this an adequate response, however? Is there a guarantee that this 'authority' will also take the correct, in the sense of morally responsible, response?

The term 'proper authority' may have to be replaced by the term 'competent authority'. By this, I mean an institutionalised collective at a global level with the ability to take morally responsible decisions. This also implies an institutionalised collective with the ability and the willingness to evaluate a situation on the basis of commitment to and insight into the situation as well as the ability and the willingness to prevent decisions based solely on subjective positions. This implies the ability to reflect on one's own subjectivity and a capability to distance oneself from one's own position without losing the moral engagement with the situation. Such a position is only possible through dialogue. Here, too, the active principle is that effective ethics is based on an open and consistent dialogue. This applies not only to educational situations but also at the international, and therefore global, level.

**Lasting peace**

War should only be waged if it creates the conditions that result in a lasting peace. The operation must therefore be achievable and deliver the intended result. In relation to the criterion of 'just cause', this means that the war should actually result in peace and security. In this regard, the criterion of 'last resort' also plays an important part. On the basis of this last criterion, all efforts should be directed to prevent war. One may ask whether this actually took place in respect of Iraq. Hans Blix,
head of the weapons inspectors in Iraq for the UN, stated that it would have been better if he had been given more time for his inspections. In Blix’s view, the unwillingness to take more time for the inspections is an indication that the war against Iraq had more priority than looking for solutions that could have prevented war. (Volkskrant, 18 March 2004).

The question that can also be asked here is whether the war against Iraq did not actually contribute to the opposite of its stated goals. Rather than peace and security, the war and its aftermath seems to have led to a heightening of differences and, therefore also to an escalation of violence, both inside and outside Iraq. In many Arab and European countries, the irritation has grown over the arrogance of the superpower that takes little notice of criticism of its ‘war on terror’ and refuses to thoroughly look into the causes of the terrorism with which it is confronted. Criticism is soon viewed as unpatriotic, as many in the US have experienced.

For many political groups, the American refusal to accept criticism over its military and economic strategies unfortunately serves as fertile soil for a spiral of violence. Considering the superpower status of the US, this spiral of violence cannot but be asymmetrical, and it will include repeated attempts made to undermine the perceived arrogance of American supremacy. The danger from individuals and groups, who sow death and destruction without any ethical scruples, will only increase. The technically advanced pre-emptive strikes that characterise the war on terror cannot change that in any way. No more than the cowboy rhetoric, with the world divided into ‘good guys’ (with white hats) and ‘bad guys’ (with black hats) and proponents who state, very simplistically, that: “who is not for us is against us”. In addition, the danger of fighting terrorism is that it often undermines the very values that one originally held high, thereby achieving precisely what the terrorists intend.

Violence is not restricted to targets abroad. Within the borders of Iraq, social, religious and ethnic tensions, which are brought about by the collapse of every dictatorial government, are becoming increasingly evident. And even though the downfall of a dictator is, of course, always cause for rejoicing, as Hans Magnus Enzensberger stated (NRC, 15 April 2003), the fall of a dictator often creates a vacuum that is filled by multiple, little dictators. This can easily transform a country into a

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*The case of the treatment of the mayor of Cracow is illustrative in this regard. During a visit by Bush to the city, the mayor was informed that his presence during events was not welcomed because he had made public statements that were critical of Bush’s pax Americana. (NRC 30 May 2003)*
Hobbesian society, in which it’s everyone against everyone and every man is a wolf to every other man, as Hobbes expressed it. In the chaos of power and cruelty, the law of the strongest always applies and the strongest in this type of situation is unfortunately always the one who is strongest materially and physically. Seldom is it someone who is admired for his rationality and his empathic abilities. It is for this reason that the Geneva Conventions imposes the responsibility on an occupying power to enforce law and order. Morally, this is a heavy responsibility that deserves to be treated with the utmost seriousness, precisely in order to prevent the violations of human rights.

**Ius in bello: ‘immunity of non-combattants’ and ‘(force) proportionality’**

The *ius in bello* criteria are concerned with how force is applied. The criteria were created to bind to rules the force that the armed forces, by definition, apply in exercising their role as instruments of force, and thereby to restrict and legitimise them. From that perspective, and based on the principle of humanity, one proceeds on the basis of the immunity of non-combatants. That does not detract from the fact that non-combatants can actually become the victims of acts of war. This can, however, be the unintentional, though unavoidable, effect of a particular operation, an effect which is therefore known as the double effect: the death or injury of non-combatants can be the tragic, but not intended, consequence of a military operation.

It needs to be added here immediately, however, that if too many non-combatant casualties are expected during a particular operation, that operation should be reconsidered and, perhaps, cancelled altogether. This relates to the principle of proportionality. This principle is also one of the *ius ad bellum* principles and, in that context, refers to the principle that, if human, economic or cultural losses are too great, and cannot be justified by the ‘good’ that one intends with the war, then the price that must be paid for the war is too high. This principle also applies in the *ius in bello* context. Here, too, it concerns the weighing of negative results, in this case of particular operations or actions, against the positive results. Van Damme and Fotion (2002, 129) point out that this principle refers to the consequences of specific actions and that the welfare of people and, therefore, the direct or indirect consequences for their lives are important for the moral calculation made. Formulated

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3 *homo homini lupus est.* The Leviathan, 1651
in another way: the moral costs should be in equilibrium with the moral benefits. The link with the Conventions of Geneva and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man can again be underscored.

The application of the *ius in bello* principles to the situation in Iraq quickly reveals a number of problems. Firing on guests at a wedding because their celebratory small-arms fire was taken for hostile fire\(^4\) is one example, as is firing on ‘suspicious’ vehicles and homes and the destruction of buildings that serve no operational purpose. It should be noted here that only the American armed forces and their allies appear to be held to upholding these rules. The rules appear not to apply to their opponents. For these internationally recognised rules are ignored completely by the groups of irregulars operating in Iraq. The irregular ‘fighters’ are not recognisable as combatants and do not hesitate to carry out attacks leading to non-combatant casualties. This type of asymmetric warfare, in which regular forces engage irregular forces and during which the irregulars intentionally provoke violations of the rules by the regular forces, makes military operations even more precarious than they otherwise would be. The manifestations of this phenomenon includes the suicide attacks by apparent civilians and storing military materiel in buildings that, according to the rules, enjoy protection, such as houses of worship, hospitals, etc.

The intentional provocation of violations of the principles of the Just War, and therefore of the Conventions of Geneva and the Humanitarian Law of War, demands an adequate response in which the rules as such remain in place. It is obvious that this is easier said than done. However, it is the only way to guarantee the legitimacy of the use of force. If the use of force is not tied to rules, and is therefore no longer legitimate, then we find ourselves back in the Hobbesian chaos mentioned above, where the law of the strongest applies. This is precisely the reason for the commotion around the photographs from Abu Ghraib prison: they explicitly illustrate the barbarization of warfare. There is a lot to say from a number of different perspectives about these photographs. I shall limit myself to a short comment from the perspective of Military Ethics and Just War.

It would be extremely naive and evidence little insight to simply point an admonishing finger and say ‘tsk, tsk’ to Lynndie England and her comrades. It would be equally naive to believe that the problem is resolved by the simple expedient of removing the so-called ‘degenerate individuals’

\(^4\) May 2004
and to demolish Abu Ghraib prison as being the home of all that is evil. Of course, the actions to which the photographs bear witness are morally reprehensible and in conflict with the principle of proportionality discussed above and with the Conventions of Geneva and Human Rights. They do, however, illustrate several important points and in that regard they are extremely relevant to Military Ethics.

The photographs make clear what people (including ‘ordinary’ and ‘normal’ people) are capable of in certain situations and under certain conditions. These people are, in fact, doing nothing other than carrying out the assignments they have been given from their superiors, as they themselves have said and as Hersh (2004) has illustrated. Arendt opened the discussion of the ‘banality of evil’ in her analysis of the Eichmann case (Verweij 2002). With the help of experiments, Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (1973) showed how disconcertingly high the percentage is of people who will maltreat those under their control if they are directed to and, with no scruples, will apply electrical shocks up to 450 volts and abuse prisoners. Raaijmakers’ study (1984) shows that the degree of moral development of an individual in situations like these provides a counter to carrying out immoral and illegal assignments.

The conclusion of these studies makes clear that Military Ethics should primarily be concerned with developing moral responsibility. For commanders, this implies a double responsibility. They should be aware of the psychological processes that are at work in this type of situation and they should explicitly state what is and what is not acceptable according to moral and legal guidelines. By so doing, the excesses shown by the Abu Ghraib photographs can be prevented, as can other forms of ‘moral disengagement’ (Bandura, 1999). Moral responsibility was, however, an unknown phenomenon in the Abu Ghraib prison, as was familiarity with the Conventions of Geneva, which became apparent during interviews with the military personnel involved (“The Geneva what??”, Lynndie England asked her interviewer when he mentioned the Geneva Conventions.)

*Ius post bellum*

Since the publication of his book *Just and Unjust Wars* in 1977, Walzer has further developed his ideas on just wars (Walzer 2004). The violent conflicts of our post-Cold War era are the main cause for the necessity of finding responses to questions about nation-building as part of post-war conflicts. Principally because, in the countries where these conflicts
take place – such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Congo – there is a weak or absent central authority and violent warlords are in charge.

Violations of human rights are the order of the day and are often the reason for humanitarian interventions by the international community. Based on these developments, Walzer hit upon the idea that, in addition to the *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello* criteria of the Just War, a third set of criteria should be given attention: the *ius post bellum* criteria. As the name indicates, these criteria apply ‘after the war’, and refer to peacekeeping and political and social reconstruction. Precisely because a Just War is not a crusade, it should be focused on “the restoration of the *status quo ante*” (Walzer 2004, 18). The *ius post bellum* criteria flow out of the responsibility that one has for a country in which one is intervening and therefore also for the population who will suffer the negative consequences of the intervention. Walzer indicates thereby that it is important to specify this responsibility more closely so that the criteria can be worked out in more detail. He calls for the creation of an international agency “that could stipulate and even enforce these responsibilities”, with attention also being paid to such things as how long the ‘occupation’ by the intervening forces should last and how regime change should take place (op cit., 22).

The lamentable situation in Iraq at this moment illustrates that the US and its allies have fallen well short in regard to *ius post bellum* in Iraq. It is clear that the road to political and social reconstruction is still long and the end is not in sight. This is illustrated by the official acceptance of the constitution in October 2005 and the simultaneous contestation of this acceptance due to accusations of fraud.

**Just War and military ethics: humanitarian discourse disguising inhuman acts?**

On the basis of the three sets of Just War criteria the conclusion can be drawn that the war in Iraq is not a Just War. International legal experts have also stated this before. This is no academic discussion, however. These types of wars are problematic due to the consequences that they generate and in doing so, they open the way that leads to the barbarisation of warfare. This has become clear in the discussion of the Just War criteria in the foregoing sections.

An unjust war is a so-called aggressive war, not initiated by a competent authority, without perspectives for peace, and, furthermore, a war in
which there are too many civilian casualties, too much material damage and in which explicit violations of human rights take place, including the barbarous way that prisoners are treated. And on top of that little or no responsibility is taken for political and social reconstruction. Wars that are not perceived as ‘just’, have little bearing surface both within and outside the war waging countries. They will inevitably meet with more resistance based on the support from people who acknowledge the injustice and this will lead to a spiral of violence. The Just War criteria discussed above form a guarantee for morally responsible actions, at both a political and military level. If the moral guarantee is absent, the use of force can no longer be distinguished from criminal behaviour and there is no brake on excessive violence. This still leaves us with one big question, however. For even though the barbaric consequences of an unjust war are clear, unjust wars are still being fought. What does this imply? Does it imply that there is a big gap between moral theory and military practice and that Just War and therefore military ethics are futile attempts to create and stimulate moral competence in the military?

One could even go one step further and pose the question, also posed by Jabri (1996), of whether Just War does not in fact legitimise cruelty and violence and, one might add, is, along with military ethics a form of window-dressing, disguising immoral pursuits. I will go into these questions in the next two sections.

Discourses on violence

Jabri’s book *Discourses on Violence* seeks to use ”social and political theory in an attempt to locate violence in the relationship between self and society” (op cit., 3). Her objective is to develop a critical understanding of war as a social continuity. Jabri defines militarism and ‘Just War doctrine’ as dominant modes of discourse, which are responsible for the reproduction of war (op cit., 97). The question is, however, whether one can place militarism and Just War on the same level. In her discussion of militarist discourse, Jabri refers to Hegelian texts in which war is presented as an important contributor to, or even constituent for, masculinity and nationhood and national identity (op cit., 98). Jabri maintains that there is a shift in militarist discourse from glorification of war towards the perception of war as an effective tool in the pursuit of policy.

The discussion of Just War in the preceding sections, however, has demonstrated that Just War is different from the militarist discourse
discussed by Jabri. Moreover, Jabri does not seem knowledgeable about the sets of criteria that are inherent to Just War. Although she recognises the normative aspect of Just War discourse (op cit., 106) and the fact that Just War theorists look for limits and restraints in conducting war (op cit., 107), she nevertheless maintains that ”the doctrine of Just War is however, also constitutive of war. (...) Rules enable war as form of conduct” (op cit., 107). What Jabri seems to overlook is the fact that Just Wars, as discussed in de foregoing sections, are different from unjust or aggressive wars.

On the whole, Jabri’s discussion of Just War is rather unsatisfactory. Jabri seems ignorant about the criteria that constitute the ‘justness’ of a Just War and that play a crucial role in the discussion about Just War. But above all Jabri disregards the critical dimension inherent in Just War. As Walzer puts it: ”Just war is designed to sustain a constant scrutiny and an immanent critique” (Walzer 2004, 22). The faculty of the University of Salamanca gives a historic example of this critical stance. In 1520 they met in solemn assembly and voted that the Spanish conquest of Central America was a violation of natural law and an unjust war (Walzer 2004, 4). A heroic moment, according to Walzer.

Jabri does not seem to realise that ”the transformative discourse” she promotes, aimed at ”peace situated in dialogic relations” (op.cit., 185) also applies to Just War discourse. It seems as if Jabri refuses to acknowledge that establishing peace sometimes requires Just War. When the values that constitute peace are under fierce physical attack, Just War is needed. Unless, of course, Jabri believes that values are merely linguistic or discursive constructions and therefore need not be defended. As Walzer puts it: ”Just War theory, even when it demands a strong critique of particular acts of war, is the doctrine of people who do expect to exercise power and use force. We might think of it as a doctrine of radical responsibility, because it holds political and military leaders responsible, first of all for the well being of their own people, but also for the well being of innocent men and women on the other side” (Walzer 2004, 14). It therefore recognises the humanity of all people.

So, Just War does not legitimise cruelty. On the contrary, it counters this tendency. It does however legitimise the use of force and therefore of violence. Notably, force and therefore violence can only be used to a certain degree and in specific situations. Just War therefore presents the image of a moral, or humanitarian, warrior. I will further substantiate this statement with the The Art of War, the ”first of all military classics” (Sun Tzu, 1963, 11) written by the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu somewhere between 400 –320 BC.
Sun Tzu

In his foreword to Griffith’s translation of Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*, Liddell Hart (a British Captain and military thinker) states that civilisation might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars of the 20th century if the influence of von Clausewitz had been blended with and balanced by knowledge of Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*.

Sun Tzu’s ideas were and are seen as benevolent and righteous. He starts his text with the statement: "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life and death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied" (op cit., 63). According to Sun Tzu, the moral dimension plays a crucial role in war. The ideal war is won without going to battle. It is won by frustrating the enemies’ plans, breaking up his alliances, and by using spies and agents rather than soldiers. Only when this fails does one have to go to war. Force should only be applied, however, in 1) the shortest possible time, "For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited" (op cit., 73), 2) at the least possible cost in lives and effort and 3) with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties (op cit., 37). The reason for this is that "Weapons are ominous tools to be used only when there is no alternative" (op cit., 40).

Sun Tzu discusses five ‘fundamental factors’ with regard to the use of weapons; 1) moral influence, 2) weather, 3) terrain, 4) command and 5) doctrine. Griffith informs us that ‘moral influence’ is the translation of the Chinese concept ‘Tao’, which also translates ‘The Way’ or ‘The Right Way’. In this context, it refers to the moral dimension of politics. The sovereign governs justly and righteously if he follows the ‘right path’ or the ‘right way’ and thus exerts moral influence (op cit. p.63). In the words of Sun Tzu: "By moral influence, I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany him in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril” (op cit., 64).

Tao is an important concept, not just in Chinese culture as a whole, but also with regard to the military. In Chinese culture, war was regarded as an evil, albeit one that was sometimes rendered necessary to restore Tao, or harmony. This is a delicate matter, for war itself also represents a temporary departure from “cosmic harmony, or Tao” (Creveld 2000, 24). Sun Tzu’s main point is that Tao can only be restored by Tao. In this context, this also means ‘by virtue’, for ‘Tao’ also translates as ‘virtue’ (Creveld 2000, 24). Since war represents a departure from Tao in order to restore it, the use of force should be kept to an absolute minimum.
It now becomes clear why the ideal war was won without going to battle. As in the rest of life, the best way to achieve Tao is not to depart from it in the first place. And when one is forced to do so, one has to make an effort to restore Tao. This also indicates that taking pleasure in inflicting cruelty and violence is not just reprehensible, or immoral, but is also a destruction of Tao. "However vast the state, he who takes pleasure in the military will perish" (Sun Pin, quoted by Creveld op cit., 34). That the use of violence should be kept to an absolute minimum is expressed throughout Sun Tzu's text. For instance: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (op cit., 77) and "The best policy is to attack plans, the worst policy to attack cities" (op cit., 78). "To capture the enemy's army is better that to destroy it" (op cit., 77). And once captured: "Treat the captives well and care for them. All the soldiers taken must be cared for with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us" (op cit., 76).

This last statement makes clear that despite the dedicated care towards the captives there is clearly self-interest at stake. This win-win situation in which the captives are treated with "magnanimity and sincerity" will hardly meet with resistance, however. Why Sun Tzu can speak of 'sincerity', even though there is self-interest is clear: "Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao and preserve the laws. (...) The Tao is the way of humanity and justice; laws are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions" (op cit., 88). That also implies that: "A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can an general fight because he is resentful" (op cit., 142).

There is another moral dimension present in the five fundamental factors with regard to the use of weapons mentioned above, notably the fourth factor, 'command'. In Sun Tzu's words: "By command I mean the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage and strictness" (op cit. p.65). Sun Tzu maintains that on the basis of these five virtues, the general is called "The respected one" (op cit., 65).

Sun Tzu's texts indicate that 'humanity' and 'waging war' are not opposed to each other, as is also indicated by the three sets of Just War criteria, discussed in the sections above. Using force can be necessary to restore Tao, but in a way that is appropriate to Tao. In other words, 'in a just way'. Otherwise, no restoration of Tao (harmony) will be possible. Sun Tzu's text and those of his contemporaries are characterised by a humanitarian ethos. "Virtue is sparing the people from death,
eliminating the hardships of the people, relieving the misfortunes of the people, and sustaining the people in their extremities” (Ta’I Kung cited by Creveld op cit. p.34)

The human duality

The preceding sections have illustrated that ‘Just War’, ‘military ethics’ and the ‘humanitarian warrior’ are intriguing concepts. One could refer to all three as contradictions terms, or, in a more literary way, oxymorons. Yet, the contradiction in terms refers to an existing phenomenon and so does the oxymoron. In that sense, they are real. This also applies to the concepts of ‘Just War’, ‘military ethics’ and the ‘humanitarian warrior’; they also refer to existing phenomena and are real.

Moreover, all three concepts reflect the same intriguing duality that is part of who we are as human beings. For we are both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, war-waging and peace-loving. We are a combination of opposite characteristics, which the ancient Greeks called ‘deinon’. Nussbaum discusses the term ‘deinon’ extensively in her review of Sophocles’ tragedy ‘Antigone’ (in The Fragility of Goodness). As is the case with many Ancient Greek terms ‘deinon’, is not easy to translate. The term refers to that which evokes admiration; it refers to the brilliant side of human intellect. It also refers to its monstrous side, however. In this context, Nussbaum quotes the chorus in ‘Antigone’: "There are many things that are ‘deinon’, but none is more ‘deinon’ than the human individual” (op cit., 52).

The human being has two faces, one admirable and the other horrifying. According to the chorus, the human being is "a wonderful and strange being not at home in, or in harmony with the world of nature; a natural being who tears up nature to make itself a home, who then modifies its own nature to make itself cities" (op cit., 73).

The human duality is also discussed by Nietzsche. In his book The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche compares dissonance or discord in music with the human being "Könnten wir uns eine Menschwerdung der Dissonanz denken – und was ist sonnste der Mensch? _"(KSA 1, p 155). And of course Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, divulged the irrational and raging passions - Eros and Thanatos – as undercurrents of our ‘rationality’.

Mankind is ‘deinon’ or dissonant and although, of course, the human being is ‘constructed’ by social and political circumstances, this does not detract from the ‘deinon’ or dissonant character as such. It will only influence the various components of this deinon or dissonant character.
People hurt and kill one another every day and not just in wars. Aggression and violence belong to our human condition, they seem part of who we are. We can be violent and ferocious animals as well as benevolent angelic creatures. We hurt and help other people and sometimes we do both things at the same time and we will probably always continue to do so. As Aristotle put it: we are neither god nor animal. We are, I would like to add, a bit of both. That is why we need ethics; we need ethics in order to deal with our ‘deinon’ character. The ethics we need, however, must be understood in a broad sense and thus as a guide to ‘a flourishing life’, which always includes others, as will be indicated below.

**Ethics and Military ethics**

Due to our ‘deinon’ character, we need ethics in life and military ethics in the military. In this section I would like to briefly illustrate the meaning that is attached to military ethics at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. In doing so I hope to dispel the suspicion that military ethics is just a form of ‘window-dressing’.

Military ethics is a form of applied ethics in the same way that, for example, medical ethics is. Just as most forms of applied ethics are, military ethics, too, arose out of confrontations with ethical questions and dilemmas in daily practice.

Applied ethics implies reflection on the values and standards (the morality) of a particular practice. In the case of military ethics this is military practice. Education in military ethics therefore implies: learning about military practices from a moral and ethical perspective. Education in military ethics aims at moral competence, which consists of five components. Moral competence means that one 1) is able to identify the moral dimension of a situation and therefore sees and knows which values are at risk and are threatened with violation. Sometimes, this is quite clear, but often it is not. And even if the moral dimension is clear for many, it may not be for particular individuals, who suffer from moral blindness. I mention in passing that, if it appears that a person’s moral blindness is incurable, this person is unsuitable for a career in the military. Being able to identify the moral dimension assumes the existence of a particular state of awareness. One must know that there is a moral question or dilemma at issue and be able to identify the values and moral interests at play.
Knowing and identifying, however, are not enough, for they do not necessarily imply that one is able to make an adequate valuation concerning the variables. One therefore also needs 2) moral judgement about which one 3) can communicate. Subsequently, one must 4) be able and willing to act (if one so decides) and to do so in a morally responsible fashion. And finally 5) one must be able and willing to be accountable. Moral competence and education in military ethics is therefore not a simple matter. It has to lead to awareness of the moral dimension of situations, the ability to make moral judgements, the ability to communicate about them, the willingness and capability to act and the willingness and ability to be accountable. Situations are, however, often very complicated. The different levels of military ethics cause this complication.

Speaking globally, military ethics is operative at three levels: micro, meso and macro. There are ethical questions and dilemmas at all three levels. I shall describe the different levels briefly.

At the micro level, the level of the individual, it is important to apply a broad view of ethics. This broad view contrasts with a narrow view of ethics that is primarily concerned with regulation. It will be clear that the moral competence discussed above cannot be achieved with regulation alone. Which does not mean that regulations are not important, but that they only form a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for moral competence. Military ethics encompasses more than making rules and therefore also more than publishing a code of conduct. It concerns insight into one’s own values, standards and moral interests. It concerns questions such as: what do I really stand for, what do I find important, and why? This not only lays the basis for the other levels of military ethics, but also for the insight into the values and standards of others, both within one’s own culture and outside it. It also implies the insight that values, standards and moral interests determine our actions. One often acts unconsciously. It is important that one becomes aware of the moral dimension that underlies one’s actions. Critical reflection is crucial in this regard. The importance of the individual level has everything to do with the fact that the individual must first of all develop moral competence within him or herself, before being able to develop it on the other levels.

The meso level, the level of the (government) organisation, is concerned with corporate and organisational ethics. The Defence organisation is of course a government organisation, but, as is the case with many government organisations, they attach great value to a busines-oriented
approach. At this level of military ethics, there is a clear link with corporate and organisation ethics, which already have a much longer tradition and which, at this level, the military can learn from with regard to things such as integrity policy, corporate social responsibility and good employership.

The macro level, the level of the international community and international relations implies the relationship with national and international politics. In every democracy, there is the primacy of politics, which implies that the government determines where and when the country’s armed forces are deployed. These days, this can be any number of different places in the world. Undeniably, international politics have a moral dimension. Especially since the end of the Cold War, military personnel are increasingly deployed based on moral considerations. Fighting human rights violations plays a crucial role. It should be noted in passing here, albeit with a certain degree of scepticism, that the human rights in one country appear to be more important than in another country. Yet, this does not detract from the fact that humanitarian intervention is actually a case of adopting a moral position at a national and international level.

Taking a moral position has a much longer history in respect of military operations, however. This moral position can also be found in the Just War Tradition, which was discussed extensively in the first sections. The macro level of military ethics also concerns the moral aspects of international politics, which usually precede military deployment. One of these moral aspects, for example, concerns the debt burden of the third-world countries, which contributes to conflicts and instability and which is increased by ‘rich’ countries in irresponsible ways (cf. Hertz 2004).

**Conclusion**

If the three sets of Just War criteria – *ius ad bellum*, *ius in bello* and *ius post bellum* – are not complied with, as seems to be the case in the war in Iraq, then the way is open that leads to the barbarisation of warfare.

The idea of Just War is based on the presumption that the use of force, and thus violence, is sometimes ‘the last resort’ to stop violence. To make sure, however, that the violence used to create peace or restore order or Tao, if you like, will reach its goal, it should satisfy humanitarian demands. The only way violence can be justified is by separating it
from mere criminal behaviour. With regard to violence, we should not fool ourselves.

As indicated above, Arendt has shown in her analysis of the Eichmann case that there can be a Nazi in each one of us. The ‘banality of evil’ is not reserved for a particular group of people, neither is the barbarisation of warfare. We can guard against this phenomenon, however, by learning about our human duplicity, our ‘deinon’ character, and by developing a humanitarian ethos, both in politics and in the military. This also implies that we need moral competence in the military and that we therefore need military ethics.

We can and should do more than formulate rules and criteria. As indicated before, rules are a necessary yet insufficient condition for moral competence and therefore for a humanitarian ethos. Rules form, as it were, the lower limit above which, ideally, one should rise. To achieve that and therefore to achieve a humanitarian ethos, military ethics is indispensable. To be clear, this implies a broad view of ethics, as is shown above. For military ethics is concerned with the ability to deal with force in a morally responsible way. This is complicated, but necessary. There is no art to using force, for some it is even quite simple and satisfying, as research into criminal behaviour shows. But using force legitimately, using force in a morally responsible way, that is something else entirely. The professional use of force therefore also implies moral competence.

Military ethics is crucial because the use of force is seldom free of controversy and because democratic societies demand of their armed forces that the latter use the monopoly of force that society has bestowed on them in a morally responsible way.

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Ethos in and Ethics for Today’s Armed Forces in the Western Societies

Why bother about military ethics and ethos? - Setting the stage

Bo Talérud

Abstract:
The purpose of this article is to discuss and shed some light upon the possibilities to improve moral conduct through an elaborated military ethos and a mixture of ethical education and “self-education.”

After “setting the stage” why military ethos and ethics maybe have more importance than earlier, and some definitions and connections of ethos, ethics and moral behaviour, I will give some examples of (prescribed) military ethos and ethics from Sweden, Canada and US. The paper continues with a discussion over the content of ethics and what values we are supposed to defend in international missions, focusing the concept ‘Human Security’. At the end of the paper I discuss some ways of supporting and facilitating a more elaborated ethos, ethics and moral conduct among our military forces. As a conclusion I argue for the possibility and necessity of an elaborated ethical education in our armed forces.

According to Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins¹, expertise and the knowledge underlying it are the coins of the military professional realm. Success in their professional practice, though, comes from effective and ethical application of this expertise. Brigadier Dr. Edwin Micewski goes a step further and argues that ”questions of ethics and morality might rest at the core of military professionalism and leadership in this new century to a perhaps more dominant degree than ever before”.²

This ethical application is by far much more complicated after the end of the Cold War and the increase of international missions, mostly in military operations other than traditional warfare. Soldiers often have to face, cope and cooperate or negotiate with other military personnel from other military organizations governed by other nations’ legislation and socio-political cultures, irregular hostile forces mixed up with local civilians, aid workers and other civil NGOs. As Dexter Fletcher from

the US Institute for Defence Analysis pointed out, soldiers in international peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions must from time to time "make rapid decisions with severe strategic consequences and with little or no opportunity to consult with their military superiors. The need for ethical preparedness extends as much to our corporals as to senior officers". Military forces in such operations must at the same time convince the majority of the people in those countries and cultures that they are only trying to bring some peace and order. If they are seen as intruders or occupants, the operation will be much more difficult to fulfil. This also puts strong demands of good ethical preparedness and proper moral behaviour among personnel in international missions.

Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in international missions in other countries and cultures must also attain legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the world. Because of worldwide mass media coverage, pictures sent by mobiles via Internet and so on, unethical actions of a military group, a single officer or even a single soldier can spread all over the world with severe political implications. Recent incidents in Iraqi prisons and towards Iraqi, Lebanese and Palestine civilians underpin the need for increased and more developed ethical behaviour both in military forces and their political executives.

Humanitarian shortcomings in ex-Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Iraq and elsewhere have contributed to an increased consciousness among western societies and their military forces about the need for developing a more ethical approach towards international missions.

Of course all this has strong implications for the development, education and re-education of the armed forces and its leadership in this "post-modern" era.

Edwin Micewski has suggested a "pyramid of capability" regarding leadership competence in a "post-modern" military organization:

"At the bottom the capability to manage and apply violence as well as to sustain under battle conditions remains vital; based on that, something I would like to call PeaceAbility has to be added to the combat ability of military leadership personnel; and lastly, on the top of the pyramid, the necessities of the manifold requirements of interoperability have to be attached, ranging from military operational and tactical practices to language skills and intercultural understanding." (Micewski 2005 p. 10).

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Another way to express "the manifold requirements of interoperability" is to also argue for the need for Collaboration Ability – towards other military units, both from own and other countries/cultures and towards NGOs and civilians in the mission areas.

Combat, peace and collaboration abilities as parts of the military profession and its expertise, and the ethical application of this expertise rests upon the military ethos in the armed forces. The purpose of this article is to discus and shed some light upon the possibilities to improve moral behaviour through an elaborated military ethos and a mixture of ethical education and "self-education". In the following article I will give some examples of military ethos and ethics (from Sweden, Canada and US), suggesting some principles of ethical conduct and how to develop them through a mixture of formal and informal education. I will also discuss ethical reasons for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing interventions relating to "human security" and international law. I will start, though, with some definitions and connections regarding the concepts ‘ethos’, ‘ethics’ and ‘moral behaviour’.

**Ethos, ethics and moral behaviour – some definitions and connections**

Ethos: "The characteristic spirit of a culture, era, or community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations.”

"Ethos: From the ancient Greek, signifying the character, way of life, or moral purpose of an individual or group. Whereas the ancients tended to assume that the individual’s ethos conformed to that of his or her community, subsequent political and social theory (beginning with the Stoics) has made the ethical differences between the individual and the community (and between different communities) a central problem. The term’s modern derivative, ethics, is usually restricted to general theories of right or moral conduct.”

Ethos: "spirit, character, tenor, flavour, disposition, rationale, code, morality, moral code; attitudes, beliefs, principles, standards, ethics.”

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The concept of 'ethos' comes close to the wider concept of 'culture' and also to the ancient Greek concept of 'paideia'. The German scholar Werner Jaeger connects 'paideia' to concepts like civilisation, culture, education and shaping of the character. Ethos, like culture reflects the characteristic spirit, way of life and sometimes moral purpose of different societies, organizations, groups and individuals, whereas 'ethics' refer to more general theories of right or moral conduct.

Ethics: "the moral principles governing or influencing conduct" and/or "the branch of knowledge concerned with moral principles".

"Ethics (Greek, ethos, character) The study of the concepts involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice. Also the second-order study of the objectivity, subjectivity, relativism, or scepticism that may attend claims made in these terms."

Ethic: "a set of moral principles".

– To make it simple, 'ethos' could be understood as the 'soul' of a society, community, institution and organization. 'Ethics' as more general theories of right or moral conduct, a set or system of moral principles, where moral conduct comes from socially grounded but individually internalized approaches towards different contexts.

The understanding and interpretations of the concepts 'ethos' and 'ethics' are of course characterized by the cultural context of a society, organization or group, ethics as a more general theory maybe to some lesser degree. But there can still be big differences among different ways to interpret ethics e.g. between different philosophical schools and religious directions. There have been some attempts, though, to formulate more global ethical systems e.g. UN's "International Bill of Human Rights", the Geneva Convention or the ethical code expressed in OSSE "Code

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8 Definitions of the concept ‘culture’ are numerous. An often referred definition though is that by Clifford Geerz (1973 p. 89) who define ‘culture’ as "A historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherent conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."


of conduct on politico-military aspects on security”. The Catholic theologian Hans Kung discusses in his book “Projekt Welthethos” the necessity of creating a global ethic:

"Welthethos, global ethic, implies, first of all, a new moral awareness. This holistic approach does not mean a strict new moral system, but developing criteria for a new global moral awareness and a description of the process to achieve it. The 1993 Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, adopted by the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago (USA), is based upon this concept. Formulation of the Declaration's wording "Towards a Global Ethic" is worth noting. The imprecise article points out that the text is only one step forward; but not a final result. Secondly, the text is using the word ethic and not ethics. The difference is that ethic (corresponding to the German term Ethos) means a moral attitude and a mood and not a strict ethical system. Moral awareness is more important than legally understood moral codes."14

I find professor Heinonen’s description above of ethos as a moral attitude or mood useful and will return to it later in this article.

Both ‘ethos’ and ‘ethics’ can be understood as prescriptions of an ideal. The concepts can also be used as descriptions of how an ‘ethos’ as a characteristic spirit of a group or ethics as a system of moral principles actually are carried out in real situations. I think it is important to be aware of the differences between prescriptive and descriptive approaches to concepts like ethos, ethics, education, learning, leadership and other concepts used both to express an ideal state of art and empirical descriptions from real life situations.

Some examples of military ethos and/or military ethics.

In Sweden the concept of ‘ethos’ (Swedish ‘etos’) is very seldom used. When ethico-cultural matters are discussed within institutions or in public it is often in terms of “Fundamental values” (Sw: ”värdegrund”) or team spirit/esprit de corps (Sw: ”kåranda”). There have been such discussions within the compulsory school revolving round the concept of ‘deliberating democracy’ and inspired by John Dewey’s “The Public and its Problems” (1927). This concept of “fundamental values” is also frequently used in the rhetoric within the Swedish Armed Forces.

Before the Swedish conscripts begin their military service, they receive a pamphlet with the title ”This is what the Armed Forces stand for” This pamphlet focuses on the importance of ethnic, religious, sexual

manifoldness, the importance of obeying civil law and military regulations. The pamphlet also stresses the importance of strengthening the democratic values within the Swedish military organization, the right for everybody to exercise their religion, prohibition against drugs (other than tobacco) and the important opportunity for personal growth, self-confidence, learning opportunities and increased influence and responsibility. Through education the organization will give everybody an opportunity to reflect over, discuss and develop their ethical standpoints.

In another pamphlet "Here and Now" the Swedish Supreme Commander has formulated the fundamental values of the organization in three "keywords": Openness, Results and Responsibility. "Our point of departure is self-evident: All human beings are equal in dignity and rights, respect for every individual, the good leadership" (my translation)

The basic book in education and training within the Swedish Armed Forces; "Pedagogiska Grunder 2006" (Educational Foundation 2006) has a section about ethics within the first chapter on a basic educational outlook. The author suggests five basic principles for the teachers and leaders, among them the ability for ethical reflections over moral problems. This is also the focus in this section. The author also suggests ways for teachers to structure a seminar about ethical matters. Other parts of this book discuss other ethical matters, for example, the need for autonomous behaviour and reciprocally taken responsibility, democracy and respect for others among all members of the Armed Forces.

The student guide for officer education up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel/Commander states the following about ethics for Swedish officers:

"…. You share the responsibility for ensuring that objectives are achieved with the least possible losses. Give careful consideration to those who will bear the consequences of your actions.

Situations can occur where neither orders nor rules can give you complete direction. You may face moral dilemmas where nobody can tell you how you should act. This is when you have need of carefully considered ethics.

Your professional ethics should be founded upon the ideological heritage that supports our society. Humanity and democracy are central pillars of that heritage. Contempt for nonconformists or for other ethnic groups is as incompatible with your profession as the unwarranted use of power and violence.

Armed forces must be founded on obedience of orders. However, following orders can

never justify actions which conflict with ethics and human rights. You are responsible for your own actions even when you have received an order. When you apply rules or follow orders – consider the aims of those rules or orders. You too must also be able to justify the orders that you give.

Live up to the high demands that come with your role. Never ask more of people than you would of yourself. Behave in a way that earns the respect and confidence of others and make your contribution to maintaining the Swedish people’s confidence in our national defence.” (Translated by Stephen Henly at the Swedish National Defence College)

This is to compare with the following quotation from the fifth paragraph of the SC Guidelines:
"Your professional ethics must be grounded on the inherent ideas that support our society. Humanism and democracy are central components of this inheritance. Lack of respect for dissidents, or for other ethnic groups, Your professional ethic must be grounded on the inherited ideas that is just as incompatible with your professional role as is the unjustified use of power and violence.”

The authors comment that these values should not be forced upon anyone, but those who do not share these values should not be entrusted with an officer’s rank. They continue on commenting concepts like loyalty, obedience, knowledge, awareness, respect, justice, honesty and forgiveness.

In Canada the document Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada is meant to "serve as a cornerstone document within the Canadian Forces professional development system.” This professional development is meant to be built on "four pillars: education, training, self-development and experience.” (Ibid. p. 18) but it is the military ethos which embodies the spirit and binds the profession together. This is made up of three fundamental components: beliefs and expectations about military service, the values of the Canadian Society and Canadian military values. The first component contains concepts of unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline and teamwork. The values of the Canadian Society are expressed in founding legislation such as the Constitution Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and express such values as the democratic ideal, the concept of peace, order,
respect the dignity of all persons, good government and the rule of law.
Canadian military values are understood and expressed within the
Canadian military ethos in terms of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.

These values must however be in harmony and never in conflict with
the values of the Canadian society. "Incorporated in the military ethos,
Canadian values mandate members of the Canadian profession of arms
to perform their tasks with humanity." (ibid. p.29)

"The Canadian military ethos is neither static nor fixed but maintained and sustained
by the accumulated actions of individuals and groups, shaping it over time and ensuring
that it remains relevant. The commitment of leaders, professional development, focused
policies; supportive Environmental subcultures and honouring the past all strengthen
and sustain the profession of arms in Canada. Each must speak to the military ethos."20

Canadian values (e.g. Rights and Freedoms) and Canadian Military
Values (e.g. Duty) are embedded in the Military Ethos. This explains
why the division between this military ethos and Canadian military
values is not clear-cut but quite complementary, as I see it:
"Ethical values prescribe rules and principles governing behaviour toward
others and are held to apply to all people regardless of social, cultural
or other differences. Aside from general obligation to avoid injury to
others, lists of common ethical values typically include honesty, fairness,
and benevolence. The DND/CF Statement of Defence Ethics comprises
a blend of ethical and professional values, couched in three general
principles and a series of obligations grouped under the values of integrity,
loyalty, courage, honesty, fairness and responsibility. Some ethical values
are unique to the military and address the obligations to others that
arise in armed conflict. For example, the principle of military necessity
and proportionality are intended to avoid needless destruction and
suffering, while the principle of non-combatant immunity is intended
to protect the weak and defenceless from harm."21

In the United States of America, "The Warrior ethos" expresses beliefs
and convictions that "have been the cornerstone of our professional arms
since the Army's birth in 1775."22

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20 Duty with Honour p. 33.
21 Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations p. 22 Canadian Defence
Academy – Canadian Forces Leadership Institute 2005.
22 Castillo, Nicholas B: Warrior Ethos – Soldiers Selflessly Committed to Army, Unit,
Warrior Ethos

"Embedded in the Soldier's Creed is the Warrior Ethos – the very essence of what it means to be a Soldier:
- I will always place the mission first
- I will never accept defeat
- I will never quit
- I will never leave a fallen comrade

The Warrior Ethos describes the frame of mind of the professional Soldier. It proclaims the selfless commitment to the Nation, mission, unit and fellow Soldiers that all Soldiers espouse. When internalized, it produces the will to win …..

At its core, the Warrior Ethos is the refusal to accept failure and instead overcome the obstacles with honour. The Warrior Ethos moves Soldiers to fight through all conditions to victory, no matter how long it takes and how much effort is required. Army leaders develop and sustain it through discipline, realistic training, commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army’s heritage."

Master sergeant Nicholas Castillo argues that this Warrior Ethos must be "alive and well in the souls of all our Soldiers, Active Guard and Reserve" and must be "the daily guidepost that all NCOs adhere to" when they train next generations of soldiers. Taken the current situation in Iraq as an example, he argues that "They [the US soldiers] have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage and kill the enemy on their first day in country."

As professor Toiskallio pointed out, this "Warrior Ethos" seems to include only "we", that is only the US, the US Army and the own unit. "It does not include the potential adversaries as human beings; they are only labelled enemies who have to be killed." Bearing recent incidents in Iraqi prisons and towards Iraqi civilians in mind, it is hard to avoid the impression of a rather questionable and ethnocentric military ethos.

However, the "Warrior Ethos" is not unquestionable in discussions about the future of the US army professions.

"Arriving on the heels of a relatively narrow professional self-concept adopted during the Cold War – that of a warrior – this decade's increase in scope of institutional missions and individual roles has left the Army and its soldiers searching for a coherent new identity."

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23 Field Manual 1, The US Army, quoted by Castillo, Ibid. p. 16.
24 Ibid. p. 16.
Forsythe et al. argues for the need of officers with "higher level of psychological maturity" with more self-awareness and adaptability to develop this new more complex identity. Officers "who are not psychologically embedded in the profession, but who are professionals capable of stepping back and viewing the profession objectively" (op. cit. p. 367) – in other words; a capacity for critical and even self-critical thinking according to one's own profession. The current military culture is focusing on training, but this is not enough. In order to achieve the goal mentioned above, the authors propose the reframing of US Army's "Training and Doctrine Command" to focus more on their officers' education and development.

Dr. and Lieutenant Colonel John Mark Mattox, in his discussion of the US Army officer's moral obligations27, argues that the US officer corps' moral bond of obligation is to the nation, to the Army's soldier and to the ideal embodied in the US Constitution. Referring to St. Augustine he also argues that army officers are to be persons of such honour and integrity that they can be counted upon to deal justly even with their enemies. According to Mattox, St. Augustine argued that officers be guided during war by the desire to achieve a just and lasting peace and not by a lust of blood or a desire to harm. Taking lives in war ought to be minimized to the greatest extent possible. Mattox calls attention to the importance of distinguishing between justified and unjustified applications of violence.

"Central to the traditional Army ethic is the idea that Army officers are the defenders of the defenceless; officers use the power and authority of their office not to defend themselves, but rather to defend from injustice those that cannot defend themselves."28

Mattox connects this only to US society and its citizens. It would have been interesting, though if he had also considered and discussed the situation of the defenceless in countries/cultures intervened by American troops. Still he argues that some things of moral import must change:

"It/US Army/ must examine itself for moral shortcomings, with special attentions to those shortcomings that are of its own making (or own allowance). This is an urgent and continuous need because, while the Army cannot cure many of society's ills, it can act to remedy its own shortcomings, and then hold itself accountable to fulfill its moral obligations."

Even if Mattox tries to argue in a rather general fashion, referring to the works of Cicero, St. Augustine and Thomas Hobbes, all his arguments

28 Ibid. p. 308.
revolve round the US society and not beyond. That is an interesting approach, taking into consideration the role of the US as the world’s by far leading military power; their interventions in different countries and the moral obligations of this world dominate power.

Generally, we can assume an increasing interest for ethical matters regarding the armed forces of western countries, illustrated for example by the many articles in the "Journal of Military Ethics". According to Patrick Milham\(^2\), military ethics is a relatively new intellectual discipline in Britain, but much older in the USA.

The three countries whose prescribed ethos and/or ethics I briefly have tried to throw some light upon are indeed very different in culture, the size of their armed forces, their international role and international influence. Still, they have some similar approaches towards ethical matters but also some differences – according to my sources. I find the prescribed ethos and ethics of the Canadian Armed Forces well structured and clear. The (traditional) ethos and ethics of the US Army seem also clear, maybe a bit ethnocentric but also showing some signs of questioning the dominant "warrior ethos". As I see it, the ethos and ethics of the Swedish Armed Forces could develop into more structured, coherent and clearer prescriptions as a more elaborated ground for ethical development.

**Ethics – What and for what reasons?**

In his book "Leadership – Theory and Practice", Peter G. Northouse discusses principles of ethical leadership:

"Although not inclusive, these principles provide a foundation for the development of sound ethical leadership: respect, service, justice, honesty and community." (p. 310)\(^3\)

In my opinion, the following five principles could be well suited for all military personnel as well as civilians.

*Respect others* means to always treat others as ends in themselves and not merely means to ends. To listen closely and sensitively to others and have respect for opposing points of views. *Serve others*:

"Leaders who serve are altruistic; they place their followers’ welfare foremost in their plans. In the workplace, altruistic service behaviour can be observed in activities such as mentoring, empowerment behaviors, teambuilding and citizenship behaviors, to name a few." (ibid. p. 311)


For all citizens it is important to see their own personal desires and aspirations as an important part of something larger than themselves e.g. the fundamental values of civil society, the military organisation, one's own group etc. "The idea behind service is contributing to the greater good of others." (ibid. p. 312)

Show justice: "Justice demands that leaders place issues of fairness at the centre of their decisions" – As I see it, this concern for issues of fairness is important for all citizens, with or without uniform. Even if principles of justice could vary according to situation and context, the golden rule could be applied; treat others as fairly as you want to be treated yourself.

Manifest honesty: Northouse refers to Dalla Costas "The Ethical Imperative" that being honest means more than "not deceiving".

"For leaders within organizations, being honest means 'do not promise what you can't deliver, do not misrepresent, do not hide behind spin-doctored evasions, do not suppress obligations, do not evade accountability' /do/ respect others' dignity and humanity" (ibid. 315)

To take this "ethical imperative" seriously demands, in my opinion, a good deal of integrity and sometimes also personal courage, be it officers, private soldiers or civilians. Build community:

"….. leaders and followers need to attend to more than their own mutually determined goals. They need to attend to the community's goals and purpose. ---We need to pay attention to how the changes proposed by a leader and followers will affect the larger organization, the community, and society. An ethical leader is concerned with the common good – in the broadest sense." (ibid. 316)

Within a military organization this could appear as self-evident. In prescribed military ethics also in accordance to the surrounding civil society. But what if "the common good in the broadest sense" is also extended to external communities and those other groups, organizations and cultures we meet in international missions? How, where and when draw the line between community building and community destruction as regards other societies in different peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations with different elements of asymmetrical warfare?

This leads me to the question of what kind of "communities" and values "we" are supposed to defend. Traditional missions; to defend one's own territory, the Nation and its citizens, remain of course. Sometimes international missions are used as an indirect way to defend one's own national interests, politically, economically, culturally etc. Considering a more international or even global view, values to defend in international missions could be strivings for democracy and freedom. There is always a risk, however, that we try to impose our western concept of 'democracy' and 'freedom' onto other cultures.
In his invitation for participation in this book, professor Toiskallio problemizes the way we think about our lives in – and responsibilities to – the ‘global village’. As one of the new and fruitful paradigms he mentions the concept "Human Security":

"Freedom from fear and ‘freedom from want’ have become the catch phrases of an approach to security called human security. Often referred to as ‘people-centred security’ or ‘security with a human face’, human security places human beings – rather than states – at the focal point of security considerations. Human security emphasizes the complex relationships and often-ignored linkages between disarmament, human rights and development. Today all security discussions demand incorporation of the human dimension."

What will be the consequences if we connect concepts of military ethos and ethics with the concept of ‘human security’?

In discussions about ‘human security’, you can find a broader and a more narrow interpretation of the concept. Proponents of the broader include such things as hunger, disease and natural disasters because this kills far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined. The narrow concept focuses on violent threats to individuals. The ambitious "Human Security Report 2005" uses the narrow concept for pragmatic and methodological reasons. The report draws some of its data from Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program, "the most comprehensive yet created on political violence around the world" (ibid.) They have a similar approach to the concept:

"The term human security, in general, relates to developing a conceptualization of security at the level of the individual person, that is, addressing what factors can make a person’s life insecure. In the widest sense, many different aspects can be incorporated in an understanding of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security, etc. UCDP’s work for the Human Security Project focuses on providing data for one crucial indicator of human security—collective violence."

Boyle & Simonsen argue for the broader concept of ‘Human security’. They advocate that the two concepts of human security and of human rights (specifically the International Bill of Human Rights) can reinforce each other both at theoretical and practical levels, citing the report Human Security Now.

"Human rights and human security are …. mutually reinforcing. Human security helps identify the rights at stake in a particular situation. And human rights help answer the question: How should human security be promoted? The notions of duties and obligations complement the recognition of the ethical and political importance of human security." (op.cit. p. 10).

Boyle & Simonsen suggest that the UN Human Rights Programme take the initiative to afresh the question of securing human rights and disarmament as related goals of the international community. They also argue that there is a clear need in international law for an authoritative interpretation of the human rights dimension of this aspect of international peace and security.

I find both the narrow and broad concept of ‘Human security’ rewarding applied to different situations. But are there any consequences for military ethos and ethics? - Let me remind you of a quotation from John Mark Mattox, cited some pages ago in this article, that army officers are the defenders of the defenceless. If we think globally and not just nationalistically, it could be the responsibilities for international missions to defend the defenceless in that region and try to support human security in the narrow sense but also in the broader sense in relation to the International Bill of Rights; maybe also including values like human dignity, autonomy, integrity and protection of the local cultural heritage. Now, I don’t think it is always easy to dichotomize between defenceless and aggressors in places like Kosovo, Iraq, Liberia etc. but maybe analyses with the help of the concepts of human security could facilitate proper moral conduct in complicated situations of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.

**How do we support and facilitate a more elaborated ethos, ethics and moral conduct in our military forces?**

Is it possible to improve other people’s moral conduct through teaching? This is a classic issue of dispute. The Sophists in classic Greece claimed that they could teach (political) virtue (classical Greek *arete*), something that Socrates strongly questioned according to Plato. And so the debate over ethical questions went on in philosophy and the philosophy of education over the centuries. John Dewey for example claimed that

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36 Bo Talerud: Kulturpedagogik i tekniksamhälle (Cultural pedagogy in a technological society) p 257 Department of education, university of Stockholm 1985.


the aim of education is growth, and its moral importance resides in its social consequences – social intelligence and personal judgement.38

Dewey's approach to moral development has some similarities, as I see it, to Aristotle's concept of phronesis. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues for the need of Phronesis, translated as "practical wisdom"39 "Practical wisdom is a rational faculty exercised for the attainment of truth in things that are humanly good or bad" (ibid. p. 176) – Aristotle sees this as an intellectual virtue, but I think we need a combination of cognitive and affective "virtues" or competencies, together with a reflected ethical ground, resultant in considered conduct, or maybe more appropriate insightful behaviour. This discussion, in turn, has similarities to Prof. Toskallio's line of argument about the connection between 'action competence' and 'virtue ethics':

"Virtue ethics is a form of what is called 'agent-focused' ethics. Agent-focused means that great importance is put on the acting individuals and their 'inner' qualities like character and motives. ----- For Aristotle it was important to see the interdependence of practical wisdom (phronesis) and the virtues of character: there is no practical wisdom without virtues." (p. 139)40

Richardson and others41 connect the same Aristotelian concept with their concept moral fitness

"Moral fitness emerges from what Aristotle called 'phronesis' and 'virtue'. 'Phronesis can be translated as 'practical insight' or 'practical wisdom'. Aristotle defines 'virtue' as a state of character concerned with choice. It is the practical wisdom that makes it possible to make the right choice, the choice that lies in a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect. Virtue is the ability to choose the 'right mean'. This is a disposition that is acquired by habit."

Aristotle goes against the tradition from Plato/Socrates and espouses to the Sophist tradition in that he explicitly states that virtue is a state of character that can be acquired by habit.

I agree with Prof. Toskallio that an elaborated, thoroughly ethically reflected and legitimate ethos is an important step towards ethical behaviour. "Habituation, the growing into the ethos of a social group,

is a necessary phase to become an ethical person.” where one of the basic features is to be responsible for one’s own actions. – I will remind you about Prof. Heinonen’s description of ethos as a moral attitude or mood, mentioned at the beginning of this article. To be experienced as legitimate and able to be internalized by its members, this ethos must stay relevant as expressed with the Canadian ethos above.

“Organizations involved in future peace operations (such as the military, NGOs, the media, and international organizations) must have well-developed self-diagnostic capabilities, allowing them to question their governing assumptions and reassess their relationship to changing environmental demands.”

With the support of an elaborated ethos, which should be able to be internalized, leaders have a special responsibility to establish ethical behaviour among the members in the organization.

“Leaders make the difference. By internalizing the values of the military ethos and living by them, by instilling the ethos of others, by establishing and maintaining a professional culture, by protecting the professional reputation of the CF/Canadian Forces, by facing and resolving problems lawfully and ethically, leaders make values real.” (p. 126).

In order to help leaders fulfill this mission, the next phase in a developmental process could be some education for officers about ethical matters in order to provide them with useful guidelines, arguments and concepts. A starting point could be the two aspects of ethical leadership behaviour described in Gary Yukl’s "Leadership in Organizations":

**Promoting an Ethical Climate**
- Set an example of ethical behaviour in your own actions
- Facilitate the development and dissemination of a code of ethical conduct
- Initiate discussions with followers or colleagues about ethics and integrity
- Recognize and reward ethical behaviour by others
- Take personal risks to advocate moral solutions to problems
- Help others find fair and ethical solutions to conflicts
- Initiate support service (e.g. ethics hotline, online advisory group)

**Opposing Unethical Practices**
- Refuse to share in the benefits provided by unethical activities
- Refuse to accept assignments that involve unethical activities
- Try to discourage unethical actions by others
- Speak out publicly against unethical or unfair policies in the organization
- Oppose unethical decisions and seek to get them reversed
- Inform proper authorities about dangerous products or harmful practices
- Provide assistance to others who oppose unethical decisions or practices.”

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42 Toskallio ibid. p. 135.
43 Richardson et.al. ibid. p. 112.
A more advanced course in "ethical leadership" could be organized e.g. around two volumes on military ethics edited by Lucas & Rubel. Those texts are the products of ten years of crafting, "born out of a need to produce course materials for a single coherent course organized around topics in professional military ethics", according to Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, who argues that those two volumes "provide a comprehensive intellectual methodology and practical content that few texts in the field of applied and practical ethics have achieved." 

It is not easy, however to identify and develop ways to encourage the internalization of a military ethos and to facilitate appropriate expression of it, as Dr. Daniel Lagacé-Roy from the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute points out:

"The how is the centre of gravity that sustains the fundamental process towards a more complex way of making sense of what is required by the society and the military profession. To make sense for an individual is to think about the structure of his/her own identity. --- Do we encourage them/officers and private soldiers/ to become more mature in their process of identity development? All those questions (and more) are related to how we emphasize education in addition to training. --- It will also address the need for growth in regard to learning and encourage critical thinking."

Heinz Florian writes about the connections between military training, education as a mixture of "role-taking" and "role-distance" – and the concept of Bildung:

"By the establishment of the aim of education ‘role-distance’ the Armed Forces are committed to support the self-‘Bildung’ processes of the single soldier. To pursue this aim it is necessary to have a look at the role from different perspectives and to be confronted with the differences. This gives the soldier the possibility to establish his own position and by that to accomplish his individual ‘Bildung-task’. So far education to role-distance as well as ‘Bildung’ occupy the ‘digestion of appearances of the military world’. In this context education is the task of the educator, ‘Bildung’ the task of the soldier."

"Bildung", as I see it, has some resemblance with the Greek concept paideia or shaping of the character through self-directed lifelong learning.

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and ethical self-development.51 My interpretation of Florian’s argument is that training and education have at least two purposes: to help the internalization to the profession, including the prescribed ethos and ethics – role-taking. The other purpose is also to facilitate "role-distance", the ability to develop a critical and self-critical approach to traditional representations of the profession including personal perceptions. From that it is everyone’s task to "digest" this in a process of "Bildung" or self-directed learning in order to reach a "higher level of psychological maturity" and "phronesis". In addition to how educational efforts are carried out, training and education must be combined with self-education, self-improvement and self-direction for lifelong learning.52 This must be of more importance in accordance with ethical matters. "It might be impossible to see any other way to moral identity and moral resources – and to high-level action competence – then self-education and self-improvement. We cannot be 'trained' to be ethical persons with a healthy moral identity and with strong moral resources."53 (p. 143).

So, in addition to support from superior officers and from education, there is also a need to stress the importance of self-education, self-improvement and informal learning. Not just initiate and facilitate discussions and personal reflections over ethical matters, but also encourage collaborators to critical, self-critical and independent thinking, to facilitate questioning over one’s own "taken-for-granted standpoints" e.g. from discussions over ethical conflict cases.

In conclusion

Armed conflicts have more often than not been a dirty business. War often includes outbursts of madness. International missions of peace-keeping or peace-enforcement have not eliminated those outbursts, as we have noticed in different unethical incidents committed by armed forces in international missions. If or when fellow soldiers or subordinates are hurt or killed in a mission, there is always a risk that you begin to behave unethically to those that you see as relatives to a perceived enemy,
even if they are civilians. Also when boredom in a camp or in endless patrol-missions takes over, there are risks that the "warrior-identity" leads to destructive and unethical actions towards local civilians or even military fellows. Bearing this in mind, I think the need for elaborated ethical ethos is obvious.

As stated at the beginning of this paper, questions of ethics and morality could be the dominant core of military professionalism in international missions often including very complex situations and difficult ethical decisions. Because of these, there could be a need for the development of prescribed ethos and ethics among our armed forces and the implementation of that ethos and ethics through training, education, self-directed learning and "Bildung". Perhaps this paper could make some contribution to those processes. There is also a need to further problemize connections, or the lack of it, between prescribed ethos and ethics on the one hand and the ethos, ethics and moral behaviour in everyday life on the other.

Our global future is in danger due to the combination of greenhouse effect and "global dimming" of many pollution particles in the air decreasing the sunshine. In my vision an intense discussion about, and development of education in ethics (including "self-education") could have some impact on the heat and "fog of brains" in armed conflicts.

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Part II:

Ethics and the Military Profession
Command as the Profession of Military Officers: Concepts, Components, Education and Training Principles

Amira Raviv

Introduction

Military academies everywhere train commanders and military professionals, and their curricula of necessity reflect the following six considerations: the organization’s needs, the learner’s needs, the profession’s knowledge structure, the abilities of the staff, commanders as well as teachers, the learning concept, and the learning environment. (Raviv 2000.)

The purpose of the present paper is to provide confirmation for the claim that command is a profession in the full meaning of the word, and also to propose a comprehensive model for training and educating commanders at the intermediate echelon. It enumerates the four knowledge components which make up the command entity: professionalism, leadership, management and ethics and describes the way training is structured around each of these components in the IDF General Command and Staff College.

What is the military profession?

A profession is an occupation which requires profound learning and training. Professionals can be distinguished from non-professionals (or from professionals in some other domain) by their theoretical knowledge in their chosen occupation and their practical skills in carrying out their professional functions. Since a specific professional milieu can only be joined by learning from other professionals, in time the members of a given profession tend to form a distinct group which can be identified by its specific perspective and work methods.

The military profession has always been perceived as expressing the trained application of the art of war by those chosen to lead the troops and manage their operations. (Hochbaum 2000; the following five
paragraphs are adapted from this article). The armed forces have traditionally provided societies and nations with protection from warfare.

The modern nation-state has been developing the various aspects of its strength since the mid-seventeenth century. One important facet has been the development of tools needed for education of military professionals, in view of the admitted uniqueness and complex needs of the army. The complexity of the military’s needs derives from its two-faced yet unified nature, operational yet also professional, as well as the ever-accelerating discoveries in the field of scientific military research, which has been branching out into other disciplines: political science, communications, social science and economics.

The military profession is unique in that by its very definition it deals with "the art and science of war". The two domains of art and science express the dialectical character of the mental apparatus through which a commander makes his decisions when applying his art under the most difficult circumstances known to mankind.

Art and science, according to Hachbaum, stand in a relationship of mutual tension, between the intuitive and the analytical, between understanding and knowledge, between abstract and concrete, between the ability to explain and the ability to observe, between coming up with an idea and translating it into a task. The dialectical unity between the two can be seen in the philosophy according to which officers are trained and the course of their development. It is also responsible for defining the core issues of military education, imparted by means of a basic curriculum designed to constitute a microcosm of military knowledge.

However, although the art component is very important, the scientific component of warfare and command are also to be found at the center of military activity; the latter are domains which can be taught, measured, drilled and improved.

Both art and science also play a part in the changes which have taken place in modern warfare, especially the transition from high- to low-intensity conflicts, with large-scale national wars involving large territories and masses of organized, uniform troops giving way to the need to cope with a large variety of threats of different kinds, coming from different sources, including esoteric global groupings whose activities have a gangster-like subversive character.
The military profession has always been conceived of as of an interdisciplinary nature; this is true now more than ever, in these times when threats, the entities taking part in conflicts, the available weaponry and the character of the dialogue between the military and society are all undergoing change and becoming increasingly dynamic and complex. It is a profession which demands an understanding of a variety of knowledge structures: history, education, the natural sciences, social science, psychology, philosophy, political science, strategy and tactics. It is also a profession which requires abilities of analysis, forecasting and implementation, leadership, ethical and historical awareness, abstraction as well as application, planning and organization, investigation and self-criticism.

Like any other profession, the military profession is based on five fundamental components (Kasher 2003): knowledge – a systematic, theoretical, constantly evolving base of organized information; skill – a systematic “toolbox” for the successful solution of professional problems; constant improvement – updating one’s knowledge through continuous learning from personal and group experience and RD processes; local understanding – the ability to enunciate the principles on which one’s action is based and to find quality solutions to unusual and complex problems; ethics – global understanding, values and norms which regulate a professional’s relations to others, including his peers, and the values of the social envelope inside which he operates.

To these one should add a number of components which are unique to the military profession: its totality, the requirement to lay down one’s life if necessary and the responsibility for the lives of others in every moment of their professional lives (Amidror 2002); the paradox of training which rarely involves testing under true battleground conditions, since no previous experience can tell us what the war of the future will be like.

**How can we define the essence of the profession of military command?**

The core of the military command profession (Shay 2004) resides in officers destined to play command, staff, coordination and intelligence roles within a specific arm of the IDF or at the level of the General Staff.

Command as an assemblage refers to a set of rational and behavioral components which the commander uses in order to operate a force for
the purpose of achieving results and attaining an aim. Command consists of integrating a commander's patterns of thinking and behaving, and translating them into action patterns carried out by his troops and equipment, using principles of thought and application of force. Segal (2004) sees the essence of command as consists in a commander's effective utilization of the authority given to him, and requires an understanding of the operational whole. Out of his profound knowledge a commander can shape operational reality in a way that will lead to the achievement of victory.

In the *IDF Terminology Dictionary* "Command" is defined as "the authority vested in the holder of a military position with respect to a military unit and with respect to subordinates, to control them, direct them, and coordinate their activities in fulfillment of their tasks".

The commander is thus the military unit's backbone, and the concept of "command" refers to the *totality* of activities involved in the organization's operation.

The complexity of military command is reflected in the following words about the traits of a commander, written by Yigal Alon (1960):

An outstanding commander must embody in his personality, to some extent and in some proportion, a set of traits and skills which give him the ability to perform the many functions for which he is responsible. He must combine the roles of father and instructor, teacher and educator, leader and combat commander. He must show himself to be a man who thinks and carries out, plans and organizes, a man of reflection and determination.

Van Creveld (1985) views the concept of command as a system. It is a function to be constantly applied with respect to two domains of responsibility: the first is to organize and coordinate the military's needs, such as supplies, services, and military law enforcement; and the second is to enable the military to perform its tasks, that is to bring about a decisive victory over the enemy.

The command system operates a number of activities. One is the collection of precise and continuous information about one's own forces, the enemy and other relevant factors. Such information must be stored, sorted, distributed and presented in an appropriate manner. Decisions must then be reached by means of orderly staff work. Command also includes detailed planning, the formulation of orders which will be
understood properly by subordinates, and the operation of feedback
and control systems.

Schematically one can identify four major components which affect the
commanding action: professionalism, leadership, management and values.

The ideal commander possesses a full and balanced complement of all
four components, although clearly different positions and different levels
of command require different admixtures of these components. Thus,
for example, senior commanders are more in need of management and
thinking skills. The ideal admixture also changes in different battle
environments and in different positions. However, the training and
learning system which forms the foundation for a commander’s
development is similar in all cases.

Analyzing each component separately as well as the interrelationships
between them results in a more profound understanding of the whole. But
this understanding cannot be complete without an analysis of the
traits and characteristics of the commander, which define the domains
of knowledge and the educating challenges.

**The traits and characteristics of a commander**

The IDF Command and Staff College, charged with educating officers
at the level of Lieutenant Colonel, has over time identified “ideal” traits
which are vital for commanders at this level (Schwarz 2005). These
traits help develop mechanisms of assortment, effective learning and
evaluation. The list of traits includes cognitive, emotional and physical
components, such as: curiosity and military intellectual abilities, an
overall systemic, multi-perspective and multi-corps approach, initiative,
delegation of authority and enforcement of discipline, awareness of
subordinates and ability to arouse confidence and motivation,
steadfastness, calm and civic courage, physical fitness, integrity and
professional pride, critical attitude and a constant endeavor to improve.

At the same time, the importance of the commander’s "personal voice",
the unique command style possessed by every individual, must always
be borne in mind, for it is this combination of characteristics which
makes every commander different, both emotionally and intellectually,
from every other. It is the scope for otherness within the profession’s
features which make possible an endless variety in the construction of
heterogeneous teams and an endless variety of solutions to problems.
The way in which Israeli officers differ from their foreign counterparts can be clearly seen in various institutional arrangements (Gal 1988). Thus, for example, the IDF is led by officers and not by NCOs. Officers grow "from below", and carry out their functions in a characteristic style of authority and independence, improvisation, taking the lead and personal example.

Nevertheless, beyond whatever cultural differences there may be, educating an officer, any officer, needs to meet the following challenges, according to H. Schwarz:

To develop the professional intellectual awareness of an officer operating in an operational environment, to identify the enemy’s combat system in order to overcome it by taking over the logic of its activity, to build up the logic of his own combat system and to operate warfare resources from single-corps and combined-force sources with a high degree of harmony in order to extract the greatest possible fighting strength out of relatively limited resources, to develop the ability to utilize the "personal staff" model (military academy graduate) and the "general and formation staff" model (staff college graduate) with multi-corps and multi-arms representatives, or to become integrated as a staff officer into any one of these models and attain a high level of professional competence.

In the cognitive sphere – to develop two professional ways of thinking that are unique to commanders: "systemic" or "heuristic-revelatory" thinking, be means of which new knowledge new theses are created, and its opposite, "retrieval" thinking, in which one uses existing information stored in memory. The latter type of thinking is particularly appropriate in technical professional settings.

In the sphere of character building – to develop two prominent professional traits: determination, in the sense of courage and taking personal responsibility for decisions which must be made quickly on the basis of an abstract picture of the situation which must of necessity be constructed by using a rich imagination and considerable creativity, since only preliminary, partial and sometimes contradictory information is available; and a critical faculty, demanding civic courage and the ability to criticize and to encourage others to criticize.

The above is in fact nothing else than educating the officer for professionalism, leadership, management and values, as pointed out above. All of these traits will help build a complete entity. For this reason it makes sense to discuss each of them in detail and to determine the main training and education principles involved in each.

**Professionalism**

There are those who claim (Amidror 2002) that five subjects are vital for training in the military profession: military history – learning the battles of the past; military theories – based on generalizations and historical experience; military doctrine – a concept suitable for a specific
army, based on military theory and perceptions of national security; operating instructions; thought experiments and battle laboratories.

Another way of looking at the military profession is through the domains of knowledge which it encompasses. These are, as pointed out at the outset, quite varied. We can, however, point to a number of generic domains of knowledge which every commander must master. These include the various command and combat disciplines: organization, tactics, operational art, and preparing one’s unit for a specific mission (Segal 2003b), in addition to intelligence and various support disciplines such as military geography, military technology, military philosophy, terror and guerrilla warfare, military ethics, and strategy. To this we must add the study of military and security issues in the political context: political science – Islam and the Arab world, international relations, government and politics, political philosophy; military aspects – society, military history and communications.

To these generic domains we must add some new disciplines which are needed for coping with the changing face of war: systemic thinking, network models of organization, concepts such as multi-dimensionality and simultaneity.

All these provide an officer with the broad theoretical and conceptual knowledge he will need in order to carry out a skilled and systematic analysis of novel situations. The knowledge which a commander creates is the source of his strength (Segal 2004).

Developing an officer at more senior echelons, at the level of military strategy, involves a profound intellectual and professional evolution, during which the generic contents of the military profession are both broadened and deepened. To conclude, the military profession is learned mainly through the acquisition of theoretical and conceptual knowledge, and the development of the mental capability to use it wisely and properly.

**Leadership**

There are many definitions of the concept of leadership. What all definitions have in common is that they speak of behavior directed towards motivating subordinates to pursue an aim, through influence and an emotional bond intended to achieve common goals.
Leadership involves motivating people to carry out tasks over time, with maximal use of means of motivation and minimal use of coercion. The *IDF Terminology Dictionary* conceives of leadership as personal traits which give a commander an ability and an authority which go beyond his formal authority to command his subordinates in battle. Military commanders at all levels should be leaders. Leadership can be recognized in the will to win; it provides aim, direction and motivation in battle. A leader's traits are both inborn and acquired, and require constant study and cultivation, in the form of learning from one's own experience and that of others.

Leadership learning deserves particular attention for a number of reasons. First of all, commanders in the IDF, as well as in other armies, are also educators. They help design the orientation of their post, shape their subordinates by helping them realize their potential and providing opportunities for the acquisition of knowledge, skills and values. At the same time, a commander must himself constantly learn; he must observe and decipher processes, evolve as a human being and a professional, and improve the knowledge and skills on which he depends. This is a very important aspect of military leadership, and perhaps of the command profession as a whole.

Furthermore, leadership requires a variety of other skills: the ability to create an imprint and shape a vision, a desire to influence, personal fortitude, understanding group processes, an awareness of differences in organizational cultures and personal motivations, openness, initiative, self learning capabilities, introspection, motivation, the ability to motivate others and still function as an effective team player.

The battlefield of the future poses other complex challenges to military leaders: transportation of troops in an age of electronic digitization, leadership and control of the battlefield at a distance with the use of technology, inter-organizational and multi-national cooperation, peacekeeping and policing missions, and more. All of these pose new challenges for, and impose additional responsibility on military leaders.

Consequently, leadership involves a variety of different disciplines, among them: military psychology, military leadership, leadership styles, personal and team excellence, work on strength and limitations, authority, influence, dealing with conflicts, stages in the evolution of a group, development of vision, defining goals and, in modern times, also wise utilization of the media and communication.
Developing a commander’s leadership qualities depends to a great extent also on processes of emotional development. This component is taught differently than the others, since an overly theoretical approach will not produce better leaders. Personal growth and tutoring, defining personal goals, using workshops in which emotional and group processes can be worked out, constitute a better way to achieve results in this domain.

**Management**

Management is a concept which describes the way the efforts of individuals in an organization and the available resources are directed towards achieving the organization’s aims. The management process channels and transforms the resources needed for carrying out the required tasks. Early theories of management focused on precise definitions of tasks and on the most efficient way to carry them out; later theories dealt more with group influences, norms, intrinsic incentives, individual needs and informal leadership. The traditional model of management does not assume that the individuals in an organization are committed to its tasks, merely that they have a certain interest in their being carried out.

For many years management and leadership in the military were perceived as mutually incompatible. In the wake of the American army’s failure in Vietnam it was commonly believed that the adoption of managerial habits and values (cost-effectiveness calculations, computerized decision-making, systems analysis, etc.) caused the military to become too much like a business corporation, thus reduction its combat strength, will to fight and unit cohesiveness. (Gabriel and Savage 1981). Business ethics paradigms, based on conceptions of profit and efficiency maximization were perceived as being inconsistent with identification with the organization’s aims, partnership and comradeship.

Over the years, as defense budgets shrank and advanced management techniques evolved, armies adopted a more realistic, holistic approach, according to which ”management” was a legitimate and necessary aspect of military command, certainly at intermediate and upper echelons. Commanders cannot do without management and planning processes as part of their job (Segal 2003a). These procedures include acts like combat time management, self time management, staff and unit management, independent resource management, efficient and orderly staff work, responsible and efficient use of resources and funds.
Good management requires abilities such as: planning, organization, control, supervision, setting priorities correctly, thoroughness and persistence, translation of tasks into resources and spreading them out in time according to a predetermined work plan, and of course the ability to work simultaneously on a number of different tasks.

Management can be taught from numerous theoretical perspectives: organizational behavior, decision making models, organizational diagnosis, management in conditions of uncertainty, information systems. This knowledge must be translated also to practical tools, such as: project management, negotiation, discussion leading, and conflict management.

**Values and Norms - the Ethical Entity**

Ethics is the branch of philosophy which deals with morality and, in particular, the different types of thinking which direct human behavior, and according to which the latter may be evaluated. Professional ethics frequently deals with practical rules needed for determining whether certain actions by members of the profession are right or wrong. A. Kasher (2003) views the ethical inquiry as the ultimate heart and core of the profession itself, since this process results in a profound understanding of professional deeds, attitudes and motives. Ethical principles are not sublime ideals, but rather rules which define desirable activities of people within their professions. Ethics as an assemblage of values and norms directs the professional as to how he should act within it. Consequently, ethics is in a sense equivalent to professionalism. Discussion of ethical issues in the profession constitutes a progressive step within it, which brings about an improvement in the skills of normative thinking.

The armed forces, however, are by definition a violent organization. Commanders have the clear duty to train their soldiers to kill in battle, and at the same time they are required to provide such killing with an ethical justification. The ethics of combat become more complex in the context of the fight against terror within a limited confrontation, because of a lack of universal legal and ethical principles dealing with military activity in a mixed environment in which there is not clear differentiation between civilians and combatants.

When is a targeted killing justified? At what price should the defense of the citizens of Israel be bought? Can one solve the contradiction, and if so how, among the four considerations which a soldier must take into account when carrying out a military mission: performance of the
mission according to its aim, preserving his troops’ lives, preserving the lives and dignity of innocent civilians, and preserving the lives of the citizens of Israel? How should one react when the armed forces are required to carry out tasks which are not military by their nature, such as the evacuation of Israeli settlements?

We believe that a constant preoccupation with ethical and normative issues is vital for the armed forces in a democratic country. The development of an ethical doctrine provides the basis for creating a unique and separate identity which gives a deeper meaning and validity to the military profession.

Military ethics are derived from the interrelationship between members of the military and three other entities: the basic body which he serves, namely the state and its citizens; his professional colleagues: commanders, peers, subordinates; and the enemy: military entities or terrorists hiding among the civilian populace. Each of these entities clearly maintains interrelations and mutual dependencies with all the others.

The military profession involves, at any rate, the requirement that one do what is in fact forbidden, namely kill (Hochbaum 2000). This is the focal point of the military profession. Its practitioner must therefore study international law, constitutional law and military law, in addition to learning military ethics and the spirit of the IDF, and gaining an in-depth understanding of the role of the military in a democratic state, of Judaism and of Zionism.

Developing a commander’s ethical awareness means making him capable of distinguishing actual from declared values, of engaging in self-criticism and of changing; he should internalize and pass on to others the habit of debriefing, develop an awareness of situations and conflicts with an ethical dimension, honesty and integrity, and a readiness to admit mistakes.

This domain, like that of leadership, requires an elaborated pedagogical concept (see also Raviv, 2005). Besides a solid theoretical base, the curriculum should give the officer the opportunity not just acquire knowledge, but also the invitation to pose questions which force one to deal with the difference between actual and declared values. This can evolve only from using dialogue approaches, continuous practice through discussions and an exchange of ideas.

Because of that military ethics is such a difficult subject to teach. It requires one to be constantly on the lookout, to engage in continuous
practice, and to perform a personal and organizational analysis of motives, interests and failures. The assimilation of appropriate values also takes place through covert learning, over which the educating institution usually has no control. This is certainly true in cases where identification with a certain value does not necessarily imply behavior which is consistent with it. This statement is true for both instructors and trainees, and makes ethics a subject with an inherent contradictory yet complementary tension between the ideal and the real, between the explicit and the implicit, between the answer and the resounding question which leaves the dilemma in place.

A hypothetical commander who masters all three entities, i.e.: excels in military theories, has leadership charisma, good management skills, however lacks any moral backbone will never be the commander militaries wish to develop, promote or even be relied on. Therefore the fourth entity, ethics, is the one we should consider as the most important of all.

**Conclusion**

Given that the world today is dynamic, complex and rapidly changing, officers are required to be able to interpret reality and cope with complex problems and dilemmas which he has not encountered in his formal studies. Consequently, an orderly and sophisticated study of the four domains of knowledge using advanced methodologies no longer suffices. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion (1981), wrote:

> Even a commander who graduated from the highest military schools does not have the right to consider himself as a master of military theory, for this theory can never, like other scientific theories, be complete. Only he who continuously follows the unending development of military research and the problems of war, and never stops learning about the theory of defense, can succeed.

Since an officer’s professionalism combines theoretical with practical studies, academic with field subjects, lessons from military history with lessons from personal experience, formal studies combined with on the job training, these should all be viewed as one complete unity.

For the past fifty years the Command and Staff College has played an important part in developing the IDF officer corps and in expounding knowledge of commanding as a profession. If we combine the relevant knowledge available in the academic world, foreign armies, the IDF and the College, we shall be able to promote a better, more profound and more professional training for the command profession and its components, challenges and evolution.
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The Ethical Change of Military Command

The transformation of future military leadership education

Vesa Nissinen

Introduction

Complexity will increase in military command. Changes in the operational environment and opportunities to apply new defense doctrines cause pressure for military leadership as well. The challenge will be that the future military leader must be able to apply his/her know-how in many circumstances and operational environments never seen before. This includes the people he/she must be able to cooperate with. The transformation of the military profession is a question of a new mindset.

The concept of human security is currently needed to back up the research as well as the practical framework of the lifelong learning of military leaders. The questions of cultural heritage, society values and autonomy can be reflected at individual level through the concepts of dignity, integrity and vulnerability. Especially the concept of vulnerability has to be understood and accepted before the new paradigm can really support the educational goals of future military organizations.

At the individual level, the concept of action competence as a theoretical construct is very useful. It integrates psychological, physical, social-cultural and ethical approaches under the umbrella of human action. When educating military leaders, a new kind of pedagogical approach has to be developed. Thus, it is important to notice that the concept of action competence also refers to our potential for continuous learning and self-development.

The traditional (mainly transactional) military culture carries within it some beliefs, which have to be re-valued before the more flexible and more effective (mainly transformational) military culture can grow up. The illusion of a perfect military leader (no mistakes, no weakness) as basis of educational goal-setting is not rational – the research of military values, ethics and moral show this clearly. Training is a contemporary tool but ethically strong education is the answer. At individual level,
the consequence is that the personal willingness to constantly learn and develop will become more and more critical for success.

As an example, the change of the operational environment will in the future further increase the challenges of military leadership if the moral and ethical justifications of given tasks are not self-explanatory. Peace support operations (PSO) carried out with multi-national troops and hundreds of non-military organizations have also given a push to the development of leadership training based on the experiences acquired from these operations. The picture of warfare is constantly changing.

Furthermore, the increasing development of information technology may have an effect on the means and tools of leadership more than we can even anticipate. Technological development includes both opportunities and threats from the viewpoint of leadership. Information that moves faster will not automatically guarantee better-quality decision-making, let alone the human dimension of military command.

**Shift from transactional to transformational military culture**

All leaders are active or potential wielders of power, but all wielders of power are not truly leaders. The basic function of leadership is to unite the individual objectives of the leader and subordinates in order to achieve the higher objective (vision). This thought therefore includes the possibility that people do not have to agree on everything, but the vision and direction of activity have to unite individuals.

There are two main concepts of authority in moral philosophy: command and respect. Command is based on organizational structure and official positions – hierarchical relations are “lines of command”. Respect is based on mutual trust and it is something that can not be ordered. In military organizations, both sources of authority are needed. Thus, the most effective leadership is based on respect. In the end, leadership and ethics are inseparable – unethical leadership is an oxymoron.

*Transactional leadership* is the most typical manifestation of leadership. It is based on command and reciprocal activity in which a leader approaches a subordinate in order to exchange something, like a salary for work. In transactional leadership it is essential that the leader attempts to achieve certain goals by influencing his subordinates, irrespective of the objectives of the subordinates. The extraordinary wide possibilities
to punish subordinates are reflecting the transactional nature of military cultures all over the world.

*Transformational leadership* is more complex and more effective. Authentic transformational leadership must be grounded in moral foundations. Its primary source of power is respect. Here a leader recognizes and exploits the needs and demands of other people. Furthermore, a transformational leader aims to recognize the motives of her/his subordinate, fulfill their needs at increasingly higher levels and thus make the subordinates commit themselves comprehensively. The result at best is a stimulating and constructive interactive relationship, in which the objectives of the leader and subordinates approach each other and in which leaders can become supporters and directors of the professional growth of their subordinates. These leaders also set a good example of learning for their subordinates and therefore support all training activities through their behavior. The leader as well as the subordinates share the path of human development: personal growth.

A transactional leader functions according to an organization’s prevailing culture, but a transformational leader can change and develop organizational culture. Culture is unavoidably an important part of an organization, and leaders have many ways to communicate for example the key values and ethics of the organization. Implicit means lean on the value foundation, traditions and rituals that rise from history. Training programs, among other things, belong to strategic means. The significance of culture is great in military organizations, as well. Inefficient leaders lean on the organization, its routines and their formal positions. Efficient leaders show with their behavior the direction and policy for other people, changing established procedures if need be.

The core of personal growth is the development of values. Values and value education have lately been central topics of discussion in military training and especially as a part of officer ethos in most armies. From the viewpoint of the transformational leadership, there is an assumption at the background of leadership behavior that the personal growth of a military leader has often to do with value choices. These value choices then guide the behavior of the individual consciously and unconsciously.

In education and education planning, values are the objects of constant research and also conflicts between schools. The acceptability of education being value-bound is related to the ability of a democratic society to carry out real and critical discussion about values. A value
discussion requires an open culture that can tolerate what is different. It is evident that the leadership culture of a military organization must be based on both externally and internally accepted value foundation. Thus, the shadow of indoctrination is traditionally above the field of military training.

**Ethics, moral and values**

Professional groups within a free society are ethical elites whose members are granted more status and privileges than ordinary people but are at the same time subject to greater moral demands. A professional code of ethics may be viewed as the response of a professional group to the trust placed in it by society at large. It is a form of internal discipline exercised within the profession concerned by which all members are obliged to act in the common interests of the profession, thereby strengthening the trust on which the freedom of that profession is based rather than detracting from it.

To be precise, we should be able to make a difference in between the concepts of ethics and moral. Moral is a concept related to a person and her/his behavior in a specified context. Ethics is a concept related to a group of persons and their mutual beliefs. It is possible that in a situation the behavior of a military leader is morally right (she/he does what she/he truly believes to be the right thing to do) but ethically wrong (against the common opinion what generally is acceptable) and vice versa. There is certainly a need to make a clear difference in between these two concepts.

Military occupation is an ethical profession: all military leaders are faced daily with ethical problems concerning their subordinates, their organizations and the whole operational environment. It is also generally believed that military leaders (in order to be good leaders) should always provide a moral example for other people. This is an ethical statement – widely accepted code of good behavior in military occupation. From the point of view of human security (including the principle of human vulnerability) we should also ask if this ethical starting point is relevant at all: how many of us military leaders are able to provide a moral example for others in all situations?

Values are like bills of exchange. Only something for which people are prepared to make a sacrifice can be regarded as an authentic value. A professional group will nevertheless perceive it to be in their interests
to commit themselves to certain values in their ethical code, for instance. The proclamation of such values in public may entail certain expenses and costs, but these will be regarded as unavoidable in order to achieve results that are appreciated as being still more valuable than the costs, i.e. they will enhance the trust, prestige and status attached to the profession.

An honest declaration of values is one that is intended to be redeemed in full. It is unambiguous and speaks only of values which are incapable of being infringed with impunity. On the other hand, those who draw up such declarations are obliged to make allowances for the stress involved in commitment to them, so that it is not deemed correct to commit a professional group to anything which will not prove to lie within a members’ powers amid the pressures and distractions of everyday life. In this conceptual approach we approve that values are more like objectives at personal level, and at the same time we approve that in all situations the objectives may not be reached.

Desirable personal characteristics and individual properties are not sufficient as an ethical basis for a military leader. They also have to be understood as products of the power relations prevailing in society. The ethics of military profession must be grounded in an ethics of doing good and fulfilling ones duties. Values do have an important role in between the conceptual gap of moral and ethics. In educational planning, values can be seen as a theoretical bridge or as a source of deep learning. By studying values and value conflicts in different situations we can create good learning opportunities for military leaders. Can we identify the key values which are there cornerstones of military ethics as well as actions of a person, a military leader?

**Military command**

The previous concept of military command in the Finnish Defense Forces (FDF) that is based theoretically on the path-goal -theory and behavioral concept of learning supports the external forms of military discipline and the leadership behavior that arises from the demands of combat situations. For example the book Military Leader I (1990) approaches leadership from the theory of social exchange that represents the transactional dimension of leadership behavior almost at its purest. The exchange theory (stick and carrot -leadership) and along with it the culture of military command that has prevailed to this day are described as follows:
“Traditional military command is usually seen as an authoritarian, hierarchical, disciplined and slowly changing system in which motivation is based on both encouragement and sanctions.” (Military Leader II 1990, 41.)

Similar conception of leadership has prevailed in many other military cultures. Correspondingly the inflexibility of a military organization is justified with the requirements of war time:

“On several occasions there has been criticism on the undemocracy of a military organization and the minimal influence of an individual. A war time organization nevertheless has to be capable of almost a machinelike performance.” (Military Leader I 1990, 118.)

Is the statement above an ethical statement? Or is it a moral statement, a basic guidance for military leaders as persons? From the educational point of view, it is a value statement. To minimize the individual influence means also that we minimize the possibilities of creative thinking of individual soldiers and leaders. On the other hand, we know through the scientific studies and our experience that the battles are many times won by the initiative of single soldiers or leaders on the spot. There is a conflict in between the traditional (transactional) military culture and the incoming (transformational) military culture. The value-based analysis shows us inevitably that the transformational military culture is more ethical and, to be remembered, more effective than the transactional culture.

*Mission command* as a leading general principle of military command has maintained its importance throughout the history of wars, and consequently, in the training of higher level military leaders. In the western culture of military leadership there seems to prevail a stable unanimity about the practicality of mission command in relation to war experiences and recent peace support operations.

Mission command is the key to success also in peace support operations. Mission command requires a strong trust throughout the entire leadership chain. Mission command requires the entire military organization and especially its leaders to have the capability for independent and initiative action, the success of which is based on the commanders’ ability to think, i.e. anticipate the events of the battlefield. As the battle area is shattered, the initiative action of even very small troops in built-up areas and chaotic situations can be very significant to the end state of the battle.
From commanders mission command requires developed conceptual thinking at the level of personal potential as well as the ability to exploit their staffs in anticipatory decision-making. Beyond these demands to the potential of a military leader, leadership behavior must support the carrying out of mission command: mission command does not work without trust between subordinates and the superior. Mission command requires strong ethical leadership. Because activity that is sensible considering the overall goal requires that lower leaders know the commander's concept of operation and prepare for different options, "ordering" alone is not enough. Battle rarely progresses in such a way that the battle plan drawn up based on a decision made earlier works without alterations.

During peace time military leaders create through their behavior the preconditions for crisis time activities. Between these two situation dimensions there is always one permanent factor: the military leader. What kind of military leader combines effectively the demands of both war and peace time? Development as a future military leader stems from the acceptance and internalization of the ethics and principles of human security and transformational leadership. The military leader must profoundly think about these issues: how do I train independent and initiative soldiers? How do I coach my sub-leaders in the principles of mission command? The answer can be found in leadership behavior that is in accordance with strong ethical principles.

Some ethical challenges of military command

From the point of view of military ethics, the conflict between the needs of an individual and the goals of an organization seems to be at its greatest in a combat situation. Solving and controlling this conflict is one of the key tasks of military command. In the future humans will act in combat the same way as before even though technology changes the image of battlefield. The significance of the human factor in combat remains: a soldier still has to attempt to reconcile his need for self-preservation, his most extreme feelings, his sense of honor and his attempt to reach the goal of his own group.

Due to these reasons, commitment has become in the new culture of military command the key concept that describes the goal of military command. Commitment is seen as the basic factor of action competence, initiative and willingness to fight. There can not be true commitment without shared values. Shared values are the basis of ethically and morally strong actions.
The culture and principles of activities of a military organization compress, from the viewpoint of the position of the military leader, on a task and its fulfillment. A task can conceptually be considered equal to an order and the significance of order in military command will be great in the future, too. The concept of military discipline has been tied particularly to order and the relationship of authority with the closest superior:

"A soldier is obliged to be absolutely dutiful to his superior and to fulfill punctually the orders given by the superior. Before a superior gives an order, he must consider its lawfulness, applicability and the possibility of performance so that he does not need to change the order uselessly. He is obliged to oversee that the order he has given is followed and is responsible for the performance of the order and its consequences." (FDF General Instructions of Military Service 1995, 67;74)

Tasks and orders are strongly tied to the person of the military leader in the entire chain of command. A military organization also expects "absolute dutifulness" to a superior. This principle has a great effect on the relationship between position of the military leader and leadership: an undivided responsibility for the fulfillment of tasks and orders is personified almost to an extreme level. Responsibility for a task and the absolute obedience of a subordinate would in practice require faultless decision-making and leadership activities, which from a human point of view does not seem possible.

The culture of orders and responsibility that prevails in military command contains an ethical paradox, because elsewhere in the "General Instructions of Military Service" it is ordered that:

"If the order of a superior is such that the subordinate would have to break a law or his obligation of duty while carrying out the order, he must inform the superior giving the order. If the superior nevertheless repeats the order, the subordinate must refuse to carry it out." (FDF General Instructions of Military Service 1995, 75.)

How does an individual reconcile a possible conflict between absolute dutifulness and the obligation of duty? Absolute dutifulness refers directly to the closest superior. Obligation of duty refers more vaguely to the overall (ethical) responsibility that the military leader has through his position. In the end ethical basis and moral values, i.e. the obligation of duty, should be the decisive factor, even if it meant violating the loyalty requirement towards the closest superior.
War history knows several examples of how the conflict in question really exists. One of the examples that most often surfaces in literature is a conflict between a task given to the military leader and the human losses that will probably result from the performance of the task. In a case like this, the obligation of duty of the military leader who received the order culminates in responsibility for people. A solution to the conflict can be found only through the ethical entity of military command, meaning the opportunities related to high-quality decision-making and educational system based on transformational leadership.

**Conclusions**

As a conceptual entity, military command is changing, even though the basic factors and mechanisms of leadership have not changed much in the course of time. Change is visible in the operational environment and is being reflected to the definition of the concept of military command, the theoretical study of military command as well as the training of military leaders. The change is strongly ethical by nature.

There is an urgent need for such pedagogical programs that are supporting the personal development of military leaders from the ethical point of view. Worldwide research on leadership training and coaching suggests that transformational leadership is a useful tool at hand for this purpose. The framework of human security and action competence offer a relevant platform for ethical and multidimensional leadership education.

**Bibliography**


Military Ethics: A Case Study
Method

Daniel Lagacé-Roy

Introduction
As the world becomes more ambiguous and uncertain, members of the Canadian Forces (CF) are called upon to take on increasingly demanding responsibilities in military operations. Dramatic changes in societal values and expectations, as well as advancements in technologies, in conjunction with a chaotic and complex geo-political security environment, demand the highest ethical standards from military personnel. Men and women in uniform are required to interact with cultures and environments of which they often know very little. In these challenging environments, their decision-making processes become complex and many people remain uncertain about the "right thing to do."

For military members, ethics is at the core of all their activities and their conduct must reflect Canadian and military values. Their behaviour defines how they, as individuals, a culture, or an institution, are perceived. However, CF members recognize that their ability to behave "ethically" is more than ever challenged by chaotic environments and could be, at times, compromised because of conflicting values or obligations (e.g., respecting the dignity of all persons and obeying a lawful authority). The continuous challenge for CF members is to reconcile those values and obligations and, to a certain extent, "rethink" the essence of ethics in specific situations.

The aim of this article is to address the question of ethics in today’s complex world. More specifically, the purpose of this monograph is to provide insight on how to (re) think moral behaviour when environments reshape the boundaries of ethical conducts. The clear, black and white responses to ethical dilemmas are longer the norm: rather they are now the exceptions. Every day new ethical dilemmas arise and CF members are faced with the difficult task of resolving them with the knowledge that their intervention may result in unknown consequences. The military member is therefore left with his/her education and training1 to resolve ethical ambiguities. Therefore, preparing all service men and

1 Personal values and beliefs are subsumed under education.
women for the challenges they may face in serving Canada is becoming an enormous task. Today, the central concern is how to prepare CF members for an environment filled with ethical uncertainties.

The first part of this article introduces the issues that arise when teaching ethics in a military setting. The primary focus of teaching ethics is to prepare future leaders with the necessary tools to resolve ethical dilemmas. We argue for a case study method that challenges CF members with questions such as "what would you do in similar situations?" and places them as the "principal decision maker" in complex situations. The second part describes a case study to illustrate how ethics permeates everything CF members do, especially when their responsibilities in military operations require dealing with a spectrum of factors which encompasses the understanding of cultural and political environment as well multifaceted threats.

**Teaching ethics**

In the profession of arms, as in other professions (e.g., medicine and law), the study of ethics is important (Callahan 1982). However, the teaching of ethics in the military is a difficult endeavour. This difficulty is illustrated by the following question: what is the appropriate ethical formation for military members? (Kennedy 2004)

It is undisputable that an adequate ethical "formation" is necessary for military members. Yet, it is difficult to determine what type of structure - one of education or training or both – is best for military members. This issue cannot be taken lightly since the teaching of ethics is further challenged by today's military operations. Present CF operations are carried out in an environment where ethics is hard to define. This complex and chaotic environment in which extremes are present (e.g., crimes against humanity, global terrorism, non-State actors) tend to blur (even re-define) the meaning of ethics. Ethics becomes "intangible" or "vague" and is therefore regulated by "grey zones" and interpreted as if a gap exists between ethical conducts and the disruptive threats posed by a "contemporary enemy" (Watkin 2006).

The important issue is to find a method in which ethics undertakes such "grey zones" and bridges the aforementioned gap. The question of method is an important one. We have to remember that the task of teaching ethics is: to help military members think through their own ethical values and standards (Toner 1993); to learn ethical reasoning
and critical thinking; to know their obligation, duty and responsibly as members of a profession; to develop their knowledge of concepts and principles; to develop skills in decision-making; and to abide by their military values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage (Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada, 2003). Teaching ethics in a military setting should encompass a method that combines both education and training. These two "prerequisites" cannot be avoided when dealing with situations of ethical ambiguity. The military member needs to be trained (e.g., technical skills) and educated (e.g., critical thinking) in order to function in ethically ambiguous situations. Some situations could create an "ethical burden" because of the consequences of those actions. The military member however is left with no manual, no checklist (Toner 1998), no teacher, only his or her "formation" to resolve ethical ambiguities. The term "formation" – as it is understood in French² – captures, in our point of view, the essence of what is achieved with training and education.

Before addressing the issue of a case study as a method, we emphasize three points that should be taken into consideration when dealing with the concept of ethical ambiguity. First, the new complex security environment does not take away concepts such as "right" and "wrong." Instead, they necessitate a broader spectrum in terms of understanding. Second, the capacity of sustaining an ethical conduct when facing extreme circumstances is a challenge in itself and becomes an obligation that military members have to follow. Third, ethics cannot be separated from the concept of leadership. It is through leadership development³ that military members acquire the capacities to internalize the military ethos and abide by the values, beliefs and practices that are at the core of that ethos. These three points highlight that the teaching of ethics in the military setting comprises knowledge, application (ethical conduct), and leadership.

A case study method

To prepare military members for ethical ambiguities a case study is used as an educational tool. A case study integrates knowledge, ethical conduct, and leadership into a teaching method. Its purpose is to describe

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² "Theoretical and practical knowledge that makes up the acquisition of a trade or a profession." (non-official translation). Le Petit Robert, 1993.
a situation or event in a chronological sequence and to place the students
in the position of principal decision-makers. It does not include analyses
or conclusions (McDade 1998).

The discussions involving case studies by students are important. This
teaching method has not been a fundamental aspect of traditional military
training, but this approach has been used within the context of a formal
classroom4 in the teaching of ethics. The benefit of this type of discussion
is that those studying ethics are more involved in the discussion, which
allows them to better understand the critical elements that constitute
an ethical dilemma and how it should be approached. This important
exercise provides an opportunity for military members to broaden their
view beyond the scope of the automatic "right answer." They realize
that a choice between right and wrong is only one facet of a course of
action. Other facets, such as choosing between "two wrongs" or "two
rights", are more difficult and require more complex moral reasoning.
The process of moral reasoning involves personal values, a sense of right
and wrong and an understanding of "what ought to be" when faced
with a difficult situation. Case studies also engage military members in
understanding the moral obligations that they must internalize while
wearing the CF uniform.

In order to explain the different factors included in a case study, we will
briefly introduce a method (Defence Ethics Program, 2nd, 2005; Trevino
1996) offered in the recent publication Ethics in the Canadian Forces:
Making tough choices (2006). It is important to mention that the method
used5 makes a significant effort in recognizing the crucial role of the
reader (i.e. students, trainees, CF members, instructors) as the principal
decision maker. By asking "what would I do in the same or similar
situation?", the reader begins the internal process of analyzing an ethical
dilemma. This is followed by a sequence of discussion guidelines that
serve only as "prompts" in helping the reader to walk through an ethical
dilemma. These guidelines are: first, the assessment of the situation;
second, the ethical considerations; and third, options and risks.

The assessment of the situation is a general summary of the scenario in
which facts, ethical nature of the situation, and personal and
environmental factors are taken into account. This assessment includes
not only textual facts, but also perceptions of the situation.

4At the Royal Military College of Canada, this method is taught as part of the fourth year
course on Ethics and Leadership.
5 This method is also called "decision making model" by the Canadian Defence Ethics
Program.
Second, ethical considerations consist of principles and ethical values that come into play when facing an ethical situation. In most situations in life we do not pay constant attention to principles and values; rather they are usually taken for granted. However, when a problematic situation arises, (i.e., a dilemma), they tend to surface and may lead to conflicts. Therefore, values might involve a competing or conflicting quality (e.g., integrity versus honesty) or a complementary quality (e.g., responsibility and integrity). Values are good indicators of how a situation is perceived, and reflect the type of dilemma that best illustrates the situation. Determining the type of ethical dilemma one faces requires the information that has been identified through facts, ethical concerns and considerations, personal and environmental factors. The gathered information helps to choose between three types of dilemmas: uncertainty, competing values, and harm.

In ethical situations, going through a list of options is considered the best route to finding solutions for different courses of action. These options take into consideration the risks associated with the application of a certain course of action. These risks could be at the personal level (e.g., poor evaluation), at the operation level (e.g., credibility of the CF tarnished) or at the institutional level (e.g., loyalty and trust in superiors questioned). Options are often guided or influenced by regulations, rules, care for others, personal sense of what is "right and wrong," outcomes, self-interest, etc. The best course of action (i.e., the option to act upon) will be based on the evaluation of these options and risks.

Before we introduce a case study that offers characteristics of the new complex environment that CF members are presently encountering, we acknowledge that the model just described requires a detailed account of the ethical dilemma in question and that such process involves an analysis that takes time. Many military members do not have this luxury when in theatre.

Applying a case study method

In the fall issue of the Canadian Military Journal, Bernd Horn (2006) wrote an article called: "Outside the Wire – Some CF Leadership

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6 Principles: Respect the dignity of all persons (humanity); Serve Canada before self (society) Obey and support lawful authority (the rule of law).
7 Values: integrity; loyalty; courage; honesty; fairness; and responsibility/duty.
Challenges in Afghanistan.” This article is a good example of the complex environment in which CF members serve in. While the main purpose of Horn’s article is to address leadership challenges, we recognize this the article raises ethical issues. Moreover, Horn’s article is also a good example of how ethics cannot be separated from the concept of leadership, since ethics influences how leaders lead (Lagacé-Roy 2006).

The case study titled ”Outside the Wire” is too long to fully recount here³. However, for the purpose of our argument, we will identify the essential components that make that case study relevant to the new complex environment. In the case study presented in ”Outside the Wire,” the author sets the tone not only by physically describing where the troops are, but by also showing how they are in a vulnerable position. The critical characteristics of that vulnerable position become evident as the case study unfolds. As we read and understand the complexity of that case study, those characteristics serve as indicators of ethical challenges. We have identified those characteristics and described them in sequence.

First, the troops realize that the conflict that they are in is one of war. The charged atmosphere and the role that they are playing (i.e., nation building, human security) contribute to the seriousness of the situation which could literally mean ”the difference between life and death.” Some soldiers admit that when you are ”outside the wire,” ”you never know for sure if you will be coming back.”

Second, the troops know that ”outside the wire” appearances may be deceiving. In normal circumstances, a local gathering could be just people meeting and talking. In other instances, it could represent a real danger.

Third, the knowledge of the lethal effect of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) increases the risk when driving on difficult roads. Troops are aware of these devices and caution is exercised (i.e., driving in the middle of the road) in order to avoid fatality.

Fourth, driving cautiously does not remove the difficult in finding potential belligerents. They could hide in places where debris, garbage, and abandoned cars are piled up beside the road. What seems not threatening at first sight could be extremely dangerous. As Horn notes ”In total, the threat environment was extreme, yet non-existent. What

³ The case study is provided in Annex A. See a full account of Bernd Horn’s article in the Canadian Military Journal at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.
was a threat and what was the simple reality of existence in a destitute third world nation?"

Fifth, the troops re-travel roads where incidents have occurred. Travelling those roads is a reminder of failed ambushes: "this is where we got hit the other night." Sixth, the perception of making a difference or improving the lives of others can be difficult to notice especially when troops are always unsure of the surrounding conditions. However, a simple gesture (i.e., waving, smiling) from a child or villager when passing by can be seen as "one small reinforcement."

Seventh, the troops are scanning their surrounds and paying attention to people's activities. For example, during Horn's trip, suddenly, and coming from "no where," a car managed to moved from behind a 10 tone truck parked by the road, got closer to the LAV III and "the suicide bomber detonated his deadly cargo."

Eighth, the troops reacted swiftly. They provided first aid to a wounded soldier and rushed him back to the airfield. Their training served them well and they knew what they had to do. However, for some soldiers it was their first experience in being in a conflict zone and witness to what the carnage of war could do for "real." Horn observes, "If there had been any doubt in anyone's mind whether they were engaged in a conflict, it was quickly dispelled."

This case study raises important issues regarding ethics and leadership. The purpose of this brief account is to highlight the spectrum of challenges that CF members may encounter when performing their duties. From an educational point of view, this case study carries important lessons. The following discussion will address some of those lessons.

**Case study as an educational tool**

The exercise of presenting and analysing a case study is a complex undertaking. This complexity can be tackled by assessing the value of using a case study approach for preparing CF members in dealing with more difficult tasks.

We presented above a method that we used in *Ethics in the Canadian Forces*. We mentioned that the publication made a significant effort in recognizing the crucial role of the reader (e.g., students, trainees, CF members, instructors…) as the principal decision maker. This crucial
role is an important one since it focuses on the responsibility of the decision maker. The nature of that responsibility takes into account what happens to those affected by an ethical or an unethical decision. As an educational tool, that method has proved to be useful. It generates discussions and prompt new ideas and provokes critical thinking. However, as we already mentioned, it requires time for analysis and reflection.

We acknowledge that a decisive factor in the study of ethics is that today’s military members deal with operations that are carried out in environments where “risk” factors are to be discussed in case studies. Those factors – referred to in the above case study as fear, life, and death, deceiving perceptions, threats, and memories of previous incidents - are not new. However, the level in which they are experienced today is different than during the Cold War era, as an example.

The unifying factor between an adequate case study method and the new security environment relies on the ability to understand the military role in terms of identification of “other people’s vulnerabilities and dignities.” This means that the teaching of ethics “is not the rational argumentation about other people, but rather the identification with other people” (Fleck, 2005). “Outside the wire” clearly highlights this human dimension, not only from the CF’s point of view of protection and security, but from the CF military members’ point of view of bringing about freedom and freeing people from fear (Heinbecker 2000; Axworthy 2004). This human dimension is in itself an ethical dilemma. CF members are called on to perform their duties with the knowledge that their lives and the lives of those that they have the duty to protect are in constant danger. This human dimension demands an understanding of the relationship between the “knowledge” of a situation and options that a person has over that situation (Trevino 1986; Morin 2004). This means that military members are challenged to sustain an ethical conduct in spite of the unexpected when “outside the wire.” This ethical conduct becomes the pivotal point around which gravitates everything that contributes to the raison d’être of a mission - which is creating a better society for the Afghan people in the case study presented.

**Conclusion: Preparing future leaders**

The objective of this article was to present a case study method. We introduced a model used in the publication *Ethics in the Canadian Forces: Making Tough Choices*. We also presented a case study to illustrate the
complexity of the new security environment. We conclude, after reviewing the "risk factors" included in "Outside the Wire," that the study of ethics in the military context requires case studies that bring about strong situations that cover the spectrum of ethical ambiguities. We also acknowledge that the principal decision maker is the person who assumes responsibility for the course of action taken.

More importantly, this article addresses the question of presenting a case study method as a way of fostering discussions in ethics. We cannot stress enough that the task of studying ethics is to help military members think through their own ethical values and standards (Toner 1993). This task can be achieved with the appropriate training (e.g., technical skills, war fighting skills) and education (e.g., analytical and conceptual competencies). This combined "effort" works to achieve the same goal: preparing future leaders to adapt to a constantly changing world; understanding that the environment in which they are called to perform their duty is not easily "controlled"; being aware that the "enemy" wears different masks and is not easily identifiable; being sensitive to a constant interaction with civilians that requires cultural intelligence and diplomacy; being alert in pursuing an attitude that conveys tolerance and combat mentality. It is essential to keep in mind that ethics permeates these aspects of the mission. These factors are also a good reminder that ethics does not happen in a vacuum.

Finally, ethics is at the centre of many situations and some of them might be more challenging than others. This article has identified that a case study is a good method for discussing challenging situations. Furthermore, we argued that this method is a valuable tool in developing future leaders in their capacity of ethical decision makers. This article also recognized the necessity of a continuous development in the area of training and education. This requirement will have a direct impact on the military profession and will find its full expression in the ethical conduct of CF military members.
Annex A:

"Outside the Wire – Some Leadership Challenges in Afghanistan"
Colonel Bernd Horn
(Permission to reproduce)

The three-vehicle convoy pulled away from the Task Force Afghanistan headquarters building seemingly invisible to the normal hustle and bustle of people and vehicles scurrying about the inner confines of the Kandahar Airfield. However, those in the vehicles were keyed up – they were going outside the wire. Only a short time before the convoy commander gave orders to his section and passengers on the immediate action drills in the case of contact, as well as the location of the ammunition and extra weapons. There was no mistaking the charged atmosphere or the seriousness of what was about to transpire – to these troops it was clear that they were at war.

The convoy, consisting of a 17 ton LAV III armoured personnel carrier, an electronic counter-measures "G" Wagon jeep and a "Bison" Armoured Vehicle General Purpose (AVGP), emerged through the heavily guarded gate and moved into a loosely guarded Afghan National Army (ANA) controlled area. As the vehicles passed a giant berm on the side of the road, everyone cocked their weapon, loading a round into the chamber. Seconds out here – literally - meant the difference between life and death.

As the vehicles roared down the dirt road, the vicious dust kicked up by the lead vehicles lashed at exposed skin. The vehicle commander could be heard over the intercom preparing his soldiers for the next leg. "Okay, when we turn onto the main highway, you gotta stay alert," he coached, "watch your arcs, keep a sharp eye behind us." The convoy eased through the ANA checkpoint and entered the notorious Highway 4 that led to Kandahar City. Once again, they would have to run the gauntlet of "IED alley."

As the vehicles turned onto the paved highway a large group of locals watched them from a dirt parking lot across the road. Some were standing in solitude, while others were in small groups. Others sat in cars. None seemed to be there for any tangible purpose. None seemed at all threatening. At least one individual was talking on a cell phone. On the surface it certainly had the appearance of nothing more than a local gathering spot. But then again, outside the wire nothing was what it seemed to be.
As soon as the tires gripped the asphalt the vehicles shot off at speed. The military vehicles led by the monstrous LAV III thundered down the middle of the road forcing oncoming traffic to drive on the opposite shoulder. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) necessitated the aggressive driving style. Driving too close to the edge of the road increased the lethal effect of a roadside IED – and distance mattered. A few feet could make a dramatic difference.

As the sentries focused on the surrounding environment they were bombarded by a panoply of contrasts. The countryside was barren, desolate and harsh, yet held a strange beauty. Similarly, the sentiments of the local population reflected a startling array of contrasts in stance and bearing. The old men gave the convoy scant attention or ignored it outright as if it did not even exist. They seemed to embody a stoicism, which radiated a resiliency and patience that carried a nuance that this too would pass. The children, as always, added a carefree exuberance and would run in bunches towards the road and wave. Conversely, the young and middle-aged men would glare – their hostility and resentment barely concealable.

The soldiers’ scrutiny, however, washed over the local population. As the convoy hurtled down the road the hyper-alert soldiers scanned the entire countryside, as well as the roadside for potential threats. The task was enormous. The ground was hilly, rugged and dotted by mud walled villages and huts that could hide hundreds of attackers. Throughout the fields peasants were gathered in plots of land that appeared far too barren to sustain any form of growth, yet they picked away at the earth anyways. Elsewhere shepherds watched over flocks of sheep, some individuals tended camels, while almost everywhere people just stood and watched or walked along the road. The ability to spot a potential belligerent while moving at speed was extremely difficult.

Roadside surveillance proved equally challenging. Debris and garbage littered the entire route. Scrap metal, old car hulks, piles of bricks and rubble or dirt, as well as garbage of every sort potentially hid a deadly IED. In addition, cars could be seen parked on the side of the highway. Some were in the process of repair while others were simply abandoned. And then, there was the traffic. Cars and trucks of all sizes and states of repair travelled in both directions. In such a saturated state of constant motion it was virtually impossible to differentiate friend from foe. In total, the threat environment was extreme, yet non-existent. What was a threat and what was the simple reality of existence in a destitute third world nation?
Within the context of this ambiguous, uncertain and lethal environment the convoy ploughed on. “Okay, heads-up,” shouted the vehicle commander into the intercom, “this is where we got hit the other night.” He was referring to the failed ambush two nights prior, where a similar convoy was attacked by an IED, which was luckily triggered too early by the insurgents and missed the vehicles. However, in that case the insurgents followed up with a volley of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and machine gun fire, all just missing the vehicles as well.

As the convoy passed the spot, not a sound was made, yet the collective sigh of relief was tangible. The convoy then passed through a defilade, two hilly outcrops that dominated the road and provided would be assailants with concealment and cover. Close by were a number of villages that could easily absorb fleeing gunmen in a maze of anonymity. With eyes glued to the passing landscape a brief glimmer of hope radiated from the otherwise drab and dreary surroundings. In the doorway of a mud hut a woman completely covered in a berka stood and waved enthusiastically at the passing convoy. Veterans who had conducted foot patrols in Kabul in previous missions had often recounted stories of passing women who without stopping, turning their heads, or bringing any form of attention to themselves, would say thank you to the soldiers as they passed. This simple gesture momentarily brought a smile to the faces of some. It was one small reinforcement that the operation was important to improving the lives of others.

Scanning ahead, the threat rich environment lay unabated. Slow “jingle trucks” laboured up the road while another large 10 ton truck sat on the roadside as its occupants apparently attempted to strap down a loosening load. The countryside was again flush with villages, houses, and activity. As the convoy pressed to the left to swiftly pass the slow moving vehicles the world became surreal. A large orange fireball erupted without warning and ballooned high into the air engulfing almost the entirety of the road. The explosion was strangely muted, with a barely audible krummmpp. The fireball was quickly followed by thick black smoke and the concussion. A vehicle suicide bomber in a Toyota sedan laden with former Soviet bloc artillery ammunition rigged to a triggering device saw his opportunity and as the LAV III made its move to pass the slow moving vehicles, accelerated out from behind the truck. Once he was close to the middle of the passing armoured vehicle the suicide bomber detonated his deadly cargo.

The "G"-Wagon and Bison within 30-60 metres of the point of impact reacted instinctively as they were engulfed in the smoke and debris.
Both vehicles swerved to the left around the blast and proceeded straight through the dense smoke. Once clear of the ambush site a cordon was quickly established. It took less than a minute to assess the situation. The suicide bomber’s vehicle lay in two distinct but very small pieces of twisted metal across the road. The LAV had taken the blast virtually point blank but the driver was able to manoeuvre his vehicle safely out of the ambush site. All waited anxiously for the SITREP [situation report] to determine if there were any casualties. Miraculously, there was only one evident, but it was serious.

The LAV III had done its job well. Although it sustained heavy damage, it protected its crew. The serious injury was sustained by the crew commander, specifically, his arm that was exposed outside the turret closest to the actual blast.

As the security cordon was established the Bison went to the assistance of the casualty – members disembarked and quickly loaded the wounded soldier into the back where immediate first aid was applied and the injured soldier was rushed back to the airfield. Many were wide-eyed, this being the first time they had actually witnessed the carnage of war and witnessed first hand a maimed colleague lying before them bleeding, missing large chunks of flesh and moaning in agony. All reacted as they had been trained. If there had been any doubt in anyone’s mind whether they were engaged in a conflict, it was quickly dispelled. In fact, this was only one of a number of serious incidents involving combat, deaths, and casualties in a period of three days.

References


Deliberation – Action – Responsibility

Philosophical Aspects of Professions and Soldiership

Arto Mutanen

Introduction

Modern societies rely strongly on the distribution of work. There are a large number of occupations. The notion of profession singles out a class of occupations. The class plays a special role in modern society. However, in a changing world, professions are also changing: the notion of profession “is a slippery one that is not entirely fixed in our conceptual geography”. (Hofman and More 1984, 26) Traditional professions are for example divinity, law, medicine, teaching and military professions. In this paper the term ‘soldier’ signifies any military professional.

Professions can be (partially) characterized through certain common properties. In the following we will discuss these. Without controversy it can be said that extensive training, which involves a significant intellectual component, is required in order to practice a profession. For example, the work of a soldier is very physical and practical work. However, the skills needed for a certain kind of work presuppose extensive practical and theoretical knowledge. The purpose of training and education is to achieve this. Professionals are experts in their own field. Sometimes, the expertise of the professionals is licensed, in which case the professionals are actually the only experts of the field in question. All this gives professionals a certain amount of autonomy. Military professionals are experts in matters of safety and physicians in matters of health. The fields of professions – safety, health, justice, etc. - constitute (ethical) values in the western world. As (ethical) value producers, professions hold a special position in the field of occupations. (Abbott 1988, Bayes 1984, Häyry and Häyry 1994)

Autonomy imposes some responsibility on professionals. The notion of responsibility has several different but connected meanings. First, there is a causal meaning in which the causes of actions and events are emphasized. This has its basic application in the field of legal and moral context. Secondly, there is a meaning relating to responsibility that is
connected to a rule relating to the position or to a role of a position holder. As an example of this, a soldier follows an order given to him or her; the responsibility is evaluated whether or not he or she has followed the order adequately. This is not individualistic behavior; a soldier acts as a soldier, not as an individual. In this sense, the responsibility is not evaluated personally either. Thirdly, there is the meaning of responsibility connected to decision-making. When a soldier makes a decision, he or she has to deliberate the situation. He or she has to take into consideration all the relevant factors. Of course, this imposes responsibility as a position holder, but at the same it imposes great responsibility as a human being – the soldier acts as a deliberating human. However, it is important to note that when a soldier decides to follow an order he or she has in fact made a decision. One cannot escape responsibility of this kind. This meaning carries a deep ethical connotation. (Mutanen 2003)

Decision-making is a practical business. Decisions have different kinds of ends. The decision-maker primarily intends something. For example, a soldier primarily intends safety. This primary intention characterizes the primary end or primary goal of the decision. Decisions are made in a concrete context. The decisions localize and direct the context in one way or another, i.e., decisions fix some parameters of the context and impose some changes in the context in one way or another. There should be a methodical way of specifying the localization. Besides primary ends, every practical decision also has several other ends. We call these secondary ends. Some but not all of these can be seen in advance. It is obvious that a decision-maker is responsible for the primary ends. Moreover, he or she is responsible for the use of the means by which he or she achieves the ends. However, it is not clear how far into the secondary ends the responsibility reaches.

Usually decision-making is analyzed as a process consisting of two factors: acquiring information and proper decision-making. These two are separated both conceptually and factually. Conceptual separation is, of course, reasonable to have. Factual separation is much more problematic. For example, in his or her practical duties, a soldier has to work in situations that do not allow him or her to acquire all the relevant information before making a decision. In fact, usually he or she has to react to the situation set before him or her. There is no time to reflect upon the situation. On the other hand, acquiring information is at the same time also a kind of decision-making. The information acquisition process cannot be carried out independently of the decision-making process. The processes are very closely connected; there is a strong
conceptual tie between the two. (More precisely, cf. Hintikka 1985, Halonen and Mutanen 2006.)

The responsibility we discuss in this paper is of an ethical nature. This has to be separated from juridical responsibility, for example. The decision concerning juridical responsibility is made in a court of law where the case is closed after the decision is made. Ethical responsibility is difficult to characterize. There is no - perhaps there cannot be any - ethical court to close cases. In a sense, the ethical court is a community of human beings. Engaging in a common dialog is the only way to move on. In fact, there is nothing but the dialog. In this sense ethics resemble international law: there is no supreme authority that could stop the dialog. (Cf. Heiskanen 1992)

The military profession is strongly ethics-laden. Therefore, discussing the profession is of extreme importance. Over and over again, we have to ask questions such as ‘What does being a good soldier mean?’ or rather ‘How does one act like a good soldier?’. The idea is not to find some characteristic properties of soldiership. The idea is to characterize good soldiership in action: we have to search for excellence in soldiership. One possibility is to characterize deliberation, action and responsibility as a whole that constitutes an aspect of soldiership. (Cf. Toiskallio 2004)

**Possible world semantics**

The military profession has a nature of its own. Soldiership connects practical skills and theoretical knowledge in a special way. The field of expertise in which the soldiers work is a complex one. Security is a fundamental thing in human life. The diverse nature of security makes it extremely difficult to handle. The decisions soldiers have to make deeply affect human life. It is a great challenge to work in this field.

Analyzing the connection between practical skills and theoretical knowledge opens up several central aspects of the military profession. This was a central topic analyzed by Clausewitz (1968). A central topic in this area is decision-making. In fact, this was the topic on which Clausewitz (1968) focused his attention. To have a unified analysis we need a conceptual framework in which both factors – practical skill and theoretical knowledge - can be analyzed. This analysis may not abolish the difference between these factors; it has to show a natural connection between the two. We will show that possible world semantics does the intended job.
In the present paper our conceptual background framework is so-called possible world semantics. Possible world semantics is a systematic semantic tool used for the analysis of modal notions. However, possible world semantics has been very fruitful; it can be applied in several different kinds of conceptual frameworks. In the following we will apply the approach in the analysis of soldiership.

Analyzing the notions of possibility and necessity by using the notion of possible world semantics is an old tradition. Leibniz was the first who used the notion of possible world semantics in this context. The roots of modern logical possible world semantics can be found in the middle of the twentieth century. Finnish philosophers Georg Henrik von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka played a central role in the development of the approach. In modern philosophical logic, this approach has developed into a systematic logical theory – possible world semantics. Possible world semantics has shown that several different notions behave logically in a way similar to possibility and necessity. Let us mention the following: knowledge, belief, memory, and perception, obligatory and permissible. (Cf. von Wright 1963, Kripke 1980, Hintikka 1957, 1969, 1976, Carnap 1947.)

The basic area of the application of possible world semantics has been in so-called aletic modalities (necessary, possible). The intuitive idea is that something is possible if there is a possible state of affairs in which it is realized. That is, possibilities are realized in a possible state of affairs, which need not be the actual state of affairs. Hence, we have the intuitively acceptable idea that not all the possibilities have been realized. This supposes that there are several different states of affairs that are taken into consideration. Necessity can be characterized intuitively as something that is true in every possible state of affairs. More generally, we call a notion modal if the semantic analysis of it supposes that several different states of affairs are taken into consideration. The notion has separating power: the notion of truth denotes the truth in the reality in question. Hence it is not a modal notion. (Hintikka 1969)

The reason for the need for the different states of affairs is of logical or semantic character. That is the meaning of modal notions cannot be analyzed without a set of possible states of affairs: the notion of possibility conceptually presupposes several different states of affairs. These states of affairs are logically equal – they occur in a logical space at the same time.
The notion of a state of affairs needs some more intuitive characterization. The basic idea is that such a state of affairs is an alternative realization of the present situation. That is, this situation is a small, restricted part of the reality. They are contextually specified small worlds. Closed systems in experimental science are special cases of possible states of affairs. In general, these states of affairs need not to be closed systems. Fortunately, it is possible to give a formal definition of the notion. (Hintikka 1969)

In the model theory in mathematical logic, models are determined by the underlying language. Models are any kind of structure that fulfills the conceptual structure — if all the terms can be interpreted, in one way or another, within the structure. These structures are abstract mathematical entities that have some properties that are specified by language. In possible world semantics the possible worlds are realistic pictures of concrete situations. However, the underlying language or concepts have played a central role in the specification of the possible worlds. The dependency on language is not an essential property of possible states of affairs. It is possible to give a behavioral or observational interpretation of possible world semantics. (Cf. Hintikka 1969.)

Let us consider the following simple example. Right now, I am sitting here writing this paper. However, it is easy to imagine that instead I could be lecturing in a classroom or I could be at home. All this is quite simple. There are several different things I could do instead of writing this paper. Not all the possible states of affairs are relevant. Specifying the class of relevant possibilities is a central problem. For example, we could problematize the question of who is writing this paper right now, instead of what I am doing right now. Problems that arise are whether it is the same person, I, who is doing all these different things, or whether it could be this same paper that these different writers are writing.

In possible world semantics we speak of a possible state of this specific state of affairs and the same individuals in different possible states of affairs. We have to do a lot of work in order to make all this reasonable. To do this, there are two different but closely related tasks to be done. First we have to determine the class of possible states of affairs that are taken into consideration. The determination of this is a contextual task. In concrete cases empirical or practical study is used to determine the class of relevant alternatives. Technically, this means that we have to determine a two-place relation called alternativeness relation. For any given possible state of affairs, the relation determines a class of possible states of affairs that are assessable from it. This signifies the iterated
application of the alternativeness relation. Secondly, we have to make it reasonable to speak of the same individual in several different possible states of affairs. An individual can no longer be an (ordinary) inhabitant of a possible state of affairs. This is true by definition. In the ordinary sense, the same individual cannot be in several different possible states of affairs at the same time. I am here, not there. We have to have a method of identifying individuals in the class of possible states of affairs. In fact, for each individual we need a separate method of identification. This is closely connected to Frege’s senses and Husserl’s noemas. (Hintikka 1975) In fact, this means that individuals have to identify with functions. These functions make cross-world identification reasonable. Each function provides a method for individuating entities in a possible state of affairs. Hintikka 1975 separates two main kinds of methods, namely perceptual and factual.

The basic underlying notion of possible world semantics is the notion of model set. A model set is a formal characterization of a possible state of affairs, i.e., a model set gives "a partial description of a possible state of affairs or a possible course of events (‘possible world’)". (Hintikka 1969, 72) We have a set of possible courses of the same events. To formalize this idea we have to connect the model sets to each other. Technically, we have to combine a class of modal sets with a two-place relation of model sets. The two-place relation gives a formal characterization of the alternativeness relation, i.e., it tells us which model sets are alternatives to a given model set. A model system is the predetermined pair of a class of model sets and an alternativeness relation. We will not now consider more closely the properties of the alternativeness relation: \( \mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{I} \rangle \) where \( \mathcal{C} \) is a class of model sets and \( \mathcal{I} \) is included in the set \( \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{C} \). (Cf. Hintikka, 1962, 1969.)

As mentioned earlier, the specification of the class \( \mathcal{C} \) is a matter of factual or empirical study not a matter of philosophical logic. The properties of the relation \( \mathcal{I} \) determine the logical properties of the modal logic that we have. For example, it is natural to assume that knowledge implies truth, i.e., if \( A \) knows that \( \phi \) is true then \( \phi \) is the case. This implies that in the case of knowledge, the relation \( \mathcal{I} \) has to be reflexive. In the case of belief or observation we do not have as strong an assumption, hence reflexivity is not assumed either. One interesting property of possible world semantics is that it is possible to determine the properties of the relation \( \mathcal{I} \), globally as above, but also locally in a model set – by showing which model sets are accessible from a given model set. This local character is interesting both theoretically and practically. (Hintikka 1962 and 1969 and Hintikka and Bachman 1991.)
Context and localization of a context

To determine a possible state of affairs one has to specify a set of parameters. This can be done using a language. In fact this was the case in model theory. Possible world semantics also allows other kinds of specification. The set of parameters determine a context. That is, the set of parameters determines the kind of states of affairs that can be taken into consideration. The set of parameters does not tell us what the case is in a given state of affairs. To find out the case, one has to determine the parameters. This determination of parameters localizes the context. The difference between context and localization of the context is essential.

Let us assume that one has the skill to jump 5 meters. This does not intend a single case, but rather that he or she, in principle, would succeed at any time and in any place. This means that the notion of skill operates at a contextual level. That is, a skilful agent is capable of acting within a context. Moreover, an expert is capable of acting in several contexts. On the other hand, actual work is always done within a localized context. (Cf. von Wright 1963 and Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986)

In a sense, actualizing skills is a constant creative process. It supposes that one localizes the context in which he or she is. A skilled person is capable of localizing the context. Through extensive training one can apply the skill in different contexts. That is, training teaches the actor to localize different contexts in the same way. However, through other kinds of training one can learn to localize different contexts in the same way. In other words, here we have two different kinds of creativity: one can localize the same context in different ways, or one can localize different contexts in similar ways. Of course, different kinds of combinations of the two are also possible.

The specification of the context provides a general picture of the reality. The picture does not determine the details but does tell us what kinds of things may occur in the reality. Wittgenstein 1974 calls these kinds of pictures genre pictures. The localization of the context gives a detailed picture of the reality. Wittgenstein 1974 calls these kinds of pictures portraits. Portraits picture the reality at a detailed level. Such a picture is true or false in a natural way. A genre picture is not true or false in such a direct way. The truthfulness or falsity of genre pictures depends whether or not they impose true or false portraits. Each genre picture imposes false portraits, but only some of them impose true portraits. The methodical role of genre pictures is to allow us to build up different pictures. Genre pictures behave like a recipe. (Hintikka and Bachman 1991, Wittgenstein 1974)
The distinction between context and localization of context is of practical and theoretical interest. For example, even if in concrete training one has to work within a localization of a context, the basic intention is to cultivate the actors so that they master the context. This is of central importance. Education and training have to be planned in such a way that the context will be placed on stage.

In the military context there is a long tradition of specifying training contexts. The central question that arises is whether the plan is flexible enough to show the context. The danger is that detailed plans will destroy the context. On the other hand, contexts are extremely messy in wartime. The specification of such a context is a difficult task. In fact, in wartime there is no time for specification of context. A soldier has to specify contexts immediately or reactively. By reactive context specification we do not mean that the specification is not conscious. Reactive context specification refers to the speed of specification. A military profession is connected to reactive context specification. This supposes very good or creative context sensitivity. Hence, in military training this creative context sensitivity should play a central role.

Creative context sensitivity is connected with both practical training and conceptual richness. The importance of practical training is obvious. There is a long and deeply rooted tradition of practical training in military education. In fact, this practical training should look for context sensitivity. Training should teach one to understand the connection and difference between contexts. (Engeström 2005)

The term conceptual richness may sound a little strange here. The idea is to develop notions, methodological notions, that help us to cross borders between contexts. To gain a better grasp, let us mention the notion of action competence. The notion is a methodological notion that connects different aspects (physical, psychological, social, and ethical) into a whole. That is, the notion of action competence connects, for example, the ethical to the physical. Physical action should be looked at from the ethical point of view. Excellence in action connects the two. That is, physical problems are connected essentially to ethical problems. Taking this into consideration, the operational environment will become conceptually richer. However, this conceptual richness imposes also factual or operational richness. (Toiskallio 2004, Rodin 2006).
Knowledge

The classical definition characterizes knowledge as well-justified, true belief. Thus, there are three conditions that knowledge has to satisfy: (i) the condition of truth, (ii) the condition of belief, and (iii) the condition of justification. The purpose of definition is to define the meaning of the statement of the formula \( A \text{ knows that } p \text{ is true} \). The definition captures the so-called propositional knowledge. The condition of truth implies that, if I know that it is raining it has to be raining. This connects knowledge to reality. A passive notion of knowledge is an interpretation of the definition. This gives us the spectator’s theory of knowledge. And thus we have the Aristotelian idea that knowledge is a matter of what there is.

To gain a more dynamic and pragmatic interpretation, we will use possible world semantics in our analysis of knowledge. (For information on the dynamic approach, cf. Hendricks 2002, Hendricks, Jørgensen, and Pedersen 2003, and Hintikka 2003.) As Hintikka (1962) says “in order to study the properties of sentences which contain the notion of knowledge, it does not suffice to consider a single model set at a time. In order to show that a given set of sentences is defensible, we have to consider a set of model sets.” (Hintikka 1962, 34-5) In other words, possible world semantics is a natural tool in the analysis of knowledge. Moreover, it allows us to formulate a dynamic interpretation as we intended. This allows us to connect the whole approach more closely to the pragmatics of the military profession. (For the behaviouristic interpretation of knowledge, cf. also Russell 1949.)

The notion of information is central for the analysis here. Let us say that \( S \) is a sentence (in a language \( L \)). The class of models of \( L \) determines a class of possibilities. The sentence \( S \) divides the class of models of \( L \) into two parts: into models in which \( S \) is true and into models in which \( S \) is false. This division is complete in the sense that each model makes the sentence true or false but not both. The sentence \( S \) excludes the class of model in which it is false in an obvious way. The semantical information of \( S \) is determined on the basis of this fact. (Hintikka, forthcoming, Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953)

In information theory and in epistemology the contexts that are considered are usually carefully specified and restricted. For example, let us say that the language \( L \) is the following simple language of two sentences ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is windy’. The sentence ‘It is raining’ excludes the possibilities ‘It is not raining and it is windy’ and ‘It is not
raining and it is not windy'. Thus, we have the following two possibilities: ‘It is raining and it is windy’ and ‘It is raining and it is not windy’. These conjunctions characterize the possible states of affairs as well as the fact that it is possible in the language in question. These conjuncts are called constituents and each constituent expresses a possible state of affairs. The four constituents cover all the possibilities that can be specified by the language.

A sentence of the language allows some of the possibilities and excludes all others. Moreover, any sentence of the language can be expressed equivalently as a disjunction of constituents. This means that a given sentence is compatible with several different possible states of affairs. The method of constituents can be generalized to predicate logic and even so-called independence-friendly logics. This implies that the method can be applied also to natural language. (Cf. Hintikka 1953, 1973, and Hodges 2006.)

Thus, if I know that it is raining then the possibilities I have to take into consideration are possibilities in which it is raining, i.e. my knowledge excludes all the possibilities in which it is not raining. That is, in knowledge worlds – the worlds in which my knowledge holds true – it can rain. The content of knowledge depends on how many possibilities my knowledge excludes. The number of excluded possibilities characterizes the completeness of the knowledge. In extreme cases the knowledge excludes all but one possibility. In this case the knowledge is complete.

Possible world semantics offers us the following behavioral analysis of knowledge (and belief). The agent acts according to his or her knowledge. That is, if in a situation in which his or her knowledge holds true, he or she behaves in a certain way, and in a situation in which his or her knowledge does not hold true he or she behaves in another way. (Hintikka 1975)

**Observational and physical individuation**

The behavioral idea can be generalized as follows. In the case of practical skills – such as playing the piano or making pottery – the actions of the agent are determined by his or her present knowledge of the situation. The situation is literally in the agent’s hands. The piano player feels the keys at his or her hands and potter feels the clay in his hands. In a sense, he or she observes via his or her hands. In fact, there is no separate need
for conceptualization. The agent has to be able to handle the situation. The information the agent needs he or she gets behaviorally or perceptually. (Ketonen 1980, and Volanen 2007)

Behavioral or perceptual information is information in the sense of modern information theory. The information excludes some of the possible courses of events. If the clay is wet then one cannot manipulate it in such and such a way. The agent feels the information by touching the clay. The information is subjective in the sense that the individuation of the content of the information is tied to the agent’s perspective: the agent feels the consistency of the clay or the agent sees Mr. Smith. The method of individuation is tied to the subject’s perspective. This makes the information local in the sense characterized above. The information fixes (perceptually) some parameters in the context. It is tied to the subject – his or her behavior or perception. However, this subjectivity is not connected to the content of the information.

In a sense, the content of behavioral or perceptual information is even more objective than in the case of propositional information (knowledge). To gain behavioral or perceptual information or to learn behavioral information one has to physically take action. He or she has to manipulate the context physically. This physical manipulation localizes and at the same objectivises the context. But to acquire semantical information (propositional knowledge) or to learn propositional knowledge one has to conceptualize and to manipulate concepts. He or she abstracts the context, i.e. does not localize it. In fact, this abstractness imposes the well-known property that the same observation or experiment can be used in answering different kinds of questions. For example, observation or experiment can be used in extending a given theory, testing a given theory or applying a given theory. More generally speaking, the individuation method is objective. (Hintikka 2005)

The basic idea above is that we have a language in which knowledge (and beliefs) can be expressed or conceptualized. The reason for this is that the notion of knowledge that has been under consideration is propositional knowledge. The analysis we have here allows us to rely on that assumption. Behavioral characterization makes it possible to analyze also knowledge and beliefs that cannot be conceptualized. We may place the agent in several situations, i.e., in different states of affairs. The agent acts in a given situation according to his or her knowledge – independently of whether or not this knowledge can be conceptualized. (Hintikka 1975)
The idea is to get a characterization that has separative power. There is no reason, besides the theoretical simplicity, to assume that the state of affairs should be conceptualized. The behavioral separation is independent of whether or not the knowledge or the belief can be conceptualized. In the case in which we have not conceptualized the situation we have a kind of tacit knowledge. In this sense tacit knowledge is a kind of context sensitivity – ability to recognize different (kinds of) situations. (Cf. Polanyi 1966) In the study of expertise a well-known fact is that expertise recognizes a huge number of different kinds of situations. (Cf. Newell and Simon 1972)

Propositional knowledge is usually seen as objective and explicit knowledge. In this sense it is tacit knowledge, as subjective knowledge appears to be opposed to propositional knowledge. So far so good, let us consider more closely practical skills that are a paradigmatic example of tacit knowledge. A craftsman, such as a potter, is a good example of an expert in a field of practical skill. A potter puts his or her hands on the clay. He or she sees and feels the clay. He or she gets the relevant information via immediate observation. Here immediate observation means that the information is not conceptualized. This can be generalized. Practical skills suppose personal manipulation of concrete things. A large amount of the relevant information about the process comes via immediate observation. (Cf. Ketonen 1980, Polanyi 1966)

In observation the observer observes something. This relation is something that Russell 1956 calls knowledge by acquaintance. Hintikka 1975 characterizes the relation by saying that observation is based on the perceptual individuation of objects. The basic idea is that in perceptual individuation the physical continuation plays the central role in the individuation process. Here, the individuation denotes the cross-world individuation in possible world semantics. However, perceptual individuation is by definition subject-centered. There is a subject whose perceptual individuation dominates the situation. This does not make the content of the perception less objective than other types of information. Moreover, in a clear-cut sense, perceptual information is even more objective than conceptual information. Perceptual information directly concerns the material world and conceptual information is mediated via concepts.

Aristotle said that knowledge is about being and skill is about bringing about. Our behavioral analysis of knowledge implies that a function of knowledge is to be a starting point for acting. For example, in decision-making the background knowledge is the starting point from which the
decision is made. However, decision-making as a practical skill (to make decisions) is building a new state of affairs. Especially in the military context, decision-making is a practical process, which imposes physical, skilful actions. But then again, this is what Aristotle said about skills.

Thus, we have the following situation. Background knowledge forms a basis for decision-making. A decision expresses an intention of achieving something. To actualize the decision is to change the world. This is a way of building or constructing a new state of affairs. In building one is searching for or doing something that does not yet exist, i.e., he or she brings about the new situation. Hence, this building is not a business of knowledge but a business of skills in the sense of Aristotle.

Military study as a methodological approach

The traditional learning of practical skills is through master-journeyman learning. The learner or rather the journeyman works together with a master. The master behaves in the way of an experienced colleague rather than a teacher. During the working process, the master shows the learner how to work and the learner will learn to master the skill. In this process, conceptualization does not play a central role. The most central aspect is doing or producing, not knowing (conceptually). In modern times mentoring and tutoring are applications of this kind of learning within a new context of knowledge-based skills. This places the problem of conceptualization in a new light. (Engeström 2005, Mäkinen 2006)

In the military context, discussion on the relationship between skill and knowledge has been very extensive. In fact, Clausewitz 1968 problematized the whole distinction. Of course "knowing is something different from doing". (Clausewitz 1968) However, doing – or skill or art – is a very broad notion. Of course, craft belongs to skill (or to art). Clausewitz maintains "that war is a handicraft; but there was more lost than gained by that". (Clausewitz 1968) Hence, military study has to gain an approach of its own.

Clausewitz 1968 emphasizes that "war belongs not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the province of social life". One may argue that there is conceptual confusion here. For example, running is a physical activity, not a field of study. Physiology is a science that studies running. In this sense, military studies (war studies) resemble physiology not running. Maybe this is true. However, Clausewitz takes another route. He emphasizes the methodological nature (Methodicism, Methodismus)
of military study. This is theoretically an extremely important step. This implies that the theory, in the sense of physiology above, has an instrumental role. The methodological approach connects different components of military study into a unified whole. These components are both theoretical and practical. (Clausewitz 1968)

Decision-making is a central aspect in military practice. A soldier has to make different kinds of decisions all the time. The decisions may concern practical acts as well as strategic views. Often the decisions concern questions that are strongly ethics-laden – questions of life and death. These decisions concern both the goals and means. The information that is needed comes from different sources. Some information is theoretical (conceptual), some observational (without conceptualization) and some behavioral. A relevant source of theoretical information is a branch of science. Practical experience is a relevant source of observational information. Practical production is a relevant source of behavioral information. However, in a decision all the forthcoming information has to be unified in a creative way. This creativeness is an essential aspect of (military) decision-making. (Clausewitz 1968, Engeström 2005)

The sources of theoretical information are fields of science, not fields of decision-making. However, decision-making means having the skill to make decisions. The skill supposes expertise but is not a field of science. The theory of decision-making is a methodological science in the same way as Clausewitz 1968 argues military study is. (Cf. Clausewitz 1968, Osherson and Torrence 1996) So, in a clear-cut sense decision-making is expertise without its own field of science. (Heiskanen 2005) The methodological approach allows us to connect several different fields of science and practical skills into a unified whole. Thus, it makes creativeness a systematic and effective approach. (Clausewitz 1968)

The behavioral characterization of possible world semantics provides a way to analyze the role of knowledge in action. In certain situations, an agent behaves, i.e., makes decisions, as if his or her knowledge was true. Intuitively he or she chooses the possible courses of events within his or her knowledge worlds. That is, knowledge determines the horizon of the decision, i.e. knowledge is the basis from which the actor orientates towards the future. In this sense, the knowledge the decision-maker has, is called background knowledge.

Bringing about something is directed towards the future, to something not yet existing. This directing may not be blind. A skilful person or
an expert directs himself or herself towards a goal in a systematic, methodical manner. The goal need not be, and usually is not, explicated precisely. He or she has to be directed strategically without a precisely explicated goal. This strategic direction is studied in methodology.

**Intention and intension**

The notion of **intention** is of central importance in analyzing human action. The notion has been understood as a central notion that separates natural and human sciences. Human behavior is understood as intentional. If I think, I think something. My thought is directed at the object of thought. The process is similar in all the other conscious acts. Intentionality or directedness is a characteristic property of conscious acts. This separates conceptually intentional from non-intentional or physical phenomena. This is the content of the so-called Brentano thesis.

An agent does $p$. If we ask why he or she did $p$, he or she may answer ‘Because I intended to do it’. This answer is a reasonable one. In this sense we may say that intention causes action. However, there are several other kinds of causes for a certain act. For example, an act may be a reaction to something: I closed my eye because a fly flew into it. It may also be that I jumped because John pushed me. So there are several different kinds of causes. Intention is one of them. In a sense, intention infers the future. One intends something that occurs in the future. In this sense motivation is broader. (Anscombe 1957)

Orders direct behavior. To get to know how orders direct actions one may ask why the act in question was performed. To this question of why, we may get different kinds of answers. For example, one can say

- because otherwise I would be punished
- because he told me to do it (my duty is to follow the order given by an officer)
- because I thought that the orders would lead me to perform the act I performed
- because I intended to perform the act (it is not necessarily the case that I knew that is was my duty or it might be against my duty)
- because I had the intention of doing something.

The first two cases are examples of following orders "blindly". The actor does not ask the reasonability of the orders; one just has to do one's duty. In the military context orders and commands are taken literally: orders put behavior in order. The last example is where the agent has
an indefinite intention: something has to be done. This intention leads to something indefinite. It is an act of finding without searching. Sometimes this is what occurs in a creative act. (Cf. Hintikka 1975)

Not all mental phenomena are intentional in the sense of directness. For example, there is some pain that is not directed in any reasonable sense of the word. Moreover, observation, which was a paradigmatic example of intentional phenomenon for Husserl, is not easy to understand as intentional in the sense of directedness. However, it is natural to interpret observation as acquiring information, i.e., as an intensional process. This can be generalized to include most of the intentional cases. This is Hintikka’s thesis of intentionality as intensionality. (Cf. Hintikka 1975, especially ch. 10.)

For example, let us consider decision-making within the same framework. It is quite obvious that decision-making is goal-seeking activity. Hence it is intentional also in the sense of directedness. However, in decision making the goal need not be formulated precisely in advance. There is only an idea of the goal. Moreover, the goal may change during the process. The skill needed is not to fix the goal but to search for the goal during the process. The search has to be a methodological process. Conceptual richness is the key to this skill. (Cf. Hintikka 1975 (especially ch. 11), Ketonen and Mikkilä 1977 and Toiskallio 2004.)

**Law, order and command**

The military profession is determined by several different laws and orders. A soldier is subsumed under national and international legislation on war as well as civil laws. Besides the laws, there are also several different orders and commands. A soldier is under high pressure – besides the laws, orders, and commands the soldier also has to take ethics into consideration. To understand the relationship between laws, orders, commands and ethics we have to more closely consider the nature of laws, orders and commands.

The laws of a state are given by some normative authority. The intention is to direct the behavior of human beings. These laws are prescriptive. In contrast to the laws of a state, natural laws depict the courses of nature. Natural laws have not been given by a normative authority. Natural laws depict the regular courses of nature that are observed in reality. They are true if the image corresponds with the object, otherwise they are false. That is, they are descriptive laws.
Laws of logic and mathematics are laws of a special kind. Sometimes they are said to be laws of thought. Laws of logic do not tell us how humans actually think. They tell that if humans think according to the rules of logic they think correctly: if human beings think according to laws of logic then true premises are followed by only true conclusions. Logic preserves truth. Even if laws of logic are formulated by human beings, they also have empirical relevance. They picture all the possible worlds in a strict sense. In fact, the distinction between logical and factual is not as clear as sometimes assumed. (Cf. Hintikka 1973)

In logic there are two different kinds of rules. First, there are rules that characterize the logic. We call these definitory rules. There are two kinds of definitory rules: Rules that tell us which sequences of symbols are sentences (and formulas) of the language. And rules that tell us how to transfer from a given set of sentences to the intended sentence. However, definitory rules do not tell us how to infer in order to infer well. There is a need for other kinds of rules – rules that tells us how to infer well. These are called strategic rules. (Hintikka and Bachman 1991)

Definitory rules tell us what moves are permissable in a given situation. In a concrete case we can use these rules in deciding whether or not a move made is correct. In this sense the use of definitory rules is local or stepwise. However, inferring well cannot be characterized locally: we cannot say whether or not a given move is good or not good without knowledge of the context, without knowledge of the whole ongoing inference process. Strategic rules are holistic rules. The distinction between definitory rules and strategic rules is a general distinction that can be made in any game-like situation. (Hintikka and Bachman 1991)

Orders may be characterized in the spirit of the distinction between definitory and strategic rules. In the case of orders, it is more natural to use the notion of local and contextual. Local orders command someone to perform a certain act on a certain occasion. That is, the order determines all the relevant factors. In this case it is quite simple to follow the order and to check whether the order has been followed. Contextual orders specify the context and the type of the task to be done. To follow such an order one has to localize the order in a specific situation.

Orders may be permissive or prohibitive. Permissive orders allow something to be done. Permissive orders allow deliberation with regard to the subject of the order. Prohibitive orders simply prohibit something. If something is prohibited the converse task cannot be prohibited. If
something is permissible and the converse task is prohibited then the task is obligatory. Here we have a nice theoretical structure. (von Wright 1963)

A human being has a history of his or her own. He or she has a family, education, hobbies etc. of his or her own. All these (together with the genetic and other personal factors) give him or her a kind of strategy according to which to act in a certain kind of situation. These are called habits of the individual. Habits are subjective in a sense that they are subjective – by definition. However, behavior shows the habits one has. In this sense, habits are also objective - they are indirectly observable. Moreover, habits are conservative: it is difficult to change them. Part of the difficulty is caused by the fact that habits are not conscious modes of behavior – habits are rooted in the individual's life. A soldier reacts in a certain way. It is difficult to analyze the reason for the reaction. In organizations there are organizational habits – ways of managing things. These organizational habits are called customs. The customs of an organization direct the organizational behavior just as habits direct personal behavior. Each field of science has a tradition of its own. Tradition is a kind of intellectual custom. The tradition shows how to solve problems and how to identify interesting problems. Tradition directs intellectual behavior. In the military profession these three meet. A soldier as a soldier is a combination of the three components. According to Clausewitz (1968), (intellectual) tradition does not play central role in the military profession. This is an implication of the methodological nature of military study. (von Wright 1963, Clausewitz 1968, Mutanen 2007)

Habits, customs and tradition impose upon an agent a specific tendency to act in a certain way. This kind of tendency to act can be analyzed intensionally. In this sense, these are a specific kind of tacit knowledge. However, we are not assuming that this tacit knowledge could be expressed linguistically. The tacit knowledge appears in concrete situations – local actions. In local actions the three components occur at the same time and in the same place. Creativity is the ability to connect the three components in a new way in a local situation. More generally, creativity is the ability to localize different contexts in different ways. Creativity in this sense is a strategic ability. (Polanyi 1966)
Deliberation

To act is to do something intentionally. The agent is conscious of what he or she is doing – what he or she is trying to achieve by it. Acting is always intentional behavior. An agent is trying to achieve something. Acting is goal-directed behavior. However, as we have said it should be possible to give also an intensional characterization of acting. Before we do an intensional analysis, let us characterize deliberation a little better.

In human studies a central problem is understanding human behavior, not explaining the behavior. The covering law model of explanation says that in explanation, the explanans is explained by what is subsumed under some general laws (together with some special facts). So, an explanation could for example be that the behavior of an agent would be subsumed under some natural laws. In understanding behavior the very goal is different. The idea is not that the character of the explanans would be of the wrong kind but that the whole idea of understanding action is not explaining it. (Cf. the Brentano thesis above.)

Von Wright 1971 said that there is a kind of reasoning that differs from the reasoning in explanation. Traditional distinction says that the conclusion of theoretical reasoning is a sentence and that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an act. Von Wright 1971, formulated practical syllogism as a tool for analyzing practical reasoning and acting. Practical reasoning can be formulated as follows (cf. Black 1989):

(i) I intend to make it true that $E$
(ii) Unless I do $A$, I shall not achieve this
(iii) Therefore, I will do $A$.

In the practical syllogism (i) and (ii) are the reasons for the action. There is a kind of conceptual connection between the premises (i) and (ii), and the conclusion (iii). So, the conclusion is not subsumed under a general law. Hence practical syllogism is not an explanation for the act in the usual sense of the notion of explanation.

Practical syllogism is a kind of deliberative argument. That is, an argument in which a goal and means for it are correlated in practice. That is, an agent sets a goal for himself or herself. He or she formulates a means by which to acquire the goal. Finally in conclusion, he or she starts to act in order to achieve the goal. The means may or may not be effective. The effectiveness of the means can be studied scientifically. (Hintikka and Bachman 1991)
The principal goal of action is not truth, but a new state of affairs. This means that the search for propositional information does not play as central a role as in the knowledge acquiring process. Acting is as much knowing as it is doing. So, the ability and possibility to do something come on the scene. Here, ability and possibility are local notions: ability to do something depends strongly on the local factors. The actor does not act in a vacuum. He or she acts within a localized context. His or her abilities are context-sensitive. An agent may be able to run 100 meters in 11 seconds. However, in a battlefield he or she cannot do so. Here, the possibility of doing has to be understood also as an ethical and social notion. Something can be possible or impossible to do depending on the context. A soldier may kill during a battle but not in peacetime. This is even ordered legally. However, also ethically, killing in peacetime is not allowed, but it is not ethically prohibited to kill during a wartime battle.

In order for the means to be rational, it has to be justified methodically. This methodical way of justification is a contextual notion. Local details within the context have to be functionally connected. The goal and the means have to be balanced within a context. A deliberative argument forms the route from the beginning to the goal explicit. As a final conclusion, it is the methodical action that leads to the goal. It may be that there is no single act that gives us the goal, but, rather, the argument itself maps a route to the goal. Moreover, deliberative argument connects the practical behavior. In fact, it connects theoretical argumentation and its application (action). Deliberation connects theory and practice. It transforms only rational means-end discussion into reasonability discussion concerning means (method) and ends (goals). This is what is meant by the methodological approach. (Hintikka and Bachman 1991, Clausewitz 1968, Mutanen 2007)

The methodological approach imposes behavioral uniformity. Neither rational nor reasonable can be in aspects separated by practice. The conceptual richness imposes practical sensitivity. This practical sensitivity imposes potential acceptability on the practice. Excellence in profession is to actualize the potential acceptability together with effectivity. (Clausewitz 1968, Toiskallio 2004)

Especially in the military context, acts are usually collective in a sense. That is, deliberation has to take this into account. The schematic picture we gave above is not good enough. The intention has to be collective. This would give us the following: (i) we intend to make it true that $E$. (ii) Unless we do $A$, we shall not achieve this, (iii) therefore, we will do
A. Here we may separate two different cases. The goal $E$ may be the sum of individual goals of the members of the group. In this case each member of the group does his or her individual task and finally the collective goal is achieved as a consequence of these separate goals. The final collective goal is achieved indirectly. On the other hand, the goal $E$ may be a proper collective goal. In this case the acts the members will perform are immediately directed at the collective goal. The separated tasks form a component of the final goal. The intention needed here is the so-called ‘weintention’ in which, besides the individual intention to do one’s own task, one also has to believe and trust that each of the members of the group will also do his or her task. This has to be a common belief. This implies that deliberation has to be taken literally: deliberation is based on deliberations within the group. (More precisely, cf. Tuomela 2000)

**Acting**

Acting is intentionally making changes in the reality. If one opens a window one changes the state of the window: at the beginning the window was closed and in the end the window is open. It easy to cf. that the occasion for opening the window has to be suitable. A window that is already open cannot be opened. Moreover, a window that opens automatically cannot be opened either. Opening something is a kind of change that can be made. Closing the window is the dual of the opening the window. The actor actively changes the state of the reality.

Following von Wright 1963, we can separate the following types of acts. Opening the window is an example of producing, while closing the window is an example of destroying. These are quite simple to understand. Of course, the difference between producing and destroying is dependent on the language we are using. However, the central factor is that they are dual acts. There are two other kinds of acts. One can keep the window open. This is an example of preserving. The other is to keep the window closed. This is an example of preventing. The four types characterize the intervention the agent makes.

If I open the window then my primary act is that of opening the window. However, the act of opening the window makes it – conceptually – sure that the window will be open. However, the act also has several consequences that do not necessarily follow. If I open the window, at the same time I let fresh air into the room. This is a consequence of the act of opening the window. However, if I want to freshen the air in a
room then I may open a window. But, conceptually, we have here a different situation here. Opening the window is a means to achieve my act of freshening the air in the room. There may also be some other possibilities for performing this act. However, the same physical act may be conceptually characterized in different ways. This is a very central point to note. Expertise in the modern world is built up in such a way that the tasks have to be characterized at a general level. There has to be freedom to make practical decisions in a local situation.

Acts in the sense above are small changes to states of affairs. The identity of action is determined by the following three conditions (more precisely, cf. Stoutland 1989):

(i) the state of the world at the beginning of act (initial state)
(ii) the state of the world at the end of the act (end state)
(iii) the state of the world if the agent does not act

We have analyzed acts as small changes in an environment. These changes are conceptually tied to the act. Besides the direct intended changes, there are several consequences that follow from an act. The characterization of an act supposes that the states of affairs – our possible worlds or states of affairs – have to be specified. However, this means that the identity of an act supposes intensional analysis of the case in the sense above. This implies that the notion of an act is a modal notion.

In collective acting, the states of affairs are collectively produced. At the beginning the state of affairs need not be unique. Moreover, after the act, the final state of affairs may be a mereological sum of several different states of affairs. Maybe none of the actors will be satisfied.

We have assumed that the agent is active: he or she plans and produces his or her acts and activities. In the characterization above we have considered only small changes in the prevailing reality. However, these small changes are the cause of several other changes in the reality. However, in planning and deliberating the agent has to consider several different courses of events that may take place. This makes the deliberation intensional in the sense characterized above.

The agent has to deliberate in what he or she is doing one way or another. This deliberation imposes agenthood on the act. Agenthood supposes that the agent has the following properties: rationality, consciousness, reciprocity, ability to communicate, self-consciousness, and informativeness. (Mutanen 2003) The list of properties can, of course, be interpreted in several different ways. The first two are unproblematic
for us. The last four properties are intuitively acceptable, but in a military context they may appear problematic.

The context of military action is messy. There are (at least) two groups of agents. They are enemies to each other. The enemy of an agent intends to destroy the states of affairs already built by the agent, or prevent the agent from building the state of affairs he or she intends. Moreover, in a state of battle a soldier may be the object of an active process of elimination. In extreme cases the soldier may just be a passive reactor to the overflowing process. In this case he or she cannot reflect on the situation in any reasonable way. In a clear-cut sense the soldier looses some of the four last properties of the list above. In fact, this means that the soldier looses his or her agenthood. Let us call this the absurdity of war.

**Responsibility**

An agent performs the act $T$. The act means that a change occurs in a world. In an obvious sense the agent causes the change. So in a direct sense he or she did $T$. Hence, in the causal and decision making sense he or she is responsible for the act. One may argue that he or she only did his or her duty. This may be a good juridical argument but it is not good enough in ethical discourse. The borderline of the ethical responsibility is not clear. (Cf. Lundberg, Arteus, and Wijnbladh 1998)

For example, a soldier pulls the trigger. This is the act he or she performed. However, pulling a trigger caused a bullet to hit a man. He died because of this. Is the soldier responsible for this? The case may be that the soldier was just testing whether the trigger was in order. He or she did not know that the bullet was in the gun. Is he or she still in responsible for the consequence? The soldier is a professional in the field. Thus, he or she is not allowed to not be conscious of the risks involved in handling guns. Therefore, we cannot restrict the analysis of an act so much so that the soldier may become like a layman in his field of profession. Let us assume that the man who died was a father. Is the soldier responsible for making a child an orphan? (Rodin 2006)

The logic here is clear enough. Responsibility cannot be restricted by restricting the notion of an act. The actor also responds to the consequences of his or her acts. One cannot escape responsibility by hiding behind ignorance or behind the role he or she has. However, this leads us to the conclusion that the responsibility of the soldier covers the whole world in the sense of possible world semantics.
Loosing agenthood or the absurdity of war takes the responsibility from the actor by definition. The actor cannot be responsible if he or she looses the agenthood that is the key to all responsibility. However, the absurdity of war is only a local phenomenon. That is, the soldier has to act in such a way that the action during the interval of the absurdity of war is in balance with ethical behavior. This is a great challenge to military education and training. (Cf. Lundberg, Arteus, and Wijnbladh 1998)

A soldier has to act in the prevailing reality. The aspects of the reality he or she meets are extreme. The soldier has to behave in a responsible way. The ethics of the soldier must also be behavioral – it must direct the individual's behavior in action. To achieve this, the military education and training has to connect the theoretical basis and practical action into a whole. The methodological approach is a long tradition in military study, education and training. This supposes that a focus of military study, education and training is context sensitivity – operational and conceptual richness. A soldier has to be a human being with all the connected responsibilities. This is a heavy task to carryout. We can only hope that future soldiers are still able to bear this heavy responsibility.

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Part III:

Social Scientific and Military Pedagogical Aspects
Why Do the Military Need Ethics in the Post-modern Society?

Professional Education in the Lithuanian Armed Forces

Audrone Petrauskaite

Introduction

The contemporary objectives of professional military education are based on the requirements of the post-modern society. Postmodernism can be described in many different ways. It is a very complex world of pluralism, international cooperation and cultural integration. Postmodernism is an age of globalisation and internationalisation. According to Edwin R. McIewski (2005, 5), "postmodernism is no period or era but rather a way of thinking and habits". All national societies are developing under the influence of all these factors. Despite this the issues of national development and national identity become very actual. The key issue of post-modern age is the creation of the civic society. According to this concept, the issues of ethics are becoming the most important aim for the society as a whole and for the military forces in particular.

The goals and the tasks of military education are determined by the requirements and circumstances of postmodernism. The most important task of military education is to train professional combatants ready for fighting in difficult situations of war, to educate a new type of leader with the habits of critical thinking and acting in untypical circumstances of armed conflicts, and to form the maturity of the military person based on the open-minded thinking and moral virtues of the post-modern society. All these aims of the military education system are very difficult in the face of social, political and cultural actualities. The armed conflicts of today raise many more ethical questions than we can answer. How to fulfil all these tasks: how to train really good military persons ready for today's armed conflicts? What could be the priorities of professional military education? And what is the role of ethics in this education system?

The present article has two aims. Firstly observes the situation in the moral orientation of young Lithuanian officers – especially cadets - in comparison with the requirements of the post-modern transformations
of the military forces. The second aim is to identify the issues of ethical education of the militaries for their future solution.

**Lithuanian defence forces**

The Lithuanian armed forces have no rich historical experience – only 20 years between the two World Wars. The restoration of the Lithuanian military after 1991 was particularly dynamic and resolute. In slightly more than a decade the national defence system, after the Soviet legacy, reformed its organisational structure, developed and established the mechanism of democratic civil control of the armed forces, and renewed the officer corps (Norgela 2005). The qualitative changes in the Lithuanian army began only in 2003 when Lithuania received the invitation to become a member of NATO. “The Guidelines for the Development of the National Defence System in 2004-2009” designed new tasks for the Lithuanian military forces and for the military training system in particular (Anon. 2006).

The education of Lithuanian military officers began just after the reestablishment of the army, i.e. in 1992. In 14 years the higher professional military education has been reformed three times in accordance with the requirements of the National Defence System and with changes in the needs of the military forces and the Lithuanian society as well. For the first two years there was just the Lithuanian Military College with a two-year professional military training system. The understanding that professional military studies are impossible without academic knowledge and civic education forced the Lithuanian government and the military staff to reform the military education system. The Military Academy of Lithuania was established in 1994 as a higher military school where the military training system was combined with academic education (bachelor’s degree programme in warfare). In 2000 the bachelor studies in warfare were turned into three civil majors: personnel management, transport engineering management and political sciences. Master’s degree studies began in the Academy in 2004 in the major subject of public administration, and in 2006 doctoral studies in military diplomacy will begin.

The Military Academy of Lithuania is a part of the Lithuanian professional military training system giving first and second degree education for military officers. Actually the Academy is the basis for officer’s further education, and for officers’ personal and professional development as well. The above defines the Academy’s important role in the whole National Defence System, providing special tasks of new transformations of the armed forces in the postmodern era.
Transformation towards postmodernity

After the 12th world congress of sociologists in 1990, where Charles C. Moscos (1992) formulated the hypothesis that modern states evolve from war readiness societies to war deterrence societies, while recently they have been transforming into warless societies, the contemporary armed forces of democratic countries faced such problems as new military missions, changes in the structure, human resources, professional change, etc. In 1994, while further improving his own concept, Moscos suggested introducing additional variables into the model, such as "threat awareness", "relationship with the media", "the role of the female", "homosexuals in the military" in accordance with the main characteristics of the postmodern society (Moskos 2000, 15). As the result of this, three categories—"modern", "late modern" and "postmodern"—appeared in the scientific description of the society and the military forces.

Professor Jurate Novogrockiene, a Lithuanian sociological researcher, concluded after a sociological testing of Lithuanian armed forces "that the military of Lithuania is rapidly moving from the late modern into the postmodern with some remaining features of the former. Many factors testify to these new changes such as new military missions, changes in the structure and the military profession, the NDS budget and armaments procurement priorities, etc." (Novogrockiene 2005, 207).

While the results of sociological research testify to the transformation of the Lithuanian armed forces towards a postmodern military, they have not mentioned the human factor of this process. However, the key issue of the postmodern transformation of the military is the problem of the transforming soldiership, which means the transformation of soldiers as human beings (Toiskallio 2005, 132). The postmodern paradigm includes the humanitarian content in the nature of the militaries. The new international, peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks and close relations with the civil society are making the new demands. The soldiers of the postmodern military have become rather human beings than military persons. The new military identity means new tasks and changes in the education system of the professional military corps and officers in particular. What is the identity of the Lithuanian soldier in the light of human values? What are the relations between the militaries and the Lithuanian society? What are the transformations of the soldiership brought about by the changes of the postmodern military?

Actually, such kind of testing of the Lithuanian armed forces is still an issue. The only scientific research project "Civic education in Lithuanian
Military forces: development, experience, issues and settled for future was performed in the Military Academy of Lithuania in 2003-2005 (Kazlauskaite-Markeliene et al. 2005). The main aim of this work was to evaluate the civic maturity of the Lithuanian cadets and the factors that might influence their civic consciousness. On the other hand, this project helps to identify cadets’ moral orientation, i.e. their point of view about such civic and moral values as the equality of sexes, responsibility, the social duties and personal characteristics of human beings and military persons in particular. On the other hand, this testing should bring some understanding into the concept of the cadet's identity and help to revise the issues of military education for further development.

According to the results of the tests, the ethical priorities of the Lithuanian cadets are: responsibility, justice and honesty, i.e. such moral values which are very important for a military person in his/her professional activities. In the cadets’ opinion, responsibility as a personal quality is the most valuable for a military person (soldier and commander) and for the human being as well. The same tendency can be seen with such personal qualities as justice and honesty. There is one exception - honesty is a less important characteristic for a military leader according to the respondents’ point of view.

Despite some common opinions on the main important ethical values, there is some disagreement in the cadets’ moral orientation as well. It is revealed in the respondents’ approach to evaluating civic and military people. For example, 40 per cent of the cadets think that tolerance is one of the most important and valuable features of a human being. But only 7 % think that this quality is needed by a soldier, and about 17 % of the respondents agree that this feature is valuable for a military leader. Also the biggest part of the respondents does not think that friendship, communication and understanding abilities are important and necessary for a military man. Additionally it is important to notice that in accordance with the test’s results the biggest part of cadets is thinking that the main feature of a military leader is the trust in himself/herself (about 65 % agree with this statement). They also do not believe that a commander needs to trust in his soldiers (only 19.8 % disagree with this).

These and similar results of cadets’ testing show the main common tendency: the cadets have a strong sense of military values and traditions, which are in some opposition to the values of the civilian society. This point of view is based on the tradition of making a difference between the military profession and the civilian society. The cadets evaluate
universal human values very highly but do not think that they are useful in the professional activity of the armed forces. These tendencies in the cadets’ mentality are quite dangerous from the social point of view. They manifest a narrowmindedness of the cadets’ mentality. This position is not in agreement with the needs of the post-modern society and the paradigm of military forces.

**Gender equality and sexual tolerance**

The role of the female in the military is one of the dimensions of the post-modern society and the military as well. The integration of women into the National Defense System of Lithuania started in the beginning of its foundation. At present, women constitute 52 per cent of the civilian employees and 10 per cent of the military personnel, that is 16 per cent of the total NDS personnel body. Since 2000, the Military Academy of Lithuania admits a few females annually (approximately 10% of new cadets). According to Novogrockiene (2005) this criterion makes it possible to speak about a transition towards a postmodern military. Is it possible to make such a conclusion on the basis of the number of women in Lithuania military?

Positive transformations toward the civic society and toward the postmodern military cannot be explained by statistics only. The real situation in the equality of sexes can be explained by the public opinion. Some questions about women’s role in the society and in the military forces were included in the test for the cadets.

The cadets agree (58 % of the respondents) with women’s right and possibility to serve in the military forces, but only 9.4 % of them would like to serve under female leadership. The biggest part of the respondents do not believe that a woman could ever be a good military leader or even a good soldier because of her limited physical abilities. According to the results of the test, the cadets’ positive position about women’s role in the military is just formal. They have to agree with the requirements of the democratic society about equal rights and possibilities. But actually the cadets’ view on the equality of sexes in the military forces is traditionally that of the woman-hater. This position is based on the traditional old-minded understanding of military profession and is in disagreement with the post-modern military paradigm.

On the other hand, such misunderstanding of the changed role of the women in the present world is dangerous from the ethical point of view.
It shows the intolerance of cadets and does not show a positive moral orientation. The situation has not improved during the last three years; the attitudes have become even more conservative. The number of respondents who formally recognized the equality of sexes increased from 29 % in 2003 to 59% in 2005, but at the same time the negative opinion about women's service in the military became more marked.

Another important dimension characteristic of the postmodern armed forces is "the homosexuals in the military". According the test results the tendencies have a similar direction as the cadets’ opinion of the role of females. While 68 % of the cadets agree that every person is free in his sexual orientation, the same 68 % of them would not like to serve under the command of a homosexual person. Also the biggest part (about 58 %) of the respondents do not worry about the sexual orientation of others, but on the other hand 65 % of the cadets do not believe that homosexuals can be successful in the military service. These quite different tendencies in the cadets’ understanding of the issue are influenced by two different factors. The new democratic situation in the Lithuanian society has forced cadets towards a positive thinking about homosexuals, where as the traditionally limited way of thinking does not allow them to accept homosexuals as equals.

**Needs for ethics**

The results discussed above approved the hypothesis of the research group: the consciousness of the biggest part of Lithuanian cadets – future military leaders – is still based on the late modern paradigm of the armed forces. Their civic consciousness also reflects minimalistic understanding of a civic society. All these tendencies in the mentality of the cadets are based on their ethical values and moral consciousness. This leads us to conclude that the professional education of the Lithuanian military has to be revised.

Ethics as a subject has been included in the military education programme from the beginning of academic education in the Military Academy of Lithuania together with other humanitarian subjects (philosophy, history, logic, etc.). It is one of the requirements for the 1<sup>st</sup> level of university education, in accordance with the state law. Ethics as an academic subject includes the studies of philosophical ethical theories. Another aim of this subject is to help the cadets in their attempts to analyse social and personal moral issues through theoretical knowledge. Ethics as a subject was not included in the content of military studies. Actually this subject
was and still is a part of the academic, but not the military studies. So the question is how ethics as an academic subject can influence the professional military moral consciousness of the cadets? Another question is whether there is a way (practical training, exercises, theoretical learning or other) to increase the moral maturity of cadets during their professional education and prevent unethical behaviour in the future?

The reforms of the economical, political and social life of Lithuania are connected with changes in the morality of the people. The realities of the Western life came into the post-communist countries together with the paradigm of empiristic, rationalistic, realistic and positivistic ethics. These theories of ethics are neither critically understood nor theoretically approved in the Lithuanian cultural life (Vasiljeviene 2000).

The models of human behaviour are evaluated in some standards, principles, norms, symbols, and language forms, and in the way of thinking. The transformations of the society together with cultural and ethical factors will influence the behaviour of the human being. The transformations give another ethical meaning and different moral content to most social occurrences. These processes need to be analysed and understood. Traditional ethical rules regulate human morality more strongly in small and closed societies, such as the Lithuanian society was before its new period of life. New realities have brought some ethical misunderstanding and divided the social consciousness. New moral principles and norms are evaluating by the society either as totally negative or absolutely positive. These processes are based on emotions, not on rational thinking and are they divide the society into opposite groups. It is very difficult to evaluate social processes adequately and to form the right moral standards in the behaviour of a particular person. Every human being can feel instability in his ethical orientation and have a crisis in his or her moral mentality in such a situation.

The Lithuanian society lives under circumstances of antiscientific understanding of ethics. The moral authority belongs to the Catholic Church in the most important questions of ethics. The issues of ethics are not discussed at all, people wait for the opinion of the Church - "What the Church will tell about?" - or explain the questions with the help of Western experiences. The most difficult problems of ethics are left without any explanation. It is only declared that "It is a problem of ethics!" Such a situation leads to argument that the Lithuanian society identifies itself more as the object of morality than as the subject. The studies of ethics and scientific research in the field of morality could help to grasp this issue.
Morality is the object of interest of many descriptive sciences as well as prescriptive sciences. There is no united opinion on the tasks of ethics – studying morality as complex knowledge or to couching moral imperatives. It depends on the different point of view about morality as a phenomenon. It can be explained as a phenomenon of the reality as the issues of mental and practical acting of human beings. Morality can also be interpreted as a complex of moral and spiritual values, as some ideals and guidelines for human beings in their life and acting. Without any doubt while the concept of ethics is discussed it is still the only science able and interested to study and analyze morality as a phenomenon in all its forms, tasks and issues.

Traditionally, ethics is the philosophy of human life. It explores all the rich experiences of people, to give guidelines into the system of values, to understand the ways to a better and happier life. Ethics has lost only its normative function in the development and become more scientific in the research of the structure, functions and origin of morality and studies of ethical theories and philosophical systems. The normative function of ethics is loosing the priority but it is still an actual task.

The social and professional role of ethics

In practice morality does not set the standard for highest ideal requirements. Morality as the ideal of the society is very valuable for every person because it expresses people's sense of justice and the needs to perfect themselves, the aspirations to a better life and more happiness. On the other hand the studies of morality in its real acting are more valuable, giving some experience for people. Ethics as a science is very important to perceive the nature of morality, to gather more knowledge about the nature of the human being and to understand human life better, to form a system of moral values and to direct the person toward the right behaviour, etc.

While normative ethics provides moral guidelines, ethics as a descriptive science analyses moral issues in the context of methodological, historical, sociological and physiological research. Normative ethics (i.e. etiquette, ethical pedagogy, the systems of normative morality and the codes of conduct) teaches and orientates people in their individual behaviour. Descriptive ethics can help to provide the aims of normative ethics, researching and analysing morality as an intellectual phenomenon. This point of view ”gives the possibility for the human being to manage his/her life, i.e. to become the subject of ethics” (Vasiljeviene 2000, 47).
This means that ethics as the object of studies helps to create personal moral principles and values, to find the arguments for and against, to make individual decisions and to form the critical thinking of a person. These requirements are the essentials of higher education of the post-modern society. This concept is the basis for the further development of the armed forces toward the post-modern military. This is the main reason for studying ethics as an academic subject in the Military Academy of Lithuania.

The universal ethical principles and moral values are the basis for professional ethics. The issues of professional ethics demand the knowledge of universal ethics. The professional moral values do not stand beyond the universal moral values. Of course, the needs of professional ethics and some situations in the professional activities demand exceptions. In any case the personal moral maturity lies on the individual ethical orientation and does not depend on the situation (Anon. 2002, 92). Military ethics is not any exception without doubt. The studies of ethics have to be used in the solution of complex moral problems of the militaries. The post-modern world demands transforming ethics as a science into social technology (Vasiljeviene 2000, 49). The scientific point of view would help to make serious decisions and to attend difficult moral issues in the context of critical thinking. It is impossible for the militaries to solve practical moral issues without a theoretical background and to understand the situation without the knowledge of philosophical ethics. It is another important reason to study ethics in the Military Academy.

The theory of ethics has to be used in the content of practical military exercises and included in the whole military education system. The real situation is far from this ideal model. Actually the academic and military studies have their own studying programmes and are quite separate in the Military Academy of Lithuania. The teachers and military instructors have different, sometimes opposite concepts of the education of cadets despite the same teaching goals. Such a separation between two teaching bodies and studying programmes is reflected in the cadets’ mentality and their moral orientation.

Also the level of education of Lithuanian military instructors is an issue at the moment. The qualification requirements demand a master’s degree of the military instructors’ but the biggest part of them are just bachelors. This is not enough even for the instructors teaching the first level university students. In many cases military instructors have to be more open-minded to grasp the issues of military education. They need more
scientific knowledge and more life experience as well. Only the military education and professional experience are not enough for the provision of deep human education of the cadets and for further development of the professional military education.

The moral consciousness of the human being is shaped under the influence of many different and complex factors. It is a very long and difficult process of years. This is influenced by common global and democratic factors of the post-modern society and it reflects the situation of the local society. So we have to understand that the professional and human education of Lithuanian militaries is a part of the Lithuanian education system and a part of the creation of the Lithuanian civic society as well.

**Conclusions**

According to the results described in this article, the consciousness of the biggest part of Lithuanian cadets is still based on a late modern paradigm of the military. The results also reflect some conflicts between theoretical knowledge and practical experience in the cadets’ mentality. These results demand the provision of human and civic education as well as revising the concept of professional education. The priorities of professional military education have to be the formation of a deeper moral maturity of the cadets and the intellectualisation of the studying process. Ethics as one of the academic subjects has to be more oriented to creating the critical thinking abilities of the cadets. The studies of ethics have to form the cadets’ scientific point of view on the most important and difficult moral issues of theirs. However ethics itself cannot change their moral orientation and system of ethical values. It should become the main mutual educating task to both the civic and military staff. This task demands better coordination between the two teaching bodies of the military academy and a deeper intellectualisation of the military studies.
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Training Military Personnel to Take Moral Decisions in Situations of Ethical Asymmetry. Lessons from the Israeli Experience

Stuart A. Cohen & Tamir Libel

For many years now, observers have justly portrayed violent clashes between Arabs and Israelis as expressions of a “compound” conflict. Disputes between the two sides are not limited solely to competition over territory. They also span a gamut of social, religious and ethnic issues. In recent decades, it is the latter that have become particularly pronounced. As a result, what was once essentially an inter-state conflict, whose principal expression was periodic bouts of organized violence between the armed forces of Israel and those of neighboring states, has now been transformed into an inter-ethnic struggle. This new dimension became especially pronounced during the fighting between Arabs (principally, Palestinian Arabs) and Israelis that marked the first and second intifadas (1987-1993 and 2000-the present).

That development has profoundly affected the style as well as the substance of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in its most recent phase. Specifically, it has transformed what was always a combustible relationship into one that is especially brutal, and hence presents challenges in the field of military ethics that are particularly acute. The purpose of the present paper is to explore some of the implications of that situation, with particular reference to the moral challenges that it presents to members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Our argument will proceed in three stages.
– First, we shall briefly outline the nature of the ethical challenges presented to military forces by violent ethnic conflicts;
– Second, we shall examine the IDF’s operational record in that area;
– Finally, we shall analyze the measures taken by the IDF in order to equip its complement for this type of combat.

**Ethnic conflicts and moral asymmetries**

From a synoptic perspective, inter-state and inter-ethnic conflicts differ in two principal respects: one is their **matter**; the other the **manner** in which they are fought. The first finds expression in the nature of the stakes that the disputants consider to be involved. By and large, inter-state conflicts revolve around conflicting interests, matters that are tangible. However vital such interests might be to the warring sides, in the last analysis they can often – albeit all too often after much expenditure of blood and treasure - eventually prove amenable to some form of compromise. Inter-ethnic conflicts, by contrast, revolve around issues of identity. For each side, the roots of the conflict are traced back to primordial myths of collective ancestry, themselves seen as vehicles for the transmission and retention of traits considered to be innate. For that reason, inter-ethnic conflicts involve issues believed to be of supreme – even transcendental – importance and resonance. Because they speak to the very essence of the combatants, they brook of no compromise whatsoever.3 That, surely, is why lasting settlements between competing identity groups have proven to be so difficult to attain.4 That, too, is why the tendency towards atrocities in inter-ethnic conflicts is so pronounced. In Donald Horowitz’s words: “because the cleavage is more salient, the conflict is itself more intense.”5


Much intellectual energy has been invested in attempting to determine whether or not the brutality thus inherent in inter-ethnic conflicts might be exacerbated by religious factors in general, and by Islam in particular. The present paper does not intend to rehearse that well-trodden ground. Its focus, rather, is on the impact that the experience of confronting terror exerts on the members of the armed forces who are tasked with the mission of combating it. Within that context, particularly important are the measures required in order to ensure that those involved in fighting the enemy themselves preserve the values encapsulated in the term “ethics” – here defined as “the body of moral principles or values governing a particular culture or group.”

At first glance, this particular challenge might not appear to be altogether novel. After all, in every war there presumably exists a great temptation to ignore moral restraints in the interests of attaining as speedy a victory as possible and thereby avoiding the waste of human life. (Indeed, on these grounds, it has even been argued that moral considerations that prevent us from winning wars are themselves inherently immoral.) A fortiori is that the case in a “low-intensity” conflict, in which insurgents adopt “an overarching strategy of turning attempts on the part of opposing forces to adhere to the Law of War against them by using nominal civilians, including women, the elderly and even children, whom they know their enemy is legally and morally bound to treat as innocents.” When exacerbated by the brutality of ethnic conflict, however, situations of that sort surely present moral dilemmas of massive proportions.

6 For especially incisive surveys of the literature and analyses of the data, see: Jonathan Fox, “The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflict”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 3/3 (1997): 1-19 and Jonathan Fox, “Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions?” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 6/2 (summer 2000): 1-24. The September 11th atrocities focused particular attention on the phenomenon of the shaheed, a term usually translated as “martyr”, but whose etymology is closer to “witness”, a person whose existence is a living testimony, even after his/her death. Thus, the Qur’an states (3:169): “Think not of those who are slain in the cause of God as dead. Nay, they are alive in the presence of the Lord and are granted gifts from Him.”


To cite just the most obvious: when confronted with an enemy whose own status is indeterminate (not least in international law\textsuperscript{10}), does it not make sense to suspend, if only temporarily and as an "emergency" measure, normal standards of behavior, such as with respect to rules of engagement or the non-use of certain types of weapons? Is it not advisable to refrain from imposing too rigid a framework of guidelines on individual troops and permit, perhaps even encourage, them to act in their own best judgment when placed in life-threatening situations that seem deliberately provocative (e.g., when a guerrilla gun emplacement is sited in a hospital or school)? What restraints could possibly prevent defending societies and their armed forces from throwing their own moral values overboard and adopting a mirror-image operational code, in which the response to such actions is one of terror tit for terror tat? In short, is it possible to fight, let alone win, win such a brutal war without oneself becoming brutalized?

The IDF and morally asymmetric conflict

Such questions certainly intruded on the minds of IDF commanders and their troops as early as the first intifada (December 1987 - September 1993).\textsuperscript{11} But it has been during the years following the renewal of Palestinian-Israeli violence in September 2000 that discussions and analyses of the military-ethical challenges specific to what are generically defined as "low intensity" conflicts have become especially intense.

What is most striking about this development is not just the exponential rise in the number of publicly available publications devoted to this subject, but also their provenance. Some, certainly, carry the imprint of senior officers and their academic advisers, and as such reflect what amounts to a General Staff perspective on the distinctive features of the\textit{ ius in bello}.\textsuperscript{12} But many others articulate the sentiments of the rank-

\textsuperscript{10} "There has been a gradual erosion of the concepts of resistance, freedom fighter, guerrilla and terrorist movements. The choice of term sometimes merely indicates the attitude of the beholder." Ingrid Detter, \textit{The Law of War}, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, CUP, 2000), p. 144.

\textsuperscript{11} Yehuda Wallach (ed.), \textit{The Purity of Arms} (Hebrew: Tel-Aviv, 1991), the proceedings of a symposium on military ethics during the first intifada, attended by senior officers as well as academics. See also: Tamar Liebes and Shoshana Blum-Kulka, "Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers and the Intifada", \textit{Armed Forces & Society}, 27 (1994):45-68.

and-file, and as such deserve to be considered representative of "grass roots" feeling. Particularly informative, in this respect, are the queries that individual religiously orthodox soldiers in the IDF now address on battlefield ethics to their rabbis and teachers through the medium of the various internet websites that cater to the needs of this community. Analysis of these materials indicates a significant shift in the focus of the religious concerns of orthodox troops now engaged in active service, who constitute an increasing proportion of the combat complement. Unlike their predecessors of an earlier generation, the present generation of such soldiers does not primarily seek rabbinic advice on the methods whereby they might reconcile their military obligations with their commitment to fulfill Jewish ritual commandments (such as the observance of the Sabbath and dietary laws). Instead, their enquiries are more specifically related to moral issues: In view of the use that Palestinian insurgents are known to make of women and children as "human shields", does Jewish religious law [halakhah] permit IDF soldiers to likewise parade Palestinian civilians in front of them when seeking out suspected terrorists? In general, what are the points of agreement, and of dispute, between the halakhah and the IDF's Rules of Engagement where civilians are concerned? And, more specifically, what are the guidelines that the tradition prescribes for behavior at border crossings and check points?

The notable rise in the prominence thus attached in the IDF to the ethics of combat in recent years is not hard to explain. In large part, that development has taken place because the incentive to escalate the military resort to violence has of late become much more compelling. After all, not only did the second intifada cause many more Israeli deaths than had the first, it also witnessed a transformation in the complexion of the deadly statistics of the conflict. Since 2000, the principal targets of Palestinian attacks have not been IDF installations and personnel, who in fact have borne a minority of the overall Israeli casualty burden,

13 The four main sites, all in Hebrew, are: moreshet (lit. 'tradition'); kipa ('skullcap'); moriya ('Mount Moriah'); and yeshiva (academy).
but the civilian population – victims of suicide terrorist bombers who indiscriminately targeted restaurants, shopping malls and bus stops.\(^{18}\)

That situation supplies the context for several changes in overall Israeli security policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians. For one thing the resort to "targeted killings", especially by manned and unmanned aircraft, has become much more frequent. So too has the imposition of curfews and of more general restrictions on the movement of Palestinian traffic along selected roads in the West Bank. Most contentious of all, however, has been the Israeli government's decision, taken in 2002, to construct a "security fence" separating Jewish from Arab areas of settlement.\(^{19}\) Inevitably, all such actions have had repercussions on much larger population groups than was originally intended. "Targeted killings", for example, always run the risk of what is euphemistically termed "collateral damage" – the deaths of persons who had the misfortune to be in the vicinity of the intended victim and were killed by the same blast or by shrapnel. Maintenance of the "curfews" has sometimes led to indiscriminate shooting on the part of IDF soldiers, and the manning of roadblocks to non-humanitarian behavior on their part. The "fence" has compounded all such problems, since it funnels Palestinian movement to a limited number of check posts, where the population is subject to intensive scrutiny and search by IDF troops.

Within the context of the present article, the relevance and significance of this situation lies in the opportunities that it provides for individual acts of immoral behavior by troops on the ground. These do not result from official military policy (although frequent declarations by senior commanders that the Palestinians must be "made to realize" that terror will not serve their purposes certainly induces a climate of intolerance). Rather, they are occasioned by the frequency, and intensity, of friction between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian citizens that government policies now induce. Conscious that troops stationed at the check-posts have often been targets of attack, even the most humane of soldiers tends to regard the Palestinians who pass under his surveillance with suspicion and circumspection. In many cases, sentiments are far more extreme and generate a resort to deviant behavior. As a result, there has been an

\(^{18}\) According to the IDF's website, of the 1084 Israelis killed as a result of Palestinian activity between late September 2000 and mid-January 2006, 761 (70%) were civilians. Similarly, civilians constituted some 80% of the 7638 injured during the same period. http://www1.idf.il/dover/site/mainpage.asp?sl=HE&docoid=49277, last visited on 20.01.06.

\(^{19}\) This decision was condemned by the International Court of Justice in July 2004. For the decision, and reactions to it, see: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fencetoc.html.
incremental rise in the numbers of defenseless Palestinian civilians who have suffered unwarranted maltreatment on a scale that ranges from harassment to death. Unquestionably, some sectors of public opinion in Israel have persistently looked on such proceedings with equanimity. Indeed, minorities of Jewish Israeli vigilantes have gone further, and - with or without the acquiescence of local troops - have themselves committed acts of violence against Palestinian persons and property. Other circles, however, have expressed outrage, and demanded that the IDF assume full responsibility for whatever acts of inappropriate behavior its soldiers might commit. Taking advantage of the freedom of the Israeli press criticize military misdemeanors, they have in so doing helped to project IDF policy on to a new course.

**IDF Responses**

Broadly speaking, the IDF has taken three categories of measures in order to reduce the incidence of morally unacceptable behavior on the part of its troops: organizational; judicial; and educational. Although in many respects mutually reinforcing, in the pages that follow those three clusters of activity will be discussed and illustrated individually.

**A Organizational**

Ever since its establishment in 1948, the IDF has relied on a militia-type system of military service. Only a fraction of the complement is composed of professionals. The vast majority of troops are conscripts (both men and women are drafted into service at the age of eighteen for 2-3 years) and reservists (for the most part men, who can be summoned for annual stints of duty until middle age). Organized into the various services and formations found in other modern armies, this pool of manpower has by tradition for the most part been trained for conventional conflict. The predominant scenario has been that of a large-scale battle, of the sort fought by the IDF in 1967 and 1973, referred to in Israeli parlance as a matter of “basic security”. By comparison, troops received little (if any) specific preparation for counter-insurgency and constabulary missions, which were rather disparagingly termed matters of “current security.” The hypothesis was that such assignments posed no challenge that could not be carried out by virtually any soldier fit enough to wear a uniform.20

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The fallacies behind that assumption were already apparent during the first intifada, when it became plain that "regular" IDF troops were simply not capable of coping effectively with civilian disturbances and low-level insurrection. Their standard equipment, command structure and modes of operation were simply inappropriate to the circumstances in which they found themselves. The result was an overall atmosphere of operational incompetence, compounded by a sense of ethical uncertainty and – in some cases – psychological despair. An examination of IDF "low intensity" operations in 1991-1992 carried out by the State Comptroller found that, in those years, the Force possessed neither a doctrine for carrying out such missions, nor the instruments required to ensure that one could be formulated and carried through.21

During the second intifada (which erupted in September 2000), matters were very different. Partly, this was because the conflict itself then became much more intense, and the need for military discipline and training with respect to ethical issues much more obvious. As various domestic and international watchdog groups regularly stressed22 (and, indeed, as the IDF Spokesman’s Unit was often prepared to admit), the IDF’s treatment of Palestinian civilians often left much to be desired. The inconveniences and humiliations to which they were subjected at the military roadblocks dotted throughout the West Bank were an especial source of complaint.23 Moreover, although rape was apparently non-existent,24 looting, larceny and bribe taking were rife. No morally sensitive army could possibly turn a blind eye to such activities. The IDF, certainly, has evinced a readiness to initiate some of the steps required to mitigate their effects.


22 Published mainly by HAMOKED - Center for the Defense of the Individual (http://www.hamoked.org.il); and BTSELEM – the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (http://btselem.org.index). See also, however, the work of such additional organizations as SHOVRIM SHTIKAH (a group of discharged reserve soldiers; http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il); and MACHSOM WATCH – women for human rights (http://www.machsomwatch.org).

23 On one notorious occasion, Israeli TV cameramen pictured filmed Israeli soldiers forcing a young Palestinian violinist to play the violin in front of them (supposedly in order to assure that the violin did not contain explosives).

24 This curiosity still awaits adequate explanation. The absence of any incidence of rape of Palestinian women on the part of Israeli troops defies all the conventions of scholarship as summarized in, e.g., Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (University of California Press, 2001), esp. pp. 108-152.
Attention has been paid, first, to the area of Personnel. During the first intifada only "special operations" had been apportioned to specifically trained "masquerader" units, known as mista’arvim. Day-to-day constabulary duties, however, had been rotated amongst a large range of units, reserve as well as conscript. During "High Tide and Low Tide" (the IDF’s generic code name for counter-insurgency operations after September 2000), however, assignments were apportioned far more selectively. True, even during 2001-2002 several of the combat units tended to be temporary frameworks, created ad hoc. But after 2002-3 the majority of LIC operations were entrusted to no less than six specifically designated conscript infantry battalions, which operated alongside and in conjunction with units of the "Border Guard" (nominally a police formation operating under IDF control). Likewise, and following the recommendations of an internal military committee that investigated conditions at the checkpoints, in July 2004 the IDF announced the formation of a specially constituted "checkpoints unit", principally composed of conscripts serving in the Military Police.

As all those involved have long appreciated, appropriate training is critical to the proper functioning of such units. Accordingly, special courses have been instituted, not just for personnel assigned to the "Checkpoints Unit", but for wider circles of troops too. Experience during the first intifada had shown that although reservists often provide the required psychological steadiness, this advantage is often offset by the short duration of their terms of duty. (Moreover, reservists tend to be a more expensive manpower item than are conscripts). Accordingly, special training facilities for urban warfare were established, and the topic became a standard feature of every combat soldier’s basic training. By the end of 2005, moreover, the Ground Forces Command had initiated a program designed to stress that, in view of the admixture of combatants and

25 See: General Mosheh Ayalon (Vice-Chief of the IDF General Staff), "Preparation of the Force for Limited Conflict", (Hebrew) Ma'archot (IDF journal), 380-381 (December 2001): 24-29.
28 In December 2005 plans were announced to combine the six infantry battalions into a single new IDF brigade. See Ba-Machaneh (Hebrew: IDF weekly), 16.12.05, p. 1.
29 Ynet, 7.07.2004 (Hebrew).
30See, e.g., remarks by COS Major-General Shaul Mofaz at the symposium cited above n. 11: The IDF must supply its soldiers with "clear orders, pre-combat training, and an emphasis on the correct and proportional use of force." Dignity of Man, p. 47.
31 See response by the Deputy Defense Minister to a question in the Knesset (Israel's parliament): Protocol of the 287th meeting of the 16th Knesset, 9.11.05.
non-combatants that characterizes the LIC conflict zone, accuracy of fire is more important than its speed.  

Junior officers, who are widely recognized to constitute what is frequently the most critical link in the entire command system in LIC operations, have been the objects of even more intensive training programs. Especially is this so in view of the absence within the IDF of a cadre of long-serving NCOs, of the type who in other western forces often supplies the experience that young lieutenants inevitably lack. By 2004, courses especially designed for and tailored to this audience had been crafted by the IDF’s Education Branch and by individual brigade commands. The "kit" prepared by the former is particularly noteworthy. Entitled "Values in Warfare – Checkpoints”, it contains analyses of three confrontational scenarios involving IDF troops and Palestinian citizens and an analysis of the situations described in a commercial film (also named "Checkpoints"), a copy of which is also screened. The IDF’s School for Military Law, originally under the command of the IDF Judge-Advocate General but since 2004 an independent unit, prepared similar materials, including discussion notes based on screenings of excerpts from "Apocalypse Now" and "The English Patient". The most recently available of the School’s Reports, indicates that in 2004 alone its various courses were attended by over 37,000 servicemen and women of various ranks, and that in that year it also opened a special program for ”para-legal NCOs”, tasked with providing the military justice system with additional assistance.

B Judicial

The organizational measures taken in an attempt to minimize the likelihood of immoral behavior on the part of IDF troops have been complemented, and very much buttressed, by a series of judicial steps.

32 Interview with the commander of the IDF unit responsible for sniper training and anti-terror operations in Bamachaneh News (Hebrew), 9.12.05, p. 1.
33 “The senior officer is more of a manager and co-ordinator than commander. Real operational ‘command’ in the sense of leading troops, has devolved downwards, through the battalion and company commanders to the NCO’s. More often than not, it is these men who are confronted with the most difficult operational decisions.” Lt.-Col. Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland, (London, Arms & Armor Press, 1985), pp. 177-8. Similarly, in Algeria it was noted that: “Military activity was reduced to the level of a few individuals at a time. The key figures on the French side became the [junior] commanding officers of the Special Administrative Sections.” Alf Andrew Hogg, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 173.
34 Not the least interesting aspect of this circumstance is that the film, which was produced entirely by a civilian company, is itself often critical of the IDF. See report in Ynet, 7.9.04. (Hebrew).
In this area, many of the foundations had been laid during the first intifada (1987-1991), when General Amnon Strasnov served as Judge-Advocate General. In response to allegations of improper IDF troop conduct, voiced by Israelis as well as Palestinians, Strasnov had by the late 1980s augmented the numbers of personnel assigned to the Military Police Investigative Department and to the offices of the Military Court Judge and Military Prosecutor, in the latter instance by drafting larger numbers of reservists who were attorneys in civilian life. Acting on a recommendation of the Supreme Court, in January 1989 a military Court of Appeals was also constituted for the first time. This system clearly had its hands full. Official IDF records show that between December 1987 and February 1989 alone, military courts tried 6879 cases against 9243 defendants. By 1992, furthermore, 168 indictments had been filed against 241 IDF personnel (54 officers, 183 regular troops, and 4 civilians employed by IDF), principally on charges of manslaughter; causing death by negligence; causing grievous bodily harm; unlawful use of weapons; cruelty towards civilians; and the theft or destruction of property. The most serious (and, inevitably, the most publicized) of these cases eventually made their way to the Supreme Court. Ultimately, 194 of the soldiers thus charged were found guilty.

This record is undoubtedly impressive (not least considering the considerable pressure exerted on the system by senior Israeli field officers, who throughout the intifada claimed that the rigid application of military justice on the part of IDF lawyers was undermining troop motivation and restricting their own freedom of operational maneuver). Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that during the first intifada the judicial process did not function as a particularly effective means of preventing brutal troop behavior. The “fuzzy” nature of many of the situations brought to trial, for which Israeli military law often provided no clear precedent, frequently created situations that could not easily be categorized in accordance with the criteria traditionally applied to troop behavior. On some notorious occasions, their task was further hindered by the tendency of troops to operate a “buddy syndrome”, resulting in cover-ups and the deliberate destruction of evidence.

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36 For what follows, see: Judge-Advocate General’s Unit, IDF, Israel, the "Intifada" and the Rule of Law (Tel-Aviv, Ministry of Defense Publications, 1993) and Amnon Strasnov, Justice Under Fire: The Legal System During the Intifada (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Yediot, 1994).
37 Israel, the "Intifada" and the Rule of Law, p. 98.
38 E.g., Strasnov, Justice Under Fire, pp. 192-3.
Events since September 200 have underscored the need for the adoption of a new approach. One step in that direction was taken by General Menachem Finkelstein, who succeeded Strasnov as Judge Military Advocate in 1999. Sensitive to the extraordinary context of "High Tide and Low", Finkelstein adopted a legal stance that defined the current state of the conflict as "An Armed Conflict Short of War".41 This position certainly granted commanders and their troops considerably more autonomy in the use of violence than had once been the case. Whereas during the first intifada, the Military Prosecutor had initiated investigations into almost every reported case of Palestinian death, after 2000 such occurrences became a rarity. Palestinian insurgents, ran the claim, constituted "illegal combatants", and even "collateral damage" suffered whilst actions were being taken against them could not therefore be brought to trial.

By and large, Israel’s Supreme Court has accepted that position. Since the outbreak of the second intifada, there has hardly been a single case of military relevance in which the Court has failed to comment that as of September 2000 the army has been involved in heavy fighting.42 At the same time, however, the Court has also become increasingly insistent that IDF actions must comply with the principles of International Human Rights Law, as defined by the International Criminal Court, established in 1998. On one occasion, it demanded to know – in the midst of a military operation – whether the IDF was supplying sufficient medical assistance, drugs, and food to the civilian population.43 Likewise, Israel’s Knesset has exercised far more stringent supervision over IDF activities. Moreover, for the very first time that body’s parliamentary committee on constitutional and legal affairs has begun to exercise its right to oversee the administration of justice in the conflict. Under the aegis of MK Michael Eitan, the committee’s chairman, the Military Judge Advocate has been summoned to bi-annual hearings on the state of human rights in the administered territories, to which representatives of human rights organizations have also deliberately been invited.44

42 Amichai Cohen, "Administering the Territories: An Inquiry into the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the IDF in the Occupied Territories", Israel Law Review, 38(3), Fall 2005: 24-79, on which much of the following is based.
44 See Eitan’s remarks in protocol of the committee meeting, 18.08.2004
How much all this activity owes to the growing sensitivity within Israel legal circles to Human Rights laws in general, and how much it might be attributed to the fear (expressed by Chief Justice Barak) that non-compliance with international human rights law could result in Israeli soldiers being indicted abroad for war crimes, is a matter of some dispute. More relevant, however, are its effects. Altogether, the IDF now recognizes that the legal arena constitutes a “front” of strategic importance. Quite apart from measurably augmenting the institutional influence of the Military Advocate General (and especially of the personnel under his command responsible for international law), this perspective has exercised a deterrent effect on the specifics of several IDF actions. For instance, as early as 2002 the IDF informed the Supreme Court that it would suspend the practice of using Palestinians as human shields. It also publicly declared it would cease to use the controversial policy of house demolitions as a punitive measure. When troops entered the Rafah refugee camps in Gaza early in 2004, the IDF opened “humanitarian centers” which were responsible for dealing with any request for humanitarian aid.

C Educational: The IDF Code of Military Ethics

Judicial measures can never supply an entirely satisfactory means of meeting the moral challenges posed to troops by their involvement in an especially brutal form of warfare. In the last resort, after all, even the most perfect system of military justice is bound by its limitations. Since courts cannot undo a crime already committed, still less bring victims back to life, they can ultimately hope merely to exercise a deterrent effect on the overall complement of troops involved in counter-terror operations.

Given these drawbacks, the IDF has found it necessary to supplement its organizational and judicial reforms by adopting what has been termed a “constructive” and “functional” approach to the moral challenges that its troops now confront. Specifically, it has initiated an extensive educational program, one of whose principal motifs is the demarcation

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47 Doctors for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip, supra note 41.

of clear boundaries between "judicial" and "ethical" codes of military conduct. Indeed, the differences between them are considered critical. The former specify certain actions that are forbidden by military law, and to all intents and purposes invoke, post facto, a legal contract. A "code of ethics", by contrast, seeks to determine a priori an ethical framework for military professional behavior. To put matters another way, the idea behind such manifestos is not just to instill in the minds of soldiers a fear of legal retribution but to make them aware that unethical conduct also violates the moral standards required of civilized soldiers. That, indeed, is why combat behavior is not the only sphere in which the IDF is presently seeking to instill a code of ethical-professional conduct. Precisely the same development is taking place in the areas of gender relations and of the behavior of officers towards the troops under their command.

Whilst a full history of the genesis and development of the IDF’s code of ethics lies beyond the scope of the present paper, its principal milestones are nevertheless worthy of note.49 In Israel (as in the Anglo-Saxon world), recognition that ethics is an independent discipline, worthy of detailed instruction to troops, is a fairly recent phenomenon. The perceived wisdom of previous generations was that codification of morals was neither necessary nor possible. That view was first seriously challenged early during the first intifada. In a letter addressed to Yitzchak Rabin, then Minister of Defense, Israel's Attorney General of the day in 1988 severely criticized what he termed the ambiguities and lack of clarity that characterized the orders issued to IDF troops commanded to employ force against unarmed civilians.50 In response, the Chief of the General Staff sought to meet the needs of the situation by addressing a general "Dispatch on Behavior" to all troops and by frequently revising what were already considered to be fairly rigid rules of engagement.51 However, as was indicated by several well-publicized subsequent trials (one of them involving a full colonel) these measures could not be considered sufficient. Clearly, a more fundamental change in the overall

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49 The following discussion owed much to: Riki Eitam, "The IDF ethical code" (Hebrew), unpub. MA thesis, Dept. of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 2004.
50 On all this see William V. O’Brien, Law and Morality in Israel’s War with the PLO (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 231-2.
51 For full text of the "Dispatch" see: Strasnov, Justice Under Fire, p. 189. Its most important points laid stress on forbidden to use force as a means of punishment, and never to use force after mission had been accomplished.

O’Brien, Law and Morality, p. 239, compares the IDF’s ROEs with those then in force in the US military. In fact, the IDF’s rulings had more in common with the “yellow cards” issued to British troops in Northern Ireland, and which were likewise frequently revised during the years 1968-1972. See Evidence to the “Saville Inquiry”, reported in Irish Times, 31 March 2000, p. 1.
tenor of the Force was required. In order to attain that end the General Staff ordered the establishment of a high-powered committee, which subsequently co-opted several senior members of the academic community, with a mandate to formulate an integrated code of ethics for the entire IDF.

The result of these deliberations was the publication in June 1995 of a document entitled *The Spirit of the IDF*: Comprising 17 pages of original text and a supplementary volume of eight suggested "readings", the document staked no claims to originality. On the contrary, its authors claimed merely to summarize the principles of conduct to which the IDF had supposedly always adhered ("responsibility", "the purity of arms", "collegiality", "professionalism", etc.). Its distinctiveness lay in its attempts to be comprehensive. *The Spirit of the IDF* itemized no less than eleven IDF "values" and 34 additional "norms", all of which (so the document claimed) derive their inspiration from three sources: (1) the heritage of the IDF and its combat legacy; (2) the heritage of the State of Israel, as encompassed in its democratic principles, laws and institutions; and (3) the traditions of the Jewish people over time." To all this was appended a "kit" of workbooks, intended to provide commanders of the Educational Corps with guidelines for publication of the Code and to serve as a work of reference for specific lectures on individual themes. Also attached was a recommendation that the entire document be reviewed after five years and, if necessary, then revised.

Quite by chance, the beginning of the mandated review process (September 2000) coincided with the outbreak of the yet another round of Palestinian-Israeli violence, which (as noted above) proved to be even more murderous than its predecessor. Hence, the need for re-assessment was felt to be particularly acute, not least by the recently appointed commander of the IDF Educational Corps, General Elazar Stern, who gathered a new team of academics and military personnel in order to suggest revisions to the original document. A new version of the IDF’s Code was indeed published in the autumn of 2001.

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53 For a similar distinction between "values" and "norms", see: Patrick Mileham, "Military Virtues 1: The Right to be Different?" *Defense Analysis* 14/2 (1998), pp. 171ff, who argues for a distinction between "first-order virtues" and "second-order values" and a "third-order culture". Although the IDF’s terminology is different, the basic idea seems to be the same.
Comparison of the two documents indicates that need for change in the original version was felt in four principal areas: its style; its organization; its content; and the manner of its dissemination throughout the Force. Each of these deserves brief mention in turn.

**style**: the new document is notably shorter than its predecessor. Written in far simpler language, it is designed for presentation in just a few slides or pages.

**organization**. Whereas the original version of *The Spirit of the IDF* launched almost immediately into an itemization of the various "values" and "norms" without almost any introductory matter, the new version prefaces them with an "Introduction" that seeks to set out the purposes of the document as a whole. Specifically, it lists the three "Basic Values" that are considered to guide all IDF activities. In order of their appearance, these are: (1) The protection of the State of Israel, its citizens and inhabitants; (2) Patriotism and loyalty to the state; and (3) Human Dignity ("Every human being possesses a value that is inherent, irrespective of the individual's origin, religion, nationality, gender, station or function").

**content**: As the body of the new version makes absolutely plain, the latter reference to "human dignity" as a "Basic Value" was by no means an afterthought. If anything, it has now become central to the IDF's entire Code of Ethics. One reason for that shift is the feeling that the original document did not take sufficiently into account the sensibilities of the minority of the IDF's personnel who are not Jewish (such as Druze troops), and for whom "the traditions of the Jewish people over time" might therefore not possess much relevance. But to this must be added a far more salient reason for change, and one that was specifically referred to in a General Staff paper on the subject drafted in October 2001. Current experience, it was pointed out, had very much highlighted the moral dilemmas confronting soldiers who, at a time when their own families and neighborhoods were being subject to terrorist attacks on virtually a daily basis, might be especially tempted to make improper use of force and degrade the Palestinian civilian population with whom they come into constant contact. That being the case, special efforts

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54 General Stern apparently initiated the drive for the insertion of this item, whose inclusion was vigorously opposed by Professor Kasher. See, e.g., the rather spirited exchange published in the senior IDF journal, *Ma'archot* (vol. 382 [Feb. 2002], pp. 83-86 and vol. 383 [May 2002], pp. 86-89); *Ha-aretz* (Hebrew daily, Tel-Aviv), 24/9/01, B1 and *Ma'ariv* (Hebrew daily, Tel-Aviv), 16.4.01, p. 11.
had to be made to avoid the "de-humanization" of suspected and potential enemies and their demonization through collective vilification.\textsuperscript{55}

That purpose also explains some of the more specific re-phrasing of some key passages. One important example is provided by the explication of the concept of "Purity of Arms" (listed as the sixth of the IDF’s "values") and originally defined as an injunction to soldiers "to use force of arms only for the purposes of subduing the enemy" and "to limit the use of force so as to prevent unnecessary harm to human life and limb, dignity and property". The new version is far more explicit. For one thing, it stresses that "Even in combat all personnel shall respect human dignity." For another it specifically forbids troops them "to employ their weapons and power in order to harm non-combatants and/or prisoners."

**Dissemination:**

The Achilles heel of even the most skillfully crafted Code of Ethics lies in the mechanisms whereby it reaches the individual soldier; all too often such documents fail to attain their purposes because the provisions taken in this regard are not only inadequate but, more fundamentally, inappropriate.\textsuperscript{56} As noted above, dissemination of the original version of *The Spirit of the IDF* was entrusted to the Educational Corps. But, in retrospect, that vehicle was thought to be unsuitable – not because its staff do not possess the required skills, but because they do not possess the kind of immediate contact and affinity with the troops that the dissemination of the document patently requires.\textsuperscript{57} (The same argument is also thought to apply to two of the other prime candidates for the dissemination of the new Code.)

\textsuperscript{55} Eitam, p. 52. In this connection see: Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little Brown, 1995) who draws a distinction between the "de-personalization" of the enemy and his "de-humanization." The former, he claims is really essential for military performance, because it allows the management of emotions during the execution of violent acts, and thereby helps to overcome the deep sense of guilt that violence in conflict might cause to the perpetrators. In fact, without de-personalization of the enemy, battle would become impossible to sustain. "De-humanization", by contrast, is based on an \textit{a priori} assumption that all enemy personnel (including non-combatants) are by definition unfitted to considered human beings.

\textsuperscript{56} In the US Army, it has been noted, new recruits, especially, are in any case "overwhelmed by the demands of uniformity, physical fitness training, marksmanship and shoe polish". Maj. Michael Carlino, "Ethical Education at the Unit Level" (2000), p. 6, http://www.usafa.af.mil/scope/JSCOPE00/Carlin00.html. With the exception of the latter, the same is true for IDF troops. Thus, in his report for 1995, the State Comptroller revealed that although General Staff standing orders mandated weekly "information sessions" for all troops, some eleven percent of combat personnel (i.e. the persons most likely to confront ethical military dilemmas) had never done so. Israel State Comptroller, \textit{46th Annual Report} (Hebrew: Jerusalem, 1995), p. 879.
task: IDF chaplains and, even more so, non-military academics drafted into reserve duty for the purpose). Hence, steps are now being taken to ensure that prime responsibility for dissemination of the ethical code is entrusted to the individual unit commanders, who are the persons more likely to gain – and retain – the attention of troops in the field. It is they who, first, have to be brought to understand that it is their obligation to explain, and by personal example to maintain, the principles of the document. Second, they must also incorporate its dissemination into their regular training schedules.

The IDF has sought to attain the first of these two objectives by framing an integrated course in military ethics, which is taught to all students at staff colleges. But it is with respect to the importance of the second objective that the General Staff has laid down particularly emphatic guidelines. Specifically, it has issued explicit instructions that the adoption of the new version of *The Spirit of the IDF* must become part of each unit’s formal and informal routine. "Only by facilitating a process that is ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top down’ can the IDF hope to ensure that the IDF’s code of ethics is familiar, and intelligible, to all ranks." To that end, the General Staff now requires that provisions be made for such matters as: a weekly commander’s discussion on the Code; the inclusion of this topic on the agenda of officer’s meetings and in each unit’s regular training exercises; and – most important of all - that detailed reference to the Code to be included in mission guidelines before each operational activity and in mission follow-up reports.

**Conclusion**

Notwithstanding all such efforts, considerable work remains to be done. Reports indicate that the troop harassment of many Palestinian civilians, and the maltreatment of some, far from being eradicated – might even have become routine in some units. The IDF, it transpires, is not at all immune to the pressures exerted on all Israeli society by the unceasing cycle of violence and counter-violence. On the contrary, precisely because of its composition as a "people’s army", the vast majority of whose personnel are conscripts drawn from a wide spectrum of society, the

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57 This feeling was freely expressed during the course of a high-level conference of senior field commanders convened by the Chief of the General Staff on 14.5.2000 (a copy of the 9-page protocol appears as Appendix 9 in Eitam, above n. 48). Eitam’s own surveys of soldiers in the field (which constitute the main body of her thesis) largely confirmed that impression.

58 For an informed and highly informative survey of the principles underlying this course see: LtCol. Amira Raviv, "The Concept of the study of military ethics in the [military] colleges" (Hebrew), *Ma’archot*, 396 (Sep. 2004): 53-55.

59 Idem. See also Carlino, above n. 55.
Force tends to be particularly sensitive to shifts in the currents of the public mood. Given that circumstance – and, as noted at the beginning of this essay, the particularly brutal nature of this conflict – the organizational, judicial and educational steps taken by the IDF warrant particular attention. They indicate both an institutional sensitivity to the scale of the ethical challenges that troops now confront and an appropriately humble assessment of the multiplicity of steps that need to be taken in order to meet them. On the success of those efforts hinges the fate of both Israel’s military structure and, indeed, the very fabric of the Jewish state that the IDF is committed to defend.
Military Pedagogy and Ethics: Current Challenges in Switzerland

Hubert Annen

If one is to look back at the military pedagogy conferences that have taken place so far (see Toiskallio, 2000; Micewski & Annen, 2005), several central contents can be identified. Basic questions of training, leadership and education are discussed, as well as the pedagogical challenges that emerge as a consequence of technological progress or political developments. In terms of the latter, the concrete concern is primarily with the growing importance of military ethics, the behaviour in a multicultural environment as well as the consequences of network centric warfare on leadership and communication. The situation can therefore be compared to that in the civilian realm, where educational science is equally experiencing a practically seismographic reaction to the constantly changing societal problems (Gudjons, 1999).

It might then be argued that while this is all right and proper, military pedagogy nevertheless still only functions as a sideline. At first glance, this might indeed be the case, for if one follows the coverage and analyses on army deployments from around the world, political, strategic or technological aspects are in the foreground. However, upon closer inspection, it can be established, for instance, that the dream of "effects-based and net-centric operations, where sensors, computers and telecommunications networks would lift the fog of war" has arguably gone up in the same smoke. Actions of the enemy in Iraq have made the techno warriors about as credible today as stockbrokers after the Great Depression (Scales, 2006). Political or strategic decisions are also frequently based on foundations other than those that ultimately determine a possible success in the crisis region concerned.

Amplifying Factors

A possible answer to the question of where success factors can nowadays be found is provided by the historian Alan Beyerchen (quoted from Scales, 2006). He has developed a taxonomy of war in the modern era in terms of four world wars. Each war was shaped by what he calls "amplifying factors".
For example, World War I was a chemists’ war in that the decisive strategic advantage on the battlefield was driven in large measure by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. The war should have ended for the Germans in 1915 when their supplies of gunpowder nitrates exhausted. But the synthesis of nitrates by German scientists allowed the war to continue for another three horrific years. World War II was a physicists’ war. To paraphrase Churchill, the atom bomb ended the conflict, but exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of the wireless and radar won it for the allies. The Cold War - also referred to as World War III - was the information researchers’ war, a war in which intelligence and knowledge of the enemy and the ability to fully exploit that knowledge allowed the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union with relatively small loss of life. And finally World War IV– the time after 9/11 - is the social scientists’ war. To win this war, the military must be culturally knowledgeable enough to thrive in an alien environment. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war (Scales, 2006).

If this is the case - and there is a great deal to indicate that it is - it consequently becomes clear that human factors have gained decisively in importance. Cultural awareness, tactical intelligence, psychological knowledge, leadership, and intuition are abilities that have always been important, but which for the first time should tip the scales towards victory or defeat. With the increasing importance of social skills, the social sciences are given more weight in the military context. Against this background, it can then also be postulated that military pedagogy should in no way be seen as being on the sidelines.¹

On the whole, Beyerchen and Scales provide grist to the mill of all employees in military organisations who work in the area of the social sciences. However, military superiors do not like to be interfered with when it comes to their core business of leading their subordinates - and certainly not by some academic "softy" or other. This is again confirmed by Scales (2006): "The relationship between the military and human and behavioral scientists has, to date, been one of antipathy and neglect. Academics and behavioral practitioners have rarely violated the turf of the soldier.” We therefore see ourselves in general terms as being faced with the challenge of how we can implement a social scientific body of

¹ As military pedagogy cannot be clearly delimited from other social scientific subjects taught in the military, in this contribution, military pedagogy is always also meant when social sciences are referred to.
thought, i.e. in our concrete case military pedagogical thinking, in such a way that it is accepted by the users and is conducive to military task fulfilment and goal achievement.

**Approach on two levels**

If one looks at military pedagogy from a strategic perspective, the concern is above all with the contents spawned by the current threat situation and the demands on military organisations derived from this. It is also a question of psychological strain, whether and to what extent it suddenly becomes vital to draw on the findings of social scientific research and practice.

When, in the World War I, the fitness for service of several hundreds of thousands of American soldiers had to be tested within the shortest space of time, a link to the psychologists was quickly produced – and with the specially developed psychometric tests it was indeed then possible to make the necessary screening decisions efficiently and more or less reliably (Geuter, 1999). As a further example, it can be argued that armies have seen themselves as increasingly confronted with psychological casualties (combat stress reaction / posttraumatic stress disorder) since the beginning of the 20th century. Here too, it was impossible to avoid drawing on the know-how of psychologists in order to cope with this fact (see Bartone, 1998).

In both cases, incidentally, the relationship proved to be profitable for both sides: The development of the Army Alpha test in around 1915/1916 represented the first major acid test for modern psychology, and at the time, the army was one of the most important employers for psychologists; and with regard to the question of stress management, military organisations provide arguably one of the most interesting fields of research and occupation for psychologists. A further current example that can be cited is the reaction of the US Armed Forces to the accidental shooting down of an Iranian passenger aircraft, where a group of researchers was immediately commissioned to examine the fundamental factors of decision-making under stress (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). And finally, the interest in getting a better understanding of a soldier or of an officer as an information-processing system can be understood as a reaction to Network Centric Warfare.

As mentioned at the outset, with regard to military pedagogy, several comparable trends can also be discerned. Nowadays, one sees oneself on the whole as being confronted with asymmetrical warfare or operations
other than war, i.e. the threat mostly presents itself in a very diffuse manner and the individual soldier often finds himself working in and having to prove himself in grey areas. In addition, he has become much more important as an autonomous part of a whole system. As the example of Abu Ghraib or other maltreatments by army members on civilians that have become public knowledge show, certain acts carried out on the group level can take on strategic dimensions. Against this background, it is not surprising that on the one hand questions of military ethics and the resulting transmission of values, intercultural competence and interpersonal communication are placed in the centre of military pedagogical thought and action, and on the other hand, holders of responsibility in the military are again taking an increased interest in military pedagogy.

All the same, it can be shown by the curriculum for the career officer training in the Swiss Army that this fact does not only correspond to the wishful thinking of a military pedagogue (Annen, 2003; Annen, Steiger & Zwygart, 2004). Ten years ago, the three-year diploma study course for career officers received two semester periods per week on leadership in the first year, and also two semester periods per week of military sociology in the third year. Today, social scientific subjects such as military pedagogy, psychology, military psychology, leadership and communication management take up approximately one third of the course plan in the first year of the training, which has been graded up to a Bachelor's degree. In addition, in the further course of the degree, contents are consolidated in several weeklong block courses in a targeted and practice-oriented manner. In this regard, it should be emphasised that military pedagogy is seen as a core subject and is weighted accordingly in the examinations.

This quantitatively discernible upgrading of the social sciences – and therefore also of military pedagogy – is without doubt gratifying. However, it would be negligent to use this fact to rest on one’s laurels. In the arrangement of the syllabi, it can at times be observed that those responsible run the risk of succumbing to a certain ”checklist mentality”. They grant the social scientists the required scope in order to show to the outside world or the powers that be (i.e. political supervisory bodies) that ”something is being done”. The duty has been done and everybody can relax. In reality, this is where the real work begins, for it is necessary to fill the vessels concerned with content and to ensure the transfer of theory to everyday practice. The fact that this is not self-evident is shown by current and comprehensive investigations, which have demonstrated that the effect of study courses in the area of ”social skills” tends to lie at around zero in most cases (see Frieling et al., 2000).
It is therefore vital to contemplate the operational level of military pedagogy. Here, the concern is with everyday business and consequently with concrete methods. Based on solid basic knowledge, it needs to be thoroughly considered how the relevant contents can be imparted in order for them to find their way from the theory room into practice. In this regard, there are clearly fewer laurels to be gained than in political discussions or at international conferences, where the state of affairs does not necessarily have to be proven. Military pedagogical work at grass-roots level requires commitment and presence, and as is common in terms of educational work, both successes and failures are directly palpable.

Using concrete examples, in the following, the basic military pedagogical work will be illustrated in the framework of the cadre training in the Swiss Army. At the same time, it will be shown how the modules concerned are evaluated in order to ensure as a great sustainability as possible of the inputs.

**Military pedagogy in the cadre training of the Swiss Army**

The Swiss Army continues to function as a conscript army. Following a two- to three-day physical and psychological fitness screening, just under 60% of 20-year-old men are drafted into military service. The remaining men carry out their compulsory service in civil protection or in alternative national service, or if deemed unfit for service, have to pay a substitute tax. In the first seven weeks of the basic military training centre, approximately one third of all recruits are selected for a cadre career track. Following a subsequent ten-week cadre school, it is decided who will be accepted for officer training. The prospective officers then complete a five-week officer candidate school, before they are enlisted in the four-week central officer training course, where all officer candidates of the Swiss Army are brought together. Here, above all basic contents in the area of Swiss security policy, leadership and military values are imparted. Following this, it is necessary to pass a 20-week officer school in the candidate’s own training unit (e.g. infantry). As the final element, this is followed by a practical service lasting for eight weeks, where the officer, who has been freshly breveted to lieutenant, leads a platoon independently. Well-qualified officers who have a Matura (Swiss university entry-level qualification) have the opportunity to pursue the track of career officer. The 50-100 candidates per year have to undergo further selection procedures (sport, social skills), and approximately 30-50 of these then undertake the three-year Bachelor’s degree at the
Military Academy. In the Swiss Militia Army, the proportion of professional soldiers among the cadres is just under 5%.

**Self-reflection**

In the cadre school, a great deal of weight is already placed on a systematic leadership training. The so-called "leadership training for lower militia cadres" comprises modules such as self-awareness, communication, conflict management, leadership psychology or personnel management. A certain number of successfully completed training modules qualifies the cadre to achieve a certificate as a "leadership specialist" that is recognised in the civilian domain.

The first module, "self-awareness", is congruent with the appraisal system according to which the prospective cadres receive regular feedback about their performance and behaviour. The instrument concerned was developed according to the principles of action research², i.e. under direct and constant inclusion of practitioners as well as considering academic findings (Annen, 2000). In a stepwise process, this enabled the creation of an appraisal procedure that contains the most essential behavioural characteristics of an officer of the Swiss Army, whereby once again, the self-competence and social competence is given a great deal of weight. In addition, all cadres and prospective cadres have to carry out a self-assessment on the same basis. The training module "self-awareness" is therefore given a practical and consistent continuation. Moreover, through the fact that the subordinate arrives at his appraisal interview with the completed self-assessment, this feedback session is given further meaning. Instead of being carried out in the form of "one-sided transmission" by the superior, a dialogue is carried out, which ultimately enables the development together of measures according to which the appraisee can improve.

The appraisal procedure concerned is continuously evaluated. After several teething problems, where military superiors struggled with the cultural change, and the extra effort involved with the differentiated form was criticised, acceptance is now quite good (Annen, 2005c). A comprehensive analysis of the completed forms as well as the feedback interview has firstly brought to light that the appraisees tend towards a certain overestimation of themselves, with this effect being greater in those evaluation dimensions relating to personality characteristics (Annen & Kamer, 2006). Secondly, it was possible to show that the effectiveness

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² Translation work between theory and practice is a central feature of action research. Accordingly, this method should be one of the most promising approaches in military pedagogical research work.
of the feedback interview, i.e. the motivation of the subordinate to work on the improvements discussed in a targeted fashion, strongly depends on the perceived credibility of the feedback giver.

With regard to the military pedagogical work, in general, the following can be established:
– Military pedagogical interventions are only as good as their acceptance and implementation by the users. In addition to the academic quality, the practicability therefore always has to be considered.
– Leadership is often perceived differently to how it was meant. The perspective on matters therefore has to be coordinated in a constant dialogue.
– Even the best appraisal instrument is only an aid. The success of pedagogical work, as here in the concrete example of the appraisal of subordinates, ultimately always depends on the people involved.

**Clarification of values**

As reported in earlier studies (Annen, 2004; 2005a), in the last few years incidences have repeatedly occurred in the Swiss Army that were carried to the general public, with particularly great gusto by the tabloid press. Mostly, the concern was with leadership errors, misguided group dynamics or questionable rituals in military schools and courses. As a consequence, at the beginning of 2005, the Commandant of the Armed Forces College commissioned a teaching module to be set up on the theme of "leadership with values". To this aim, in a first step, together with experienced leaders of different hierarchical levels, concrete cases were gathered that had occurred in the last few years. These were subjected to a qualitative content analysis by means of which the following central problem fields were analysed: "creative" educational measures, inappropriate training methods, demonstrations of power, using the wrong words and tone, group momentum resp. dynamics, rituals, too passive superiors.

On this basis, the available material was compressed into eight model cases and developed from a didactical perspective, i.e. it was given a uniform structure and reference was made to relevant principles (military service regulations, military penal law, leadership guidelines). The product, which was made available to the trainers in the central officer training course, additionally contained a methods manual with concrete suggestions for implementation in the teaching. The aim was to sensitise prospective officers to delicate topics by working on these cases. With this mental confrontation with the subject matter as well as the
discussion of possible solutions, the danger is guarded against that in practice, they will be surprised and overstretched by a comparable situation; consequently, they should be in a position to react competently and appropriately.

The experiences with this teaching sequence are discussed with the whole teaching body of the officer training course on a yearly basis, enabling possible optimisations to be derived. In concrete terms, it meant, for instance, that based on current events in terms of "Diversity Management", it was possible to implement a new problem field without delay. In addition, a study is currently in progress that is examining the short-term and long-term effect of the module "leadership with values". Initial results show that the cadets are able to position themselves more clearly in terms of their subjective opinion following the teaching sequence concerned. On the part of the participants, however, it is criticised that the time allocated for the topic is too short, and more interaction is also desired. In addition, it can be established that opinions on this module strongly depend on how it is implemented by the trainer in charge.

Accordingly, the following central military pedagogical findings can be established:
– A teaching sequence is never a finished product. It needs to be constantly reflected upon, enabling a timely reaction to current problems.
– The effect of military pedagogical training is difficult to discern. There is consequently the danger that the trainers will favour (more trivial) contents that are easier to measure and promise short-term training success.
– Once again, it is clear that the personality of the person imparting the information is of decisive importance for the effect of military pedagogical work.

**Leadership culture**

The assessment center for prospective career officers (ACABO) is the most essential selection hurdle on the path from militia officer to career officer. Here too, the emphasis is on the evaluation of self-competence and social competence. Therefore, in addition to having a functional aspect (personnel selection), this procedure also has an implicit aspect, through the fact that the targeted selection of credible, human-oriented leaders also shapes the leadership culture as such. Bearing in mind the importance of this selection instrument, the ACABO is regularly subjected to academic examination. Accordingly, we will not address this further at this point, but refer rather to the numerous publications on the matter (see Annen, 2005b).
Sustainability

As mentioned, in the framework of the three-year Bachelor's degree for becoming a career officer, a fair amount of weight is given to the social sciences in general, and consequently also to military pedagogy. However, a problem arises here that can arguably be observed in any "classical" degree course: The students only take in what appears relevant for the examinations; contents are learned mechanically, processed specifically for the examination and then quickly forgotten again. In short: testing drives instruction. Against this background, it is therefore not particularly surprising that in spite of the fact that the human factors are granted a great deal of training time, in practice, the same leadership errors are constantly observed.

Military pedagogical contents should accordingly be examined in such a way that it is not the contents but rather the processes that are effective in everyday life that are in the foreground. In other words, if (self-)reflection, interaction and discourse are the central emphases in the teaching, then the performance appraisal should be congruent with this – i.e. instruction drives testing. For this reason, in the subject of military psychology and military pedagogy, the subject matter has recently started to be tested according to the portfolio method (see Jones, 1994; Bohl, 2005). In concrete terms, this means that the students already document their learning process during the semester on a continuous basis. They are compelled to assume responsibility for their own learning, recognise coherence and interconnections, and through this critically deal with the subject matter in such a way that the practical usefulness of the knowledge is brought to the fore. Accordingly, each student works on his individual portfolio, in which he records learning within and outside of the lessons, stores formal and informal documents and shows his standard of performance. Generally speaking, he tells his own learning story. In the portfolio interview at the end of the semester, it is then discussed what has been entered into the portfolio, why it was selected, how one rates one's own performance and learning progress and what practical consequences one thinks should be drawn. In addition, the lecturer poses several knowledge questions.

The experiences with this appraisal instrument are systematically evaluated and analysed. Currently, corresponding data from two study courses are available. Predominantly positively, it is noted in this regard that in comparison to traditional evaluation procedures, there is a greater reflection on learning behaviour, one's own learning process is perceived more consciously, and there is therefore also a greater awareness of one's
own state of knowledge. The feedback on the portfolio interview turned out to be particularly gratifying. The impression given is that one is able to represent the state of knowledge well and that accordingly, the grade is clearly easier to comprehend than is the case, for instance, in a written examination. Ultimately, 75% of those surveyed were of the opinion that the portfolio enabled better conditions for a transfer into practice. Points of criticism were the additional effort required during the semester as well as the less than clear guidelines on what exact form the portfolio should take. Although both are in line with the intention of the procedure, as a consequence, in the future, these particular features will be communicated to the students in advance more explicitly. From the perspective of the lecturers carrying out the portfolio process, it can be added that the phase of portfolio discussions is very intensive and requires a markedly high mental and emotional presence. Only in this way can justice really be done to the students and their individual learning history.

The method of portfolio assessment and the first evaluation results lead to the following generally relevant insights for military pedagogy:

- The teaching of interpersonal processes, as it is represented to a broad extent by military pedagogy, can be depicted with a content-oriented test only to an unsatisfactory degree.

- Military pedagogical teaching demands from the trainer an above-average mental and emotional presence; consequently, this is also the case when the students are being examined in this subject.

- Evaluation methods, be they focus on academic testing or a performance examination in a degree course, have to adapt to the subject. For the former, the action research method has proved to be valuable, and for the latter the portfolio assessment.

**Link theory – practice**

After a career officer has worked in practice in the Swiss Army for 5-8 years, with regard to his further career course, he has to complete an additional training course at the military academy lasting for 12 weeks. Among other things, this course offers the opportunity to refresh, reflect upon and discuss military pedagogical contents with these participants against the background of their practical experiences, which in turn can have concrete consequences for the military pedagogical teaching in the basic training. To this aim, as part of this year’s course, the career officers in question were given the task of writing an essay with the title "The career officer as a military pedagogue”. These essays were evaluated by
means of content analysis and the relevant factors from the point of view of the experienced career officers can currently be presented as follows:

Table 1: The career officer as a military pedagogue – Key factors/challenges from the perspective of experienced career officers (N = 24; Maj/LT Col, 35 - 40 y.)

In view of this result, the general alignment in the basic training appears to be right. The further elements of military pedagogical teaching mentioned above are also found in the essays. As a direct consequence, only the theme E-learning and its meaningful implementation will be given more attention in the future.

With regard to military pedagogy, in general terms, the following emerges:

– More than ever, the (military) superior has to set himself the task of bestowing meaning and orientation.
– Military pedagogical work means above all creating a framework for making the subordinates able or willing to fulfil their task (mission-type tactics, work climate, team).
– The contents of military pedagogical accomplishments are largely given and experience only minor changes over the years. What is decisive, by contrast, is to create as concrete a picture as possible in the training regarding what it means in practice, e.g. to be a role model or to impart values, for the mere issuing of orders surely does not achieve this.
Conclusion

It is important to define the strategic level of military pedagogy. Through this, from the meta-perspective, trends and developments are identified that draw the framework for military pedagogical work. Efforts at persuasion are based on the same foundation, so that this theme, which is becoming increasingly important but which is difficult to comprehend for military leaders, can be granted the necessary space in the training.

On a somewhat provocative note, however, it can be commented that it is comparatively easy to lecture from a distance on, for instance, military ethics regarding all sorts of splendid and socially desirable factors. In addition, the content-related orientation of pedagogical functioning should stay roughly the same, as certain values such as consideration of human dignity, mutual respect or camaraderie are, for example, of general and temporally enduring validity. Things become more tangible, however, on the operational level, where, for example, the concrete question arises of how, against the background of current conflicts and army deployments, human dignity can or should be taken into account. Here, in everyday military pedagogical work, cases and dilemmas need to be discussed, and solutions need to be developed against the background of practical experiences and academic foundations. This requires personal commitment and not rarely also the courage to go out on a limb. Military pedagogy cannot be organised or delegated, but needs to be understood as an enduring process, which has to be lived out and reflected upon. Its challenge is the translation work between theory and practice, and its benchmark is therefore the sustainability of teaching and consequently the action competence of individual army members in both training and deployment.

References


Part IV:

New Paradigms for the Global Age
The purpose of this article is to comment on international endeavours to create sustainable alternatives for violent conflict resolution by promoting dialogue competence. The Danish cartoon provocation in 2006 is given as an example from current history, of how lacking capacities for dialogue can create a crisis in the homeland and cause violent international conflicts.

The second part of the article concerns tools for education in dialogue competence. The tools are divided to three main groups dealing with knowledge about the rules of dialogues, skills to interpret language with its symbols, and ethical preconditions for finding the same wave-length in interaction.

Dialogue among civilizations: an international endeavour

In the 53rd Session of the UN General Assembly (21.9.1998) the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad Khatami, held an important speech. He proposed the UN to create a platform for the promotion of intercultural understanding, and for this purpose nominate a year of dialogue of civilizations. The Republic of Finland supported his proposal, together with many other nations. The year 2001 then became a year of hope for diminishing international tensions, but also the year of a disastrous terror attack which seemed to annihilate all the attempts to promote intercultural harmony.

New in the proposition of Khatami was its argumentation, which pointed out the role of religions in the new situation after the end of the Cold War. The reasons for this new way of thinking can be found in three different bases of values. First, Khatami comes from a state which is more or less a theocracy led by Muslim scholars and mullahs. From their point of view no real dialogue can be carried out without references to religious and cultural values.
Secondly, this way of thinking has a justification also from a very secular point of view. Samuel Huntington has pointed out in his famous writings on the "clash of civilizations" that the religions of the world maintain the value memory of cultures. They represent the history of the moral development of nations, which is realized through a dialectical process in which the religious heritage with its basic values is discarded and found again in a new way. Thirdly, surprising in Khatami’s presentation was his open way to promote a historical critical approach in studying religions and cultures. Religions as “the oldest human establishment” go through various changes and should not be understood as if they have taken their final form. As a believing Muslim he even said that “nobody can propose to have the absolute truth” (Khatami 1998).

It is important to listen to others to evaluate one’s own conviction and try to understand both, but this process of inter-religious learning cannot be reached in a cognitive way only. It requires a new approach of combining rational and productive imaginative thinking. Through his innovative way of commitment to a dialogue of cultures and religions, Khatami inspired international endeavours to promote mutual understanding. In the implementation of this process the Muslim organization of 51 States, ISESCO, has later played an important role. From the point of view of dialogue competence it was vital that Khatami took a negative stance towards declarations of one’s own religion as an ultimate, absolute truth. He let the door open for new ideas and mutual change of values, opinions and knowledge, without forgetting his Muslim faith.

**Dialogue towards complementarity of cultures**

ISESCO has promoted the dialogue among civilizations by arranging international meetings and publishing declarations. It has highlighted the readiness for dialogue of its 51 Muslim member states, which have had difficulties to communicate on the political level with western countries. The lists of participants have shown that not very many representatives from Western countries have participated in the conferences. However, the representatives of the UN and its organizations, such as UNESCO, have played an important role in the agenda of the conferences.

after the 11th September 2001 has been more critical towards the widening gap between the Islamic world and the western cultures.

In the emphasis of the process of dialogue the following changes have taken place. First, it was important to demonstrate the willingness of the Muslim states to dialogue and try to define the concept. In the history of international relations the initiatives of ISESCO to promote intercultural understanding - pointing out the role of religions and ethical values - will remain an important issue.

In the ISESCO conference in Tunis in 2001, a new aim for the dialogue was launched. Intercultural communication should promote understanding of the complementarity of cultures, which means willingness to give and get new cultural impulses (Heinonen 2001a). In the Frankfurt conference in 2003, the concept of complementarity was taken to the headline of the program: ”Dialogue among Civilizations and Cultures: Diversity within Complementarity”. By doing so, ISESCO put forward Khatami’s thinking that religions and cultures need interaction and they can help each other to develop their genuine ideas to better realization. Through this process Muslims can become better Muslims and Christians better Christians.

In the conference in Tunis in 2006, the concept of complementarity of cultures could be found also in the opening address of the Patron of the conference, the President of Tunis, Ben Ali. In accordance with the Rabat declaration of 2005, the Tunis conference 2006 pointed out the necessity to come forward to concrete deeds, such as ”alliance of civilizations” and intercultural co-operation. ”I also wish to commend, on this occasion, the role assumed by the United Nations and the specialized international and regional organizations, such as UNESCO, ISESCO and ALECSO, and their common endeavour to establish channels of communication and complementarity among all civilizations, cultures, religions and peoples” (Ben Ali 2006).

This was a new aim in the process, from willingness to dialogue to complementarity of cultures and again forwards to an ”alliance of civilizations”. The UN headquarters saluted this emphasis with a good response. The world organization has started an international evaluation of various attempts of dialogue to promote the alliance of civilizations. The task of chairing the process of assessment has been given to the former president of UNESCO, Federico Mayor. We can take the commitment of the UN to the process towards the alliance of civilizations to some extent as a success of the ISESCO endeavours. (See the Action

Appreciation of the UN of the dialogue conferences of ISESCO came out also in the speech of Federico Mayor in the Crans Montana Forum conference in Monte Carlo in June 2006. My impression was that he seemed to be aware of the development of the talks in ISESCO and about the emphasis on the concept of complementarity of cultures. It needs to be pointed out that this happened after the cartoon provocation of the Danish *Jyllands Posten*. ISESCO had sent an ultimatum to the Danish officials to apologize for the provocation, without a significant result. The theme of the conference in the Crans Montana Forum was oriented to this oppressive situation: "How to restore confidence and begin again the dialogue among civilizations". This theme can be interpreted as a cry for new dialogue competence.

**Cartoon provocation and the failure of the dialogue process**

On September 30, 2005 the *Jyllands Posten* published the now famous 12 cartoons of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. Based on his studies on the Danish refugee policy, Peter Hervik (2006) proposed that this kind of anti-Muslim writings were not a new issue in the Danish media: "For the Danish mass media such obvious provocation on part of Jyllands-Posten (JP) was not really newsworthy." It had published anti-Muslim contentions many times before.

Two things contributed to the sharpening of the conflict, however: the intensity of the reactions of the Muslim communities and the blunder of Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He refused to meet the 11 ambassadors representing half a billion Muslim people. Both reactions were predictable, writes Hervik. The Muslims felt that they were offended by blasphemy of their Holy Prophet. But the cartoons included also old, inherited European prejudices and accusations on Islam. (See *Die Welt* 1.2.2006; "Allah und der Humor", *Die ZEIT* 2.2.2006, p. 5; "Muhammed –bilderna sprids I europäisk press", *Hufvudstadsbladet* 2.2.2006, p.15; "Bilderna är hets mot folkgrupp", *Dagens Nyheter* 2.2.2006, p.10)

The reactions of Prime Minister Rasmussen reflect not only regrettable lacking diplomatic skills but perhaps also the anti-Muslim atmosphere of the government. What he seemingly did not envision, was the intensity
of the reactions of the international Muslim world, Ummah. Also ISESCO, which had been the mentor for international dialogue, urged the Muslim world to protest. In its communiqué from 3.2.2006, ISESCO expresses itself with unusual sharpness: "The Islamic Organization – ISESCO- calls on Muslim governments, organizations and peoples to adopt an active and solid stand to face this racist, spiteful onslaught and to take all measures necessary to defend the Prophet (PBUH), protect the sanctities of the Ummah, uphold its dignity and preserve its interests." (ISESCO Communiqué on the ongoing offence campaign against the Prophet Mohammed)

The message was sent also to UNESCO and UNICEF. The gap in understanding and respecting religious and cultural issues becomes obvious, when we compare this reaction to the thinking of Western commentators. "The Danish commentators looked at the cartoons themselves and argued that they could not see what the fuss was about. The images looked remarkably innocent to them." (Hervik 2006, p.1.) Their inability to imagine the functions of holy symbols released in the suspended international atmosphere the most serious crisis in Danish foreign policy since World War II (ibid.). The cartoon crisis highlights the importance of dialogue competence and shows how easily the issues of religions and cultures can turn to political and violent actions. For the sake of conflict prevention at home and abroad it is therefore important to identify the means of how to promote dialogue competence among religions, cultures and political worldviews.

**Cognitive preconditions of competence for dialogue**

Competence for dialogue cannot be defined with skills of diplomatic discourse, nor is it small talk or elegant manners with eloquence. It is many-dimensional interaction among individuals, which promotes both common and individual endeavours. It is some kind of readiness on the cognitive, affective and conative levels of culture for mutual exchange of knowledge, values and skills.

Dialogue has been defined as the opposite to monologue. In the Platonist tradition of philosophy, dialogue meant a form of discourse in which the answer to a central question (Socratic question) was sought in a dialectical way through reflecting the arguments of opposing partners of discourse. Asking today what dialogue as genuine interaction in discourse could be, we have to refer to the studies in the history of
cultures and religions by Gustav Mensching and Udo Tworuschka. They have defined rules and recommendations which promote the transformation of everyday one-dimensional interaction into a multi-dimensional dialogue.

When comparing religions and cultures, prejudices and lack of knowledge can come out in a very fateful manner, as we have seen in the cartoon provocation of the year 2006. Some common recommendations for the comparison of religions and cultures can be formulated as follows.

1. Religions and cultures should not be compared as entities by saying for instance that Muslims, Christians, Hindus are such and such. Generalizations create prejudices and hinder mutual open encountering.

2. Intra-cultural plurality must be noticed. There is sometimes great variation inside one religion or culture, depending on historical or local issues. This concerns also Christianity. The Catholic church is called *complexio oppositorum* - a unity of opposing factors.

3. The difference between a theoretical and practical religion should be noticed. It is not right to compare the practical decisions of a Muslim *sharia* court in a village to the noble principles of a Western theory of law. Practice should be compared with practice and theory with theory.

4. It is important to ask, what kind of phenomena belong to the primary and what to the secondary religiosity of a culture. How do we understand the debate on the right to wear the Muslim scarf? What kind of themes in the debate belong to primary issues of faith and what are secondary features created by cultural history?

In the comparison, the different phenomena should be assessed on the basis of the center of the religion. It has to be asked what is central in the religion and what this or that phenomenon means from the perspective of the wholeness. If there had been good will, knowledge and sensitivity to understand the very special role of the Prophet in the Muslim faith, the loss of human lives and economic disasters could have been spared.

In this connection, it is not necessary to speak about the over-reactions on the Muslim side, which were mainly caused by deep mistrust on Western cultures. When the Danish media justifies the publication of the cartoons as a test of "freedom of speech", we must ask whether there was any ability or readiness to understand what religious symbols mean.
The lack of awareness about what is central and less important in a religion contributed to the escalation of the conflict. In a multicultural society “religious literacy” is needed in order to understand the proportions of various features in religions and cultures. Vice versa, the religiously committed states should know how the secular man thinks and try to find out common values for the basis of interaction.

**How to develop skills for dialogue**

Meeting the so called fundamentalists, it is not difficult to realize that discussion can be carried out in a harmonious atmosphere only in issues of common agreement. Every differing point is a threat for a break-up of the human relationship and contact. Naturally, the characters of the partners play a role in communication. Often the debate culminates in controversy about the meaning of a concept which both partners know but understand in different ways. This often means that the concept is symbolized in different levels of abstraction. The differences on symbolizing “jihad” or “holy land” create huge practical consequences. To understand on which level the partner symbolizes the concept, we need a symbol theory. In order to identify the levels of abstraction, I will use here a model derived from the religious and psychological studies of James Fowler and the symbol theoretical pedagogy of Peter Biehl. Especially the analysis of religious language and its symbolic functions made by Biehl helps us to construct the stages of abstraction which can be identified in the discourse.

On the first - the magic-numenic – level, the world of symbols is perceived as reality. Usually this level is experienced in our culture before the school age. The picture of a thing is taken as seriously as the object itself. But we can meet the same phenomenon also in the world of adults. When we react on this level, the picture of Ayatollah Khomeini, to some, symbolizes Islamic revolution. Many taboos are based on this level. Also a name or a word can be understood as taboo. The ancient Romans used to say *de mortuis nihil nisi bene* - speak only good things about the departed. Many euphemisms have been created to avoid words and associations related to death. There may be magic thinking and fear behind this, arisen from the impression that unworthy using of the word brings the thing itself to the space.

The representative function of a symbol is greatest on this level. If the Danish caricaturists had been able to imagine that the picture of Prophet Muhammad does not only refer to the Islam, but represents the Islam
as a reality, they would have reflected on the publication more seriously. On this level the discussion is usually blocked by question: either you accept my interpretation of the symbol or I do not accept any of your proposals. This kind of communication is called "communivation of survival" in the typology of Karl Jaspers.

In the cartoon crisis, the reactions of the Western media and politicians showed in some countries that there was neither ability nor willingness to understand the seriousness of the representative function of a symbol on the magic-numenic -level. The result today is that we hear voices saying: do not give in to the Muslims. The consequences to the co-existence of cultures can then be as the redactor-in-chief of the newspaper *Jyllands Posten*, Carsten, hypocritically says: "The integration is perhaps impossible" (*Dagens Nyheter* 2.2.2006, p. 8-9.) On the level of political decision making, this kind of communication of survival leads to a "law of jungle". It means more or less violent conflicts according to the Hobbesian "power principle".

On the second - *fundamentalistic* – one-dimensional level the text and words are understood word by word in their lexical meaning. In a non-religious society "heaven" loses its religious, multi-dimensional meaning and can be understood only as space. When Juri Gagarin, the first Soviet cosmonaut, returned home, he was asked if he saw God in heaven. On the religious side, the creationist attempt to harmonize the creation of the Genesis with the knowledge of natural science belongs to the same level of symbolizing. One has to wonder how some people use holy texts to urge people to violent actions. Also in the training camps of Al–Quida it is recommended to read the Koran. This is only possible when some sentences are separated from the wholeness of the book and then interpreted in a fundamentalist way as direct orders for action.

On the third - *trivial symbolic* – level, religious symbols are interpreted in a traditional way, depending upon the cultural heritage in question. Within the Christian culture, "the way" has a different meaning than in Taoism or Buddhism. The specific meaning of the symbol is primary and not so much its average meaning as a human aspiration and endeavour to spiritual self-cultivation.

On the fourth - *symbol-critical* - level the symbol itself is not as important as the phenomenon to which it refers. Its representative function has diminished and its referring function is greatest on this level. On this level it is possible to understand that religious and cultural symbols have very much in common. The difficulties on this level rise from the
very general way of seeing religious cultures, and thus the differences are no longer clear. There is a threat of seeing the world in a syncretistic and superficially unifying manner.

The positive effect of the symbol-critical interpretation is that the unifying elements among religions and cultures can be discerned, which is usually much more difficult than to perceive the separating ones. On this level the "great jihad" of Koran as self-cultivation to spiritual aims can be found also in the other great religions.

On the fifth - *post-critical, multi-dimensional* – level, both the common and differing features of the symbol are realized. The representative and referring function of the symbol are realized. The symbol is understood as representing something and also referring to something. Genuine dialogue is possible on this level. It is based on mutual understanding about what is common and what is different e.g. in the symbols "way", "water", "hand" and "heaven". On this level it is possible to envision that the world’s religions and cultures can reciprocally enrich each other. They establish a unity in diversity. In conflict management it is most important to be aware that under the surface of various twists on concrete issues, there is the post-critical-level of symbolizing, doctrinal areas which combine rather than separate religions and cultures. The ability to find out such symbols belong to cognitive dialogue competence.

**Finding the same wavelength**

Making comparisons of cultures and religions on the basis of texts in newspapers may produce confusing results. From one point of view all modern cultures and religions seem to be quite different, with no similarities. From another point of view they seem to be almost equal. In the first case nothing connect the cultures and religions, in the second case no deeper discussion is necessary, because everything seems to be equal. In both cases there is no fruitful basis for a common discourse and interaction. In the first case the difference creates an alienating reaction. The unknown behaviour will be interpreted as a negative, perhaps threatening reaction. So e.g. the habit of Iranian women of not shaking hands with men can be interpreted as pride. Concerning the second case in which everything seems to be equal in the compared cultures and religions, the astonishment will be great when the first conflicts of values reveal the real differences.

Dialogical discourse cannot emerge only through knowledge and
communication skills, because the ethos from which communication is derived is vital. It needs some deeper based values and moral principles and free innovations about what is right and wrong, i.e. morality.

After the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the international community sought for a new basis for peaceful interaction of nations. Irrespective of good promises, the globalization process promoted a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. Quite correctly, the Rio Janeiro Summit for the Environment in 1992 pointed out the vital role of a new ethical orientation of states and individuals. Without commitment to a re-evaluation of the basic values guiding international politics and cultural development, no real change in the threatening eco-catastrophe and disastrous future will happen. From that time the global ethic discourse developed on the level of NGOs (Non-governmental organisations) in five waves in the 1990s.

To the first wave belongs the global ethic declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago in 1993. More than six thousand unofficial representatives of different religions took part in the conference. The declaration including norms, moral principles and recommendations was undersigned by well-known personalities, for instance from Finland the former Archbishop Mikko Juva and the then Under-Secretary of State, Martti Ahtisaari. The aim of the declaration was to show that in the tradition of religions and cultures there already exist relevant common moral codes. The golden rule pointing out the reciprocity of moral behaviour is written in the Bible “Whatever you wish that others do to you, do so to them - this is the sum of (God’s) law, and (the teaching of) the prophets.” In Buddhism this is formulated as follows: “Treat all creatures as you would like to be treated.” The same in Islam: “No one of you is a believer, until you desire for your neighbour that which you desire for yourself.”

In the second wave in 1993-95, the assessment of the declaration took place. It was positively supported by intellectuals in politics and religions. In the third wave in 1995-97, international organizations like the World Economic Forum, IAC (InterAction Council), UNESCO and others adopted the main ideas of the declaration. In the fourth wave in 1995-2000, the foundations for Global Ethic were established in Tübingen, Zurich, Amsterdam and Prague to support the intercultural dialogue. In the fifth wave in 2001, the UN began to highlight the necessity of global ethic for taming the negative effects of globalization. The year 2001 was nominated as the year of ”Dialogue among Civilizations”,
and the book "Crossing the Divide" came out. The book was initiated by the Secretary General Kofi Annan with co-writers from various cultures and every continent. The dedication of the book was as follows: "To the innocents who lost their lives because their only fault was to be different from their murderers."

The necessity of global ethic was not only pointed out in this book but also in some UN-organizations. E.g. ILO, the labour organization of the UN, stressed its meaning by writing in its report in 2004 that globalization needs "an ethical frame of reference". What does this mean from the point of view of dialogue competence? Firstly, in conflict resolution the ethical atmosphere in which the talks are carried out is important. No promises can convince the partners, if they have a distrust of the aims of others. On the other hand, if the partners can present the ethical principles they are committed to in praxis, small symbols of fairness are enough to bring the discourse towards a positive solution.

Is it valid to say that ethical fairness and commitment to global ethic belong to dialogue competence? Are we, vice versa, used to thinking that just clever Machiavellist negotiators are the best, and the ethically committed persons represent unrealistic naivety, which has no chance of being taken in earnest?

One of the most encouraging successes of a dialogue process among fighting partners in a society divided by apartheid politics is to be found in the Truth and Reconciliation process of South Africa. In his book "No Future without Forgiveness" the leader of the process, Archbishop Desmond Tutu describes the great change of his society: "It is quite incredible the capacity people have shown to be magnanimous - refusing to be consumed by bitterness and hatred, willing to meet with those who have violated their persons and their rights, willing to meet in a spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation, eager only to know the truth, to know the perpetrator so that they could forgive them."(Tutu 1999, 120.)

References


Human Security and the Military in the 21st Century

Dan Henk

Introduction

The 21st Century is ripe with potential for new ideas about human conflict and about the roles and responsibilities of those who participate in it. The new thinking may well relate to military establishments, whose traditional role in the West in modern times has been to apply lethal violence on behalf of nation-states. More precisely, military establishments have provided national leaders with options for applying state-sanctioned coercion in a disciplined and controlled way to achieve particular purposes. Clausewitz captured this succinctly in his oft-quoted dictum that war is “simply the continuation of [political] policy with the admixture of other means.” In the early 21st Century his thinking still resonated with military professionals, as did his implicit admonition that the appropriate role of military forces is either to destroy a military adversary or to compel him to accept undesired conditions.1

A simplified Clausewitzian formula is attractive to modern military professionals, increasingly uneasy about professional overreach. But governments have long used military establishments for purposes other than applying or threatening lethal violence. This certainly is true of the United States, whose military since the 19th Century has played a key part in building national (or international) infrastructure, assisting authorities in restoring order local communities, governing aboriginal populations, administering conquered territories or conquering disease, to name just a few non-lethal roles. By the early years of the 21st Century, few military establishments had the luxury of confining their focus exclusively to the management or application of violence.

That is not to discredit Clausewitz. The 19th century produced a rich crop of European thinkers who deserve credit for efforts to place conflict

and the role of the military within a broad theoretical framework for examination. These theorists were not the first in the field. They followed a rich Western tradition with roots in the classical scholarship of Thucydides, Caesar and Tacitus. Conflict and those who engage in it comprise an essential dimension in the experience of the human race, and made an unmistakably key contribution to the development of modern European states. Fort its part, theory is important to an understanding of that dimension of human experience. It helps answer key questions about ends, ways and means, about accountability and norms of appropriate behaviour, and about the stewardship of public resources.

It could reasonably be expected that profound analyses of war and the military would thrive after the likes of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan and their 19th Century contemporaries. A number of gifted military theorists did indeed emerge in the following century. Regrettably, however, the early years of the 21st Century had yet to produce an equivalent to Clausewitz, successful in capturing the nature and expectation of military activities of a radically new era. A variety of factors were fundamentally altering global thinking about the role of the state, the roles of coercive institutions and the roles of non-state actors. Perhaps the processes of change were so rapid that theory could not keep pace. Still, the utility of a compelling new body of theory to explain the phenomena of modern conflict seemed obvious. If a widely endorsed theory were to emerge to suit the spirit of the times, much of it probably would deal with the concept of “security” and with evolving notions of who (or what) should provide it.

The basis for such a theory may be emerging. Since its popularization by the United Nations in the early 1990s, “human security” has become a concept with significant implications for national policymakers. Its key attraction has been an implicit answer to many of the seemingly intractable problems of conflict that plagued mankind at the beginning of the 21st Century. Several countries have made it a foundation of their foreign policy. The European Union has embraced it as a basis for regional engagement with the rest of the world. It infuses the thinking of civil servants found in the new Africa Union and many of the governments of East and Southeast Asia. Scholars, intellectuals, development experts and humanitarian organizations have endorsed it.

2 This brings to mind the famous dictum of (Prussian King) Frederick the Great that “states make war and war makes states.”

Yet despite a growing global interest, human security remained a controversial idea in 2007. Its proponents disagreed profoundly on its definition and details. Some favoured a broad, inclusive view in which human security required the attenuation of a wide range of threats to the wellbeing of individuals and communities. Others adhered to a more austere, narrow view, in which it consisted mainly of the attenuation of the threat of physical violence. However defined, human security resonated with certain philosophical and cultural traditions more than others. Critics questioned the motives of its advocates, seeing it as a threat to valued national sovereignty, dismissing it as naive utopianism, or suspecting a sinister intent to divert scarce public resources. One of its most widely disparaged aspects was the difficulty of "operationalizing" it – translating complex, ambitious (and sometimes conflicting) components into policy that mobilizes institutions, instruments and sectors.

In the West, human security seemed particularly at odds with the most carefully nurtured instruments of state power. Almost by definition, it directed attention away from the traditional "security" institutions of the state – military, police and intelligence – and towards those that promote the development, opportunity and wellbeing of local communities or even individual citizens. Agencies that advance human rights and economic development take precedence in its programs. Agencies that manage the state's putative "monopoly on violence" do not appear to have much of a role; hence, adoption of a robust, broad human security agenda raises questions about the relevance of a state's coercive agencies. Yet despite the seeming discontinuity between human security and military establishments, the new security paradigm may actually offer a remarkable opportunity to rethink military roles and missions in the light of contemporary global security problems. The focus of this chapter is how to frame an argument that military establishments are suited to explicitly human security ends.

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What is “Human Security”?  

The end of the Cold War unleashed a debate that had been growing for years by scholars and practitioners increasingly dissatisfied with traditional conceptualizations of “security.” Earlier thinking had tended to limit the domain to the “threat, use and control of military force” in the context of state-centered international competition. But by the late 1970s, scholars had begun to contest the notion that the state should be the referent object and were arguing that conventional approaches failed to capture the reality of a proliferating cast of global actors and circumstances posing a variety of threats to individual human beings or local communities. These views gained an increasing following through the 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the new thinking began to take hold amongst policymakers.

The new approaches achieved unprecedented visibility in 1993, with the publication of the United Nations Development Program’s annual Human Development Report. This document promulgated the “human security” formula, a phrase given even a sharper definition in the following year’s report. Though it remained controversial and subject to varying definition, the “human security” paradigm subsequently became a benchmark for the broader visions among emerging new models of “security,” so it is appropriate to briefly review how this concept was framed by the UN. The 1994 document castigated the inadequacies of earlier thinking on the subject:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary

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In contrast to this purportedly discredited older thinking, the UN offered a new approach, calling it "human security" and portraying it as a people-centered (rather than state-centered). Its most basic components were freedom from fear and freedom from want. This kind of security offered safety from chronic threats like hunger, disease and political repression as well as "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life." According to the UNDP, the new model required two levels of urgent change by the societies of the world: "from exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security. . .[and] from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development." The breadth of the UN concept spread even further and by 2003 its Commission on Human Security added a concern for populations on the move and extended the paradigm to include the importance of providing adequate conditions of "knowledge."14

The nation-state was clearly the key source of security in earlier, mainstream conceptualizations, though with the widespread recognition that the state also could be a signal source of insecurity.15 The UN's new human security formula significantly altered this model. As it was now conceived, security was vastly more complex in detail; the threats were much broader, more diffuse and more intractable. Responsibility for it could not realistically be relegated to the public sector of nation states, which egregiously lacked the means to guarantee it even in the developed nations. Most of the literature (including the original UNDP formulation) characterized human security as a "global" problem requiring a "global" solution.16 Achievement of human security was almost by definition a collaborative effort involving the individual citizen as an active player but also including contributions of civil society groups, the private sector, non-governmental and international organizations, and governments of nation-states.17

12 Ibid, 22.
The 1994 UN document argued that achievement of human security required the mitigation of a wide range of threats to people. These could be categorized into the separate sub domains of: 18

- Economic security that assured every individual a minimum requisite income, alleviating the threat of poverty
- Food security that guaranteed "physical and economic access to basic food," alleviating the threats of hunger and famine
- Health security that guaranteed a minimum protection from illness and unhealthy lifestyles, alleviating the threats of disease and injury
- Environmental security that protected people from the short and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature and deterioration of the natural environment, alleviating the threats of resource scarcity, pollution and environmental decay
- Personal security that protected people from physical violence, whether from the state, from external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, from predatory adults or even from the individual himself/herself (as in protection from suicide)
- Community security that protected people from loss of traditional relationships and cultural values and from sectarian and ethnic violence, alleviating threats to cherished traditional values and a community's loss of control over its own destiny
- Political security that assured that people could "live in a society that honors their basic human rights," alleviating the threat of political repression.

One of the most profound novelties in the UNDP formula was the shift in responsibility. This kind of security could not be imposed by the state. Nor could it be donated by the state. It was available only through a genuine, synergistic partnership between civil society and the public sector. Much of the associated literature tended to emphasize the importance of poverty alleviation. Yet even the most austere visions of "human security" required an attenuation of violence that depended, in turn, on an interconnected combination of material, social and emotional wellbeing for individuals within and among human societies, circumstances that demanded more than mere economic opportunity.

While the publication of the UN formula in 1993 was a dramatic development, the new thinking did not appear out of whole cloth: it simply followed and (to a degree) institutionalized a perspective that already had been widely debated in the scholarly literature. Nor did
the UN endorsement of this paradigm ended the debates about security. In the UN conceptualization, human security was the dominant security paradigm—it was to take precedence over any other kind of "security." But not all proponents of the broad new definitions agreed with this prioritization or with the UN taxonomy of the component parts. Some, like the Canadians and Norwegians were inclined to a much narrower view of the content or tended to accord "national security" an equivalent status. Security continued to be a contested concept.¹⁹ Still, the UN backing was a powerful encouragement to supporters. Secretary General Kofi Annan was a particularly vigorous advocate. His tenure as Secretary General saw the institution of a UN Human Security Commission and ended with the concept firmly embedded in the formal structures of the world body.²⁰

The UN was not the only organization that embraced the new formula. In 1999, a group of countries along with scholars and policy advocates launched the Human Security Network, supporting its agenda with annual ministerial-level meetings. By 2007, the Network included twelve countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia and Thailand. South Africa was participating as an "observer." The Human Security Network saw itself as an "informal, flexible" mechanism for "collective action," bringing "international attention to new and emerging issues." It sought to apply a "human security perspective" to "energize political processes aimed at preventing or solving conflicts and promoting peace and development." It involved itself in a variety of international issues, including campaigns to eliminate landmines, control the flows of small arms, establish the


International Criminal Court, offer human rights education and human rights law, fight international crime, and find solutions to the epidemic of HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{21}

While the Human Security Network became a significant actor in its own right, many of its participating countries also had demonstrated an active unilateral commitment to the new paradigm. One of the earliest was South Africa, seeking to redefine its own security in the wake of majority rule in 1994.\textsuperscript{22} Several years later, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi endeavoured to make human security the defining characteristic of Japanese foreign policy, instituting in 1998 a “Trust Fund for Human Security” in the UN Secretariat and funding it generously. The Japanese approach tended to the broader end of the human security definitional spectrum.\textsuperscript{23} By 2000, Canada also had made “human security” the foundation of its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{24} Canadian diplomatic effort and foreign aid was backing the new emphasis with significant national resources. The Canadian model tended toward the narrow end of the concept.\textsuperscript{25} Other countries, ranging from Austria to Switzerland selected an approach and followed suit.

The new paradigm received still another ringing endorsement in September 2004, when the European Union published the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe.” The doctrine would consist of three key elements: a list of seven principles for operations in conditions of severe humanitarian emergencies, a response force, and a legal framework for intervention and operations in humanitarian crisis situations.\textsuperscript{26} A notable feature was the proposal for a “human security [crisis] response force” to be composed mainly of civilian specialists skilled

\textsuperscript{24} Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), 5.
\textsuperscript{25} See <http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca> 1 August 2005.
in conflict prevention and social reconstruction. Even the small military component would be heavily imbued with a human security ethic. While it still was too early in 2007 to anticipate the implementation of these proposals, the ideas had begun to resonate powerfully among intellectuals and policymakers in Western Europe.27 The Europeans clearly were looking at the world – and their role in it – in a significantly new way.28

“Operationalizing” Human Security

The concept of human security has been attacked on a number of points, including the differing conceptualizations of the model. But regardless of how it is defined, the most serious difficulty has been methodological – how to “operationalize” it. Even its most ardent proponents recognized the dilemma, one describing the concept’s key deficiency as “its tendency to remain a normative vision rather than a practical policy tool.”29 A pressing question was not “is it desirable?” but rather, “is it feasible, and if so, how can it be implemented?” That still may be the wrong question. The “human security” paradigm describes a desirable alternative future, so its proponents may be justified in promoting it as a viable strategic end in itself. But the concept is much more useful as a mechanism to illuminate the ways and means to an end rather than a specification of the end.

Following this logic, human security (at least its broader definitions) provides two things: an overarching theoretical framework for action and the stepping stones along the route to something like community contentment or social peace. A human security framework may thus be particularly useful if it can be wielded as a tool to uncover the problems that must be fixed before a society could reasonably expect social contentment and peace. Its particular role would be justify a course of action, then to call attention to a destabilizing lack of adequate “security” in one or more of the component domains. In this conceptualization, the new paradigm serves more as a rationale and an analytic device than an ultimate “end” in itself.30

27 For details on emerging European thinking on this topic, see <www.iss.eu.org> 1 August 2005.
Again following this logic, "operationalization" refers less to the achievement of human security than to the ways in which a particular government, a national security establishment, or even an international community of actors, rearranged its structures, operating principles and organizational behavior to pursue human security objectives. Put another way, the question would revolve around how organizational culture – belief and behavior - were different because of the institutional embrace of human security values.

Within this definition, it should be possible to distinguish several levels of "operationalization." One dimension is the degree to which a regional organization or national government committed itself to the concept – manifested in policy at the strategic level. Even at this level, an interesting distinction within a state would be whether a government's initiatives were largely internal to the country or external to it; in other words, relevant to domestic or foreign policy (or both). In developed countries like Canada, Japan and Norway human security values resonate strongly with the attentive public and national leaders and the societies as a whole enjoyed a high level community contentment and social peace long before the national leaders embraced a self-conscious human security agenda in the 1990s.

In these developed nations, the "operationalization" of human security may be much more evident in foreign than in domestic policy, reflected in an explicitly human development complexion to the country’s foreign aid programs, or in the country’s willingness to engage in international humanitarian relief and peace support operations. On the other hand, in a developing nation, achievement of human security may well be a pressing internal priority, and conceivably could be manifested in both domestic and foreign policy, with primary emphasis on the former.

Another important distinction is the way institutions and agencies of the state, including the coercive agencies, "sign on" to human security values and are willing to make the necessary changes to accommodate a human security agenda. Analysis at this "organizational" level would seek out indications that the institutional culture and behavior have changed in order to promote human development. Adjustments of behavior may be evident (for instance) in organizational training programs and espoused values (codes of conduct, core values, organization vision). Still another level of analysis would be the degree to which individual members of society internalized the new values that supported a human security agenda.
Each of these levels is significant in its own right. In cases where a country’s policymakers considered "human security" to be a strategic end-state (a desirable alternative future) the national political practice could reasonably be expected to reflect both a philosophical commitment and some implementing activity by government agencies in partnership with civil-society actors. However, it is entirely possible that a country’s senior leadership were rhetorically committed to a human security agenda yet without much implementing capacity or impact on the behavior of state institutions, and without much "buy-in" by either the lower-level civil servants or the attentive public.

Regardless of how it has otherwise been "operationalized," the human security concept could be credited with several signal achievements by 2007. It had moved the notion of "security" – with its implicit demand for priority of attention – to the forefront of international discourse and out of the dusty halls of academe, classrooms of war colleges and back rooms of national government. It endowed the broadened new concept with a meaning relevant the everyday lives of non-elites, particularly those in circumstances of crisis and want. It furnished the international community a "wedge for opening sensitive debates on humanitarian intervention and the responsibilities of sovereign states to protect their civilian populations." More than that, it called attention to the putative responsibilities of an international community in circumstances of state failure and egregious human suffering. Human security was now a conceptual toolkit wielded by a variety of different actors, providing some common agreements on responsibilities to attenuate humanitarian tragedy and a sketchy roadmap showing how it could be addressed.31

Reviewing Some Objections

The broadened definitions of "security" – including the "human security" paradigm – have been challenged on a number of conceptual and methodological grounds.32 While there is general agreement among its proponents that protection from the threat of violence is a core feature, even the limits of that protection are still contested.33 Scholars also

31 Muggah and Krause, "A True Measure of Success?," 129.
33 Muggah and Krause, "True Measure of Success?," 129-130.
have argued that its extension to a wide variety of social and environmental phenomena runs a risk of rendering it so all-inclusive that it becomes largely meaningless as an analytical tool. If every human problem is a “security” issue, so the argument goes, how will it be possible to identify, categorize and prioritize what truly must be protected? Put differently, must every human quandary be elevated to the same level of concern? Another conceptual objection to the broader human security visions is the difficulty in drawing clear logical connections between and within the component parts. For instance, it does not necessarily follow that “community security” preserving traditional values is compatible with “political security” that guarantees individual human rights, or that sustainable economic development is compatible with attenuation of ecological degradation or that “economic security” can resolve competing pressures for autarky on one hand and international economic interdependence on the other.

The methodological problem is compounded by the failure of the paradigm to achieve preeminence over competing conceptions of “security,” particularly “state security.” The broad human security model, by its very nature, lays claims to predominance and sets an agenda in which traditional criteria of national security play a minor supporting role. This is very evident in the arguments of some scholars such as Swatuk and Vale, who attribute insecurity in southern Africa largely to the “Westphalian state form” and whose conception of human security requires a diminution, deconstruction and demystification of state sovereignty. Even in cases where human security and national security are considered “complementary” as in Canada, it seems likely that the coexistence is explained more by efforts to placate a national security constituency than by any real compatibility of the two concepts. Ultimately, one model or the other will dominate attention and command a preponderance of available energy and resources.

Like all models, human security has its limits. Despite the enthusiasms of some of its supporters, it cannot possibly be a panacea for all the seemingly intractable crises and conflicts of the contemporary world, even assuming a wider consensus on its definition. But it can play a particularly useful role in identifying and clarifying the key variables at play. And this is its important contribution. The international community is engaged in a number of difficult efforts to guide war-ravaged societies from conflict and discord to peace and stability. Military leaders frequently find themselves participating in efforts to rebuild societies fractured by war or humanitarian crisis. Here, the broader notions of human security would seem to be sources of insight.

**The Potential**

So how can human security apply to the military? A simple answer to this question could be generalized to any organization, military or non-military. The paradigm provides an overarching theoretical framework that explains and rationalizes behaviour. It also provides a practical guide to action – a mechanism for strategy, helping to identify, ways and means. But there is a more particular applicability to military organizations. Twenty-first century military leaders confronted problems for which human security seemed to offer particularly apt answers. These problems included the inadequacy of the Western concepts of Just War, and the prospect that human security could help redefine those concepts to better fit the international environment. They included the problems inherent in bringing together multiple, mutually-suspicious actors in attempts to forge a coherent approach to the difficult dilemmas of fractured societies. Then there was the quandary of defining the specific roles that military forces could best play in circumstances of community strife or complex humanitarian crisis. Each of these potentialities warrants a brief comment.

In the early 21st Century, the Western scholarly tradition included a robust – if controversial and oft ignored – body of thinking about “just war” including both the rationale for resort to war (ius ad bellum) and the specification of right conduct during war (ius in bello). These traditions were strongly rooted in Western Christian thought, and authorities like Augustine, Aquinas and Grotius still were widely cited. Since the latter 19th Century this earlier Just War doctrine had been supplemented with a growing body of international agreements and legal precedents. As the dominant world political and military powers in modern times, European nations were largely instrumental in defining
"just war," establishing the precedents in international law, and dictating the criteria of the "international" rules of armed conflict. Perhaps not surprisingly, they have defined it largely in terms of well organized western-style states and conventional military operations and forces.

In the post-Cold War world, the limits of the Western model became increasingly evident in the ambiguous conflicts and proliferating cast participants. Here, the environment was populated by military (or paramilitary) forces, "security" consultants, well-armed criminals, freelance ideological warriors and other "non traditional" military actors. The limits were further obscured by increasing resort to coercive power short of actual war, challenging the assumptions on which a traditional doctrine of *ius ad bellum* could rest.

Because it does not rely on such a strongly Western cultural base and rejects the notion of a state monopoly on violence, human security offers a possible conceptual bridge to a reformulation of "just war" and a more universally respected criterion for determining the legitimacy of combatants, the limits of acceptable conflict behaviour and appropriate responses by the international community to violations. This implies the accountability of policy makers, military planners and combatants to an emerging new concept of Just War built around agreement on a criterion for resort to violence. Such a criterion could contain any number of provisions, but one might be a proscription on any course of action that clearly threatened to undermine the long-term human security of a significant population. Both the Barcelona Report and the Rome Statute offer concepts and institutions with some potential for endowing the international community with a future ability to establish and enforce an emerging criterion of Just War accountability.40

The opportunity to refine international perspectives on "just war" may be an advantage of human security thinking, particularly in specifying the limits of just cause, discrimination and proportionality. However, the broader visions of the new paradigm may be equally significant as a mechanism for guiding military operations once they are initiated. The simple truth is that military establishments in the early 21st Century were heavily engaged in human security-related activities. They were charged with wide range of non-combat roles, including humanitarian relief, attenuation of health threats, support to national education programs, assistance to law enforcement and protection of the

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environment. Perhaps this was an inevitable consequence of the fact that the military often was the only public sector institution with the resources required for the expensive efforts required to address public calamity. However, militaries had other advantages as well. They were fairly unique within state public sectors for their ability to recruit and train leaders capable of managing very complex, large-scale endeavors. They also could apply the single-minded discipline and dedication to mission accomplishment that most other state agencies could not match. Whether mitigating the effects of hurricanes in the southern United States, earthquakes in Pakistan, tsunamis in the Indian Ocean, floods in Mozambique or guaranteeing peace agreements in Sudan, the military was the agency of choice for managing the effort.

A rapid expansion of military roles and missions to accommodate humanitarian concerns has been a world-wide phenomenon since the latter part of the 20th Century. The United States Army went through a particularly dramatic metamorphosis over the course of a decade. In the mid 1990s, it still had a Chief of Staff who insisted that the exclusive role of its Regular Army was to "fight and win the nation's wars." By late 2006, with the hard experience of years of anti-insurgent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Army published its new field manual on counterinsurgency operations – a capstone summary of the Army's most pressing operational concerns and its most concerted thinking about expected roles. This document was profoundly informed by human security perspectives. Its introduction bluntly notified a military readership that it now would be obliged to acquire proficiency in subjects like "economic development, public administration and the rule of law." The American military had discovered human security, although it did not seem to know quite what to call it.

It is precisely in the contexts of conflict and humanitarian catastrophe that the human security paradigm may be most useful, at least in its broader iterations. It provides a vision of a desirable alternative future to guide collective effort. At the same time it offers a useful taxonomy of what must be repaired, reconstructed or established to achieve that desirable future. It calls attention to the limits of military capability and provides a conceptual framework for the collaborative roles of civil society actors, scholars, international organizations, other government agencies and the military.

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41 US Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, x.
The broader conceptualizations of the human security paradigm seem particularly to promise answers to the common pathologies of failing and failed states.42 They call attention to the necessity for a coordinated approach by multiple actors. They focus attention on present and future threats. They can be used to initiate efforts to develop public sector redistributive capacity, private sector employment opportunity, and civil society safety-net infrastructure, and helpfully call attention to the importance of complementary development of justice protocols, with provision for law enforcement, administration of justice, reinforcement of contract law and protection of basic human rights. While all this is happening, they require the protection of persons and fragile infrastructure from violence. The paradigm bolsters the argument that uncoordinated, sporadic and incremental efforts often are largely ineffective at attenuating perceived deprivation and producing meaningful security in the long run. It has fallen to military leaders to mediate many of these efforts in the early years of the 21st Century.

**Linking the Formerly “Un-linkable”**

One of the most important attributes of the human security paradigm is its potential for establishing and rationalizing the collaborative efforts of very different actors. If a military organization pursues a deliberate human security agenda, it will be obliged to surrender pride of place to very dissimilar partners, including actors from civil society, humanitarian organizations and subject matter experts from academe. These are likely to harbour suspicions of their new military partners. In the recent past such suspicion has been nowhere more evident than in communities of behavioural scientists in the United States, and no single discipline has borne this suspicion more profoundly than the field of Anthropology. The antipathy is significant and most unfortunate. Anthropologists often are the best source for the nuanced understandings of foreign societies required for effective programs of cross-cultural communication and collaboration, understandings desperately required by military organizations seeking to attenuate the traumas of complex humanitarian emergencies.

Behavioral scientists had an ambivalent and troubled relationship with the US government in the 20th century. In 2007 American anthropologists were still conflicted over the contribution of some their colleagues to the Allied war effort in World War II. Their discipline's

42 Scholars have begun to measure the actual degree to which deliberate efforts informed by human security can impact the problems of failed states, see Muggah and Krause, “A True Measure of Success,” op. cit.
ambivalence had given way to profound alienation during the Cold War, and especially during the 1960s and early 1970s, when intelligence agencies allegedly hijacked the expertise of unwitting scholars to destabilize countries deemed unfriendly to the United States. By the mid 1970s, anthropologists in North America were making considerable effort in their professional literature, assemblies and educational institutions to discourage their colleagues from government involvements, particularly those with military or intelligence agencies. Though emotions cooled after the Viet Nam conflict, the basic inclination continued into the early years of the 21st Century and seemed re-energized by US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq after September 2001.

Issues of ethics and ends lie at the heart of this fractured relationship. Agencies of the US government have at times been guilty of acts that scholars find reprehensible, and the Viet Nam era saw a shattering of any common propensity by American intellectuals to trust the good intentions of their country’s senior political authorities. In 2007 some of the attitudes toward the military within American academe still seemed anchored in the stereotypes of the Viet Nam anti-war movement. Few American anthropologists were serving in military or intelligence agencies. Interestingly, these broken relations were not replicated in Europe, where behavioral scientists worked productively with military officials in countries like Germany or Sweden. However, the ubiquity of the American military (and its leading role in coalition contingency operations throughout the world) gave the rift between America’s scholars and soldiers an unfortunate world-wide impact.

The antipathy between the US government and the American behavioural science communities is one impediment to a productive collaboration. But another has been the failure of both to embrace the human security

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43 For related perspectives, see Irving L. Horowitz (Editor), The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics, Revised Edition (MIT Press, 1967); and The Use and Abuse of Social Science: Behavioral Research and Policy Making (Transaction, 1975).
46 See Christopher H. Varhola, “Commentary. The U.S Military in Iraq: Are We Our Own Worst Enemy, Practicing Anthropology 26, no. 4 (Fall 2004), 39-42. Varhola is a US Army reserve officer and anthropologist with extensive combat experience.
concept. By 2007 the new paradigm had resonated strongly in some scholarly communities, among humanitarian activists and amongst policy makers and behavioural scientists in Europe, but it had not been a particular interest of North American behavioural scientists, whose professional literature had paid it scant attention. Nor had human security been particularly attractive to US policymakers. Ironically, the most energetic and well-resourced group of Americans pursuing human security objectives was the country’s military.

The senior American generals who oversaw America’s combatant commands had few illusions about the importance of broad partnerships or about the importance of avoiding, resolving and attenuating regional conflict. Their headquarters resembled military mini-United Nations and they devoted enormous effort to cultivating foreign political and military leaders and humanitarian organizations operating in their areas of responsibility. They had good reason to do so. Virtually all their operations were coalition operations in circumstances of complex, humanitarian crises, and these posed the predictable challenges of differing national agendas and difficult cross-cultural communications along with the necessity to execute operations in culturally complex environments on short notice. Delivering aid, reconstituting infrastructure, rebuilding civil society and restoring basic order were every bit as prominent as application of violence. The attenuation of causes of conflict had become as important as the capacity to engage in it. These new roles posed the significant challenges of communication and collaboration across profound cultural boundaries.47 For the American military in the post Cold War world, it had produced a host of new partnerships that severely stretched the bounds of the art of the possible.48

In 2007, members of the US military were acutely aware of their need for a robust set of conceptual tools that would enable them to collaborate effectively with foreign civil societies.49 They were reaching out for 48 This was recognized as early as the Clinton Administration, which issued a Presidential Decision Directive in 1997 ordering the US Combatant Commands to develop working relationships with the international and non-governmental relief organizations. PDD/NSC 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," May 1997, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm
help. Here is where the human security paradigm could offer an important bridge between the behavioural scientists and the military in the United States. Although neither has paid it much heed, it comes close to defining what members of both currently care about most deeply. It especially is worth a substantial exploration in the thinking and debates of anthropologists and military professionals. Human security could serve as the inspiration for a new relationship that benefits a world community in ways none would previously have thought possible.

**Examples of a Military Human Security Agenda**

In pursuing its part of the Global War on Terror, the US military in 2007 may have been stumbling its way into an operationalization of a human security in its overseas engagements, whether "stability operations" in Iraq and Afghanistan or foreign internal development in the Horn of Africa. But the American political elite had not endorsed the concept or shown it much sympathy. A question immediately arises: what are the implications if a country actually adopts and implements a human security agenda relevant to its military? Put a different way, would a military establishment be fundamentally different in ethos, structure or usage if the country were thoroughly committed to human security in its domestic and foreign policies? Given the very wide range of variables that might inform an answer, it probably is dangerous to generalize. But it is possible to review the military record of countries that have applied deliberate human security thinking to their militaries. Two interesting and illustrative examples are Canada and South Africa, and a brief comparison of how these countries have applied human security

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49. These efforts were further energized by the publication of a Defense Science Board study in 2004 that highlighted significant deficiencies in US government's capability to deal with the social problems inherent in transitions from combat operations to restoration of normality. One of its findings was the essentiality of better understanding of culture and more speakers of foreign languages. That study was followed in January 2005 by the publication of a Defense Language Transformation Roadmap one of whose major articulated goals was to "create foundational language and regional area expertise." See Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington DC, December 2004); and Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, January 2005).

security thinking to their militaries provides insights into the current "art of the possible."

**Canada**

Canada served as a stalwart participant in the West’s long confrontation with 20th Century totalitarianisms, and it was an early partner in the NATO alliance. Its regular military establishment has traditionally been small and since World War II very closely aligned to that the United States. However, the advent of United Nations in the wake of the World War, along with the advent of international military “peace operations” under UN auspices, also offered Canada a complementary international role that it enthusiastically embraced. This role emphasized participation in international peace operations with the commitment of substantial military, police and human development resources.

In 2007 Canada maintained a conventional war-fighting capability (that it was employing to good effect as part of the NATO contingent in Afghanistan). But at the same time its scholars, diplomats and government officials had been among the most ardent proponents of human security. Not surprisingly, Canada was one of the two founding members (with Norway) of the Human Security Network in 1999. The country’s official perspective had been succinctly captured in 2001 by one of its government-supported research centers: “the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions.”

By the late 20th Century, Canadians in general seemed to take justifiable pride in the international peace operations of the Canadian Forces. However, this confidence was rudely (if temporarily) shaken by scandal in 1993, when Canadian military personnel participating in the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia were accused of flagrant human rights violations. The resulting public outcry was harsh. A traumatized Canadian military leadership set up a Leadership Centre within its primary military training establishment, staffing it with a robust contingent of military and civilian scholars and run by a gifted senior

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Canadian military officer, a Ph.D. in psychology. This Centre immediately set about the task of defining a military ethos consistent with Canadian values. A stream of high-quality studies then charted a path to building that ethos throughout the Canadian Forces, with emphasis on recruitment and professional military education. Within about five years, these efforts had borne remarkable fruit.53

By 2007, the Canadian Forces increasingly were steeped in human security values as a result of a coherent and deliberate socialization process. Canada was endeavouring to build military forces capable of performing a wide range of roles along almost the entire spectrum of modern military expectations, from conventional military operations to provision of various kinds of relief in complex humanitarian emergencies. It required all its military personnel, including the combat elements, to conform their professional behaviour to explicitly human security understandings.54 In fact, it appeared in 2007 that the Canadian military was operating on a somewhat broader vision of human security than its parent government.

Whether broadly or narrowly defined, citizens of Canada enjoy a substantial degree of human security in their own country as a historical legacy. "Domestic" human security is thus a largely unconscious given. That probably is why Canada’s human security emphasis has a heavily foreign-policy ring to it. Human security underpins Canada’s engagement with the rest of the world, including its military engagements. For Canada, the military “operationalization” of human security includes an almost compulsive willingness to engage in international peace support operations with clear international mandates and the expectation that its military operations and military personnel display a human security ethos in their relations with all other categories of actors. In sum, human security is a foundational concept at all levels of Canadian military experience, from the national-strategic to the “grass roots” tactical. It is the most characteristic feature of Canada’s military relations with the rest of the world.

53 The officer responsible for this program was (Naval) Captain Alan Okros. For illustration, see Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada, published under the auspices of the (Canadian) Chief of Defence Staff, 2003, 28-31, available at: www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca.
54 For a succinct summary of these expectations, see “Introduction,” Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, published under the auspices of the (Canadian) Chief of Defence Staff, 2005, vii-x, available at: www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca.
South Africa

Human security was not a South African concern in the apartheid era. However, since the advent of majority rule in 1994, South Africa’s domestic and foreign policies have been heavily infused with human security thinking. The South African Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy which charts the path for the country’s human development can be characterized as a human security manifesto. Since 1994, South Africa’s vigorous engagement with international partners on a broad range of issues ranging from the environment to reform of international monetary institutions to conflict prevention and peace support all point to a strong human security emphasis in its foreign policy. In 2007, the country had ”observer” status within the influential Human Security Network and was engaged in promoting security architecture in Africa heavily imbued with human security values. So at the national-strategic level, South Africa was fully committed to a human security agenda in its domestic and foreign policies.

Not surprisingly, the South African government that came to power in 1994 articulated a whole new philosophy of national defense as well. It started by redefining national security, capturing one of the broadest expressions of human security on record anywhere:

In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people.

Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being [emphasis added].

Security now would be ”sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs” of the citizenry.

Despite the embrace of a very broad human security paradigm, the country unambiguously endorsed a conventional military establishment,

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56The White Paper explicitly stated that the [armed forces] comprise ”...an important security instrument of last resort...[but not] the dominant security institution.” Ibid, 3,4.
stating that the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) would be a "balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force. 57 By 1998 the country had further framed its intention very explicitly:

"The government has adopted a broad, holistic approach to security, recognising the various non-military dimensions. . .[but it] has adopted a narrow, conventional approach to defence. . .The SANDF is designed and equipped chiefly to fulfill its primary mission of defence against aggression." 58

Despite the very conventional military capabilities it sought to maintain, South Africa’s commitment of military power since 1994 has been very much in consonance with a human security agenda. This has been true both internally to South Africa and in its external military deployments. Immediately after the advent of majority rule, the government was obliged to dispatch military ground forces to maintain order in urban areas, supplementing the role of the thoroughly discredited police. Senior military leaders disliked that mission, but the Army apparently performed it competently. Throughout the subsequent decade, the South African Air Force and Navy continued to perform search and rescue operations, important but unheralded missions that require technical competence, courage and skill.

From the initiation of majority rule in 1994, the South Africans found themselves pressured to participate in efforts to resolve regional conflict. The new leaders at first proceeded cautiously, fearful that other African countries would suspect hegemonic motives. However, by 1999, the government had sufficient confidence to publish a White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, a document founded upon human security thinking. It called specific attention to broadening notions of "security" that ideally should include "political, economic, social, cultural and personal security." 59 It argued that attenuation of instability required "effective governance, robust democracies and ongoing economic and social development." 60 It seemed to suggest that South Africa should contribute to these in its peace operations. The document was a milestone in South African thinking on human security-related engagement with the rest of the Continent.

57 Ibid, 4. Virtually the same ideas, in the same wording, had appeared in South Africa’s Interim Constitution of 1993, and would be reflected in the final Constitution of 1996.
58 Ibid, Chapter 1, paragraphs 27-8; Chapter 7, paragraph 1.
60 Ibid, paragraph 2-1.
In fact by 2007 South Africa’s primary contribution to human security outside its borders seemed to be its growing involvement in Africa’s rapidly evolving regional security architecture and a firm and growing commitment to regional peace operations. These had included a peace enforcement intervention (under a regional mandate) in Lesotho in 1998, flood rescue and relief in neighboring Mozambique in 2000, deployment of peacekeeping ground forces to Burundi first under a bilateral arrangement and then as part of a UN mission, participation in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the African Union intervention in Sudan and several smaller-scale observer missions. The country also had hosted consultations between warring parties in Burundi, Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.

Since 1994, South Africa has gone the "extra mile" to depict itself as a cooperative regional partner, participating in regional organizations and fora, accepting roles in regional conflict resolution and peace support, and refraining from pursuit of narrow national interests through military strength. Its military commitments at the national-strategic level conform to human security thinking.

However, commitment of military force to peace operations is not the same thing as building an organizational culture oriented to human security. In other words, deployment for peacekeeping does not necessarily indicate that a military establishment is particularly suited by training or equipment to promote human security in its operations.

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61 It is important to stress that these were not the only South African external involvements in human security-related activities. As examples, in 2002, South Africa hosted the highly influential UN-sponsored World Summit on Sustainable Development. See <http://www.johannesburgsummit.org> and <http://www.unep.org> 20 August 2005. In September 2005, the South African government pledged some R 36 million (US$ 6 million) to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Veronica Mohapeloa, "SA Pledges R36m to the Global Fund," BuaNews (Tshwane), 7 September 2005.


or that it is imbued with human security values. Despite the continuous involvement in humanitarian relief and peace support operations since 1998, there was still little evidence for a genuine human security ethos in the SANDF in 2007. South Africa’s military leaders clearly wanted the capability to cope with all conceivable contingencies. Their military strategy had listed the missions they envisioned for the Defence Force, and these covered a considerable spectrum, ranging from high to low intensity conflict. Although was not clear that the country could afford a military with that level of versatility, the military leadership continued to emphasize conventional combat capabilities.

The nature of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) itself was not as closely aligned to human security thinking as that of its parent government. This seems to have been a deliberate intent – a government emphasis on a conventional military focused on the “prime function.” The ambivalence was evident in the training and actual employment of South African military forces since the mid 1990s. South Africa had committed its military to regional peacekeeping operations and appeared likely to continue such commitments, but its capacities to engage in corollary humanitarian-related activities (and interest in doing so) were limited.

Conclusions

Despite the seeming incongruity of linking human security and military establishments, such linkages already had widely occurred by the early 21st Century. Given the prominent roles played by the military in mitigating the effects of complex humanitarian emergencies, its leaders
could hardly avoid engagement in programs and activities with overtly human security ends. There were, nonetheless, significant differences in the details of human security “operationalization” by military establishments.

The spectrum ran from countries like the United States that were minimally committed to an overt national human security agenda, yet whose military at the tactical level was preoccupied with human security responses to the difficult problems of counterinsurgency, to South Africa whose government was fully committed to a national and international human security agenda yet whose military at the tactical level was much more conventional in its perspectives and capabilities, to Canada whose foreign policy was anchored in human security premises and whose military at all levels of organization and operations was thoroughly infused with human security thinking.

Still, beyond the military operationalization of the concept, there was the prospect that the new paradigm could fundamentally alter global expectations of military institutions and ideas about accountability for a government’s use of military power. Human security offered the promise of a mechanism for attaining widespread consensus on the circumstances under which the use of lethal force was legitimate, providing a more nuanced and widely acceptable theory of Just War and a mechanism for establishing accountability for abuses. Such agreement, even if partial and limited, could significantly attenuate a key factor in global insecurity.

Beyond the Just War potentialities, human security also seemed to offer an overarching theoretical framework for new processes to avoid, mitigate and resolve conflict, and a new formula for determining the appropriate roles of coercive agencies amongst other key actors. This framework might offer a sufficiently compelling common vision to forge hitherto unprecedented bonds of collaboration between civil society activists, international organizations, scholarly communities and the military.

In 2007 the human security paradigm was far from achieving its potential. Although there were broad themes of agreement among its advocates, and a number of countries were trying to conform their foreign and domestic policy to its principles, supporters had not succeeded in achieving a common definition in the details of its substance. Nor had any country convincingly demonstrated the superiority of this approach to a skeptical international audience. Opponents still objected to it on a number of grounds. It was not entirely clear in 2007 that human security would be the dominant security concept for the “long haul.”
Still, while the concept did not dominate global “mainstream” thinking about security or about the roles of military forces, its time may well come. It is worth recalling the impact of 18th Century Enlightenment thinkers on world-wide notions of governance. These thinkers disagreed profoundly with each other on many points, but achieved at least a rough agreement on the importance of accountability of rulers to ruled. At the time, the autocratic political authorities and class-ridden societies of Europe had little sympathy for these radical views – it was only the elites in obscure North American colonies that seemed willing to draw inspiration for governance from the new visions. Yet two centuries later, ideas first offered by the Enlightenment thinkers had become so commonly accepted in the West as to be taken largely for granted. Perhaps the same destiny is in store for the new security paradigm.