The studies in this compilation thesis examine the origins and early post-war history of the idea of multiculturalism as well as the interplay between idea and politics in the shift from a public ideal of homogeneity to an ideal of multiculturalism in Sweden. The thesis shows that ethnic activists, experts and officials were instrumental in the establishment of multiculturalism in Sweden, as they also were in two other early adopters of multiculturalism, Canada and Australia. The breakthrough of multiculturalism, such as it was within the limits of the social democratic welfare-state, was facilitated by who the advocates were, for whom they made their claims, the way the idea of multiculturalism was conceptualised and legitimised as well as the migratory context.
THE MULTICULTURAL MOMENT
The Multicultural Moment


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As a child I discovered the past as a land of heroics and tragedy that I could venture into through books and ruins and adventure in. I retained some of my more fantastical notions on the past through adolescence until they were cruelly, but convincingly, put to rest during my first years as a history major at Åbo Akademi University. The sense of adventure did not, however, vanish; it rather changed its shape and direction. The scientific study of the past might even be a more dangerous, and therefore exciting, quest than juvenile reenactments of glorious triumphs and ruinous defeats. My work on this doctoral thesis, this quest, has now come to an end, and I could never have journeyed this far without the aid of numerous persons, institutions and funding agencies.

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scholars there. I must confess that I, believing myself to be lone-wolf historian without the need for a pack, at first was somewhat apprehensive in making new acquaintances across disciplinary lines and national borders. My concerns were, however, quickly replaced by the talent, knowledge, and enthusiasm of my new colleges Heidi Vad Jønsson, Elizabeth Onasch, Saara Pellander, Marjukka Weide and all the other PhD students in WelMi, the welfare and migration research network we founded together under the umbrella of NordWel. Thank you Heidi, Liz, Saara and Marjukka for taking in a lone academic stray and making me become aware of the interdisciplinary possibilities of my work.

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My final and heartfelt thanks go to my family, the Wickströms in Karis and Åbo. Your unconditional support has always made it possible for me to explore my interests fully and without fear. Thanks to you I have been able to preserve my sense of wonder and inquisitiveness and felt
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Åbo, November 2014

Mats Wickström
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements......................................................................................... I
Part I................................................................................................................... 1

1 Introduction................................................................................................... 3
  1.1 Research questions and scope of the thesis............................................. 20

2 A new diversity: post-war Europe and labour migration.............................. 24
  2.1 Post-war immigration and the Swedish welfare state............................ 31
  2.2 Finland as Sweden’s special case and vice versa.................................... 44

3 Earlier research on the history of multiculturalism in Sweden...................... 54
  3.1 Explaining Sweden’s political turn to multiculturalism in earlier research.. 64

4 Theory and method...................................................................................... 73
  4.1 Comparative and transnational perspectives.......................................... 80
  4.2 Actors..................................................................................................... 89

5 Source work.................................................................................................. 95
  5.1 Interviews............................................................................................. 102

6 Summaries of the four studies..................................................................... 107
Part II: studies I–IV........................................................151

I. Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration..............................................................155
    References..................................................................194

II. The difference white ethnics made: The multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark.................................201
    Sources and bibliography...........................................244

III. Making the Case for the Mother Tongue: Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New Policy Discourse on the Teaching of Non-Swedish Mother Tongues in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s........................................251
    References..................................................................285

IV. Huvudsekreteraren och mångkulturalismen: Jonas Widgren och 1975 års invandrar- och minoritetspolitik..........................................................291
    Noter...........................................................................318

Swedish Summary – Sammanfattning.........................323
1 Introduction

Twenty years ago I spoke to the immigrants about the multicultural society on Christmas day. And of course the multicultural society is a revolution, it is inevitable. But because I’m a reformist I want this revolution to transpire gradually.1

Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme in Dagens Nyheter, 16 October 1985.

If the multicultural society is a revolution, as asserted by Olof Palme, the iconic Swedish Social Democratic Party leader and then Prime Minister, it is a revolution that has spawned numerous counter-revolutionary movements in Europe’s ethno-culturally diverse countries over recent decades. One of the most significant shifts in European politics of the 2000s is the rise of an ideologically assorted collection of populist radical right-wing parties. A common denominator of these parties is a critical or blatantly hostile stance on multiculturalism, both as a social fact and a political idea. Right-wing populists often conceptualize multiculturalism as ‘anti-nationalism’ or ‘anti-Westernism’ that espouses open borders, subverts ‘truths’ and is employed

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1 "För 20 år sedan talade jag på juldagen till invandrarna om det mångkulturella samhället. Och naturligtvis är det mångkulturella samhället en revolution, den är oundviklig. Men eftersom jag är reformist, vill jag att denna revolution skall ske gradvis.” This and subsequent translations from Swedish are mine. See study II, ‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’, in this thesis for more on Palme’s multiculturalist Christmas day speech in 1965.
as an ideological tool with which to suppress dissidents.\textsuperscript{2} As a consequence of the rise of radical right-wing populists, political debates and academic discussions on the present and future multiculturalism in Europe have intensified: what is the problem? Is there a problem? How can the problem be resolved?\textsuperscript{3} Even if the past is employed as a point of reference in these debates and discussions, little attention has been paid to the history of multiculturalism, especially as a political idea.

The studies in this compilation thesis conceptually, comparatively, transnationally, and biographically examine the origins and early post-war history of the idea of multiculturalism and also the interplay between idea and politics in the shift from a public ideal of homogeneity to a public ideal of multiculturalism in Sweden. The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I comprises the introductory and summarizing chapters of the thesis. Part II comprises the four studies of the thesis: ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration’ (study I); ‘The difference white ethnics made: The multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’ (study II); ‘Making the Case for the Mother Tongue: Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New Policy Discourse on Non-Swedish Mother Tongues in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s’ (study III); and ‘Huvudsekreteraren och mångkulturalismen: Jonas Widgren och 1975 års invandrar- och minoritetspolitik’ (study IV).


Analytically, the use of the term ‘multiculturalism’ and corresponding terms in Swedish (mångkulturalism or multikulturalism) and other languages can be divided into descriptive and normative usage. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition:

The characteristics of a multicultural society; [also] the policy or process whereby the distinctive identities of the cultural groups within such a society are maintained or supported.\(^4\)

The term ‘multiculturalism’ and its adjective (i.e. multicultural) can thus be employed in different and overlapping ways. Sociologists Michel Wieviorka and Östen Wahlbeck have analytically identified three distinct usages of ‘multiculturalism’: it can refer to the existence of ethno-culturally diverse segments in the population of a society or state (e.g. multiculturalism in Finland); it can also denote particular types of programme and policy that take ethno-cultural diversity into consideration (e.g. multiculturalist education); it can also refer to general political or normative aims concerning how an ethno-culturally diverse society ought to be organized and managed (e.g. multiculturalism is the answer).\(^5\) The opacity of ‘multiculturalism’ and the contested nature of the interrelated referents of the term sometimes make it difficult to pinpoint its precise meaning when it is employed in public debates and academic discussions. Multiculturalism can, as sociologist Thomas Faist emphasized, “mean many different things – a demographic


description, an ideology, a set of policies or a political theory of modern society”, although Faist points out that it still carries a distinctive conceptual core in its “normatively oriented intellectual lineage” – the overcoming of ethno-cultural inequalities and the creation of social cohesion through the “recognition of cultural traditions, language and religion” of minority groups.⁶

For my dissertation project, I have studied the political and normative side of multiculturalism historically, from the beginning of the “normatively oriented intellectual lineage” of multiculturalism. For the purposes of my work, I have defined multiculturalism as a political idea on how an ethno-culturally diverse liberal democratic polity ought to accommodate and manage its diversity. The political idea of multiculturalism includes the following core tenets: (i) ethno-cultural diversity should be publicly endorsed for the greater good of the whole of the polity, and (ii) ethno-cultural minority groups should be formally recognized as groups and protected from discrimination and assimilatory pressure (i.e. a form of discrimination) exerted by the majority population. The idea of multiculturalism is an inherently political idea that both normatively describes the polity by conceptualizing it as comprising different ethno-cultural groups and prescribes solutions on how the polity should be politically and socially ordered on the basis of this description.⁷

The idea of multiculturalism resembles earlier notions of

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cultural pluralism that also valourised difference. However, whereas the early 20th century idea of cultural pluralism advanced by the Jewish-American philosopher Horace Kallen exalted diversity, it did not place the onus on democratic incorporation in a way similar to multiculturalism. The idea of multiculturalism is underpinned by the belief that respect for difference and support for its endurance will expand the scope of the societal “we” (i.e. demos, or the common people) and generate social cohesion in diversity.  

Official multiculturalism

Following the definition of the idea of multiculturalism above, we can speak of official multiculturalism or state-sponsored multiculturalism when a polity introduces policies that affirm and endorse ethnic diversity, formally recognizes ethno-cultural minority groups living in the polity and supports the maintenance and development of the language and culture of these groups. Official multiculturalism was first introduced into Canada in 1971; Australia also introduced official multiculturalism in the 1970s, which is further discussed below.

Sweden was the first European country where the idea of multiculturalism emerged in the political mainstream in the latter half of the 1960s and became public policy in the mid-1970s. On the 14th of May 1975, a unanimous Swedish parliament passed an act on a new immigrant and minority policy put forward by the social democratic government

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lead by Olof Palme, that explicitly rejected the ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity and the policy of assimilation. The three main principles of the new policy were equality, partnership and freedom of choice. The explicit policy aim of the freedom of choice principle was to create the opportunity for ethno-cultural minority groups in Sweden to transgenerationally retain their own languages and cultures, a decidedly multiculturalist policy goal.\textsuperscript{9} From the mid-1970s, the goal of enabling the preservation of ethno-cultural minorities and creating a positive attitude towards the new publically endorsed multicultural society among the majority population became incorporated into Swedish cultural, educational and media policies.\textsuperscript{10} The introduction of state-sponsored multiculturalism in 1975 constitutes the political crowning of Sweden’s multicultural moment: the revolutionary shift in the publicly affirmed ideals on ethno-cultural diversity between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.


Multiculturalism remains a publicly affirmed ideal in the country despite the rise and protestations of the, as of yet, politically isolated right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats. The emergence of the political idea of multiculturalism in Sweden and subsequent elevation of the idea to a public ideal and conceptual basis for the new multiculturalist immigrant and minority policy of 1975 is therefore of historical interest. The history of the idea and politics of multiculturalism might also be of relevance to contemporary debates on multiculturalism in Sweden and elsewhere.

Multicultural transformations

The immigration waves during and after the Second World War changed the composition of the Swedish population in a historically unprecedented way. At the end of the 1980s, historian Harald Runblom and ethnologist Ingvar Svanberg declared that the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity of Sweden had never been greater. According to intellectual historian Svante Nordin, echoing Palme, the societal and intellectual changes brought on by post-war immigration into Sweden are revolutionary; not only has immigration changed the structure of the Swedish population, it has also changed the very idea of Sweden and Swedish culture. Nordin dates the beginning of the immigration-induced intellectual revolution, which he contends was the result of the interplay between the social phenomenon of immigration and politicking legitimized by this phenomenon,

to the 1960s. Nordin argues that the numerous new concepts relating to immigration, which have been introduced into Sweden from the 1960s onwards, mirrors the depth and scope of a major societal transformation that he suggests might have been the most salient of all the great cultural changes in 20th century Sweden.¹²

Nordin’s observation that post-war immigration has not only had a demographic and social impact on Sweden but also profound intellectual consequences is a pertinent historical and historiographical point. The modern era of immigration into Sweden that began at the end of the Second World War has, without doubt, transformed Sweden in many ways – socially, economically, culturally, intellectually and politically – and thus needs to be studied from different and overlapping historical perspectives.

In particular, this thesis focuses on the beginning of Nordin’s “intellectual revolution”¹³ in general and on the early history of the idea of multiculturalism and the introduction of official multiculturalism (i.e. policies based on the idea of multiculturalism), a juncture in the intellectual and political history of Sweden that I have chosen to term Sweden’s ‘multicultural moment’. I have chosen to employ the term ‘moment’ because I consider the radical changes, beginning with the first sustained public critique of assimilationism in 1964 and ending with the introduction of official multiculturalism in 1975, in political discourse and public policy to be a pivotal period, a turning point, in the modern and contemporary history of Sweden. The term ‘multicultural’ is here employed in the normative, political sense of the word; that is, it analytically denotes that the

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¹³ “Intellektuell revolution”, Nordin, p. 12,
historical development examined for this dissertation project was a profound change at the levels of ideas and politics. Thus defined, a polity can become increasingly multicultural in a descriptive sense without the occurrence of a ‘multicultural moment’: the introduction and establishment of the idea of multiculturalism in political discourse and the subsequent elevation of this idea to a public ideal.

Post-war Sweden was, despite the influx of war-time refugees and labour immigrants, still relatively culturally homogenous in the mid-1960s, when 96 percent of the population still belonged to the Lutheran state church and the only non-Christian communion was that of the Jewish community. More importantly, the ostensible homogeneity of Sweden was upheld as the ideal societal condition or, in the words of historian Rune Johansson, “[t]he folkhem [people's home] was distinctly a home for ethnic Swedes, and in some contexts was only for the representative members of the tribe.” The notion that the good society rested upon the homogeneity of the Swedish population can be exemplified with the following statement made by Sweden’s long-term (1946–1969) social democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander, Palme’s predecessor, in parliament on the 28th March 1965:

We Swedes live in an infinitely more happy condition [in comparison to the Americans]. The population of our country is homogenous, not only in regards to race but also in many other aspects.

16 ”Vi svenskar lever ju i en så oändligt mycket lyckligare lottad situation. Vårt lands befolkning är homogen, inte bara i fråga om rasen utan också i
The ideal of racial and cultural homogeneity, which was regarded as an important condition for the realization of the social democratic peoples’ home had, since the inter-war period, also underpinned Swedish policy on domestic minorities and immigrant settlement. The inhabitants of the land that were not ‘Swedish’ (with the exception of the reindeer herding Sámi, who were to be ‘protected’ from the dangers of civilized life17), namely Finnish speaking Tornedalians, the Roma, war-time refugees and more recently arrived labour immigrants, should become Swedish, that is, be assimilated into the Swedish majority. ‘Non-Swedes’ were, without doubt, officially tolerated in the early post-war period, although the expectation was that the collective basis of their ethno-cultural distinctiveness would not be generationally reproduced.18

At the beginning of 1965, Sweden was a much more ethno-culturally diverse society than it had been at any point since the loss of Finland in 1809. However, as Nordin points out, it was not immigration per se that brought on the intellectual and political changes that were connected

to the phenomenon. Many European countries became multicultural (or more multicultural) in a descriptive sense as a consequence of post-war labour immigration without experiencing a multicultural moment or even acknowledging that the country had in fact become a country of immigration, as in the case of Germany.¹⁹ During Tage Erlander’s tenure as prime minister from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1960s, the folkhem had de facto become home to many substantial groups of non-Swedish peoples (e.g. Finns, Estonians, Latvians and Hungarians). Nevertheless, this demographic change did not lead to a change in the political thoughts of Erlander or those who shared his ideal of homogeneity. The political idea of multiculturalism, the recognition and affirmation of ethno-cultural group differences in the public sphere, the re-conceptualization of the people’s home to the home of peoples, was a far-fetched if not inconceivable notion for many Swedes in the mid-1960s.²⁰ Ten years later, the ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity and the Swedification of all non-Swedes was undoubtedly a conceivable notion, although it contradicted official policy.

From a historical perspective, the multicultural moment in Sweden is certainly conspicuous and is also distinct from a comparative perspective. Sweden is the odd one

²⁰ In 1968, the Commission on Immigration, which in the same year had been set up to investigate and put forward proposals on the facilitation of immigrant adjustment in Sweden (see study I), conducted the first large-scale interview survey on Swedish opinion on immigration and immigrant settlement. This survey indicated that the majority of the respondents favoured the Swedification of immigrants and their children over a more multiculturalist approach. Arne Trankell, ‘Svenskarnas fördomar mot invandrare’, SOU 1974:70, *Invandrarufrutredningen 4. Bilagedel* (Stockholm 1974), pp. 121–212.
out in the three countries that standard reference works, such as *The Age of Migration*, lists as the early adopters of official multiculturalism in the 1970s: Canada, Australia and Sweden. The history of the emergence of Canadian and Australian multiculturalism has constituted an important point of reference for this dissertation project, as will be shown later. I will therefore next outline the history of the introduction of official multiculturalism in Canada and Australia.

**Canadian and Australian multiculturalism**

Canada became the first country in the world to introduce state-sponsored multiculturalism in 1971 when the country adopted it as an official policy, “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”. Similar to the other major British settler societies of immigration (i.e. the United States, Australia and New Zealand), Canada actively pursued the assimilation of immigrants and the ideal of a common national culture and language until the Second World War. Ethno-cultural groups that, for intertwined cultural and racial reasons, were deemed not to be assimilable were not allowed to immigrate into Canada. In the post-war period, Canada’s racially charged immigration policy was gradually dismantled and assimilationism gave way to a more pluralist perception of what it meant to be Canadian. It was, however, the social and political upheavals triggered by the so-called Quiet Revolution in the French-speaking province of Québec that provided the impetus to introduce official

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21 Castles & Miller, p. 15.

multiculturalism in Canada.\textsuperscript{23}

At the beginning of the 1960s, an independence movement emerged in Québec that posed a severe challenge to the cohesion of the Canadian state. One of the most significant responses to the national crisis by the Canadian government was the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (i.e. the B&B Commission) in 1963. The primary mandate of the commission was

\begin{quote}
to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution [---].\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

The goal of the B&B Commission was clear: national unity. Both Francophone and Anglophone Canadians, “the two founding races”, should consider the national institutions and the Canadian state as their own.\textsuperscript{25} The Quebec nationalist movement and the creation of the B&B Commission also brought a heightened salience to the question concerning the position of the other ethno-cultural groups in Canada. Many

\begin{footnotes}
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of the non-English or non-French-speaking groups were not content with the B&B Commission’s focus on bilingualism and biculturalism. The group that most actively voiced its disapproval was the Ukrainian-Canadian community.\textsuperscript{26}

Historical research on the introduction of official multiculturalism in Canada has shown that the activism and lobbying of the non-English- or non-French-speaking groups, primarily Ukrainian-Canadians, was a crucial element in the establishment of a federal policy of multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{27} In a recent publication, historian Aya Fujiwara sums up the current state of knowledge on Ukrainian-Canadian involvement in the establishment of Canadian multiculturalism as follows:

> The multiculturalism movement, as a form of resistance to bilingualism and biculturalism, thus began under the initiative of Ukrainian nationalists. Having representatives in the Senate and on the B&B Commission who were motivated by cultural and linguistic survival as well as pride as nation builders equipped them for this leadership.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{28} Fujiwara, p. 173.
Following the recommendations of the final report of the B&B Commission, “The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups”, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced the Canadian policy of multiculturalism in the House of Commons on the 8th October 1971:

The policy of multiculturalism I am announcing today accepts the contention of the other cultural communities [those not of British or French origin] that they, too, are essential elements in Canada and deserve government assistance in order to contribute to regional and national life that derive from their heritage yet are distinctively Canadian.  

The introduction of the new policy formalized the post-war Canadian turn from a policy of assimilationism. At the same time, a similar turn was underway in another British settler society, Australia.

Australian research on the emergence of the political idea of multiculturalism in the late 1960s and the subsequent introduction of state-sponsored multiculturalism in the mid-1970s has also emphasized the role of ethnic activism in Australia’s turn to multiculturalism.  

The German-Jewish refugee Walter Lippmann, President of the Australian Jewish Welfare Society was, for example, one of the leading

29 Quoted in Haque, p. 227.
activists in the promulgation of the idea of multiculturalism in Australia.\textsuperscript{31} However, in comparison to the Canadian turn, whereby organized ethno-cultural minorities and their representatives played a pivotal role in the emergence of multiculturalism, Australian scholars, in particular Mark Lopez in his seminal work \textit{The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945–1975}, have identified a relatively small group of public officials and politically active academics as the prime movers in the establishment of multiculturalism as a political idea and public policy in Australia.\textsuperscript{32} According to Lopez:

The ideology of multiculturalism was developed between 1966 and 1975 by a small number of academics, social workers and activists initially located on the political arena of migrant settlement and welfare [---] The definers of multiculturalism were also the principal actors in the struggle to advance their beliefs and make them government policy.\textsuperscript{33}


Lopez furthermore shows that “many of the principal multiculturalists were Anglo-Australians” and argues that during the “decisive events of the early 1970s the overwhelming majority of ethnic groups and their leaders played no direct role in the progress of multiculturalism”.\textsuperscript{34}

Multiculturalism was thus engendered differently in Canada and Australia. In Canada the ethnic groups and their leaders played a direct role in the advancement of multiculturalism from its development as a political idea to the introduction of official multiculturalism. Comparative historian Jatinder Mann has also pointed out that there was no “French-Canadian factor” or “other long-established ethnic groups such as the Ukrainian-Canadians” in Australia.\textsuperscript{35} According to Mann, this “makes the adoption of a policy of multiculturalism in Australia even more noteworthy”.\textsuperscript{36} Australian multiculturalism, in comparison to that in Canadian, was to a greater extent the product of behind-the-scenes activism and lobbying at an interpersonal level.

That the settler state of Canada, which harboured two major nationalities (i.e. Anglophones and Francophones, the so-called founding peoples of Canada) and also numerous indigenous peoples and large and established immigrant minorities, would become the birthplace of official multiculturalism, and that Canada would be followed by Australia, its fellow British settler state and a country of immigration, does not, in hindsight, appear particularly odd, at least in comparison with Sweden, the first European country that introduced state-sponsored multiculturalism in the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, p. 23.  
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 499.
1.1 Research questions and scope of the thesis

The following research questions have guided this dissertation project from its inception: when, how and why did the political idea of multiculturalism emerge and become established in Swedish political discourse? When, how and why did the idea of multiculturalism become established in the emerging field of immigrant research and policy in Sweden? In what way does the history of the idea and politics of multiculturalism in Sweden differ from or resemble developments in other Western European countries and also in Canada and Australia, the other two early adopters of official multiculturalism?

Spatially, the thesis primarily focuses on the nation-state of Sweden. The spatial scope of the thesis, however, extends beyond intellectual and political life in Sweden to include Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, particularly Finland and Denmark, and the migrational context of post-war Western Europe and similar historical developments in Canada and Australia. Diachronically, the thesis mainly focuses on the 1960s and 1970s, in particular the years between 1964 and 1975, although the diachronic scope of the thesis also covers the early post-war decades of the 1940s and 1950s and also takes into account developments following the political breakthrough of multiculturalism in the mid-1970s.

The idea of multiculturalism could have been introduced into Sweden without official affirmation, in which case there would not have been a Swedish multicultural moment as defined in this thesis; that is, the rooting of the idea of multiculturalism in political discourse and also in the ethnic politics of Sweden. The inception of multiculturalism into Swedish political discourse might have merely offered an alternative way in which ethno-cultural difference was addressed in public. For a few years around 1970,
this certainly seemed to be a possible outcome from a contemporary perspective. If that had been the outcome, the history of the introduction of the idea of multiculturalism would now perhaps be written as the history of a curious phenomenon in Swedish intellectual history with little or no political and cultural impact. As such, the word ‘moment’, usually reserved for more profound intellectual and political shifts, would hardly be apposite as a descriptive term.

When, how and why the political idea of multiculturalism found a (seemingly) thriving home in post-war Sweden, an old homogenous nation-state with a long history of homogenising nationalism and a short history of large-scale immigration, are questions that have puzzled me since I took an interest in the public debates on migration and multiculturalism that, as I perceived it, grew in intensity from around the mid-2000s in Finland and internationally. Over the last decade, the idea of multiculturalism has been fiercely criticized in the public mainstream and many countries that espoused multiculturalism as a public ideal have now rejected it, with Sweden as the notable European exception.37

The multicultural moment in Sweden represents a conceptual and political shift of scholarly importance across disciplinal lines, as also testified by previous research on the topic.38 In addition to being of general academic interest, Sweden’s multicultural moment also carries transnational significance due to Sweden’s status as a role model for the other Nordic countries, especially Norway and Finland. According to Norwegian social scientists Brochmann & Djuve, “the credo [of Norwegian integration ideology] that

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38 See chapter 4.
minorities and immigrants should be able to choose to sustain their own culture while having equal access to the goods of the majority society” was imported from Sweden in the 1970s. The development of a Finnish policy of multiculturalism in the 1990s was also influenced by the Swedish example.

Even though integration policies and public discourse on multiculturalism have undergone many shifts in Sweden, the officially declared public ideal on ethno-cultural diversity as a societal good, established by the multicultural moment, is still upheld. The multicultural moment was undoubtedly only one of the major historical changes that occurred within the frame of the expanding welfare state of post-war Sweden. However, in comparison to other ‘moments’ of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, ‘the feminist moment’, ‘the

40 In the 1970s, Finnish Roma policy moved in a multiculturalist direction partly because of the multicultural moment in Sweden. See Panu Pulma, Suljetut ovet. Pohjoismaiden romanipolitiikka 1500-luvulta EU-aikaan, (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura 2006). Sweden and Swedish policies were also points of reference in the early 1990s when official Finnish multiculturalism was being developed, see e.g. Monikulttuuriseen Suomeen. Syrjintää selvittävän työryhmän muistio, Oikeusministeriön lainvalmisteluosaston julkaisu 4/1990 (Helsinki: VAPK- kustannus 1990).
41 E.g. the former social democratic government declared the year 2006 to be The Year of Multiculturalism (Mångkulturåret) and the current centre-right government, in office since 2006, has consistently maintained that increasing ethno-cultural diversity is good for Swedish society. According to political scientist Anders Johansson Heinö, a “diversity discourse” (mångfaltsdiskurs) is well established in Sweden and mångfald (diversity) is one of the most positively charged words in the Swedish language today. Andreas Johansson Heinö, Gillar vi olika? Hur den svenska likhetsnormen hindrar integration (Stockholm: Timbro 2012), p. 27.
anti-authoritarian moment of 68’ and the ‘sexual revolution’, which were more or less transnational phenomena in the West, the multicultural moment was not a widely shared historical juncture. As will be shown in the following chapter, “A new diversity: post-war Europe and labour migration”, the multicultural moment in Sweden was a European exception.

The uniqueness of Sweden’s multicultural moment in the European context and its apparent significance for later developments in migration and integration policy, even national identity, in Sweden and elsewhere, has become even more noticeable in the wake of the ‘anti-multicultural moment’, in the throes of which Western Europe seems to be at the time of writing (i.e. 2014).

The following chapter of part I (Chapter 2) situates the Swedish multicultural moment in a European, Nordic and historical context. Chapter 3 presents the extant research on the history of multiculturalism in Sweden. Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion on the theory and methods employed in the dissertation project. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the sources of the project and chapter 6 gives the summaries of the four studies that, together with the introductory and summarizing chapters of part I, comprise the compilation thesis. Chapter 7 presents the results of the dissertation project and draws final conclusions of the thesis. Subsequently, the individual four studies are presented in part II.
2 A new diversity: post-war Europe and labour migration

From the end of the Second World War to the oil crisis of 1973–1974, massive capital investment and expansion of production in Western Europe brought large numbers of migrant workers from the less developed European periphery and former and present European colonies to the expanding industrial regions of Western Europe. From the end of the 1940s, the Western European economy, especially that of Western Germany, began to recover from the devastation of total war and when economic growth ensued, it escalated. From the early 1950s, the Western European demand for cheap labour could no longer be satisfied by domestic labour forces and an era of mass migrations to the prosperous regions of Europe ensued.42

In the mid-1950s, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany began to recruit foreign workers. The first recruitment offices of the Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) were established in Southern European countries. The recruitment process, social security and working conditions were regulated through bilateral agreements between the German government and the migrants’ countries of departure.43 The first agreement was made between Germany and Italy in 1955. In 1960, German entered into agreements with Spain and Greece, which were soon followed by agreements with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and, finally, with...

Yugoslavia in 1968.\textsuperscript{44}

German immigration policy was conceptualized and treated foreign workers as guest workers (\textit{Gastarbeider}), not as immigrants that would settle in the country. The foreign workers were, as migration scholars Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller have pointed out, perceived as “temporary labour units”. Guest workers were recruited, employed and removed according to the requirements of their German employers. Labour and residency permits were only granted for limited time periods, with labour permits usually being restricted to particular jobs or segments of the labour market to facilitate rotation of the workers.\textsuperscript{45} In addition to Germany, other continental European countries that received labour immigration through recruitment, such as Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands, also regarded foreign workers as “guests” and treated them as such; that is, foreign workers’ political and social rights were limited.\textsuperscript{46} This also meant that

\textsuperscript{44} Randall Hansen, ‘Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons’, \textit{The Political Quarterly} 74 (2003), p. 25.
\textsuperscript{45} Castles & Miller, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{46} Gianni D’Amato, ‘Migration and Integration Policies in Switzerland’, \textit{Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present}, eds. Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Penninx & Maren Borkert (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011), pp. 108-127; Stefanie Mayer, ‘Migration and Labor Markets. Political Discourse in Austria’, \textit{Debating Migration: Political Discourses on Labor Immigration in Historical Perspective}, eds. Stefanie Mayer & Mikael Spång, Mikael (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag 2009), pp. 25–73; María Bruquetas-Callejo, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Rinus Penninx and Peter Scholten, ‘The case of the Netherlands’, \textit{Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present}, eds. Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Pennix & Maren Borkert (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011), pp. 129–163. Denmark also perceived its labour immigrants to be guest workers. However, although this perception of immigrants framed and structured public discourse and policy on immigration, the immigrants were not excluded from the Danish welfare state’s social rights; see
no policies on immigrant settlement (i.e. integration), be they assimilationist or multiculturalist, were introduced in countries ‘hosting’ guest workers.

Despite the aim of preventing immigration, that is, the act of entering and settling in a country, Western European countries that upheld guest worker regimes still had to face the social challenges of de facto immigration. At the end of the 1960s, the restrictions on settlement and family reunion were loosened and could also be circumvented by the foreign workers. This meant that countries receiving guest workers were forced to confront the reality of guest workers’ children, who might be born in their parents’ country of residency but still lacked citizenship of that country, entering the educational system, which resulted in the introduction of bilingual education in recipient countries. The introduction of bilingual and bicultural education was, however, not motivated by the political aim of recognizing and supporting the emergence of new ethno-cultural minorities of immigrant origin and modern multicultural societies, but by the overarching migration policy goal of encouraging ‘non-native’ ethno-cultural groups to leave. Symptomatically, the 1977 European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers did not seek to promote the introduction of multiculturalist policies. Article 15 of the convention recommends the introduction of mother tongue teaching in migrant workers’ languages to facilitate their return to their state of origin.47

In Germany, inclusion of guest workers’ children within the German educational system, while simultaneously preparing them for return to their ‘home’ countries, was termed Ausländerpädagogik, or “foreigner pedagogy”. Ausländerpädagogik became the leading principle in the

47 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 176, note 2.
education of guest workers’ children in Germany from the end of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{48} When the official guest worker policy was ended due to the cessation of immigration into Germany in 1973, it was replaced by a policy that promoted voluntary repatriation.\textsuperscript{49} The nationalist immigration policy and Germany’s segregationist Ausländerpädagogik undoubtedly recognized the difference between German nationals and ‘non-Germans’, but it did so to preserve the ethno-cultural integrity of the German nation, not to promote the inclusion of new ethno-cultural groups into German society. The demographical fact that Germany’s ethno-cultural mix had changed as a result of employing guest workers was not acknowledged and after the guests, from a German perspective, had overstayed their visit, their presence was no longer perceived as economically beneficial or, least of all, as a culturally enriching social good.

In the 1980s, the idea of multiculturalism was introduced into German political discourse, when, according to social scientist Frank-Olaf Radtke, some pro-immigrationist German politicians “picked up the idea of multiculturalism and painted a colourful picture of a society of cultural plurality”\textsuperscript{50}. In the early 1990s, the idea of multiculturalism reached its, as of then, peak influence in Germany when it


was promoted by leftists and liberals in an effort to prevent potentially re-awakening German nationalism in the wake of re-unification. An article on the protection of minority rights for all ethnic groups was almost introduced into the German constitution before conservative opposition opposed to the multiculturalist integration of ethno-cultural groups of immigrant origin prevented its introduction. In the 2000s, according to immigration scholar Karen Schönwalder, the idea of multiculturalism lost its “hegemonial position in the left-liberal spectrum” of German politics.

Post-colonial immigration

The labour demands of the former colonial powers such as France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were, to a large extent, satisfied with spontaneous migration of workers from the former colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; workers from Western Africa moved to France; the United Kingdom received migrants from the Caribbean, Pakistan, India and Ireland; and Indonesians and Surinamese settled in the Netherlands. Following its tradition of what sociologist Rogers Brubaker, among others, has termed “Republican

53 Castles & Miller, pp. 102–103.
assimilationism”\textsuperscript{54}, immigration into France in the 1960s and 1970s did not prompt the French government to alter its way of approaching the settlement of immigrants; the newcomers were expected to accept French values and abandon their former collective identities in favour of a new French identity.\textsuperscript{55}

Great Britain adopted a general policy of anti-discrimination and tolerance of cultural diversity in the 1960s that rejected outright assimilationism.\textsuperscript{56} It was, however, not until the 1980s that British policies of multiculturalism, particularly a multiculturalist educational policy which actively valued and promoted diversity, were introduced.\textsuperscript{57}

In the Netherlands, post-colonial Indonesian immigrants of the 1950s were encouraged to assimilate. Post-colonial Surinamese immigrants and guest workers from the Mediterranean region who arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 1970s were, however, encouraged to retain their own ethno-cultural identity and no effort was made to advance their integration into Dutch society. Instead of trying to integrate or assimilate the migrants, the authorities followed the traditional Dutch system of ‘pillarization’ (\textit{verzuiling}) and created institutional ‘pillars’ for the migrant communities in line with how the existing pillars of the various political and religious communities of Dutch society were arranged. The official motive for this policy approach

was that the retention of ethnic identity, facilitated by the separate institutional arrangements of the pillar, would help migrants to reintegrate into their countries of origin when they returned; that is, migrant groups’ pillars were perceived to be temporary structures in Dutch society. The policy was not underpinned by the idea of multiculturalism as the permanent presence of new ethno-cultural minority groups was not even acknowledged. When, in the 1980s, it became clear that the labour immigrants’ stay was more than temporary, the ‘guests’ were formally re-conceptualized as ethnic minorities. The pillarization policy was then continued in the Dutch Minorities’ Policy, a decisively multiculturalist policy.  

The French historian Marc Bloch has, by making an epidemiological analogy, argued that an idea can only breed in the correct conditions and that “contagion” of an idea “supposes two things: microbe multiplication and, at the moment when the disease strikes, a favourable breeding-ground”. Germany, France, Denmark and most of the rest of Western Europe where hardly exposed to the idea of multiculturalism; no multiplication of the idea occurred in these inhospitable breeding grounds until the 1980s and then only in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The idea of multiculturalism was, however, able to strike and multiply in one European country in the post-war labour migration period, Sweden, and when the idea struck, the breeding ground turned out to be favourable.

2.1 Post-war immigration and the Swedish welfare state

The Kingdom of Sweden has a long history of immigration, especially into the cosmopolitan upper echelons of society. The Swedish state was ethnically very diverse until the early 19th century and the loss of Finland, the eastern part of the kingdom. In the latter half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century, Sweden was primarily a country of emigration with, from a historical and comparative perspective, an ethnically homogenous population. The Germans, Walloons, Dutch, Scots and the Forest Finns that had migrated to Sweden in the previous centuries had been assimilated by the early 20th century. In the early 1940s, the Jewish group numbered approximately 8,000, the Roma group in the hundreds, the Sámi population was roughly approximated as 10,000 and the census of 1930 estimated the Finnish-speaking population of Norrbotten, a Northern Province bordering Finland, to be approximately 30,000, most of whom were Tornedalians.

As late as 1930, more persons left Sweden than entered the country. Due to returning Swedish-Americans, immigration began to exceed emigration in the 1930s. At the end of the Second World War, approximately 30,000 Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians fled to Sweden and after the war, approximately 34,000 war-refugees, so-called displaced persons, were transported to Sweden.65 The flight from Estonia brought future ethnic activists Sven Alur Reinans and Voldemar Kiviaed to Sweden, and the most prominent ethnic activist of post-war Sweden, Polish-Jewish Holocaust survivor David Schwarz, who after the war had ended up in a refugee camp in Italy, was brought to Sweden in 1950 as part of the displaced persons programme.66

Labour immigration

Sweden was unaffected by the human and material devastation of the Second World War and the export-driven Swedish economy grew rapidly in the post-war period. The average annual GDP growth of the Swedish economy in the 1950s and 1960s was 3.6 percent. In 1945, the visa requirement for Danish and Norwegian citizens

was abolished and for Finnish citizens in 1949. The post-war economic boom in Sweden led to a shortage of labour and steps were taken to provide Swedish industries with the labour they required. In 1954, the Common Nordic labour market, which gave Nordic citizens the right to take up residence in another Nordic country without a work permit, was formally introduced. The agreement on and implementation of the Common Nordic labour market further facilitated intra-Nordic movement, particularly labour migration from the economically underdeveloped Finland to the economic powerhouse of Sweden.67

From 1947, labour immigrants were also recruited from Europe, initially from Italy, Hungary and Austria and, in the 1950s, from West Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Belgium.68 In the mid-1950s, a policy of what essentially amounted to free immigration of foreign labour was introduced, the so-called tourist immigration policy, by cancelling the visa requirement for most foreign nationalities. Non-Nordic foreigners could arrive in Sweden on a tourist visa, apply for a job in Sweden and then utilize an offer of employment to receive Swedish work and residency permits. In the 1960s, the trade union movement began to criticize the system of tourist immigration. The demands for regulation by the trade union movement were spurred on by the large numbers of Yugoslavs who arrived in Sweden in 1964 and 1965. Many Yugoslavs arriving on tourist visas were unable to find work or housing in Sweden and the unemployed Yugoslavs were gathered in camps by the National Labour Market Board. The plight of the Yugoslavs fuelled the debate

68 Widgren, p. 13.
on Sweden’s immigration and immigrant problem that was ongoing at that time. *Fackföreningsrörelsen*, the weekly journal of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, demanded stricter immigration controls to avoid the “chaos” that the “Yugoslav invasion” had caused in 1965. The following year, Lars Ahlvarsson, the ombudsman for immigration and immigrant matters at the Trade Union Confederation, argued that unregulated immigration was beyond the resources of Sweden. As ombudsman for immigration and immigrant matters, Ahlvarsson was to play a key role in the Swedish multicultural moment, which shows that the endorsement of the idea of multiculturalism was not tied to an open-borders position at this time.

**Control and consequences of labour immigration**

Although the foreign born population of Sweden had steadily grown since the 1940s, it was the so called crisis of the ‘Yugoslav invasion’ that made immigration and, more importantly, the question of immigrant adjustment (i.e. integration in today’s terminology) an issue in the public sphere. In 1965, a working group on immigrant matters


70 Ibid.

71 See the studies ‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’ (II) and ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration’ (I) in this thesis.

72 See studies I, II and IV (‘Huvudsekreteraren och mångkulturalismen. Jonas Widgren och 1975 års invandrar- och minoritetspolitik’) in this
was established by the Government. This can be posited as the historical starting point for the development of a new policy field in Swedish politics that is now termed ‘integration policy’. What was to become the Swedish multicultural moment had thus begun two decades after Sweden had opened its borders to refugee and labour immigration.

The period of free tourist immigration ended in 1967, when new rules forbidding the issue of work permits after entry into Sweden were introduced. The new immigration policy, introduced in 1968, further regulated the entry of non-Nordic labourers by introducing requirements for both a work permit and housing before entering Sweden. This meant that non-Nordic foreigners could no longer enter Sweden as tourists, apply for work and then receive work and residency permits. However, the organized recruitment of labourers continued and workers continued to be imported from Yugoslavia and Turkey. The introduction of the new regulations on immigration was coupled to an improvement in the position of non-Nordic migrant workers in the Swedish labour market. Work permits for non-Nordic migrant workers who had entered the Swedish labour market before the introduction of the new regulations were prolonged indefinitely, which meant in practice that the migrants could

thesis for the politicization of the so-called immigrant question in the public sphere in the mid-1960s.

73 Hammar, p. 32.

74 Sweden’s intake of war refugees in the mid-1940s was, as labour and migration historian Lars Olsson has shown, a precursor to Sweden’s labour immigration policy in the post-war period. Upon arrival in Sweden, the refugees were almost immediately put to agrarian work in the south of the country. Lars Olsson, På Tröskeln till Folkhemmet: Baltiska flyktingar och polska koncentrationslägerfångar som reservarbetskraft i skånskt jordbruk kring slutet av andra världskriget (Växjö: Morgenrodnad 2008).

75 Lundh & Ohlsson, pp. 82–83.
remain permanently in Sweden if they so chose.\textsuperscript{76} The secured right of residency also gave non-Nordic migrant workers and their families, who were allowed to re-unify in Sweden, the same social rights as Swedish citizens and \textit{invandrare} (immigrant) symbolically replaced \textit{utlänning} (foreigner) as an administrative and political concept.\textsuperscript{77} The official affirmation that labour immigrants were persons likely to settle in Sweden was a pivotal precondition for the promotion of the idea of multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{78}

In 1972, the Trade Union Movement effectively put a stop to large-scale recruitment of non-Nordic labour immigrants by issuing an internal circular letter to the national trade unions urging them to exercise a more restrictive policy towards the approval of work permits.\textsuperscript{79} Finnish migration to Sweden decreased considerably after the immigration peak at the turn of the 1970s due to improved economic conditions in Finland, a slow-down of the Swedish economy and the introduction of regulations on the praxis of Swedish recruitment in Finland.\textsuperscript{80} By the mid-1970s, the post-war era of large-scale labour immigration had ended in Sweden, as it also had in the other western European countries that had received millions of labourers from Southern Europe, Turkey and past and present colonies. In comparison to other labour importing countries such as West Germany, Sweden never formally introduced a guest worker regime, despite the

\textsuperscript{76} Frank, pp. 95–103.
\textsuperscript{77} Hammar, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{78} See study II in this thesis for a comparative analysis between the case of Sweden, where foreign workers were regarded as settling immigrants, and Denmark where, for a long time, foreign workers and their families were perceived as ‘guests’.
Swedish immigration policy towards non-Nordics containing elements of that kind of rotation system.\textsuperscript{81}

The scale of immigration into Sweden from the 1940s to the 1970s was, from a historical perspective, massive and greatly increased the ethno-cultural diversity of the country. When immigration and the adjustment of immigrants to Swedish society became ‘problems’ in the mid-1960s, the ‘problem’ of labour immigration was solved by restricting non-Nordic immigration. The problem of immigrant adjustment was to be, as one of the key actors in the introduction of official multiculturalism, Jonas Widgren, polemically put it in retrospect, solved to general satisfaction by teaching the immigrants Swedish and creating social equality between the immigrants and the Swedes; in other words, by assimilating them in the same way as earlier influxes of immigrants.\textsuperscript{82}

Sweden had, from a demographic perspective, become multicultural over the time-span of one generation. The country went from a foreign-born population of approximately 1 percent at the start of the Second World War to a foreign born population of 6.7 percent in 1970.\textsuperscript{83} It was against this backdrop of demographic change that the idea of multiculturalism was introduced into Swedish political discourse in the mid-1960s. It is, however, important to bear in mind that official multiculturalism was established after the cessation of non-Nordic immigration and the decrease in Nordic immigration in the 1970s, and also that the new policy did not contradict the restrictive labour immigration policy that had been established a few years earlier. On the

\textsuperscript{81} Frank, p. 51. During the period of tourist immigration, migrant workers from Southern Europe were not guaranteed continued work and residency rights in Sweden after the time limits of their work permits had expired (ibid. p. 248).

\textsuperscript{82} Widgren, p. 15.

contrary, the success of the new policy of multiculturalism was presented as being dependent on regulated (labour) immigration. The annual net immigration of 20,000 in the 1960s dropped to 13,000 in the 1970s and remained below 20,000 until the 1990s.

The post-war people’s home

Another important backdrop to the multicultural moment was the increase in prosperity, the political stability of the corporatist system, the long rule of the Social Democratic Party, which controlled the Swedish government from 1932 to 1976, and the institutionalization of the universalist welfare state. Sweden’s bulging public treasury, to which immigrants were net contributors, was handled by a party that was intent on changing Swedish society in line with its ideology and the growing expectations of the citizenry. As a

84 SOU 1974:69, pp. 114–115. The Commission of Immigration did, however, also legitimize its multiculturalist policy aims by forecasting a continued inflow of immigrants to Sweden. A premise of the new policy was that the current minority groups of Sweden “will be joined by new population groups speaking other languages besides Swedish and having a partly different identity which in many cases they will be anxious to retain”, SOU 1974:69, p. 25. This was in line with the prediction of Jonas Widgren (head secretary of the Commission, see study IV in this thesis) that the Swedish nation-state would wither away as a consequence of immigration.

85 Lundh & Olsson, p. 22.

result, new universal benefits and services were introduced and the public sector grew massively from the 1960s onwards. The wave of social reforms, together with concurrent changes in the cultural mainstream brought on by urbanization, secularization, and the 68-revolt(s) against prevailing conventions on social behaviour, politics, sex, gender and the environment, transformed the Swedish way of life. 87

The process of modernization went hand in hand with the ideological construction of Sweden as the most modern of nations, a form of implicit or banal nationalism that by the 1960s had largely replaced the more expressive conservative nationalism of the 19th century. 88 At the beginning of the


1960s, the Swedish historian Sten Carlsson characterized Sweden’s new nationalism in the following succinct way:

The Swede is no longer enthroned upon memories of great olden days [a reference to the second verse of Sweden’s national anthem] but finds the superiority of his own country over other countries fairly self-evident without giving the matter much thought.89

In the mid-1960s, the popular celebration of the warrior kings of old, whose statues were centrally placed in many of Sweden’s major cities, came to an end90 and, with the new constitution of 1974, the monarchy lost the last vestiges of power and was given a purely ceremonial role in the political system. The law on religious freedom in 1951, which guaranteed the free choice of religious affiliation and the removal of Christian elements (e.g. Christian instruction and the Morning Prayer) in the new comprehensive school system that was introduced in the 1960s, weakened the influence of the Lutheran Church. By the mid-1970s, the traditional pillars of Swedish nationhood, the Monarchy and the Church, had formally been reduced to quaint, if not embarrassing, symbols of the “great olden days” that were now considered merely old in light of the ever progressing modern (social) democratic Swedish welfare state.

The state’s basic centralized power structure that had been established by the sovereigns of centuries past was, however, utilized and expanded by the post-war welfare state; never

89 ”Svensken tronar inte längre på minnen från fornstora dar, men finner det egna landets överlägsenhet över andra tämligen självklar, utan att närmare reflektera häröver.” Quoted in Hall, p. 277.
before had Swedish society been so thoroughly organized and centralized. The strong state, together with the high level of taxation which increased with the growth of the public sector, meant that there was virtually no possibility to organize communal life independent of the state. A non-public school, for instance, needed special permission from the state to operate and the funding of such schools was almost always given on a temporary basis.

Ethno-cultural difference in the people’s home

In 1940s and 1950s, before the implementation of the comprehensive school system reform, Estonian and Jewish refugees were able to secure permission to establish schools of their own. However, the public funding of these schools was precarious and the costs of running them had to be supplemented by the community members.\(^{91}\) State subsidies for the running of the catholic St. Erik’s School were also granted on a temporary basis and on the condition that the school would not be utilized as a base for missionizing or as a precedent for establishing additional religious schools in Sweden.\(^{92}\) The establishment and existence of the schools was only tolerated due to the so-called special circumstances


and small size of the groups. After the comprehensive school system had been established, the Estonian and Jewish minority schools were increasingly regarded as problematic precedents, especially when immigration from Finland increased in the 1960s.\(^9^3\)

The scope and power of the expanding welfare state also meant that new political ideas and reforms, often introduced and drawn-up by academic experts close to the Social Democratic Party, could have enormous impact on all aspects of society.\(^9^4\) Social scientists, for example, gave scientific legitimacy to new ideas on gender and women activists, armed with these ideas, worked within the Social Democratic Party and the state to change Swedish gender relations.\(^9^5\) Through political reforms (e.g. the introduction of separate assessment in taxation) and state-run campaigns, the Swedish housewife, as an ideal and a social position, became obsolete in the 1960s and 1970s.\(^9^6\) The expansionist and reform-oriented drive of the welfare state, the top-down political power structure of the state and the labour movement (i.e. the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement) in control of the state made it possible for new ideas to break through politically at the top of the structure and then be implemented across the whole of society.

In brief, the political and the cultural context of post-

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\(^9^6\) Östberg & Andersson, pp. 182–183.
war Sweden included both adverse and conducive elements for the idea of multiculturalism. However, the nationalist universalism of the people’s home was unfavourable to an idea directly opposed to the ideal of homogeneity. The liberal egalitarian norms on which the welfare state project was built could be, and were, also employed to legitimate the emancipation of the individual from historically constituted institutions such as the family. This did not bode well for an idea that stressed the importance of preserving ethno-cultural minorities. A minority is preserved through intra-group contact and cohesion, beginning at the level of family, while the universalist norms and institutions of the Swedish welfare state were (implicitly) nationalistic; that is, the whole of society was geared towards the reproduction of ‘Swedishness’. The reformist drive and future-oriented outlook of the Swedish political and cultural elites, the general level of prosperity and the widespread will of the politically dominant left and parts of the centre-right to turn disadvantages into equal life chances did, however, also offer opportunities for the furthering of multiculturalism.

Underprivileged immigrants and their children needed to be included in the welfare state project according to the logic of the universal (social democratic) model of welfare. Political philosopher Nancy Fraser has pointed out that political discourse in modern welfare states centres on ‘needs’ and that these needs are not self-evident but politically contested, rejected or affirmed. Needs can be established or denied through struggles over the interpretation of what a particular need is and how it might be satisfied. The institutionalized possibility of creating new needs and making claims on the satisfaction of these needs in the (expanding) welfare state

97 Berggren & Trägårdh, pp. 294–297.
opened up an opportunity for the advancement of the idea of multiculturalism. The needs of the immigrant groups could be defined and shown as different in kind from the needs of other underprivileged groups, and prompt and legitimize political reform to satisfy these new needs.

Furthermore, the increase of ethno-cultural diversity brought on by immigration was, from a contemporary Swedish perspective, a modern economically beneficial and even exciting social phenomenon. The idea of multiculturalism was at least new, if nothing else; the question was whether it was also progressive.

2.2 Finland as Sweden’s special case and vice versa

Labour immigration from Finland, unaffected by the regulations on non-Nordic immigration, increased rapidly in the late 1960s and peaked in 1970 with more than 40,000 Finnish citizens emigrating to Sweden during that year. In 1970, in excess of 200,000 Finnish citizens and more than 50,000 Finnish-born Swedish citizens resided in Sweden.99 At the beginning of the 1970s, the Finnish immigrant group was larger than all the other immigrant groups combined and, as the Finnish migration scholars Korkisaari and Tarkiainen have pointed out, the question of immigrant adjustment in Sweden was, to a great extent, tantamount to the Finnish immigrant question at that time.100

The fact that the majority of labour immigrants in Sweden were Finnish citizens sets Sweden apart from the rest of the European countries receiving immigrant labour. The territory

99 Korkisaari & Tarkiainen, p. 164.
100 Ibid., p. 170.
of the Republic of Finland had been an integral part of the Kingdom of Sweden from the middle-ages until the early 19th century when Sweden lost the eastern part of its realm to Russia during the Napoleonic wars. The shared history of the two countries and the reforging of close political and cultural ties under the banner of Nordic cooperation after the end of the Second World War differentiated Finnish immigration into Sweden de jure and de facto from other streams of labour immigration.

From the 1940s onwards, the scope of Nordic cooperation widened and deepened. The Nordic Council, an arena for parliamentary cooperation between the Nordic countries, was founded in 1952. In this year, passport-free travel, which allows Nordic citizens to travel and reside in Nordic countries without residency permits and passports, was introduced. The joint Nordic labour market came into force on the 2nd July 1954 and, in 1955, the Nordic Convention on Social Security was implemented, which expanded the social rights of Nordic citizens living in another Nordic country on the basis of formal mutuality.101 These intra-Nordic reforms also gave impetus to Nordic cooperation on citizenship legislation. Formally initiated during a meeting of the Nordic ministers of Justice, a commission of experts was called in 1961 to overhaul and give recommendations on the revision of citizenship legislation in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. The political mission of the joint Nordic commission on citizenship was to investigate the further facilitation of naturalization for Nordic citizens in the Nordic countries.102

According to the commission, the need for a revision

of citizenship legislation that furthered the naturalization of Nordic citizens had become pressing in light of the advancement of Nordic cooperation in other fields and due to the general aspirations of the Nordic countries to deepen cooperation. The reform of citizenship legislation was conceived as a judicial expression of the togetherness that existed between the Nordic peoples.\(^\text{103}\) The 1961 commission’s proposal for revisions to the naturalization policies of Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway were introduced in all four countries at the end of the 1960s. The residency times required of Nordic citizens for naturalization through application were lowered in all four countries and, from the beginning of the 1970s, all non-naturalized Nordic citizens could become citizens of another Nordic country by simply notifying the relevant authorities of their wish to acquire citizenship, providing they had resided in the country for a minimum of seven years.\(^\text{104}\)

Finnish immigrants in Sweden were thus not considered to be strange and distant foreigners in the eyes of the law, nor according to the trans-Nordic political principles of Nordic cooperation and brotherhood. The intertwined past, close geographical proximity and geopolitical positions of Sweden and Finland also meant that the connection between Finland and Sweden went beyond the institutionalization of Nordic cooperation; Finland was Sweden’s ‘special sibling’ and vice-versa. The interlaced historical ties between Sweden and Finland were also manifested in the official

\(^{\text{103}}\) Ibid., p. 13.

bilingualism of the Finnish state (i.e. Finnish and Swedish), the constitutionally protected language rights of Swedish-speaking Finnish citizens and the monolingual (Swedish) institutions of the Swedish-speaking minority.

For centuries, Swedish had been the language of the state, commerce and high culture in Finland and remained so for decades after Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy after Russia’s victory over Sweden in the Finnish war of 1808–1809. In the latter half of the 19th century, the Finnish language slowly but surely gained an official position in Finland. The constitution from 1919 and the Language Act of 1922 established that Finnish and Swedish were the two national languages of the independent Republic of Finland. When Finland declared its independence in 1917, approximately 11 percent of the population was Swedish-speaking, but by 1970 this percentage had dropped to 6.6 percent.105 One of the causes for the proportional decline of the Swedish-speaking population was emigration. After the end of the Second World War, many Swedish-speaking Finns migrated to Sweden and approximately 15–20 percent of the total Finnish emigration flow to Sweden from the 1950s to the 1970s comprised Swedish-speaking Finns.106 After the loss of Finland, 19th century Swedish nationalism concentrated on naturalizing the unity and ‘Swedishness’ of ‘true’ Sweden. Over time, the Sweden that came into existence territorially after the loss of Finland was projected onto the past before the turning point of 1809.107

107 Gabriel Bladh & Christer Kuvaja, 'Från ett rike till två nationalstater',
The ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity established in the 19th century was carried into the 20th century by the Swedish labour movement in reconfigured, equality-driven form with the gaze of reform set firmly on the future. The Conservatives of the 19th century wanted to forget Finland because the separation was too painful, and the Progressives of the 20th century were no longer bothered with the past except as a negative point of reference in the march towards an ever improved future. The Swedish heritage of Finland, including the existence of the Swedish-speaking minority, thus became increasingly irrelevant in Sweden. This, coupled to the fundamental fact that Swedish-speaking Finns who emigrated to Sweden spoke Swedish and shared the same cultural traditions with the Swedes, which facilitated their adjustment, meant that Swedish-speaking Finnish immigrants largely disappeared from view in Sweden. In the eyes of the Swedish authorities, all Finnish immigrants were presumably Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking Finns were, for instance, sent information material on Sweden written in Finnish.108

In 1969, Swedish-speaking Finns in Sweden established their own national organization, *Finlandssvenskarnas Riksförbund i Sverige*, which was comparatively late if one considers the duration of sustained immigration of Swedish-speaking Finns and the size of the group at that time. In comparison to the national organization of Finnish-speaking Finns in Sweden, *Ruotsin Suomalaisseurojen Keskusliitto – Centralförbundet för finska föreningar i Sverige*, the national organization of Swedish-speaking Finns established in 1957 carried little political weight and was never an active player

in the debates and political struggles over Sweden’s future as a multicultural society in the 1960s and 1970s. There is also no evidence of individual Swedish-speaking Finns in Sweden making the claim that Swedish-speaking Finns constituted a new Swedish minority group worthy of public recognition and support. However, Swedish-speaking Finns living in Sweden at that time, such as author Gösta Ågren and journalist Erik Bagerstam (Pakarinen), expressed support for the idea of multiculturalism in general and for the recognition of the linguistic and cultural rights of Finnish-speakers in Sweden in particular.\textsuperscript{109} The preservation of the Swedish-speaking Finns as a distinct minority group in Sweden was never brought to the fore by the Swedish-speaking Finns in Sweden who merely wanted the Swedish authorities to recognize that Swedish, not Finnish, was their mother tongue. The Finnish-speaking Finns in Sweden, however, had more pressing issues with the Swedish government concerning the future of Finnish-speaking immigrants and their children.

Transnational Swedish-Finnish entanglements and multiculturalism

In the third study of the thesis, I show how the education of Finnish-speaking immigrant children in Sweden became politicized transnationally in both Sweden and Finland. Language teaching in and of the mother tongue was conceptualized as a social policy and migration policy question. The new perception and policy discourse on mother

tongue teaching that was established at the end of 1960s in Sweden occurred in the context of large-scale immigration from Finland, which had been enabled by common Nordic labour. The efforts of a dedicated group of ethnic activists, linguistic experts and officials facilitated the introduction of multiculturalist policies supporting non-Swedish languages in Sweden in the mid-1970s. The main actor in the initial stage of politicization, ethnic activist Artturi Similä, largely built his claims for mother tongue teaching in and of Finnish on the basis of comparison between the politics of language in Sweden and Finland.

In study III, I furthermore show how scientific concepts such as, in this case, the concept of semilingualism were introduced and rooted in contemporary political debates and also the historically constituted saliency of language. I also demonstrate how these post-war debates on language acquisition and education still affect language policy discourses in both Sweden and Finland today. The political discourse on mother tongue teaching in Sweden shows how the new policies could be legitimized in different, even contradictory, ways to satisfy various political demands and ideological motives, most of which evolved around the ‘special relationship’ between Sweden and Finland.

The importance of the ‘Finnish factor’ in the making of Sweden’s multicultural moment is also demonstrated in study II of this thesis, the results of which highlight the specific characteristics of the groups for whom ethno-cultural recognition and support was claimed and for whom multiculturalism was introduced. The establishment of multiculturalism in Canada was facilitated by claims made by well-integrated white ethnics who, as Kymlicka has pointed out, were regarded as “fully committed to the basic liberal democratic principles” and “seen to share a common
‘Western’ and ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilization”\textsuperscript{110}. The Finns in Sweden were also white ethnics and well-integrated in the sense that their labour market participation was higher than that of the majority population. The Finns not only shared a common ‘Western’ and ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilization with the Swedes, they belonged, in the words of historian Pirjo Markkola, to the same “Lutheran corner of the world”\textsuperscript{111} as the Swedes and the other majority populations of the Nordic countries.

Kymlicka has, on the basis of the historical success and failures of multiculturalism policies in the West, theorized that the following conditions are especially salient for multiculturalism to prosper: i) the minority group is not perceived as a threat to national security; ii) the group is not regarded as illiberal; that is, the group’s culture is not at odds with human rights norms; iii) there is a perception among the citizenry that immigration is regulated and borders controlled; iv) immigration is heterogeneous; that is, immigrants come from many source countries; and v) immigrants are perceived as economic contributors to society.\textsuperscript{112} Post-war Finnish immigrants were never regarded as potential fifth columnists in a conflict between Sweden and Finland, and after a slight ‘red scare’ concerning some Finnish immigrants in connection to the so-called wild strikes (i.e. strikes not authorized by the Trade Union Confederation) at the beginning of 1970s\textsuperscript{113}, the Finns in Sweden have not


\textsuperscript{113} ’Invandrarna svåraste frågan’ [Interview with PM Olof Palme], \textit{Dagens}
been perceived as any sort of national security threat in Sweden. There was also no fear of culturally-based human rights abuse in the Finnish community and, when official multiculturalism was introduced, labour immigration had been regulated and the borders of Sweden were (seemingly) under control. Post-war immigration into Sweden was not as heterogeneous as subsequent immigration has been, but after the leadership of the Finnish community was co-opted by the Social Democrats and the large majority of Finnish immigrants became politically well-integrated from a social democratic standpoint — the Swedish labour movement practiced collective affiliation of local unions with the Social Democratic Party and Finnish immigrants were highly unionized\textsuperscript{114} — the size of this single immigrant group was no longer perceived as a political problem.\textsuperscript{115} The economic contribution of the Finns was also never in doubt; in the 1960s and the 1970s, Finnish immigrants contributed more to the Swedish welfare state than they took out.\textsuperscript{116}

Finnish immigrants in Sweden were a ‘special’ group, not on the grounds that they were particularly unusual, peculiar or exotic but because they were perceived as rather ordinary. The Finns were ‘special’ in a political sense due to the interwoven history of Finland and Sweden and because they


\textsuperscript{115} See studies II and III in this thesis.

were Nordic citizens living in another Nordic country at a
time of extensive Nordic cooperation. The cultural sameness
of the Finns and the political circumstances connected
to their migration to Sweden furthered the advancement
of multiculturalism as a political idea in Sweden. It also
facilitated the introduction of official multiculturalism due to
the universal logic of the Swedish welfare state; although the
Finns were ‘Nordic brothers’, they were still conceptualized as
one group among many new groups and measures directed at
the Finns also had to apply to the other groups. Nevertheless,
the fact that immigration into Sweden was heterogeneous and
not exclusively Finnish could also be utilized to legitimize the
rejection of Finnish claims of Swedish-Finnish parity and the
limits of Swedish multiculturalism. Sweden could not follow
Finland’s example of bilingualism without discriminating
against other minority groups of immigrant origin and official
multilingualism was not a conceivable option.

In the larger context of post-war European migration,
Finnish migration to Sweden constituted a special case.
However, Finland was not only Sweden’s special case, Sweden
was also Finland’s special case and the power relationship
between the two countries was asymmetrical. Their shared
past and Nordic cooperation could and was employed to
underpin argumentative claims on Swedish obligations
towards Finland and Finnish immigrants, although the
ability and will of the Finnish state to make demands on
Sweden was limited. Finland’s past as a Swedish province,
the historical prosperity gap between the two countries,
the (accentuated) geo-political predicament of Finland
in the post-war shadow of the Soviet Union and the close
ties between the Social Democratic Parties in Sweden and
Finland all contributed to curb potential Finnish pressure
on Sweden with regard to Finnish immigrants. Also, shown
in study III, neither the Finnish government nor the Finnish
president, Urho Kekkonen, pushed for the introduction of
formalized minority rights for Finns in Sweden. The Finnish political elite was satisfied with the official affirmation of the new multicultural and multilingual Sweden that centred on the Finns and, from a historical perspective, the radical policy reforms based on this new outlook, even though these reforms were very limited in comparison to Finnish bilingualism. There was room for multiculturalism in the Swedish people’s home as long as it did not cross national and social democratic thresholds; thresholds that the Finnish government also respected.

3 Earlier research on the history of multiculturalism in Sweden

The research literature on immigration, integration, ethnic relations and related topics in Sweden is vast. In the following, I present the literature that has been especially relevant for this dissertation project in chronological order, according to date of publication.

The history of the victors

Research on the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden began a few years after the idea of multiculturalism was introduced into Swedish political discourse due to the fact that David Schwarz, the father of Swedish multiculturalism\textsuperscript{117}, pursued a career as a social scientist from the end of the 1960s to the mid-1970s. Schwarz

\textsuperscript{117} See studies I and II in this thesis.
conducted research on immigration and the politics of ethnicity in Sweden and published scholarly works on the political response to the idea of multiculturalism. \(^{118}\) Schwarz’s academic ambitions were deeply intertwined with his political aims and thus his works, including the anthologies he edited, should be read as part scholarly treatises and part political pamphlets. When one realizes the duality of Schwarz’s work, it becomes twice as useful. It is an essential reference work on the history of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden and, simultaneously, an important part of that same history.

*Svensk invandrarpolitik: en faktabok*, an often (uncritically) quoted work by Jonas Widgren, the former head secretary of the Commission on Immigration, also carries the duality of being both a treatise on historical development of Swedish immigrant policy and a defence of it in its then current multiculturalist approach. Widgren presents, without mentioning his own role in the process, a generalized account of the post-war history of Swedish immigrant and migration policy and, at the same time, tries to legitimize the multiculturalist policy turn, of which he was one of the architects in the 1970s. \(^{119}\) As the history of Sweden’s multicultural moment, the political turn to multiculturalism in particular, was initially written by

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119 Widgren, *Svensk invandrarpolitik*, pp. 15–17, 87–89; Also see study IV in this thesis for an analysis of Widgren’s pivotal role in the making of the multiculturalist turn.
the ‘winners’, that is, ethnic activists, experts and officials advocating multiculturalism directly involved in the making of the moment and/or its political aftermath of sweeping implementation, the turn to multiculturalism is presented in passive voice and carries a teleological tendency in early accounts.\textsuperscript{120} For example, Widgren describes the turn as a teleological process brought about by immigration into Sweden, unified demands for a generous minority policy by the minority groups and a general breakthrough of a more progressive outlook on ethno-cultural diversity among the political parties and forces influencing public opinion.\textsuperscript{121} The agency of the actors Widgren mentions in passing is not specified; no individuals, specific parties or forces are identified and Widgren also, perhaps out of modesty, writes himself out of the process. The focus of Widgren’s short account is on the process, not on whom or what made the process happen.

Nevertheless, the narratives by Widgren and other actors involved in the turn have contributed to my understanding on the events and processes leading up to the turn. For example, Widgren’s brief comment that the two main arguments for a multiculturalist society (i.e. no-one should have to abandon his/her language and ethnic identity and that ethno-cultural diversity is enriching and beneficial for the whole of society)


\textsuperscript{121} Widgren, \textit{Svensk invandrarpolitik}, p. 88.
made an impression on the Commission of Immigration and was an important lead for this dissertation project. These accounts were, however, not written as historical treatises but with the intention of providing a short and legitimizing background to the then current (post-turn) politics coupled to discussions on how the multicultural society and multiculturalist policy could be further developed. The teleological narrative of progress presented in passive voice was, to a degree, reproduced when historians started writing, at the beginning of the 1990s, on post-war immigration and its consequences.

**Historical studies on Swedish multiculturalism**

In the standard work on post-war immigration into Sweden, *Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring* (1994), economic historians Christer Lundh & Rolf Ohlsson casually and causally claim that the growth of immigrant minorities was strong in the early 1960s and that this engendered an explicit and coherent minority policy. The growth in numbers and size of the immigrant minority groups was, however, even stronger in the latter part of the 1960s, although this did not compel the Social Democratic Party to introduce an explicit and coherent minority policy at that time. Lundh & Olsson also sweepingly claim that the minorities, both new and old, as individual collectives and collectively demanded a minority-friendly policy on multiculturalism. As a matter of fact, this was also how the ethnic activists of the 1960s framed their demands

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122 Ibid.
123 Lundh & Ohlsson, p. 122.
124 Ibid., p. 123.
and how the introduction of official multiculturalism was later legitimized by, among others, Jonas Widgren and the Commission on Immigration in the mid-1970s.

However, as shown in this thesis, the conceptualization of non-Swedish ethnic groups in Sweden as (national) minorities and the political demands that followed from this was highly contested within and between the groups. Furthermore, I emphasize that official multiculturalism was introduced after immigration had decreased substantially; that is, when it seemed that the growth of immigrant groups had been halted. Harald Runblom’s seminal article ‘Swedish multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective’ (1994) also, to some extent, reproduced the passive voice of the (victorious) narrative on the multicultural moment. Runblom’s historical and comparative take on the established narrative of the moment nonetheless dismantles the teleology of formal and semi-formal accounts. There is more on ‘Swedish multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective’ below.


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moment is also touched upon in both works, especially in Suomalaiset Ruotsissa that narrates the intra-Finnish feuds on, among other things, whether the Finns were a national minority in the making or a group of social democratic workers with some ‘special problems’ and on how they should organize themselves politically in Sweden.

Due to the language barrier, neither Suomalaiset Ruotsissa nor other academic works in Finnish have been utilized by Swedish researchers. The same is true for source material in Finnish. This has created something of a blind-spot on the largest and politically most important immigrant group in post-war Sweden as a factor in Swedish politics. Finnish-speaking researchers writing in Swedish or English have, however, mainly been interested in the social and cultural history of the Finnish migratory experience, not the history of ideas and politics relating to migration. This has left a research gap on the transnational politicking of the Finns in Sweden and bilateral Finnish-Swedish discussions on the Finns in Sweden, a gap that this dissertation only partially fills.

In his ground-breaking historical study on the development of Swedish immigrant policy in the post-war period, *Jämlikhet och valfrihet: en studie av den svenska invandrarpolitikens framväxt* (2001), historian Lars-Erik Hansen expands on Román’s work on Schwarz and the debates on the immigrant question in the 1960s.¹²⁷ *Jämlikhet och valfrihet* is a pioneering work on the post-war history of Swedish integration policy and is regularly cited in later political and social science studies. Hansen empirically charts the discourses on immigrant policy from 1945 to 1975 with detours back to the inter-war period. Hansen’s and Roman’s studies were the first empirically grounded historical accounts on the actors and debates that shaped (what I term) the multicultural moment. Without the efforts of Hansen and Román, this dissertation would not exist in the form it does today.

In *Jämlikhet och valfrihet*, Hansen declares that he will critically discuss two of Roman’s results: Roman’s categorization of contesting camps in the first major debate on the immigrant question into zealous assimilationists (*assmiliationsivrare*) and pluralists and Roman’s actor-centric hypothesis that David Schwarz seemingly played a pivotal part in the way in which the new policy of 1975 was formulated. However, among these issues, Hansen only addresses the question of categorization head on; he argues that the group Román terms ‘zealous assimilationists’ should be termed ‘advocates of a mixed culture society’ (*blandkulturförespråkare*) as they were not keen supporters of assimilation. Political scientist Carl Dahlström, however, categorizes the two groups as multiculturalists and

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universalists in his analysis of the debate from 2004.\textsuperscript{128}

I think all three are misguided in their labelling of the group I have chosen to term ‘progressive assimilationists’.\textsuperscript{129} The 1960s’ advocates of assimilation were neither Swedish ethno-nationalists nor advocates of a mixed culture and, as Will Kymlicka, the leading political philosopher of multiculturalism has pointed out, there is no such thing as non-assimilationist universalism because states are not ethno-culturally neutral.\textsuperscript{130} The perception that the modern and secular Swedish state was, or at least strived to be, ethno-culturally neutral and universalist did, however, form the basis for the progressive assimilationists opposition to multiculturalism. The progressive assimilationists perceived the idea of multiculturalism as reactionary collectivism, the primacy of blood-lines, tradition and conservatism over modernity and the progressive emancipation of the individual, thus arguing much in the same way as many of today’s numerous critics of multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{131}

Hansen’s disregard for Román’s tentative claim that Schwarz played an important part in the making of Swedish multiculturalism probably stems from Hansen’s theoretical approach: “I analyse the actors from a discursive perspective [… ] and is therefore not interested in the interests of the actor or their tactical games.”\textsuperscript{132} However, I have studied


\textsuperscript{129} ‘Multiculturalists’ is an apt categorization of the group I call ethnic activists if one merely considers the ideological position of the ‘multiculturalists’, but as I also focus on the personal history of the ‘multiculturalists’ and their political activism, I have chosen the more contextualizing label ethnic activists. See subchapter 5.2.


\textsuperscript{131} For more on the progressive assimilationists see study I in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{132} ”Jag analyserar aktörerna ur ett diskursperspektiv […] och är därför inte intresserad av aktörernas intressen eller taktiska spel.” Hansen 2001,
the multicultural moment from an idea- and actor-centric perspective. Thus, I have also taken an analytical interest in the motives and intentions of the actors and their “games”. From this perspective, Román’s argument on the importance of Schwarz, which he advanced solely on a comparison between the policy prescriptions made by Schwarz in his debate articles and the policy aims of the state-sponsored multiculturalism introduced in 1975, must be applauded.¹³³ Hansen’s neglect of the role of the actors, their interests and tactical games in his examination on the development of Swedish immigrant policy is perfectly understandable as he primarily employs a method of discourse analysis to chart the development of policy. However, in so doing, he presents a fragmented narrative on the policy turn that displays gaps of information, inaccuracies and temporal incoherence.

A major problem of Hansen’s *Jämlikhet och valfrihet* is that, although Hansen professes to historically chart the emergence of the field of immigration policy with the use of discourse analysis, he does not map or present the analysed discourses diachronically. Evidence of the discourses, usually written statements from the source material, is presented and analysed without much regard to when the statements were made. Hansen’s theoretical and methodological need to fit the historical evidence into a scheme of discourses leads to a disregard for the historicity of the source material from which the evidence is derived; speech acts are categorized as belonging to this or that discourse and the temporal context of the speech-acts and also the discourses that the speech-acts purportedly manifest are neglected. Due to a lack of information and the dogmatic scheme of discourses, Hansen, for instance, declares that the Working Group on

¹³³ Román, p. 37.
Immigration suffered from conceptual confusion when, in 1968, it argued that a compromise between integration and assimilation must be sought.\textsuperscript{134} In light of how the concept of integration had been defined in 1968 by the Working Group’s expert, Harald Swedner, partly on the basis of the ethnic activist’s definition of integration, the group’s statement on the need to reach a compromise between integration and assimilation makes perfect sense (see study II in this thesis).

When the existence of a discourse at a particular point in time has been established by Hansen, he proceeds to infer, sometimes on a very loose or non-existent empirical basis, that the discourse has become dominant. Hansen, for example, claims that David Schwarz (or the discourse emanating from Schwarz) in 1967 had broad-based social democratic support, that the social democrats positioned themselves in support of increased ethnic equality (i.e. a confusing analytical concept employed by Hansen to categorically label anything not explicitly assimilationist) and that large parts of the social democratic movement came out in support of state-sponsored multiculturalism at this time.\textsuperscript{135} This was simply not the case: the social democratic movement was staunchly anti-multiculturalist in 1967, as shown in studies I and IV in this thesis. It is highly questionable whether the social democratic movement has ever shown broad-based support for multiculturalism or to the much more radical ‘ethnic equality’ concept employed by Hansen, even after the idea of multiculturalism was conditionally adopted by the Social Democratic Party in the 1970s. Hansen wants to prove his thesis that the changes in discourse he identified almost immediately caused radical political change in a simple causality model of discursive change–policy change, even though he lacks empirical evidence to support

\textsuperscript{134} Hansen 2001, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{135} Hansen 2001, p. 146.
Hansen did, however, produce new historical knowledge on the birth of Swedish immigration policy in the post-war period. Hansen paved the way for further historical research on both the policy-making process and the multicultural moment by uncovering new information and, at the same time, revealing the gaps in historical knowledge on the subject. Later historical, political and social science research has not filled these gaps because the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of the multicultural moment as an historical turning point have not been of main research interest. Explanations for the introduction of official multiculturalism that have not strictly followed the teleological narrative utilized to legitimize the new policy after it was introduced have, however, been presented on a regular basis since the 1990s.

3.1 Explaining Sweden’s political turn to multiculturalism in earlier research

Since the 1990s, the multiculturalist turn of Sweden has been a subject of both historical and social scientific research as a part of the general rise in academic interest on immigration into Sweden. In the article ‘Swedish multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective’ (1994), historian Harald Runblom argued that Swedish multiculturalism, as a political ideology, constituted a clear break from Swedish traditions when it was introduced in the 1970s. Runblom points to four factors that caused what he characterizes as

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a “180° turn”. First, there was a “growing awareness” that some immigrant groups, especially the Greeks and the Turks, who had arrived in the late 1950s and in the 1960s were not as easily integrated as groups who had come during the 1940s and 1950s. Second, because of these ‘problematic’ immigrants groups, the Swedish government established immigrant policy as a policy field. Here Runblom refers to parliamentary motions on supporting the aspirations of the Balts in Sweden; however, the Balts were one of the groups who had arrived in the 1940s and, thus, supposedly followed Runblom’s first factor of an ‘unproblematic’ group. Third, “in certain circles awareness was growing that the state had moral responsibility for the well-being [of the immigrants]” and the Swedish authorities “discovered and accepted the consequences” of the population’s diversification. Fourth, Finland initiated international pressure.

Runblom’s brief and hypothetical explanation for the “180° turn” was, in light of later research including my own, surprisingly poignant. Runblom’s article functioned as one of the starting points for this dissertation project and one could argue that some of the factors and processes Runblom points to have now been empirically substantiated and analytically fleshed out. An odd feature of previous Swedish research is the lack of references to earlier research. Runblom’s article is not referred to in later research on the multiculturalist turn; for example, Hansen’s Jämlikhet och valfrihet does not cite Runblom’s article.

Runblom’s article also garners no mention in studies on political science that discuss and/or try to explain the multiculturalist turn such as Demker and Malmström’s Ingenmansland? Svensk immigrationspolitik i utrikespolitisk

137 Ibid., p. 629.
138 Ibid., pp. 629–630
139 Ibid., p. 630.
My initial reading of Runblom, Román and Hansen in the latter half of the 2000s partly satisfied my curiosity while, at the same time, leaving me wanting more information and analysis on what I, from my temporal vantage point, perceived to be a profound shift in the modern history of Sweden. The works of Runblom, Román and Hansen thus provided an impetus to initiate this dissertation project and the historiographical basis on which to further develop Sweden’s multicultural moment as a research problem.

Neither Hansen’s discourse analytical approach, nor Runblom’s empirically and theoretically vague factors nor Román’s short biography on Schwarz as a debater, fulfilled my then dim expectations concerning what should be known on such a pivotal and comparatively unique historical turning point. After I began my own research into the matter, I was able to determine why I found the historical accounts of Runblom, Román and Hansen, and also the political and social science literature referred to

above, lacking: the theoretical approach, be it discourse analysis, institutionalism, policy analysis or a mix of all three, produced accounts of the turn that, in my opinion, underplayed the role of actors, ideas and concepts within the historical process and also the nature and composition of post-war immigration.

The method of discourse analysis utilized in the earlier research in particular overlooks the agency of actors as conceivers and users of ideas and concepts. Instead, applications of the method have led to a form of circular reasoning on the emergence of multiculturalism: an empirically observed discourse is explained as a product of that same discourse. At the level of actual political impact, the explanatory value of discourse analysis can also become rather mystical as historians might, knowingly or unwittingly, endow ‘discourse’ itself with agency. Hansen, for instance, argues that “the equality discourse drove all established parties, influenced all ideologies in the direction of state-intervening pluralism [i.e. multiculturalism]”143. This might be so, but it begs the question of why the “equality discourse”, apparently in place since at least the beginning of the 1960s, as connected by Hansen to the so-called active foreign policy of Sweden and the establishment of the welfare state, did not work its magic before the 1970s, why the Swedish equality discourse produced this outcome when equality discourses in other countries did not and why exactly the (Swedish) equality discourse drove both parties and “ideologies” towards multiculturalism and not assimilationism, which it arguably had done before the 1970s.

In a similar fashion to Hansen, political scientist Ulf Mörkenstam primarily employs a method of Foucauldian

discourse analysis to uncover the normative foundations of Swedish immigrant policy between 1946 and 1976. Mörkenstam acknowledges that the methodology of his analysis marginalizes individual actors, although he argues that the party political consensus on immigration policy in the time-period he studied lessens the problem of omitting actors.\(^{144}\) I maintain, in line with Borvei and Hammar\(^ {145}\), and in this thesis show that the lack of pronounced party politicization gave individual actors a much more influential position in the agenda-setting and policy-making process than would have been the case if immigrant policy had been party politicized.

In comparison to Hansen’s chronically fragmented analysis of Swedish immigration policy discourse(s), Mörkenstam’s narrative follows the normative changes in discourse in an orderly fashion from 1946 to 1976 by analysing a clearly delimited string of statements on immigration and immigrants in official publications such as Commission reports, government propositions and law. Mörkenstam makes several noteworthy observations on discursive ‘themes’ in the material and some of these observations have been of relevance for my dissertation project. For example, he notes that concerns on security in connection to immigration declined in salience and that immigration was regarded as economically beneficial.\(^ {146}\) He also emphasizes the importance of Nordism and Finnish immigration in the discourse on immigration and immigrant policy.\(^ {147}\) My dissertation project has benefited from the results of Mörkenstam’s discourse analytical reading of official statements on immigration policy, even though Mörkenstam’s analysis does not go

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144 Mörkenstam, pp. 574–575.
145 Hammar, p. 45.
146 Mörkenstam, p. 586.
147 Ibid., pp. 599–600.
deeply into the discourse to reveal the ideas, players and moves that produced the themes and norms that he finds on display in the formal documents. Moreover, much in the same way as Hansen, Mörkenstam’s explanations for the discursive changes he detects suffers from theoretical overstretch brought on by the choice of theory and method. The discourse(s), seemingly immune to human agency and interest, reproduces and sometimes reconfigures itself according to changing ‘structural’ circumstances and impresses itself on policy. According to Mörkenstam, Sweden’s multiculturalism in the 1970s somehow amounted to the re-creation of the cultural hierarchies embedded in Swedish nationalism during the early 20th century. Mörkenstam construes the multiculturalist recognition of difference introduced in the mid-1970s as negative othering of immigrants brought about by the nebulous force of institutionalized Swedish nationalism. In Mörkenstam’s account, the immigrants or, for that matter, the Swedes themselves are bereft of political agency. Multiculturalism becomes a product of Swedish ethnocentrism forced on the hapless immigrants; Sweden and Swedish ideological power as the subject, the immigrant other as the excluded object.

In addition to a lack of information, disregard for human agency and diachronic incoherencies, the earlier research also carries methodological nationalist tendencies. The explanations for the Swedish turn to multiculturalism are fuelled by the unarticulated assumption that only factors inside nationally bounded societies, in this case Sweden, determine and explain historical change. There are also, with the exception of Runblom, no attempts to analytically situate the Swedish turn in a transnational context or to contrast the Swedish case with other national cases. The methodological nationalism of previous research is especially apparent in the

148 Ibid., pp. 605–606.
‘active foreign policy-argument’ put forward by both Hansen and Demker & Malmström, which seemingly transcends the boundaries of the Swedish nation in its explanation for the multiculturalist turn, although ultimately falling back on a very national and social democratic cause. According to Hansen, and also Demker & Malmström, Sweden’s active foreign policy, which included a critique on racism and ethnic discrimination in other countries, made the Swedish government vulnerable to moral critique on how it treated minority groups in Sweden. Therefore, as the Swedish government wanted to pursue its active foreign policy, it had to adjust its own policy on immigrants and minorities. There is, however, nothing to suggest that Sweden faced any serious charges of hypocrisy in the international arena on this point. Sweden’s active foreign policy, with its concomitant critique on racial discrimination, was perhaps in its most active phase in the years prior to Sweden’s official turn to multiculturalism in 1975.\footnote{Kjell Östberg, *När vinden vände: Olof Palme 1969-1986* (Stockholm: Leopard 2009), p. 111. See also Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Vol. 1, Formation of a Popular Opinion (1950-1970)* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 1999); Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Vol. 2, Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1994* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 2002).}

Hansen apparently takes the arguments of the ethnic activists as literal truths by arguing, without providing any empirical evidence to support his claim, that when abroad, Swedish diplomats, politicians and journalists were often reproached about the situation of the immigrants and minorities in Sweden and that this led to a re-evaluation of domestic policy.\footnote{Hansen 2001, p. 205. The ethnic activists, in particular Schwarz, often emphasized what they conceptualized as a discrepancy between the internationalism of Swedish foreign policy and the policies towards the immigrants and minorities in Sweden. To widen the scope of this claim to include international remarks on Swedish ideological inconsistency,} Demker & Malmström, in turn, stretch
their thesis too thinly when they argue that, in addition to Sweden's immigration policy, its integration policy can also “to a great extent can be explained by Sweden’s active foreign [policy] profile [utrikesprofil] and the picture of reality that this profile gave rise to”. Demker & Malmström fail to realize that multiculturalism in no way had been established as an international norm in the 1970s and that Sweden, ceteris paribus, could be conceptualized and portrayed as a leading country in immigrant/integration policy, in line with the picture of reality that the active foreign policy profile potentially gave rise to without embracing multiculturalism as a political idea. In fact, Sweden was portrayed as a leading country in the field of immigration policy well before multiculturalism became official policy as Hansen, contradicting his own foreign policy argument, has shown.

This is not to say that the idea of internationalism, the internationalism of prime minister Olof Palme in particular, and the use of this idea to further the idea of multiculturalism did not facilitate the multiculturalist turn, although there was nothing intrinsically multiculturalist about post-war Swedish foreign policy. Sweden’s active foreign policy emphasized the principles of democracy, human rights (at that time, human rights were conceptualized as individual rights, not minority rights). Schwarz, in his 1971 book Svensk invandrar- och minoritetspolitik 1945–68, referred to a statement made by South Africa in the general assembly of the UN on the 14th October 1960 that criticized Sweden and Norway (both prominent critics of Apartheid) for discriminating the Sámi and two similar manoeuvres made by the dictatorships of Portugal in 1969 and Poland in 1970 after the Swedish critique. However, Schwarz himself conceded that these few instances of international critique from authoritarian regimes hardly made the minority question in Sweden a foreign policy concern. David Schwarz, Svensk invandrar- och minoritetspolitik 1945–68, p. 48. 151 Demker & Malmström, p. 150. 152 Hansen 2001, p. 205.
or group rights, in the arena of international relations\textsuperscript{153}), universalist anti-racism and national sovereignty protected by international law.\textsuperscript{154}

Hansen and Demker & Malmström thus present a line of argument that tries to break from the national framework, although reproducing it in a different form. According to Hansen and Demker & Malmström, Sweden’s multiculturalist turn was, at least in part, caused by the active foreign policy of the social democratic Swedish government. Hansen also criticizes Demker & Malmström for being unable to show the connections between Sweden’s foreign policy and the Swedish policy of multiculturalism while ultimately failing to do so himself.\textsuperscript{155}

The earlier research on Sweden’s turn to multiculturalism has undoubtedly covered many aspects of the turn, although its nation-state-centric angle and often discursively underpinned observations have, to some extent, overlooked actors and processes below, beyond or even inside the Swedish welfare state. Policy change is not always set in motion by national political elites, institutions or ideological traditions.

\textsuperscript{155} Hansen 2001, p. 33.
4 Theory and method

Tracing the emergence of an idea and analysing its development and political impact makes for a multi-layered and multifaceted research problem. The nature of the research problem led me to approach it from different theoretical and methodological angles. However, at its theoretical and methodological core, this work is a study on the history of ideas. My dissertation seeks to historicize the multicultural moment of Sweden by exploring it as it developed in a particular historical context and was conceived and shaped by the agency of historical actors. The premise of the study is that history is not wholly determined by socioeconomic structures or self-generating discourses (in a discourse analytical or Foucauldian sense) and that the making of the future both in the past and in the present is never self-evident, but contingent on, among other things, the acts of men and the ideas they devise, develop and employ.

Following the theoretical and methodological tradition of the history of ideas or intellectual history, I have regarded texts and documents of the past, in the words of intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock, “as media of political discourse, in which authors perform speech acts upon readers and universes, and respondents perform acts leading to dispute and reflection.”\(^{156}\) Political discourse is here understood as being conducted “in a context of shared languages, consisting of variety of language games” which have been historically constituted and which are “specialised to perform rhetorical and paradigmatic functions related to the conceptualization and conduct of politics.”\(^{157}\) To make sense of the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Swedish political discourse,


\(^{157}\) Ibid., p. 81.
I have traced and analysed speech acts that manifested and, more importantly, utilized the idea of multiculturalism in arguments aiming at political change.

By speech-act I mean, following Pocock and fellow intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, ‘doing things with words’; that is, what historical actors were doing when making their utterances and, in particular, what kind of “move” they (potentially) performed.¹⁵⁸ I thus posed the question of what kind of action is performed in a text or in particular statements of a text. To understand these actions, they must be, as Pocock points out, placed “within a context furnished ultimately by social practices and historical situations, but also – in some ways more immediately – by the political languages by means of which the acts are performed”.¹⁵⁹ Pocock defines ‘political languages’ primarily as “idioms, rhetorics, ways of talking about politics, distinguishable language games of which each may have its own vocabulary, rules, preconditions and implications, tone and style”¹⁶⁰. This means that in addition to asserting what was said, I have also addressed the matter of how it was said, why it was said in a particular manner and in what way the utterances might have had an effect on subsequent speech-acts and, thus, political discourse. Political discourse is in this dissertation project is simply defined as the communication of political ideas and arguments, either through the spoken

¹⁵⁸ “To put it in another way, there is a sense in which we need to understand why a certain proposition has been put forward if we wish to understand the proposition itself. We need to see it not simply as a proposition, but also as a move in argument. So we need to grasp why it seemed worth making that precise move; to recapture the presuppositions and purposes that went into the making of it.” Quentin Skinner, ‘A reply to my critics’, *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, ed. James Tully (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988), p. 274.

¹⁵⁹ Pocock, p. 67.

¹⁶⁰ Pocock, p. 89.
or written word.

An understanding on the social, political and intellectual context and also intimate familiarization with the inter-textual context of the debate, in which the author was participating, was thus necessary to answer the questions concerning what the actors said and meant: “the intended force with which the utterances is said”\textsuperscript{161}. The intellectual and inter-textual contexts were identified through a holistic reading of contemporary texts; that is, the contexts were not identified separately from any particular contemporary text. The contexts were rather analytically constructed through a process of analysing different (and, it would turn out, at times inter-textually connected) contemporary texts that was conducted in tandem with reading narrative sources and the research literature on the post-war period. I was thus able to learn the ‘languages’ in which the political discourse was conducted, situate the texts in the contexts of which they themselves were constitutive parts, develop an understanding on what their authors were doing in writing them and what the conventions (the then prevailing tacit assumptions and practices\textsuperscript{162}) on ethno-cultural diversity in Swedish political discourse were and in what way these embedded conventions were challenged by the speech-acts (and other actions) of a particular set of actors and ultimately reconfigured.

Following this method, I plotted the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Swedish public discourse as a series of moves and counter-moves beginning with the opening move of David Schwarz in October 1964. I was attentive to any form of conceptual innovation in the debate(s) that followed and was able to pinpoint the introduction and propagation

of new concepts such as ‘the multicultural society’\(^\text{163}\) as the idea of multiculturalism took shape through argument. The operation of tracing and analysing the speech-acts was supplemented and underpinned by tracing concomitant actions conducted with the intention of advancing the idea through means other than performing (public) speech-acts and performing rhetorical moves; for example, ‘making contact’ and ‘collaborating’.

The question on how a move was performed with a speech-act has been primarily answered by identifying two specific and interconnected linguistic actions, referring (including pleading and invoking) and legitimizing. To what or whom did the actors refer when making their claims and in what way did the actors try to legitimize their claims? The question of legitimacy is not, as Skinner has pointed out, merely a question of epiphenomenal \textit{ex post} rationalizations for chosen courses of political action. Politicking, for instance the choice between policies, requires legitimation, especially if the political move attempted by an actor is in some way untoward, which was the case with the advancement of multiculturalism.\(^\text{164}\) Skinner typifies an actor attempting to legitimize untoward social and political action as an “innovating ideologist”:

\begin{quote}
It is by describing and thereby commending certain courses of action as (say) honest or friendly or courageous, while describing and thereby condemning others as treacherous or aggressive or cowardly, that we sustain our vision of the social behaviour we wish to encourage or disavow. This being so, all innovating ideologists may be said to
\end{quote}


face a hard but obvious rhetorical task. Their goal is to legitimise questionable forms of social behaviour. Their aim must therefore be to show that a number of favourable terms can somehow be applied to their seemingly questionable actions. If they can bring off this rhetorical trick, they can hope to argue that the condemnatory descriptions otherwise liable to be applied to their behaviour can be overridden or set aside.\textsuperscript{165}

I have chosen to describe David Schwarz as an “innovating ideologist” in ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration’ (study I) as Skinner’s ideal type perfectly fits the actions of Schwarz. The categorization of Schwarz as an innovating ideologist underlines the historical importance of the actions of Schwarz and his fellow promoters of multiculturalism who, in a way, were also innovating ideologists in their own right.\textsuperscript{166} The innovating ideologist Schwarz, followed by the other advocates of multiculturalism, was able to, in the way Skinner posits, “challenge your opponents to reconsider the feelings of disapproval or they normally express when they use the terms concerned” by rhetorically re-describing concepts such as homogeneity (as in the homogenous society), assimilation and integration. Skinner notes that the innovative ideologist “can try in the first place to introduce new and favourable terms into the language” and simply “coin new terms as the descriptions of allegedly new principles, and then apply them as descriptions of whatever questionable actions you [the innovating ideologist] wish to see commended”.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{165} Skinner, Visions of Politics, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{166} E.g. Artturi Similä (see study III in this thesis) and Jonas Widgren (see study IV in this thesis).
\textsuperscript{167} Skinner, Visions of Politics, p. 151.
This is exactly what the ethnic activists did when they introduced the concept of the multicultural society and described this ‘new’ society (wherein minority groups uphold their own communities and seek to perpetuate the distinctive cultural character of the group transgenerationally; a questionable action in post-war Sweden) by employing existing and favourable evaluative-descriptive terms such as, for example, modern, progressive, international, open and enriching. This rhetorical move was usually performed in tandem with a comparison to the ‘old’ homogenous society that was described by employing existing negative evaluative-descriptive terms such as, for example, nationalistic, divisive, discriminatory and parochial.

The activists’ conceptual innovation was thus made up of both the introduction of novel concepts and the innovative use of the established terminology of what could be referred to as the ‘political language of progress’ to prop up their new concepts and pejoratively described concepts deemed to be at odds with the idea of multiculturalism. The point here is that the activists had to address and utilize the prevailing conventions and political language to innovate in a manner that could be understood and successful.

The idea of multiculturalism emerged and developed through conceptual innovation and the concomitant use of the idea in political discourse. In this thesis, I have studied the idea of multiculturalism as it was conceptualized and advanced in political argument by actors engaged in politicking on the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of Sweden. The idea of multiculturalism emerged through conceptual innovation (e.g. the concept of the multicultural society), rhetorical re-descriptions or re-conceptualization (e.g. of the concept of assimilation), and by inter-connecting concepts in an oppositional scheme to a set of pejoratively
defined concepts (e.g. multicultural – uniform). Concepts not directly born out of the struggle to change discourse and politics in Sweden, such as semilingualism and identity, but that furthered advancement of the idea of multiculturalism, were also enlisted and given a place in the conceptual scheme that constituted the idea in Sweden by the time it was officially accepted in the mid-1970s.

Precisely as the idea of multiculturalism was in flux when it emerged, it has clearly continued to change as it has been employed. The idea(s) of multiculturalism that exists today are not conceptual carbon copies of the post-war idea of multiculturalism as it was construed in Swedish political discourse and in the 1960s and 1970s, just as any idea that was conceptually constituted in a particular historical context and ‘lives on’ over time (in this case, to the present day) will be shaped by contestation and re-conceptualizations in different contexts. Although the idea of multiculturalism is very much a ‘living’ idea, we can still refer to the idea of multiculturalism then and now without committing the sin of anachronism. Employing the term ‘multiculturalism’ communicates that the idea of multiculturalism, over which we argue today, has a history of usage in argument and politics that reaches back to the 1960s.

168 See studies I and II in this thesis.
4.1 Comparative and transnational perspectives

My interest in the multicultural moment of Sweden stems from what I perceived to be, from a temporally comparative perspective, the peculiarity of the moment. Sweden’s multicultural moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s seemed curious to me in light of the country’s history of state-sponsored race biology and assimilatory practices and I became even more curious when I realized, through a superficial synchronic comparison between Sweden and the rest of post-war Western Europe, that Sweden’s multicultural moment also stood out in the contemporary European context. One might say that a comparative perspective on Sweden’s multicultural moment gave birth to this dissertation project and that comparison, as a perspective and method, has been an integral part of the project from the beginning.

The transnational perspective has been an in-built theoretical approach of the dissertation project because the project was conceived as a study on the history of ideas. Historians of ideas, intellectual historians and conceptual historians and also a host of other historians interested in phenomena, events and spaces that transcend or cross different kinds of border (usually national borders) have been studying transnational history since long before the term ‘transnational’ became a historiographical buzzword in the 1990s. The gist of the so-called transnational turn in historiography, the notion that nation-states are not and


never have been hermetically sealed containers but open vats in close proximity to each other, has been an important source of inspiration for the project, both methodologically and theoretically.

**Comparative history**

The comparative historian Marc Bloch, an innovator in the field of historical research, noted that “there is no true understanding without a certain range of comparison”\(^{172}\) and this adage has been followed in this dissertation project both diachronically and synchronically. Diachronic, or historic, comparison uncovers and, more often than not, tries to explain change over time and constitutes a *raison d’être* for much of modern historiography. Synchronic comparison, however, seeks to explain similar and/or different outcomes between units of analysis in the same temporal context and is commonly employed in the social sciences.

What, then, does the use of synchronic comparison entail in historical research? Following comparative historian Jürgen Kocka, “comparing in history means to discuss two or more historical phenomena systematically with respect to their similarities and differences in order to reach certain intellectual aims”\(^{173}\) Kocka argues that there are four principal methodological purposes and functions (i.e. intellectual aims) of comparative historical research: heuristic, descriptive,
The heuristic function of the comparative approach enables an historian to identify problems and questions that would otherwise have remained unidentified and un-posed. It was the heuristic function of comparison that enabled me, by studying the research literature on the emergence of multiculturalism as a political idea and the introduction of official multiculturalism in Canada and Australia, to, for example, develop an assumption that ethnic activism, a prominent feature of the Canadian and Australian cases, might also have been a feature of the Swedish moment. Working from this assumption, I discovered ethnic activism in the Swedish case.

The descriptive function of historical comparison clarifies the profiles of single cases by contrasting them with other cases. Kocka points out that all particularistic characterisations of historical phenomena (e.g. the notion of a German *Sonderweg*) are, in a way, comparative and that comparison not only can gives impetus to descriptions of particularity but can also be employed to criticize such notions. In this dissertation project, by contrasting Sweden to the rest of Western Europe, I have clarified the profile of the Swedish case by emphasizing the particularity of Sweden's multicultural moment in the European context.

The analytical purpose of comparison is, according to Kocka, to ask and answer casual questions and also to criticize explanations of both a local and a generalizing type. Both analytical purposes of comparison have been employed in this dissertation project, even though I do not argue that, for instance, the idea of multiculturalism or ethnic activism caused Sweden's multiculturalist turn. I have also utilized the

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175 Ibid., p. 40.
176 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
comparative approach to challenge the particularity of earlier explanations for the turn.

Kocka finally argues that the paradigmatic function of comparison is the distancing effect (Verfremdung) from the case an historian knows best, usually the historian’s own country (in the comparison of countries), which means “comparison can have a de-provincializing, a liberating, and eye-opening effect”. The comparative approach has also provided an “eye-opening effect” in my work with this dissertation project, even from my Finnish vantage-point, as I have worked on the particulars of the Swedish multicultural moment accordingly to the (put in brief) contextualising principles of historiography that can facilitate a reproduction of the nation-state as the self-evident framework for analysing and explaining past events and processes.

A comparative approach has many advantages but also presents some methodological difficulties, the foremost of which are the questions on what it is that is to be compared and the selections and abstraction that are necessarily involved in the process of comparison. Clearly, all historical research must select and abstract; however, when comparing, such decisions are accentuated. In this dissertation project, I have not compared the ‘totality’ of Sweden with the totalities of other national contexts but with the specific historical phenomenon of the multicultural moment as it occurred (or didn’t occur) in the historical context of particular countries.

Kocka and fellow comparative historian Heinz-Gerhard Haupt denote historical comparisons conducted to identify and understand the peculiarities of one case by asymmetrical comparison. In an asymmetrical comparison, the other cases are usually employed as background to the focal case that is investigated thoroughly, which means that the comparative study is not “full-blown” but a “national-historical analysis

177 Ibid., p. 41.
in a comparative perspective”. The three-way comparison between the cases of Sweden, Canada and Denmark in study I of this thesis, ‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’, is not a full-blown comparative study but a national-historical analysis underpinned by a comparative perspective. By i) comparing two cases where similar historical events occurred (the contemporary multicultural turns of Sweden and Canada) and ii) two cases with similar societal histories (i.e. Sweden and Denmark) but with different outcomes at the event level, the peculiarities of the main case, Sweden, are revealed. In addition to clarifying the profile of the Swedish case and facilitating the explanation of the Swedish turn to multiculturalism, which was the main purpose for analysing Sweden from a comparative perspective, the three-way comparison of ‘The difference white ethnics made’ also highlights some interesting aspects of the cases of Canada and Denmark and in general. The saliency of a strong Diaspora-mentality in multiculturalist claims-making (e.g. the Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada and the Estonian Diaspora in Sweden) and the importance of agency for the advancement of new political ideas (e.g. the lack of ethnic activists in Denmark) are results of the comparison that can be employed in further studies on multiculturalism in the specific national cases of Canada and Denmark and as analytical starting points for research on multiculturalism in other national contexts or for formulating theories on what brought or brings about multiculturalism.

Transnational history

In this dissertation project, the comparative approach was employed in tandem with the transnational approach. The former approach aided me in formulating and answering my research questions, the latter gave me impetus to not shorten my investigation when the quest for answers went beyond the geographical borders of Sweden.

The history of ideas has, in part, been ‘transnational’ in theoretical outlook due to the border-crossing capabilities of ideas and concepts. Ideas travel lightly; a whole school of thought can be transported between continents in a single letter. The study of ideas and concepts cannot be properly conducted if historically constituted borders methodologically delimit the analytical scope of the study. Studies on the history of ideas and conceptual history have undoubtedly often focused on the history of an idea or concept in any one country or polity, but without isolating the transnational history of the idea or concept that is scrutinized. In this thesis I have studied the history of an idea and concepts relating to that idea. I thus included the transnational approach as a relevant analytical perspective from the beginning of the dissertation project. My choice of analytical perspective was strengthened by familiarization with the so-called ‘transnational turn’ in historiography.

Although the transnational turn in historical studies is, as pointed out by historian Christoph Conrad, “as much a speech act in public relations, on the demarcation of domains and on the search for new founding as it is a theoretical revision”, it has also led to the posing of new questions and the discovery of new research subjects.¹⁷⁹ The most

¹⁷⁹ Christoph Conrad, ‘Social policy history after the transnational turn’, Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, eds. Pauli Kettunen & Klaus Petersen (Cheltenham: Edward
important lesson of the transnational turn in contemporary historiography is the notion that historians should not axiomatically treat the nation-state as a hermetically sealed unit of analysis and assume that all developments that take place within this historically and analytically constructed container are shaped only by factors ‘inherent’ to the container. Historians need to be aware of past transnational processes and forces, if only to be able to refute a hypothesis that something might have been the result of transnational trends and transfers. In brief, the saliency of a transnational approach in historical research depends on the topic and questions of the research.

This study does not perceive the examination on transnational history to be something very different from traditional examination on history, if we mean the business of discovering traces of the past and producing knowledge on the past based empirically on these traces (evidence in the hands of the historian). A transnational approach to studying the past can yield novel historical insight and knowledge; however, without basic knowledge on the entities that the transnational processes are supposed to have influenced and/or formed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to analytically grasp the salience of potential transnational processes. Haupt and Kocka have argued that transnational history and comparative history can be combined to provide transnational history with analytical precision and to embed comparative history in the potentially salient connections between the compared cases. I think Haupt and Kocka are correct to point out that transnational and comparative

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181 Jürgen Kocka & Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, p. 20.
history can complement each other. I have accordingly considered comparative and transnational history to be complementary approaches to studying the past and, as such, they have also been employed in a complementary manner in this dissertation project.

By surveying the literature on post-war immigration in Europe and the emergence of multiculturalism in Canada and Australia, I posit that Sweden’s multicultural moment was unique in a contemporary European context and similar to contemporary developments in Canada and Australia. I then continued my research to identify Canadian and Australian influences in the multicultural moment of Sweden, especially in the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden, as earlier Swedish research had noted the Canadian connection in the policy-making process.¹⁸² In addition to working with a more traditional hypothesis of international (between states) transfers of ideas, I have studied the empirical material on the Swedish moment with a ‘transnational eye’; that is, I endeavoured to detect evidence and trace and analyse concepts and speech-acts that potentially were the direct products of transfer (e.g. foreign policy programs) or transnationally shaped (e.g. the ‘stretching’ of an imported concept to fit Swedish convention). The use of this method produced some interesting results both with regard to intra-state influence and the transfer of concepts and elements of political discourse from other national contexts into Swedish political discourse by the actors.

In study I and study IV, I show how the Canadian policy on multiculturalism functioned as an important example of the Swedish policy-making process both as a model and as a point of reference in legitimizing the introduction of a similar policy in Sweden. However, an important observation is that the emergence of the political idea of multiculturalism

¹⁸² Hansen 2001, p. 182.
in Sweden and its establishment as a viable basis for policy occurred independently of Canadian or, for that matter, Australian development. There is also nothing to suggest that Australia was influenced by Sweden or vice-versa.

The debates and political struggles concerning non-Swedish mother tongue teaching were transnational (i.e. Swedish-Finnish) at many levels, as made clear in study III. The politics of language in Finland was employed as a reference point in activist claims-making in Sweden, and the concept of semilingualism was scientifically developed and employed in an interconnected manner in political argument on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. The use of the minority policy of the inter-war Republic of Estonia as a template for how Sweden could set up its minority policy by ethnic activist Sven Reinans, and later by Reinans in cooperation with Widgren in their capacities as public officials in the Commission of Immigration, is an interesting transnational aspect of ethnic activism in Sweden, as shown in study IV. Furthermore, in study IV, I analyse the personal history of key actor Jonas Widgren through a transnational lens, a fruitful endeavour that reveals the transnationally constituted biographical predisposition of Widgren towards the idea of multiculturalism. The heated debates between the ethnic activists and the progressive assimilationists (both set of actors were mainly immigrants), highlighted in study I and study II, were also transnational in nature and I could not have fully comprehended the debates without pursuing the transnational threads in my analysis of the debates.
4.2 Actors

When posing the question of why, or for what kind of intention, a linguistic action or, for that matter, action in general was performed, I have not only analysed the point of the action in relation to other actions (e.g. a rebuttal) and the intellectual-political-discursive context in which the action was situated, but also the actor performing the action. I have thus paid attention to the biographies of the actors, their background and social position, when and where (i.e. from what position) in the actors’ lives the actions were performed and in what way they (potentially) interacted with each other. In study III, ‘Making the Case for the Mother Tongue’, the analytical concept ‘historical body’, which puts the onus on the lived experiences of an actor and how this experience affects the actor’s (political) aims and actions, is specifically employed as a method of analysis. All of the studies in this thesis have, however, addressed the actors’ personal histories.

By employing this method, I uncovered decisive information on the actors involved in the multicultural moment. This information was utilized to create a typology of three main actor-categories, all engaged in the politicization of the idea of multiculturalism: (i) ethnic activists, (ii) experts and (iii) officials (i.e. civil servants).

Politicians undoubtedly also feature as individual or collective (e.g. political parties) actors in this dissertation project. Nonetheless, I have not perceived the need to theorize their role as political agents, as a politician by definition is engaged in (political) activism or politicking, whereas the status of an expert in modern society rests on his/her (supposedly) apolitical scientific expertise and politically neutral and efficient implementation of political decisions according to the formal rules of bureaucracy.
Ethnic activists

The analytical category ‘ethnic activist’ was adapted from the literature on the multiculturalist turns in Canada and Australia and the literature on the so-called ethnic revival in the West that became a transnational phenomenon in the early 1970s. In this dissertation project ‘ethnic activists’ describes a set of foreign born actors who advanced the idea of multiculturalism and engaged in claims-making on behalf of immigrants and ethno-cultural minority groups in Sweden across the dominant left-right division in Swedish politics. The term ‘ethnic’ refers to their self-professed non-Swedish ethnic identity (minority is a term that could also have been employed) and ‘activist’ refers to their cooperative political efforts to promote the idea of multiculturalism in different arenas and across the traditional party lines of Swedish politics as political agents.

A subcategory to the category of the ethnic activist was also employed in the dissertation project to emphasize the primary political starting point of many of the ethnic activists; that is, the assertion of preservationist claims in the name of the ethnic group (as a distinct group) with which the activist him/herself identified and wanted to maintain as a group (e.g. Estonian activists).

Experts and officials

The research on the development of the Nordic welfare state has shown that experts, also termed ‘social engineers’ in the literature, which is a contested concept, were important political players in the making of the welfare state. The experts were often prominent academics, or at least became prominent after their services to the state, and they gained power through the scientification of politics and politicization of science, especially human science, which was coupled to the emergence of the welfare state from the late 19th century onwards. Not only were the experts active players in agenda-setting and the formulation of problems, they were also enlisted by policymakers (i.e. politicians and officials, usually social democrats) to solve the problems the experts themselves as public intellectuals often had a hand in defining.  

Swedish family policy was, for example, as Lundqvist & Roman have shown, to a large extent constructed by “the coalition of the state and state-appointed experts” Welfare policy was, in brief, developed through the interplay of social science and politics. Because policy-reform was legitimized as scientific, it also de-politicized decision-making and put it in the hands of ‘rational’ scientists and officials. The strong tradition of cooperation between


experts and policymakers (i.e. officials and politicians) in Sweden opened a window of opportunity for nascent experts in the new field of immigration and immigrant adjustment to influence policymaking.

Social sciences thus played an important part in shaping Swedish society from the 1930s at least until the late 1970s, and accounts of conceptual change in Sweden over this time period have to consider the positions taken by influential experts whose expertise derived from the social sciences. The system of government commissions was the main instrument by which experts could influence policy making in Sweden. The parliamentary commission system was an arena for interaction between the interest groups of Swedish society and the commissions were appointed by the government to address a wide range of specific issues that needed to be scientifically investigated and for consensus to be reached on the proposed solutions.\textsuperscript{187} Government commissions were an integral part of Sweden’s political system and this facilitated the close relationship between politics and social science in Swedish policy-making between the 1930s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{188} The function of the commission system as establisher of consensus in Swedish politics, at least up until the late 1970s, cannot be emphasized enough.\textsuperscript{189} It was very rare that a final report and its policy proposals were discarded.


The commissions also functioned as important knowledge-producing institutions and Swedish social sciences were partly established within the commission system.\textsuperscript{190}

It has been shown that the social scientists cum women’s activists involved in the commissions addressing family policy were highly influential in shaping the reports of the commissions and thus implementing the Swedish women’s movements ideas on gender at a policy level.\textsuperscript{191} Research on the relationship between experts, science and politics in the field of immigration and integration policy in other national contexts has also highlighted the role of experts and the use of social scientific expertise as an authority in the setting of de-party-politicized policymaking in the post-war period.\textsuperscript{192}

The analytical figures of the expert and the official were thus important actor categories for this dissertation project. After determining the experts in the social science research on immigration and minorities’ and the key officials in policymaking process, I began analysing them as actors; that is, as potential political agents in the making of policy and political discourse on ethno-cultural diversity in Sweden. This turned out to be a very fruitful endeavour as I was able to precisely track the experts’ changing positions on ethnocultural diversity and show how social scientific expertise was employed to legitimize the idea of multiculturalism in


\textsuperscript{191} Lundqvist & Roman. pp. 216–236.

political discourse and in the policy-making institution of the Commission on Immigration. I was also able to uncover the acceptance and promotion of the idea of multiculturalism by trade union and also government officials (see studies I, II and IV).

Agency, expertise and science

A result of the analysis was that the three main actor categories of the dissertation project, ethnic activist, expert and official, were overlapping categories in the case of some of the actors.\textsuperscript{193} The way in which expertise and the positions of the enlisted experts were utilized by the officials in the policy-making process followed the results and theoretical insights of previous research on the relationship between science, institutions and politics. The officials of the Commission on Immigration and the civil servants tied to this policy-making organization were clearly influenced by the experts but also utilized the experts and academic expertise to politically further (among members of the commission) and give legitimacy to the idea of multiculturalism and their policy preferences along the policy-making process.

My point here is two-fold: the scientific endorsement of the idea of multiculturalism by the Swedish academic community in the field of immigration and minority research, de-politicized the idea and re-conceptualised it as the rational and progressive alternative. The scientified idea could then be employed, in light of the scientific consensus, to politically legitimize (to parliament and the public) a new policy

\textsuperscript{193} Sven Alur Reinans, e.g., was an ethnic (Estonian) activist, an expert on immigrant statistics (primarily demographics) and an official of the Commission of Immigration.
approach as the self-evident way forward.

Through the intertwined process of politicizing science and scientificating of politics carried forward by the officials of the commission on Immigration in cooperation with social scientists and linguistic researchers, the multiculturalist policy reforms were brought, presented to and accepted by the parliamentary members of the commission, the government and finally the Swedish parliament as a whole. This is not to say that science determined political choices or that it was employed in a purely instrumental way. The argument is rather that the (supposed) boundary between science and politics, so important for the legitimacy and status of science, was crossed both when the idea of multiculturalism became scientificated and when it became formally politicized.

5 Source work

The methodology for locating and selecting sources for this dissertation project was guided by the overarching research problem: the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of the multicultural moment of Sweden. Heuristic considerations embedded in the research design have delimited the scope of source selection; nonetheless, a wide range of different types of source material have been collected, examined and analysed to answer the main questions of the study and the many secondary questions that emerged along the research process.
Selecting and collecting published sources

The references in earlier research, and in the very useful bibliography *Invandrare i Sverige 1965–1974*¹⁹⁴, functioned as an introduction to the published sources. In addition to following these references, I employed the yearbook register of Swedish newspaper articles *Svenska tidningsartiklar* to chart articles of interest. The charting of editorials, feature articles, debate articles and review articles registered in *Svenska tidningsartiklar* was conducted in the following way: I selectively read the published registers from the year 1961 (i.e. first year of publication of *Svenska tidningsartiklar*) to 1975 and listed the articles that seemed to touch on questions relating to, for example, immigration, ethno-cultural minorities, assimilation (and related terms such as the commonly employed *anpassning*, or adjustment), minority culture and language.

The register is ordered in accordance with the Swedish classification system and the articles on the topics that interested me have, for the most part, been consistently classified as E (i.e. upbringing and education), M (i.e. ethnography and social anthropology) and O (i.e. social and legal science). The register’s indexes of names (i.e. authors of the articles and persons covered in the articles) and subject headings were also systematically surveyed after I had compiled lists of authors, articles, books (the register includes reviews) and subject headings. Employing the methods described above, I believe I was able to list all articles of relevance registered in *Svenska tidningsartiklar*. The same methods were also utilized for charting and listing articles registered in the national yearbook series on Swedish journal.

and magazine articles, *Svenska tidskriftsartiklar*, which I surveyed for the same time period, 1961–1975. Thus, I listed approximately 800 articles from the two registers.

This brings us to the next phase in the establishment of a corpus of articles, the collecting of the articles. The list of newspaper articles was culled according to perceived relevance (e.g. articles concerned with racial segregation in the USA and apartheid in South Africa, both popular topics, were culled) and the size of the newspaper (i.e. articles published in local newspapers with a distribution of less than 50,000 copies)\(^{195}\). Some exceptions were made for articles that, on the basis of their titles, seemed to have strong perspectives on issues relating to ethno-cultural diversity or that featured or were authored by actors who I had identified as important in the conceptual struggle between multiculturalism and assimilationism. All journal articles that were deemed relevant on the basis of title, indexation or authorship were included in the collection phase.

Åbo Akademi University Library holds an almost complete microfilm collection of *Dagens Nyheter*, in which the articles of interest were collected by printing paper copies of the microfilm. The articles in other newspapers were collected by printing copies of the articles from the microfilm collection at the National Library of Sweden. Åbo Akademi University Library and the National Repository Library of Finland together hold an extensive collection of Swedish journals and magazines, and I was able to procure the majority of the magazine and journal articles of interest from these two libraries. Articles in journals, including Swedish social science journals, and magazines not available in Finland were obtained through inter-library loans from Swedish libraries. In this way I collected a substantial corpus of newspaper,

\(^{195}\) Based on the circulation figures in Lars Furuhoff & Hans Hederberg, *Dagspressen i Sverige* (Stockholm: Aldus 1965).
journal and magazine articles that covered the time-period 1953–1975. Most of the articles in the corpus were published in the latter half of this period, which was expected.

I also collected a large amount of other material on immigration and related topics published in Sweden between in the 1960s and early 1970. The collection of contemporary published material (e.g. official reports, parliamentary protocols and motions, books, and conference publications) was informed by the earlier research, analysis of the newspaper and journal articles and the continued following up of leads that came to light along the research process. If the research literature, a contemporary article or other sources at my disposal referred to or reviewed published material and if I assessed the published material to be of relevance to the dissertation project, I procured it either at Åbo Akademi University Library or through inter-library loans or internet purchases from second-hand booksellers in Sweden.

The first political programs on immigrant (integration) policy of the centre-right parties were obtained through purchase and donation. The party programs and election manifestos of all the Swedish parties for the focal time-period studied were obtained from the CD-ROM Vi vill… Svenska valprogram 1902–2002. As it transpired, the explosion in published material on immigration and related topics occurred at the end of the examined time-period. This, as in the case of the articles, made it possible to collect and scrutinize the material in a (somewhat) holistic manner, which facilitated the tracing of the emergence and establishment of the idea of multiculturalism.

Source assessment

The corpus of articles and publications in my possession was employed as a primary (contemporary) source material on the speech-acts of various actors and other acts and events, and also as a narrative source material on acts and events. Some of the source material was thus analysed as contemporary speech-acts and also primary and/or narrative sources if they included statements that I deemed to be of interest beyond the particular speech-act move(s) of the text. The information derived from the texts, when employed as primary and/or narrative sources, was scrutinized following a critical assessment of sources according to the basic principles of historical source work; that is, the temporal closeness and relationship of the statement (and the maker of the statement, if he or she could be identified) to that which is stated (i.e. distance in time to that which is stated and whether the statement is based on personal testimony or hearsay), the tendency of the account and how the account sustains in relation to other accounts.\textsuperscript{197}

By following the criteria of historical scholarship on the critical assessment of sources and by applying the theoretical insights and methods of intellectual history described above, I was able to pinpoint the introduction of the idea of multiculturalism, the way in which the idea was conceptualized and contested, the moves and rhetoric employed by the actors involved in the struggle over the idea and the scope of the impact of the idea of multiculturalism in public discourse after the end of the clearly delimited period of public contestation (i.e. 1964–1968).

The analysis of the corpus also uncovered a group of actors who I, based on the literature on the history of

\textsuperscript{197} John Tosh, Historisk teori och metod (Lund: Studentlitteratur 2000), pp. 76–94.
multiculturalism in Canada and Australia and also on the ethnic revival, had expected to find: the ethnic activists.\textsuperscript{198} The corpus of published material at my disposal also included social scientific articles and publications that were employed to detect and analyse the usage of the concept of assimilation and the idea of multiculturalism in the Swedish social sciences and the interconnectedness of this process to the public debate and the actors involved in the debate, the coming together of ethnic activists and social scientific experts. The analysis of the published source material indicated that the multicultural moment of Sweden, in a similar fashion to the contemporary multicultural moments of Canada and Australia, was not just the result of a debate between debating citizens that, when coupled to other factors such as large-scale labour immigration, resulted in a change of official policy. Armed with the results of the analysis of the published material, I focused on the politics of multiculturalism and the question of why Sweden officially turned to multiculturalism.

\textbf{Additional source material}

The analysis of the published source material strengthened my research hypotheses that the idea of multiculturalism and the actors who promoted the idea, primarily the ethnic activists, were constitutive factors in the multiculturalist turn of Sweden. The analysis of the corpus of articles and publications also provided information and leads to additional sources on the activities of the activists and, as it would transpire, experts and officials sympathetic to their cause and the idea of multiculturalism. The collection of

\textsuperscript{198} See pp. 3–6, pp. 49–51 and p. 55 above.
additional published and also unpublished source material on the identified actors and, in the case of my own interviews (see below), the construction of unpublished source material was, again, informed by the overarching research questions of the project: the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the multicultural moment. I thus collected material on the key actors such as interviews, retrospective articles and obituaries. These endeavours were facilitated by electronic databases, search engines and digitalization.

The archive of David Schwarz, deposited at The National Archives of Sweden in 2008, a hitherto unused source on the history of multiculturalism in Sweden, provided new material, primarily letters, on the life and activities of David Schwarz and those associated with him. The single most important archive for the study, the archive of the Immigrant Commission, was also accessed at the National Archives of Sweden. Source material was furthermore extracted from the archives of Tage Erlander, Olof Palme, Rune Johansson, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetparti (SAP) and Kulturarbetarnas socialdemokratiska förening at the Labour Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm. The Labour Movement Archives and Library also provided me with published material such as annual reports on the activities of SAP and the motions and protocols of its congresses. The king’s speech at the dinner in honour of President Urho Kekkonen in 1974, quoted in study IV, was kindly donated to me by the court of Sweden.

I followed up transnational leads, which were identified due to my transnational approach, by collecting relevant ‘non-Swedish’ source material; for example, Finnish source material and international source material such as conventions. To enable comparison of Sweden with Canada and Denmark, I collected some Canadian and Danish source material; for example, the contemporary Danish debate and social science literature to gauge the (possible) use of the idea
of multiculturalism in Danish political discourse and social science, even if the comparisons with Sweden were primarily conducted by utilizing the extant research literature on the history of immigration and ethnic politics in Canada and Denmark.

5.1 Interviews

Since Herodotus and Thucydides, historians have utilized oral sources to make sense of the past.\(^{199}\) All written historical sources employed by historians have been created by someone at a particular point in time for a particular reason. The difference between conventional historical sources and the source material that can be produced with the methods of oral history is that the latter is actively created by the historian, not just located and selected from the traces of the past. The sources that are produced by utilizing the methods of oral history are the product of interaction between the historian and a living person and, therefore, must be considered to be narrative sources on the past but not of the past. As a narrative source, the source material produced by the historian through interviews does not, in principle, differ from other narrative sources such as, for example, memoirs. As with all sources that are selected and employed to answer questions put by historians to the past, the source material derived from interviews must be treated critically. Statements derived from an interview are not direct and \textit{a priori} reliable evidence on events in the past, even if the informant was a primary witness.\(^{200}\)

199 Tosh, p. 244.
I conducted interviews for the specific purpose of gathering new information on Sweden's multicultural moment. The aim of the interviews was to provide new insight, perhaps new questions, and to further my understanding on the persons, events and processes of relevance to the questions this dissertation project has put to the past.

Selecting and contacting informants

Naturally, in making my selections, I had to first ascertain whether the person identified as a potential informant was alive. Unfortunately, I found that the majority of the persons identified as key actors in the making of the multicultural moment had passed away. I then chose to initiate contact with potential informants, such as persons deeply involved in the public debate on multiculturalism (ethnic activists and progressive assimilationists) and/or the Commission on Immigration, when I believed I had gained sufficient knowledge on the actors and processes of interest to be able to fruitfully utilize the interview method to gain further knowledge.

I made contact with my informants by sending letters describing my dissertation project and explaining why I thought they could help me in my research. I also listed some topics and general questions that I wished to discuss with them. After contact was made I, in consultation with the informant, arranged a date and time for the interview. I was able to establish contact and conduct interviews with the following persons, in chronological order: Seppo Isotalo, Sven Alur Reinans, Lars Ahlvarsson, Sulo Huovinen, Tomas

Hammar, Per Gahrton and Olle Svenning. Contact was also made with persons unable or unwilling to discuss the past. Furthermore, I was in contact with and questioned the following persons on their potential possession of source material: Matti Similä (son of Artturi Similä, the leader of the Finnish community in Sweden until the end of the 1960s), Jadranka Widgren (the widow of Jonas Widgren, head secretary of the Commission of Immigration) and Torkel Wächter (son of Michael Wächter, the leading progressive assimilationist in the contested debate on assimilation versus multiculturalism in the 1960s). I interviewed Seppo Isotalo and Sven Alur Reinans in person. Lars Ahlvarsson, Sulo Huovinen and Tomas Hammar I interviewed by phone. I corresponded with Olle Svenning and Per Gahrton via email, and I also corresponded further with Sven Reinans via email after our meeting. The orally conducted interviews were taped, utilizing a digital recorder, with the exception of the session with Seppo Isotalo that was recorded utilizing pen and paper. The audio files were copied to my computer for transcription and the e-mail correspondence printed and archived in my personal research archive.

The interview process

The interviews were semi-structured; that is, I proceeded from general topics of discussion.\textsuperscript{201} I began the interviews by asking open questions on the informant and his/her professional and political life at the time of interest. I wanted the informant to freely reminisce on the themes of interest before progressing to more detailed questions. I did, however,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{201} Steinar Kvale & Svend Brinkmann, \textit{Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun} (Lund: Studentlitteratur 2009), pp. 120–133.
\end{flushright}
ask more precise questions if something of interest arose when the informant freely reminisced. Depending on the flow of the interview, I began asking fairly open questions on specific actors and events according to my prepared list of questions, asking impromptu follow-up questions if something of interest was discussed. After I had exhausted all of my prepared topics and more detailed questions, I sometimes followed up questions that had been touched upon and which I thought could be discussed further before ending the interview.

In hindsight, I believe that I might have further exploited the method of oral history. Also, I should have conducted the interviews at a later date, when I knew more, and selected the informants more systematically. In the best of worlds, the dissertation project should have started earlier. Schwarz, for instance, passed away in the autumn of 2008 and I was fortunate to contact Sven Reinans shortly before he sadly passed away. I also think that I might have been more acutely aware of the gulf in perspective between myself and the informants and, on a more technical note, I should probably have taken a course in the art of interviewing to enhance my interviewing technique and conversational skills.

The source material constructed through the interviews, however, gave me new insight that furthered my research and, despite my short-comings, I was able to produce a unique source material that facilitated answering the questions I put to the past. The lucidity of the informants and the detail, validated by cross-checking with the historical source material including the source material derived from the interviews and the previous research, in which they narrated their past experiences of the then emerging field of immigrant policy and/or research often surprised me. There were few if any uncomfortable silences and the informants did most of the talking. This can perhaps be partly explained by how most of informants described the time-period, events
and persons explored in the interviews: it was an exciting
time, immigration was a new phenomenon and all the
informants were at some point in their lives deeply involved
in matters related to immigration, either personally and/or
professionally.

Results

The result of the analysis of the source material constructed
through the interviews was an important piece in the
analytical puzzle of the dissertation project. Combined with
the analysis of the other sources, the interviews helped me
to establish, for instance, that the ethnic activists cooperated
extensively\textsuperscript{202}. Lars Ahlvarsson, the ombudsman in charge of
immigrant matters at the Trade Union Confederation, was
deeply influenced by the ethnic activists, especially David
Schwarz\textsuperscript{203}. Schwarz was a very energetic and persistent
person ("He could walk through closed doors with his
energy, absolutely fantastic! It was almost impossible to
throw him out."	extsuperscript{204}) He also constantly tried to communicate
his point of view: "A persevering guest of the secretariat
was of course David Schwarz"\textsuperscript{205}. Jonas Widgren was a big
personality and an influential actor in the introduction of the
multiculturalist immigrant and minority policy of 1975 and
had a strong connection to Yugoslavia through his Croatian

\textsuperscript{202} Author’s interview with Sven Alur Reinans, 17 December 2009; E-mail
correspondence with Olle Svenning, 14 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{203} Author’s interview with Lars Ahlvarsson, 26 February 2010.
\textsuperscript{204} "Han kunde gå genom stängda dörrar med sin energi, helt fantastiskt.
Det var omöjligt att slänga ut honom, närapå." Author’s interview with
Sven Alur Reinans, 17 December 2009
\textsuperscript{205} "En trägen gäst hos sekretariatet var ju naturligtvis David Schwarz.”
Author’s interview with Sulo Huovinen, 22 December 2010.
Schwarz and Olle Svenning worked closely together to promote multiculturalism within the Social Democratic Party from 1966 to 1967.207

Much of the source material collected for the purposes of this dissertation project is not directly referred to in any of the articles or in this introductory synthesis. This, however, does not mean that it hasn’t been employed over the research process. On the contrary, the breadth and variation of the source material has enabled me to approach Sweden’s multicultural moment from different although complementary, theoretical and methodological perspectives. Even the reading of what turned out to be, for my purposes, seemingly irrelevant source material has facilitated my research as it has contextualized my reading of other sources and enhanced my understanding on the actors, language(s) and contemporaneous thought. The wide variety of sources stretched the dissertation project empirically and methodologically; however, the multifaceted nature of the research problem, the multicultural moment of Sweden, called for a high degree of source pluralism.

6 Summaries of the four studies

The four studies reprinted in this volume were written as four independent articles on the history of the idea and politics of multiculturalism in Sweden and beyond. The studies therefore overlap each other to some extent. The studies employ different reference systems and also different forms of spelling due to preferences of the publishers and editors. The basic layout of the original articles according to

206 Author’s interview with Tomas Hammar, 8 March 2011.
207 E-mail correspondence with Olle Svenning, 14 October 2011.
the preferences of the publishers and editors has also been retained. However, the studies all examine the same topic, the multicultural moment of Sweden. Taken together they form a comprehensive (but not exhaustive) and interconnected study on Sweden’s multicultural moment.

Study I. Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration

The first study, ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration’ was written for an anthology on multiculturalism in the Nordic welfare states.²⁰⁸ The study explores the conceptual history of the multicultural moment of Sweden by analysing the rise of the concept of (multiculturalist) integration and the concomitant fall of the concept of assimilation. In the article, I focus on the entangled history of the concepts of assimilation and integration in Swedish political discourse and academia and also on how the concepts were constructed as each other’s opposites.

The concept of assimilation was, until the latter half of the 1960s, a conventional concept in Swedish politics and social science. Politically, the concept of assimilation was coupled to the egalitarianism of the people’s home project as it was developed in the post-war era. Assimilation was a prerequisite for the inclusion of previously excluded groups such as the Roma in the new (social democratic) society of modern living and equal life chances. Assimilation, as a

process and a political aim, was conceptualized as socially and politically progressive.

The concept of integration was first put forward and advanced by the ethnic activists, mainly David Schwarz, to introduce a counter concept to assimilation. Integration was defined as the incorporation of ‘non-Swedish’ groups into Swedish society without the loss of their particularity as groups. Integration was coupled to another conceptual innovation of the ethnic activists, the multicultural society, in an ingenious way: the multicultural society was the wave of the future and if Sweden successfully wanted to ride this wave in a truly progressive (a constant point of contestation in post-war Sweden) manner, assimilation had to be replaced by integration. According to the ethnic activists, assimilation was not only morally objectionable, it was bad policy because a majority of ‘non-Swedes’ could not and did not wish to be absorbed. A policy of assimilation would create a backlash among non-Swedes and hinder their successful incorporation into Swedish society. A policy of integration, however, would secure a stable and prospering multicultural society as non-Swedes would willingly become a part of a society that recognized and supported them in their difference as members of non-Swedish groups. The non-ethnic Swedes should integrate and be integrated, that is, become equal members of Swedish society while retaining and developing their own (non-Swedish) languages and cultures.

The conceptual innovation of the ethnic activists was picked up by social scientist and immigration and ethnic relations expert (for the government) Harald Swedner. Swedner adopted the multiculturalist concept of integration into his own research and based his policy proposals on it by arguing that what he termed ‘functional integration’ should guide Swedish immigration policy. Swedner re-cast the concept of assimilation, which had functioned as the fulcrum for his policy-oriented academic work, as the
undesirable antithesis to functional integration. The Swedish Trade Union, heavily influenced by the ethnic activists, also included the new concept of integration in its advocacy of multiculturalism.

The social democratic government was well aware of the assimilation–integration dichotomy when it appointed the Commission of Immigration in 1968 and rejected both concepts in its directives to the commission. This meant that the Commission of Immigration was unable to employ the term ‘integration’ when it, after its multiculturalist turn in the early 1970s, put forward its proposal for a new immigrant and minority policy in 1974, even though this new policy de facto was a policy of (functional) integration in line with the definition of integration of the ethnic activists and Swedner, who had worked as an expert for the commission.

The concepts of integration and assimilation share an entangled history and remain highly contested in Swedish political discourse on the incorporation of immigrants and minorities. The term ‘assimilation’, if not the concept, continues to be employed pejoratively in the Swedish political mainstream, if utilized at all. The meaning of the term ‘integration’ is seemingly in constant flux, although the definition given by the ethnic activists and Swedner to their concept of integration remains in common usage.
Study II. The difference white ethnics made: The multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark

The second study, ‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’, was written as a contribution to an interdisciplinary (i.e. history, political science and sociology) anthology on the relationship between migration and the welfare state.  The aim of the study is to examine how the welfare state, as a normative and institutional framework, shapes discourse and policy on migration and how, in turn, the welfare state is shaped by migration.

The study analyses the introduction and politicization of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden in comparison to Canada, where multiculturalism was first introduced, and Sweden’s close Nordic sibling-nation Denmark, where multiculturalism has never established itself as a public ideal. The study outlines the history of wartime and post-war immigration into Sweden and comparisons with Canada and Denmark accentuate the features and factors of historical change in Sweden.

Ethnic activism was an important feature of the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism and political turn to multiculturalism in Canada and Sweden. Not only was the heated public debate on assimilation versus multiculturalism, which occurred from 1964 to 1968, ‘won’ by the ethnic activists, the social scientists and civil servants involved in the emerging field of migration and immigrant settlement were personally influenced by the activists. The political

parties were also subjected to lobbying by the activists and the organizations they represented. The most notable case is the Estonian activists influencing the Conservative party. All the prominent ethnic activists in Sweden were Swedish citizens who possessed the necessary language and societal skills to engage in political activism. They were also, in line with the activists who pushed for ethnic recognition and support in Canada, white ethnics.

The activists, and the minority groups for which they sought recognition, were all white ethnics whose differences to the majority population could be framed as benign while, simultaneously, recognition of these same differences was framed as pivotal for the well-being of non-Swedes. When the multiculturalist immigrant and minority policy was formally accepted in the Swedish parliament on the 14th of May 1975, the MPs could hardly have envisioned that Sweden, which three years earlier had successfully ended non-Nordic labour immigration, would be home to one and a half million foreign-born immigrants hailing from almost all corners of the world and one of the most multicultural countries in Europe four decades later. The immigrant problem of 1975, such as it was, mainly comprised the aggregated social problems of Finnish immigrants, who constituted by far the largest immigrant group in Sweden at that time. The typical immigrant in 1975 was, both statistically and stereotypically, a male Finnish labourer; ‘culturally’ similar to his Swedish peers except for the language.

The Finns, the Estonians and the Jews were not culturally nor physiologically that different from the Swedes, hence it was hard for contemporaneous critics of multiculturalism to successfully argue that ethno-cultural recognition of these groups went against the ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ standards and aims of Swedish society. All post-war immigrants could also be perceived as contributing to Sweden’s welfare; was it not then only fair that they got something in return? The
ethnic activists, together with the civil servants and social scientists sympathetic to their struggle for ethnic recognition, introduced a new discourse on (non-Swedish) ethnicity in which the formerly hegemonic concept of assimilation was cast as a negative, unprogressive counter concept to the new concept of a multicultural Sweden, where different ethnic groups would be recognized, supported and incorporated within the welfare state on the basis of group cooperation. This new idea was given official status in 1975 and was even added to the new Swedish constitution.

Denmark, however, did not turn to multiculturalism after the end of the labour immigration period. The divergent paths of the two neighbouring countries would have been difficult to predict in the mid-1960s. In contrast to Sweden, neither the immigrants nor the small domestic minorities in Denmark participated in the public debate on migration and immigrant settlement to any great extent during the 1960s and 1970s. A committee for foreign workers in Denmark, which regarded itself as an interest group for the immigrants, was established in 1976, although its impact was limited. Lack of interest on the part of immigrants and lack of resources limited the influence of immigrant organizations and initiatives. The lack of interest and resources was probably dependent on three factors: time spent in the country, socioeconomic status (i.e. class) and self-identification. It is difficult to be politically active in a new polity without knowledge on the language and, without any prior experience of it, the politics of the respective country probably seems even more remote. Even when an immigrant was educated and politically active, his/her priorities did not necessarily include the pursuit of in the country of residence, especially at this time of radical leftist politics and strong political conflicts in the country of origin. General pleas for tolerance and equal treatment in the workplace might have been sufficient for an immigrant voicing his/her concerns in public.
This, however, does not mean that immigrants in Denmark were not concerned about identity or culture. Pakistanis sent their daughters back to Pakistan to avoid the corrupting influence of Danish society and many Greeks and Turks were also worried about their children becoming overly Danish. The Danes, too, were concerned about the immigrants’ ‘culture’, although from an opposite standpoint: the negative, ‘primitive’, aspects of immigrant culture compared to modern Danish culture.

Another crucial aspect in the Danish stance on immigrants and their own politics was the status and future of the immigrants, or “foreign workers” (fremmedarbeider) or guest workers (gastarbeider), as the Danes referred to them. The general line of thinking in Denmark, as in most of Western Europe, was that a foreign worker, at some point, would return to his/her native country. This line of thinking was confirmed by immigrants themselves, who often expressed their intentions of returning to their countries of origin. The immigrants did not consider themselves settlers; they were simply guest workers who would return as soon as they had earned sufficient money. Hence, immigrants in Denmark did not merely lack resources and an ‘acceptable’ Western culture, they lacked the diasporan identity of the well-integrated and politically active Estonians and Jews in Sweden. When the immigrants in Denmark demanded ‘multiculturalist’ policies and services or the demand was made for them by Danish activists, the demands were grounded in the idea of return. The immigrants’ children should be taught the language of their native country so that the whole family could move back to its country of origin. The ‘multiculturalist’ educational policies (e.g. mother tongue education in national classes) that were implemented in Denmark at the municipal level in the 1970s were not motivated and legitimised by the idea of multiculturalism as in Sweden, even if they were directly influenced by Swedish examples.
The current differences in immigration and integration regimes between Denmark and Sweden can, however, not to be solely attributed to existence or absence of (white) ethnic activism in the years of labour immigration. The multiculturalism of the 1975 policy was already being toned down in Sweden during the 1980s. Later policy reforms have also not emphasized the maintenance of ethnic groups, although the idea of multiculturalism that was introduced in the 1970s lingers on in public discourse and in policy documents. For instance, the new Swedish constitution of 2010 strengthened the wording of the paragraph on the state’s responsibility for the cultural preservation of ethnic minorities in Sweden from “ought” to “shall”. The current discursive divergence between Denmark and Sweden can, therefore, be traced to the formative period of immigration policy and discourse during the 1960s and 1970s that set the way in which one could address ethnicity or cultural difference in public on two remarkably different paths.

Study III. Making the Case for the Mother Tongue: Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New Policy Discourse on the Teaching of Non-Swedish Mother Tongues in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s

The third study, ‘Making the Case for the Mother Tongue: Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New Policy Discourse on Non-Swedish Mother Tongues in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s’, was also written as a contribution to an interdisciplinary anthology (i.e. linguistics and history) on the multi-sitedness of language policy and language policy
discourse in Sweden and Finland.²¹⁰

The study specifically investigates an important element in the multicultural moment of Sweden, the politicization of language. In Sweden, where ‘metaphysical’ natural rights carried little political weight but where a concept such as equality had been elevated to a matter of secular faith by the end of the 1960s, arguments advancing multiculturalist policies such as non-Swedish language education were framed as a question of providing de facto equal opportunities that would then result in equal socioeconomic outcomes. In line with the conventions of Swedish political discourse, mother tongue education was conceptualized as a necessity of progressive social policy. For instance, the working group on matters concerning immigration, the precursor to the Immigration Board, which was established in 1966, initially conceptualized mother tongue education for immigrants’ children as preventive social policy. The working group argued, in line with ethnic activists who championed the idea of multiculturalism, that if immigrants’ children ‘lost’ their mother tongue they would be unable to communicate at a deep emotional level with their poorly or non-Swedish speaking parents with disastrous consequence for family cohesion and the psychological well-being of both the parents and the children. In and of itself this was unacceptable; however, emotional discord in an immigrant family could in turn affect society at large as the troubled children might become juvenile delinquents and perpetually marginalized and, thus, endanger the social cohesion and progressive aims of equality and justice of the Swedish welfare state. From 1968, the argument of intergenerational breakdown was supplemented with another ‘strong’ social policy-

²¹⁰ Mia Halonen, Pasi Ihalainen & Taina Saarinen, eds., Language Policies in Finland and Sweden: Interdisciplinary and Multi-sited Comparisons, (Bristol MultilingualMatters, forthcoming 2014).
grounded argument for mother tongue education: it was needed to prevent semilingualism. The scientific concept of semilingualism, which became popularized in 1968 by the book *Tvåspråkighet eller halvspråkighet?* (Bilingualism or semilingualism?), was included in the conceptual repertoire of the ethnic activists and other actors supportive of the idea of multiculturalism.

The detrimental phenomenon of semilingualism, in this context, the inability to attain mother tongue proficiency in neither Swedish nor Finnish, had to be avoided or Finnish immigrants’ children would be placed in an unequal position in comparison to their peers from Swedish speaking homes. According to those who employed the concept of semilingualism in their advocacy for a more multiculturalist policy approach in Sweden, excellent proficiency in a foreign language (i.e. Swedish) was also unachievable without the basis of the ‘real’ mother tongue, which meant that ‘Finnish’ children had to learn Finnish to become completely functional in Swedish. As fluency in Swedish was an uncontested prerequisite for social and political equality, activists could demand mother tongue education in the name of equality. The need for mother tongue education was also conceptualized as part of migration policy on both sides of the Baltic Sea: the preservation of the native language facilitated repatriation of the immigrant family.

The question of mother tongue teaching for non-Swedish speaking children was intimately connected to advancing the idea of multiculturalism. The establishment of semilingualism as a politically affirmed scientific truth on which policy could, and would, be based was a man-made phenomenon that attained officially affirmed political (and therefore scientific and vice-versa) legitimacy when key policy makers added the concept to the government sanctioned policy discourse on multiculturalism in Sweden during the 1970s that, although constituting a discursive break from the previous ways of
articulating the politics of language and ethnicity, the actual changes in policy that accompanied the discursive change were not as revolutionary as the rhetoric perhaps suggested, even if the policies stretched social democratic conventions.

**Study IV. Huvudsekreteraren och mångkulturalismen: Jonas Widgren och 1975 års invandrar- och minoritetspolitik**

The fourth study, ‘Huvudsekreteraren och mångkulturalismen: Jonas Widgren och 1975 års invandrar- och minoritetspolitik’ (The head secretary and multiculturalism: Jonas Widgren and immigrant and minority policy of 1975), was published in the Swedish journal for biographical research *Personhistorisk tidskrift* in the fall of 2014.

The study focuses on the role that Jonas Widgren, born in 1944, played as head secretary of the Commission on Immigration between 1971 and 1974. Widgren was the principal author of the commission’s final report and also the subsequent government proposition on the new immigrant and minority policy, which introduced official multiculturalism into Sweden. In the article, I show that Widgren, receptive to the arguments of the ethnic activists and inspired by the Canadian turn to multiculturalism, at the beginning of the 1970s became an advocate of the idea of multiculturalism. I also show that he utilized his position as head secretary of the Commission on Immigration to further the idea politically together with his secretariat, which included ethnic activist and expert Sven Alur Reinans. Reinans and Widgren, for instance, tried to convince parliamentary members of the commission that Sweden
should adopt the minority policy model of the inter-war Republic of Estonia, which gave the ethno-cultural minorities cultural autonomy; that is, full control of minority schools and other cultural institutions of the minority through a system of tax-funded cultural councils democratically constituted by the minorities themselves. The Estonian model was never accepted \textit{per se} by the Swedish politicians; however, that it was on the secretariat’s agenda shows the strong support for the idea of multiculturalism among the commission’s experts and officials.

In the article, I further argue that the adoption of the idea of multiculturalism by the Commission of Immigration depended upon Widgren’s acceptance of the idea. Widgren’s biography, at least partly, explains his receptiveness to the idea of multiculturalism. The latter part of the argument is two-fold.

First, Widgren’s family history was very transnational and his family was ethno-culturally diverse. After the death of his French-speaking mother in 1959, the adolescent Widgren spent time abroad with relatives in France and Switzerland and thus came of age in a partly transnational setting. He also married a Croatian woman, Jadranka Čaić, in 1965. Thus, Widgren’s family history and personal life were very multicultural in a descriptive sense.

Second, Widgren was an almost stereotypical member of the politically active and progressive-minded segment of the Swedish boomer generation. What set him apart from the caricature of the 1968-activist was that, instead of becoming a sectarian left-wing radical in the early 1970s, he became a (social democratic) official in the emerging field of immigrant and minority policy. Although Widgren did not join the left-wing revolutionaries, he was still somewhat of a revolutionary, albeit a revolutionary that worked within the system. Widgren was also well aware of the fact that the idea of multiculturalism he promoted as head secretary of
the Commission on Immigration was a radical and utopian idea that broke with prevailing Swedish and social democratic conventions on ethno-cultural diversity.

At some time during the 1980s, Widgren became disillusioned with the idea of multiculturalism when he realized, as he put it, that Finnish immigrants (the major immigrant group in Sweden) were not that interested in organizing and mobilizing themselves as an ethnic minority. In the early 2000s, Widgren lamented the endless philosophizing on multiculturalism in which he himself had engaged during the 1970s. The political thought and actions of the young head secretary in the 1970s seemed slightly misguided to the now older and internationally prominent migration and integration expert. Despite his later reservations, Widgren contributed to the historical shift in Swedish ethnic politics from assimilationism to multiculturalism. This makes Jonas Widgren a person of note in modern Swedish history.

7 Conclusions

Sweden’s transformation from a country of emigration to a country of immigration is one of the most salient historical changes in modern Swedish history, as it is for many other European countries. Sweden’s demographic transformation also encompasses a concomitant intellectual and political change that catches the eye from a comparative European perspective: the introduction and establishment of the political idea of multiculturalism in public discourse in the late 1960s and the introduction of official multiculturalism in the mid-1970s, which is a comprehensive conceptual and political shift that I have termed the ‘multicultural moment’.
This dissertation project is the first study to historically analyse the idea of multiculturalism in the making of Sweden's multicultural moment.

Post-war immigration made starkly visible the fact that the Swedish welfare state was a national project with restrictions on non-Nordic labour immigration exhibiting the power of two branches of the labour movement – the trade union movement and the Social Democratic Party – in post-war Sweden. If exclusion was the external objective, inclusion was the internal principle. Everyone in the nationally universal (social democratic) welfare state was to be serviced and educated by the same (intrinsically Swedish, although purportedly universal) institutions to produce the desired outcome of social equality. Difference, especially ethno-cultural difference, was perceived as a threat to the aims of the national welfare state project. This assimilationist logic of the post-war Swedish welfare state, coupled with a relatively long history of ethno-cultural homogeneity and concomitant ethnocentrism, highlights the radicalness of Sweden's multicultural moment. The idea of multiculturalism politicized ethno-cultural differences in Sweden in a previously unthought way and the new immigrant and minority policy of 1975 included, among its aims, the furthering of minority life on a collective basis in Swedish society.

**Seven points on Swedish multiculturalism**

The historical examination on the making of Sweden’s multicultural moment undertaken in this dissertation project has resulted in the following conclusions on the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism and the introduction of official
multiculturalism.

The inception of the idea of multiculturalism into Swedish political discourse exhibits, conceptually, comparatively, and transnationally, seven noteworthy features. First, the timing of the introduction and conceptual development of the idea: by the end of 1966, David Schwarz and the other ethnic activists had already developed multiculturalism into a fully-fledged political idea with its own conceptual scheme, normative claims, set of policy prescriptions and rhetorical devices. This was only around two years after the idea had achieved a similar level of maturity in Canada\(^\text{211}\), a couple of years before it had done so in Australia\(^\text{212}\) and more than five years before the ethnic revival, in which the idea of multiculturalism played a central role, became a cultural and political trend in Western Europe and the USA.\(^\text{213}\)

Second, the pivotal role played by individual actors in the making and promotion of the idea of multiculturalism: the initial conceptualization and advancement of multiculturalism was the work of a handful of ethnic activists. There was no grand popular movement that demanded public recognition of ethno-cultural difference and support for minority group maintenance in a way similar to the mobilization of the substantial Ukrainian-Canadian community and other large and organized ethno-cultural groups in Canada in response to the establishment of the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in

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\(^\text{211}\) See study II in this thesis.
\(^\text{212}\) Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism*, p. 91.
1963. In this regard, the emergence of multiculturalism as an elucidated political idea in Sweden resembles the development of multiculturalism in Australia, where it first was developed and promoted by a small number of academics and activists. However, as long as ethnic (Finnish) activist Artturi Similä held his leadership position in the National Organization of the Finnish Associations, the claims made by the ethnic activists were, according to corporatist conventions of Swedish society, in principal supported by the growing Finnish community in Sweden. The Estonian activists also acted with the mandate of parts of the Estonian community. The idea of multiculturalism in Sweden was initially developed by ethnic activists and then picked up by academics, experts and public officials.

By cooperating and rallying behind the idea of multiculturalism, the activists from different minority groups could move beyond the ethnocentric approach that the Estonian and Jewish groups had employed in the past. Instead of making group-specific claims, the activists made pan-ethnic claims utilizing the idea of multiculturalism. Instead of casting particularistic appeals on a group-by-group basis, the ethnic activists employed the idea of multiculturalism to put forward their claims in a universalistic tone, an approach that fitted the political conventions of the time.

Third, the idea of multiculturalism was not transferred to Sweden as a ready-made package, but was made in Sweden. Swedish multiculturalism was, without doubt, a ‘non-Swedish’ product in the sense that it was an immigrant innovation shaped by the experiences, ideas and expectations of the innovators both as individuals and as members of specific groups. The way in which these different experiences, ideas and expectations came together and were moulded in the specific context of post-war Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s was, however, a particular Swedish development. Therefore, the conceptual origins of Swedish multiculturalism are as
much domestic as they are transnational. The emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden was not the manifestation of a conceptually primed transnational intellectual current; it was, in light of the historical evidence, very much an independent stream. This was also the case in Canada and Australia.²¹⁴

Fourth, the historically contingent and distinct diasporan mentality that underpinned the ethnic activism of the Estonians and the Jews, in particular the activism of Sven Alur Reinans, Voldemar Kiviaed and David Schwarz, must be emphasized. The Estonians in Sweden, similar to many other migrants and refugees hailing from lands occupied by the Soviet Union in the 1940s (e.g. the Ukrainians in Canada), had lost their homeland which faced an existential threat in the form of communist Russification. The Estonians in Sweden, and elsewhere, were not merely living away from Estonia with an option to return, they were keeping the very nation of Estonia alive in exile, precisely in the same way that Ukrainians in Canada were upholding the nation of Ukraine in Canada.

Among Swedish Jews, especially among those who had survived the Holocaust and arrived in Sweden as refugees, there was a strong will to keep the revitalized Jewish community of Sweden alive. This determination was born out of the millennia-long diasporan tradition of Judaism and the horrors of the Holocaust. For David Schwarz, who barely survived the anti-semitic atrocities of the Nazis, the Jewish minority in Sweden and also other ethno-cultural minorities had a fundamental right to be recognized and supported by the majority population in their endeavour to establish and develop their own minority communities. Schwarz devoted his new life in Sweden to advancing the idea of multiculturalism; his work was shaped by his

²¹⁴ Breton, p. 45; Lopez, The Origins of Multiculturalism, p. 454.
experiences as a member of the Jewish diaspora at a time when the very existence of the Jewish people was in peril. The prominent Australian multiculturalist and Jewish activist Walter Lippmann was also a victim of Nazi persecution and, similar to Schwarz, was highly motivated in his aim to secure the future of Australian Jews and other minority groups in Australia by promoting multiculturalism in his new home-country.

For many ethnic activists who advanced multiculturalism in Sweden, Canada and Australia, the survival of their own ethnic groups in the face of assimilation pressures was a matter of life or death. Promoting the idea of multiculturalism was a way to preserve the people to whom they belonged and cherished as an integral part of their own personal identity.

Fifth, although the debates over multiculturalism in the 1960s at the basic ideological level share many similarities with later debates on multiculturalism (e.g. the individual vs. the collective; the salience of historically constructed identities in the modern world; ethnic identity vs. class position), the emphasis on cultural difference, both for and against, was less pronounced than in contemporary debates. This is probably due to the fact that the cultural differences, factual and/or perceived, between Swedish majority and minority groups, especially between Finnish-speaking Finns and Swedes, fundamentally amounted to linguistic differences. The cultural practices that today’s critics of multiculturalism usually refer to when counting the social and personal ills supposedly propagated by multiculturalism (e.g. religious fanaticism, forced marriages, and female circumcision) were not really an issue in Sweden in the 1960s.215

215 The progressive assimilationists did make some arguments along these lines with reference to the Jewish minority but, as the debate as a whole centred on labour immigrants, in particular Finnish immigrants,
There was some concern among the Social Democrats that a number of Finnish immigrants might spread communism. However, communism was never conceptualized as a negative and essentialist cultural trait of the Finnish group that would grow if the Finns were granted some form of ethno-cultural recognition. It is also interesting to note that when the limits of the multiculturalist freedom of choice principle of the 1975 immigrant and minority policy came under criticism from the turn of the decade in 1980, it was a feminist-based critique of the isolated and oppressed position of immigrant woman in families from patriarchal cultures, sometimes with direct reference to Muslims.\textsuperscript{216} The mosque as a symbolic and organisational focal point of religious fundamentalism and other arguments of contemporary anti-Islamism could, however, scarcely be employed in earnest in 1960s debates because there were hardly any Muslims in Sweden at that time and no visible mosques; the first mosque was built in 1976.\textsuperscript{217}

Will Kymlicka has also emphasized the difference between debates on multiculturalism in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s and contemporary debates:

For many people, a major risk of multiculturalism is that immigrant groups will invoke the ideology of multiculturalism to demand legal protection of illiberal practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM), forced arranged marriages, or honour killings. This idea never arose in the initial debates and not on the potentially illiberal practices of a well-integrated and small minority whose members had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, this line of argument did not catch on. See, for example, Michael Wächter, ‘Varför stöda en auktoritär judendom?’ \textit{Arbetaren} 2–8.6.1966; Leif Zern, ‘…och vad gör man sedan med invandrarna?’ \textit{Expressen} 20.8.1966.\textsuperscript{216} Dahlström, pp. 98–99.\textsuperscript{217} The Nasir Mosque in Gothenburg.
in Canada. After all, the white ethnic groups who were demanding multiculturalism had been present in Canada for several generations, and were typically very well-integrated.\textsuperscript{218}

In Australia, attacks on the idea of multiculturalism began in earnest in the 1980s. One of the leading critics of multiculturalism was historian Geoffrey Blainey who coupled Australian multiculturalism to increasing Asian immigration and argued that this particular combination would undermine national cohesion.\textsuperscript{219} Since the advent of the ‘War on Terror’ in the early 2000s, Islam and the presence of Muslims in Australian society have also been a major issue of contestation in debates on multiculturalism in Australia.\textsuperscript{220}

Debates on multiculturalism or on any other political idea are, of course, historically contingent. The idea of multiculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s did not carry the implications it does today. Contemporary polemics must not be projected onto the past, even though past debates and political choices effect the present.

The sixth noteworthy feature of the early history of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden is closely connected to the fifth and can be put into one word: Finns. The Finns constituted a ‘special group’ historically, politically and even \textit{de jure} as Nordic citizens. Even though the leader of the Finnish community, Artturi Similä, was ousted from his leadership position at the end of the 1960s due to his conceptualization of the Finnish group in Sweden as an oppressed minority in need of minority rights, his claims

\textsuperscript{219} Jupp 2007, pp. 109–110.
did not go unnoticed in either Sweden or Finland. Similä’s analogies between Finnish-speaking Finns in Sweden and Swedish-speaking Finns in Finland might have led to his political downfall, but he pointed out something that could not be ignored in the new context of large-scale migration from Finland to Sweden: the fact that Finnish-speaking Finns in Sweden almost equalled Swedish-speaking Finns in numbers without the former group enjoying any de facto group rights of the latter. Furthermore, in the heyday of post-war Nordism, Finns were conceptualized as Nordic brothers of the Swedes, Danes, Norwegians and Icelanders in formal intra-Nordic cooperation, which was something that the Swedish government had to take into consideration.

One can also argue that Finnish immigrants, even though many of them only spoke Finnish, were very similar in many respects to average Swedes of the same generation. Cultural difference, without doubt, need not be significant in the creation of an ‘other’ who might be prescribed traits that condemn him/her to discrimination or worse; although, in the context of prospering Nordism during the 1960s and 1970s, this sort of negative categorization of a fellow Nordic nationality was not in any way formally sanctioned by the state. The majority of the Finns in Sweden had the reputation of being hard-working labourers with modest demands, and the demands made in their name by ethnic activists such as Artturi Similä were also modest by today’s standards. Similä was mostly concerned with the preservation of the Finnish identity, primarily emanating from the Finnish language, of the Finnish immigrants’ children; that is, Finnish-speaking children born in Finland and children born of Finnish-speaking parents in Sweden. Clearly, this can be regarded as a radical and potentially dangerous idea from a social democratic perspective; Swedish-speaking Finns in Finland with their own institutional life and dominant (within the group) centre-right party (i.e. the Swedish People’s Party)
again providing a cautionary example of what could happen to working-class solidarity in a society with strong emphasis on linguistic (ethnic) affiliation. Finnish-speaking immigrants thus constituted a special problem for the social democrats.

Finally, the seventh striking aspect of the rise of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden pertains to, again following Bloch’s epidemiological analogy, the contagiousness of the idea. After the resistance of the progressive assimilationists had been silenced, the idea of multiculturalism quickly established itself as the conventional wisdom when addressing the issue of ethno-cultural diversity in the public sphere. Here, again, it is important to bear in mind that immigration into Sweden at that time was perceived as being under strict control, and that questions connected to the new ethno-cultural diversity of Sweden and the management of this diversity were not party-politicized to the extent that they are today. Paying lip-service to the blessings of diversity and the value of upholding and developing non-Swedish ethnic identities was at the time, by and large, the politically inconsequential showing of goodwill in a time of great social and cultural change when it became somewhat of a norm to question traditional, at least ‘Swedish’, norms and conventions. The breeding ground for the spread of multiculturalism was also favourable after it had been established as a progressive, even virtuous, idea; after all, Sweden was the land of consensus. The continued commitment to diversity by the Swedish establishment is partly a consequence of the multicultural moment and the historical concord on multiculturalism. Questions related to ethnic diversity and multiculturalism are, however, no longer politically inconsequential.

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221 See p. 30 above.
Contributions and future prospects

By focusing on the idea of multiculturalism, I have been able to emphasize the pivotal roles that the idea and the actors advancing the idea played in the introduction of official multiculturalism in Sweden. I have also identified particular historical factors that facilitated the political breakthrough of multiculturalism such as the ‘golden age’ of the Swedish welfare state, the radicalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the sources and composition of immigration, the politicization of science and the scientification of politics and the commission system (i.e. the research–policy nexus).

My main contributions to the research on Sweden’s multiculturalist turn are the findings of my comparatively underpinned actor-centric analysis on the idea of multiculturalism in Swedish politics and policy-making. I show that the very idea of multiculturalism, as it was conceptualized, accepted and promoted by ethnic activists, experts, officials and politicians, must be considered to be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the introduction of official multiculturalism in Sweden. My point that the idea of multiculturalism mattered profoundly in Sweden’s multiculturalist turn might seem self-evident or trivial; however, in light of the fact that the impact of the idea of multiculturalism and the actors who conceived and employed it has been unacknowledged or theoretically underplayed in previous research is a point that nonetheless must be emphasized.

Many of the factors I, based on my examination on the history of the idea of multiculturalism, highlight as conducive to the political breakthrough of multiculturalism have been acknowledged although not necessarily meticulously investigated and discussed, in previous research; for instance, the ‘Finnish factor’ and the ‘expert factor’. Here, my
contribution is primarily historical; that is, from conceptual, comparative, transnational and biographical perspectives, I have fleshed out new aspects on previously identified factors in the political turn to multiculturalism.

I argue that the activities of actors not previously recognized as political agents, such as ethnic activists, experts and officials, were instrumental in the introduction of official multiculturalism. I show the intertwined connections between the activists, experts and officials and how the idea of multiculturalism travelled from public contestation to a politically affirmed ideal through social science and the Commission of Immigration. Here, I emphasize the significance of head secretary Jonas Widgren and put forward a biographically underpinned explanation for his eager acceptance of the idea of multiculturalism and the ‘Canadian model’. As I illustrate, this was important as a source of inspiration and as a reference point in the political advancement of the idea of multiculturalism, but not the conceptual source of Swedish multiculturalism. As noted above, the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden did not lack transnational ramifications, which also applies to the introduction of official multiculturalism.

Furthermore, I make the point that the political success of the idea of multiculturalism, such as it was, depended upon whom the claims-makers were and for whom they made their claims, and also the migratory context of the 1970s. All major immigrant groups in post-war Sweden were of European origin, labour immigration from non-Nordic countries had been completely halted in 1972, Finnish immigration had markedly subsided by the mid-1970s, immigrants were well integrated within the labour market and the political potential of the (by far) largest group, the Finns, had been co-opted by the Social Democratic Party. ‘Finland’ was a factor in the political turn to multiculturalism not only at an intra-state level, as has been noted in the previous research, but at
cultural and conceptual levels. The Finns were undoubtedly perceived as different, but they were not too different and their difference, and also the difference of the other European immigrants, could and was conceptualized and presented as beneficial. Moreover, new research findings in linguistics and in the social sciences emphasize the benefits of maintaining the difference that could also facilitate return migration, which was deemed important in both Finland and Sweden.

I also highlight Olof Palme’s receptiveness to the idea of multiculturalism in contrast to the more traditional assimilationist outlook of Tage Erlander and other leading social democrats of Erlander’s generation. I furthermore shed new light on the multiculturalist position of the Conservative party by noting the connection between the Estonian community and the party, in particular ethnic (Estonian) activist Voldemar Kiviaed. The topic of parties, politicians and migration and integration policy has, however, barely been scratched in this dissertation project. A monograph could, I believe, be written on the Social Democratic Party, immigration and the idea of multiculturalism. The dearth of studies on how the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of Sweden has been discussed and conceptualized by the political parties and their leading figures should invite more research now that the historical saliency and continued relevance of the changes connected to post-war immigration are becoming clear for all to see. The history of immigration and ethno-cultural diversity should no longer be treated as a quaint sub-plot in the history of post-1945 Sweden; it should be moved into the historiographical mainstream.

The results of this thesis have not exhausted the need for further research on the history of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden that, after its official affirmation in 1975, can be explored in all of its conceptual and transnational detail. The way in which immigrant groups debated and conceptualized
their position in Swedish society after the introduction of official multiculturalism is also a subject that can be charted and analysed. Historical research with a transnational perspective on the question of second-generation Finns in Sweden might be especially fruitful. The rise of Finnish activism at a local level, such as the school strikes in protest against the lack of education in and of Finnish in the 1980s, might perhaps provide a starting-point. More information on the activities and aspirations of immigrant groups that arrived in Sweden after the mid-1970s could further enhance our knowledge on ethnic politics in Sweden and on the contemporary history of immigration into Sweden.

From a Swedish perspective, the second-coming of the idea of multiculturalism since the late 1980s as an international norm is a subject worthy of further research both at transnational (e.g. the history of the idea in international organizations and in academia) and national levels. The European/Western/global history of the idea of multiculturalism remains to be written and, hopefully, the findings of this dissertation project will be useful to that potential project. Social scientists primarily interested in explaining the contemporary divergence in migration and integration policy between Sweden and the rest of the Nordic countries may also find my research contribution informative.

The conditionality and contingency of the multicultural moment

As the idea of multiculturalism carried social and political implications at odds with prevailing social democratic ideology, the idea needed to be modified, or ‘social democratized’, in the policy-making process. Policies put
forward by the new immigrant and minority policy were tied to existing institutions and the funding of the ethno-cultural minority organizations became dependent of the state. The minorities’ community life was, with the consent of the community leadership, formally co-opted into the institutional structure of the social democratic welfare state. If Canada introduced multiculturalism within a bilingual framework in 1971, Sweden introduced multiculturalism within a social democratic framework in 1975. The minorities’ ethno-cultural difference was recognized, publically endorsed as a societal good and given state-funding although, in the end, it was a seemingly politically neutralized recognition of difference from a social democratic perspective. Minority groups’ organizations were incorporated into the social democratically controlled corporatist system (with the Finnish organizational structure firmly under internal social democratic control) and the threat of minority schools, especially Finnish minority schools, had evaporated with the acceptance of the home language reform as a suitable ‘compromise’.

Even if official multiculturalism was conditional and limited in policy praxis, it still constituted a break from traditional Swedish policy as it constituted a 180° turn with regard to the publically upheld ideal on ethno-cultural diversity. The rejection of homogeneity as a public ideal in favour of diversity is a major, if not revolutionary, shift in the intellectual history of modern Sweden. This shift changed the way in which ethno-cultural minority groups in Sweden were perceived, at least formally. ‘Non-Swedes’ were no longer on their way to becoming Swedes, but minorities in the making whose cultural differences needed to be acknowledged, respected and supported.

The shift also re-opened the field of culturalization or ethnification in Swedish politics and public discourse that had laid fallow in the aftermath of the Second World War.
The ‘othering’ of those not perceived to be Swedish was once again a state-sanctioned public ideal, although the rationale had been inversed. The ‘non-Swedes’ who then threatened the racial purity of the Swedish nation now enriched Swedish society with their new cultures. Then, Sweden had been conceptualized as fragile and in need of protection from alien peoples and cultures; now it was ‘non-Swedes’ and their ‘cultures’ that were perceived as brittle and in need of shielding from encroaching ‘Swedishness’. A positive position on ethno-cultural difference in the name of benevolent recognition and progress, together with the continued support of increasing ethno-cultural diversity on the basis of its stimulating societal effects, seems to be a prevalent legacy of the multicultural moment in Swedish politics and public discourse.

In 1965, multiculturalism was a radical idea advanced by a handful of ethnic activists. Ten years later it formed the ideological basis of Sweden’s new politics on ethnicity and, in 1985, Prime Minister Olof Palme claimed that the multicultural society was an inevitable revolution. It is possible that the post-war demographic changes in Sweden’s ethno-cultural make-up were inevitable and even revolutionary. However, as evidence by the contextualization of Sweden in the contemporary European context of labour migration, the intellectual and political ‘revolution’ of Sweden’s multicultural moment was not predetermined.

The Swedish multicultural moment was undoubtedly contingent on Sweden’s recent history and also the country’s more distant past. Sweden’s strong economic growth from the end of the 1940s to the mid-1970s enabled the realization of the people’s home and gave the country one the highest living standards in the world. The expansion of the Swedish economy also attracted foreign workers to Sweden in unprecedented numbers, mainly the descendants of Swedish subjects from Finland. This set the historical scene for the
advent of Swedish multiculturalism. However, it was a small company of dedicated actors, working from a script imbued with the need for ethno-cultural recognition, who put forward the idea on the public stage and engineered its inclusion in Swedish politics. The fact that Sweden, together with Canada and Australia, to this day upholds a formal commitment to the tenets of multiculturalism developed and espoused in the 1960s and 1970s through the agency of a handful of activists, experts, officials and politicians, testifies to the power of ideas and the agents of change who promote them to shape even seemingly inevitable revolutions.
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